(

G

C

F ~ c l d S c r v i c o Regulations) i

Horcwith i s a t r a n s l a t i o n of P a r t I of t h o r c o o n t Gorman t c x t "TRUP~~TNF~~IIRI~NG' Lead.ing ) roo^

.

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" T R T J I ' I ~ N F ~ ~ U h e G ' ' , important manual o f t h e Geman Army, t ~ ~ most i s t h e German F i e l d S e r v i c e Regulations. The p r e s e n t e d i t i o n was p u b l i s h e d on October 17, 1933. This document was " s e c r e t " u n t i l iVovem.ber 1, 1935, when P a r t I ras r e l e a s e d , Part 1 , containing t h e detailed' 1 t a b l e s of .o r g a.n-i-z a t i o n and r o a d spaces, i s s t i l l ,a ~".., e c r e t " , . document. s ~. . . ~ .- . . . . . . .. Pa11-t.1 i s now o f f e r e d i n tKe b e l i e f t h a t it 1611be found i n s t r u c t i v e and of t i m e l y i n t e r e s t ./

By D i r e c t i o n o f t h e A s s i s t m t Commandant:

F. 1fiL IvVIILBURlJ, Lieut. Colonel, I n f a r t r y , Assi:;'tant S e c r e t a r y .

Part I Sections Pars.1

I

- XI11 - 15 16 - 26

1

-

724 (inclusive)

IntroductionI

............................. Par............................ "I '

incl.

11

vrar Organization

I1

......................... " Loadorship ............................ "Security

27-119 120-194 195

I'

111 Roconnaissancc

"

IV

.................................

- 267

"

V

VIAttaclc

...................................

V II PursuitVIII1X X

Defonso

- 409 .................................. 410 - 426 " .................................. " 427 - 502 """

314

Dolaying Action c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S p e c i a l Typos o f warfare Billeting

";

531 539 650 699

- 538649

"

"

XI:I I :XI11

................

-

Quartering

...................

" "fit

- 698- 724

I'

Army Cavalry

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"

Introduction

1 The c0nduc.t of T a r i s an a r t , depending upon free, creative a c t i v i t y , . s c i w t i f i c a l l y grounded. I t makes t h e highest demands on t h e personality.New means of 2 . The conduct of war i s ba sod on cont inuous development warfare c a l l f o r t h ever changing employment. Their use must be anticipated, t h e i r influence must be c o r r e c t l y estimated and quickly u t i l i z e d .3. Situations i n mar a r e of unlimited variety. They change often and Incalculable elemcnts suddenly and only r a r e l y a r e from the f i r s t discernible. The independent w i l l of t h e enemy i s p i t t e d a r e often of g r e a t i&luence. against ours, W i c t i o n and mistakes a r e of every day occui-rence,4 . T ~ Bteaching of the cbhduct of war cannot be concentrated exhausti~rel y i n regulationsb Tho p r i n c i p l e s so enunciated must be employed dependent upon t h e s i t u a t i o n &

.

Simplicity of oonduct, l a g i c a l l y carried through, w i l l most surely a t t a i n the objective. 5. War i s the severest t e s t of s p i r i t u a l and bodily strength. I n war, character outweighs i n t e l l e c t * Many stand f o r t h on the f i e l d of b a t t l e who i n peace would ranain unnoticed. Armies a s well a s l e s s e r u n i t s dm-and leaders of good judgment, c l e a r thinking and f a r seeing, leaders with independence and decisive resolution, leaders with perseverance and energy, leaders n o t emotionally moved by the varying fortunes of war, leaders w i t h a high sense of r e d p o n s i b i l i t y r6.

7. The o f f i o e r i s a leader and a teaoherr Besides h i s knowledge of men end h i s sense of j u s t i c e he must be distinguished by h i s supericr .knowledge and experienoe, his earmstness, his self-control and high courage.

8. The example and personal con%uot of p f f i e e r s and n o n - c n ~ i s s i o n o d o f f i c e r s a r e of decisive influence on the troops. The o f f i c e r who i n the face of t h e enany i s cold-blooded, decisive and courageous inspire8 h i s troops onward. The o f f i c e r must likewise find the way t o the hearts of h i s subordinates end gain t h e i r t r u s t through a n understanding of t h e i r f e e l i n g s and thoughts and through never ceasing care of t h e i r needs.

Mutual t r u s t i s t h e surest b a s i s of d i s c i p l i n e i n necessity and danger.

9. I n a l l s i t u a t i o n s every leader must e x e r t , without evasion of responsibility, h i s wholo p3rsonality. Willing and joyful acceptMce of res p o n s i b i l i t y i s the distinguishing c h a r a o t e r i s t i c o f leadership. This does not man t l a t t h e subordinate should seek an a r b i t r a r y decision without proper consideration of the whole o r t h a t he s h o d $ n o t obey orders p r e c i s e l y or t h a t he should l e t h i s f e e l i n g of g r e a t e r knowledge t a l e precedence over obedience. Inde~endenceof a c t i o n should never be based upon oontrariness. Independence of action, properly used, i s o f t e n tho b a s i s of great suoceas,I n s p i t e of technique, the worth of man i s t h e decisive factor. 1 s i g n i f i c m c e i s increased i n group combat. Its

The emptiness of the b a t t l e f i e l d demands independently thinking and aating fighters, vho, congidering sach s i t i n t i o n , a r e dominated by the convfct i o n , boldly and dcoisivcly t o aot, and dotomined t o a r r i v e a t success.Being accustcmd i;o physical ~ccomplishments, laok c f consideration of s e l f , w i l l power, s e l f confidence, a d courage qualify a man t o master the most d i f f h u l t situdtions. Report No. 14,507.-1.-

1 . The vrorth of leaders and men determined t h e b a t t l e worth of t h e 1 troops, which i s supplemented by the possession, care and maintenance of arms and equipment

.

