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Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire

in Moral Reasoning

Byron J. Stoyles

Accepted: 16 October 2006 / Published online: 24 January 2007# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract This paper serves both as a discussion of Henrys (Ethical Theory Moral

Practice, 5:255270, 2002) interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of akrasia

knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway and an indication of the importance of

desire in Aristotles account of moral reasoning. As I will explain, Henrys interpretation is

advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how Aristotle could have made good sense

of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to observe in the real world, while

maintaining non-trivial distinctions between temperance (sphrosun), self-indulgence(akolasia), self-control (enkrateia) and akrasia. There are, however, some interpretive

challenges that follow from Henrys account and this paper is intended to explain and

resolve those.

Key words akrasia . Aristotle . desire . Devin Henry .practical reasoning

The akratic man is

a man whom passion masters so that he does not act according toright rule, but does not master to the extent of making him ready to believe that he

ought to pursue such pleasures without reserve. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1151a 2025)1

This paper serves both as a discussion of Devin Henrys interpretation of Aristotle on the

possibility of akrasia knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway and an

indication of the importance of desire in Aristotles account of moral reasoning.2 As I will

explain, Henrys interpretation is advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how

Aristotle could have made good sense of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to

observe in the real world, while maintaining non-trivial distinctions between temperance

Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2007) 10:195207

DOI 10.1007/s10677-006-9050-6

1All quotes from the Nicomachean Ethics are from Ross translation.2H (2002)

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(sphrosun), self-indulgence (akolasia), self-control (enkrateia) and akrasia. There are,

however, some interpretive challenges that follow from Henrys account and this paper is

intended to explain and resolve those.

My focus is on two specific challenges raised by Henrys account. The first of these

arises from an apparent tension between Henrys interpretation and Aristotle

s claim that

practical reasoning, expressed by practical syllogisms, must result in action unless the agent

is restrained (1147a 2931).3 The other arises because Henrys interpretation seems to entail

that reason is dragged around by desire on Aristotles account as it is on Humes, yet this

possibility is precluded by Aristotles account of motivation and his ontology of desires.

Before turning to these, I will begin by outlining Henrys interpretation and the motivation

behind it.

1 Aristotle on Akrasia: Henrys Interpretation

As have many, Henry distinguishes between two kinds of akrasia. They are distinguished

from one another by the different senses in which an agent knows that what he is doing is

wrong when he goes about doing it.4 On the one hand, a person can have knowledge but

not be exercising that knowledge. That is, a person can know something (like a rule of

morality), but fail to realize that his knowledge applies to his particular situation or, seem to

realize that it applies, but fail to act accordingly.5 In book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics

(NE), Aristotle tells us that such a person has knowledge that what he is doing is wrong in a

qualified sense only in the same way as a man who is asleep, mad, or drunk (1147a13).

Following Henry, I will refer to this first sort of akrasia as

drunken akrasia.6

On the other hand, a person can know that what he is doing is wrong in an unqualified

sense. In such a case, the person knows that what he is doing is wrong and is exercising

this knowledge.7 A person who acts while knowing in an unqualified sense that what he is

doing is wrong exhibits genuine akrasia. If a person is genuinely akratic, he really knows

both the right rule (orthos logos) that should be followed and that it applies to him in his

present situation. Genuine akrasia, then, does not result from an intellectual error.

Henry argues that Aristotle allowed for the possibility of genuine akrasia. One strength

of his interpretation is that it does not involve any attempt to squeeze an account of this

state of character out of what is said in NE 7.8 Aristotle makes it clear in NE 7.3 that his

focus is on the possibility of having knowledge in the drunken sense and behaving contraryto that knowledge. That this possibility remains his focus throughout the remainder of NE 7

3 I dont mean to equate practical reasoning with what is represented by the practical syllogisms. The former

is surely broader in its scope than the latter. This said, the latter is certainly part of the former in the picture of

practical reasoning. (More on this below.).4 The masculine pronoun is used throughout this paper to mirror Aristotles discussion. I do, of course, think

that women can be moral (and akratic, for that matter).5 In the former case, the knowledge of the rule could be referred to as knowledge which is non-occurrent or

not being exercised. In Aristotelian terms it is the first grade actualization of knowledge (i.e. having

knowledge) without using or applying the knowledge.6 This is not to imply that drunkenness is thought to have the same effect on our knowledge in all instances.

