The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 29 | Number 1 | Article ID 3385 | Jul 19, 2010

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The New Face of U.S.-China Relations: “StrategicReassurance” or Old-Fashioned Rollback?　　米中関係の新局面——「戦略的保証」か古い巻き返し作戦か

Peter Lee

The New Face o f U .S . -ChinaRelations: “Strategic Reassurance”or Old-Fashioned Rollback?

Peter Lee

The Obama administration took office in 2009determined to move beyond might-makes-right-makes-might unilateralism of the Bush years,and reassert America's global influence as themost principled and powerful guarantor of rule-based multilateralism.

With respect to China, this approach waspresented as a doctrine of "strategicreassurance".

However, the policy has not yielded thesystemic breakthroughs that the Obamaadministration hoped to achieve on climatechange, non-proliferation, Middle East security,still less on U.S.-China relations.

Instead, increasingly acrimonious exchangesbetween Beijing and Washington reveal thecontradictions inherent in attempting toshoehorn an authoritarian, mercantilist, andsuspicious nation into a refurbished worldsystem that ostensibly promotes democracy,open markets, multilateralism, while forcefullyadvancing American interests.

Now the Obama administration seems to haveaccepted a world of lowered expectations andstrives for the more achievable goal ofadvancing U.S. power at China’s expense.Friction with China has emerged as a regularfeature of U.S. diplomacy—a means to score

points in the game of international diplomacyat the expense of an unpopular, uncooperative,and, at least for the moment, diplomatically andmilitarily weaker regime. Indeed, U.S. Chinapolicy today looks a lot like good old-fashionedrol lback, i so lat ing China instead ofincorporating it into a win-win multi-polarsystem.

The Western press, distracted by individualissues such as Iran sanctions, Google, and theCheonan sinking, seems oblivious to the factthat the U.S.-China relationship has lurchedinto zero-sum territory and relations are in thedeep freeze, largely as the result of thewillingness of the Obama administration toconfront China in pursuit of its agenda. TheChinese media, on the other hand, talks aboutnothing else.

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Observers who believe that China will yield toU.S. pressure as long as its access to worldmarkets is assured are ignoring unmistakablesigns that Beijing has decided that, while itseconomic interests are vital, it must beprepared to downplay short-term economicgain in order to ensure its geopolitical positionand national future.

Even in its inception, U.S. demands for“strategic reassurance” were inherentlyunequal, framed as something that China hadto provide up front before the U.S. wouldreciprocate. Deputy Secretary of State JamesSteinberg described the doctrine at a Centerfor a New American Security conference onChina in September 2009. The onus forreassurance was put on China in a way thatBeijing undoubtedly found grating. (1)

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State JamesSteinberg with Lee Myung-bak

Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit,bargain. Just as we and our allies must makeclear that we are prepared to welcome China’s“arrival”, as you all have so nicely put it, as a

prosperous and successful power, China mustreassure the rest of the world that itsdevelopment and growing global role will notcome at the expense of security and well-beingof others. Bolstering that bargain must be apriority in the U.S.-China relationship. Andstrategic reassurance must find ways tohighlight and reinforce the areas of commoninterest, while addressing the sources ofmistrust directly, whether they be political,military or economic.

Steinberg proceeded to list five areas of"impressive" cooperation: reviving the globaleconomy, denuclearizing North Korea, dealingwith Iran's nuclear program, mitigating climatechange, and anti-terrorism and anti-piracy.

In retrospect, it is clear that in only two areas--the global economy and anti-terrorism/piracy--do the U.S. and China share a genuine identityof interests, while with respect to North Korea,Iran and climate change, among other issues,U .S . and Ch inese pos i t i ons rema infundamentally at odds. And in the key area ofthe global economy, agreement is by no meansabsolute.

While appreciating the massive Chinesedomestic stimulus program (and the equallymassive Chinese purchases of U.S. sovereigndebt), U.S. plans for the new economic orderclearly include a stronger Chinese currency—asituation that Mr. Steinberg alluded to when hedescribed the three "continued areas ofmistrust and disagreement": China's militaryexpansion, global resource competition, andthe economic relationship.

Indeed, in mid-2010, a bleak but accurate glosson "strategic reassurance" might be that theonly area of genuine mutual reassuranceconcerns China's willingness to sail around theHorn of Africa in a cautious and responsiblemanner in search of pirates.

