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Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem
Author(s): Robert HeinamanReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1990), pp. 83-102Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182348.
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Aristotle
and
the
Mind-Body
Problem
ROBERT
HEINAMAN
In
this
paper
I will
argue
hat
Aristotle's
position
on
the
mind-body roblem
is probablybestcharacterized sdualism.The
question
of whetherdualism
is true
divides
into
three
questions: Are there
immaterial,
non-physical
substances?Are
therenon-physical
mentalevents?
Are there
non-physical
mental
properties?Since
Aristotle's
position
is
clearerwith
regard
o the
first
wo issuesthan
the
third,
I will
confine he
discussion
o
an
examination
of
Aristotle's
position
on
those
questions.
Section
I
deals with
Aristotle's
commitments n
relation to
the questionabout
substance and
section II
deals with the issue
in relation o
events. An
alternativeaccount
of
Aristot-
le's
positionon
the second
issue is
examinedandrejectedin section
III.
I will arguethat, with reservations, t is plausibleto say that Aristotle
accepts he
existenceof
non-physicalubstances.
On the
question
of
mental
events,
I will
arguethat Aristotle's
position s at
odds with
both the
dualist
and
the
physicalist
iews,
but since
in this case too it
is
plausible
o
say that
Aristotleaccepts he
existenceof
non-physical
vents,his overall
position
s
best
classified as
dualist. The
evidence drawn on
occurs
largely
in
the
comparatively
neglected
first book
of De Anima.
Many have
thought, correctly,
that Aristotle's
views on
the intellect
commit him to
some sort
of dualism
with regard
o
the
rational
soul, but
rejectthis as an accuraterepresentation f his positionfor other typesof
soul
-
sensitive,
nutritive,
etc. My
argument n section
1
rests on no
assumptions
about
the soul peculiar
to the intellect.
Aristotle's
dualism
regarding he soul
holds for any kind
of soul, including
he
souls of plants.
However,section II
deals onlywith
psychicevents
whichhave
the soulas a
subject. Digestion
and other
actualizations
of the nutritive
soul are not
mental events
becausethe
proper
subject of digestion,
forexample, is
the
body
alone.
Phronesis
1990.
Vol.
XXXVII
(AcceptedAugust 1989)
83
8/11/2019 Cuerpo y Alma en Aristoteles
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I
Whatmust Aristotle
believe in orderto hold a dualistview of the soul?
Of
course, he must believe
that.
(1) the soul is an
immaterial ntity,
but clearlymore is
required.A materialistmightbelieve that the structure
or shape of some
wooden object is an immaterial ntity
-
it is not madeout
of matter without
abandoninghis materialism.
The
shape,
like
weightor
velocity, will count as a physicalproperty,and this the materialist s happy
to
accept. Similarly,even if Aristotle accepted(1), he might think of the
soul as a kindof physicalattribute f the body andso not be whatwe would
want to call a dualist.
More is needed.
Belief in the
possibilityof the soul's existenceseparately rom the body
suffices to make one a
dualist,but Aristotle rejectsthat belief for at least
most
types of soul. If
Aristotle is committed to dualism, he
must be
committed o a weakerversionof it whichadmits hat the soul cannot
exist
apart rom the body.
The question of
whether Aristotle had some Cartesian oncept
of
con-
sciousness is irrelevant to the
issue,
as Robinson has
pointed
out.' A
materialistmight acceptsuch a concept while a dualistmight rejectit.
Nowadays the mind-body problem revolves around
the
question of
whether psychological
ntities and laws are reducible o physicalentities
and
laws (or eliminable
altogether). There is
no
question
of Aristotle's
wishing o reduce
psychic aws to physical aws (or eliminateanything),
so the relevant
question
with
regard
o Aristotle s:
does
he reduce
psychic
entities
(suchas souls andmentalevents)to material ntities(such
as bodies
and
physicalchanges)?
The fact that Aristotle
considered he soul
to be an
immaterial ntity
irreducible o matter sput beyonddoubtby his argumentsn De Anima
I 3
and 4
whichpurport o
prove that the soul is changeless.2
In
I.2, 403b25-27,
Aristotlehad said
that
the living
have
been
thought
o
differ from the non-living n virtueof two characteristics
movementand
perception.
Since it is the
presence
of a soul that
distinguishes
he
living
fromthe
non-living, he
soul of a
living hing
should
explainwhy
t is able
to
move. And it was
thought
hatthis
explanation
would irsthave
to
posit
that
the
soul
moves, andthensay
that
he
body
of a
living hing
s caused
o move
I
H.M. Robinson, MindandBody in Aristotle , ClassicalQuarterly, 8 (1978), p. 106.
2
Cf.
Dc
An.
411a24-26, De
Gen. et
Corr.
334al-15.
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by the soul's
motion.
This account entails
materialism,
or the soul can
move only if it is a materialobject.3
Thus, for example,
Democritusheld the
soul to be
composed
of
fine
spherical atoms
which
move, bump
into coarser atoms
constituting
the
body, and thereby
cause it
to
move.
And, of course,
since
Democritus'
atoms were material
objects he
had to
say that
the soul was
a
material
object.
Aristotleagreesthat the
soul
of a
living
thing explainswhy
it
moves
as
it
does, but he rejects
the suggestionthat the
soul moves
the
body
in
the
manner proposedby Democritusby arguing,
n I.3 and 4, that
the
soul
cannotchange at all.
Whydoes Aristotle
reject he possibility f
a
soul undergoing
hange?As
Alexander pointsout,4 it is because the soul
is a form, and all forms are
immaterial,and hence
changeless.5
The soul, being a
form, is not a body6 ndhence has no magnitude7
nd s
not
divisible into parts
with magnitude.According o De Anima
409al-3
3Although
Aristotle says that some of
his
predecessorscharacterized
he soul as
&ac-
gaurov
405bll), this does not mean
that they
considered it to be immaterial
but rather
that they
considered it to be
constitutedby a fine
and
rarifiedsort of stuff such as
fire as
opposed to earth
(409bl9-21;
cf. Phys.
215b5, 10).
Cf.
R.D.
Hicks,
Aristotle,DeAnima
(New
York, 1976), p. 227.
4
Alexander of Aphrodisias,
DeAnima, ed. I.
Bruns(Berlin, 1887), p.
17, 9-11;
pp. 21,
22-22, 12;
In
Aristotelis Topicorum, ed.
M. Wallies
(Berlin, 1891), pp. 162,
25-163,
2;
pp.
164,
24-165, 3.
Cf.
Simplicius,In Aristotelis
Physicorum,ed. H.
Diels (Berlin,
1895),
p. 964,
14-17; p. 1250,
16-18; In Libros
Aristotelis De Anima
Commentaria,
ed.
M.
Hayduck
(Berlin, 1882), p.
56, 26-28;
G. Rodier, Traittde
l'dme(Paris, 1900),
p.
136;
H.M.
Robinson,
AristotelianDualism, in J.
Annas (ed.), Oxford
Studies
n
Ancient
Philosophy I
(Oxford, 1983),
p. 131.
5 Meta.
1032b14, 1035a28-29,
1037al-2, 1044b21-24,27-29,
1075al-2; Phys.
224bl-13,
25.