We might compare for instance passages at 1110b 25 ff and 1113b 35 with the passages at 1147a 14 1151a

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is made clear by his repeated and consistent assertions that the akratic person knows what

he is doing is wrong in the sense of a man mad, asleep, or drunk.9 Henry is right, however,

to point out that this does not entail that Aristotle denied the possibility of genuine akrasia

altogether. Though the phenomenon is not explained in NE 7, neither is it ruled out. 10

According to Henry, we must look beyond the famous passage in NE 7 to reconstructAristotles account of genuine akrasia.

The best evidence that Aristotle thought genuine akrasia to be possible is found in the

Eudemian Ethics (EE). In this text, the qualification that the akratic man has only

knowledge in the drunken sense is conspicuously absent. Though not conclusively, this

suggests Aristotle thought himself to be explaining genuine akrasia in the EE. Specific

passages provide more conclusive evidence. In EE 7.13, Aristotle claims that Socrates was

right to think that nothing is stronger than wisdom but wrong to think that nothing is

stronger than knowledge (1246b 3335). In this passage, there is no qualification that

Socrates was wrong only with regard to knowledge we possess but arent exercising.11

More concrete support for Henrys interpretation comes at 1224b 1521 where Aristotle

asserts that the akratic man has a pain of expectation, thinking that he is doing ill (or

acting badly kaks praxein).12 Unless the akratic man is actually thinkingthat what he is

doing is bad, he would feel no pain of expectation. Knowing in the drunken sense would

not produce such a pain.

Henrys strategy for reconstructing Aristotles account of genuine akrasia is to focus on

the way in which Aristotle could have explained the differences among akrasia, self-

indulgence, self-control and temperance in a manner that is neither trivial nor ad hoc. Of

these four states of character, only temperance is a virtue and only self-indulgence is a vice,

though the others are part of the same genus insofar as they are related to the same thing(1145b 1): the desire for the pleasures associated with food, drink and sex.

In terms of their behaviour, both the self-controlled man and the temperate man are alike

in that they manage to pursue these pleasures in accordance with reason to the degree they

promote health and well-being. Conversely, both the akratic man and the self-indulgent man

pursue these pleasures excessively. In terms of their knowledge about what is best in their

particular situations, the self-indulgent man is easily distinguished from the others. He is the

one who is convinced that bodily pleasures should be pursued for their own sake (he

chooses to pursue them and acts in accordance with this choice, 1150a 1620). As genuine

akrasia cannot be the result of an intellectual error, the genuinely akratic man is no

different, cognitively speaking, than the self-controlled man or, perhaps more tellingly, theman with the virtue of temperance all three have knowledge of what pleasures they

9 See, for instance, 1147a 14, 1151a 4, and 1152a 15.10 At the very least, Book 7 lacks an explanation for this kind of character. It is tempting to read Aristotle s

text to have ruled this out completely, especially when we consider the conclusion that the position Socrates

sought to establish actually seems to result (1147b 14) for Socrates, as we know, denied the possibility of

akrasia altogether. That Socrates position seems to result from what is said in NE 7, however, doesnt entail

that this is Aristotles final word on the matter, and it certainly doesn t entail that Aristotles view must be the

same as Socrates in the end.11 Though Aristotle doesnt explicitly consider the possibility that appetite could be stronger than knowledge

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should pursue. As Henry sees it, we must look to Aristotles account of proper and alien

pleasures to fully explain the differences among these states of character.

Throughout the Ethics, Aristotle insists that being virtuous is related to pleasures and

pains. As he puts it, moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on

account of pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of pain that we abstain fromnoble ones (1104b 1011).13 In NE 10.5 Aristotle tells us that there is a proper pleasure

(oikeiai hdonai) for each activity and that there is a proper pleasure related to the proper

function of each kind of animal. In relation to food, drink and sex, Aristotle insists that

some pleasures are necessary. The necessary pleasures are those which promote health and

well-being (1114a 15). As Aristotle sees it, one experiences the proper pleasure of

temperance when one takes pleasure or delights in pursuing only the kind and amount of

bodily pleasures necessary for health and well-being. In contrast, he tells us that the the

bad man is bad by virtue of pursuing the excess, not by virtue of pursuing the necessary

pleasures (1154a 1516). Pleasures that one experiences when pursuing excessive

pleasures or pleasures from inappropriate sources (like adultery) are alien (allotriai

hdonai) and, thus, actually impede or destroy happiness (NE 7.13).

