The Last 80 Days Before the Elections

The Last 80 Days Before the Elections Strategic Planning in the Obama Campaign

08 Autunno

CMCS Working Papers -‐ Blue Label

Flóra Anna Rétfalvi

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The last 80 days before the elections

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Flóra Anna Rétfalvi

The Last 80 Days Before the Elections

Strategic Planning in the Obama Campaign

Roma

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Published by Centre for Media and Communication Studies “Massimo Baldini” LUISS University Viale Romania, 32 – 00197 Roma RM -‐ Italy Copyright in editorial matters, LUISS CMCS © 2014 Copyright “The Last 80 Days Before the Elections. Strategic Planning in the Obama Campaign” Flóra Anna Rétfalvi © 2014 ISBN 978-‐88-‐6536-‐017-‐0 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published. In the interests of providing a free flow of debate, views expressed in this CMCS WP are not necessarily those of the editors or the LUISS University. CMCS Working Papers are peer-‐reviewed (double blind review system) CMCS Working Papers – Blue Label are accepted papers but not peer-‐reviewed


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Nota

Questo saggio fa parte della serie blu dei CMCS Working Papers. La serie blu (CMCS Working papers -‐ blue label) raccoglie lavori di qualità, realizzati da student*, neo-‐laureat* e giovani studios*. Questi saggi sono stati selezionati da una commissione editoriale ma non sono sottoposti a blind peer review.

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Acknowledgements

Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to

my advisors Prof. Roberto D’Alimonte and Prof. Michele

Sorice for the continuous support of my Master studies and

research, for their patience, motivation, enthusiasm, and

immense knowledge. Their guidance helped me in all the

time of research and writing of this work.

Besides my advisors, a special thanks to HKS Professor

Steve Jarding for his support, critics and input to this work

and my personal progress. Moreover I am grateful for his

permission to attend his classes and be a student of Harvard

Kennedy School for a semester.

Moreover I would like to thank all of the staff of the OFA

Office: Alex, Esther, Hannah, Bay, Chris, Ryan, my campaign-‐

family, and the enthusiastic volunteers of the campaign:

Ronnie Werner, Sue Hubberd, John Titus, Greg Atkinson,

Eva Powers, Larry Drake and family Schwarz, you made it

real.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family for

their patience in the research period and for their support

in these 20 years of my studies.

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Index

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................... 7

INDEX .......................................................................................................... 9

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................... 12

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 15

1.1 METHOD OF ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 20 1.2 THE ROAD THAT WE HAVE TRAVELLED ............................................. 24 WHO IS OBAMA? ..................................................................................................... 24 EARLY LIFE / BIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................... 25 2008 CAMPAIGN .................................................................................................... 26 2008-‐2012 ............................................................................................................ 26 1.3 HOW DID MODERN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING CHANGE ..................... 28

2. BATTLE-‐GROUND GAME ................................................................ 33

2.1 ELECTORAL SYSTEM ............................................................................ 36 2.2 SWING STATES ..................................................................................... 43 2.2.1 WHAT IS A SWING STATE? .......................................................................... 43 2.2.2 WHICH STATES ARE SWING STATES? ....................................................... 48 2.2.3 SHIFTS AND THE TIPPING POINT ............................................................... 54 2.3 SWING VOTERS .................................................................................... 60 2.3.1 WHO ARE THE SWING VOTERS? ................................................................ 60 2.3.2 NATIONAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION ......................................................... 62 2.3.3 OBAMA INDEPENDENTS ............................................................................. 71 2.4 PATH TO VICTORY .............................................................................. 83 2.4.1 SWING STATES -‐ WHICH STATES? ............................................................ 86 2.4.2 PATHWAYS .................................................................................................... 90 2.4.3 FACTS AND FIGURES .................................................................................... 94 2.4.4 CORE PROGRAM ........................................................................................... 95

THE CAMPAIGN .................................................................................. 101

3. FUNDRAISING ................................................................................. 105

3.1 RECORD-‐BREAKING .......................................................................... 107

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3.2 WAYS TO RAISE MONEY ................................................................... 110 3.3 FUNDRAISING STATISTICS ............................................................... 114 3.4 FUNDRAISING BEST PRACTICE ........................................................ 118 3.5 TOP CONTRIBUTORS ........................................................................ 124 3.6 RESULTS AND PROPORTIONS .......................................................... 129 3.7 SPENDING ......................................................................................... 131

4. CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION ................................................... 135

4.1 EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION .......................................................... 140 4.1.1 TENDENCIES ............................................................................................... 141 4.1.2 THE DIGITAL TEAM’S CORE PROGRAM ................................................. 145 4.1.3 THE CAMPAIGN’S WEBSITE ..................................................................... 146 4.1.4 VIDEO COMPONENT AND YOUTUBE ....................................................... 148 4.1.5 EMAILS ......................................................................................................... 150 4.1.6 SOCIAL MEDIA ............................................................................................. 154 a, Twitter ............................................................................................................. 156 b, Facebook ......................................................................................................... 158 4.1.7 WEB DESIGN ............................................................................................... 162 4.1.8 OLD MEDIA .................................................................................................. 164 4.1.9 THREE PRIORITIES: MESSAGING, FUNDRAISING AND ORGANIZING ... 166 a, Messaging ....................................................................................................... 166 b, Fundraising .................................................................................................... 169 c, Organizing ....................................................................................................... 170 4.1.10 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 172 4.2 INTERNAL COMMUNICATION ........................................................... 175 4.2.1 METRICS-‐DRIVEN CAMPAIGN .................................................................. 177 4.2.2 MERGING SYSTEMS .................................................................................... 180 4.2.3 NARWHAL ................................................................................................... 181 4.2.4 DREAMCATCHER ........................................................................................ 183 4.2.5 DASHBOARD ................................................................................................ 185

5. THE LAST 80 DAYS OF THE CAMPAIGN .................................. 189

5.1 WHERE DID I COME FROM? ............................................................. 192 5.2 THE FIRST 24 HOURS ....................................................................... 193 5.3 THE OFFICE ....................................................................................... 197 5.4 TWO DAYS TRAINING ....................................................................... 203 5.5 NEIGHBORHOOD TEAMS .................................................................. 207 5.6 THE FIRSTS ....................................................................................... 211 5.6.1 PHONE BANKING ........................................................................................ 212 5.6.2 CANVASSING ............................................................................................... 215 5.6.3 INSERTING DATA ....................................................................................... 218


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5.7 LET THE COMMUNITY GROW ........................................................... 220 5. 8 DEBATES .......................................................................................... 222 5.9 47 % ................................................................................................ 229 5.10 BILL CLINTON VISITS NH .............................................................. 232 5.11 HURRICANE SANDY ....................................................................... 233 5.12 EVOLUTION OF THE MESSAGE ....................................................... 234 5.12.1 VOTER REGISTRATION ............................................................................ 238 5.12.2 PERSUASION ............................................................................................. 240 5.12.3 TURN OUT -‐ GOTV ................................................................................. 241 5.13 ELECTION DAY ............................................................................... 244

6. RESULTS AND REFLECTIONS ..................................................... 249

6.1 DEMOGRAPHICS ............................................................................... 256 6.2 WHY DID REPUBLICANS NOT WIN? ................................................. 259 6.3 REFLECTIONS ................................................................................... 262

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................... 263

OFFLINE SOURCES ................................................................................... 265 ONLINE SOURCES .................................................................................... 267 OTHER RELEVANT PAGES ...................................................................... 279

APPENDIX ............................................................................................. 290

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List of Tables 1. Introduction

2. Battleground Game

Picture 2.1: Distribution of Electoral Colleges among the states ....................................................................................................................... 39

Picture 2.2: Voting DNA in various states ....................................... 41 Picture 2.3: Initial status quo ................................................................ 42 Picture 2.4: Map of swing states .......................................................... 45 Picture 2.5: Turnout differences in swing states ......................... 47 Picture 2.6: The calculation of the tipping point state 2012 ... 56 Picture 2.7: State-‐Level Margins Relative to the Nation

(Ordered by Shift in Relative Vote) ............................................................ 58 Picture 2.8: National Party Identification 1937-‐2012 ............... 63 Picture 2.9: Trends in Party Identification ..................................... 64 Picture 2.10: Political Ideology – Recent Trend Among

Republicans .......................................................................................................... 66 Picture 2.11: Political Ideology – Recent Trend Among

Democrats ............................................................................................................. 67 Picture 2.12: Political Ideology – Recent Trend Among

Independents ....................................................................................................... 68 Picture 2.13: Obama as Divider ........................................................... 70 Picture 2.14: Party Identification Among Whites ........................ 74 Picture 2.15: PID among white voters .............................................. 77 Picture 2.16: How we win: Expand the electorate ...................... 81 Picture 2.17: Jim Messina – Our Mission ......................................... 85 Picture 2.18: Battleground states, margins and results ............ 87 Picture 2.19: Potential Pathways to the White House ............... 89 Picture 2.20: Path to Victory, by Jim Messina ................................ 93 Picture 2.21: Key methods of Generating Votes ........................... 98

3. Fundraising

Picture 3.1: Fundraising Overall ........................................................ 110 Picture 3.2: Fundraising month by month .................................... 116 Picture 3.3: Money raised by Sources ............................................. 117 Picture 3.4: Outside Spending ............................................................ 117 Picture 3.5: Optimazation of Fundraising Webform ............... 121 Picture 3.6: Top Donors ........................................................................ 125 Picture 3.7: Top State Donors ............................................................. 126 Picture 3.8: Top Industry Donors ..................................................... 127


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Picture 3.9: Top Donors for Both Candidates from Industries128 Picture 3.10: Distribution of Donors ............................................... 130 Picture 3.11: Proportion of small-‐ and big donors .................... 131 Picture 3.12: Spending Related to Presidential Race ............... 132

4. Campaign Communication

Picture 4.1: Online platforms’ first use in campaigns .............. 142 Picture 4.2: Subject lines for the E-‐mails ....................................... 152 Picture 4.3: Obama Tweet after Elections Day ............................ 157 Picture 4.4: The Facebook Timeline of Barack Obama ............ 159 Picture 4.5: Web Designer and Print Designer -‐ Organigram163

5. The last 80 days of the campaign

Picture 5.1: Number of Campaign Field Offices .......................... 199 Picture 5.2: The growth of Field Offices in Swing States ........ 201 Picture 5.3: Volunteer Hours per Week in 2008 ........................ 208 Picture 5.4: Neighborhood Team Structure ................................. 210 Picture 5.5: Exponential Increase of Personal Conversations212 Picture 5.6: How volunteers first got involved ........................... 220 Picture 5.7: Debate Calendar .............................................................. 223 Picture 5.8: First Presidential Debate’s Perceptions ................ 225 Picture 5.9: Perceptions of the candidates before and after debate ........................................................................................................... 228 Picture 5.10: Voter Registration and Margins ............................. 239

6. Results and Reflections

Picture 6.1: Results in swing states .................................................. 254 Picture 6.2: Expections and Real Outcomes ................................. 255

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1. Introduction

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“Tonight, in this election, you, the American people, reminded us that while our road has been hard, while our journey has been long, we have picked ourselves up, we have fought our way back, and we know in our hearts that for the United States of America, the best is yet to come.”

President Barack Obama,

Election Night Speech (2012)

012 was an intense year in American political history. Many say that this was the year were “history was made”. The 2012 electoral campaigns were intense

and spectacular. Viewers from the country and even from other countries, from oversees have followed this day-‐by-‐day battle between Gov. Mitt Romney and Pres. Barack Obama. Closer we got to the Election Day, more the tension in the air has risen, more the times for decision-‐making have shrank and more the impact of certain events have increased. Therefore we will examine now the last 80 days of the campaign, before Elections.

Nonetheless many say that the campaign starts right after the candidate’s election, the 2012 Obama race officially

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began on the 4th of April, with the announcement of President Barack H. Obama running for President of the United States of America.