The aggravated US-China relationship iscompounded by the Obama administration's

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difficulty in making compromises.

At first, the administration's initiatives lookedpromising. They made no easy accommodationto hab i tua l U .S . c la ims to na t iona lexcept iona l i sm, and even had someinternational appeal.

Indeed, they were designed to repudiate thearrogant American me-firstism that had seenthe U.S. turn its back on the Kyoto climatetreaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, theInternational Criminal Court, and the Law ofthe Sea Treaty. In short, rather than deployingthe rhetoric of national interest, the Obamaadministration presented itself as a promoter ofglobal norms—and sought to impose thosenorms on China.

Yet the full brunt of U.S. intentions often onlybecome clear in the foreign policy-making fineprint, such as the somewhat obscure speechesof U.S. deputy secretaries. As Steinberg putmatters with respect to China:

Now, strategic reassurance does not only applyto the relationship between China and theUnited States. Our partners, particularly inAsia, must have the same certainty that China’sexpanding role will not come at the expense oftheir interests. And this not only requires thatthe United States bolster its own bilateralrelationships, especially with key allies likeJapan, South Korea and Australia, but also thatwe lead in updating and strengthening theregional and international institutions thatshape the context in which Ch ina ’sdevelopment occurs, so that change isconstructive rather than destabilizing.

...

When it comes to the international system, wemust ensure that new powers like China – andthere are others as well, of course – can taketheir rightful place at the table withoutgenerating fear or mistrust. ... As we pursuethese policies, we will be open to China’s

growing role, but we will also be looking forsigns and signals of reassurance from China. IfChina is going to take its rightful place, it mustmake those signals clear.

So, when U.S. initiatives collided with Chineseinterests, there was no graceful way tonegotiate between Obama universalism andChinese particularism or, as it is usually framedin the Western press, U.S. principle vs. Chineseselfishness. The situation has not been helpedby the fac t tha t many o f the Obamaadministration's grand strategic initiatives havefizzled in practice (or in the case of somethinglike economically crippling Iran throughsanctions, the outcome may be years in thefuture).

Complex Rubik's cube diplomacy involvinginterlocking initiatives and delicate sequencingon much tougher Iran sanctions, climatechange, and nuclear non-proliferation haveyielded few breakthroughs. The reasons arenumerous, but in each case, China is part of thestory. China has challenged the U.S. on anumber of these issues. For example, Beijingearned the Obama administration's ire for itshigh-profile role in opposing U.S. initiatives inthe Copenhagen climate debacle and as a resultof its hard bargaining on UN sanctions againstIran.

Partly as a result of Chinese resistance, theclimate and NPT treaties and Iran sanctionshave, after immense expenditures of prestigeand energy by the United States, degeneratedinto little more than unproductive can-kickingdown the road of futile multilateral initiatives.In short, strategic reassurance is notforthcoming in areas of potential cooperation, asituation that the Obama administration blameson China, and not on any shortcomings of itsown policies.

Frictions, on the other hand, are persistent andapparently structural. It appears that, inresponse, the Obama administration haschosen to interpret “strategic reassurance” as

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the simple and emotionally satisfying strategyof rollback—attacking Chinese interests insteadof trying to accommodate them.

From the Chinese perspective, the Obamaadministration’s China policy increasinglylooks, walks, and quacks like containment.Apparently, the United States prefers adifferent term: “preempting China’s monopolystatus”.

On his blog, the Washington Note, foreignpolicy insider Steve Clemons reported on aconversation he had in early June with senioradministration officials involved in theinternational realm.

One of the most interesting comments made toa question I posed probing the administration'sstrategy in Asia, was "Steve, don't watch thehand!"

What this person was saying was 'don't get lostin everything going on at the surface' in US-China relations or US-Japan relations, butrather look at the other many bits and pieces ofAmerica's engagement in the Asia Pacific thatare enhancing US leverage and generating agreater sense among Pacific Rim countries thatAmerica is there, engaged, and preemptingChina from enjoying monopoly status. (2)

Either by accident or design, U.S. publicdiplomacy campaigns involving climate change,nuclear proliferation, Internet freedom, Iran,and the Cheonan sinking, while yielding fewconcrete gains, have succeeded in one keyrespect. They have placed China at ageopolitical disadvantage, forcing it to line upwith pariahs or near pariahs like Iran, Burma,and North Korea in opposition to the Westerndemocracies, Japan, and South Korea.