The temperate man is the one who loves the pleasures associated with food, drink and

sex for what theyre worth and not more than theyre worth. He is the one who delights in

being temperate and is repulsed by pleasures of the sort pursued by the self-indulgent man

(1119a 1214). The man with the virtue of temperance, we can infer, is not tempted by the

alien pleasures he delights only in pursuing the amount and kind of food, drink and sex

that reason deems necessary.14

In contrast to the temperate man, both the self-controlled man and the akratic man are

tempted by the same alien pleasures as the self-indulgent man. The self-controlled manbehaves like the temperate man insofar as he manages to keep his appetitive desires in

check and acts in the manner determined by reason. The akratic man behaves like the self-

indulgent man insofar as he follows his appetite. Since both the self-controlled man and the

genuinely akratic man know in the unqualified sense what they ought to do, ignorance

cannot be used to explain the difference between them. And, since both desire alien

pleasures, the presence of this sort of desire cannot be used to explain the difference

between them either. What is it then that accounts for the difference?

The most obvious difference is that the self-controlled mans character routinely leads

him to act in accordance with his choice for temperate action and the akratic mans

character routinely leads him to act without regard for this kind of choice. As Henrycorrectly notes, however, this explanation makes the distinction trivial. The real challenge is

to pick out Aristotles explanation for why each behaves differently from the other without

merely circling back to the fact that they have different states of character. It is a significant

advantage of Henrys interpretation is that it meets this challenge.15

13 This idea is repeated in the text immediately following the section quoted and again at 1152b 5. The same

idea is presented at 1113a 35 in relation to the source of error in moral reasoning. It is also prevalent in the

EE. See, for instance, 1221b 34 ff, 1222a 17, and 1227b 16.14

In the EE, Aristotle presents the same idea in terms of absolute pleasures these are the pleasures oneexperiences when acting according to reason. They are those that are pleasurable by nature. This can be

compared to the passage in the NE where Aristotle reports that some pleasures are desirable in themselves,

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To identify the manner in which Aristotle distinguished between akrasia and self-control,

Henrys strategy is to look for what it is that gives the self-controlled man the power to

restrain his appetite. Consequently, Henry reasons, the mark of the akratic man will be the

absence of whatever accounts for this ability in the self-controlled man (pp. 2645). In

the end, Henry argues that genuine akrasia must be the result of an agents failure to

desire the proper pleasure of being temperate. While the self-controlled man is drawn

towards indulgence, he is disposed to follow reason and acts according to right rule. The

akratic man, on Henrys interpretation, lacks the desire for the pleasures that should

attend the pursuance of bodily pleasures in the manner directed by reason. One possible

reason for this is that he has not (yet) successfully habituated the state of character that

disposes him to take pleasure in acting temperately. In this respect, we would expect him

to be no different from a child; and this is exactly what Aristotle tells us at 1095a 311.

For the akratic man, as for the child, knowledge is of no use to him and he acts on the

desire for bodily pleasures alone. Knowledge would be of use to him only if he desired

to act in accordance with the rational principle (1095a 711).

Henry argues for the strong view that the genuinely akratic man does not experience any

inner-conflict between the desire that would move him to act temperately and the desire to

indulge in food, drink or sex for the reason that he lacks the former (p 257). This entails that

the akratic man does not find himself torn in any way between the desire to do what is right

and the desire to enjoy the bodily pleasures as many recent accounts of moral weakness

orweakness of will seem to suggest. Though the genuinely akratic man has knowledge of

what he ought to do, he is moved to act by the desire for the bodily pleasures alone. On

Henrys interpretation of Aristotle, the akratic man simply feels no desire moving him in the

direction of reason.Henry has, perhaps, overstated his case here it is not clear that we need to assume the

akratic man lacks all desire for the proper pleasures of temperance. It could be that his

desire is simply outweighed by the desire for bodily pleasures. One of Henrys motivations

for denying the possibility that the akratic man has any desire for the proper pleasures of

temperance seems to be that this would make the distinction between the self-controlled

man and the akratic man stark.16 If he is right, the difference is simply that the self-controlled

man desires the proper pleasure of being temperate whereas the akratic man does not. And

this, Henry thinks, is what Aristotle tells us at 1224b 1517 of the EE where he says,

the self-controlled man feels pain now in acting against his appetite, but has thepleasure of hope, i.e. that he will be presently benefited, or even the pleasure of being

actually at present benefited because he is in health; while the akratic man is pleased at

getting through his akrasia what he desires, but has a pain at expectation, thinking that

he is doing ill.

Whereas the self-controlled man is moved by the hope of experiencing the pleasures

associated with health and well-being, this passage suggests the akratic man does not

anticipate this same sort of pleasure. Henry thinks this passage implies that the only thing

that could move the akratic man to act in accordance with reason would be the desire to

avoid pain. To act on this desire, however, would be a form of softness (malakia) ratherthan self-control (1150a 14).

