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www.time4education.comTriumphant Institute of
Management Education P Ltd
Nyayapati Gautam
NaxalismThe single biggest
threat facing India?
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Human cost
287 civilians and 113 security force
personnel killed in 2012 (Nov 30). In
2011 and 2010, the casualty figures were
611 and 1005 respectively.
10,268 casualties between 2005 and
2010
21 policemen were killed in a landmine
blast in Malkangiri, Orissa on July 16,
2008.
In Feb 2010, 24 personnel of the Eastern
Frontier Rifles (EFR) in West Bengal
killed.
April 2010 a landmine blast killed 11
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Human cost
P. Chidambaram on 31stDecember
2011: This year 447 civilians and 142
security personnel were killed as against
718 and 285 respectively in 2010.
According to PC, 2011 was a
satisfactory year as it had seen a
historic low level of terror and Naxalite-
related violence.
This is how we measure success with
reference to Naxalism.
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Origins
Throughout the fifties, the Terai region of
West Bengal, saw discontent brewing in
its tea gardens.
In 1964, when the CPI split and the
CPI(M) was formed, Charu Mazumdar
showed his undisguised inclination to the
Maoist line.
Naxalbari: The peasant agitation.
In May 1967, the first police bullet was fired,
triggering a violent phase in the movement.
May 25: The police fired at the demonstrators,
killing nine women and two children.
It was after this incident that the movementlost its agrarian character and became a
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The Spread of the
Movement Calcutta
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar & Jharkhand
Chhattisgarh
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Class Enemies
Naxal activists defined class enemies
rather broadly. Government employees,
judges and a vice-chancellor were
among those killed in Kolkata in class
action.
At the height of the movement, traffic
policemen were stabbed on the streets of
Kolkata.
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Sangam & DalamThe Red Corridor including Nepal
Flowing Water TheoryRural v/s Urban
Naxalism
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Impact
Social divisions
Economic and business related
POSCO
Security related.
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Steps that can be
taken Development
Jobs
Infrastructure development
Bridging the divide
Between the Haves and the Have nots.
Government and people.
Use of security forces
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Sun Tzu
Now an army may be likened to water, for
just as flowing water avoids the heights
and hastens to the lowlands, so an army
avoids strengths and strikes weakness.
And as water shapes its flow inaccordance with the ground, so an army
manages its victory in accordance with
the situation of the enemy. And as water
has no constant form, there are in war noconstant conditions.
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Inspiration - Mao
When the enemy advances, withdraw;
when he stops, harass; when he tires,
strike; when he retreats, pursue. Mao
Tse Tung
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Maos Strategy
Mao employed four elements of national
power in his theory of guerrilla warfare.
The general populace (peasant
population
of the rural areas) was the center of
gravity in his theory of guerrilla warfare.
A symbiotic relationship between
revolutionary soldiers and the citizenry.
"The (people) may be likened to water
and the (guerrillas) to the fish who inhabit
it. How
may it be said that these two cannot exist
together?".
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Maos Strategy
The guerrillas not only operated among
the people, they were dependent on them
for logistic and informational support.
It was absolutely key to have the people
in allegiance with the political aims of the
guerrilla forces and understand how it
concerned him .
This education process was to be
multifaceted and well developed, "by
word of mouth, by
leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers,
books and pamphlets, through plays and
films, through schools, through the mass
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Three Stage Process
At the strategic level, Mao managed
"victory in accordance with the situation
of the enemy" through a three-stage
process:
Strategic defensive
Strategic stalemate
Strategic offensive
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Strategic defensive
The forces are on the strategic defensive,
focused primarily on mobile, irregular
warfare to erode the strength of the
enemy and build one's own strength,
both militarily and politically.
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Strategic stalemate
The enemy has ceased his offensive
while friendly forces have control of
certain base areas and continue to
employ guerrilla tactics as well as some
conventional operations when and whereappropriate.
