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Checking Presidential Detention Power in the War on Terror: What Should We Expect fromthe Judiciary?Author(s): DARREN A. WHEELERSource: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 677-700Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress

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Checking Presidential Detention Power inthe War on Terror: What Should We Expect

from the Judiciary?DARRENA. WHEELERBallState niversity

Whenhe .S.Supremeourtssuedts irstetaineeecisionsn2004 manyheeredheCourtor ervings a checkntheGeorgeW Bush dministration'snilateraletaineepolicies. closerxamination,owever,evealshat he ush dministrationas depttretainingignificantowerver etainee attersnspite f he eeminglyegativeudicialdecisions.his rticlexploresournstitutionalndpoliticalactorshat,ndividuallyndcollectively,ork o imit he upremeours bilityo serves a significanthecknpresidentialowern he rea f etaineeffairsn he ar n error.he rticleoncludeshat,evenf heudiciarys nclinedobe ctiven hisrea, heseactorsre ikelyo onstrainnyjudicialttemptso ignificantlyheckresidentialetentionowern thewar n error.

This article xamineswhether he U.S. Supreme ourt erves s a significantheckonpresidentialetention ower nthewaronterror.WhentheSupreme ourt ssued tsfirst etainee ecisionsn2004,1manynthepopularmediacheeredheCourt or ervingas a check on theGeorgeW. Bush administration'snilateral etaineepolicies n theongoingwar on terrorCoile andEgelko2004; Greenhouse 004). This mediaeuphoriacontinuedn 2006 and 2008 whenthe Court ssued ts decisions nHatndan .Rumsfeldand Boumediene. Bush respectivelyAbramowitz 008; Ignatius2006; Savage2006)."We cleanedtheirclocks,"exhorted ne detainee awyer Biskupicand Locy 2004).Another ivil ibertarianoncluded hat heresultsnthedetainee aseswere betterhanthe humanrights nd civil iberties roups skedfor"Lane2004). Steven hapiro, helegislative irector or heAmerican ivil Liberties nion,calledthedecisions "strongrepudiationfthe administration'srguments"Coile and Egelko2004).

1. Hamdi.Rumsfeld542U.S.507 2004); umsfeld.Padilla542U.S.526 2004); asul .Bush542U.S.466 2004).Darren heelersan assistantrofessorf oliticalciencetBall State niversity.e sthe uthorfPresidentialowernAction:mplementingupremeourtetaineeecisions2008).

Presidentialtudiesuarterly9,no. December) 6772009 enterorhetudyfheresidency

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678 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY/December 009Perhapsmoretellingly,herewerealso accountsbyBush administrationfficialslamenting he imitations lacedon the administration'setainee oliciesbythe Court(CNN 2006; Goldsmith 007; Yoo 2006b). Responding o theCourt's2004 detaineedecisions,White House press ecretarycott McClellan stated hatthe administrationhad everyntention fputting n place a process hat"respects he concerns hat theSupremeCourtraised," ut he hedged,noting hatthe administration ouldput pro-cesses n place that are "consistent iththeauthorityf the President o exercise isconstitutionalesponsibilityuring ttime fwaric" (WhiteHouse2004). Former ushadministrationegal advisorJohnYoo criticized he Harridanecision, ayingthat tsignaled "dangerousudicial ntention o intervenenwartime olicy," nvisionedn

exaggeratedolefor ongress,nd wouldhinder hepresident'sffortsofighthewaronterrorYoo 2006a, 2006b). Testifyingefore he House Armed ServicesCommittee,administrationfficial tephenBradbury choedthis refrain hen he statedthattheCourt'sHamdandecisionmightbe read torequire hatAmerican oldiers eadMirandawarningsocaptured attlefieldombatants. equiring his f hemilitary as, nhisview,"nonsensical"Bradbury006). Clearly here s evidence osuggest hat heBush admi-nistrationhought heCourt'sdetainee ecisionswerebothconsequentialndlimiting.However, closer xamination f theprocess hat followed heSupremeCourt'sdetainee decisions revealsthatthe Bush administration as actuallyquite adept atretaining ignificantoweroverdetaineemattersBall 2007; Fisher 008; Schwarz ndHuq 2007; Wheeler2008). Consequently,t is possibleto make theargument hat,despitemedia and Bush administration hetoric o the contrary,he SupremeCourtactually erves s a poorcheckon presidential etention ower n thewaron terror.significantodyof cademic iterature,massed ver considerableeriod ftime, endssupportto this alternativergument, s these authors onclude that the courts regenerally poor check on executivewarpowers Fisher2005; Henkin 1996; Howell2003; Koh 1990; Rossiter ndLongaker 976; Scigliano1971). Which view on judicialpowerin the war on terror s accurate? s the SupremeCourtseverely imiting hepresident's etentionpowers,or are the courtsmerely paper tiger at worst, ninconvenienceopresidentialdministrationseterminedo retain ontrol verdetaineesinthewaronterror? his article xamines hequestion, oes theSupreme ourt erve sa significantheck npresidentialetentionower nthewaronterror?tconcludes hatthere re mportantnstitutionalndpoliticalfactorshatmitigate heCourt's bility obe a significantheckonpresidential etention ower n thiscontext.

Literature ReviewThe post-9/11war on terror nd the Bush administration'setentionpolicies

sparked enewednterestn thesubjectofpresidential etention ower mong cholars(Ball 2007; Berkowitz2005; Cole 2003; Greenberg nd Dratel 2005; Paust 2007;Schwarz nd Huq 2007; Wheeler2008), the media (Savage 2007), and evenformerBushadministrationfficialsGoldsmith 007; Yoo 2006a). These detention oliciesthe designation f terror uspects s enemycombatants, he holdingof suspects n


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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE JUDICIARY? | 679Guantnamo,heuse ofextraordinaryendition,nd theuse of"enhanced"nterrogationtechniques remain mongthemostcontroversialf the Bush administration'soliciesin the waron terror.When theSupremeCourt firstgreedto review hesepolicies n2004, it onceagain raisedquestions bout the role ofthe udiciaryn warpowers ndforeignffairsmatters.While it was EdwardCorwinwho notedthat heConstitution isan invitation ostruggle or heprivilege fdirecting merican oreign olicy" 1957, 171), "struggle"is probably he last word thatmost scholarswould use to describethe relationshipbetween hepresidentnd the udiciarynthe reas fwarpowers ndforeignffairs.hemajorityof scholarsapproach the relationship rom the presidential ide, askingwhateffect he courtshave onpresidentialctions, nd concluding hatthe courtshavehistoricallyerved s a poorcheck npresidential ower nthe reaofwarpowersFisher2004, 2005; Koh 1990; Rossi er ndLongaker 976; Schubert 957) andforeignffairsmoregenerallyAdler1996; Henkin 1996; Howell 2003; Schlesinger 005; Scigliano1971). Some, uch as Louis Fisher2004, 2005) and David GrayAdler 1988), maintainthatthis has notalwaysbeen the norm.Courts n the first eneration f thiscountry'shistory, hey argue,were far more likelyto serve as checks on expansive laims ofpresidential ower.Despite this, hescholarlyonsensus s thatpresidential arpowerhas vastly xpandedsince World War II (Fisher2005; Koh 1990), and manyblameCongress orfacilitatinghis trend hrough xcessive elegations fpower,poorover-sight, nd a general ack ofwill to playa powerful ole n foreignffairsPious 2007;Wolfensberger002). The judiciaryhas also beenaccused ofaidingand abetting hisgeneral expansionof presidential ower (Adler 1996; Howell 2003; Ramsey2007;Sheffer999). The judicialdecisions ited nsupport f hispropositionrefamiliar. .S.v. Curts Wright1936) providedwhatwould become powerful recedent or iewingthepresident s the central iguren foreignffairs, proposition nown s the "soleorgan"doctrine.n addition,decisions uch as U.S. v. Belmont1937) and U.S. v. Pink(1942) legitimized he use ofpresidentialxecutive rders t homeandexecutivegree-ments broad.Ifwedig deeper nto thisrelationshipnd focusmoreparticularlyn the relation-shipbetween hepresidentnd thecourtsnthecontext fpresidentialetention ower,weagainfind residentsna very trong osition.The casesarefamiliar o mostreaders.President braham incoln gnoredChiefJusticeRogerB. Taney'sholding nEx ParteMerryman1861) thathe had nopowerto suspendhabeascorpusduring he Civil War.Decades ater, heSupreme ourt nKorematsu. U.S. (1944) put tsstamp f pproval ntheWorldWar I internmentfmore han100,000JapaneseAmericans.n Hirabayashiv. United tatesanother nternmentase,ChiefJusticeHarlan Stoneconcluded hatthe"warpower fthe national overnments thepower owagewar uccessfully. . it's notfor ny ourt o sit nreview fthewisdom fthe actionofthe Executive r ofCongress,or to substitutets judgmentfor heirs."2 he unmistakable eneralpatternn recentdecadeshas been one of judicial deferenceo claimsofpresidential etention ower(Fisher 005).