There are three reasons to question Henrys interpretation on this point First the stark

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what is right and the desire to pursue some forbidden pleasure where these would lead to

different courses of action. Accepting Henrys interpretation involves accepting that

Aristotle would have believed that anyone who felt such conflicting desires would always

exhibit self-control rather than akrasia.

Second, the text Henry cites in support of this part of his interpretation is inconclusive.That Aristotle does not mention any inner-conflict arising in the akratic man does not entail

that Aristotle ruled this possibility out completely.

Third, this strong view is apparently inconsistent with Aristotles assertion that the akratic

mans choice is good (1152a 17). Henry dismisses this comment by claiming that Aristotle

means that the akratic mans choice of ends is good. In context, however, it seems more likely

Aristotle meant to tell us that the akratic mans choice for a particular course of action is good.17

Aristotle states explicitly at 1150b 21 that some men after deliberation fail, owing to their

passion, to stand by the conclusions of their deliberations. He is writing there of deliberation

about specific courses of actions. Presumably, the weak mans choice being described in this

passage is the result of deliberation (1113a 35 and 1227a 5). And, since choice is

deliberative desire (1139a 24) desire for the objects or actions that we expect to promote or

be a part of happiness it must be true that the akratic man is unable to formulate a choice

(insofar as choice is deliberative desire) for the appropriate course of action in situations

where he behaves akratically if Henry is right to think that the akratic man lacks the desire for

the proper pleasures of temperance. I see two ways resolve this tension.

The most obvious way to resolve this tension from Henrys perspective is to demonstrate

that a man who is genuinely akratic does not choose what is right even though he reasons

correctly. This possibility is suggested by Aristotles claim that for choice to be good, both

the reasoning must be true and desire right

(1139a 24). On Henrys view, the genuinely

akratic man lacks the proper desire. It follows that he would not come to formulate a choice

for what is best in his particular situation even if he reasoned well from an intellectual

standpoint. He would know what he ought to do, but not choose it. This view is consistent

with the claim at 1095a 35 that knowledge is of no use to the akratic man for he, like a

child, tends to follow his passions rather than reason.

To maintain consistency, we might then read the claim that the akratic mans choice is

good at 1152a 17 to apply only to the man who is akratic in the drunken sense and not to

the man who is genuinely akratic. Not only is this claim made in NE 7, but the akratic

mans failure to stand behind his deliberation is easy to explain in terms of akrasia of the

drunken sort he deliberates correctly and then is intoxicated by the promise of bodilypleasures. Indeed, this is exactly the explanation provided at 1151a 4 where Aristotle tells

us that the failure is due to the fact that the akratic man is like people who get drunk

quickly and on little wine. Though the deliberation might be made with knowledge in the

strong sense, the knowledge is eclipsed when the agent acts. Thus, the situation being

explained is at 1150b 21 is plausibly read as a case of drunken akrasia.

The other way to resolve this tension is to reject Henry s strong claim that the genuinely

akratic man lacks the desire for the proper pleasures of temperance completely. It could be,

for instance, that both the genuinely akratic man and the self-controlled man have a desire

moving them towards doing what they know is right and a desire moving them towardsindulgence where the former is to be distinguished from the latter by the fact that his desire

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to act temperately is outweighed by his desire for indulgence whereas the opposite is true of

the latter. On this reading, both the self-controlled man and the akratic man choose, or form

deliberative desires for a temperate course of action, but the akratic mans choice is

outweighed by his appetitive desires.

The weaker view I am here suggesting, however, would be precluded if it is the case thatno amount of desire for the alien pleasures could outweigh the desire for the proper

pleasures when the latter is present. In other words, it would be precluded if choosing to

avoid excessive or inappropriate consumption of food, drink or sex meant that one will or

must necessarily act on that choice. This possibility is worth exploring further.

On Henrys account, the self-controlled man has both a desire to act temperately and a desire

to over-indulge or pursue pleasure from an inappropriate source (like adultery). The latter is an

appetitive desire (epithumia). The former is based on, or directed by, reason. In the language

of NE 6.2, the desire for the proper pleasures of temperance is a choice (proairesis) caused by

desire and reasoning with a view to an end (1139a 32) and, in this sense, it is a desiderative

thought or intellectual desire (dianotik orexis ororektikos nous, 1139b 45).18 This means

that the two desires felt by the self-controlled man are of different kinds.19

On this reading, it is easy to make sense of the presence of conflicting desires. The self-

controlled man has a desire of one kind moving him in one direction and a desire of a

different kind moving him in the other (rather than two desires of the same sort pulling him

in opposite directions). This reading, on Henrys view, also explains why it is that a person

who desires the proper pleasures of temperance will always be moved to act by this desire.

