Naxalism Mumbai

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www.time4education.comTriumphant Institute of

Management Education P Ltd

Nyayapati Gautam

NaxalismThe single biggest

threat facing India?


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Human cost

287 civilians and 113 security force

personnel killed in 2012 (Nov 30). In

2011 and 2010, the casualty figures were

611 and 1005 respectively.

10,268 casualties between 2005 and

2010

21 policemen were killed in a landmine

blast in Malkangiri, Orissa on July 16,

2008.

In Feb 2010, 24 personnel of the Eastern

Frontier Rifles (EFR) in West Bengal

killed.

April 2010 a landmine blast killed 11


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Human cost

P. Chidambaram on 31stDecember

2011: This year 447 civilians and 142

security personnel were killed as against

718 and 285 respectively in 2010.

According to PC, 2011 was a

satisfactory year as it had seen a

historic low level of terror and Naxalite-

related violence.

This is how we measure success with

reference to Naxalism.


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Origins

Throughout the fifties, the Terai region of

West Bengal, saw discontent brewing in

its tea gardens.

In 1964, when the CPI split and the

CPI(M) was formed, Charu Mazumdar

showed his undisguised inclination to the

Maoist line.

Naxalbari: The peasant agitation.

In May 1967, the first police bullet was fired,

triggering a violent phase in the movement.

May 25: The police fired at the demonstrators,

killing nine women and two children.

It was after this incident that the movementlost its agrarian character and became a


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The Spread of the

Movement Calcutta

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar & Jharkhand

Chhattisgarh


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Class Enemies

Naxal activists defined class enemies

rather broadly. Government employees,

judges and a vice-chancellor were

among those killed in Kolkata in class

action.

At the height of the movement, traffic

policemen were stabbed on the streets of

Kolkata.


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Sangam & DalamThe Red Corridor including Nepal

Flowing Water TheoryRural v/s Urban

Naxalism


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Impact

Social divisions

Economic and business related

POSCO

Security related.


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Steps that can be

taken Development

Jobs

Infrastructure development

Bridging the divide

Between the Haves and the Have nots.

Government and people.

Use of security forces


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Sun Tzu

Now an army may be likened to water, for

just as flowing water avoids the heights

and hastens to the lowlands, so an army

avoids strengths and strikes weakness.

And as water shapes its flow inaccordance with the ground, so an army

manages its victory in accordance with

the situation of the enemy. And as water

has no constant form, there are in war noconstant conditions.


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Inspiration - Mao

When the enemy advances, withdraw;

when he stops, harass; when he tires,

strike; when he retreats, pursue. Mao

Tse Tung


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Maos Strategy

Mao employed four elements of national

power in his theory of guerrilla warfare.

The general populace (peasant

population

of the rural areas) was the center of

gravity in his theory of guerrilla warfare.

A symbiotic relationship between

revolutionary soldiers and the citizenry.

"The (people) may be likened to water

and the (guerrillas) to the fish who inhabit

it. How

may it be said that these two cannot exist

together?".


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Maos Strategy

The guerrillas not only operated among

the people, they were dependent on them

for logistic and informational support.

It was absolutely key to have the people

in allegiance with the political aims of the

guerrilla forces and understand how it

concerned him .

This education process was to be

multifaceted and well developed, "by

word of mouth, by

leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers,

books and pamphlets, through plays and

films, through schools, through the mass


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Three Stage Process

At the strategic level, Mao managed

"victory in accordance with the situation

of the enemy" through a three-stage

process:

Strategic defensive

Strategic stalemate

Strategic offensive


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Strategic defensive

The forces are on the strategic defensive,

focused primarily on mobile, irregular

warfare to erode the strength of the

enemy and build one's own strength,

both militarily and politically.


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Strategic stalemate

The enemy has ceased his offensive

while friendly forces have control of

certain base areas and continue to

employ guerrilla tactics as well as some

conventional operations when and whereappropriate.