Nevertheless the relatively early announcement and the years long preparations before the campaign; the last couple of months were mainly that period where elections were decided. Even thought we will have an outlook towards the preliminary happenings and factors before elections to draw a broad picture, but we will rather focus on the last 80 days before Election Day, November 6th. For that time of a being the frames and the principles of the famous Obama-‐machine were practically built up and settled, it only had to be extended, intensified and last but not least escalated in the GOTV period, the last 3 weeks. So on the next pages we will first understand the structure and the organization of the Obama machine, then review it’s functioning and operative principles to gain a clear explanation of how did Obama win the 2012 elections?

Why not a comparative analysis between 2008 and 2012?

This can be a reasonable question as many analysts are focusing on the main differences between one and the other campaign. In our case the core questions of the analysis are why the Obama campaign was efficient? What elements had to be established and strengthened to have a visible output? And how did they coordinate these elements?

Although there are some parts that reframe the 2008 campaign we will see how old components were reformed and/or developed and what kind of innovations were implemented this time. Our aim is to understand how the 2012 edition of the Obama campaigns achieved its goals and what it took to be reelected.


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This analysis won’t take in consideration the political content of campaigning. We won’t focus on social statistics, sensibility towards certain policies; neither will we look at the political background of the parties or the candidates. What we will do in this thesis is more of an understanding of the operation and execution of a modern, or a better to say, the current most innovative campaign in political history.

What we will take into account are those American characteristics that allow the existence of such a campaign. I will try to give a complete picture of those background information that are required to understand some specific parts and reasons of strategy and structure. At this point I find it necessary to underline the correspondence between some American particularities and the functioning of the campaign. What do I mean? The Obama 2012 campaign in it’s form could work so uniquely only in the USA in the year 2012 due to the country’s electoral system, privacy law and social culture. It could be an interesting point of view to examine the relevancy of the Obama2012’s components in various countries, but the results would be unquestionably diverse due the diversity of the countries’ regulation and social background. In this light I will try to give an insight to those peculiarities that are valid only in the USA and will try to assure enough information to understand why this campaign could work.

Fortunately unlike many analysts and journalists who

gave explanations and insight about the Obama campaign, I had that rare opportunity to take part in the Obama campaign as a European member. This aspect of mine is a unique combination of a participant’s statement and a European political analyst. Contemporary to this work

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experience I was attending two courses at the Harvard Kennedy School, in Cambridge held by Prof. Steve Jarding, former campaign manager called “The making of a politician” and “Running for Office and Managing Campaigns”. This academic background knowledge gave a great theoretical support to my empirical experiences.

I will implement my empirical experiences the same as my scientific research, and will try to give a linear argumentation of its pragmatism. Based on this complex point of view specific trends and elements of modern political campaigning might be described in a particular way and understood better for those who lack scientific knowledge of American politics and law and/or modern political communication and campaigning.

1.1 Method of analysis “It’s about the candidate. It’s about the message. It’s about where they’re going to lead this country with a vision.”

Jim Messina, Campaign Manager (2012)

This work is divided into six main chapters. The introductory part serves as an antipasto to make appetite for diving into the depth of the topic. First of all we will have a review of how modern political campaigns have changed. What are the main differences between now and then. We will see a short summary about modern political campaigning and about Barack Obama himself, mostly focusing on his last term and it’s communicational issues. These information give us a wider picture to establish our


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knowledge. Taking a step ahead, in the second chapter, it is

necessary to understand the American electoral system and some of the social characteristics, as this define the path to victory. Electoral system and privacy law give the frames of the battleground game that both parties were playing in the elections, actually since the beginning of electoral history. Traditional political background reveals us which are swing states and where are the swing voters who have to be targeted and persuaded to win the presidential seat. In addition we will have a clear explanation what it took for the Obama campaign to win, what were the options to succeed and so where were the focus points. If we have the rules clear, we understand the game better.

In our third part we arrive to the analysis of the campaign itself. We will focus on elements that are necessary to get an insight of the whole system. Therefore we will start with fundraising and how money was raised for the campaign. We will review some facts and figures, explain some statistics, but however we won’t enter into merits of the financial background and dynamism of the campaign, mainly because this thesis focuses on a political communication aspect, also because nevertheless the transparency requirements, campaign finances are always a foggy issue for analysts. After all it is essential that we know how American campaign finances work from a communicational perspective, how they sell the campaign, and to whom. It is interesting to see the differences between the two parties fundraising methods and their targets.

And than we arrive to one of the most important parts of this dissertation: campaign communication. Many speak about Facebook and other social media when it gets to political communication. In my opinion there is much

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more to examine and to understand when we search for key communicational effects used by this campaign. It would be bald to look only at ads and profiles that we can see only at the surface, nonetheless this is one side of the coin. But the other side is as much important, and this would be the internal communication. For this reason I decided to divide the chapter in two parts when speaking about communication, once we will have a look at the external communication what topic many researchers have handled and second we will take a journey behind the scenes and view the internal communication, database building and information flow models and so on.

To understand in detail the various IT systems and their use it is essential to proceed with our analysis in this direction, as this gives the frame of the nationwide organization. Well-‐established internal communication channels help the workflow and the coordination between thousands of staff and volunteers nationwide contemporary from a small office in Chicago.

The fifth part of the next argumentation focuses on the campaign’s operative functioning. As previously mentioned, given the fact that I could participate as volunteer and later on collaborate as staff member to the Organizing for America organization in the Field Office of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, I have decided to give a picture from the inside out and through my own experiences we will not only examine the everyday life within the campaign, but brighten the view to the whole campaign. The reason why I find this method convenient and the most efficient is mainly because as our Field Office has worked, so did hundreds of others work nationwide.

Within the same chapter we will have a look to what it was all about. What the money and the established


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communication system was used for? And how? What was the message and how it was coordinated internally and externally? How did they build up such a historical movement? How did they recruit thousands of volunteers without necessarily increasing costs? And what were the principles in allocating staff members? Or in planning the President’s journeys? How did the message evolve while the campaign? How did they mobilize and direct this mega machine? And last but not least what legacy does this campaign leave to us?

The answers to these questions reveal the soul of the Obama 2012 campaign. I have combined newspaper articles, scientific literature and empirical experiences to give a broad and extensive picture of operative functioning. Going through a chronological order we will not only get an insight in my experiences, but will have an outlook to the historical events that had a social impact and defined the campaign strategies, just like the Democratic Convention, the Bengazi case, governor Romney’s 47% speech, the presidential and vice-‐presidential debates, Hurricane Sandy and last but not least the GOTV mission. This last one, the get-‐out-‐the-‐vote mission is not necessarily an event that was observed by the whole country, but it was the diamond on the campaigns “crown”. These last 3 weeks, better to say this last weekend before the election was the magnificent escalation of the whole campaign, that seems to be only a preparation for this mission, like a rehearsal for the great performance. We will see at great length how it worked and what results it had.

Now that we have examined the rules and frames of the game, know more about the why’s that determine strategic decision-‐making, had an insight in key-‐fields of the campaign, such as fundraising, internal and external

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communication and organization-‐building and the events that could have determined the campaign and it’s outcome, we can get to our conclusions. In this sixth and last chapter we will give utterance to some reflections on what did de facto help Barack Obama to re-‐win the elections. We will assume all the background knowledge gained in the thesis to reach our final results relevant to the US demographics, to the Republican campaign results and to the twenty-‐first century campaigning.

1.2 The road that we have travelled “We want to create a powerful display of support. Neighborhoods by neighborhood, block-‐by-‐block, as proof that Americans are ready for real change on these key issues. “

Jeremy Bird Deputy National Field Director

(2012)

Without entering into the merits of a political analysis of Barack Obama’s former years or first presidential mandate, we will just assume the core points of these to emphasize the understanding of the 2012 campaign. We need to know who Obama is and what the focus points of his first term were to know what the 2012 campaign could possibly use as key messages, but as I mentioned, we won’t give a complete political analysis of these. Who is Obama?

After a 22-‐month long campaign, on November the 4th, 2008, Sen. Barack Obama was elected as the 44th president of the United States. He took the oath of office on January the 20th, 2009, and became the first black U.S. president.

Four years later, on November the 6th, 2012, Obama


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was re-‐elected, narrowly defeating Republican nominee Mitt Romney. Obama prevailed in both the Electoral College (303 to 206) and the popular vote (50% to 48%) by taking several crucial battle states, including Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Wisconsin.1 Early life / Biography

Barack Hussein Obama was born August 4, 1961 in Honolulu, Hawaii. He has graduated at Columbia University and Harvard Law School, where he served as president of the Harvard Law Review2. Since the beginning, Obama was a fan of canvassing and volunteering3, it confirms that he was a community organizer in Chicago before earning his law degree. He started his political career serving three terms by representing the 13th District in the Illinois Senate4 from 1997 to 2004, nevertheless in 2000 he ran unsuccessfully for the United States House of Representatives.

It was in 2004 when Obama first received national attention firstly because of his campaign to represent Illinois in the United States Senate at the primaries that ended with his victory5, secondly because of his keynote address6 at the Democratic National Convention in July, and thirdly because of his election to the Senate in November. 1 Information Please: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0930136.html [Accessed: 03.08.2013] 2 He was the first African-‐American president of the Harvard Law Review. 3 Referring to campaign’s staff members telling. 4 He served on the Senate's Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee; the Foreign Relations Committee; the Veteran's Affairs Committee; and the Environment and Public Works Committee. 5 In 2004, he was elected to the U.S. Senate, winning with 70% of the vote against the conservative black Republican, Alan Keyes. Obama became the only African-‐American serving in the U.S. Senate (and the fifth in U.S. history). 6 Obama's eloquent keynote speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention earned him wide praise and cemented his reputation as one of the party's freshest and most inspirational new faces.

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2008 Campaign By taking advantage of the Internet and the power of

text messaging on mobile phones, Obama ran an innovative campaign that appealed to young voters. Avoiding public financing for his election, Obama raised an unprecedented amount of money mainly from small donors. He began his presidential campaign in 2007, and in 2008, after a close primary campaign against Hillary Rodham Clinton, he won sufficient delegates in the Democratic Party primaries to receive the presidential nomination. Prior to the financial crisis, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dominated the campaign. Obama presented himself as the candidate for change and stressed that a McCain presidency would mirror the policies of the Bush administration. 2008-‐20127

Obama took office in the middle of a relentless recession, therefore he had to focus on economical issues. As a response to the “Great Recession’ he signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, a $787 billion spending bill designed to create jobs and reignite the economy. In 2010 he continued with the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and Job Creation Act.

Other major domestic initiatives in his first term included the reforms on health care that was a chief legislative goal and a major campaign promise. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act -‐ often referred to as "Obamacare" -‐ and the expansion of Medicaid were one of the major victories for Obama.

7 Issues of the Obama campaign: http://www.infoplease.com/us/government/presidential-‐campaign-‐2012-‐obama-‐issues.html [Accessed: 20.11.2012]


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In foreign policy, Obama ended U.S. military involvement in the Iraq War, increased U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, signed the New START arms control treaty with Russia, ordered U.S. military involvement in Libya, and ordered the military operation that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden.8

On social issues, Obama won praise from the gay community and its supporters. In December 2010, he signed the repeal of the Don't Ask Don't Tell military policy, and in May 2012 he came out in support of gay marriage.

In the November 2010 midterm elections, the Republicans regained control of the House of Representatives as the Democratic Party lost a total of 63 seats, and after a lengthy debate over federal spending and whether or not to raise the nation's debt limit, Obama signed the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, as in the fall of 2012, there were signs that the recovery from the 2008 recession had stalled with job growth continuing to come up short, the unemployment rate hovering at 8%, and the stock market experiencing ups and downs.9

These were the main pillars of Obama’s first presidential term that framed the messages and arguments of the 2012 campaign. We will see later how they built up and coordinated the communication of these messages to make it more effective in having an impact on the targeted electorate.