The antagonistic US-China relationship showssigns of becoming institutionalized, especiallywith the Obama administration’s efforts toestablish a solid strategic, legal, and diplomaticfoundation for sustained and successful third-

country sanctions on the issue of Iran, with theEU and Japan ready as always to lend a hand.The administration’s overwhelming desire toisolate Iran virtually assures a confrontationalposture against China.

Even as the UN resolution on the fourth roundof Iran sanctions wound its way uncertainlythrough the Security Council, it was an opensecret that China would water it down. TheU.S.-proposed solution was follow-on nationalsanctions that, if not "crippling" as desired byIsrael, would hit Iran where it hurt--in theenergy sector. The perceived flaw to thatsolution would be that China would honor theUN resolution, impose no follow-on nationalsanctions, and scoop up Iran contracts whilethe U.S. and Europe stood on the sidelines.

U.S. national and EU sanctions are useless if allthey do is dr ive Iran- -and i ts energyinvestments, petroleum products, andimport/export and financial dealings--furtherinto China's arms, as Glenn Kessler reportedfor the Washington Post:

U.S. and European officials acknowledge thatthe administration's gambit faces uncertainties.

China, for instance, could swoop into Iran toreplace Western investors. "China is theelephant in the room," one diplomat said, butthe hope is that China will face politicalpressure not to appear to profit from aninternational pullout. Officials also say Chinacannot replicate some of the technologies andproducts produced in Europe. (3)

Both Russia and China have insisted that, inreturn for their support of the UN resolution,they received assurances that follow-onnational sanctions by the U.S. and Europewould not damage their energy and economicinterests.

However, the obsessively forward-thinkingObama administration would certainly have aplan for addressing the underlying weakness of

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a massive geostrategic effort that hasconsumed the energ ies o f the U .S .administration for the last six months.

Perhaps the Obama administration gave Russiaand China the desired assurances with thecaveat (perhaps implied or unspoken) that, ifIran's behavior didn't change, then promises tolay off Russian and Chinese interests wouldhave to be honored, as they say, "in thebreach".

The enabling U.S. legislation on Iran sanctions--H.R. 2194, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010--was signed by Obama in early July and providesample justification for imposing third countrysanctions, whether in sorrow or in anger: (4)

The proposed bill, announced in a jointstatement by Representative Howard Berman(D-Calif.) and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) , would bar non-U.S. f inancialinstitutions dealing with Iran's RevolutionaryGuard or targeted Iranian banks from alsodoing business with the U.S. banking sector.The bill would also penalize firms sellinggasoline to Iran through restrictions on theirU.S. bank transactions, property transfers andforeign exchange in the United States.

As one analyst observed, "The act presentsforeign banks doing business with blacklistedIranian entities a stark choice -- cease youractivities or be denied critical access toAmerica's financial system," an outline of thebill states, adding that it would addressproblematic moves taken by internationalbranches of U.S. financial institutions. (5)

President Obama made a show of asking forexplicit waivers for "cooperating countries",understood to be Russia and China, in returnfor their support on the UN resolution, as ademonstration of good faith. He didn't get theblanket waivers, but he is perhaps not unhappythat he didn't. He will be able to grant one-year exemptions for individual corporations,

albeit with a "name and shame" requirement toput the recipients on the public record.

Therefore, if China exploits Western andJapanese sanctions to entrench itself in Iran’senergy sector or is excessively dilatory insupporting the initiatives of the Obamaadministration, financial sanctions can bedeployed against its banks, as they were earlierwith respect to North Korea in the famous caseof the 2005 sanction of Banco Delta Asia, asmall bank in the Chinese territory of Macao.

The Obama administration’s carefully-constructed legal and diplomatic edifice ofthird-country sanctions gives the United Statesa weapon that it can wield against China, notonly on Iran, but also to advance US interestsin the myriad other areas of friction thatbedevil the relationship. The other key area offriction between the United States and Chinatoday is the Korean peninsula.

In a development that China affects to findincreasingly suspicious, U.S. exchanges withChina in Asia have grown progressively moreconfrontational, thereby playing to America'sprimary strength—its overwhelming militarysuperiority while highlighting a key Chinesevulnerability—regional fears (albeit voicedmostly by Japan and more recently SouthKorea) concerning the geopolitical ambitions ofits burgeoning military.