Superior b a t t l e worth can equalize numerical i n f e r i o r i t y . The higher t h e b a t t l e worth, the more vigorous and v e r s a t i l e can war be executed. Superior leadership and superior troop b a t t l e readiness a r e r e l i a b l e portents of victory. 12. The leaders must l i v e with t h e i r troops, p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e i r dangers, t h e i r wants, t h e i r joys, t h e i r sorrows. Only i n t h i s way can they estimate the b a t t l e worth and the requirements of the troops,hlan i s not responsible f o r himself alone, but also f o r h i s comrades. X &o can do more, who has g r e a t e r capacity of accomplishment must i n s t r u c t e the inexperienced and weaker.

Frem suah conduct the feeling of r e a l comradeship develops, which i s j u s t a s important between the leaders and t h e men as between t h e men tliemselves. 13. Tmops only superficially, and ience, welded together, more e a s i l y f a i l unexpected crises. Therefore before the maintenance of steadiness and d i s c i p l i n e .ing, i s of decisive importance. not through long t r a i n i n g and experunder severe conditions and under outbreak of war the development and i n the troops, a s well a s t h e i r t r a i n ?

%cry commander i s enjoined immediately t o intervene vritn a l l powers a t his disposal agninst any relaxation of d i s c i p l i n e , against excegses, plund- ering, panic and other damaging influence.

fit

to

Discipline i s fundarnontal i n an army, i t s s t r i c t mintenance a bene- all,

14. The strength of the t r o o p s must be able to meet the highest demands i n decisive moments. H who unnecessarily f a t i g u e s the troops jeopardizes eSUCCCSB.

The strength ellp?lo$d i n b a t t l e must stand i n preportion t o t h e ob- jective desired. Unrealizable demands prejudice the t r u s t i n the leaders and shako t h e s p i r i t nf the troops. 15. From the youngest s o l d i e r on q?the omploymont o f every s p i r i t u a l and bodily power i s demanded t o t h e utmost. Only i n sueh conduct i s the f u l l power of accompliahmcnt of the troops achieved. So do men develop and maintain t h e i r courage and pwrers of decision i n hours of s t r e s s and c a r r y fofmurd with them t o greater deeds t h e i r weaker comrades.Tfio f i r s t demand i n w a r i s decisive action. Everyone, the highest comaader end the nost junior soldior, must be avraro t h a t o m i s s i 9 ~ sand neg- l e c t s i n c r i a m t e himmore severely than the mistake of choice of mans.

Report No. 14,507.

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I.

War Organization

-- Troop D i s t r i b ~ t t i o n r

16. The o r g a n i z a t i o n of war e s t a b l i s h e s tho r c g u l a r command and ndminIt i s ordered b y t h e IIigh i s t r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s of t h e army i n t h o i l c l d . Command (War ~ c p a r t m o n t )and b y it only can be cbaged. 17. T h e F i e l d h and army troops. y c o n s i s t s of armies, u n i t s of army cavalry, a i r u n i t s

18, An Amp c o n s i s t s o f I n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s ( a l l r e g u l a t i o n s enunciated f o r I n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s a p p l y f o r t h e other arms, i n so f a r a s t h e y a r e conducted a s Idant&, &d o t h e r r e g u l a t i o n s t h e r e f o r a r e not e x p r e s s l y p b l i s h ed), which a s a r u l e a r e grouped .under corps commanders a s Army Corps. Corps have corps troops, armies, army troops. Several armies m q be formed i n t o an Amy Group. 19. The u n i t s of Field Army Cavalry a r e g e n e r a l l y Cavalry d i v i s i o n s . as

Several Cavalry d i v i s i o n s may be grouped under a Corps commander a Cuvalry Corps, t o which a r e added corps troops.

The a t t a c h m n t of Field Army Cavalry u n i t s i n general i s l i m i t e d t o Army Groups m d armies. Units of t h e a i r arm a r e t h e a i r u n i t s (reconnaissance echelons, 20. a t t a c k ( p r s u i t ) squadrons nnd bomb% squadrons) and t h o a i r defonse troops. Units of t h e a i r arm can b e a t t a c h e d t o army groups, armies, army or Cavnlry corps, arvl oxceptionnlly t o I n f a n t r y and Cavalry clivisicns. 21. The following belong t o t h e F i e l d Army t r o o p s : s t a f f f o r s p e c i a l q l o y m e n t , bicycle-, motorcycle-, machine gun-, minenlvcrfer-, nnd t a n k defense u n i t s , motorized recopnaissance b a t t a l i o n s , a r t i l l e r y , including observation b a t t a l i o n o and b a l l o o n platoons, t a n k u n i t s , chemical troops, onginecr m d s i g n a l units, s p e c i a l t r o o p s end u n i t s of t h e s e r v i c e s of supply. 22. The I n f a n t r y and Cavalry d i v i s i o n s a r e t h e s m a l l e s t u n i t s which organi c a l l y a r e capable of independent operations. They have a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l t h e m a n s f a r independent cambat missions and sustenanoe.23. Amy and Corps t r o o p s a r a organized s i m i l a r l y t o F i e l d Army troops. The supply s e r v i c e s of Corps troops a r e o n l y so l a r g e a s a c t u a l l y n e c e s s a r y t o supply t h e Corps troops.