8 Information Please: http://www.infoplease.com/us/government/presidential-‐campaign-‐2008-‐barack-‐obama.html [Accessed: 11.10.2012] 9 Information Please: http://www.infoplease.com/us/government/presidential-‐campaign-‐2012-‐obama-‐issues.html [Accessed:15.10.2012]

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1.3 How did modern political campaigning change “We knew who we were -‐ a grassroots campaign to the core.”

David Plouffe, describing the Obama for America presidential campaign

(2009)

As we all might see, political campaign strategies and techniques have rapidly and profoundly evolved and transformed in the last two decades. Over the last 8-‐10 years a new model of professional political campaigning has emerged with high-‐level consultancy and greater citizen engagement, fueled with access to online communication. Based on the excellent book of Dennis W. Johnson called ‘Campaigning in the twenty-‐first century’10 let us aim to assume the focal points of modern campaigning. But first, in order to understand the differences, let us name what the traditional campaign was alike? Johnson listed 7 main characteristics11:

1. Political consultants were always a dominant and defining factor in framing a campaign.

2. A top-‐down method defined internal communication. 3. Television was the chief channel of mass-‐

communication. 4. Campaigns had enough time to prepare messages, to

reply to opponent and they had time for decision-‐making. 5. Instinct, guesswork and past experience played a

main role in strategic planning. 6. Big-‐ticket events were the primary fundraising

methods.

10 Johnson, D.W.: “Campaigning in the Twenty-‐first Century”, Routledge, New York, 2011. p. 5 11 Johnson, D. W. [2011]. pp. 4-‐5


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7. Voters were basically spectators. But with the diffusion of some information

technological inventions -‐ such as Internet -‐ and it’s common use, everyday life and also political campaigning changed. Referring to Johnson “by the 2008 presidential election contest, online communication had truly come into its own as a significant force.”12 In the course of time Internet proved to be a relatively inexpensive, but an effective way for spreading ideas, recruiting supporters and collecting funds.

The 2008 Obama campaign implemented many innovative forms of online communication, use of social media, cell phones and television and last but not least they were able to integrate both online and offline elements into one campaign. David Plouffe, campaign manager 2008, stated that technology “was core to our campaign from Day One and it only grew in importance.”13

But here we have to state a cardinal observation that there was nothing extremely new about technology, nothing unexpected and without precedent. But the use of technology was new. The key was strategic and organic integration of online campaigning that was complementary to traditional political campaigning.

Following the 7 characteristics collected by Johson and listed previously, we review them one by one and give an additional description of what has changed and why is twenty-‐first century campaigning different:

1. Even though consultants are still present in political campaigning, the ground has changed: the more

12 Idem p. 4 13 Plouffe, The Audacity to Win [2009] p. 237

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possible channels of communications we have on our disposal for campaigning, the more the probability of chaos grows. The more chaos grows, the more coordination is required. Therefore there will be a higher need for clear and consequent lead in campaign management.

2. Given the accessibility of online communication the top-‐down model is replaced by a more fluid model, which means a more horizontal way of organization and this might encourage citizens to give their input and be involved.

3. Television continues to be a high profile medium for campaign advertising but completely new ways of reach out were established given the IT development.

4. Politics have speeded up dramatically and are expected to be responsive and ready 24 hours a day.

5. Strategies and decision-‐making are based on research, data collection and metrics. There is no more need of intuition and guesswork.

6. Due to the Internet also fundraising has changed. The composition of donors got more diverse as after the big-‐dollar givers numerous small-‐amount donors appeared.

7. Thanks to online communication voters have the opportunity and a greater sense of participation in a campaign.

Collecting the core points of the twenty-‐first century campaigning we had a review of innovations in political campaigns in general. With the broad examination of President Obama’s political background and the evolution of


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political campaigns we got known some fundamental elements that are required as a background knowledge to understand better why Obama won in 2012. Let us now proceed with the definition of the why’s and how’s of potential strategies as paths to victory.

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2. Battle-‐ground game

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“…close, but nevertheless decisive…”

2012 US election reaction The Agenda with Steve Palkin

very political campaign plans its strategy based on certain characteristics of its country. There are numerous aspects that can be taken in consideration

while planning the campaign some more, some less determinative. For example the electoral system and relative regulation stated in the law are fairly concrete to adjust to. Demographic questions are quite influential circumstances that affect campaign strategies: first it’s core messages -‐ key issues and policy concepts may vary based on targeted demographic groups; second the campaign’s selected communication channels, as social media and mobile apps got primarily to younger voters, but mailing reaches easier the elder groups of the society. Geography can be taken in consideration whilst planning. It can be important regarding state visits and presidential travels, calculating timeframes for volunteers or allocating certain social groups living area. Fundraising and it’s relevant

E

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questions such as whom should I address my message of fundraising? How should I do it, using what channel? How could I motivate people to fund my campaign, are there any additional activities I could utilize to increase donation purposes?

It this next chapter we will bring into focus all those significant background information that define the path to victory. We examine the electoral system to enter into details of what it means to win a swing-‐state, who are the swing voter and what it takes to cast 270 electoral votes. 2.1 Electoral system

The electoral system functions like the rules of a game, defining what moves you can make and urging the optimization of decision-‐making and planning. Therefore it has high importance that we understand very well how the American electoral system works, taking in consideration the traditions, social factors, previous statistics and experiences. So let us jump into it.

The United States constitution specifies that a president must be elected every four years and can accomplish a mandate only twice. Candidates must be at least 35-‐years-‐old and a US citizen born in the US. However some additional criteria in the eligibility regulation might differ from state to state.

Potential presidential candidates form an "exploratory committee" to gather support from party followers and lobby donors to assure their campaign contributions. If they believe they have enough support, they inform federal authorities that they are in race and start their serious


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fundraising journey and state-‐to-‐state campaigning for their party's nomination.14

The primary is the first step in choosing a party's candidate. In the US, voters who declare support for one party or another get to choose from a list that is put together by their party.

US presidential elections are always held in November. State primaries begin the preceding January with candidates campaigning against other running members of their same party for the nomination. In 2008 we could witness the incredibly close race between Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama, in 2012 governor Mitt Romney had to get through the primary elections and convince Republican electors of his capability to lead the country.15 The primaries end at the parties’ conventions. The delegates from each state formally choose their champion to continue the race as presidential candidate but this time against the other parties’ nominees. The winning candidate also names a vice-‐presidential running mate.

After the primaries the parties announce their candidate and so the presidential campaign can get started. Although first they set a nationwide publicity to introduce the nominees and their core politics, the race ends up with a

14 BBC NEWs, How the elections works: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/americas/04/us_election/election_process/html/rules.stm [Accessed: 22.11.2012] 15 “Delegates at the party's national convention in the summer make the final selection. In the primaries, voters select these delegates, who in most cases have pledged to support a particular candidate. Candidates need a majority of delegates at the convention to win. Some states, such as Iowa, use a caucus system rather than primaries to choose their delegates. Whereas in primaries people simply indicate at the ballot box which delegates they support, caucuses are more complex and work by selecting delegates through a number of stages.” BBC NEWs,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/americas/04/us_election/election_process/html/rules.stm [Accessed: 24.11.2012]

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particular focus on the so-‐called swing states and the persuasion of the swing voters. But what does this mean? And how does this work?

First we need to understand what an Electoral College means. The Electoral College is a process, not a place. This is what makes the American presidential elections indirect. It was set in the Constitution as a compromise between election of the President by a vote in Congress and election of the President by a popular vote of qualified citizens. The Electoral College consists of 538 electors16. You help choose your state’s electors when you vote for President because when you vote for your candidate you are actually voting for your candidate’s electors. A majority of 270 electoral votes is required to elect the President17, so that is the number

16 NARA-‐ US National Archives and Records Administration, Who selects the Electors? http://www.archives.gov/federal-‐register/electoral-‐college/electors.html#selection [Accessed: 12.01.2013] The process for selecting Electors varies throughout the United States. Generally, the political parties nominate Electors at their State party conventions or by a vote of the party’s central committee in each State. Each candidate will have his or her own unique slate of potential Electors as a result of this part of the selection process. Electors are often chosen to recognize service and dedication to their political party. They may be State-‐elected officials, party leaders, or persons who have a personal or political affiliation with the Presidential candidate. On Election Day, the voters in each State choose the Electors by casting votes for the presidential candidate of their choice. The Electors’ names may or may not appear on the ballot below the name of the candidates running for President, depending on the procedure in each State. The winning candidate in each State—except Nebraska and Maine, which have proportional distribution of the Electors—is awarded all of the State’s Electors. In Nebraska and Maine, the state winner receives two Electors and the winner of each congressional district receives one Elector. This system permits the Electors from Nebraska and Maine to be awarded to more than one candidate. 17 NARA-‐ US National Archives and Records Administration: http://www.archives.gov/federal-‐register/electoral-‐college/about.html [Accessed: 25.01.2013]


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both sides aim to win to claim the White House. This process makes the American electoral system indirect.

Each state, plus Washington DC, is awarded with a certain number of electoral votes based roughly on size and demographics. California, America's largest state, gets 55 votes while sparsely populated Wyoming gets only three. You can see the states and their electoral votes illustrated on the next page. All but two states use a winner-‐takes-‐all system18, so if you win the most votes in a state you take its entire haul of Electoral College votes. 19

Picture 2.1: Distribution of Electoral Colleges among the states [Source:http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/namerica/usstates/electorl.htm]

18 Maine and Nebraska each have a variation of “proportional representation.” 19 Telegraph, US Election Guide: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-‐election/9480396/US-‐Election-‐guide-‐how-‐does-‐the-‐election-‐work.html [Accessed: 02.02.2013]

So how do they go about reaching 270? We will speak about the Obama campaign’s electoral strategy in detail, but now let us see in general what it takes to win the majority of the electoral votes. States vary following their so-‐called voting DNA. This means that most of the citizens of a certain state will predominantly vote for one or the other main party. This makes them become blue or red states, that mean that they are solidly committed to one party -‐ for example California is unfailingly Democrat while Texas always goes Republican.

But there is a small group of around a dozen of the so-‐called swing states. These are states with less predictable voting behavior, as they sometimes vote Democrat and sometimes vote Republican. Like Florida, Ohio and Iowa, these swing states are the main target of presidential campaigns as basically they decide the outcome. The campaigns will focus their time, their money and their resources on winning these swing states. Swing voters in these states are overwhelmed with advertising and endless visits from the candidates.

You can see the colored states on the following chart: yellow signs the swing states, where the campaign escalated in the last weeks. Blue are traditionally voting Democrats and red vote Republicans. Dark colors mean solid voting identification; lighter colors mean leaning voter behavior.


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Picture 2.2: Voting DNA in various states [Source: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-‐politics/political-‐opinion/blogs/the-‐pulse/obama-‐versus-‐romney-‐wrap-‐november-‐7-‐2012-‐20121107-‐28wrw.html]

This chart shows what the status quo was at the beginning of the race and the numbers of electoral votes the two candidates had to cast to gain the majority.

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Picture 2.3: Initial status quo [Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-‐election/9657641/US-‐election-‐ 2012-‐the-‐electoral-‐college-‐explained.html]

Still let us dive into the depth of the issue of swing

states, swing voters, elasticity and voter behavior to acquire strategic thinking, moreover to find reasonable and logical the path of victory drawn by the campaign manager, Jim Messina.


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2.2 Swing states “…the electorate will become more diverse and some specific groups of the society will get more significant and decisive.”

Delaware Institution of Politics Election Aftermath

(2012) 2.2.1 What is a swing state?

With reference to our previous chapter, we have seen how the electoral system among other factors can influence the strategic planning in the campaign. Summarizing the relevant information we can point out three basic aspects:

● A candidate needs 270 electoral votes to gain majority and win the elections.