The
fact that the
soul's
changelessness rules out the
possibility of its being
a
material
object
has now been pointed
out by C. Shields
( Soul and
Body in Aristotle ,
Oxford
Studies in Ancient
Philsophy VI (1988),
pp. 114-18), and
section
I of
the present
paper
can
be
read as an attempt
to
strengthen his first argument
for ascribing dualism
to
Aristotle
by adding the
following points. (i)
There is an
explanationof why
an
object
lacking magnitude
cannot
change based on the
requirements for a
subject
of
change
found in
Phys. VI.4 and 10.
It is this rather than
the arguments
ound in De
Anima 1.3
that
provides the basic
explanation of
why the soul is
changeless. (ii) For
reasons to be
mentioned shortly,
establishing hat the soul is not
a material
substancedoes not
by itself
warrantthe
conclusion that
Aristotle is a dualist.
A strongerclaim
should, andcan, be
established.
6
De An.
412a17,
414a20-21, Parva
Nat. 467b14; cf. De
Part. Anim. 652b7-9.
7
De An.
407a2-22, De Motu
Anim.
703al-3;
cf.
De An.
424a26-28, Meta.
1075a6-7,
Phys. 212b7-12,
28-29.
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and the arguments f PhysicsVI.4 and 10, this excludes the possibilityof
the soul's changing.8
The conclusion hatthe soul is changelesswas an important evelopment
in Aristotle'sviewswhich s linked o otherchangesof position,for example
in his accountof pleasure.PreviouslyAristotlehadnot hesitated o speakof
the
soul
as
the subjectof change.In the Categorieshe soul is the substance
which is the propersubjectfor differentkinds of qualities la25-26, 9b33-
35), and
a
distinguishing eature of
a
substance s
its
capacity
to
persist
througha change between contraries
4alb19).
Similarly, he Protrepti-
cus thinksof living as a changeundergoneby the soul (B80, 83
-
During),
and the Topics oo speaksof the soul'schanging 120b21-26,123al5-17).9
At this
stage Aristotle apparently s willingto say that
if F
and
G are
qualities
whose
proper ubject
s
the soul, then the soul's
ransition etween
F and G is a change n the soul.
By the time he wrote Physics VII, Aristotle was no longer willing
to
accept this. There we find a rather strange intermediateposition where
some but
not
all
transitions
between different
qualities
of
the
soul
are
changes.The intellectualpartof the soul both acquiresanduses knowledge
but neither
s
an
alteration
a
qualitative hange
in
the
intellect.
But
this
s
notdueto any differencebetweensouland matter, ortheperceptive oul
does undergoalterations 244b10-12, 47a4-17,248a6-9)1I
nd
some
transi-
8
This
is also required by
Aristotle's
view that a self-mover
must be divisible
into the
changing subject
of motion
-
the
body, and
an unchanging mover
-
the soul
(Phys.
VIII.5;
cf. 266b28-29).
Note
too that Aristotle
says that
alteration the only
species of change
which the
soul
could possibly
undergo
-
has a perceptibleobject
as its proper subject
(De Gen.
et Corr.
319bl-15) and that
the subject of a quality
is divisible
(Phys. 236b7-8,
De
Caelo
299bl9-24).
Nevertheless,
in manypassagesfrom
what I take to
be mature
works
Aristotle
ascribes
change to the soul. While he doubtless often uses
'x(vYjaoL'
n a broad sense, this
doesn't seem to
account for Phys.
IV. 11 where
'change'must be
used in a strict sense
in
the
definition
of time but
is still ascribedto the
soul.
Likewise
Aristotle
ascribeschange
to
points
(Phys. 219b6-19,
227b14-17)
despitethe fact
that they have no magnitude and
Phys.
VI. 10 explicitly
denies that
they can change.
I
H. Cherniss akes Top.
111b4-8and 121a30-39
o show that the
Topicsasserts
he view
that pleasure
is not a change
and
the
soul does
not undergo change
(Aristotle's
Criticism
of
Plato
and the
Academy
(New York, 1962),
p. 589). But there
is no reason to
believe
that
Aristotlewishes to use
the arguments here
presented
as illustrations o derive
those
conclusions.
For example,
Aristotle
says that if the soul
changes, then it
must undergo
one
of
the species of change
-
alteration,
locomotion
etc. But he does not
deny that any
species of change does characterize he soul and then concludethat the genus change
does
not applyto it either.
10
Cf.
De
An.
406b10-11,
An. Post.
1.29,
Rhet. 1369b33-1370al.
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tions of state in material
objects
are not alterations
but
completions
(or
tXcr6oEL5).
What Aristotle wishes to prove in VII.3 is that alteration
occurs n
a
subject soul
or matter
only
with
respect
o
qualities
which
are
perceptible.
If the
qualities
n
question
are
not
of
that kind but are
rather
conditions,states
or
shapes,
then
the
subject
- soul or matter
transiting
betweenthem is
not
thereby
altered.
If
the
qualities
are
perceptible,
then
the subject body or soul
-
is altered. Since the intellect
s not affected
by
sensible
qualities,
it is
only
the
perceptive part
of
the
soul
that
suffers
alteration.
Aristotle's
ascription
of
change
to the soul
in
these earlier
phases
does
not mean that he was then a materialist,anymore thanin Plato's case.1'
Rather, by
the time he
wrote De
Anima he
had more
clearly thought
out
what was requiredof a proper subject of
change and had concludedthat
such a subject could
not
lack
magnitude.Believing
that
souls lack magni-
tude
he had to concludethat soulsare changeless.
But why did he
come to believe that a subject of change must possess
magnitude?The answer
can be
found
in PhysicsVI.4,
234blO-20.12
In any
change there is a subject, starting-point nd
end-pointof the change. The
end-pointof the change is the newly acquired
eature; he starting-points
the feature lost
in the change; and the subject s what persists hroughout
the change,
what begins with the starting-pointand finishes with the
end-point.
Suppose that
a subject is changing rom A to B, where B is what the
subject first changes into ratherthan an
extreme (et;
6
tETafriXEX
6
7QwOCoV).
or
example, if A is white, take B to be grey rather than black.
Suppose hesubject s now engaged n the
process
of
changing rom
A
to
B.
Then, Aristotle
argues, the subjectcannot be
in A as a whole for then the
subject would
be
at
the starting-point f the change rather han changing.
Nor
can the
subject be in B as a whole for thenit would be true that it has
But
note that
already
n Phys. VII
Aristotle thinks
that a subject of
change
is
divisible
(242a40, 47-48).
How this is to be
reconciled
with
VII's ascriptionof
alteration
o
the
soul
is
unclear.
On
attempts to
construe the
earlyAristotle
as
a
materialistwho
identified
the soul
with
the fifth
element,
see Cherniss,
Aristotle's
Criticism f Plato
and the
Academy,
appendix
VIII.
12
Cf.
the similar
argument n
VI. 10,
240b8-241a26,
and225a31,
242a40,
47-48,
257a33-
bl,
258b25,
267a22-23. Note that
theargument
n VI.4
is intended only
to establish that
a
subject of
change is
divisible
into parts, not
that it is infinitely
divisible(Phys.
235b4-5).
By
'change' I
mean
x(v1aL;
as defined in
Phys. III and
contrasted with
bviELa
(activity) in
Meta. IX.6 and EN
X.4.
When
'WQ0yELa'
overs both
change
and
activity I
translate
it as
'acutality'.
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become B,
not that t isbecomingB. Since
the subjectcannotas a whole
be
in
both A
and
B
or in neither, partof the
subjectmustbe in A and part
n
B.13But that
means the
subjectof change,any subject
of change, mustbe
divisible ntoparts.Since
the soul, like anyform, is not
divisible nto
parts,
it
cannot
change.Therefore t is
immaterial, ince forAristotleall
matter s
changeable
and divisible.