2.Hirabayashi.Unitedtates320U.S.81,93 1943).


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680 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 009There has beena renewed nterestnd focus n political nstitutionsn boththepresidential nd public law literaturesn recentyears Gillman and Clayton1999;Howell 2003). This article rawsfromnd builds on eachof thesebodies. Much oftheworkin these literaturess historical nd tends to focus on the roles of particularinstitutionsnthepolitical ystemsee,e.g., Mayer 001). On thepresidencyide, omescholars avebegunto eschewong-dominantuestions boutpresidentialehaviorsndcharactern favor fa focuson theunilateral,nstitutional owersof thepresidency(Cooper2002; Howell2003; Mayer 001; and Howell 1999a, 1999b).This sa veinofresearchhat sparticularlyelevant o warpowers ndforeignffairs ecause hese reareas in whichpresidents requentlyxercise heirunilateral owers.PresidentBushexercisedmany nilateral owersnthemaking fwaron terror etention olicy, owersthat heBarackObama administrationowpossessesBall 2007; Wheeler2008). Exam-iningthescope, depth, nd political"usefulness" f suchpowershas importantmpli-cationsforpresidential owerand the checks nd balances n our American oliticalsystem.A number fpublic aw scholars avealsoexpressed renewednterestnpoliticalinstitutionsndhowthey nteractwithone another. ne vein ofresearch asemployeda varietyfgametheoreticnd rational hoicemodels, ften singquantitative ata andemphasizing hestrategic ature fthe nteractions etween ourts, hepresident,ndCongressEskridge 991; Knight ndEpstein1996; Sala andSpriggs 004; Segal1997).

A somewhat elated pproach, "new institutionalism"Gillmanand Clayton1999;March and Olsen 1989; Smith 1988), has also recently mergedwith the intentof"seekingto explorethe broadercultural and political contexts f judicial decisionmaking." his "new nstitutionalism"s a more interpretative"pproach ostudyingheSupremeCourt,one thatplacesan emphasis n theways n which the Court nteractsother ocialand politicalstructuresClayton nd Gillman 1999, 2). This focus n theinstitutionalharacteristicsf the Court nd itsrelationships ithother olitical ctorsand institutionss particularlysefulbecause some critics rguethat udicial scholarshave largely gnored he issue of executive nforcementf judicial decisions Howell2003). These bodiesof literature ovetailnicelywith theirfocuson the institutionalcharacteristicsndpowers f thepresidencynd thecourts, nd howthese nstitutionalcharacteristicsmpactthepowers ach branch ossesses.Theyalso allow us to examinetherelationshipetween hepresidencynd thecourts, relationshiphatmayexhibitcertain eneral nstitutionalharacteristicsegardlessfwhosits n the White House oron theSupremeCourt bench.This focus n institutionss a particularlyseful ontextnwhich o examine herelationshipetween hepresidentnd the udiciarynthe reaofpresidentialetentionpower.To justfocus n thespecificsf the Court'sopinions n this area s to miss thecontextnto whichthesedecisionswere njected.Even ifthe usticeswere nclined osignificantlyurtail heBush administration'snilateral etention olicies,did institu-tional andpoliticalconstraintsxistthatmighthinder uch efforts?ikewise, o focussolelyon the personalitiesn the Bush administrations to miss the fact thattheseindividualswere xercisingnstitutionalowers, owers hatremainnplacefor sebysubsequent residentialdministrations.


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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE JUDICIARY? | 681This article rguesthat there re four pecific easonswhythoseexpecting heSupremeCourt to be a significantheckon presidential etention ower n thewar onterrorre ikely o be disappointed. he first eason s that he udiciarymakesdecisionsinwhat can be referredo as "judicialtime." n short, he courts re slow. The judicialdecision-makingrocesss often nethat akesyears ocompleteRehnquist1998). Fewpolitical ctors onceptualizehedecision-makingrocessnsuch n extendedmanner.fthepresidentanrespondmore uickly o matters fpolicy han hecourts,tmightbedifficultor he udiciary oactas a check n thepresident. he secondfactorhat imitsthe udiciary's bility o checkpresidentialetention ower s thefact hat ourts suallyanswerpecific arrowegal questions s opposed o arger, big picture" olicy uestions

(Baum2007; Rehnquist 998; Rosenberg 991). Asa result,venwhen heCourtmakesa decisionon a matter,t is often narrow ne that addresses nlya smallpartof theoverallpolicy picture.This can limitthe impactthatthe courtshave on thepolicy-makingprocess, s otherpolicymakers ften inddifferent eans to accomplish heirdesiredgoals regardlessf the roadblocks resented ythe courts n particular etails.The third actorhatpotentiallyimits udicial mpact n thepresident's esired eten-tionpolicies s thefact hatthe udicial mplementationrocess s fraught ith uncer-tainty Baum 2007; Canon and Johnson1999; Carp, Stidham, nd Manning2004;Stumpf 998). Even whenthe courtsmakea decision, t is possiblefor therpoliticalactorsincluding hepresident)oshapethe mplementationrocessn sucha wayas tominimize he mpact hat heparticular ecisionmighthaveonthepresident'sreferredpolicies.Finally, he udiciary, specially ince thesecondhalfofthe twentiethentury,hasadopted general osture fdeferenceo the executiven matters fwarpowers ndforeignffairsFisher 005; Howell 2003; Rossiter ndLongaker 976). This deferencemight ead the Courtto refuse o evenhearchallenges opresidential etention ower.Evenwhenthe Courtdoeshear ases, tmaydisposeof them nways hat llustratehishistorical attern fdeference. nycombinationfthesefactorsmay imittheability fthe judiciary o checkpresidentialnitiatives,specially n a policyarea thewar onterror in which the Bush administrationlearly emonstratedn intensewillingnessand desire o exert nilateralontrol vermattersFisher 004; Goldsmith 007; Kassop2007; Savage2007; Wheeler2008).Thesequestions boutexecutivend udicialpower, hough ouched n a somewhatnarrow olicycontext, ave mportantheoreticalndpractical amificationsorpolicymaking n thewaron terror. he powerto detain s one ofthe most mportanthatgovernmentan exercise.The uses (and abuses) ofthispowerspeakvolumesabout agovernmentnd itspeople.The SupremeCourthas issuedfullopinions n fivemajorcases ddressing overnmentetention ower n thewaronterror.nboth heHamdi ndPadilla cases,the Bush administrationnitially laimedthedistressinglyroadrightto indefinitelyetainAmerican itizensas enemycombatantswithout nyaccess tocounsel r udicialreview. asulandBoumedieneealtwiththerights fnoncitizenerrorsuspectsdetained at GuantnamoBay, suspectswho could not accordingto theadministrationappealto internationalaw or the U.S. Constitutionor elief.At issuewas thedetainees' esire ohaveU.S. courts eview he egality ftheir etention. heseGuantnamo etainee ases raised ignificantumanrights ndinternationalaw issues.


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682 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY/December 009The Hamdan case arosefrom he Bush administration'sesireto resurrecthe use ofmilitaryribunals o try uspected errorists.ollectively,hese ases llustratemany fthe broaddetention owers hatthe Bushadministrationlaimed.Thepresidencyndpublic aw iteraturesargely aint portraitf president honeed not argely oncern imselfwith udicialchecksduring imes fwar Fisher 004;Rossiter ndLongaker1976). Does thisrelationshipontinue o hold trueduring his"new"kindof war on terrorism?y closely xamining hewar on terror etainee ases,we canbeginto answer hisquestion nd determine hethermedia andadministrationcomplaints bout the Court's decisionsrepresent real break fromwhathistoryndtheoryell us aboutpresidents,ourts, nd warpowers.At an applied evel,the answer oquestions boutthescopeofpresidential eten-tionpower nd the role ofthecourtshaspractical mplications or hedevelopmentfdetaineepolicy s the war on terror ontinues.All of the ssuesraised n thesedetaineecases and the Bush administration'sesireto limit udicial review f its actionstakeon a greatdeal more mportancen lightof some importantriticismseveledat theadministration or the indefinite etentionof enemycombatants, he extraordinaryrenditionfsuspected errorists,nd the use of "enhancednterrogation"echniques ndetainees. he Bush administrationas beenhighly riticized or he unilateralmannerin which t approached etaineepolicy n thewaron terror. healthy estorationfchecks nd balances, hese ritics rgue, s what will bestserve hecountryBall 2007;Fisher 004, 2005; Kassop2007; Schwarz ndHuq 2007; Wittes2008). Ifa "restored"checks nd balances s thegoal, is the udiciary he answer?