This would be the case if, in Aristotles moral psychology, intellectual desires or choices of

particular courses of action formulated with a view to an end always override appetitive

desires. (Thinking of proairesis in the strong sense of

willing

as many scholars do makesthis way of reading Aristotle especially tempting for the reason that it would make room in

Aristotles theory to justify a claim analogous in meaning to the idea we mean to express

when we assert that the will can override lower desires20).

With regards to the explanation of genuine akrasia, the implications of this reading are as

follows. The akratic man does not desire the proper pleasures of temperance and, so, does

not choose to act temperately. This is because he lacks what it is that would cause or give

rise to such a choice. Remembering that the cause of choice is desire and reasoning with a

view to an end, lacking the cause of the choice to act temperately could involve a failure to

deliberate correctly about what bodily pleasures promote health and well-being (as this is

the end of temperance). This, however, is ruled out in the case of genuine akrasia if weaccept that this phenomenon involves knowledge about what one ought to do in an

unqualified sense. Second, and by default the only real possibility in the case of genuine

akrasia, is that the akratic man lacks the desire that would move him to act temperately.

And this, of course, is exactly what Henry is arguing.

To my mind, it is not obvious which of the stronger or the weaker views being

considered is the best interpretation of Aristotles view. There are good reasons to support

18 In context, Aristotle seems to mean the efficientcause of the proairesis is desire and reasoning with a view

to an end. He could, however, mean the formal cause. The latter would account for the characterization ofchoice as desiderative intellect or intellectual desire. The former would add force to what I say below about

the practical syllogisms (See note 42)

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each reading and there is no textual evidence that is definitive either way. Aristotle makes

no explicit statements claiming or denying that a deliberate desire always trumps competing

appetitive desires. In the context of this paper, it is significant to notice that there remains

good reason to adopt Henrys explanatory strategy whatever way this tension is resolved.

As Henry observes, both the genuinely akratic man and the self-controlled man desire topursue pleasures that are not necessary for, and are detrimental to, health and well-being

and both know in the unqualified sense that they should not act on these desires. Henry s

strategy of exploring the implications of Aristotles distinction between proper and alien

pleasures succeeds in generating an interpretation of Aristotle that makes sense of genuine

akrasia and allows us to distinguish between it and self-control in a non-trivial way.21 Even

if we dont accept all of the details of this interpretation, it is a promising alternative to the

ever-growing number of attempts to pick out Aristotles explanation of genuine akrasia by

pulling apart the practical syllogisms found in NE 7.

To summarize, the key points of Henrys interpretation are as follows: (1) Aristotle did

allow for genuine akrasia, and (2) the genuinely akratic man is one who knows in an

unqualified sense that what he is doing is wrong he knows both the right rule and that it

applies to him in his situation but (3) lacks all (or, on the weaker version I have

considered, sufficient,) desire for the proper pleasure of acting temperately.

2 Two Interpretive Challenges

If Henry has correctly identified Aristotles position on the possibility of genuine akrasia,

we find ourselves faced with two additional interpretive challenges. First, it seems thatAristotle cannot consistently allow for genuine akrasia if he held that the conclusions of

practical syllogisms are actions (rather than prescriptions or statements). Second, Henrys

interpretation suggests that reason is no less the slave of the passions for Aristotle as for

Hume. I will explain each of these problems in turn and then suggest how both might be

resolved in a consistent manner.

2.1 Practical Syllogisms and Genuine Akrasia

Aristotles views about drunken akrasia in NE 7 are explained using what are commonly

read as practical syllogisms.22 Simplifying the account of moral reasoning, Aristotle tellsus that the akratic man knows the universal premise of the syllogism. This is the premise

containing a universal rule of morality.23 Removing the details, the universal premise

21 Of course, to say Henrys strategy succeeds in generating a useful interpretation of Aristotle is to say

nothing about the plausibility of Aristotles theory when compared to others aimed at explaining genuine

akrasia. I leave this task for another project.

23 Here, I follow Thornton (1982) in reading the syllogisms in NE 7 to specify a rule in the universal premise

22 Grogi (2002) argues that the text in NE 7.3 does not give examples of practical syllogisms, but that

these are syllogisms to reflect the epistemic state of the akratic man. As I will argue, I think that these are

practical syllogisms, but that they provide an incomplete representation of moral reasoning and choice. This

is likely, as many such as Burnyeat (1999) argue, because the focus in this text is on the sort of knowledgeinvolved in akrasia.