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Strategic offensive
Friendly forces assume the strategic
offensive
with the primary emphasis on
conventional
warfare to thoroughly defeat the
conventional forces of the enemy.
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Che & his Thoughts
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Che Guevara & Regis
Debray If a guerrilla operation is not in direct
contact with a socially favourable
situation, if the really powerful social
charge that is ready to explode is
somewhere else . then clearly theremust be a definite link there, between the
two, the detonator and the explosive, the
vanguard and the moving forces of the
revolution.
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Che Guevara & Regis
Debray That link is a system of communication
and supplies - men, information, orders,
arms and ammunition, food - operating in
both directions between the guerrillas
and the town centres.
Such a system is both technical and
political since the technical operation -
with contacts, couriers, reinforcements -
is inseparable from its political content,and the importance it is given in the
guerrillas' general scheme of things.
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Debray on Che
Che turned the traditional
actions of the revolutionaries
completely upside down.
Che's immediate objective was
not to seize power, but first of all
to build up a popular power with
its own effective organ of activity,an autonomous and mobile
military force
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Debray on Che
In his view, the establishment of
a popular power took
precedence over the seizure of
power in Bolivia. Indeed to Che it would have
been a real catastrophe if a
premature victory cut short his
plan for history: a plan whichcould only bear fruit in the
fullness of time, by delaying its
effects for as long as possible.
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Debray on Che
Responsibilities in Bolivia
would have prevented his long-
term plan from achieving
fulfilment.
the establishment of a seed-bed
of national vanguards which
would, bit by bit, spread over allthe countries on the continent.
This called for time and patience,
and from those involved, for a
certain spirit of sacrifice as
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Debray on Che
It would not have been wise to
get too close to the towns, or
to make it a tactical objective
to enter urban centres, for thatvanguard, with the form and
membership of a guerrilla
troop, that is to say of a mobilestrategic force, could only grow
and become established by
developing in the countryside.
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Andes the Sierra
Maestra of America
In the Sierra Maestra; the
column, as it developed,
produced off-shoots, separate
columns which grew in theirturn, and moved away to open
other fronts until the entire
territory was covered.
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Andes the Sierra
Maestra of America
The inherent advantages in
this type of organic
development have often been
pointed out: strategiccentralization and tactical
decentralization, unity of
purpose and diversity in waysof carrying it out
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DAU TRANH -
Struggle The Vietnamese adopted Mao's three
stage strategy a means of throwing off
French colonialism.
The authors of Dau TranhVo Nguyen
Giap, Ho Chi Minh, and other members
of the Politburo in Hanoi viewed the
military element of their theory, in Maoist
terms, with both guerrilla and
conventional elements. They incorporated political, military,
informational, and economic
considerations.
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Dau Tranh
Giap had highly trained commandos
infiltrate into the south to conduct a wide
variety of limited operations.
This strategy allowed Giap to conservehis
fighting power while wearing down that
of the enemy.
Giap planned two-year campaign inJanuary 1975, but he was successful in
just four months with the total collapse of
South Vietnam
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Three Action
Programmes Action among the enemy:
aimed at both the South Vietnamese and
American peoples.
Among the southerners, a wide variety of
media was used: meetings, leaflets, lectures,rumor
campaigns, rallies, protests, stage dramas,
etc.
All were directed at enhancing the legitimacy
ofthe government in the north.
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Three Action
Programmes Action among the military:
Aimed at persuading South Vietnamese civil
servants and military personnel to defect or
desert.
Promised rewards, undercover agents tospread dissension, intimidation, influence
through friends and family, etc. are typical of
the tactics used within this program.
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Three Action
Programmes Action among the people:
This was within communist controlled areas
and primarily involved administrative
measures (recruitment, tax collection,
organization). This action provided safe base areas for the
Vietcong forces, raised revenues, and
portrayed the image of societal stability under
communist rule.
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