Decision Making in "Judicial Time"The first rgument gainstthe SupremeCourtserving s an effectiveheck onpresidential etention ower n the war on terrors thatthe udiciary imply akestoomuchtimeto makedecisionsRehnquist1998). This doesnot meanthat t takes ongerto resolvedetaineecases thanothertypesof cases in the federaludicial system, utrather hatthe entireudicialdecision-makingrocess tself s one thatsimply akeslotoftime.The workload fthefederal ourt ystem asconsistentlyisen ver hepastseveraldecades Carp and Stidham2001). Both civil and criminal ases usuallytakeyearsto wind theirway through he federal udicial system nd reach the SupremeCourt. Eventhen, heSupremeCourtmaydecide not to heara case,or it maysimplyremand he case back to the ower ourts or urtherroceedings. ome cases travel pand downthe federaludicial systemmultiple imes,with decisions t each level oftentakingmonths revenyears.This lengthy rocess an be referredo as "judicialtime,"and it is a recognitionhatcourts ften ake onger omakedecisions hanmany ther

politicalactors.The conceptof "judicialtime" s similar n somerespects o StephenSkowronek's1993) idea of thinking bout a president's bilityto impactpolicyintermsof cyclical "politicaltime,"as it also highlights he importance f lookingatpolicymaking n a temporal ontext. he time t takesfor ourts o makedecisionsespecially elative o other ctors is thekey.While the judiciary ontemplatesases


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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE JUDICIARY? | 683beforet,other ctorsmaynot be inclined owait forudicialresolutionfpolicy ssues,optinginstead to take actionon theirown terms nd timetables and Howell1999a, 1999b). It is fair o saythat engthy eliberations an institutionaleature fthe udicial systemnd, ndeed, vena reflectionhat he udiciarys functioningnthemannern which t was intendedHamilton,Madison,andJay1961). The courts resupposedto be deliberativend sortthrough ften omplicatedegal arguments. hisphenomenon f judicial time is not inherently ood or bad, but it can influencehepolicy-making rocess and the decision-making alculus of otherpolitical actors(Rehnquist1998).WhentheSupremeCourt s pressuredo actquickly,nstitutionalroceduresndnorms anbreakdownand the Courtcanrespond oorly. he WorldWarII case ofExParteQuirin1942) involvingheuseofmilitaryribunalsotryuspectedNazi saboteursis a prime xample.Upon capturingightNazi saboteurswhohad landedon the shoresofthe easternUnitedStates,President ranklin . Roosevelt uicklydevised specialmilitaryribunal o try hesuspectsnstead fprosecutinghem n civilian ourts. heSupreme ourthastily onvened special essionafterhetribunal earings adalreadycommenced), eard oral arguments,nd issueda decisionagainstthe defendantsn aperiodofonly fewdays.The saboteurswereeventually oundguilty nd severalwereexecuted. t wasn'tuntilthreemonths aterthat theSupremeCourt ssuedan opinionjustifyingts hurried ecision, n opinionthatJustice elixFrankfurteraterremarkedwas"not happyprecedent"Fisher 003). A more ontemporaryxample,Bushv Gore(2000), engendersimilar riticism.n a decision hat ffectivelyanded hepresidencytoGeorgeW. Bush,the Court's nvolvementromtart ofinish ouldbemeasuredn amerehandful fdays.The opinions hat resulted rom hiscase,many ritics ontend,reflectedhehurried ature fthe Court's udgmentCorrespondentsf theNew YorkTimes 001; Greenhouse 001).On the otherhand,theabilityto makedecisionswithdispatchhas been trum-petedas a strengthfthe executive ranch incethefounding. his is especially ruewhen t comesto warpowers.One oftheprimaryrgumentshatAlexanderHamiltonmade in the Federalist apersforplacing the commander-in-chiefuthorityn theexecutive ranch ay in the beliefthatpresidents ave the abilityto act quicklyanddecisivelyn militarymatters eededto protect he nation.President ush respondedproactivelyo policy questions n thewar on terrorn cases involving etainees.Thepresidentuicklyputdetainee olicies ntoplace,andreactiveffortsn thepartofthecourtsand Congressto modify hosepolicies have provenespeciallydifficultBall2007; Schwarz nd Huq 2007; Wheeler2008). It can truly e said that theexecutiveand the judiciary ften perate t verydifferentpeeds.This can complicate udicialeffortso checkexecutive ower Koh 1990; and Howell 1999a, 1999b; Wheeler2008).

YasirHamdi wascapturednAfghanistanycoalition orcesnlate2001. Hamdi,an American itizen,wasdesignated n enemy ombatantnd held ncommunicadoormonthswithout ccess to family rlegal counsel.Hamdi s family iled habeascorpuspetitionon his behalf n 2001, but it took severalyearsof judicialwrangling nd anumber fdistrictnd circuit ourt pinions eforeheSupreme ourtdecidedHamdi's


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684 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY/December 009case in June 2004.3 During this time, the Bush administrationoggedly pursuedpositions esigned oseverelyestrict amdi s rights. he governmentefused o allowHamdi access to counsel,claimed the rightto unilaterally old him as an enemycombatant s longas thepresidentwished, nd refused odivulge heexact riteria sedto make that determination.erhapsmost mportantly,heBush administrationlsoargued hat udicialreview fthepresident's aron terror etention ecisions houldbeminimal n some instances nd nonexistentn othersFisher2008; Paust 2007). Theresolutionf these ssues n the owerfederal ourts tretched utover periodofyears,and the mportancefthis became clear after heSupremeCourt'sdecision. nsteadofprovidingHamdi a neutral orumnwhichhe could be givensometype fdueprocessto contesthis enemycombatantdesignation, s the SupremeCourt instructed,headministrationptedto releasehimfrom ustody ltogether. pparently amdi hadbeen ncustody or uch a length ftimethathenolongerhadany ntelligencealue orposed anythreat o theUnited States Anderson 004).A second xample, hecase ofalleged"dirty omber" osPadilla,also illustratesthedifficultieshat ourtsmayhave ncheckinghe ctions fother olitical ctorswhenthey reacting n judicialtime.JosPadillawas originallyrrestednMay 2002 on amaterialwitnesswarrant elatedto a criminal nvestigationnto the eventsof 9/11.Rather hanrelease adillawhen hewarrantxpired, resident ushdesignated imanenemy ombatant ndtransferredimto a navalbrig nSouthCarolina.Padilla's counselfiled habeascorpus hallengenNew YorkDistrictCourt where adilla hadoriginallybeenheld)arguing or is release. adilla'schallenge roceeded rom hedistrict ourt othe SecondCircuitCourtofAppealsand eventuallyo theSupremeCourt,where, n2004, theCourtdecidedthatPadilla hadfiled is habeaspetitionnthewrong istrict.4If he wanted to challengehis detention, e would have to re-file is case in SouthCarolina,wherehewasbeingheld.Padilla did justthis ndthecase made tswayup thefederal ourt ystemgain,thistimevia theFourth ircuitCourtofAppeals.However,as Padilla's new egalchallengewaspoisedtoreach heSupreme ourt gain itwas now2006), the Bushadministrationuddenly ecided to transferadilla tocivilian ustodyand filefederal riminal harges.5 his effectivelyhort-circuitedadilla's attempt ohavetheSupreme ourtreview hemerits fhis case.Padilla's egalodysseyhroughhefederal ourt ystem ad lasted more thanfiveyears,without heSupremeCourt everruling n themerits fPadilla's legal arguments. adillawas first eldin the criminaljusticesystem, esignated n enemycombatantwhen it became convenient or theadministrationo do so, and thentransferredack to civiliancustody n an apparentattempt o avoid udicialreview fhis constitutionallaims Ball 2007). The judiciary

3.Hamdi.Rumsfeld243F.Supp.27 D.C.Easternirginia);amdi.Rumsfeld316F.3d 50 4thCir.); amdi .Rumsfeld542U.S.507 2004).4.Padilla .Bush233F.Supp.2d64 S.D.N.Y. 002); adilla .Rumsfeld352F.3d 95 2nd ir.2003);Rumsfeld.Padilla124 .Ct. 711 2004).5.Padilla .Hanft389F.Supp.d678 D.S.C. 005); adilla .Hanft423F.3d 86 4th ir. 005);Padilla .Hanft432F.3d 82 4th ir. 005);U.S.v.PadillaCaseNo.04-6000-CR-COOKE/BROWN(S.D.FL2005).