● The number of each state’s electoral vote varies based on its geographic and demographic caliber.

● Except Maine and Nebraska, the formula of ‘the winner takes all’ prevails.

This last point is what led to the creation of the phenomenon of swing states, because this is where the winning candidate who gains the most popular votes, wins all of that state's electoral votes. This way, presidential candidates have no incentive to spend time or resources in states they are likely to win or lose by a sizable margin.20 Since states may have different voting behavior compositions, we can differentiate states on a scale between predictable and unpredictable. Therefore on the one end we see states with a regular outcome, where voting for a certain party is traditionally consequent, the so-‐called ‘safe-‐ 20 Wikipedia: Swing states, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swing_state [Accessed: 23.03.2013]

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states’21 and on the other end we have the swing states. A swing state, also called battleground-‐state or purple-‐

state22 is a state in which no single candidate or party has overwhelming support in securing that state's electoral college votes.23 Moreover we have states leaning Democrat and states leaning Republican where one party has a slight advantage with a wider margin, nevertheless the exceptions in it’s electoral history.

21 Non-‐swing states are sometimes called safe states, because one candidate has strong enough support that he or she can safely assume that he or she will win the state's votes. [Wikipedia:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swing_state] 22 A purple state is referencing the combination of red and blue, in reference to Red states and blue states. 23 Wikipedia: Swing states, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swing_state [Accessed: 23.03.2013]


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Picture 2.4: Map of swing states [Source:http://www1.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/2012_elections_electoral_college_map.html#safe_seats

On the map above you can see the electoral map of the US. Red states are leaning republicans, blue states are leaning democrats. The darker the color, more solid is the dominance of that specific party. Tossup states are grey colored and sign the battleground. In relation to its electoral history a Republican candidate can expect to win easily

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many of the Southern states like Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina, which historically have a very conservative and religious culture, and a more recent history of voting for Republican candidates. They could also expect to win states like Wyoming, Utah, Idaho and Nebraska, which share conservative values but have had a longer history of voting Republican. Similarly a Democratic candidate can expect to win California, Vermont, Massachusetts, Oregon, Hawaii, Connecticut, Illinois, Rhode Island, and New York, because they are traditionally liberal states.24 This means a significant difference between voter turnouts between the two parties. In a Blue state +23,1%25 for Obama (D: 60,2% R: 37,1%) in California, or +28,1%26 in New York (D: 63,3% R: 35,2%). Likewise in a Red state like in Arkansas +23,7%27 (D: 36,9% R: 60,6%) or Texas +15,8%28 (D: 41,4% R: 57,2%).

But sometimes the outcome can’t be anticipated so evidently. We can see some outstanding examples from the 2012 elections on the map below.

24 Wikipedia: Swing State, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swing_state#cite_note-‐3 [Accessed: 12.02.2013] 25 Real Clear Politics: Romney vs Obama -‐ California: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/ca/california_romney_vs_obama-‐2009.html [Accessed: 14.04.2013] 26 Idem – New York: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/ny/new_york_romney_vs_obama-‐2868.html [Accessed: 14.04.2013] 27 Idem – Arkansas: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/ar/arkansas_romney_vs_obama-‐2918.html [Accessed: 14.04.2013] 28 Idem – Texas: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/tx/texas_romney_vs_obama-‐1945.html [Accessed: 14.04.2013]


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Picture 2.5: Turnout differences in swing states [Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Swing_states_2012.svg]

As we already know, the only states in which the

campaign would target to spend time, money, and energy are those that could be won by either candidate, these are the so called swing states.

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2.2.2 Which states are swing states?

In this chapter lets see, which are the swing states specifically:29

We divide potential swing states in three groups: leaning Democratic ones, Tossup states and leaning Republicans. We will list them below, in the brackets you might see the number of electoral votes one state can carry.

It is important to take in consideration even the leaning states, as sometimes campaign strategists can decide to go for less equal, but putatively victorious states. Just like the Obama campaign opting for Arizona that tends to vote for GOP, but can be carried by the Democrats.

29 NY Times: Electoral Map; http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/ratings/electoral-‐map [Accessed: 28.03.2013]


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Leaning Democratic

Maine (4): Nevertheless Maine was previously a real battleground state, with Dems winning the

last five election it has largely slipped towards being a leaning Democratic state, especially since President Obama won by 17 percentage points in 2008. But given governor Romney’s Northeastern roots and the state’s GOP strain, it was worth following up on Maine, especially because Maine is one of the two states that don’t exercise the winner-‐takes-‐all rule, but divide their allotment.

Michigan (16): Mitt Romney was born and raised in this state; moreover his father was a popular governor in Michigan. This makes it important for him. The competition between the two candidates was rooted in the economy here, with a special view on the government’s rescue on auto industry, which Mr. Romney opposed.

Minnesota (10): Although we have listed Minnesota only among the leaning Democratic states, President Obama didn’t have any reason to struggle as Dems have won Minnesota in the last nine presidential elections. But the president’s campaign has organized here too and hadn’t taken this Midwestern state for granted.

New Mexico (5): Despite the Republican victory in 2004 and their results at the 2010’s gubernatorial elections, Obama campaign strategist were on the view that nevertheless the Romney campaign there, Republicans would not pick up

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electoral votes. The 15-‐point Obama victory in 2008 is in line with this theory.

Nevada (6): Against Obama the high rates of home foreclosure and unemployment rates can be used, and so using these main focus points, Romney argued the Obama administration didn’t work well in this state. Pro Obama are the Latino voters and the strong early-‐vote push that gave an edge in the final days of the race.

Pennsylvania (20): Nevertheless the state has trended Democratic in presidential races, the Republican Party was always trying to make it competitive. They have invested campaign visits and advertisement, but with negligible results. The new voter identification law raised concerns about possible drop in Democratic turnout, but the state soon appeared to be once a Tossup than leaning Democratic.

Tossup States Colorado (9): President Obama’s victory in Colorado was among his most prized accomplishments in 2008, especially because the state had voted reliably Republican in eight of the last nine presidential elections. However Dems couldn’t take this state as granted, nor could Republicans as independents and women were a challenge to face.

Florida (29): With no doubt we can call Florida the most famous battleground state in America after the 2012 race. Obama


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carried the state in 2008, but economical issues have complicated his way to re-‐win it. Dems concentrated their forces on Florida, but never calculated only on this state to cast in order to win the elections -‐ but we will speak about potential strategies to victory later on. Mitt Romney’s hope to gather this state increased with the growing number of conservative retirees, but the challenge was still there the whole time to convince the Latino voters, particularly younger Cubans in Southern Florida and Puerto Ricans in central Florida.

Iowa (6): This is the state where Obama delivered his first victory in the primaries of 2008, but this time Iowa presented a far bigger challenge. Since a close electoral race these six electoral votes can be crucial for both counterparts. Governor Romney and the Republicans have spent months to capture the state. Indeed numerous attacks against the Obama administration and a concentrated negative campaign kept the president’s poll ratings lower than in other nearby states.

New Hampshire (4): The White House paid close attention to New Hampshire, sending leading members of the Democratic Party to the state repeatedly to make an argument against governor Romney, who has a personal connection with the state

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due to his vacation house here. Moreover this small, but strategically important state is quite challenging because of voters having an independent streak and opposing messages that they perceive as government intrusion.

Ohio (18): There are few credible paths to victory for Republicans without winning this state. Ohio has accurately picked winning presidential candidates in the last 12 elections and it was not different in 2012 either. Large portion of the state remained conservative, therefore the Obama administration had to improve positive figures of economy to assure their advantage, 2011th victory of turning down a law restricting public workers’ right to bargain collectively was not enough.

Virginia (13): Virginia traditionally is a Republican red state, but voters tend to shift in Northern Virginia. These changed political demographics make Virginia become one of the nation’s newest battleground states. Mitt Romney focused his arguments on the government’s expansion that in Virginia is complicated because of the numerous government workers. Nevertheless this didn’t mean automatically such a high difference like in 2008, where Dems carried this state by 7 percentage points.


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Wisconsin (10): The addition of Paul Ryan to the Republican ticket intensified the race, as he was born in this state. Moreover Reps were advertising in Wisconsin to try to push the Obama campaign to exceed their spending. This meant that even if Democrats carried this state in the last six presidential

elections -‐ often with a narrow margin -‐ it was a real battleground.

Leaning Republican Arizona (11): Although Arizona is a traditionally Republican state, demographics were shifting recently mainly because of an increasing number of Hispanic voters that the Obama campaign was focusing on both the 2008 and the 2012 elections. President Obama, who lost with 9 percentage points in Senator McCain’s home state in 2008, haven’t listed Arizona as impossible state, but kept registering voters and increased their party’s competitiveness by the fall.

North Carolina (15): North Carolina was always the most challenging battleground state for Democrats, therefore the party selected Charlotte for their national convention to generate voter enthusiasm to help repeat Obama’s narrow 2008 victory. Therefore both sites were advertising heavily in the campaign, until the Obama

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campaign started to reduce their investments and efforts towards this state. That made Republicans gain some advantage, although they kept following up with NC in the whole campaign period, especially because the early voting pushed President Obama over the top in 2008.

2.2.3 Shifts and the tipping point

In 2012, the states of North Carolina, Florida, Ohio, and Virginia were decided by a margin smaller than 5 percentage points. However, none of these was the "tipping point" state; Mitt Romney could have won all of them and still lost the election. Rather, Colorado was the tipping point in 2012, as it was in 2008.30 But we can use the next table from the famous political analyst, Nate Silver for demonstration.

First about the chart: the 50 states and the District of Columbia are arranged from the most Democratic to the most Republican ones based on their preliminary results from Election Day. Electoral votes were counted and cumulated following the order of states, so that we arrive from 0 to 538 as the President wins progressively more difficult, more Republican states. Accordingly we can see which are the states that make Obama get above 270. The state that puts Obama over the top of the winning minimum is the tipping state.

Even though many analysts thought till the very last

30 Wikipedia: Swing state, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swing_state#cite_note-‐3 [Accessed: 04.04.2013]


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minute that it will be Ohio that helps Obama gain the necessary electoral votes, they proved to be wrong as it turned out that it was Colorado, just like in 2008.31

From the next chart we can see very clearly which were the states where the battle was the closest: Florida has showed only a 0.6 percentage point of a difference between one result and the other. Not only in Florida, but also in North Carolina (R+ 2.2%), in Ohio (D+ 1.9%) and in Virginia (D+ 3.3%) were the turnout polls very close to the 2.5% National average.

31 Fivethirtyeight blog: As Nation and Parties change, Republicans are at an Elecotral College Disadvantage http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/as-‐nation-‐and-‐parties-‐change-‐republicans-‐are-‐at-‐an-‐electoral-‐college-‐disadvantage/ [Accessed: 06.04.2013]


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Picture 2.6: The calculation of the tipping point state 2012 [Source:http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/as-‐nation-‐and-‐parties-‐change-‐republicans-‐are-‐at-‐an-‐electoral-‐college-‐disadvantage/]

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Picture 2.7: State-‐Level Margins Relative to the Nation (Ordered by Shift in Relative Vote) [Source: http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/the-‐2012-‐election-‐in-‐a-‐relative-‐sense/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0]

We can see that this table is fairly red. “In 46 states and in the District of Columbia, Obama did worse in 2012 than he did in 2008, winning by less or losing by more.”32 -‐ writes Micah Cohen, author of the article. Entering in detail we can notice that the vote shifted to the political right even on a lower level, in the counties. This right tilt can be viewed in the column where national absolute shifts are listed, as except 4 states but all the others turned into red. Even the national margin got lower since 2008, from 7,3% to 2,8% that proves the Republican lean nationally.