In particular, it appears that the temptation toexploit China’s geopolitical vulnerabilities—andtake advantage of South Korea President LeeMyung-bak’s enthusiasm for using U.S. supportto challenge Chinese hegemony in NortheastAsia—were irresist ible to the Obamaadministration.

The result is a destabilization of the Koreanpeninsula that has, by U.S. design, achieved theexact opposite of reassurance.

Things started to come to a nasty head over thesinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan

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near North Korean waters on March 26. Theway South Korea and the United States haveallowed the issue to play out seemed designedto put China in an ugly light.

South Korea turned to the United States and itsallies—and passed over China and Russia—toconduct the investigation into the sinking. Thenthe United States took center stage to endorsethe findings, and South Korea's call for UNaction, unequivocally. Secretary of StateClinton visited China to encourage it to supportthe ROK/US position. To date, China hasdeclined. The United States and South Koreaprofess to believe that China prefers to protectits feckless and dangerous ally, North Korea,instead of standing with justice, security, theinternational community, and its key economicpartner, South Korea. China's statements infavor of peace on the peninsula and greaterdiplomatic efforts by the North and South tosettle their differences get no respect.

Senator James Webb, the Democratic Party’smost influential spokesman on Asia inCongress, put it this way, in a Korea Timesnews article posted on his official website:

Webb said China's position on the Cheonanincident when it reaches the UNSC will be abarometer of its willingness to cooperate withthe international community.

'It is a good opportunity for the rest of theworld to observe and comment on whetherChina is proceeding in a mature fashion as amember of the international community,' hesaid. 'It's a test of whether it can participateamong the leadership of the world community.'(6)

James Webb with Barack Obama

The Chinese government may feel that theSouth Korean/international investigationcontains enough evidentiary and proceduralshortcomings that it can be safely disregarded. A recent report by the South Korean Board ofAudit and Investigation, while calling for theremoval of 25 ROK military officers for theirfailings in responding to the disaster, alsohighlighted at least two instances offalsification of official records of the incident.

The South Korean military was furtherembarrassed by the revelation that it haddisplayed the schematic of the wrong NorthKorean torpedo when it rolled out its case onMay 20.

However, China’s ambivalence on the issue ofthe Cheonan probably has more to do with thegrowing suspicion that the U.S. definition of"strategic reassurance" now involves, above all,not just the maintenance but the attemptedenhancement of U.S. strategic advantage inChina's backyard.

The Cheonan incident and the U.S. responsedid not occur in a vacuum. They took place at atime of considerable uncertainty concerningthe U.S. forward position in the Pacific. In late2009/early 2010 the Obama administration was

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busy ostracizing the Democratic Party of Japangovernment in Japan, which was attempting toestablish a more equal and independent rolefor Japan within the U.S.-Japan-China triangle. The DPJ government's unwillingness to acceptthe U.S. position on a key issue was itscampaign promise (recently abandoned) torenegotiate the deal made by the outgoingLiberal Democratic Party to build a new U.S.Marine Air Station at Oura Bay on Okinawa.

At the same time, the conservative governmentof South Korean president Lee Myung-bak wasdeterminedly burnishing its pro-Americancredentials by backing away from theindependent security policy and “sunshine”engagement of North Korea favored by its twopredecessor governments.

The United States decided to reward PresidentLee--and South Korea's ambitions as a regionalpower and security partner, placing it virtuallyon a par with Japan--by endorsing severalmoves designed to enhance the nation'sstature. These included supporting SouthKorea as the host for two prestigious summits: the G-20 confab in November 2010, and thenext Nuclear Security Summit--PresidentObama's keystone diplomatic initiative--in2012. Part of the deal apparently included acoordinated response on the Cheonan sinking,extending beyond participation in theinvestigation and support of its findings toagreement to support a call for UN SecurityCouncil action.

The cost of this deepening of the ROK-USsecurity relationship was China’s feeling thatthe two countries were ganging up on China onmatters Northeast Asian. To Beijing, the U.S.clearly showed the cloven hoof by endorsingthe UN Security Council as an appropriatevenue for the Cheonan sinking. This impliedthat the United States’ idea of “strategicreassurance” involves good relations only ifChina repudiates its North Korean ally andacquiesces to sidelining the Six Party Talks—a

diplomatic initiative that granted China acentral role in regional and global affairs.