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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE JUDICIARY? | 685moved slowly,while the presidentmoved quickly in order to achieve his desiredoutcomes.The Bush administrationlso had to dealwith egalclaimsof noncitizen etaineeshousedat theAmericannaval base in GuantnamoBay,Cuba. Did these noncitizendetainees ave ccess o American ourts? hisquestion irstegan o work tswayupthefederal ourt ystemn 2002 in the case ofRasulv. Bush.en 2004, theSupremeCourteventuallyoncluded hat hedetainees idhave ccess o federalourts, ut s it eft therquestions egarding etainee ights nanswered,he egalchallenges ontinued. ozensof detainees iledhabeascorpus uitschallenging heirdetention.7he caseswerecon-solidated nd appealedto the District f ColumbiaCircuitCourtofAppealsunder henameofBoumediene. Bush. nitialoralargumentsnthese aseswereheld nSeptember2005, yetthe circuit ourt'sdecision a ruling gainstthe detainees was not issueduntilFebruary0, 2007,more han17months fter he asewas filed. hecourthad usedthis engthof timeto hear two sets of oralargumentsnd fourrounds fbriefingnseeminglynnumerableuestions elated othe ase.8While this ase was beforeheD.C.Circuit, he Bush administrationnstituted review rocess orGuantnamo etaineesknown s a CombatStatusReviewTribunal hatwasdesigned o determine hetherhedetaineeswere roperlyesignatedsenemy ombatantsWolfowitz004). Congresslsogotintothe actby passing he Detainee Treatment ct of2005 (DTA) and theMilitaryCommissions ct of 2006 (MCA). These acts were n attempt o spellout the imitedlegal rights fGuantnamo etaineeswithgreater larity.hese actions yCongressndthepresidentffectedherights fGuantnamo etaineesn a number f mportant ays.However, he importanthingto note for hepurposes fthis discussion s thattheychanged he egalstatus nd egal rights f hedetaineeswhile he ircuit ourtwastryingto reach ts decision.Otherpoliticalactorsweremovingquickly nd proactively.hecourtsweremoving lowly nd as a resultwereforced orespond o the ctions fothers.The detainees ared etterwhenBoumedieneventually as decidedbytheSupremeCourt nJune2008. The majority eldthat he detainee eview rocess utlinedbytheDTA wasnot nadequate ubstituteor abeas orpus.Manyof hedetainees in a pointemphasized n a concurring pinionwrittenby JusticeDavid Souter had been incustody ormore han ixyears,ndtheywere ntitled oa prompt abeas orpushearingin federal ourtswithoutundue delay.Armed with the SupremeCourt'sBoumedienedecision, he owerfederal ourtsbeganto address heremaining roceduralnd legalquestions hat would frame he detainees'habeashearings.The D.C. DistrictCourtsappear o beputting hedetaineehabeas aseson a "fast-track"Apuzzo2008). Theyhadreacheddeterminationsn almosta dozen cases as ofFebruary 009 and ordered herelease f several etainees. till,the Bushadministrationppealedmany f the udges'proceduralulings, ppealsthatmightneed to be resolved eforemany ftheremaininghabeashearings ould occur.

6.Rasul .Bush215F.Supp.2d5 D.D.C.2002).7. nRe:Guantnamoetaineeases355F.Supp.2d43 (D.D.C. 2005);Khalid . Bush355F.Supp.2d11 D.D.C. 2005).8. Boumediene.Bush476F.3d 81 D.C.Cir. 007).


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686 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY/December 009Shortlyfter /11, he Bush administration ade thedecision hat ertain onciti-zenterroruspectswould be tried y new ystemfmilitaryribunalsBush 2001). Oneof the firstndividuals o be designated or rosecutionefore hese ribunalswas SalimHamdan,Osama bin Laden's former river. houghnotunprecedented,ush'smilitarytribunal rderwas controversialn lightof the imiteddue process rotectionsffordeddefendantsFisher2003). Hamdanchallenged heconstitutionalityhepresident'sri-bunalsystem, challenge hatwas not resolved ytheSupremeCourtuntil 2006. TheSupremeCourt nKamdan truck ownthe Bush administration'sribunal ystem, utleft pentheoption o workwithCongress odesign newsystem. his is exactlywhatPresidentBush did as he signedthe MCA into law a few months fter he Court'sdecision.With new egislationnhand, heBush administrationnceagainattemptedotryHamdan before militaryribunal, tribunal hat nmany mportant aysmirroredthetribunalystemtruck ownbytheCourt Ball 2007). It tookHamdan's casealmostfiveyears o reach heSupremeCourt. t onlytook the administration fewmonths ogetnew egislation assedso that t couldtryHamdanonceagain.Hamdan's newtrialbefore militaryribunal egan nJuly2008. On August6,2008, the newmilitaryribunal onvictedHamadan ofprovidingmaterial upport orterrorism,et cquittedhimof the more erious harge fconspiracy. e was sentencedto five nd a halfyears n prison,but was givencreditfor heroughly iveyears hathe had spent n military ustodyGlaberson2008). Manyobservers onsidered his a

relativelyightsentence nd a rejection f thegovernment'sontentionshatHamdanwas a dangerous errorist ho needed o be confined or ife. nstead,Hamdan served heremainderfhis sentence partof t in his nativeYemen and waseventuallyeleased(WhiteandBranigin 008).The transitionfpower rom heBush administrationotheObama administrationhas had a number f mmediate,f ndeterminate,ffectsn detaineepolicy. n his firstweek in office, residentObama suspended he remainingmilitary ribunalhearingspending broadreview fthe Bushadministration'setainee olicies.The transitionoa newpresidentialdministrationlso caused suspensionfmany etainee roceedingsin order o give theObama administrationheopportunityo reevaluate hegovern-ment'sposition n detaineehabeas cases. While the delay may add monthsto thedetainees'detention,heymayultimately enefitfthe Obama administrationptsfornew detaineepoliciesthatvary ignificantlyrom heBush administration'sard-lineapproachto detaineerights.Despite the transition f powerfromone presidentialadministrationoanother,t is importantonote hat heunderlyingheme emains hesame. The onlydifferences thatnow t is BarackObama rather hanGeorgeW. Bushwhohas theopportunityoproactively ieldpresidential etention owers.Regardlessof theoccupantwhosits n the WhiteHouse, the courtswill in all likelihood ontinueto be the ones thatrespond o the actions f othersn thispolicy rea Wheeler2008).The Court'sdetainee asesnicely llustrate hephenomenon f udicial time. nthese ases, hepresidentook dvantage fhisability oactmore uickly han he ourtseitherbyusingthelegal process tself o extend he time thathe could detain terrorsuspects s evidencednHamdiand Padilla orby quicklyreacting o a Courtdecision(e.g., thepassageof the DTA andMCA) in a manner hatretained xecutive ontrol f


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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROMTHE JUDICIARY? | 687detaineepolicy,while at the same time settingoff notherround of lengthy egalchallenges uch as theones seen nHamdan ndRasul.

Narrow Legal Questions and "Big Picture" Policy MakingA secondargument hatcan be offeredgainstthe SupremeCourt'sabilitytosignificantlyheck ssertive laims ofpresidential etention ower n the war on terroris that ourts re almost nvariablyskedto answer arrow,echnicalegal questions, ot"big picture" olicyquestions. t was Alexis de Tocquevillewhofamouslybserved hattherewere ew olitical ssues ntheUnitedStates hatdid noteventuallyurnnto egalquestions. he corollaryo this phorisms that uch egal questions re often raftednsuch way s to make udicial"resolution"f he arger olitical ssuevery ifficult,fnotimpossible.As a result,t is difficultor heSupremeCourtto be theprimaryriver fpolicychange Rosenberg 991).Judges reusually ncouraged o rulenarrowlyn issues and to avoidansweringquestions hat re notdirectly efore hem CarpandStidham 001; Rehnquist1998).As a result, hey reusually nlybeingasked to look at a smallpieceofa larger uzzle.Yes,courts uleon subjects hat re ofgreat mportance,utthey re often sked to doso ina very pecificndparticularmanner. ven f udgeswere nclined o broaden heir

perspectives,heyoften ind hemselvesn a Catch-22 situation.Judgeswho ruletoonarrowlyn matters ometimes et criticized or nly answeringhenarrow,echnicalquestionwithoutgivingbroaderguidanceto thoseresponsible or mplementinghedecision.Theyoften eavequestionsunanswered. owever, f udgesrulebroadly ndanswer uestionsthat are not directly efore he court, hey re often astigatedformeddling n the affairs f thepoliticalbranchesBaum 2008).Unlike the judiciary,he president s arguably he nation's chiefpolicymaker(Cronin nd Genovese2004; Milkis and Nelson 2008; Rossiter 960. Ever since thefounding, he country as looked forpresidents o take chargeduring military ndforeignffairs rises.Additionally,s America's nterests ave become moreglobal innature,he stature fthepresidents commandernchief nd chief iplomathasgrownconcomitantlyFisher2004). Since theNew Deal, we also expectpresidents o enterofficewitha legislative genda,or vision,forAmerica.The resultof these trends npresidential ower s thatthepresidents now in bothreal and symbolic ermsviewedbyAmericanss the eader f hecountry,he ndividual esponsibleor eingthe"chief ecider"Cronin ndGenovese2004).In theHamdicase,thequestionbeforeheSupremeCourtwassimplywhether hegovernmentad thepower o detainHamdi as an enemy ombatantnconnection iththeongoinghostilitiesn Afghanistan.he Court answered hisquestion n the affir-mative,holding hattheAuthorization o Use Military orce AUMF) passedbyCon-gress n the aftermathf9/11provided hepresidentwith thepowerto detainenemycombatants.t also ruled hatHamdi,as anAmerican itizen,was entitled o dueprocessand the rightto challengehis designation s an enemycombatantbefore neutraldecisionmaker.However, heCourt nly fferedpeculations to what hesedueprocess