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specifies that such and such a man ought to do such and such. Drunken akrasia occurs

when the agent is so overcome by desire that he fails to realize that this rule applies to him

in his present situation (an error in moral perception) or realizes it only as a drunken man

or as an actor who says something without really knowing what is being said. As Sparshott

(1996) puts it, the knowledge of this rule isbypassed

for the reason that the drunken

akratic man does not really recognize that the rule should be exercised in his particular

case.24

Though there is much debate about how it is that we should understand the nature and

application of Aristotles practical syllogisms, there is little doubt that Aristotle thought that

the conclusion of the sort of reasoning represented by these syllogisms is action unless the

agent is restrained.25 The Aristotelian corpus contains many clear statements of this idea.

The most explicit of these comes to us in the seventh chapter of the Movements of

Animals,26 but the idea is also present in the NE. There, Aristotle provides examples of

syllogisms and tells us that if the universal and the particular premises are recognized, then

the man who can act and is not restrained must (necessarily) at the same time actually act

accordingly (1147a 2931).27 He just means the person will act.

On first glance, Henrys thesis that Aristotle allowed for genuine akrasia flies directly in

the face of Aristotles assertion that practical reasoning results in action. Just like the

temperate man, the genuinely akratic man knows a universal rule of morality and knows

that it applies to him in his particular case. In this sense, knowing means that he recognizes

the major and minor premises of the practical syllogism, has put the syllogism together in

the right way and has concluded that he ought to act in a certain way. For example, a man

who knows that temperance requires avoiding excessive indulgence and that eating the

entire party-sized pizza before him would be a form of excessive indulgence must alsoknow that he ought to avoid eating the entire pizza. The problem is that, if the conclusion of

practical reasoning is action (in this case an avoidance) and not simply a normative

judgment or moral prescription (I ought to avoid...), then there is no room for genuinely

akratic behaviour: putting the major and minor premises together will simply result in right

action.

This, however, does not mean that we must give up the idea that Aristotle allowed for

genuine akrasia. Instead, I think we should be led to the realization that there is more going

on in practical reasoning than indicated by the simple syllogisms offered in NE 7.3. Most

significantly, the presentation of these syllogisms excludes any mention of desires. As

Aristotle presents them in NE 7, each syllogism composed of a rule indicating a moralobligation (all men ought to...) and knowledge of the persons particular situation (I am in a

situation to...). If this were all there is to practical reasoning, however, none of us would

ever be moved to act, for intellect itself, Aristotle tells us, moves nothing (1139a 37).

24 Sparshott (1996, p 245).25 We express the conclusion as a prescription. See, for instance, Hintikka (1973). For the opposing

interpretation, see Kenny (1979). Kenny argues that the conclusions of practical syllogisms are prescriptions

rather than actions. If he is correct, his way of reading Aristotle would effectively obviate the need to address

what I have identified as this first interpretive challenge. The challenge only exists if practical reasoning, as

expressed by the practical syllogisms, has action as its conclusion. As indicated by what follows, I think thereis sufficient textual evidence to reject Kennys view.26

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On Aristotles view, only desire moves us to act.28 With this, he must have thought that

practical reasoning only results in action when desire is somehow involved or attached to

the process of reasoning represented by the practical syllogisms.29 This is just to say that

desire is a necessary part or condition of practical reasoning. And, if desire is that which

ultimately moves us to action, then simply knowing what you are doing is wrong

even inan unqualified sense will not be sufficient to preclude your doing it anyway. As Thornton

(1982) states the issue, Aristotle must grant that desires can prevent us from acting on our

practical syllogisms or his account of akrasia becomes incoherent.30 This, however,

suggests that Aristotle held reason to be the slave of desire in the same way as Hume. In

order to spell out the details of how Thorntons observation helps us avoid the first

interpretive challenge being considered in this paper, it is instructive to remind ourselves of

the ways in which Aristotles views differ from Humes.

2.2 Is Reason the Slave of Desire?

As outlined above, the genuinely akratic man and the self-controlled man have appetitive

desires that are excessive or directed at the wrong objects. The self-controlled mans desire

for the proper pleasure of temperance moves him to do what is right. The genuinely akratic

man, however, is moved in the opposite direction. Since both of these men know (in the

unqualified sense) what is right for them to do in their particular situations, Aristotle seems

committed to the view that it is really desire, and desire alone, that leads us to act

whatever process of reasoning occurs before our desires move us.

