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210 • VALUATION VALUATION. 1. The a ct of valuing an object or state of affairs; 2. the value or worth attributed to the object in valuing it. See also VALUE APPERCEPTION. VALUE. 1. The activity of apprehending an object or state of affairs as valuable, that is, taking something to be pleasing or painful, likeable or dislikable, good or bad; 2. the object apprehended in a value appercep- tion . See also VALUATION. V ALUE APPER CEPT ION (Wertnehmung) . Taking something as valuable. Husserl uses the term Wertnehmung analogously to Wahrnehmung ( perception). In pe rception and the belief-modality that belongs to it, the subject takes the object to exist in a determinate manner and believes that taking to b e true. Hence, the subject t akes S as p as true. Similarly, in a value apperception , the subject takes—and believes— S to be valuable; the subject takes S p as v . This for malized way of stating the obje cts of pe rc eptio n a nd value apperception reveals the impo rtant founding relation be twe en the m. Hu sse rl c laim s b oth tha t v al ue s ( th at is, va lue d ob je cts ) a re constituted in feeling -acts or emotions and that this feeling-act (and the value sense it constitutes) are founded o n a presentation (and the cogni- tive sense it constitut es). In the exam ple, therefore, there is a underlying pr ese nta tion tha t c ons tit ute s th e se nse ‘ S as p ’ and founded upon this is the value apper ception constituting the sense ‘ Sp as v .’ The value attribute is founded on the descriptive proper ty available to a pu re cognition, but the value attribute itself is not available to pure cognition. It is disclosed by a f ee li ng or emo tio n. T he va lue appercep tio n is a un if ie d ac t ; it does not arise separately from the objectifying presentation. The founding relationship , howeve r, i s one-s ided suc h that the objectif ying presentati on can occur separately from the feel ing or em otion tha t constitutes the value apperception. See also CONSTITUTION; FOUNDATION; FOUNDED MOMENT; FOUNDING M OMENT; OBJECTIFYING ACT. VALUE ATTRIBUTE. The goodness (or badness) of a valued (or dis- valued) object. Th e attribute wil l be specified accord ing to the type of value involved (aesthetic, utilitarian, moral), the underlying descriptive features o f the o bject that make the object valuable, and the kind of feeling or emotion involved in the valuation of the object. See also VALUE APPERCEPTION; VALUE JUDGMENT. VALUE JUDGMENT. The explicit articulation of the value a ttribute of an object as belonging to the object. The value ju d g men t is founded upon
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210 • VALUATION
VALUATION. 1. The act of valuing an object or state of affairs; 2. the
value or worth attributed to the object in valuing it. See also VALUEAPPERCEPTION.
VALUE. 1. The activity of apprehending an object or state of affairs as
valuable, that is, taking something to be pleasing or painful, likeable or
dislikable, good or bad; 2. the object apprehended in a value appercep-
tion. See also VALUATION.
VALUE APPERCEPTION (Wertnehmung) . Taking something as valuable.
Husserl uses the term Wertnehmung analogously to Wahrnehmung (perception). In perception and the belief-modality that belongs to it, the
subject takes the object to exist in a determinate manner and believes that
taking to be true. Hence, the subject takes S as p as true. Similarly, in a
value apperception, the subject takes—and believes— S to be valuable;
the subject takes Sp as v. This formalized way of stating the objects of
perception and value apperception reveals the important founding relation
between them. Husserl claims both that values (that is, valued objects) are
constituted in feeling-acts or emotions and that this feeling-act (and the
value sense it constitutes) are founded on a presentation (and the cogni-
tive sense it constitutes). In the example, therefore, there is a underlying
presentation that constitutes the sense ‘S as p’ and founded upon this is the
value apperception constituting the sense ‘Sp as v.’ The value attribute
is founded on the descriptive proper ty available to a pure cognition, but
the value attribute itself is not available to pure cognition. It is disclosed
by a fee ling or emotion. The value apperception is a unified act; it does
not arise separately from the objectifying presentation. The founding
relationship, however, is one-sided such that the objectifying presentationcan occur separately from the feeling or emotion that constitutes the value
apperception. See also CONSTITUTION; FOUNDATION; FOUNDED
MOM ENT; FOUNDING MOMENT; OBJECTIFYING ACT.
VALUE ATTRIBUTE. The goodness (or badness) of a valued (or dis-
valued) object. The attribute will be specified accord ing to the type of
value involved (aesthetic, utilitarian, moral), the underlying descriptive
features o f the o bject that make the object valuable, and the kind of
feeling or emotion involved in the valuation of the object. See alsoVALUE APPERCEPTION; VALUE JUDGMENT.
VALUE JUDGMENT. The explicit articulation of the value attribute of an
object as belonging to the object. The value judgment is founded upon