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688 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY/December 009rights hould ook like.9The Bush administrationimply eleasedHamdi shortlyfterthedecisionwithout evising nytype fdueprocess orum or nemy ombatants. heresult f theHamdicase is that arger uestions urroundinghedetention fAmericancitizens eized and detained n the war on terror,hescopeof thepresident's onstitu-tionalpower o detain itizens,nd theroleofthe udiciary emain nsettledBall 2007;Wheeler2008).ThePadilla casewas similar oHamdi'sinseveralmportant espects,nd t is herethat the Court could have provided ome clarity egarding he scope ofpresidentialdetention owerover U.S. citizens.However, he SupremeCourtavoidedthe largerconstitutionalssuesbydecidingPadilla's case on a narrowhresholdssue, urisdiction.ChiefJusticeWilliamRehnquist uled hatPadilla had filed is case nthewrong ourt.Having reached hatconclusion, hefive-justice ajority eclinedto speculate n themerits fPadilla's constitutionallaims or theexpansive laims of inherent rticle Ipresidential etention owermadebytheBushadministration.10he SupremeCourt'ssecond ook at thePadilla caseproved o be a reprise f thefirst. gain,the Courtuseda thresholdssue this timemootness to decline review n Padilla's case.When theBush administrationransferredadilla to civiliancustody,he Courtconcluded n itsdenialofcertiorari,adilla's claims becamemootbecause he was no longer n enemycombatant.11othinstances nPadilla illustratehe imitations f the Court erving sa check npresidentialetention ower. erious onstitutionalssueswereraised, et heCourtchose to focus n narrow,echnicalegal questions.Padilla's failure o overcomethese hresholdssuesdoomedhis case eachtime he soughtreview efore heSupremeCourt.In theRasul case,theSupremeCourt ruled thatGuantnamodetaineeshad theright o filehabeascorpus hallengesn federal ourt. omecommentatorsrgued hatthiswasa broadruling, ne thatdeparted romeeminglyettled egalprinciplesboutthe scope ofprotections oraliens detainedabroad Wedgewood2005; Yoo 2006b).Despite this,the Courtdid exercise ome estraintn Rasul. Having ruled thattheGuantnamo etainees adaccess o federalourt, heCourt topped.TheCourtdeclinedtospeculate ustwhat ubstantiveights hedetaineesmight nvoke nfederalourt.Asa result,heBushadministrationrgued hat hedetainees adno ubstantivenforceablelegal rightsnd that heir ases houldbedismissed. he administrationlsointerpretedtheCourt'sdecision nRasulas an endorsementftheadministration'sroader ecisionto use theGuantnamo acilityo detainsuspected errorists,espitethe fact hattheCourtneverdirectly ommented n the desirabilityfusingGuantnamo n such afashionBush2006). The Court's nitialrefusalnRasultoarticulate hatrights,f ny,Guantnamodetaineeshad lead directly o the Boumedienease, one thatthe Courtdecided nJune2008. InBoumedienetheCourtruled hatdetainees avetheright o filehabeas corpuspetitions n federal ourt.Unfortunately,usticeAnthonyKennedy'smajority piniondidnotspecificallyrticulateustwhat hishabeasreview ythe ower

9.Hamdi .Rumsfeld542U.S.507, 25 2004).10.Rumsfeld.Padilla542U.S.526 2004).11.Padilla .Hanft126 .Ct. 6492006).


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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE JUDICIARY? | 689courtswould ook ike nterms fparticular ights or he detainees.12gain,the Courtrefused o speak to the larger ssuesof detainingterroruspects n Guantnamoorwhethertwasappropriateor hepresidentodesignate hesenoncitizenerroruspectsas enemy ombatantsn the first lace. It is these arger uestionsfromwhichmorespecific egal questionswill derive n futureitigation.In the Hamdancase, the SupremeCourt struckdown the system f militarytribunals reatedby the president, ut it failed to address a numberof larger, ndpotentiallymore mportant,ssues.By failing oprovidemoredetailedguidelines s towhat constitutionalilitaryribunalystemwould ook ike,theCourtopened hedoorfor he BushadministrationndCongress opasstheMCA, an actreestablishing veryexecutive-centeredilitaryribunalystema systemhatwas ater artiallytruck ownbythe Court nBoumediene).owever, he arger uestionofwhetherhe Bush admin-istration houldhave even used a military ribunal ystem o tryterroruspects asopposedto themilitaryr civilian ustice ystems) emains n openone.The Court nHamdan lso ruledthattheoriginalBush administration ilitaryribunal ystem io-latedCommonArticle oftheGenevaConventions,ut tfailed o addresswhetherheremainderf the GenevaConventions pplied to the Guantnamodetainees.13hesequestions re"big picture" uestions, nd it is theanswer o these uestions hatwillbekeyto the detainees' bility oobtain reliefn futureegalchallenges.All of hese xamplesllustratehedifficultyhatflows rom hetraditionaludicialpredilectionor eciding asesnarrowly.nfortunately,ourts hatrulebroadly re alsocriticized orbeingtoo activist ndmeddling nmatters est eft o thepresidentYoo2006b). Still,narrowegalrulings fteneave thepresident greatdeal ofwiggleroomwhen it comes to the implementationf judicial decisions,the next,and related,constraintn the udiciaryWheeler2008).

The Implementation of Judicial DecisionsA thirdreason hatpresidents an generally xercise heirdetention owerwithlittlefear f seriousudicial nterferences that he mplementationrocess hatfollowsa judicialdecision s often very ncertainne.Courtsmustrely n the ctions fothersto implement heirdecisions Baum 2007; Canon andJohnson1999; O'Brien 2005;Stumpf 998;Wasby1970). Issuingdecisions hat recritical fthepresident onesthepresidenthimselfwill be expectedto implement can be a losing proposition. nFederalist o. 78, AlexanderHamilton reminds eaders hat"[t}he udiciary . . has noinfluence ver eitherthe sword or the purse . . and can take no active resolutionwhatever.t maybe truly aidto have neither ORCE notWILL butmerelyudgment;and mustultimately ependupontheaid oftheexecutivermevenfor heefficacyf tsjudgments." ordecades, udicial politics cholars avehighlightedhe difficultieshatlie inthe udicial mplementationrocess, speciallyncontroversialreas uch s school12.Boumediene.Bush128S.Ct. 229 2008).13.Hamdan.Rumsfeld126S.Ct. 749 2006).


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690 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY/December 009prayer,bortion,chooldesegregation,nd,morerecently,he war on terrorBall 2007;Bullock ndLamb1984; CanonandJohnson 999; Dolbeare nd Hammond1971; Gilesand Walker1975; Johnson 967; Peltason1961; Wasby1970; Wheeler2008).Presidents o notoften efyunfavorableudicialdecisions utright.n fact, heimplementationf a judicial decision s often routinematterCanon and Johnson1999). Anyevasion hatoccurs s usuallymore ubtle Stumpf 998). This is probablyattributablenpart othe fact hatpresidents ave a widevarietyftoolsthat an affectthe udicial mplementationrocess. irst, hey ftenppointed he udgeswho aredoingthe decisionmaking,udgeswhowere ometimesppointed or,mongother onsider-ations,theirpro-executive owerorientationsAbraham1985; Baum 2007; O'Brien2005; Scigliano1971). Second, he olicitor eneral rgues hegovernment'sasesbeforetheSupremeCourtand seeks to shapea judicialdecisionbefore heopinions re evenwrittenO'Brien2005; Scigliano1971). Third, t is often xecutive ranch gencies hatare responsible or mplementing judicial decision. The presidenthas considerablebudgetarynd policycontrol ver theseagencies Cohen and Nice 2003). Finally,president an interpret judicialdecision n sucha wayas to dramatically xpandorcontract he impact t mayhave Canon andJohnson 999; Carp and Stidham2001;Stumpf 998).The Bush administration'sesponseso theCourt'sdetainee ecisions emonstratethevagaries fthe mplementationrocess hat ollows judicialdecision. ollowing heSupreme ourt's ecisionsntheHamdi ndFadilla cases, heBush administrationeftlyremoved othfrommilitary ustodyo as to avoiddesigning forum oprovide hem ueprocess. n these ases,President ush exercised he unilateral owers f the office ndexecutivediscretion o achieve his preferredutcomes Ball 2007; Wheeler 2008).Padilla'scase, ikeHamdi's, llustrateshepower f hepresidentounilaterally anipu-late the implementation rocess o as to minimizethe negative ffects f a judicialdecision.When Padilla re-filed is case in the South CarolinaDistrictCourt after isinitial 2004 hearingbefore heSupremeCourt, heBush administrationontinued otenaciouslylingto tsexpansive rgumentsf xecutive etentionowerBall 2007). Asbefore, adilla had some success n the merits f his claims nthe ower ourts. istrictCourtJudgeHenryFloydfound n favor fPadilla, concluding hatthegovernmentshouldeither harge adilla in criminal ourt r releasehimfrommilitary ustody. heFourth ircuitCourt fAppealsoverturnedhedistrict ourt's uling nd foundnfavorof thepresident's owertodetain Padilla.However, s Padilla's legal teamprepared oonceagain appeal to theSupremeCourt, heBush administrationuddenly nnouncedthat it was transferringadilla to civiliancustody nd adding his name to a 2004criminal ndictmentiled arlierna SouthFloridadistrictourt.14 he president urelyhas thepower o order uch transfer,ut themotivation ehind t and thetiming f hetransferueled he Bush administration'sriticsBall 2007). Forexample, venJudgeMichaelLuttig,whose FourthCircuitpanel denied thegovernment's equestforthe