24. The troops a r e distributed i n nccord,mce with t h c needs for s t r a t e g i c a l and t o c t i c a l emploporit (advance gucrd, r e a r guard, f l a n k guard, march columns, b a t t l e groups). The u n i t s a s organized a r c m a i n t l i n e d i n t h e i r i n t e g r i t y a s f a r a s possible.25. Laadors a r e senior end subordinate. T h e higher 1es.dership ombraces commaIulers of a1 1 u n i t s dolnn to i n c l u d e I n f a n t r y 'and C a v n l r j d i v i s i o n s , t h o l a v e r a l l s?nr,ller c o m d s . 26. ( ~ r u ~ ~ o r i l " u h r eThe t r o o p comr~wder i s one pcrmmently o r tcmporcrily r) indopendently i n oomand of e. u n i t of a l l ttrms (combined arms).11

Xcport No. 14,507.

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11. -----Leadership. ---27. Great. successes presume boldness juQmnent.

darin~ preceded by

;ocd

28. !'le never have a t our d i s p o s a l a l l t h e d e s i r e d f o r c e s f o r tlie d e c i s i v e a c t i 0 3 . Be :'rho w i l l b e s c c w e everyi~hereor vho f i x e s f o r c e s i n secondary t a s k s a c t s c o n t r a r y t o tile i"uidm.cntal+Thm wczitcr f o r c e , t h r o u ~ hspeed, !nobility, & r e a t march accomplishmnents, utilization of d a r h s s and t h e t e r r a i n t o t h e A r l l e s t , s u r p r i s e and d e c e p t i o n , can b e t h e s t r o n c n r a t t h e d e c i s i v e a r e a ,29. Time ar:3 space must be c o r r e c t i y e s t i m a t e d , f a v o r a b l e s i t u a .-. t i o n s q u i c l r l : ~recor,nized acd d e c i s i v e l y e x s l o i t c d . hvery advantagi- over the eneiny i n e l e a s e s OLW oi-m ficcdom o Y a o t i o n .

30. RZpidi t:r of a c l i o n i n t h e diSplacs!x?i?nt of troops ca be a s s i s t e d g r e a t l y o r retardi:d t y t h e roeds a d s t r e e t n e t s alld by t h e t e r r a i n conditions. The season, t h e n e a t h e r , t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e t r o o p s , a r e a l s o of irlfluence.

3 . The d u r a t i o n of s 4 ~ r a t e f ; i c a l nd t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s cannot a always be foreseen. Successful engagements of t e n proceed slovlly. Often a t h e s u c c e s s of t o d a y ' s b a s t l e is f i r s t r e c o ~ l j z d -tomorror;.

S u r p r i s e of t h e a ~ e ~ i z i a d e c i :live i'actcr iii a success. is Actions based on su:?rise a r e only of isreat succes~? .:ihe:i we do not permit t h e enemy t o t a k e adequate countcr izea:ura-s.2 .

The ene.:iy ~ ~ i j . 11,ilrev'ise endeavor to make u s e of s u r p r i s e . 1 conduct must ta& t h j s i n t o consideration.

Our

5 . The kno:?led;;e of the h o s t i l e l e a d e r s h i p and Tire;- p r i n c i p h s can i n f l u e n c e t h e d e c i s i o n arid a i d our h a t t l e condv-ct, bu-? i t m o t n e v e r load t o preconceptions.

34. Those condi:i.ons :;hich f a c i l i t a t e t h e conduct of -;Jar i n our l a n d , make i t more difi'ic:llt i n f o m i ~ n land.?, r e q l l i r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

up.

35. I n s t r e n u o u s col?lbat,troopa are soonx!orn out and a u i c k l y u s e d The f o r c e s m u s t r e c e i v e t i m e l y r e i n f c r cu51e1:t s i n l e i d e r s , men, nnimale , b a t t l e ;leecis and vrnr m a t c r h l f i of a l l lcinds.36.

Tho mission and t h e s i t u a t i o n form xhe basis of t h e fiction.

The mission desi(y-att.s t k c objt c t i v e t o be at1;ained. The l e a d e r m u s t never ;"or;et h i s micsion. A :nission 7:bi.ch iridicatos s e v e ~ a l -tcnk,s e a s i l y divi:riz from ttic . x i n objcctivo. Obscurity of t h a s i t u a t i o n i s t h a r u l e . Seldon c i l l one have exact i n f o r m t i o n of t h e a a ~ y . Clarif'ication of the h o a t i l e s i t u a t i o n Is a self-evirtent; demand. :icv;ever, t o wait. i n t e n s e s i t c a t i o n s for inf a r m t i o n , is seldom a token of s t r o n s lcadersb.%p, cfbm of weakness.37. The clecisior, a r i s e s froin t h e mission and .tile s i t c a t i o n . Should t h e mi@s io n no l o n g e r o?.rffi ce a s t h e 2.1ndamental o' conduct o r f I s it changed by event.9, t h e d e c i s i o n -t t a k e t h e s e ccnisiderations i n t o account. Ire 7.7bo chm,es h j s m i s s i o n o r iice s not execute t'ie one g i v e n !iiust r e p o r t h i s a c t i o n s a t or~ceand assulEs a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e consequences. Re mst al.rq.rs ke q~ i n mind -the whole s i t u e t i o n .