And since thereis no question
but thatAristotle
considered he soul to be a
substance, 4hesoul is an
immaterial
ubstance.
But before
we
can
secure
the claim thatAristotleis a
dualist, a further
question must
be addressed:does
Aristotle consider
the soul to be the
organization
f the body? 5or those who
thinkthatbeing an
organization
conflicts
with
being
a
substance, his
possibility
s
ruled
out.
But MetaH.2
makes it
doubtful that
Aristotle agrees. And if
artifactsare substances,
their
forms are substances,
but in many
cases such a form
will
be the
organization
of the artifact'smaterial
parts. So
the
interpretation
which
understandsAristotle's soul to
be
the
organization
of
the
body
which
enables
an
organism
o
engage
n certain
ypes
of
behavior
annotbe
clearly
ruledout on this
basis. And
if the soul were
simply
he
organization
f the
body,then
it
wouldbe
far
from
clear
hatthe soul
is
a
non-physical ntity.
The
characterization f Aristotleas
a
dualist
would be
very
dubious.
But there s a
conclusiveobjection
o
this
nterpretation:
n
DeAnima
I.4
Aristotle
argues hat the soul is
not the
organization
f
the
body.
If
Aristotle
were
to
expressthe
view
that the soul
is the
organization
f
the body,
what Greek word would
serve for
'organization'?
The
possibil-
Cf. 230b29-231al,
240a19-29.
14
Meta. 1017b1O-16,
4-26, 1035bl4-16,
1037a5,28-29,
1043a29-36,
1077b31-34;
DeAn.
410a13-22, 412al9-21,
blO-13, 415bll-14,
De Part.
Anim.
64la25-29,
De
Gen.
Anim.
738b26-27.
I do not understandwhy Richard
Sorabji Body
and Soul
in
Aristotle ,
in J.
Barnes,
M. Schofield and
R. Sorabji
(eds.),
Articles
on
Artistotle,
vol. 4 (London, 1979),
p.
48)
and Terry
Irwin (Aristotle's
First
Principles
(Oxford,
1988),
p. 291) think that Meta
1041bll-33
shows
that an immaterial
soul could not
be a component of
a composite
living thing of form
and matter. Whatever
they may
mean by 'component',
what the
passage does show
is that the
form is not another
element
(GooXrtov)
n
the
composi-
te. Since
the passage
defines an element
as a material component (1041b31-33;
cf.
1088bl4-16,
De Caelo 302al5-19),
all 1041b31-33
proves
is that the form is not
a
material
component
of the composite,
not that it is not an
immaterial
component. Aristotle
repeatedlyspeaks
of the composite as being
composed of
((x)
form and
matter (e.g.
Meta. 1035al7-20,
b32-33, 1037a29-30).
s
Thus
A. Edel, Aristotle and
His Philosophy (London,
1982), pp.
144-45;
M.
Nuss-
baum,Aristotle's
De Motu Animalium(Princeton,
1978),
pp. 71, 73, 149,
and Aristote-
lian Dualism , pp.
200-1; M.
Frede, Substance in
Aristotle's Metaphysics ,
in
A.
Gotthelf
(ed.), Aristotle on Nature
and Living Things
(Bristol,
1988), p. 21.
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ities seem
to be:
Td~tL
(arrangement),
xQaot;
or
RtLL
(mixture), X6yo;
(proportion),
ol5vOrLg
(combination),
&IMOml;
state) or
E;tg
(condi-
tion).
The first
word
does not
occur
n
DeAnima,
butthe next four
do,
in
I.4
where
Aristotle argues
that
the soul
is
not
a
mixture
or
proportion
or
combination
of
bodily parts.
TMere re three
things
o be
distinguished
ere.A combinationof
bodies
is
a
juxtaposition
of
particles
of the bodies which
eaves
the nature
of
the
original particles
intact. For
example,
I
might
throw sand and
sawdust
together
in
such
a way that
particles
of
sand
and sawdust ie
next
to
each
other and are still
particles
of
sand
and sawdust.
But when
two
bodies are
mixed theyacton one another nsuchawaythatthenaturesof the original
bodies are
altered
to
a
different
nature a kind of
chemicalreaction akes
place.
16
And
the
proportion
s
simply he ratio
of
the
amounts
of
the mixed
or
combinedbodies.
If, asAristotle argues,
he soul is notanykindof
combination
r
mixture
or
proportion, hen itcannotbe an
organization
f
bodilyparts.It
is useless
to
appealto
the notionsof
arrangement r state orconditionand
ascribe o
Aristotle
the view thatone of
these ermsexpresses
he type of organization
of
bodily
parts with which the soul is
to be identified. For in
De An. 1.4
(408al-3)
Aristotle saysthat, unlike
the soul, it
wouldbe correct o identify
healthor
the
other
bodilyvirtueswitha harmony f
bodilyparts.And
Meta.
E.19 and
20, after
defining
a
state (b60mEaL;)
s an
arrangement
-T(zLg)
of
whathas
parts, saysthat a condition
(EtLg)
s
a
kind
of
state,
and
gives
health as an
example. 7
So health is
an
arrangement of bodily parts, a
conditionand
a state ofthe body;and
givenDeAn.
408al-3'scontrastof the
soul
with
health, theconclusionmust
be that, forAristotle, the
soul is none
of
these. For
every
term
X that might
express he
concept
of
organizationn
Greek,
Aristotle denies
that the soul is an
X
of
bodily parts.
The
view
that
Aristotle
considers he
soul to be
some organization f the body
is false.
Further
evidence that Aristotle
rejects the
view that the soul is the
organizationof the
body is suppliedby the fact
that although
Aristotle
defines
the
soul as
the form of
the body, he at
times suggests that
an
animal's
soul
is
located primarily
n the heart.18This would
make no
16
De Gen. et
Corr.
1.10.
17
Cf.
Phys.
246b3-10;
Top.
116b17-22;
Fragmenta
ed. Ross),
pp.
19-20;
Alexander,
De
Anima, p. 25,
4-7.
Contrast Top.
145a33-bll.
18
ParvaNat.
450a28-29,
467b13-16,
469a4-b6,
478b32-479al;
De
Part.Anim.
665al-13,
667b19-22;
De Motu
Anim.
702bl5-21, 703a36-b2; Meta.
1035b25-28;
cf. Parva Nat.
438b8-10.
On
this
issue see T.
Tracy,
Heartand
Soul in
Aristotle ,
in J.
Anton and
A. Preus
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sense if the soul
were the body's
organization: body's
organization s not
locatedprimarily
n anybodily part.
The point is put
beyondquestionby
Aristotle's
insistence(408b20-29)
that
the soul is unaffectedby
(non-fatal)
damage to the body of
a living
thing.'9 f the
soul
were the organization
f the bodythat
constitutes he
living
thing'scapacity o
engage in certainkindsof
behavior, henthe part
of the
soul which s ananimal's
apacity o
see wouldhave to
comprise he
organization f the
animal's yes. In which
case thedestruction r
crippling
of
theeyes of an
animalwouldat the same
time destroy
hatpartofthe soul,
since
the relevantorganization
would be destroyed.
But this is
just what
Aristotlerejects:
an old man,he says, could
see as wellas a young
man f he
were given a new
eye. The damage to
the physicaleye leaves
the soul
unaffected.So the
relevantpartof
the soulcontinues o
exist even
whenthe
bodily
organization
s gone, andhence the
soul cannotbethat
organization.