14.Padilla .Hanft389F.Supp.2d78 D.S.C. 005). adilla .Hanft423F.3d 86 4th ir. 005).U.S.v.PadillaCaseNo. 04-6000-CR-COOKE/BROWNS.D.FL2005).


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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE JUDICIARY? | 691transfer,uestionedthe administration's otives n a sharplywordedopinion.13 heSupreme ourtultimatelyefused o hearPadilla'scaseagain.He wassubsequentlyriedand convicted f conspiracyo commit murder nd sentenced o 17 years n prison.Perhaps omewhatronically,herewas no discussion rchargesn civilian ourt fany"dirty omb"plot,which hegovernmentadcontinuallyccusedPadilla of ince2002.While Padilla and Hamdirepresentwo cases in which President ush used theunilateral owers fthepresidencyo subvertheSupreme ourt's ulings,heRasulandHamdan asesrepresent orefrontal ssaults n the Court'sdetaineedecisions.n Rasuland Hamdi theSupremeCourt tronglympliedthat he Guantnamo etainees houldhave access to federal ourts nd should have someneutral ribunal eview heirdesig-nation s enemy ombatants.n response o these ases, heBushadministrationreatedCombat StatusReviewTribunalsCSRTs) thatweredesigned odetermine hether hedetaineeshould tillbe considerednemy ombatants. hese tribunals ere riticized ymany or heir ackofdueprocess rotections.ndeed, omeargued hat heywere ittlemore han showdesigned oprovide he llusion hat hedetaineeswerereceiving fairhearing nd precludethe need for nyfuture ctionin federal ourt Denbeaux andDenbeaux2006; Fisher 004; Lewis2004). The DTA waspassed, imiting herights fGuantnamodetaineesto file habeas corpusproceedings. hese actionsby the Bushadministrationnd Congressweredesignedto severelyimit detainee ccessto federalcourts.However,Guantnamodetainees, akingtheir ue from heRasulCourt,filedchallengeso theDTA and theCSRTs nfederalourt.nHamdantheCourt truck ownthepresident's ystem fmilitary ribunals.While this was a serious etbackfor hepresident,headministrationook the Court's ue and workedwithCongress o obtainlegislation, heMCA, whichcodifiedmanyoftheprovisions ontainedn theoriginaltribunal ystemtruck ownbythe Court'sdecision.Ultimately,ven thisnew egisla-tiondid not atisfyhedueprocessmandates f heSupreme ourt.Portions fboth awswere struckdown in the Boumedienease as the Courtrejected he elected branches'attempts o limit detainee ccess to the udicialsystem.16Clearly,heBush administration ashighly ctive nthe mplementationf ll theSupremeCourt'sdetaineedecisions.Workingunilaterallyn someinstances,nd withother olitical ctorswhennecessary,hepresidentttemptedoshapethe mplementa-tionprocess fthe Court'sdetaineedecisions n sucha manner s to retain ignificantcontrol verdetainee olicywhile ubvertingomeoftheCourt'sholdingsn theprocess(Wheeler2008).

Judicial Deference in War Powers MattersThe final eason ne shouldnot ook to thecourts o checkpresidential etention

poweris that the judiciaryhas, overtime,developeda cultureof deferenceo thepresidentn matters fwarpowers nd foreignffairsFisher 005; Howell 2003; Koh15.Padilla .Hanft432 F.3d 82 4th ir. 005).16.Boumediene.Bush128S.Ct. 229 2008).


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692 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY/December 0091990; Rossiter nd Longaker1976; Scigliano1971). While thisdeferencemayhavedeveloped npartbecausethe Constitutionrovides orno express olefor he udiciaryin war powersmatters, ome scholarshave arguedthat judicial supervision f thepresidencynsuchmatters asbeenhaphazard, ith ourts nly ikely o rule gainst hepresident henCongressndpublic opinion reagainsthim,or when hepresidentriesto limit the review owerof the udiciaryCronin nd Genovese2004; Pious 2007).This deferentialrendhas beenespecially ronouncedincethesecondhalf f thetwentiethenturyFisher2004; Koh 1990), butU.S. historys repletewithexamplesthat llustrate hisgeneral oint. n thePrizeCases theSupremeCourtruled nfavor fPresident incoln'smilitarylockade f heSouth ven bsent congressionaleclarationofwar.WorldWar I precedentsuchas Korematsu. U.S. and Ex ParteQuirin lacedtheCourt'sstampof approvalon executive ctions that detained thousands fJapaneseAmericansndallowedNazi saboteurs o be tried y militaryommissions.While thereare cases nwhich heCourthasactually aid notopresidential ower, uch s YoungtownSheet Tube o. v.Sawyerthe definite rendhas been one of deference. he courts ftendecline o hear ases, iting hresholdssues uch as standing,mootness, r thepoliticalnature f thequestionsbefore hem Adlerand George1996; Fisher2005; Genovese1980; Howell 2003; Koh 1990). Or they implyfind way to rule in favor f theexecutive n the merits f the issues before hecourt Ducat and Dudley 1989; Fisher2005; Howell 2003).

There s some evidence f thisphenomenonn the area ofpresidential etentionpower nthe war on terrorWheeler2008). It cancertainlye argued hat heSupremeCourt showed little deference o PresidentBush's preferredetaineepolicies in theHamdan and Rasul cases. In Hamdan the Court struck own thepresident'smilitarytribunal ystem.However,the Court indicated most explicitly n JusticeStephenBreyer's oncurrence thatusing military ribunals o trynoncitizen etaineeswouldlikelybe permissiblefthe tribunal ystemwas the result f a jointeffortetween hepresidentndCongress. he Courtdid not aynotomilitaryribunalsltogether,t ustsaid no to thepresident's ribunal ystem.t is also certainlyorrect o saythat theCourt's decision n Rasul to extendfederal ourt urisdictiono theGuantnamoBaydetaineeswas a direct epudiationfthe Bushadministration'slaimsthat hedetaineeshad no accesstoAmerican ourts rrights nder heU.S. Constitution.till,the Courtcould havegonefurtherndrefused o do so. Thismighthave been smallconsolation othe Bush administration,ut it did allow thepresident o continue o argue n subse-quentGuantnamo ases that thedetaineeshad no substantive ights, ven ftheydidhaveaccessto federalourts. he administrationontinued oclingto thisposition, ndthe resultwas theBoumedienease. As noted arlier, oumedieneasclearly repudiationof theadministration'sisionof imiteddetainee egalrights.A better ase can be madethatthepresident eceived onsiderableudicialdefer-ence in theHamdi and Padilla cases. In Padilla, as notedearlier, he SupremeCourtrefrained rom ulingon theconstitutionalssues n Padilla's claim,opting nstead odefer he matter.This deferencewas reinforced hen the Court declinedto reviewPadilla's casea second ime, pting nstead o let the criminalustice ystem andle hematter. ne couldargue hat heCourt houldhavereviewed hemerits f Padilla's case


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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE JUDICIARY? | 693for t least two reasons. irst, ll of the ower ourts eached decision n the merits fPadilla's constitutional laims.More importantly,heywere divided.The SecondandFourthCircuitCourts fAppealsreached ery ifferentonclusions n thescopeof thepresident'suthorityohold American itizens s enemy ombatants.17ucha divisionbetween ircuits s often rounds or heSupreme ourt ostep n andprovide larityna particularssue O'Brien2005). Second,the ssue n question presidential owertodetainAmericancitizensas enemycombatantswithoutrights is an exceptionallyimportantne, arguablymportantnoughthat t shouldbe addressedby the land'shighest ourt.JusticeRuth BaderGinsburg rguedas muchin herdissentfrom heCourt'srefusal o hearPadilla's case the secondtime around.