The d e c i s i o n n q s t d e p i c t a c l e a r o b j e c t i v e aimed a t m i t h t h e ,::hole f o r c e . The s t r o n g 7 1 i l l of t h e c m a a n d e r rflust s u p p o r t it. Often t h e s t r o n g e r r-rill g a i n s t h e success.

' : r i M o r ~ t -$er;; ~ o o d r:;asons a d e c i s i o n occe ziade should not be abandoned. I f x s v c r , i n t h2 vicissi.';udcs of liar an irif!.exi b l e mainte.;ar:ce o? tilo ori:,inal. d c c i s i o ~ :map l e a d t o p e s t raint5Kes. Timely reco:;nition o-r L i cor:di tici::; h and the t i m 3 i c h c a l l f o r ' a :le*;/ d e c i s i o n ; h i s a11 a a . $ t r i h u t r . of .iflie a r t o leafi*.r-.hip. r%a c ,~~ma::.?cr t p e r n i t freedoxx of a c tio:l t o h i s s . o r d i ~ . a t e s !!?us 1k : w i n s o t a r % h a t t h i s 6% s not e!n$ail;;er -tl::e ~ d01s .sche;~~e Iie m t n o t suz?.cnder t o tl-im t'losc d o c i s i o n s f o r irhich ic alone in ~,nsponsi.bl.c.

.

Z?. Tho combs-t ( d m ~ e f e c h)t by lm$;e arr0.y v n ' i t s t h e b a t t l e ( d i e Rchlac:-~t) - is the armed c o n f l i c t v h i c h e n s u e s -idlcn t:.ro opponoxts come taf;otknr.39. Thh- attack; is launchod i n ordor t o d o f c a t t h o oneniy. Tho a t t a c k e r h a s t h e i n i t i a t i v e . S u p e r i o r i t y of l c a d c r s h i p and of t r o o p s sl!o:-I t o t h e b e s t a 3 v a n t a ~ ei n t h o a t t a c k . Success does not il?.;ays c01!1e y t o s u g e r i o r i t oi' nm;te?s.

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I n s y c i a l i n s t a n c e s t k e o b j e c t i v e o f an a t t a c k may hel i m i b ed.

?'he p o s s i b i 1 f . t y t hzt m a t t a c k clay m i s c a r r y siiould n e v e r gemlit t h e f e t t e r i n & :of e n e r f ; e t i c l e a d e r s h i p from t h e f i r s % .p ~ r s u i t-ec:-s t:?e f r u i t s oi' v i c t o r , . It . s t r i v e s t o d e s t r o y 66::; tr::.ction was not possi.ble i n t h e l)i.eceding engageOnly a t h o r 0 ~ ~ . ! 1 - ~ .:j0 ir~ .l e n t l e s s p u r s u i t , vriiich ;ci-'eiients t!le e enemy f r o n gaiv.ini. t i to r e s t and r e c i l p e r a t e , ea.ies w r s e l v e s s a c r i f i c e s n e c e s s i t a t e : i: -:-le pps?r.~it +he enemy t o f o r c e a n o t h e r d e c i ~ i ~ , e art;q;ement.40.

' .

the enemy, x h i c h

41. The defeasa -;!&its f o r t h e opponent. prescribe t h e battle terrain.

Tho dcl'cnder s e e k s t o

The d e f e n s e is chostzl when our o m i ; l f e r i o r i t y p e r n i t s r,o o t h e r choice, o r i f :'or o-the r r e a s o n s it ap2ears adv&tajeous. The d n f s i held t o t h e l a s t . The comrm-der ( l e a d e r s h i p ) m y lini-i; the t i n e of t h e d e f e w e .A d e c i siv e v i c i;oly caSF:

has t h e laission of s i m t t e ~ i i ? i ;t h e enemy at-tack.

FoY t h i s purpose, t h e a t t a c k is r e c e i v e d i n n ci-re11 t e r r a i n , 1-rliicll is

be aclliuved only by an o i i a l s i Y e r e t u r n .

The d e l a y i ~ l t :a c t i o n h a s t h e m i s s i o n of i n f l i c t i q ; h i c h l o s s e s on t h e enemy w i t h o u t p e c l i t t i n : ~ a decisi-ie a c t i o n t o r e s u - l t . Fm t h i s t pur?,ooe .;re m u s t .;iitildri?-:! in ti!= f ~ o r n h o hoati2.c a t t a c k a&d @ v e t e r r a i n f o r timc.42. the b a t t l e en~;+;;.ai:unt ing a c t i o n

RreaLin, W f .in en(;ageiI:.ent has t h e pur20so o f t e m i n a t i n z . o r ,jvi?;i UP tP.e .former p o s i t i o n i n order t o c o n t i i l l s t h e a t a moro fa-;o:-able p o s i t i o n . 1x1 t h e l a t t e r i n s t a n c e d e l a y i s oTton e??gloyc?d.

lliust

43. Tho r e t r e a t i n t e n d s t o avoid t ~t h e r combat. The engage-wnt r for t h i s purpo;.e b:, tcn:xinated and tho oithd~.arral of' the t r o o p s be

.protected.44. The chacgir?: f o r t u w s of b a t t l e du.;.:mh o f t e n t h e p a s s i n g ihrn one t y p e of a~&a&clzion.to another. t

!:?port bmb

No. 14,556.