Thesoul of a
living hing s
not anorganization f
bodilyparts,but rather
somethingwhich
supervenes
on
bodily parts
when
they
have been
orga-
nized
in a certain
way (408a20-21:
[&AAov
rE(6v
TL
o1oa (xoi5
X6yov)
tW(VEaL
ro';
i5XEoLv;).
The point
is made with
great
clarity by
Alexander.20
Aristotlecertainlybelieves that
the
soul
of
a
livingthing
is
dependent
or
its
own
existenceontheexistence
of
bodilyparts
arranged
n
a
certain
way.2'But the
fact
that this
organization
s
a
necessary
condition
for
the
soul's
existence does not require
us
to
identify
it with the soul.
Rather the soul is
a dynamis that
supervenes
(biny(yvETac)
on the
body
when the
organizationof
matter has reached certain evel.
From the
ac-
countwe
find
n
De
GenerationeAnimalium
735al4-17,736a35-b4)
we
can
see that
different
oul-constituting apacities
will
supervene
on
the
material
organization
at different
stages
of the
living thing's
development.
The
soul
is
a form
and
all
formsare immaterial
ntities.
But
forms
can
be
relatedto
matter n
three ways:
(1)
A
form
which
s
a
structural
r
physical
eature
of
matter,e.g.,
the
form
of an
artifact uch as a
house,
or
a
color,
or a certain
arrangement
f
bodily partssuch
as
health.
(eds.), Essays in Ancient
Greek Philosophy
II
(Albany, 1983), pp. 321-29. As
is well
known,
Franqois
Nuyens' mistakenbelief that this view
about the soul's location
conflicts
with the definition of the
soul as the form of the body led him to some now discredited
hypotheses regardingAristotle's
development
(L'Ovolution
e lapsychologie d'Aristote
(Louvain, 1948) ).
19 Cf. H.M. Robinson,
Mind and Body in
Aristotle ,
p.
120.
2 Alexander, De Anima,
pp. 24, 18-26, 30.
21 De An. 403b2-3 413a3-5, 414al9-20, 427a26-27;Parva
Nat. 453a2-6, 14-15;
De
Gen.
Anim. 736b21-29;EN
1128bl3-15;
Dc Caelo
278bl-3.
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(2)
A form which
is not
an immediate
structural
or
physical
feature
of
matterbut is supervenient nddependent oritsexistenceon immedi-
ate
physical
eatures
of matter
such
as the
power
of
a
drug,
according
to
Alexander,andthe
soul, according o
Aristotle.
(3) A form which
does not
depend
on matter
or
material
eatures
for
its
existence.
If
Aristotle held
the
soul
to
be
a
form of the third
sort he would
be
a
Cartesiandualist.At most he thinks
he intellect
s such
a
form.
If
Aristotle
held
the
soul
to
fall
into
(1),
then
there
would
be
at
least
some
plausibilityn
labellinghim a
materialist,
despite
the
fact
that
the soul wouldstill
be
an
immaterial ubstance.I haveargued hat Aristotlebelieves the soul to fall
into
the
second class
of forms.Since
this makes
his
position
very
ike
that
of
presentday
emergent
dualists ,
t
is,
I
think,
best to
classify
Aristotle
as
a
dualist.
So:
on
the
standard
account
of
the
dualist-physicalist istinction
the
former
accepts he
existenceof
non-physical ntitiesand
the
latter
does
not.
Non-physical
ntities
are
explained
asbeing
entities
rreducible
o
physical
entities.
On this
understanding f
the
issue,
Aristotleis a
dualist.
But
there is a
complication
n that
this
account
of the
physical-non-
physical distinction, and hence of the physicalist-dualist istinction, is
inadequate.
Philosophers
disagreeas to
whether
a
dispositional
property
such
as
fragility
should
be
considered
a real
property
distinct
from
its
physicalbase
-
say, the
molecular
tructure f
glass.
Suppose
Jones
believes
dispositions
are real
properties
but
rejects
the
identification
of them
with
their
physical
bases.Then
Jones
might
consider
ragility o
be
an
emergent
property hat
superveneson
certain
physical
tates
but is
irreducible o any
of
these
material
bases.
That in
no way
commitsJones
to
denyingthat
fragility s a
physical
property.
Likewise,
the
irreducibility
f a
formof
kind(2)
need not
show
thatit is
non-physical.
Given
this
unclarity, t
also
becomes
unclear
whether
dualist'
is the
correct
abel to
applyto
Aristotle's
position.
Furthermore,
Alexander'
compares
he soul
with
the
power of a
drug
which is
not
identicalto
the
matter t is
found
in or to
the
matter's
orga-
nization.The
comparison
uggests
hat
Alexanderdoes
not see any
radical
break
with
the
physical
whenthe
soul
supervenes,and
there is no
evidence
to
suggestthat
Aristotle
dideither.
Hence, the
interpretation f
Aristotle as
a dualist
remains
problematic
for
two
reasons:
(i) at
least as far
as I know,
there is no
account
available
'2
See n.
20.
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enabling
us to
draw
a clear
distinction
between
non-physical
ndphysical
emergententities or, hence, betweenthe dualist
and the
physicalist;
ii)
even if such
an account
of the
physical-non-physical
istinction
were or
is
available,
here s
no
reason o believe
that t or anythingike it entered
nto
Aristotle'sthinking
about
the
soul.
II
Aristotle
explains
whathe
considers
a psychological
vent
to be at the
end
of
De
Anima I.1,
403a3-bl9.
He
begins
by asking
whether
psychic
events
(~z&q)
belong onlyto thesoulof theliving hingor also
have
the body as
a
subject.
And
from
thesucceeding
inesit is apparent
hat Aristotle
equates
this question
to
the following
one:
Is it true
that,
for any
appropriate
predicate
F,
the soul
(of
the living
thing)
is
F entails
the
body
is
changing?
Aristotle
goes
on to claim
that
with the possible exception
of
thinking,
the
entailment
always
holds. So,
apart,
possibly,
from
thought,
anypsychic
event
involves
a bodilychange.
Aristotle
then
(403a24-bl9)
proceeds
o say
thatfor at least
most
psychic
events, there
will
be a bodily
change
which
s not merely necessary
or
its
occurrencebut servesas
thematterof
the psychological
vent which, ike
a
material
substance,
s a composite
of form
and
matter.
If so,
what
is
the
form
of
a psychic
event?
The
matter
s
a
change
n
the body.
Theform
will
be something
rue
of the
soul
sinceAristotle
has justexplained
hat
psychic
events
are common
o body
andsoul.
It cannot
be
a change
giventhat
that
s
the
material
partof
a psychic
event
and
a soulcannot
change.
Since
the
formal
aspect
of
a
psychic
vent
is
a
feature
of
the
soul and
must
also be
an
occurrence
nd
not
a
power
or condition
of
the soul,
the only
alternative
among he
menagerie
of Aristotelian
beings
s
an
activity
n
the
sense contrasted
withchange
nMeta
IX.6
and ENX.4.
So
a psychic
event,
for
Aristotle,
is
a composite
of activity
and
change.
The activity
(form)
takes place
in the
soulof
a living
hing
and
the change
(matter)
occurs
n
its
body.
The
compositepsychic
event
is
not
an activity
any
morethan
the
composite
human
beingis
a
soul.