In the second part of the table we can see the relative number that focuses on the states’ shift related to the national popular vote. This means that we tried to separate out the national political environment from more fundamental political shifts at the state level. Here the picture is entangled as 29 states and the District of Columbia shifted towards the President whilst 21 states shifted towards Republicans. But this move in most states is only moderate, and only one state, Virginia flipped from one (R:-‐1.0%) to the other party (D:+0.3%).

After the examination of the swing states from a geographic point of view, let us focus rather on the demographic aspects that decide an election, the swing voters.

32 Fivethiryeight Blog: The 2012 Election in a relative sense: http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/the-‐2012-‐election-‐in-‐a-‐relative-‐sense/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [Accessed: 10.04.2014]

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2.3 Swing voters “Demographic aspect is quiet important as it has contributed to the definition of the outcome, and we need to take it in consideration as the country is changing and it is changing rapidly.”

David Plouffe Former Campaign Manager

(2012)

So now that we became familiar with the American electoral system and the concept of swing states, we might observe the phenomenon of swing voters. This is important, because it refines the campaign strategy on a very high level and defines the message to communicate. If the electoral system is the how, swing states are the where than swing voters delineate the what for a common outreach.

2.3.1 Who are the swing voters? A swing voter is very likely to be registered as an

independent voter, especially due to the fact that registered Republicans and registered Democrats vote with their party at least in 90% of the time in presidential elections. Speaking about the 2008 elections, many analysts list independents together, when in fact there are two distinct type of independent voters: those who voted for Barack Obama and those who voted for John McCain in the last presidential elections. This time, in 2012, the ‘Obama Independents’ were the heart of the race for a very simple reason. If Obama manages to win, better to say win back


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these independents, he is reelected. But in case the Romney campaign casts enough of these votes, the governor will be the 45th President.

But who are these swing voters? And can they be categorized? Swing voters, as stated earlier, are likely to be an independent voter who could probably vote for either party. Based on former campaign manager, current Harvard Kennedy School Professor Steven Jarding’s lecture on ‘Running for Office and Managing Campaigns’, when planning the campaign it is crucial to qualify voters and their relevancy to our campaign. This step helps to increase the concentration of staff and investments of the campaign itself, as it determines whom to connect and how. Prof. Jarding identified five subcategories in voter qualification:

Own base Own lean Undecided Lean Opponent

1. Registered and determined voters of our party. They are the core of the party’s identified voters, who are the easiest to mobilize and are not the main focus of targeting and persuading, but activating.

2. Leaning voters, who need extra attention, as they can turn to be undecided voters or even leaning voters towards the opponent in case they lose enthusiasm, but with a careful identification and sophisticated messaging they can become volunteers of our party too.

3. Undecided, or independent, or swing voters -‐ the main and most important target for both sides as mainly they decide the elections. Their identification is crucial for both campaigns.

4. Opponent’s leaning voters, who such as on our side, easily become undecided voters in case they don’t gain

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enough attention and a individualized message. 5. Opponent’s base voters. It isn’t worth to invest effort

and funds to convince these individuals, as their voter identification with the opponent’s party is strong enough to not to be changed in a campaign. As Jarding says: “It isn’t worth to reach out because you don’t win as much as much effort you put in.” 2.3.2 National Party Identification

For an efficient qualification it is rewarding to initiate with reviewing voters’ party identification. On the chart below we can see how voter self-‐identification with national parties has changed in the last 85 years.


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Picture 2.8: National Party Identification 1937-‐2012 [Source: Presentation by David Brady and Morris Fiorina from the Hoover Institution, 2011] This graph shows quite visibly the evolution of the

national PID (Party Identification) that US electorate has been through. On the one hand there is a fall in both big parties’ PID, moreover they narrowed each other, they both are on a constant level since 1990’. On the other hand it is visible how independent voters’ PID increased. This means that many voters lost their clear party orientation and/or new voters have a lower identification. The more recent date we examine the more precise and accurate results we gain, especially from the last 20 years. Such as this chart below that shows clearly how PIDs changed since 1992.

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Picture 2.9: Trends in Party Identification [Source: http://www.people-‐press.org/2012/08/23/a-‐closer-‐look-‐at-‐the-‐parties-‐in-‐2012/]

When we look at the Dems’ blue line, on both charts we see a peak in 2008. In the absolute table Obama reached 38 percentage points, that made him win 52% of the independent voters33 (see the independents’ green line under it), and make most of the independents become leaning democrats, that can be seen on the second table, where leaners are included and in this manner they uplift the blue curve to 51%. Even if there was a decline after 2008, Democratic Party identification didn’t get lower than before. Not like Republicans, who had a visible fall under the Bush administrations and have recovered only partially their base voters. Even the third green line, signing independents, has had an interesting swing and a significant rise in the new millennium.

We shouldn’t forget that the changes in national party identification are due to the changes in the parties’ identification itself. Even though it is necessary to maintain a certain consistency and invariance in it’s fundament, the political messages a party is emitting whit selecting a candidate and with setting a preference in it’s policy-‐making influences and completes what the party’s identity is alike. And as we discussed earlier whilst planning a political campaign, parties aim to carry base voters and leaners that will make their policies consistent and at the same time they are willing to carry independents who require a certain adjustment of their political agenda-‐setting.

Before viewing 2012’s voters and their PID, let us have a short outlook towards national tendencies in the past decade. 33 Diggles, M. & Erickson, L.: 2012 Showdown: Battle for the Obama Independents, Third Way: http://content.thirdway.org/publications/485/Third_Way_Report_-‐_2012_Showdown_Battle_for_the_Obama_Independents.pdf [Accessed: 24.07.2013]

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One of the most important facts is that most self-‐identified independents actually vote consistently for one party or another.34 This is mainly because both parties have become more ideologically homogenous -‐ turns out from a report based on Gallup data.35

Picture 2.10: Political Ideology – Recent Trend Among Republicans [Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/152021/Conservatives-‐Remain-‐Largest-‐Ideological-‐Group.aspx]

Since 2000, the percentage of Republicans self-‐identifying as “conservative” has increased 9 points (from 62% to 71%), while Republicans self-‐identifying themselves as “moderates” has dropped from 31% to 23%. And only relatively few 34 Idem. 35 Gallup Group: Conservatives remain largest ideological group: http://www.gallup.com/poll/152021/Conservatives-‐Remain-‐Largest-‐Ideological-‐Group.aspx [Accessed: 13.09.2013]

The last 80 days before the elections 67

Republicans, only 4%, said they are “liberals”.

Picture 2.11: Political Ideology – Recent Trend Among Democrats [Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/152021/Conservatives-‐Remain-‐Largest-‐Ideological-‐Group.aspx]


At the same time the Democratic Party remained much

more ideologically diverse than the GOP. Roughly 40% of Dems identify themselves as “liberals”, the same, 40% call themselves “moderate” and 20% “conservative”.36

But now, let us focus on the identification of undecided voters, as they are the ones who determine the results, and so the ones that are in the focus of the parties and their campaigns.

Picture 2.12: Political Ideology – Recent Trend Among Independents [Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/152021/Conservatives-‐Remain-‐Largest-‐Ideological-‐Group.aspx]

Independent voters are the most crucial and the largest

36 The New Yorker: Obama’s Swing Voters: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/02/obamas-‐swing-‐voters.html [Accessed: 15.09.2013]


social, political group37 in the States and have been steadier ideologically than either major party in the last decade. However since 2008 the proportion of those, who describe themselves as “moderates” have declined marginally from 46% to 41%, whilst “conservatives” increased from 30% to 35% and significantly less independents identify themselves as “liberals”, only 20%.

As a conclusion I would like to draw your attention to watch all this data in its completeness. This chart shows the figures that prove that Barack Obama is a divider for the electorate. The average approval of his administration was visibly and significantly higher among Democrats even in its second and third year. This means that who agreed with him and his policy-‐making and voted for him, did not change opinion whilst his presidential term.

In the second and third year of his term voters were asked about their approval of the President’s policy-‐making. Results make clear that there is a considerable gap of 70-‐72% between the Democrat point of view (83-‐84% of approval) and the Republicans (12-‐13%). This underlines how voters with steady party identification are consistent, and at the same time how much of a difference we can note between the two party identities.

37 Gallup Group: Record High Americans Identify Independents: http://www.gallup.com/poll/151943/Record-‐High-‐Americans-‐Identify-‐Independents.aspx [Accessed: 17.09.2013]


Picture 2.13: Obama as Divider [Source: Presentation by David Brady and Morris Fiorina from the Hoover Institution, 2011]

As already mentioned the most self-‐identified

independents actually vote consistently for one party or another. This means that both sides, Republicans and Democrats each have about 45% of voters on their side. That leaves just 10% of voters as genuine independents; those who are realistically open to voting for either party.38 But who are they? What do they look like?

38 The New Yorker: Obama’s Swing Voters: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/02/obamas-‐swing-‐voters.html [Accessed: 17.09.2013]


2.3.3 Obama Independents

As we described it earlier, in the 2012 elections the most important target for both parties will be the swing voters persuaded in 2008 by the Obama-‐campaign. In 2012 Obama could win only with maintaining all his “Obama Independents” from 2008. But who are they? And how can we influence their voting behavior?

In reference to Nate Silver’s reasoning, swing voters are very likely to be devoid of any kind of special characteristic that might predict and define their voting behavior.39 For instance, a swing voter is unlikely to be an African-‐American that very strongly predicts Democratic voting. Or it is unlikely to be a Southern evangelical, which predicts Republican voting, at least recently.40 However we will try to outline the characteristics of the Obama Independents, such as they did in the campaign, to understand better how the communication strategy was formed. In line with this we will use a supportive analysis, made in February 2012, by Michelle Diggles and Lanae Erickson from Third Way.41 39 Nate Silver, FiveThirtyEight Blog: Swing voters and Elastic states: http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/swing-‐voters-‐and-‐elastic-‐states/?_r=0 [Accessed: 30.05.2013] 40 Idem. 41 Diggles, M. & Erickson, L.: 2012 Showdown: Battle for the Obama Independents, Third Way: http://content.thirdway.org/publications/485/Third_Way_Report_-‐_2012_Showdown_Battle_for_the_Obama_Independents.pdf [Accessed: 24.07.2013]


● Obama Independents are the most moderate segment of the electorate. There are more moderates in this group than in the others: 60% among the Obama Independents, 44% among all voters, 47% among all Democrats and 56% among all Independents.

● They are concerned with the nation’s economy. In 2008 Obama independents were more worried about the national economy (55%) than McCain Independents (44%). The importance of this characteristic increased for 2012 due to the financial crisis that determined the President’s first term.

● Obama Independents were hit hardest by the recession early on. Already in the earliest stages of the crisis 58% of Obama-‐voting independents said their family’s financial situation was worse than 4 years ago. This percentage is higher than any other group -‐ including 55% of Democrats.

● They bolted from the Democratic Party in midterms. A high proportion of swing voters make up the independent voters targeted for the 2012 elections.

● In addition, nearly half of the Obama Independents were not Democratic voters in 2004. This certifies that in 2008 Obama won more independents than McCain. Beside the 52.6% base democrats, 24.5% Bush voters, 6.2% other independent voters and 16.7% (!!) voters, who didn’t vote earlier.

● Gender is an important point: Obama voters include more women. 51.3% female and 48.7% male.

● Obama Independents are more racially diverse. They are practically a mirror image of America: 74,3% white and 35.7% of black, Latino, Asian and other ethnicities.


● Obama-‐voting independents are younger. One-‐fifth under 30.

● They attend religious services less often than McCain Independents, or interestingly, less than Democrats generally.

● Obama Independent felt a connection to their candidate: 75% in 2008.