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The pacsage fmr:? a t t a c k t o defense i s mcconiplished by holdin:; c t!?e t e r r a i n -.iliich hai; b curl $&en, or ,' if SEc c s s u r y , unitur hos l i l c u . i . x s ~ l x o . T!!e t l o op; a r c r ~oi1r!cd, dio pcnsablc Tor cos :-ri thdra,;m from t!1c f line. I n t h e gar:;a.-;c fro.;? t h e dcfonzc t o t:ic a t t a c k t h c tiincly c o n c o n t r a t i o n of stro?:> fwco:; a t dccici-yo area:: i c of dcciciv;, iin- pcrtmcc. 45. Dc:aying a c t i o n aqmids a d o c i s i o n . tlic mcmy hurjy ars! dcccivcd. Fui1:t a t t a c k t j ,pmvido dcccption. Thc ;;i&th of battle: zoncs and s c c t o r s is dcpcndcnt u ~ o n tho i n t m t i e n s , the istin tin{ aCJaccnt s u p p o r t and t h c t e r r a i n . I t is inr f l u c n c c d by t h c conduct an? breadth. of t h u c n c ~ a s 1-10ll a s hy o m o r bqtB opcri f1an::s. %?c b r c a d t h of zonos and. s c c t o r s is d i f f c r m t . G r o a t c r brr~adthc,n r s pcrrfie s i b l c i n fa701,ablc t o r r a i n , i;spc c i a l l l ; if i t is a r t i f i c i a l l y r c i n f m c i d . Grcatrir b r c a d t h s can uc u c d i f no a m ~ l o y b a t t l e Lroups. Great bre*O.ths can b r i n ~t o e a r l y frui.tio!i t h e c n t i r e ow t r o o p to a s t a n d e f f e c t of t h e am.?, bu'i. thoy can prematurely b r i . n ~ s t i l l . Too ;;reat b r e a d t h c r e c t e s t h e d m g e r of a p e n e t r a t i o n , t o o riarrov, e c p c c i a l l y inthou",eep or;anim,Lion, the clon;er of envelopme~~t im or l e ~ a s i o nof t h o p o s i t i o n by t h e enemy. I n an at-Lrc!; an i n i t i ~ bre?.dth g r e a t e r t h n -th?.t of t h e ene;;l:; ri1r.y be t h e forerutmer of g r e c t e r s u c c e s s .,v' ,. o

It \-rill g a i n t i m c , keep

I n unc:.rxified s i t u c . t i o n c , or;;nniz?.tion i n de;?th p r e s e r v e s freedoin of c c t i o n f o r t h e com:i,".mler. & p i n s t -.more r.-.pidlg moving eneiny or one ;:rith p o n t e r m o b i l i t y i s such o r ~ m i z n t i o nr.l:i?.y^.y:; proper i n i t i C n . l l p . in At t h e d e c i s i - e ? r e ? t h e r e ir, norm".lly t h e dcr?;..~id f o r or;;:niz.?tion depth. The c m t " . n d e r must d i o t r i b u t e h i s f o r c e s i n d e p t h ?nd breq.dth b e f o r e c o n t z c t ?.nd during, t h e b ? t t l c , -.ccordin{, t o t h e n i t u l t i o n . 47. Durin:.: t?e course of the b , - t t l e t h e c o m ? n d e r i n f l u e n c e s t h e b -.ction t ~ o s t r o n ~ l y y t h e concentr.?.tion ?ad i n c r e c s e of f i r e ?ad tkrou,h ~ t t h e a n p l o p ~ ~ e no r h i s r e s e r v e s . t Ammunition o u p p l i c s hcld ::lobile, m - b l c him t o i n c r e c s o t h e i'ire e f f e c t i v c n e a s r.t tho d c c i s i v o r.rc,:. z t t h e d e c i c i v c t i m e ,".11d t o inf l u e n c e t h e en~?gcmcnt cvcn ? . f t e r h i s roscrvLs hcvc becrl coimiit ted.

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D i s t r i b u t i o n , loc?.tion .-ad eiap1oyf1or.t of thc r e s e r v o s r c q u i r c o c.?rcftil considcr?.tion. M o b i l i t y i n c r o z s c s tilo p o n s i b i l i t i o s f o r t h e i r urployinent.2'0 m?2:c tho foir coy c i ~ ~ p l o y5 dt h e f r o n t l i n e t o o wc:lk i n 1 1 ~ o r d o r t o f l v o r r. l z r g c r ~ o s c r v c ,oi'+on i1c.-11s t h o l o s s of t h s succsss n . : y lo-.& to 4ofw.t ii; d c t n i l . TI1cr1; ?.re ir~st.-.nccsi n \-&ich it 4s b o t t o r t o b o l d no r c s c r v z a .