The
end
of De
An. I.1
showsthat
there
are only
two
possibilities:
an
activity
such
as seeingred
must
be
either
the
form
of a
psychological
vent
or a composite
of
form
and
matter
where
the
matter
s a
bodily
change.
But
the second
alternative
s
not
possible.
Aristotle believes
that a change
necessarily
occupies
a
period
of
time
(Phys. 234a24-31)becauseit is itself divisibleinto temporalparts with
magnitude .
This structure
of
a
change
is
determined
by
the analogous
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structure
f
itspath
and
in
turn
determines he time
occupiedby
the
change
to have an analogousstructure Phys. 207b21-25,219al-14, 235al5-17).
We must,
of
course,
distinguish
he
divisibility
f the change tselffrom the
divisibility
f thetime it occupies,justas we mustdistinguish
he
divisibility
of a
play
into the three acts constituting t from the divisibility
of the time
occupied
by the playinto three
hours. The fact that a
play
is
composed
of
parts
with
a temporal
magnitude
meansthat the
play
cannot be squeezed
into
a moment
but
is
itself
spread
out over time and so must exist for a
period
of
time. Likewise
the
fact
that
a
change
is
composed
of
temporal
parts
with
size
means hat
t
is
spread
out
over
a
period
of time andcannot
be squeezedinto a moment.
On
the other
hand,
an
activity
does
not divide nto
temporalparts
but
like
a pointis a whole all
of
which
exists whenever
t exists
(EN
1174b9-14).
Just as
a point has no spatial parts
so an activity
has no temporalparts.
Because t
is temporally
ndivisibleanactivity wholly
xists in a moment
(EN 1174al4-19,b7-9).
So even if it lasts for a period
of time, thiswill not
consist in
furthertemporalphases
of the activityrevealing hemselves
as
different
partsof the timeoccupied
by a changedisclosedifferent
tages of
the changeitself.
If
an
activityexistsat the present
momenttheneven if it
lastsfor
10 seconds all of it is present
at that firstmomentand
t is not the
case that
more of it will come into
existence in the future.
The time
following
thatfirstmomentwill not
reveal further
partsof the activitybut
only further
phases of
time occupiedby the activity.
Since
a
changenot onlyoccupiesa
periodof timebut s itself
divisible nto
differenttemporalparts,
whereasanactivity s not
divisible nto temporal
parts, it is as absurdto
suppose that an activity
could be composedof a
change
as it
is
to suppose
that
a
spatially
ndivisiblepoint
could be com-
posed
of a spatiallydivisiblemagnitude.
For the same
reason t is absurd o
suppose hatthe same
thingcouldbean activityunder
one description nd
a
change
under a different
description.
This fundamentaldifferencebetween
activityand
changeexplainsother
temporal
differencesbetween them
that rule out
the possibilitythat an
activitycould be made
out of'
a change. (1) An activity
exists in a
moment
but
a
change
doesnot. Sowhen
anactivity
xists
n
a
moment
here
then
exists
no
change hat
could constitute
heactivity. 2)
The same
result
follows
if
Aristotle allows(as
I
believe
he does)
that anactivity
an exist
for
one
andonly one moment.
(3)
There
is
a first
moment whenan activityA
existsbut thereis no first
momentor time whena changeC exists(Phys. 236a7-27).On the proposal
under
consideration, heactivity
A
-
is a composite
he matterof which s
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a bodily
change
C. Thenthere
aretwo possibilities.
Suppose
t is the first
momentof activityA. Either(1) t is a limitof the time occupiedby C- at t
and prior o t C
does notexist
but for
a
period
of time
of
which
is the
first
limit it does exist;
or (2)
C beginsto
existbefore
t.
On (1), all
of the temporally
ndivisible
activityA exists
at t but C
does
not. Therefore
C couldnot constitute
A.
On (2),
since
C existsbefore
t andmoments
arenot next
to one
another,
there
will be a period
of time occupied
by C
prior
to t. Now if C is
the
material artof the
activity, hen
the
time needed
for thechange
o cometo
be fromthelast
moment
of theperiod
of restuntil
t will also
be timeneeded
for the activity'scomingto be. If the changeconstitutes he activity n
the
way Socrates'
flesh and
bones
constitute
Socrates,then
the stagesof
the
change's
coming
to
be'
up until
t willbe stages
of the activity's
oming
to
be, just
as
stages
of
Socrates'
body coming
to
be are stages
of Socrates'
coming
o be. And the time
necessary or
the stagesof
the changeprior
o
t
to pass by
will also be
time necessaryfor
the activityto come
to be. So
contrary
o
EN 1174b9-14,
here
will be
no
difference
on
this
score
between
change
and
activity.
Since, then,
an activity
cannot be
a
composite
the
matter
of which
is
a
bodilychange,theonlyalternativesthatanactivity
s
the
formal
aspect
of
a
psychological
occurrence,
.e.
it is that part
of
a
psychological
occurrence
the
propersubject
of which
s
the
soul.
Not only
do activities
occur
n souls, they
occur
onlyin
souls. This
claim
receives
support
romthe examples
of activities
isted
by
Aristotle
which
are all
psychic
occurrences:
hinking,perceiving,
iving,living
well, plea-
sure.2?
And the
clear implication
of
EN 1173b7-13
s
that
the soul
is
the
subject
even
of
activities
hat
are
bodily pleasures.
Further,
a soul has
no
magnitude
nd
t
is
certain
at
least
thatthe
nature
of
an
activity
s
notsuch
as
to demand hat its
proper
subject
be an
entity
possessing
magnitude.
Phys.
VI.4's
argument
hat the
subject
of
a
change
possesses
magnitude
estson
a
distinctive
eature
of
change:
t has a
path
with
starting-point
nd
end-point
(andintermediate
points)
which
are
specifically
different.
And
it is conse-
quently
argued
hat
-
if
A and
B are
two such
features
on
a
path
of
change
then
since
a
changing
ubject
cannot
be
A
as a
whole
or
B
as
a
whole, part
of
23
'Stages
of the change
coming
to be' is used
in the sense in
which
fluting
the
columns
and
fitting
the stones
together
are stages
in temple-building's
coming
to
be .
Help
in
understanding
EN
1174bl2-14's
implication
that there is generation
of
change
is
provi-
ded by Phys. 206a21-25,29-33, 219b9-1O.
'
Cf.
R.
Polansky,
Energeia
n Aristotle's
MetaphysicsIX ,
Ancient
Philosophy,
3
(1983), p.
165.
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the subject
must be
A
and
anotherpart
B. But
an
activity
has no
path.
Thereis no distance romone quality,quantityorplaceto anothercovered
by the
subject
of
an
activity.So VI.4's
argument
annot
be
applied
o
derive
the
conclusion
hat the
subject
of an
activitypossesses
magnitude.'
Furthermore,he
indivisibility
f the
subject
of
an
activitymay
be
neces-
sary
given
Aristotle's
view that a
change,
its
subject
and
time
areall
alike
divisibleor
indivisible Phys..
235al3-b5),
whereasthe
time of
an
activity
may
be indivisible
(EN
1174al4-19,
b7-14).
For
this
may
imply
that
the
subjectof
an
activitycannotbe
necessarily
divisible,
as
any
material
object
is.
Manywill
object that
activitiescannot be restricted o
psychic
events
because, e.g.,
walking
and
housebuilding
must
(or can) be
counted
as
activities.One
motivation for
this
view
is the
tense-test
according o
which Xing
is an
activity if A
is
Xing entails
A
has
Xed . But
on
Aristotle's
ownview
(Phys.