It also indicated that the U.S. was promoting anew, destabilizing security paradigm in NorthAsia—promoting an enhanced role for SouthKorea while pushing the future of North Koreainto the U.S.-friendly UN Security Council atthe expense of the Six Party Talks. As the NorthKorean regime approaches a leadershiptransition that might plunge it into chaos,Beijing is surely sensitive to the fact thatAmerica seems to be sidelining the PRC fromthe consultations that may decide the future ofthe Korean peninsula.

These issues received an airing at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a think-tank sponsored confab ofdefense ministers held annually in Singapore.At the 2010 iteration, held from June 4-6, SouthKorean President Lee Myung-bak carried hiscampaign to exploit the geopol i t icalimplications of the sinking of the corvetteCheonan to a major Asian forum. His call for aunited anti-North Korea front by the civilizedworld was overshadowed by a conspicuous spatbetween U.S. Secretary of Defense RobertGates and China’s delegation to the conference,led by General Ma Xiaotian.

Lee Myung-bak with Robert Gates at theShangri-La Dialogue

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Secretary Gates dismissed China’s Taiwanarms sa les - re lated anx iet ies wi th acondescension that China’s official opinionfound infuriating, especially when contrastedwith a high-profile tripartite meeting betweenGates, Lee Myung-bak, and Japan's DefenceMinister that pledged to “deter furtherprovocation” in the region.

During the conference, it transpired thatSecretary Gates was not welcome to visitBeijing. This was construed, perhapsinaccurately, as a further, high-profileexpression of Chinese displeasure at Taiwanarms sales. The Taiwan arms sale matter hadbeen thoroughly hashed out earlier in Januaryand had already triggered the tit-for-tatChinese response: cancellation of scheduledmilitary exchanges and some US-Chinadiplomatic exchanges at the Vice ForeignMinister level.

It is more likely that by June Beijing wassending a message concerning the overallhealth of the military and political relationshipwith the U.S.—a message that Secretary Gateswas perhaps not ready to share with theWestern journalists covering the conference.

In the Q&A subsequent to Secretary Gates’speech, Chinese Major General Zhu Chenghu,took the U.S. to task for working with Israel toslow walk the investigation on the assault onthe Gaza aid flotilla, while demanding fullspeed ahead on censure of North Korea. Zhuconcluded with a remarkably straightforwardstatement of dissatisfaction: "The Chinese aretaking the Americans as a partner, as friends,and Americans take the Chinese as enemies." (7)

In his official remarks to the forum, General Macriticized the traditional military mindset ofrelying on zero-sum alliances that weaken anadversary. He also made the pointed remark,“We should not treat only the symptoms but notthe causes, still less try to put out a fire with ahammer.” (8)

This can be construed as a reference toAmerica’s preference for casting all regionalproblems within a security template simplybecause military might is America’s lastremaining trump card in Asia. Matters have notimproved since Singapore.

Previously, mindful of the objections of theDemocratic Party’s union base, PresidentObama had resisted pushing Congress to ratifythe South Korea—US Free Trade Agreement. However, the U.S. yielded to South Koreanstrategic blandishments—President Lee hadopenly stated that he wanted to stall the ROK-PRC Free Trade Agreement until after theagreement with the U.S. went into effect, sothe U.S. could gain the greatest benefits—andPresident Obama confirmed the pro-ROK/anti-China tilt of his administration by coming out insupport of ratification of the South Korea—U.S.Free Trade Agreement. President Obama thenused the public forum of the G20 summit inToronto to pointedly insult President Hu Jintaoby accusing China of “wilfull blindness” inrefusing to publicly endorse the results of theinvestigation into the sinking of the Cheonan.

Chinese perceptions of U.S. hypocrisy andhostility were undoubtedly reinforced by theobservations that a) no public insults weredirected at Russia which has also declined toendorse the Cheonan findings as yet; and b) theU.S. stepped forward to reject a North Koreancall for a joint investigation of the Cheonansinking under the auspices of the UN—aninvestigation that might reveal additionalembarrassing holes in the “compelling” casethat the US claimed China was exercising“wilfull blindness” in disregarding.

Criticisms of U.S. China policy in the Chinesemedia have become less oblique and markedlymore strident. Chinese media characterizedPresident Obama’s “wilfull blindness” rebukeas “irresponsible and flippant”.