U n i t s uf conbincd ?.r.r,.x".re p ? r t i c u l o . r l y ' s u i t z b l o .-.s r o s o r v c s t t s+i?$?n l l c s ~-20 c.-.p?blc of indcpondcnt c c t i o n . The d i e n l p t l o n of s u c h .mits " ;.rill n s t h o f r i t t w i r i a :??a: of r o s u r v c s i s t o b c ?Void~d. aInmC

; d m

it $8 fl?n!;

Tho l o a n t i o r . of t h o r c s c r v o dcponds upon its p r o b ~ , h b ploytho tor,Yr.i]l. I t o t b i o l y c?mployacnt must bc caaurod. Wnomlly t o b c o c h o l o 1 ~ 3hohind t+tc f l n r k . ~ i s t - = c ox d iatcrvp.1 from t h c iricrczsos i r i t h t h o s i z o af t h o ?csc?vc.

Rcport No. 14,556.-6-

A i-eserva h:??d xiell seek is p m t e,cteil z~d i t s a.l_olop,io;?t i n i~ reserTJo f ~ u ~ t l ~ o r a c c o l c r - Tor-:lard d i f f e r e n t d h o c t i o i x ; i.3 ;:;icilitated. is a t e 6 i t s i n t c r s c n t i c i - i j.11 tlte b a t t l e . The s u r e r t h o coim~liuzd~r of t h o oi:~pls:{mc~?t thu r,.:scr-vc G:?. - t k i n r s ir.riiinont t h i s ci.:plo3lllcnt i s , tho of n0ari.r tlir: f r a n t ,::ill, i-5 !Inuall:r d e r i v e d froii t h o :;ener&l im~x~ls&::eel" h i s r~ethccia 01- a r e pi.@cuved from s p e c i a l sources cf i n ;or:!ation. A i r and. c r o ~ ' a droconr.ai ssar.ce , he s e a r c h i n g f o r of' ~ mid c c n t i n u a l o b s o ~ - ~ o t i o n thc: a:cr;y, and i i i i . ~ l . ~ ; : t i o rs e c w e d t!lrou;;h : ' s ~ ~ c i r?eans prot'i;ii? a uo;-c d o f i n i t e p i c t u r u 0 tho hosti2.e r w c c . , i l o n ~ a l ;?ith a c c u r a t e i n f c r l i ~ t i o nw.d r e p o r t s .;IO i.m.st roclton on inco1:i~lote%id inaccurate i n f m i a t i c n . >YC,:,I t h e ~ i i l o l tho cm.i~mcicrj.s able to d r m ~ c c r r c c t co!?cli?si.,ns . i p p o r ~ n t l 7 mir.ipm t m t d e t a i l s n a y , i n connection ,;.ith othc r r c p o r t s , hni-c c a-mid crcblr: ;lor th.

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Zvcry r c ] ~ o r - tad Yio hc:;"si:li'~r~:iatioil oro of l i t t l c o 110 r volur! ;ihf;n t h e y r n a c h t c n l c t c : t:ic corilia.n!: f r - : h i c h thcy nrn j.ntzn$od. i49. 7 i t h i n h i s a r e a oT o p e r a t i o n s , e v e r y co.manfier is respoiisible f o r t h e contir;u.al recoi:naiissan.ce of t h e h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n and % r t e r r a i n Imot:iledi,e both da:? and ni;,ht. Contact once zained u i t h t h e enemy n l ~ l s . i ; be rflaint ained.

A l l conlulmders arc: en joincci, a s e a r l y arid t o t h e ,&reatesT o t e x t e n t p o s s i b l e , t in.:orc~ tt)lt: hj-h+- 7 comncns?e r of -the s i i , ~ ~ aoni and t o t r a m m i t a l l importar t inforlna t i o n .

50. I n hi:;iier co:~mmds, if' n e c e s s a r y a l s o by l o r - I C ~ commands, an o r f i c e r i s char::ed ?d.th t h e e'valua'bion of reconnzissarice r e s u l t s s p e c i a l reports. I n f m i a t i o n a d raporbs i~iustb e d i s c ~ i n ~ i n a t e ley a l u a t e d , v is Any a t t m p t t o deeuce ~~1ia.t d e s i r e d by us or is-810s t f a v o r a b l e t o u s , ;nus t be avoided,

5 . The one ;.!al:ix a r e p o ~ t nust e q r e s s hirilse7.f clear-ly end 1 r p ~ ~ i t i ~ e l He . ms-i; d L f f e r e n t i a t e bewe,-n ,,>:!at he lias s e e n , v ~ h a tar.o'iher y !:as n o t e d o r s t a t e d , arid :-t>at is preswied. he s o u r c e of the i n f orrmtion lmst b e s t a t e d . 5;u?picions must have bases.52. mom in::

.

Exact stotei,lonts as t o numbers, t i m e and p l a c e have ~ e o t -

I t i s o f t e n of g . r e c t v s l u e t o l o a m . I-here t h e enemy hos n o t i been rne t ~ r i t h , ,?he ~ o n f j ~ r m a tn oof' previous inf'onnnt ion a d t h e proof of unchanged condi.tion; i n a s p e c i f i e d t,imo W e also of g e o t v a l u e ,n c p o r t No. 14,556.

Important i n f o i ~ u a t i o na s t o t e r r a i n is to be addod ? o t h e r e p c r ts c oncemiin[, thii oner,?y.53. The c o n t e n t s and r e l i a b i l i t y of & p o r t s , not t h e i r numbers, ai-e the 5:mportan-i ~ a t t c ? . R ~ p o r t smust cal;nly d e p i c t thc events. Exag&;orated rscports ace dctrairliontrd., soino t h e s d i s a s t r o u s . Colored r e p o r t s lEIdcr1~net r u s t and ma!rc t h ~ conniland o r u n c e r t a i n .