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Strategic offensive

Friendly forces assume the strategic

offensive

with the primary emphasis on

conventional

warfare to thoroughly defeat the

conventional forces of the enemy.


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Che & his Thoughts


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Che Guevara & Regis

Debray If a guerrilla operation is not in direct

contact with a socially favourable

situation, if the really powerful social

charge that is ready to explode is

somewhere else . then clearly theremust be a definite link there, between the

two, the detonator and the explosive, the

vanguard and the moving forces of the

revolution.


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Che Guevara & Regis

Debray That link is a system of communication

and supplies - men, information, orders,

arms and ammunition, food - operating in

both directions between the guerrillas

and the town centres.

Such a system is both technical and

political since the technical operation -

with contacts, couriers, reinforcements -

is inseparable from its political content,and the importance it is given in the

guerrillas' general scheme of things.


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Debray on Che

Che turned the traditional

actions of the revolutionaries

completely upside down.

Che's immediate objective was

not to seize power, but first of all

to build up a popular power with

its own effective organ of activity,an autonomous and mobile

military force


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Debray on Che

In his view, the establishment of

a popular power took

precedence over the seizure of

power in Bolivia. Indeed to Che it would have

been a real catastrophe if a

premature victory cut short his

plan for history: a plan whichcould only bear fruit in the

fullness of time, by delaying its

effects for as long as possible.


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Debray on Che

Responsibilities in Bolivia

would have prevented his long-

term plan from achieving

fulfilment.

the establishment of a seed-bed

of national vanguards which

would, bit by bit, spread over allthe countries on the continent.

This called for time and patience,

and from those involved, for a

certain spirit of sacrifice as


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Debray on Che

It would not have been wise to

get too close to the towns, or

to make it a tactical objective

to enter urban centres, for thatvanguard, with the form and

membership of a guerrilla

troop, that is to say of a mobilestrategic force, could only grow

and become established by

developing in the countryside.


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Andes the Sierra

Maestra of America

In the Sierra Maestra; the

column, as it developed,

produced off-shoots, separate

columns which grew in theirturn, and moved away to open

other fronts until the entire

territory was covered.


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Andes the Sierra

Maestra of America

The inherent advantages in

this type of organic

development have often been

pointed out: strategiccentralization and tactical

decentralization, unity of

purpose and diversity in waysof carrying it out


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DAU TRANH -

Struggle The Vietnamese adopted Mao's three

stage strategy a means of throwing off

French colonialism.

The authors of Dau TranhVo Nguyen

Giap, Ho Chi Minh, and other members

of the Politburo in Hanoi viewed the

military element of their theory, in Maoist

terms, with both guerrilla and

conventional elements. They incorporated political, military,

informational, and economic

considerations.


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Dau Tranh

Giap had highly trained commandos

infiltrate into the south to conduct a wide

variety of limited operations.

This strategy allowed Giap to conservehis

fighting power while wearing down that

of the enemy.

Giap planned two-year campaign inJanuary 1975, but he was successful in

just four months with the total collapse of

South Vietnam


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Three Action

Programmes Action among the enemy:

aimed at both the South Vietnamese and

American peoples.

Among the southerners, a wide variety of

media was used: meetings, leaflets, lectures,rumor

campaigns, rallies, protests, stage dramas,

etc.

All were directed at enhancing the legitimacy

ofthe government in the north.


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Three Action

Programmes Action among the military:

Aimed at persuading South Vietnamese civil

servants and military personnel to defect or

desert.

Promised rewards, undercover agents tospread dissension, intimidation, influence

through friends and family, etc. are typical of

the tactics used within this program.


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Three Action

Programmes Action among the people:

This was within communist controlled areas

and primarily involved administrative

measures (recruitment, tax collection,

organization). This action provided safe base areas for the

Vietcong forces, raised revenues, and

portrayed the image of societal stability under

communist rule.

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