All of this suggests Aristotle was committed to the view that we only act according to

desire and even, perhaps, that the role of practical reason is merely calculative orprobabilistic (i.e., meansend reasoning) in the manner advocated by Hume.31 This,

however, cannot be Aristotles view. As is well known, Hume denied the possibility that

reason and passion can conflict. Noting that [n]othing is more usual in philosophy, and

even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, Hume thought the

whole debate about akrasia is nonsense (Treatise, III.iii.3). This is because he believed that

only passion or desire moves us to act for the reason that only passion or desire determines

which ends we pursue. On Humes account, reason can serve to determine how to reach our

desired ends, but reason does not determine or prescribe which ends should be pursued or

which means to achieve our ends are adopted (it is in this sense that reason is a slave or

subservient to desire on Humes account). Thus, according to Hume, it makes no sense toconsider actions which are done in accordance with, or from, reason.

Though Aristotle held that intellect alone cannot move us to action, he cannot have

shared Humes view. For one thing, Aristotle explicitly states that reason and appetites can

28 At De Anima 3.9 (433a), we are told that mind is never found producing movement without some desire.

(This desire, of course, could be boulsis as I will argue below.)29 We could also consider giving up the idea that Aristotle held the conclusion of practical syllogisms to be

actions. Since there is textual evidence that Aristotle did think that practical reasoning results in action,

rejecting this view seems like the less responsible move. In any case, I dont think we have to give up either

as I will argue below.

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move us in different directions.32 This is supported by his ontology of desires specifically

the distinction between deliberative and appetitive desires. As outlined above, Aristotle tells

us that choice is deliberate desire (1139a 24). Relevant to the present discussion, we learn

two things from this comment. First, we learn that choice is, at once deliberate (rational)

and a desire, though the details of how this could be are not clearly worked out.33

Second,and following this, we learn that Aristotle identifies at least two kinds of desire.34 The one,

which I have outlined here, is deliberate desire presented here as an orexis or, more

specifically, as a boulsis. The other, which we are told in Movement of Animals and

elsewhere is that which moves the lower animals, is appetitive desire. This is often

referred to as appetite or desire epithumia.

Where, then, does the genuinely akratic man go wrong? The stronger version of Henrys

interpretation entails that, in at least one respect, the akratic man is little different from

animals who are moved by appetite: neither acts as a result of choice. Whereas animals lack

the cognitive ability for choice,35 the akratic man lacks deliberative desires for acting

temperately: he is, therefore, not capable of choosing what is right and, for this reason, does

not act according to reason. On a strict reading, this would entail that the akratic mans

behaviour does not count as action (praxis) at all. On the weaker version of Henrys thesis

considered above, the akratic man does choose correctly, but his choice, in the form of a

deliberative desire, lacks sufficient force to overcome his appetite for pleasure.36

Where does this leave us? We should conclude from what has been said that the picture

in which reason is dragged around as the slave of desire in the Humean sense is too

simplistic to capture Aristotles more sophisticated model of practical reasoning. Given

Aristotles insistence that there are intellectual or deliberate desires that can initiate action,

he would not have accepted Humes view reason plays no role in determining our course of

action beyond that of identifying the means for achieving our desired ends. Further, it is not

the case, as it might first appear, that the possibility of genuine akrasia entails that we

reason about what we ought to do in the manner reflected by the syllogisms Aristotle

presents in 7.3 and then act according to our desires. This would entail that the conclusions

of the practical syllogisms are prescriptions rather than actions. But, if the conclusion of the

process of reasoning represented by the practical syllogisms is action (as Aristotle insists)

and, if we are only moved to act by desire (as Aristotle insists), then it must be true that

desires are either prior to or a part of our practical reasoning.

It might be the case that a practical syllogism specifying a rule that ought to be followed

in a persons particular case will only move a man to act if he already desires to do what isright. Anscombe (1963), for one, suggests that the syllogisms that move us to act are those

which start by identifying something we want. For example, the major premise stating that

we ought to eat dry food would only lead to action if we first desire dry food because we

32 See, for instance, 1102b 1328.33 As Hursthouse (1999) notes, Aristotle did not seem concerned with working out these details. Though it is

a worthy challenge to see how this could be worked out, I leave it for another project. Nothing I say here

depends on these details.

34 Cf. EE 2.7 where Aristotle lists three kinds of desire ( orexis): appetite (epithumia), wish (boulsis), andpassion (thumon).35

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recognize this to be good in relation to our proper end. When the major premise of the

syllogism specifies a good that ought to be pursued and the person knows this thing in front

of him is just such a good (as the genuinely akratic person is said to know), the person

would be disposed to pursue that good.37 If Anscombes reading is correct, we would be

left to explain how a deliberate desire could come to outweigh an appetitive desire whichmight be done by comparing their relative forces or by arguing that the deliberate desire

simply trumps the appetitive desire in the manner considered above.