F i r s t c o n t a c t nit:? t h e cllc:~ny is aL\'~a:is t o he r c p o r t c d , w l c s s o t h c r c ~ i s oordered. I n o t h e r ciFcu.mortin; agoncy, l o a d thc c n r m l i c a L i o 11s sys texi wid r,al:t: more d i l f i c u l t tile corm,iailder's conaim t. I~lportan';:i n f o m a t i o n of tile ene;ny inay demand v e r i f i c a t i o n .54. B a t t l e i t s e l f m a - i d e s t h e o!ost r o l i c . b l e meam of e s t i l ; a t i n & t h e memy.

Reports dui-lnc, b a t t l e a r e i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r ihe co~cluc of t t h ~ n~agcr~icnt e During t h e combat, r o p o r t s nlust be c o n t i n u a l l y made about t h e enemy and our cml s i t u a t i o n , t h e t e r r a i n and t h e armunition supply. Camrnuicatin;; i m y r e s s i o n s , su[;[>estions f o r exp1oi.ti.n; f a v o r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t h e t e r r a i n f a c i l i t a t e t h e f o r x u l a t i i q of d e c i s i o n s . Pauses i n the b a t t l e a r e t o be, u t i l i z e d -to - ~ d dt o t,he informatio!: reported. At t h e approach of darlniess, h a s t y b a t t l e r c p o r t s a r e of p r t i c u l a r value t o t h e 11j~gller omand. c At .Lt~cclout: of a b a t t l e . Lhe f o l l o r , i l i ~ clessages s i i o ~ l dbe s e n t 7-!ithout delay: '7liici1. h o s t i l e t r o o p s a r e o p p o s i t e , h m tho en.em:r coiidl>Cts l ~ i r n s e l f , i n -!hat coridj.tion he i s , our owl situatio!?, o w muniticn3, e t c .55. I n pressin;. s i t m t i o n r ; , r e p o r t s r m t he made ilct o n l y t o t h e . n e s t s e n i o r c o m a 2 o r but io t h e s e n i o r coml-amder ( ~ r u p p e 1 1 f ~ r e . i )Troops threateneri by t h o e n e m y , r e p r t t h i s i r m e d i a t e l y viithont ro;;ard t o o t h e r - m e s s u ~ os e n t siniultctneoi~sl;r t o s e v e r a l co.w:ia!ldnrs A . n c c c s s a r y pressa(;es. c o n t a i n s t h i s i n f o r m t i o n of thi? enbilly.

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56. Mcid;l?ori dctnchmcrts muo t comunicatc imnpmtmt okseruat i o n s concornitv; thc ci-my ail& cb,anfps i n t h e i r o-m s i t l ~ n t i o n .57. Tho l!lo:rc dcb?j. li? rcpori; f r c q u c n t l y r ounds out tlm p i c t u r e Tt~cs h o r t iness,?.;,os sorli imi'1cdi?.telq' a f t c r tho p-.intec? by t h e :nesszLcs. b a t t l e do not e l i ~ i i i n ? . t ct3.c n c c c s s i t y f u r b?.ttle re;:% ls. T l ~ c s ca r c t o b i m?.;?o ,-.s soon 2 s ;.cssiblo M t ~ t ho b n t t l c . r Tkcreforc d u r i n ~ ;thc b,?.ttl.o i t i s nccr;ss?ry t o i-71 t c dw;!n tcmpor?.?:ilg- ?.i~d t o orr:>nza c:?il?.t is l a t o r t o kc r ~ p c r t c d .

Orders and nessa;;es 1-hich have been issuet? dirrily; aud have 1 i n f u e n c ed %lie er?;a;;er,~en.c , .,ri 1 be inclu-ied i n t h e report or added a s inclosures.58. I?Ie v e r y hi.:;he r :leadquarters, silxla t ion ]raps o r e t o be k e g t and the s i t u a t i o n thereon posted. Ace ~ r f i i n - ;to t h e needs thoy must o d e p i c t t h e h o s t i l e e i ' ; ~ ~ a t in , our 01-m si'uatio n and inforrna t i o n Of n e i g h b o r i r ~u n i t s . T i a s e f a c i l i t a ' t e Lci.:nsu, r i l l n e c e s s a r y o r d e r s iswsed by t1:e aomnlander on tb.e supply s e r v i c e s a r c issued as . s , ~ i a l oi-dem. Z

3 1 s p c i a 1 o r d e r s {;o onlly t o t h e co::lmad. concerned. If 1 t h e s e comni!:: :lo not r e c e i v e t h e o c e r a t i o n s o r d z r , t h e s p e c i a l o r d e r :mrst c o n t a i n t h e n e c e s s a r y i n f m i a t i o n ~ . I I ~ ~ - R S ~ O : , ~ .

. 8'3. D a i l y o r d e r s ( c o r i : ~ . ,d i .jisiori, e t c . , d a i l y mii.i:~*s) :.elate t o t h e i n t e r i . or ecoilo!-:~yoi.' t l ~ ecom1laix3 m a i o r i a l s p e r s o n a l 1ra tiiers , roccC;nitioils, e t c .