“The symbol of the Republican convention was Clint Eastwood, an old man. The symbol of the Democratic convention was Scarlett Johansson, a young woman.42” -‐ sounds a very good observation made by David Plouffe, former campaign manager, at a roundtable held after the 2012 elections at University of Delaware. This fact describes very clearly what the main target and main message of each party was. What they wanted the electorate identifies themselves with. Among others we could see, how Democrats have targeted white working-‐class women–the so-‐called “waitress moms”– who were particularly sensitive to Romney’s 47% gaffe, that we will talk about later; and the Obama campaign was running ads on the daytime programs that they generally watch – like Judge Judy and Doctor Phil.43

42 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 43 TIME: Obama’s Swing State Success Explained: http://swampland.time.com/2012/10/03/obamas-‐swing-‐state-‐success-‐explained/ [Accessed: 11.05.2013]


Picture 2.14: Party Identification Among Whites [Source:http://www.people-‐press.org/2012/08/23/a-‐closer-‐ look-‐at-‐the-‐parties-‐in-‐2012/]

On the one hand, the President has increased his female vote, as Plouffe said: “In fact our share on the female vote increased in many battleground countries such as Virginia, Iowa,


Florida.”44 -‐ mainly because the president won many swing-‐suburban voters and swing-‐suburban women in the country. But on the other hand, even if “the president carried most of the key suburban counties of the country such as Bucks County of Pennsylvania, Hillsborough County in Florida, the states that are the 4 most heaviest in white population”45, he couldn’t overhaul Republicans in their figures on white voters. On the chart below it can be seen clearly how party identification among white voters have evolved in the past years.

Whereas in 2008 the percentage of white voters was

almost evenly divided between the two parties (46% Republicans and 44% Democrats), the balance has changed considerably as the Republican Party has now 12-‐point advantage. The GOP’s current lead among white voters is not unprecedented, between 2002-‐2004 and between 1994-‐1995 it was the same proportion of 51-‐52%. Nevertheless “whites are no more likely to call themselves Republicans today than in 2008 (34% in both years), but they are more likely to lean Republican (17% today, up from 12% in 2008)” -‐ states a research made by ‘People and the Press’ in 2012.46

44 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 45 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 46 People and Press: A Closer Look at the Parties in 2012: http://www.people-‐press.org/2012/08/23/a-‐closer-‐look-‐at-‐the-‐parties-‐in-‐2012/ [Accessed: 12.06.2013]


Without entering in details of the democratic electorate’s

analysis, I would like to draw your attention to one short table, researching mainly white voters.47

47 The detailed version can be found in the Appendix.


Picture 2.15: PID among white voters [Source: http://www.people-‐press.org/2012/08/23/a-‐closer-‐look-‐at-‐the-‐parties-‐in-‐2012/]


The reason of the decrease of Democrat and leaning Democrat voters from 51% in 2008 to 48% in 2012 comes from the Republican gain among white voters (Republican lead increased by 10 points) and in a smaller proportion from other demographic subgroups such as black (+2%) and Hispanic (+1%) voters. Focusing on white voters the GOP lead among white men has doubled from 11 points (2008) to 22 (2012) and nonetheless we have seen earlier Plouffe declaring their increase of female voters, the Democratic Party has lost 10 points of white women voters; and with this their lead -‐ Reps 47%, Dems only 44%. The two parties now run even among white voters under 30, while Republicans have the advantage among all other age groups.

Whilst there was no substantial change among higher income white voters, lower-‐income and less educated white voters have shifted significantly toward the Republican Party since 2008. Moreover middle-‐income white voters ($30,000-‐$74,999), who were split between the two parties in 2008, now favor Republicans by 17 points.

But let us avoid getting into the depth of voter analysis now, as we will elaborate this topic thoroughly once studying results of the 2012 elections. As a conclusion we need to see that in spite of the Republican lead among white voters, this was not enough to win the 2012 presidential elections, as “Democrats were targeting so many social groups – Hispanic, Latinos, married women, feminist women etc. – that Republicans didn’t have enough space and social groups to


convince to win the presidential election.”48 Targeting is not enough to win the race. The party and the

candidate need to connect with them and find the best and most efficient way to communicate with them directly. Referring to the research made by the ‘Third Way’49 the Obama independents felt more connected to their candidate than republican independents. What did they do better? Following the theory delineated by HKS Prof. Steven Jarding “you can connect your message with voters easier, if you connect with them first”. Therefore it is important to explore the potential ways of connection, such as inquiring the certain subgroups’ character, connecting through questions related to their common characteristics can help the directed reach out and bring the nominee closer to his or her electorate. For example knowing a group’s common cultural background, beliefs and traditions, through these features messaging can be individualized. Or geographical attributions, like living in suburban areas can form the content of communication, for example using local, specific questions that can be more relevant than national politics. Or connecting to religious beliefs proposing parochial questions can make a certain group feel addressed. As Jim Messina explained the goal is to identify,

48 Steven Schmidt: Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 49 Diggles, M. & Erickson, L.: 2012 Showdown: Battle for the Obama Independents, Third Way: http://content.thirdway.org/publications/485/Third_Way_Report_-‐_2012_Showdown_Battle_for_the_Obama_Independents.pdf [Accessed: 24.07.2013]


target and turn out voters. To achieve this goal it is necessary that we define “policies and issues that are consistent with the actual solutions we face today”.50 The Obama campaign recognized at an early stage that there are other ways to gain more voters besides winning independents. One is with expanding the electorate. In 2008 they have emphasized with great focus the importance of registering new voters and turnout those who didn’t vote on previous elections. This is proved even by the fact that 16.7% of the Obama Independents were voters who didn’t vote earlier.51

50 Jim Messina, Obama 2012 Strategy Briefing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k [Accessed: 25.05.2013] 51 Diggles, M. & Erickson, L.: 2012 Showdown: Battle for the Obama Independents, Third Way: http://content.thirdway.org/publications/485/Third_Way_Report_-‐_2012_Showdown_Battle_for_the_Obama_Independents.pdf [Accessed: 24.07.2013]


Picture 2.16: How we win: Expand the electorate [Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k]

This diagram refers to a report given by Jim Messina

defining the strategy. We can see how important it was for the Obama campaign to register voters, as new people who have signed up for the elections ended up voting for the president. There is a visible difference between Democratic (69%) and Republican (31%) new voters: 38%. “That made real differences in close states across the country” -‐ as Messina says. Winning first time voters by a large margin increased their support in 2008. In 2008 the campaign gathered numerous new voters, numerous first time voters and numerous independent ones.52

This was an important tactic even in 2012. In 2008,

52 Jim Messina, Obama 2012 Strategy Briefing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k [Accessed: 25.05.2013]


President Obama won 52%53 of Independent voters and in 2012 independents had even a bigger role; in fact, an analysis of voter registration in eight key battleground states showed that Democratic registration was down to 5.6% since 2008, while independent registration was up 3.4%.54

To increase their efficiency in targeting and reach out, the campaign has used a website, called ‘GottaRegister.com’. The campaign had to take into consideration the varying voter registration laws and a state-‐specific deadline; therefore each state’s voter registration program was uniquely designed.55 They used their Facebook targeted sharing first for voter registration-‐persuasion and targeting, but we will speak about this innovative campaign method in the next chapter. Using many channels to make people register resulted in more than a million people registered online.

Now that we know more about swing states and swing voters, we can analyze in its merits how the Obama campaign messaged, mobilized and turned out voters. We will get back to some demographic facts and figures in the last chapter that

53 Michelle Diggles and Lanae Erickson, “Independents Day 2012,” Third Way, November 2011. Available at: http://thirdway.org/publications/470. [Accessed: 12.05.2013] 54 All data from the 2008 Presidential election, including crosstabs, is based upon authors’ analysis of exit poll data. National Election Pool Poll # 2008-‐NATELEC: National Election Day Exit Poll [computer file]. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research Study USMI2008-‐NATELEC Version 3. Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International [producer], 2008. Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut [distributor], 2011. 55 Legacy Report (2012), p.85


deals with the results and some general reflections. But for now let us close this part with quoting Jim Messina, campaign manager of Obama campaign 2012: “the electoral landscape will be more challenging in 2012 than ever before in American history.”56

2.4 Path to Victory

After a detailed substantial analysis of the American electoral system, a thorough examination of the swing states and swing voters we have sufficient background knowledge to dive into the internal dynamics of the campaign. We start our journey with the understanding of the strategy planned carefully by the campaign team. After having an insight in what, where and how the campaign will do, we will continue with the description of the campaign machine and examine it in the next chapters.

The campaign paid attention to make its decision-‐making transparent and understandable for the wider society. Communicating continuously what the campaign plans increased trust, dedication and mobilized voters as the organization gave a transparent and truthful impression. Therefore Jim Messina, campaign manager and his team gave regular reports to volunteers and followers how the campaign was proceeding, what was coming up next and naturally a call to action, expecting more people to join, as they suspected that 56 Jim Messina, Obama 2012 Strategy Briefing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k [Accessed: 25.05.2013]


intentions might increase due to the understanding of the campaign and motivations behind it.

Like in the next video57 message, where Jim Messina speaks to the citizens -‐ we will see in substance -‐ the report in general is easy to follow and understand even if the meaning is quite complex. Generally speaking to make sure all of the volunteers are able to follow the campaign’s next steps and have a clear picture about the primary motivations of them, OFA staff emphasized continuously the strategy-‐communication. They concretized the meaning by using facts and numbers, they regularly illustrated their message with appealing figures and charts and they kept repeating the core message in every video, in every report, in every speech and on every platform to make sure everyone can understand what they can do to reelect the President.

One of these reports was published on Youtube at an early stage, in 201158 is when Jim Messina evaluates 2008 elections, explains planned fundraising and mobilizing methods for 2012 and makes clear what the viewer can do right away for the President. In almost 6 minutes we understand “strategic framework for the campaign, and what we think things are today and the challenges that are in front of us”.59 In addition he says that the idea behind the organization-‐building is to strengthen a “conversation on the local level plus [to have] the same ideas

57 Jim Messina, Obama 2012 Strategy Briefing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k [Accessed: 25.05.2013] 58 Idem. 59 Idem.


and same values [that] makes us powerful, [...] because small spotted efforts and values that bind us together make an impact.” Shortly after the explanation of how, follows: “How we will run the campaign: Respect. Empower. Include. Win.” And a well-‐designed chart appears parallel with Messina’s explanation:

Picture 2.17: Jim Messina – Our Mission [Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k]

In correspondence to Messina’s video message and the

information about swing states the Obama campaign was relying “on it’s strongest advantage -‐ the skills and energy of grassroots supporters around the country.”60

60 Legacy Report 2012: http://secure.assets.bostatic.com/frontend/projects/legacy/legacy-‐report.pdf [Accessed: 12.01.2013] p. 6


2.4.1 Swing states -‐ Which states?

As we have examined earlier, the Obama campaign just like the Romney campaign focused on those states where both had a chance to win, ergo both parties tried to secure a majority of votes by winning these states. Even though the Obama team divided states in two groups, they had a reason for organization-‐building in both: in the in states where outcome could have been the closest they invested in organization-‐building to turn out voters and win the state, in the more secure ones, they did so to support the more competitive ones. But because the two groups had a different role, even their campaign program was different.

The two groups were the battleground states and the border states. We have already spoken about the battleground states, also called swing states or tossup states. States that were decided by a close margin received more attention by the campaign, “a larger share of the resources, including organizers offices, and principal and surrogate trips” -‐ can we read in the campaign’s legacy report.61 Moreover the campaign invested the most in states that were considered the closest to the tipping point of 270. To ensure as many paths as possible, they have extended the list of states to win with those like Virginia and North Carolina. On the table below we can see the list of tossup states and their margin. Obama won nine of the top 10

61 Legacy Report 2012: http://secure.assets.bostatic.com/frontend/projects/legacy/legacy-‐report.pdf [Accessed: 12.01.2013] p. 7


battleground states.