VI.6) A is
walking
ntails
A
has
walked .
Again,
activitiesare
ends,but
peoplemaywalk
for its
ownsake,
and nthat
case it is
an
activity.
I
cannot
fully reply
to
this objection
here, but it
restson a
misunder-
standingof
Aristotle's
distinction,
ncluding he
failureto
appreciate
hat
activities
and
changes
fall
under
hierarchiesof
species
andgenera
just as
itemsin
other
categoriesdo
(Phys..
V.4).
Aristotle s
drawinga
distinction
between
mutually
exclusive
classes of
beings,not
betweenverbs or
verb-
phrases.
Nor is
the
distinctionbased on
a
grammatical
ifference.
In
Phys.
Vl 6
Aristotleargues
hat tmaybe
simultaneously
ruethatA is
changingand A
haschanged,
but
thisdoes not
meanat all
that a
change s
an
activity.
SupposeA
changes
placefrom B
to E in
time
t,
to
t4.
B
C
D
E
tq
t
2
t
3
t
4
I _
Aristotle
thinks
that
there
areinfinitely
many
points(or
places)
along the
path
B-E
to
whichA
can be said to
be changing
n
the courseof
t1-t4.VI.6's
claim
is
that if
we pickout
one of these,
say
the change
from B to D,
then
5 Likewisethe considerations
brought
forward
at
Phys.
236a27-35and
240a19-29
which
require
the
divisibility
of
the
subject
of
change
will
not
apply
to the
subjectof
an
activity.
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when A
is changing romB to
D, A has changedadifferent hange,say
from
B to C (and infinitelymany
others).
This does not
show thatchange s an activity
or two reasons. (i) In the
tense-test t must be the
same change that is referred o by the
present
and the
perfect (Phys.
231b28-232al),
but in
VI.6 differentchanges
are
referred o by the present
and perfect. (ii) The
tense-test, properlyunder-
stood,
does not
statethatthetruthof one statement
s or is not simultaneous
with the truth of another
statement. Rather it asserts that
non-linguistic
states of affairs (or events)
are
or
are not simultaneous.In VI.6
A is
changing and A has
changed may be simultaneously rue
statements,
but the
relevantpoint is that the state of affairs
referred o by the second
is earlier han the event
referred
o
by the first(236b34,237bS).
Here it
is
also
essential o
bear n mind hat ust as A'swalking and A's
walking
rom
B
to
D denotethe same being, so
A is walking and
A is
walking
rom B to D bothrefer to the same
being.
And
we
have
already
seen
that it is impossible or the same thingto be an
activity
and a
change.
Note too that
housebuilding or walking), ike
changes
and unlike activ-
ities, (1) can be fastor slow,
andso (2) mustoccupy
ime; (3)
is divisible
nto
partsspecificallydifferent
rom each other and the whole (cf. Phys.
VI.4,
ENX.4); (4)
has a
divisiblepath
with
different
tarting-
nd
end-points; 5)
ends with
an old feature ost and a new feature
deposited
n the
subject
of
change;(6) has
an
end
-
the house
-
distinct rom itself and so
(7)
is
not
indefinitely ontinuable; 8) depends or itsspecieson what
happens
ater:
if no
house results it wasn'thousebuildingafter all.
Furthermore,
hese
characteristics f
housebuilding or walking)
are
unrelated
o the
question
of whether
he housebuilder
ngaged
n
housebuilding
or
its own
sake or as
a means to an
end. For example,Jones'
housebuilding
or its own sake
cannot
bring
it
about that his housebuildingneed
not
occupy
time
or is
indivisible
nto
specifically
different tages.6
As Aristotle
explains
n Meta.
IX.6,
the end (in the relevantsense)
of
walking
s a
limitof the
walk.Since
'
Some believe that moral
actions are activities, but I argue against such an
inter-
pretation in Aristotle and
the Identity of
Actions , Historyof Philosophy Quarterly,4
(1987), pp.
307-28.
Although
I will not address them here,
problems arise
for
Aristotle's
position in the
case of psychological
events
such as learning, and even
for practical and theoretical
thinking (De An. 407a23-31,
EN 1142b26-28).
I believe that the case
of leaming leaves
Aristotle with an unresolved ncoherence n
his views but that the case of thinking
can be
dealt with: thinking a proposition
s not an activitybut a succession
of discrete
activities
(Cat. 4b22-23, 32-37; De Int. 16al3-16;
Meta. 1020a7-11;
De An. 407a6-10,
430a27-28,
b14-15, 432all-12).
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walking
andhousebuilding annot
be theirown
limits heycannotbe ends n
the relevantsense.
Now in order to see
that the above
interpretation f a psychicevent fits
Aristotle's
text,
one has
to take
into
considerationan
ambiguity
n
terms
referring o
psychic
events.
This
ambiguity
orresponds
o
the
ambiguity f
terms
referring
o
substanceswhich
are
composites
of
form and
matter.In
the Metaphysics erms
such
as 'man'and
'horse'are usedeither
to refer
to
the formon
its
own,
i.e.,
in
thesecases,thesoul,
or
to the
compositeof form
and matter.27
imilarly
or
psychological
erms such as
'perception'
and
'anger': heyrefer
to
composites
of form
(activity)
and
matter
change)
but
can alsobe understoodo refer o the activityalone. And this swhat anger'
denotes
when the dialectician
defines angeras
the desireto returnpain for
pain
(403a30-31).Omitted
s
any reference
o the matterof the
composite
a
bodily
change
-
which must be taken into
considerationby the natural
scientist
who studies
anger. (The same
ambiguitywill applyto 'desire').?8
2'
Meta.
1032al7-19,
22-25,
1033a24-33,
b14-18,
1034bl1,
1035a6-9,
1036al6-19,
1037a7-
10,
1043a29-b4,
1069b35-1070a4;
f. De Gen. et
Corr.
321b19-22.
Note
that
Meta.
1043a33-34
proves
that
Aristotle does
not
think the
ambiguity
holds
only for
the
names of
composites of
form
and matter which
are
substances.
Also,
1043a34-35
and
1037a5-10
prove
that in the
case
of
substance
terms
the
ambiguity
s
not
that they
can
denote
either
the
individual
composite or the
universal
species.
'
Given
the
ambiguityof
terms
referring
to
psychic
events,
we
can meet
a
possible
objection
to
my
claim that
the soul
alone
rather
han the
composite of soul and
body
is
the
proper
subject of
activities. In a well
known
passage
at De
An.
408b13-15
Aristotle
says:
For
perhaps
t is
better
not to say
thatthe
soul
pities or
learnsor
thinks,
but that
the
man
does so
with
the soul.
This
naturally
uggests that
the
proper
subject
of
an activity
such
as anger
is
not the
soul but
the
composite.
However,
the
sense of
this
claim
becomes
clearer
when we
see that
it
occurs
in
a
context
(408a34-b8)
where
Aristotle
is
arguingthat
the soul
does
not
change
while
conceding that
psychic
states
like
anger are
changes in
the
body
(408b5-11). If
anger
is
understood
as
being a
change in the
body,
then
in thepresentcontext'anger'refersto the
composite of
form (in
the soul)
and
change
inthe
body.
Hence,
when Aristotle
says that
we
should
not say
thatthe
soul
is angry
but
ratherascribe
the
predicate to the
composite
man, he is
saying
that the
composite
psychic
event
should be
ascribed to the
composite
substance.