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S t a f f ori?err, reilfi-atn t h e i n t e r i o r economy of ' . c ro f f i c o r s :;boy r c l o r t tb.e d e s t i i l a t i o n of t h e i r mssa;s. As thny ~ i d r ; a r~iarchcolunil tl?ey l i k a - r i a o report to t h e c m m a ~ d e ra 3 riel1 as by t o the advanco ( - r o a r ) C:uiai.d conl.mmdor; a,? thr::! pass s c c u r j t y f a r c c s -t?.cy r e p o r t to tile i l e a r e s t col-~!r:wd e r . I:i s e r i o u s or tllreatenin:; sitzl.at ions t h e y c a l l o u t t h o contelits of '&LC inessai;e t o t h e coimardcrs and t h e They rnmt be inst_*ucted t o a;;!? f o r t h e l o c a t i o n of the corilr~alder tloo:!s. t o 7:ihon t3.e ordeer or m e s s q e is direc-bed. B i c y c l i s t s conduc t t h e n s e l v e s s i n i l a r l y t o nooiu?tedr;essw.;;ers. >'roc. ~ i o t a r c y c l eriessengers t h e c o n t e n t s of i.lessai;es cannot of ten. 3e denailded. Hj.&her corma;ders and cormmders of r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o i l s a r e a u t h o r i z e d t o reod riessa.;es yassi11;; -then, b i ~ t +,i~:i t unduly imst n o d e l a y i t s t r a n s n i s s i o n . They r l w t n o t e on t h e i z s s a g e t h a t they have l e a r n e d of i t s contellts.A l l colxm~~d s a r e er: joined L ~ o i i l to?it -the ?lily t o cr o t Every element i-.us r.lesscilge rs , a l l t r o olx t o nalco i-lay f ol> r2Bssengors. a s s i s t i n getti!lL t h e m s s a z e i,hroq;h, if n e c e s s a r y b:r ~ r o v i d i : q trans;;ortation facilities.

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101. ;is a r u l e one o r more c r c s s e s pJLaceci 011 t h e nessage o r i t s c o n t a i n e r i n d i c a t e s tile speed bo be xaiiitaiiled by counted ,mssen;ers:

x = one k i l o n e t e r i n 7 t o xx = one k i l o n e t e r i n 5 t o

8 rlinutes.

ninutes.

0 If n e c e s s a r y , t h e q e e d of b i c y c l e and 110torcycle i;lessen:;ers i s indj.cated i n !:ilo!lecers per bour. 103. -:llxer. tile t r a n s n i s s i o i ; of messages and o r d e r s nust b e i:iade over long d i s t a n c e aild t r a r i s r i i s s i o n b'r si&aal -,leans cannot be a s s u r e d , i t m y b e c o r ~n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h d i s p a t c h r i d e r p o s t s . "Dispatch r i d e r s ' ! :?ay be ruumers, r.iounted nesselli;ers, b i c s and mwntod c l i s t s or m t a r c y c l i s t s . i s o r i s t i . RUILI?~TS riesser.{;eTs a r e t o be used oriiy if b i c y c l i s t s and n o t o r c y c l i s t s a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e or if t h e t e r r a i n does n o t p e n l i t t h e i r u s c .1 The d i s t a n c e bet\-men "dj. s p a t & r i d e r " p o s t s depeads upon t h e lenfitll of t!r? ilistance to be t r a v e r s e c , t h e purpose of t h e ' f d l s p t c h l i n e w , and t!?e c o n d i t i o n of t h e roads aad t h e termain. The s t r e q t h of t h e post,s is deton.linod bg t h e i r d u r a t i o n , t h o m o u n t of c o ~ ~ w . i c a t i o r . t r a f f i c , and t h e n e c e s s a r y l o c a l s e c u r i t y .

105. C a r r i e r pifieons and riessenger dohe:: cor.Tand is res::onsible for c o r r m - ~ j c a t i o n *lie -to lower, f o r t h e c o n s t r u c i i o n and r.i:~ntenance +hereor.

Co!lr 7.ullic aTia n be b:/een r?ei ;;:ibori i?; o i e i e n t s is t o be i n liOr?- au:.;urated ax1d r m i i ~ t a i n ~ cjYor; t h e l e f t , ~ u ~ l e other'.!jse ordered. d ss e v e r , t h i s does not rele:ise t h - e l e r e n t of t h e ri,Jlt f r o n t!.e duty of establishin:; co:.:nlujlication t o t h e l e f t , i f t~is cor.?;lwicatioi? is lackin;;. h 107. I n 1.ar~:er c o r n ~ a ~ dt s e hi;;heY c a x ~ a n d s r:lay n i sxa tcl- l j a i s o n o f f i c e r s t o a t t a c h e d ~or.lnad.s a:ld to iiei;hbori:?: 'zits. These office?.^ i n f o r r i t h e wnits t o !-;;.:Tic!? s e n t of t h e i r t m t i o r i s o f t h e i r com.18nd-r and acquai?!t t h e n riitl: t h e s i t u a t i o n . Iil a d d i t i o l l t o c l e a r perceptiol: a?ld independent jud,.:.;!ei!t tlicae o f f i c e r s r e q ~ ~ l r e (;reat jnilital3, t a c t . :~15?.boi~ f r i e t j o n , t h e y sczi: t o a s c e r t a i n t h e ?::t:?~?tions a?id sr'ders uf tlle c s a l a n d e r s to {-$.or: they a r c s e n t , anti, b e f o r e sendin; their r q ? o r t s , t o tori.' incc t l i a ~ o e l v c ovrha ihjr i??