Picture 2.18: Battleground states, margins and results [Source: Legacy Report 2012] On the other hand we have those states, in the legacy report that are called border states62 that are expected to be decided

62 Idem. p. 8


by a wide margin whether for Democrats like California, or for Republicans such as Alabama. In these states the campaign invested less, but still didn’t exclude involving electorate as a force for supporting nearby battleground states. “For example, volunteers in California helped us win Nevada and Colorado and volunteers in Alabama helped us win Florida. They contributed their efforts to help turn out the vote where the campaign needed their help the most – and helped out locally by creating a lasting volunteer structure.”63 Both parties invested in planning the campaign accurately: voter identification, targeting, contacting, mobilizing, organization building, image building, policy setting, communication setting and so forth. Everything had to be planned. According to Professor Jarding, better the strategy is planned, more predictable it can be, less unexpected happenings can occur. Not only the parties, but journalists and analysts tried to calculate the possible pathways to the White House. We can find many online interactive features that illustrate very well these ballgames of two parties. One of them, in my opinion, one of the most visible ones, is provided by the website of ‘The New York Times’64. A screenshot can be seen below.

63 Idem p. 7 64 The New York Times: Paths to the White House, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/11/02/us/politics/paths-‐to-‐the-‐white-‐house.html?_r=1& [Accessed: 22.07.2013]


Picture 2.19: Potential Pathways to the White House [Source:http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/11/02/us/politics/paths-‐to-‐the-‐white-‐house.html?_r=0]

‘The New York Times’ writers and analysts have calculated 512 potential paths to victory of which 84%, namely 431 options belong to Obama and only 15%, 76 are realistic for Romney. 5 of them are ties that are rarely realistic but are still conceivable.65 This difference within the proportions of possible ways is realistic as Obama started his race with 237 electoral votes more or less assured to be blue, whilst Romney

65 Edge of Your Seat Possibilities: There are five paths to a tie. In this case, the newly elected House of Representatives would select the president (likely Mr. Romney) and the Senate would select the vice president (possibly Joseph R. Biden Jr.).


had only 206. This theory and calculation puts 95 unallocated electoral votes in the focus of the game.66

What are the different pathways for the Obama campaign to win? What are the most crucial states that they need to carry to assure their position?

2.4.2 Pathways

Unlike ‘The New York Times’’ calculation the campaign’s directorate thought that there are only 40 different pathways to get to the White House of which 5 were the most important ones.67 Let us see these five paths:

As first, preliminary map we need to know the “The Kerry map”68: The Obama 2012 campaign management based on previous elections beliefs that they are able to carry those 246 electoral votes that Kerry could carry.

1. First the “West Path” that contains Colorado, New Mexico and Nevada, optionally even Iowa. In Colorado and Nevada the Democratic Party haven’t won for a very long time until 2008. Therefore they have invested staff and started to recruit volunteers in an early stage, to ensure the maximum of connecting voters. Based on

66 CNN: Election 2012 Calculator: http://edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2012/ecalculator#?battleground [Accessed: 22.11.2012] 67 Jim Messina: Paths to 270 Electoral Votes: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7Y-‐Q9ZY5Ao [Accessed: 10.11.2012] 68 Idem


‘The New York Times’’ ratings if Nevada goes to Obama and North Carolina goes to Governor Romney than the President has four times as many paths to victory as his opponent.

2. The second path is Florida. The Obama campaign couldn’t count on Florida alone to take them to 270, even if that was the easiest way to get there. This is why they were building a massive operation on the ground and invested as much as possible. On the other hand not only for Democrats was Florida the easiest way, but even Republicans needed to concentrate on this state, since if they lose this state, they had only one way to victory: through all the other battleground states. But if Romney wins it, he has 75 paths open to him, says ‘The New York Times’’ ratings.

3. Next is the South, where the campaign management has invented the so-‐called “New South Map”. This option focuses on North Carolina and Virginia and would assure 274 electoral votes to the Dems. As they believed in this map, they have chosen to put the Democratic National Convention to Charlotte, North Carolina. Even the 2011 electoral win emphasizes their positive results there. But to be certain of these states, the Obama campaign was building their neighborhood teams and implemented numerous local offices with special care.

4. The “Midwest Path” leans on Ohio. One of the places where they were doing the most work on the ground already since 2011. Obama had the largest lead in Ohio,


partly because of a strong local economy and the auto industry bailout. If he lost here, it was likely he would trail in Florida and North Carolina too. Losing all three have left him with only 14 ways to win.

5. The last path is called “Expansion Path”. This is a kind of irregular path as it is based on a leaning red state, Arizona. But as Messina said: “If 2008 taught us anything, it’s that we can’t count on anyone’s old map, including even our 2008 map. We need new ways to put every state into play.”69 And this includes winning states that weren’t pathways in 2008. Why Arizona? Arizona wasn’t a swing state in 2008, because Senator McCain was present with his campaign, but there were quite a significant amount of unregistered voters, that the Obama campaign believed to be able to cast. In fact some polls might even have shown the President leading in the state, although it was not constant.

For a better demonstration you can see the following chart that assumes all these pathways that the campaign could have possibly walked.

69 Jim Messina: April Fundraising and Path to 270: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTKPNaEgTXo [Accessed: 10.08.2013]


Picture 2.20: Path to Victory, by Jim Messina [Source: Field Staff Manual]

How intensive local and regional campaign they could hold in these states, how many local offices and neighborhood teams they could afford depends purely on their financial and human resources. For this reason contemporary with their recruitment process and organization building they were raising money to be able to increase democratic presence in these crucial states.


2.4.3 Facts and figures

In reference to another video message, called ‘April Fundraising and Path to 270 Update’70 delivered by Messina, we have some facts and figures about the actual stage of fundraising and local campaigning in May 2012. Based on this video we get an exact picture of how the campaign’s organization building proceeds. First he gives us, viewers an explanation how fundraising proceeds saying: “We had 169,500 first-‐time donors in April putting us within reach of 2 million donors this election cycle. And here’s my favorite part: our average donation was $50,23, with 98% of those donations $250 or less. That makes our campaign different, and it’s how we’re going to build a winning organization across the country.” This and such statements make clear the circle of activities within the campaign: followers and supporters donate money that they spend on organization building, recruitment and voter-‐persuasion, plus registration.

One of Messina’s principles is to measure the results. He shares some figures to increase transparency and therefore trust. So following the same logic of the previous video, Messina describes the 5 basic and most potential paths adding each time numerical results to summarize it at the end concluding with: “So thanks to everyone who stepped up to support the campaign. Together we have raised 43 million dollars from 437,323 grassroots supporters in April alone – 70 Jim Messina: April Fundraising and Path to 270 Update: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTKPNaEgTXo [Accessed: 10.08.2013]


helping us to open up 42 new field offices around the country. Those offices, plus the 120 new team members we were able to hire, means that we can be out there every day training volunteers, knocking on doors, making phone calls, and registering new voters.”

2.4.4 Core Program

But for what did the Obama-‐machine use all these funds? What did field offices and neighborhood team leaders do? What was the campaign’s core program alike?

Before analyzing fundraising, internal and external communications and field organizing in detail in the following chapters, let us have a quick review of what activities the campaign has combined to maximize their result in the crucial swings states.

To win a battleground state, the campaign set a goal of winning 51 percent, ergo the majority of the vote in each state. There are three ways the campaign could generate votes for the President – registration, persuasion, and turnout – so these became the core of the program. The fourth element, organization building was added because it created the grassroots volunteer capacity that was the soul of the campaign and served to register citizens, persuade voters and turn out supporters. These programs were shared and coordinated across every campaign department and therefore they focused staff members on the work needed to reach the goals set -‐ 51% of votes in every battleground state and 270 electoral votes


nationwide.71 ● Registration: We have already spoken about the

importance of registering new voters and target voters who didn’t vote. This was one of the pillars even in 2008 and was kept for the 2012 elections too, but extended with a further aspect, identifying supporters who may have changed their address. Within registration we can find multiple platforms and formats like voter registration weeks of action, hot spot registration canvasses, and GottaRegister.com.

● Persuasion: this was the soul of the field offices, where contacting voters and coordinating volunteers multiplied persuasion results. Various campaign methods increased efficiency and they combined various tactics such as neighbor-‐to-‐neighbor conversations, canvassing, trainings, phone banking, surrogate visits, press articles, television ads, online messaging etc.

● Turnout: Turning out voters was always a focal point in the campaign as it can change results. The frame of this pillar is sharing information with supportive electors about where, when and how to vote and motivate them to cast their ballots. We will see how professional this became once arriving in the Get-‐Out-‐The-‐Vote (GOTV) period as this was the highlight of turnout besides early

71 Legacy Report 2012: http://secure.assets.bostatic.com/frontend/projects/legacy/legacy-‐report.pdf p. 8


voting. GOTV included tactics such as commitment cards, early vote events and rallies, and GOTV canvasses.

● Organization building: “The 2012 campaign is only as strong as the grassroots” -‐ said Jim Messina.72 The nationwide network of supporters was the real fundament of the whole campaign. Organization building meant recruiting, empowering and training volunteers and volunteer leaders to build the strongest grassroots organization in the history of American politics. We will see in detail how this was coordinated and controlled from the headquarters’ office, from Chicago. Organization building tactics included one-‐on-‐one talks, volunteer trainings, house meetings and Neighborhood Team buildings and meetings.

72 Jim Messina: Paths to 270 Electoral Votes: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7Y-‐Q9ZY5Ao [Accessed: 10.11.2012]


Picture 2.21: Key methods of Generating Votes [Source: Legacy Report 2012 p.9]


The last illustration shows exactly the connections

between these pillars and what results each of them has brought.

Campaign management has elevated these core programs to another stage. They identified what kind of activity is the most useful in a certain state in a specific period and they managed to balance them to have a fruitful combination of activities. These state-‐specific, plan-‐based combinations were actually tailored to each region and neighborhood. Supporters’ direct and measurable feedback made it possible for Messina and his group to act rapidly and make decisions on a realistic and credible information basis.73

So does this mean that staff in the Chicago office knew exactly how many voters will vote for the President in every little neighborhood from Arizona to New Hampshire, from Montana to Maine? The question is reasonable as this short description sounds a little bit utopistic without entering in detail of how this campaign was built up and how it’s different departments and groups have functioned.

Even campaign members say that they “ran an innovative, groundbreaking campaign, making huge advances in areas like data, digital, technology, fundraising, communications, and political and constituency outreach. Campaign leadership ensured that all of these departments worked closely together, 73 Jim Messina: Obama 2012 Strategy: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k [Accessed: 12.03.2013]


with no silos, to execute the same shared strategy.”74

74 Legacy Report 2012, p. 6


The Campaign


“I think we have the ability to both persuade the undecideds, because of our huge footprint and our experience, and turn out our vote."

Jim Messina Campaign Manager

(2012)

ut why the Obama campaign was so exceptional? Why was it not the second edition of the 2008 campaign? Referring to Jim Messina’s strategy briefing “this

campaign will be different from 2008”. This is not the same campaign for many reasons. Firstly because the electoral landscape was more challenging this time. Secondly because President Obama was not a new candidate starting from zero, he had already a reputation and adjudication. Therefore Republicans were ready to take on him and judge his records. Thirdly because Barack Obama is not only a candidate, but the

B


President if the United States of America. This changed his attitude and public performances, moreover it influenced his image as a nominee both positive and negative way.

As the situation is new, the campaign needs to be more innovative and unprecedented, utilizing only useful elements from the 2008 campaign, but not copying it completely. Following we will see how this unique campaign was set up and how it functioned.