For if
we
ascribed he
composite
psychic
event
-
form and
bodily
change
-
to
the soul
alone, we
would
mistakenly
ascribechange
to the
soul.
So
Aristotle is
saying
that
the
proper
subject
of the
composite
psychic
event is
the
composite
substance,and
that
is
entirely
consistentwith
the
view that
the
propersubject
of the
form
of the
psychic
event is
the soul
alone;
just as
it is
consistent
with the
view
that
the
proper
subject of
the
matter
of the
psychic
event
(the
bodily
change) is the
body
alone.
And
the fact is
that
even after
408b13-15
Aristotle
repeatedly
refers
to the
soul as
the
subject
of
mental
events
(402a7-10,
blO-14,
403a3-16,
409bl5-16, 411a24-28,
429al-11,
17-18,
22-24,
31-b4,
23-24,
29,
430b5-6;
Parva
Nat.
445b16,
447b7,
24,
449a5-6,
8-9).
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At
the end
of Book
II
(424b16-18)Aristotle
says that smelling s
some-
thing over
and
above
undergoing
a
change
(na3tXdLv
TL), i.e. over
and
above the
matter
of
smelling, viz.
perceiving
(T6
REv
V.RL&Oa
xaiL
atoOdvEoOac).
Perceiving'
here
refers
to the
formal
aspect
of the
per-
ception
apart rom
the change
n the body
of the smeller.
It mustdo so if
it
statesthe
formal
aspect
of the
perception.
Forif 'perception'
here
denoted
a composite,
thenperception
ouldnot
be
what smelling s over
and
above
(ncaQd)
bodily
change.
So a typical
psychological
event
is a changein
the
body
as
well as
an
activity,
just
as Socrates
s flesh
andbones
as well
as a soul.
Perception,
recollection,
anger,fear
and
shame (e.g.)
arebodily
(aw[tatxL6v)
vents
(De
An.
427a27,
ParvaNat.
453al4-15,
26,
EN
1128bl3-15),
unlike
think-
ing
which is
not
a bodily
actuality
(De
An.
427a26-27,
De
Gen. Anim.
736b21-29,
EN 1117b28-31),
ven
if it requires
one (viz.
imagination)
n
order
to
occur
in human
beings.29
o while Aristotle
disagrees
with
the
materialist
n
holding
a psychological
vent
to be
not reducible
o
a
bodily
change,he also
disagrees
with
he
dualist
nholding
a
psychological
vent
to
be
a
bodily event,
for
the
matter
of such
an event is a physical
change.
The relation
between
the
change
and
activity
composing
a psychic
event
can
be causal.
Which
way
the causal
relation
runs
will vary
withthe type
of
the
psychic
event.
Thus,
at De
An. 408b15-18
Aristotlesays
that n the
case
of
recollection
hechange
occurring
nthe
bodymay
be caused
by
the soul,
i.e.,
I
suggest,
bythe
form
of recollection,
an
activity
occurring
n the
soul.
On
the other hand,
in the
case
of
perception
he causal
chain
must
proceed
in
the opposite
direction
a
sequence
of changes
n the
body
leads
to
the
occurrence
f anactivity
nthe soul. Similarly,
ParvaNat. 436b6-7
ays
that
perception
comes
to
be in the
soul via
the body.?'
It is in
this
waythat,
in
the
case
of
psychic
events,
the soul
is an
efficient
cause
of
bodily
events.
David
Charles3
as
objected
hatthe
soul cannot
be
an
efficient
cause of physicalevents becauseany such cause must have
extension
and
magnitude
and
be
divisible.
A movermoves
anotherthing
only
if it
comes
into
contact
with
the moved object.
Given
Aristotle's
definition
of contact,32
nly
a
material
object
can
have
contact,
and
that
29
Note how
the alternativesare distinguished
at
De An.
403a8-9.
3
I do not
wish to
dispute
the
suggestion
hat in at least some
cases activities
supervene
on
changes
ratherthan
being efficiently
caused
by
them.
We know
from
EN
X.
1-5 that
the activity
of pleasure
supervenes
(bntyyvE?aL)
on other activities,
but
I am
not
certain
that
Aristotle
distinguishes
his relation from
efficient
causation
in this
type
of
case.
31
D. Charles,
Aristotle's
Philosophy
of
Action (London,
1984), p.
218.
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with
another
material
object. So
a
mover, like
a
moved
object,
must
have
extension and magnitude.The soul lacks magnitudeand extension, and
therefore t cannot be a
mover,
or at
least
can
be
one
only
incidentally n
virtueof
existing n
matter
which
is,
properly,
a
mover.
But Aristotle
believes
only
that
whatever
moves
an
object
naturally
(VpuoLxdg)
must
do so
by
coming
nto
contact
with
t
and
hence tself
suffers
a
reaction
rom
the moved
object
(Phys.
201a24-25,
198a27-29,
02a3-9,
De
Gen.
Anim.
768bl5-25).
And as
Aristotle
points
out in De
Anima
(406b24-
25), it is
preciselynot
in this
way
that
the
soul
moves
the
body
but
through
choice
and
thought .
Aristotle
does
not
elaborate,
but since
he
is
explicitly
rulingout
the soul's
changing
being
a
cause
of theanimal'smotion, 'choice'
and
thought'
anonly
refer
o
activities or
perhaps
equencesof
activities):
choice
and
thought
mustbe
actualitiesand
there s
no
other
kindof
actuality
that
is an
occurrence
available
in
Aristotle's
ontology.33
Further,
De Gen. et.
Corr.
distinguishes
wo types
of
efficient
cause. In
everycase
the moved
object will
be a
physical
magnitude,but
only certain
movers
properly
ouch the
moved
object,viz.
those
which
hemselves
have
position and
magnitude
(322b32-323al, 5,
10-12; cf. De
Gen. Anim.
768bl5-25). In
these
casesthe
moverwill
be a
moved
mover
because t will
in turn
be acted
onby
themoved
object.So if
A moves
B inthis
way,both A
andB
have
magnitude,and A
will
touchB
and
B will
touchA,
and A
will
move B
and B
will
move
A.
But
sometimes
the
mover
A is
without
magnitude,and
then A
will
touch
B but
not
be
touched or,
hence,
moved
by B
in return
(la' 6U
LoleL
5unaOfv-ra
-
328a22;
cf.
323al3-34, De
An.
406a3-4,
Phys.
258a18-
259a3).3 This
describes
he
relation
betweensoul
and
body
demandedby
Aristotle's
accountof
self-motion
n Phys.
VIII.5.
The soul
is
immaterial
and
without
magnitudeand
hence
cannot be
touchedby
the
body
which t
moves. And
so
it
cannotbe
moved
in
return,and
hence is an
unmoved
mover.
So
it is
clear
that
Aristotledoes
notbelieve
thatonly
material
bodies can
be
efficientcauses
of
change.
3
Phys.
V-3;
231a21-23.
3
Cf.
Alexander,
DeAnima
Libri
Mantissa, n
Bruns
(ed.),
op.
cit., p.
106,
5-17.
Choice
and
thought
are,
of
course,
efficient
causesof
action
(EN
1139a31-33).
3 Cf.
Alexander, De
Anima,
pp.
21,
22-22,
12;
Simplicius,In
Aristotelis
Physicorum,
p.
1243,
25f.
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III
To close
I will consider
a
possibleobjection
to
my conclusion
hat
whata
psychic
event is over
and
above a
physicalchange
is an activity.