Despite theseconflictingowercourtdecisions, he Bush administrationeverrepudiatedheposition hat t had complete ower nddiscretiono detaincitizens senemy ombatants. he Bushadministrationaspassedfrom hescene,butthere s noguarantee hattheObama administrationor someotherfuturedministrationwillnotadoptcomparable olicies ndpositions egardinghedetention f uspected error-ists.The Obama administrationmulated he Bush administration'sreatment fJosPadilla in February 009 when t transferredli Saleh al-Marri, legal alienheld inindefinite ilitaryustodys anenemy ombatant,o civilian ustodynd filed riminalchargesgainsthim a month eforeheSupreme ourtwas set tohear ral rgumentsnhis case. The Obama administrationskedtheSupremeCourtto dismissthependingcaseagainstAl-Marri, request he Courtgranted.18 hile the Courtalso vacatedthepro-governmentourthCircuitCourt ofAppeals decisionthat was in question,theObama administration as very areful o avoidrenouncingheBush administration'sposition hat thepresident as thepowerto indefinitelyetainenemy ombatantsnmilitaryustody Liptak2009). Again,a presidentkillfullymaneuveredetainee egalclaimsawayfrom upremeCourtreview.In Hamdi the Courtaffirmedhepresident's ight o detainAmerican itizens senemy ombatants ytaking n expansive iewofpresidential owerunder he AUMFpassed hortlyfter /11.Eventhough heAUMF did not pecifically ention etainingsuspected erroristsletaloneAmerican itizens), plurality uledthatdetaining errorsuspects s enemy ombatants as ncident o thepresident'sower ousemilitaryorce,a powerthat theAUMF spelledout in quite broadterms.The Hamdidecisionalsoeffectuallyecognized hat thepresidentwas usinghiswarpowers n detaining nemycombatantsYoo 2006b). The Bush administrationagerly ocused n this spectof theCourt'sdecision.Shortlyfter hedecision, JusticeDepartment pokesman aid that"[t]heJusticeDepartment s pleased that the U.S. SupremeCourttoday upheld theauthorityfthe President s Commander-in-Chieffthearmedforces o detainenemycombatants,ncludingU.S. citizens.This authoritys crucial n timesofwar" Lane2004).

17.Padilla .Rumsfeld352F.3d 95 2nd ir. 003); adilla .Bush233F.Supp.2d64 S.D.N.Y.2002); adilla .Hanft423F.3d 86 4th ir. 005); adilla .Hanft432F.3d 82 4th ir. 005); adillav.Hanft389F.Supp.2d78 D.S.C. 005).18.Al-Marri. pagone08-368.


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694 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY/December 009In war on terror etainee uestions, heSupremeCourt has shownthepresidentsomedeference,ven fnotalways thistoricalevels.There re several otential easonsfor his.First, heCourtmayview thewaronterrors "different"rom astconventionalwars declaredwars gainst tateswithrecognizablermies, ules fwar, ndconcludingpeacetreaties. econd, he usticesmaynotplacemuch tock nthe wartime recedentsthat the administration as so heavilyrelied on in its arguments. imeschange, ndsometimes lderprecedentsecome essapplicable o currentroblems.Andfinally,hejustices ppear o bemakingdecisionsndetaineematters hatwill reserve ome roleforthe udiciary. hey, n effect,remaking urethattheyhavea say n the formationfdetaineepolicy n the war on terrorWheeler2008).

ConclusionThe broader rgument fferedn this article s thatthe udiciary,nd more pe-cificallyheSupremeCourt, s generally poorcheckon presidential etention ower.However,recentlyhe media and former ush administrationfficials avepubliclyargued hat he udiciary indered resident ush as he hasattemptedo formulatendimplement etaineepolicy n the war on terror. ut whatthis articlehas contended sthat, rotestationsside,there s a good bodyofevidence osupport he conclusion hat

when t comes to detaineepolicytheSupremeCourt's bility o serve s a significantcheckon thepresidents limited.There reboth nstitutionalndpoliticalforceshat hapetheCourt'srole n thiscontext.nstitutionally,he factthatthe courts perate n judicial timeand focusonnarrowegal questions ftenmakes t moredifficulto check presidentwho s capableofactingquickly nd has theability oshape"big picture" olicymakingmorereadilythan hecourt. olitically,he udiciary asadopted general osture fdeferenceo theexecutivenwarpowers ndforeignffairs atters. his is rightlyrwrongly oftena matter fpoliticalwill rather han n approach hat s compelledbytheConstitution.The implementationrocesss one that s shapedbothbythe nstitutionalimitations fthe udiciarynd bythepoliticalprocess hatfollows judicialdecision.If presidential etentionpower is to be checked assumingthis is what theAmerican eopleevendesire), hen his heckmust ikely ome from ther ources,uchasCongress r theAmerican eoplethemselves. ritics avebeenharsh nCongressince9/11, rguing hat,nstitutionally,thas allowed tself obe bullied ndcircumventedythe executive n policymattersnvolving he detention nd processing f suspectedterroristsBall 2007; Fisher2008; Pallitto ndWeaver2007; Savage2007). Congress,these ritics ssert,mustrediscoverts own argely ntapped eservoirfpowers n thisarea.Congress houldconduct igorous versight,emandopenness ndaccountability,and be proactive n providing egislative olutionsto ongoing problems nstead ofacquiescingto unilateral, d hoc executive etention olicies Anderson 006; Fisher2004, 2008; Pallitto and Weaver2007; Schwarzand Huq 2007; Wittes 2008). ACongresswillingto take suchactions ould ndeedhave thepotential obe a significantcheckonpresidential etention ower.


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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE JUDICIARY? | 695The ever-increasingond betweenthepresidencynd public opinionhas beenwidely hronicleds a potential ource f trengthormodern residents,nd this s trueinforeign olicymatters s well Kernell2007). After /11,President ush received helargestrecorded rallyeffect"n history nd he received ubstantial upportfor hisantiterrorolicies HetheringtonndNelson2003). The presidentlso received ublicsupport or he nvasion f raq in2003 as partofthe argerwaron terror. nfortunatelyfor hepresident,upport or hewardropped recipitously,s did thepresident'sverallapprovalratings. f a public was clearly nd adamantly pposed to the president'sdetention olicies, his, oo,might erve s a checkon thepresidentn thispolicy rea.To date,such a groundswellfpublic oppositionhasyetto emergeDavis 2007).This analysis f the udiciary's ehaviorn the area ofdetention olicy ppears oprovide omepreliminaryupport or he ontentionhat heCourt sacting trategicallyvis--vis he president n this policyarea. This has important mplications or thejudiciary's bility o "check" residentialower.The term check"has been usedrepeat-edly n thisarticleprimarilyo illustrate he difficultieshe judiciaryhas in limitingpresidentialctions nthis rea. fby"check," riticswantthecourts ocompletely altor trumppresidential etention nitiatives, hese critics re probablydestinedto bedisappointed.However, heconceptof checks nd balances s farmore fluid hat this.Checks nd balances renot a zero-sum ame.Theredoesnot have to be a winner ndaloserwhosepowers re "checked" r "balanced."Anydiscussion fgovernmentetention

powers hould llowpresidentsnoughpowerto address hevarious xigencies hat reassociatedwithwar and ancillary etentionswhileat the same time nvolving udicial,congressionaland evenpublic) checkson thesepowers n the interest fpreventingabusesofpower.The judiciarywill remain nvolved n detention uestionsregardless fwhetherother heckson thepresidentmerge r not. As a coequal branch fgovernment,hecourts urely avea roletoplay.The judiciarytselfwillpartially ecidewhat this rolewill be because ne ofthefascinatinghings bout oursystemf hecks nd balances ndseparationfpowers s thatpolitical ctors nd institutions within he confinesftheConstitution have ignificantbility o defineheir wnroles nparticularolicy reas.Indeed,while somecritics ave beendisappointed hat he udiciary as not confrontedthe Bush administration'snilateralnitiatives s forcefullys these riticsmightwish,it is importanto rememberhathas, n its series fdetaineedecisions, ertainlyarvedouta rolefor tselfn the futuremaking fdetention olicy.Rather hanoutright ejectthe Bushadministration'sbility o detainAmericans s enemy ombatants,he Courtheldthat itizens reentitled o dueprocess. he courtswillsurely ave say n ustwhatwill constitute ue process n this context.Additionally,when the Courtheld thatnoncitizen etainees n Guantnamowere entitledto habeasproceedings, he Courtensured hat t wouldhave a role n determininghescopeand nature f thesefutureproceedings.This is indeedwherewe return oCorwin's invitationostruggle"n themakingofforeign olicy.Here, haveargued hatthisrole s probably otthatofthe udiciaryserving s theprimaryheckon presidential etention ower.This does notmeanthatthere s no rolefor hecourts oplay.As the branch fgovernmenthathas thepower o


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696 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY/December 009"saywhat the Constitutionmeans," ts views on theconstitutionalityf laws and theactionsof otherpoliticalactors s surely elevant,fnotalwaysdispositive. he courtsmaynot be playing he role omepresidentialriticswould ike,buttheymaybe actingstrategically,oingwhatthey angiventhepolitical nd institutionalimitations hatreflect he realities f the judiciary's owerto influence ublic policy.For now,thepresident emains hedriving orce ehinddetaineepolicy, nd evidence uggests hatthose ookingfor hat trong udicialcheckmaybe better erved o search lsewhere.