Alternatively, it might be the case that the first premise of a practical syllogism is meant

to reflect that we desire a certain kind of thing and the second premise indicates that what

lies before us is a thing of that sort.38 For a relevant example from NE 7.3, the first premise

might reflect that we desire dry food because it is healthy and the second might indicate that

such and such a food (bread, for example) is dry. If this were the case, then it is easy to

imagine how the process of reasoning represented by the practical syllogisms would give

rise to choice in the form of a deliberative or intellectual desire (1139b 4 ff). In the

example, this choice would be to consume bread.

Neither of these is a new way to interpret the Aristotelian texts. In various forms, both of

these interpretations are found in previous commentaries about Aristotles use of the

practical syllogisms.39 Relevant to my present discussion, it is important to note that we do

not have to think that Aristotle held reason to be the slave of desire in the Humean sense to

accept Henrys view that Aristotle allowed for genuine akrasia. And that, if practical

reasoning is to result in action, then the complete formulation of practical reasoning must

include mention of ones deliberative desires.40

What, then, are we to make of the syllogisms in 7.3? At the very least, they must be

understood as incomplete statements of the kind of reasoning or process that leads to achoice for certain courses of action. As McDowell puts it, the practical syllogisms must be

read as mere argument-like schemata to represent the cognitive aspect of practical

reasoning.41 The presentation of these syllogisms is incomplete insofar as it includes no

mention of desire. Since the syllogisms are most plausibly read as representations of the

process of reasoning that initiates certain actions, desire must be involved too. This

conclusion is supported by Aristotles claim that choice, which is that which initiates action

(praxis), is caused by a combination desire and reasoning in NE 6.2.42

The syllogisms in 7.3 were likely intended to reflect the akratic man s cognitive state

only. That is, it is likely they were intended to show only what sort of knowledge a man has

37 This line of thought is consistent with Aristotles view that we desire good things because they are good at

Metaphysics 1072a 2829. Though, if genuine akrasia is possible, then it cannot be the case that simply

knowing something is good or right is sufficient for us to desire that thing over the promise of bodily

pleasures.38 For this view, see Wiggins (1975) or McDowell (1979).39 See Thornton (1982) for a fuller discussion of the various ways people have understood Aristotles

practical syllogisms.40 As the literature indicates, there is no obvious way to decide which is the best way to identify the place

Aristotle gives to desire in practical reasoning as it is represented by the practical syllogisms. I have

presented what I take to be two plausible alternatives. Noting that each of them would help us overcome the

interpretive challenges posed by Henrys thesis, it suffices for my present purposes to conclude that somestory needs to be told, but leave the difficult task of figuring out just how this story is supposed to go for

another project

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when he knows what he is doing is wrong and does it anyway. As Henry asserts, a full

explanation of how this is possible as it is manifest in the form of genuine akrasia is not to

be found in this famous bit of text.

3 Summary

In this paper I have worked to explain and resolve some interpretive challenges raised by

Devin Henrys interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of genuine akrasia. As I have

argued, the challenges that arise from Henrys interpretation can be resolved by recognizing

that knowing something is good or right is insufficient for moving us to do what is good or

right. Even if we know in an unqualified sense that what we are doing is wrong, only desire

to do what is right could move us to act correctly. The upshot is this: what have traditionally

been read as practical syllogisms are, at best, incomplete representations of the process of

deliberation that results in action. Recognizing this, future consideration of Aristotles view

about the possibility of genuine akrasia should focus less on these syllogisms and more on

the role of desire in moral reasoning. If genuine akrasia is possible, it cannot be the result of

an error in reasoning or a lack of knowledge. To explain this phenomenon, then, we need to

look somewhere other than the cognitive states of the akratic man. This is the lesson to be

learned from sorting out the details of Henrys interpretation in a manner that allows us to

meet the interpretive challenges it presents.

Acknowledgements An early version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Western

Canadian Philosophical Association in 2004. I am indebted to those in attendance for their insightful

comments, criticisms, and suggestions. I am also indebted to John Thorp, Devin Henry and the members ofthe Greek Gang at the University of Western Ontario for their feedback and guidance. I wish to extend my

thanks to all of these people, this paper is much better as a result of their shared knowledge. The paper is also

better for the input provided by the two anonymous reviewers for Ethical Theory and Moral Practicethe

number and quality of their comments about earlier drafts have been instrumental in helping me clarify many

of the ideas being presented.

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