For
according
o one popular
view Aristotle
s afunctionalist,35
ndon this
view
a mentalevent
is, in addition
to a
material
change,
a certainfunctional
characteristic;
r perhaps
rather
he material
change which
is
(alone)
the
mental
eventhas sucha characteristic.
According
o functionalism
certain
type
of
mental
event s to
be defined n
terms
of itscausal
role,specifically
n
terms
of
itscausalrelations
o sensory
nput,
behavioral
utput,
andother
mentalstates. ThiswouldallowAristotleto give a materialistaccountof
psychological
vents for
a physicalevent
may have
sucha causalrole.
But
whether he causal
role is
counted
asa physical
or non-physical
roperty,
t
willbe adisposition
of thematerial
hange
which sthe
matter
of thepsychic
event
and
not,
as
I
claimed,an
activity.Hence,
the
formof a
psychicevent
is not
an activitypossibly
causingor
caused by the bodily change
but
the
causalrole
of
that
change.
It shouldbe noted,
to begin
with, that
there is
no evidence
that
Aristotle
shares
he belief
which s
one
of the main
motivations
f functionalism,
iz.
the belief that the same mental state can have different physicalreal-
izations.
For
example,
different
species
of animalcan,
it is said,
have
the
same
mental state even though
its physical
realization
will differ in
the
differentspecies.
And then it
is concluded
that a type
of mental event
cannot
be
identified
with a
type
of physical
event.
On
the other
hand,
functionalism
asily
handles
this
possibility
of
multiple
realizations.
It is
true that Aristotle
allows that
the
same
psychological
vent
may
be
found
in
different
species
of animal(Hist.
Anim.
588al5f.;
cf. De
Part.
Anim. 639al5-22,
645b3-6)
but nothing
he
says
suggests
that he
believes
that the physicalbasisof the samepsychological tatewillvary.It maybe
that he
thought,e.g.,
that
boiling
blood
is
the
physical
basis
of
anger
in
every
species
of animal
hat
can
experience
anger.
There
are
good
reasons
o
reject
the
view thatAristotle
s a
functionalist.
To
begin
with,
for the
functionalist
he
only
essential
features
of a
psycho-
logical
event are its functional
eatures. Thus,
while
brain matter
may
in
I
See,
e.g.,
N. Block,
Introduction:
What is Functionalism?
n N. Block (ed.),
Readings
n
the
Philosophy
of
Psychology
(London,
1980), pp. 171, 177;
M. Nussbaum,
Aristotle's
De
Motu Animalium,
p. 146;
E. Hartman,
Substance,Body and
Soul
(Prin-
ceton, 1977),pp. 197-98,211;S. MarcCohen. The Credibilityof Aristotle'sPhilosophy
of
Mind ,
in M.
Matthen
(ed.), Aristotle
Today
(Alberta, 1986), pp.
103-21.
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fact realize pain
in
man,
it is
possible
that
eventually
some
synthetic
material houldcometo playthecausalrole of pain,andthen thesynthetic
material
wouldrealize
pain.
Generally,
t
is an essential eature
of
function-
alism that
it
allows the same
psychological
tate
to be realized
n
different
types of matterorevent.Aristotle
rejects
his. At
the close
of
De
An. 1.1 he
saysthat t ispartof the definition
f
anger
hat
t is
boiling
blood.' He
does
not say that it is inpartmatterwhichmust
have
features
enabling
t
to
play
the causal
role of
anger.Similarly, ear
is
defined
as refrigeration De
Part.
Anim.
667al2-19, 692a24-25,Rhet. 1389b32), .e. as being that
pecific ype
of change, not merely as
whatever type
of
change has certain causal
features.
Further, upposeone accepts,as
I
do, RichardSorabji's nterpretation37
according o which
he
visionof a
red objectconsists n,
as
faras its
matter
s
concerned,the eye-jelly
becoming
red.
Could this specifictype
of
change
not be necessary or theperceptionof red? Couldthe matterof
seeing red,
for
Aristotle, be a change to yellow, greenor any other sensible
quality?
No, because Aristotle
thinks that the perception of a sensible
quality
involves the sense organ
becoming like the perceived quality (De An.
418a3-6,422a7, b14-16,423b27-424a2, 24a7-10,17-18, 425b22-24).If
so,
the
specificchangeof
becomingred is necessary or the perceptionof red,
and
a
similar
point applies
to the rest of the five senses: the organ must
acquire
the
specific quality
perceived. Contrary o a functionalistview,
Aristotle
considers pecifictypes of perception o be tied down to
specific
types
of
bodily change.
Secondly,Aristotleallows hat
one's bodycanbe in the sameconditionas
it is
when one is
in a certainpsychological tate but not be in that
psycholog-
ical
state (De An.
403a21-22).This is incompatiblewith a materialistic
functionalism
or a
physical state
which
realizes a certain
psychological
state
in
human
beings
cannot fail
to
have the
functionalfeatures
which
make t
therealization f that
psychological tate when
it
exists
n
a
person.
Thirdly,
if we
look
at some
of the formal definitions
of
psychological
events
given by Aristotle,
they
often fail to conform to
the functionalist
style
of
definition.
For
example,
n Rhet.
11.3
Aristotle
irst
defines
growing
calm as
the
quieting
of
anger
and
then
explains
what can
cause
it.
Consider he
psychologicaloccurrenceof theoretical
contemplation.A
typical
cause of
this event
will
be the
theoreticalknowledgewhich
is
the
3'
403a21-22,
31; cf. De Part.
Anim.
650b35-651a3.
It is
not clear
whether
Aristotle
is
thinkingof
anger in
general or
anger in
human
beings
alone. But
either
way
Aristotle's
definitionrules
out a
functionalist
nterpretation.
3
Body
and Soul in
Aristotle ,
pp.
49-50.
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potentiality
or
that actuality, ust as
knowledgeof the artof housebuilding
is a cause of its actualityof housebuilding Meta. 1032b21-23,De Gen.
Anim.
730b15-19,De Gen. et Corr.
324a35-bl, 335b32-33).But Aristotle
rulesout
defining
he actuality n termsof thepotentiality Meta. 1049b12-
17,DeAn.
415al8-20).
So not all of the typical
causesof contemplation re
used to define
it, and a parallelpoint holds
for any psychologicaloccur-
rence. Again, when Aristotle says at EN
1177b2 hat nothingcomes to be
from
contemplation part romthecontemplationtself, this meansat least
that the definition of contemplationwill not
incorporateany statement
asserting hat it
causes certain effects. Nor could any final causes be re-
ferred to in a definitionof contemplation.So the psychological vent of
contemplation s
not functionallydefined by Aristotle, and therefore he
cannot
have wanted, in general,
to
give a
functional
account of mental
events.
Finally,
a
functional haracteristic
s a
quality
a
disposition
whereas
a
psychological
vent is an
event, falling
nto the
category
of
doing(nIoLEiV)
or
suffering
tnadXELv).
Aristotle can no more allow an
event
to be
consti-
tuted
by
a
quality
than he
can allow a substance o be
constitutedout
of
qualities (De
An
410a13-22;
Meta.
1038b23-27,1039a30-32, 1070b2-4,
1073a36,
1086b37-1087a4, 088b2-4;
f.
Phys.265al5-16).
The
form of an
event must be an
event, just
as the form of a substance
must be
a
substance.A8
UniversityCollege
London
3
I
would like to thank
MalcolmSchofield
for his
helpful
commentson an earlier
draft
of
this
paper.
102
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