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Wheeler WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM THE JUDICIARY? | 697Cole,David. 003.EnemyliensDoubletandardsndConstitutionalreedomsn theWar nTerrorism.NewYork: ewPress.Cooper,hillip .2002.ByOrderf heresidentTheUse ndAbusef xecutiveirect ction.awrence:Universityress fKansas.Correspondentsf heNewYork imes.001.36 Days:TheCompletehroniclef he 000 PresidentialElectionrisis. ewYork: imes ooks.Corwin,dward . 1957.The residentOfficendPowers1787-1957.th d.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityress.Cronin,homas,ndMichael .Genovese.004.The aradoxesfhe mericanresidency.nd d.NewYork: xfordniversityress.Davis,Darren.007.Negativeiberty:ublic pinionnd he erroristttacksnAmerica.ewYork:RussellageFoundation.Denbeaux, ark,ndJoshuaW. Denbeaux. 006.No-Hearingearings:SRT:TheModernabeasCorpus?eton allPublic awResearchaper o.951245.http://ssrn.com/abstract951245.Detaineereatmentct f2005.Public aw109-148. 09th ong., ecember0.Dolbeare, enneth,ndPhillip ammond.971.The choolrayerecisions:rom ourtolicyo ocalPractice.hicago: niversityfChicagoress.Ducat, raig,ndRobertudley. 989- FederalistrictudgesndPresidentialower uringhePostwarra."Journalf olitics1 February):8-118.Eskridge, illiam. 991. Overridingupremeourttatutorynterpretationecisions." ale awJournal01 November):31-450.Fisher,ouis. 003.NaziSaboteursnTrial. awrence:niversityress fKansas.. 2004.Presidentialar ower.nd d. Lawrence:niversityressfKansas.. 2005. Judicialeview fWar ower."residentialtudiesuarterly5 September):66-95.. 2008.The onstitutionnd 111:RecurringhreatsoAmerica'sreedoms.awrence:niversityPressfKansas.Genovese,ichael . 1980.The upremeourt,he onstitution,ndPresidentialower.anham, D:Universityress fAmerica.Giles,Michael,ndThomasWalker.975. Judicialolicy-Makingnd outhernchool esegrega-tion"Journalf olitics7 November):17-36.Gillman, oward,ndCornelllayton.999.The upremeourtnAmericanolitics:ew nstitutionalistInterpretations.awrence:niversityress fKansas.Glaberson,illiam. 008."Bin aden river entencedo Short erm." ewYork imesAugust,p.Al.Goldsmith,ack . 2007. TheTerrorresidency:awandJudgmentnside he ushAdministration.NewYork:WW.Norton.Greenberg,aren ., ndJoshua. Dratel,ds.2005.TheTortureapers:heRoad oAbuGhraib.NewYork: ambridgeniversityress.Greenhouse,inda. 001."Bush . GoreA SpecialReport;lection ase Test nda Traumaorlustices."ewYorkimesFebruary0.. 2004. "The mperialresidencynd heConstraintsf he aw.NewYork imesApril 8,p. 7.Hamilton,lexander,ames adison,ndJohn ay. 961.The ederalistapers.ewYork: enguin.Henkin,ouis. 996.Foreignffairsnd he .S.Constitution.nd d.Oxford,K: Clarendonress.Hetherington,arc ., ndMichael elson. 003."Anatomyf Rally ffect:eorgeW. Bush ndtheWar nTerrorism."S:PoliticalciencendPolitics6 January):7-42.Howell,William . 2003.Power ithoutersuasion:he oliticsf irectresidentialction.rinceton,NJ:Princetonniversityress.Ignatius,avid. 006."Fighterrorwith aw."Washingtonost,une 0,p.A27.Johnson,ichard. 967. TheDynamicsfCompliance.vanston,L: NorthwesternniversityPress.Kassop, ancy.007."BushndCheneynd he eparationfPowersedger:WillTheyLeave hePresidencytrongerhan hey oundt?"Paper resentedt heAnnual eetingf heAmericanPoliticalcience ssociation,hicago, ugust 0-September.


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CQ Press.Knight,ack,nd eeEpstein.996. On he truggleor udicialupremacy."aw nd ocietyeview30:87-120.Koh,Harold . 1990.TheNationalecurityonstitution.ewHaven, T: YaleUniversityress.Lane, harles.004. JusticesackDetainee ccess oU.S.Courts;resident'sowers re imited."WashingtonostJune 9,p.Al.Lewis, eil.2004."U.S. sReadyingeview anels or ubaBase."NewYorkimesJuly7.Liptak, dam. 009."Justicesrase uling hatAllowedetention."ewYork imesMarch.March,ames ., ndJohan Olsen. 989- ediscoveringnstitutions:he rganizationalasis f olitics.NewYork: ree ress.Mayer,enneth . 2001.Withhetrokef Pen: xecutiverdersnd residentialower.rinceton,J:Princetonniversityress.Militaryommissionsct. 006.Public aw109-366, ctober7.Milkis,idney,ndMichael elson. 008.The mericanresidency:riginsnd evelopment,776-2002.5th d.Washington,C: CQ Press., erry ., ndWilliam .Howell. 999a. The residentialowerfUnilateralctionJournalof aw, conomics,ndOrganization5 April): 32-79-. 1999b. UnilateralctionndPresidentialower: Theory."residentialtudiesuarterly9(December):50-72.O'Brien,avidM.2005. tormenter:he upremeourtnAmericanolitics.th d.NewYork:W.W.Norton.Pallitto,obert .,andWilliam . Weaver.007.Presidentialecrecynd he aw.Baltimore:ohnsHopkins niversityress.Paust,ordan.2007.Beyondhe aw:The ush dministration'snlawfulesponseso he War"n error.NewYork: ambridgeniversityress.Peltason,ack. 961. ifty-Eightonelyen:outhernederaludgesnd choolesegregation.ewYork:Harcourt,race World.Pious,Richard.007. "Inherent ar ndExecutiveowersndPrerogativeolitics."residentialStudiesuarterly1March):6-84.Ramsey,ichael . 2007.The onstitution'sextnForeignffairs.ambridge,A:Harvardniver-sity ress.Rehnquist, illiam . 1998.Allthe awsbut ne: ivil ibertiesnWartime.ewYork: lfred .Knopf.Rosenberg,erald . 1991.TheHollowopeCanCourtsringboutocial hange?hicago: niver-sity fChicagoress.Rossiter,linton.960.TheAmericanresidency.ewYork: arcourt,race.Rossiter,linton,ndRichardongaker.976.The upremeourtnd he ommandernChief.thaca,NY: Cornell niversityress.Sala,BrianR., andJames SpriggsI. 2004. "Designingests ftheSupremeourt ndtheSeparationfPowers."oliticalesearchuarterly7 June):97-208.Savage,harlie.006. JusticesealBush etbacknTribunals;ighCourtays uantnamoctionIllegal." ostonlobeJune 0,p.Al.. 2007. Takeover:heReturnf hemperialresidencynd heubversionfAmericanemocracy.Boston:ittle,rown.Schlesinger,rthur .,Jr. 005.War nd he mericanresidency.ewYork:W.W.Norton.Schubert,lendon. 957. ThePresidencyn theCourts. inneapolis:niversityfMinnesotaPress.Schwarz,rederickr.,ndAzizZ. Huq.2007. UncheckedndUnbalanced:residentialowern Timeof error.ewYork: ewPress.Scigliano,obert.971.The upremeourtnd he residency.ewYork: ree ress.Segal, effrey. 1997. Separation-of-Powersamesnthe ositiveheoryfCongressndCourts."Americanoliticalcienceeview1 March):8-44.Sheffer,artin. 1999.The udicialevelopmentf residentialar owers.ewYork: raeger.


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