The next, inevitable area of friction concernsthe joint U.S.-ROK naval exercises scheduled

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for early July in the Yellow Sea between theKorean peninsula and China, which may or maynot feature an appearance by the U.S. aircraftcarrier George Washington. With good reason,China has chosen to interpret these exercisesas a deliberate provocation, whose purpose isnot to overawe North Korea; it is to humiliateBeijing by demonstrating that the U.S. fleet cansail the oceans of East Asia in disregard ofChina’s sensibilities and openly expressedobjections.

The USS George Washington

A June 12 People Daily Online editorial entitled,“US Must Restrain Provocative MilitaryActions” predictably adopted the framingfavorable to China, calling for “peace” instead

of “provocation” and made it clear that itexpects that it is China and not the UnitedStates that should be “reassured”:

The United States may believe that since itconducted military drills in the Yellow Sea inthe past, it can do that now and in the future.But the United States should understand, withChina's increasing national strength, Chinesenationals will get more sensitive to theprovocative actions the U.S. navy takes in aplace so close to their home.

No one would allow its competitor with guns inhand to wander in front of their home or keep aclose watch staring through their windows, andthe Americans would not too.

China does not object to the U.S. navy'spresence in the western Pacific and even showsunderstanding that some countries in thisregion still need the U.S. military to provide asense of security. And no country has thecapability to replace the United States in thiscapacity. But, this does not mean the UnitedStates can ignore China's self-esteem and drivetheir aircraft carrier straight to the front ofChina's doorstep to flex their muscles.

Only when the United States learns to respectthe western Pacific countries and adapt to thechanges of their politics, economies and, inparticular, public opinion, can its authority inthis region be recognized. The United Statesshould make people feel that the U.S. militarypresence in this region is peaceful andnecessary, not vice versa.

Furthermore, the United States needs to takeinto account these countries' moods if it wantsto become a peacemaker, not a troublemaker.Otherwise, the United States will havedifficulties in staying in the region for a longtime and its interests here will be difficult toeffectively protect. (9)

People’s Daily’s international affairsmouthpiece, Global Times, ran an editorial with

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a similar theme—and wording—under the title“Yellow Sea No Place for US Carrier”:

Many Chinese are tired of the abrupt changesin US posture. The US just stressed theimportance of partnership between the twocountries at the second Strategic and EconomicDialogue at the end of last month. Now, it looksas if the US could try to incite China withmilitary aggression. (10)

China’s expression of displeasure moved fromwords to munitions, as China announced itsnavy would conduct live fire drills in the EastChina Sea for the duration of the U.S.-ROKmaneuvers.

On July 6, Global Times ran a blunt editorialtitled, US has to pay for provocation.

The US provocation on the western Pacific is atypical act born out of the Cold War mentality.

This will only further isolate the US in theseparts, as no East Asian country would like anoutsider to mess up the region, and itsneighborhood.

Developments in East Asia over the past 10years contributed significantly to the economicboom of the United States in the decade beforeit suffered a setback from its own financialtrouble.

As commander in chief, Barack Obama needs torethink his role in East Asia, as to whether he issquandering the invaluable political heritageleft behind by George W. Bush. It will be atragedy if the US upsets the prevalent situationand turns the clock back on East Asianrelations by decades.

Considering the growing economic, diplomatic,

political and cultural ties the US has withChina, the price the US has to pay for itsirresponsible decision will be higher than it canenvision now. If the US does not pay for this"adventure" now, it will pay in the future.These are not the opinions of a strategicallyreassured--or reassuring--China. These are thewords of a threatened regional power thatregards U.S. hostility as dangerous andgrowing.

Scheduling the George Washington to avoid theYellow Sea in early July is not going to allayChinese concerns about America’s hostileintentions. By now, suspicion has probablyhardened into certainty.

It’s a worrisome reflection on the Obamaadministration’s China policy that U.S.interactions with Beijing are now apparentlydriven by frustration, rancor, inertia, andopportunism—and the acrid residue of newAmerican ambitions for regional leadershipthat China is determined to contest.

Peter Lee is the moving force behind the Asianaffairs website China Matters which providescontinuing critical updates on China and Asia-Pacific policies. His work frequently appears atAsia Times. He wrote this article for The Asia-Pacific Journal.

Recommended citation: Peter Lee, "The NewFace of U.S.-China Relations: 'StrategicReassurance' or Old-Fashioned Rollback?" TheAsia-Pacific Journal, 29-1-10, July 19, 2010.

On related subjects see Rick Rozoff, "U.S. RisksMilitary Clash With China in the Yellow Sea,Global Research, July 16, 2010.