3. Fundraising


“Obama: $1.123 billion vs. Romney: $1.019 billion. That’s the final fundraising tally in the most expensive presidential election ever.”

www.politico.com (2012)

3.1 Record-‐breaking

The 2012 Obama campaign brought many innovative solutions into popular knowledge not only regarding political communication, but also fundraising methods and techniques. Many analysts and journalists write that they managed to reach historical peaks and put off record numbers. One of these achievements is that they managed to raise more than $1 billion dollars by the 2012 campaign and its affiliated party


committees, and so they brought the 10-‐figure milestone for the first time in history.75

If we look at a broader picture and review political fundraising in general we can see that many things have changed and fundraising went through an evolution in the past decade. First and most important change is that costs of political campaigning have increased significantly. As Johnson writes in his book ‘Campaigning in the twenty-‐first century’ “the presidential and congressional elections of 2008 were up to this point the most expensive ever in American history”76 when the 2012 broke this record. Just to illustrate how costs have been multiplied let us use some figures: presidential elections in 2008 cost nearly $2.4billion77. This was nearly twice of the candidates’ fundraising for the 2004 election and triple for the 2000 election. As Plouffe once said speaking about television ads and their costs “last week of the campaign the OFA has spent a 100 million dollars in the 9 states on the air. Which is more than McCain campaign spent in its entirety 2008 certain last 60

75 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed:12.11.2013] 76 Johnson, D.W.: “Campaigning in the Twenty-‐first Century”, Routledge, New York, 2011. p. 43 77 The costs of campaigns at the federal level -‐ presidential, House and Senate -‐ has risen drastically even adjusted for inflation. Some of the biggest increases have come in California ballot initiative issues. In many local contest, campaigns remain relatively low cost, while in others, they have jumped tremendously.


days”78. In 2008, the average cost of a successful, competitive seat in the House of Representatives was $1,372,35979. “This is nearly a 50% increase, adjusted for inflation, from 1996, when the average successful competitive campaign cost $673,739”80.

Increased costs required increased funds and sophisticated fundraising techniques. Campaigns were forced to invent many new ways of collecting funds, motive donors to donate money. The Obama campaign focused not only on the big donors, but contemporary with their organization building efforts they tried to bring in more small-‐donors through e-‐mails, social media, mobile applications and it’s website. As they managed to reach out to many individuals, they raised more money from small-‐dollar donations during the final months of the race than they have initially projected.81 We will see what techniques they have used to cast donations and what results they have achieved.

On the next table you can see the most important fundraising figures comparing the two candidates.

78 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 79 Johnson, D.W. [2011]. p. 44 80 Idem p.45 81 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed:12.11.2013]


Picture 3.1: Fundraising Overall [Source: http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php] 3.2 Ways to raise money “The email titled, "I will be outspent," was one of the campaign's most successful, raising $2.5 million.”

The Huffington Post (2012)

Even though law and regulations of political fundraising

are truly accurate and comprehensive, the system is fairly


complex as fundraising and it’s ways are numerous and complicated. As Dustin Cable researcher writes “Unless you are financial expert or professional politico, the latest fundraising statistics can seem incomprehensible. The rules and regulations governing campaign finance are complicated and it is not always easy to tell which candidate is doing better financially.”82

To understand campaign finances and their statistics we can identify three main ways to raise money for a political campaign:

1. Committees of the candidates -‐ like Obama for America (2008), Organising for America (2012) or Romney for President

2. The national parties themselves 3. And independent groups like political action committees

(PACs), Super PACs, 527s and other sympathetic non-‐profits Campaign finances may not always seem transparent

mainly because media outlets tend to focus more on the first and sometimes the second points together when they report on fundraising. Although Super PACs gain always more attention in the news, seldom are they considered in fundraising statistics.83

But PACs and SuperPACs are rather important in campaigning, why? What are these PACs? In the United States, a political action committee (PAC) is a type of organization that 82 Dustin Cable: Who is winning the money game? Understanding campaign finance statistics. http://statchatva.org/2012/08/29/whos-‐winning-‐the-‐money-‐game-‐understanding-‐campaign-‐finance-‐statistics/ [Accessed: 01.10.2013] 83 Idem.


pools campaign contributions from members and donates those funds to campaign for or against candidates, ballot initiatives, or legislation. At the federal level, an organization becomes a PAC when it receives or spends more than $1,000 for the purpose of influencing a federal election, according to the Federal Election Campaign Act.84

In addition let us review what the British online newspaper The Telegraph writes about SuparPACs and what they are used for as the explanation is clear and compact:

“SuperPACs (super political action committees) are a new phenomenon that are having an extraordinary influence on elections, especially the latest ones. They are independent political groups -‐ in theory not connected to any candidate -‐ that are allowed to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money during the campaign.

By law, SuperPACs must be completely separate from the campaigns and are not allowed to donate or coordinate their efforts with the candidate’s staff. But the reality is that the SuperPACs act as aggressive proxies for the official campaigns, echoing their message and hammering their opponents. Priorities USA, a pro-‐Obama SuperPAC, is run by former White House staffers while Restore Our Future, a pro-‐Romney group, was founded by a former Romney aide.

The concept of the SuperPAC emerged from a landmark Supreme Court case, Citizens United v Federal Election

84 Wikipedia: Political Action Committee. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_action_committee [Accessed:03.01.2014]


Commission, where justices ruled that there could be no limits to how much money individuals, corporations or unions can donate to independent political groups, even if they are campaigning on behalf of one candidate.

Because SuperPACs are nominally independent from the campaigns they are often behind the election’s most scathing attacks which could easily backfire if launched by a candidate’s official campaign. A Priorities USA ad in August was widely criticised after it seemed to imply that Romney was responsible for the death of a woman whose husband had lost his healthcare when his factory shut down.”85

85 The Telegraph: US Election guide – How does the election work? http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-‐election/9480396/US-‐Election-‐guide-‐how-‐does-‐the-‐election-‐work.html [Accessed: 22.08.2013]


3.3 Fundraising statistics

Despite the transparent Federal Election Campaign Act and the Federal Election Commission (FEC)86 that makes all campaign disclosures available in it’s numerous database; fundraising statistics rarely include every source and calculate every income. One of the most complex charts that was made by ‘The Financial Times’87 shows us the money raised and spent by the presidential candidates, the national party committees and the even the primary Super PACs whose sole purpose was to support the candidate. Even if this statement is relatively accurate, it doesn’t include money raised or held by each candidate’s “victory fund”, a joint fundraising committee that will distribute funds to the campaigns and party committees. In addition to these committees, it doesn’t show nonprofit groups that do not have to file with the Federal Election Commission and other super PACs that have spent at least $65 million more on television advertising, almost all of it against President Obama or in support of Mitt Romney.

Viewing the chart we can see total incomes and spending by both campaigns listed month by month. These figures are absolute numbers, not accumulated values. The Democratic Party started earlier -‐ in 2011 -‐ to raise money and managed to 86 Federal Election Commission, Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal: http://www.fec.gov/pindex.shtml 87 The New York Times: The 2012 Money Race – Compare the Candidates http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-‐finance [Accessed: 12.05.2013]


raise slightly more in the summer period partially due to the fact that Republicans’ attention was drawn to their presidential primaries till the 14th of July.

In the last months donations were significantly increasing not only compared to the previous months but compared to previous years’ tendencies too. Thanks to the sophisticated online fundraising techniques, that we will examine later on, Dems could multiply their income in this period. September 2012 was a better month than September 2008 online. And “in October 2012, when there was significant voter excitement and anxiety generated by the presidential debates, digital fundraising increased on a month-‐over-‐month basis.”88

88 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed: 12.11.2013]


Picture 3.2: Fundraising month by month [Source: http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-‐finance] The second part of this statistic is showing proportions of the different sources mentioned earlier, named the presidential candidates, the national party committees and the even the primary Super PACs -‐ by democrats called ‘Priorities USA Action Super PAC’, by republicans called ‘Restore Our Future Super PAC’.


Picture 3.3: Money raised by Sources [Source: http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-‐finance ]

Obama, as candidate, has raised $258.9m more based on

this statement, partially because of his time advantage. This can be seen even in the different nominee’s own fundraising contributions, because the amount that the President has raised ($726.2m) was 68 percent of his total incomes, whilst Romney carried only 45 percent of his funds with alone raised money.

Picture 3.4: Outside Spending [Source: http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-‐finance]

Last, but not least we need to take look at a table showing

outside spendings. We can see listed the top spenders for and against each candidates.


3.4 Fundraising Best Practice

Romney’s biggest financial advantage was that he has been able to attract big donors, either through direct contributions to the campaign or through independent groups. 46% of Romney’s campaign committee donors gave the maximum allowable contribution of $2,500, compared to 15% of Obama’s donors.89 But the Obama campaign performed exemplary with its digital fundraising, as they increased the previous amounts they’ve raised, from $500 million in 2008, to $690 million in 201290 that came through their various web properties.

To have a well-‐performing digital fundraising platform the campaign had to have a stable and well-‐planned background system that had enough capacity to handle the increased interactions and maximize online fundraising efficiency. Since 2011 the campaign’s IT team collaborated with one of their vendors, Blue State Digital91 (Blue State) and aimed to develop an unprecedented fundraising platform. The

89 Dustin Cable: Who is winning the money game? Understanding campaign finance statistics. http://statchatva.org/2012/08/29/whos-‐winning-‐the-‐money-‐game-‐understanding-‐campaign-‐finance-‐statistics/ [Accessed: 01.10.2013] 90 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed:12.11.2013] 91 Blue State Digital’s homepage: http://www.bluestatedigital.com [Accessed: 12.05.2013]


campaign increased progressively the number of hired engineers with specific focus on fundraising.92

One of the campaign’s priorities was performance. “We knew from the very beginning that our new donation platform needed to be as fast as we could reasonably make it. We were very familiar with all the stories from huge companies like Amazon93 and Google94 about how only 100 milliseconds of latency can affect conversions by as much as 1%.” -‐ says Kyle Rush, Obama campaign technologist. They managed to make the new platform 60% faster and that resulted in a 14% increase in donation conversions.

Design and comprehensibility was a priority too. Therefore they elaborated an appealing and user-‐friendly web form (see Picture 3.3).

And with this technological background the campaign could leverage the micro donations, online fundraising, social networks and social media and they had some notable results:95

92 Kyle Rush, Expert in Optimization: http://kylerush.net/blog/meet-‐the-‐obama-‐campaigns-‐250-‐million-‐fundraising-‐platform/ [Accessed: 18.03.2013] 93 Hacker News: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=273900 [Accessed: 08.01.2014] 94 WPO: Web Performance Optimization. http://www.stevesouders.com/blog/2010/05/07/wpo-‐web-‐performance-‐optimization/ [Accessed: 07.05.2013] 95 Social Media Fundraising, Obama and the 2012 Presidential Elections: http://www.npengage.com/social-‐media/social-‐media-‐fundraising-‐2012-‐presidential-‐election/#sthash.R4Tgfgqg.dpuf [Accessed:02.04.2013]


• 58% of individual donations were under $1000, 30% of the total being under $2000. • Three million donors made Six and a half million

donations online. • Eighty-‐dollar average was the online gift size. This may also suggest that over the last four years

American voters have become more comfortable with the idea of giving small amounts of money to a presidential campaign online.96 Social media fundraising in general tends to be a very, if not a the most powerful tool in modern campaigning.97 A data focused research98 identifies four reasons why social media users are more willing to donate99: because they are more politically engaged; they are more active users; are well connected and simply they raise more money. This is what the Obama campaign understood at the very beginning and explored it on a really high level.

96 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed:12.11.2013] 97 The Power of Social Fundraising and Friends Asking Friends: http://www.npengage.com/social-‐media/the-‐power-‐social-‐fundraising-‐and-‐friends-‐asking-‐friends-‐infographic/ [Accessed:04.09.2013] 98 MDG: Fundraising in the Social Media Era: http://www.mdgadvertising.com/blog/political-‐fundraising-‐in-‐the-‐social-‐media-‐era-‐infographic/ [Accessed: 12.06.2013] 99 Social Media Fundraising in the 2012 Presidential Elections: http://www.npengage.com/social-‐media/social-‐media-‐fundraising-‐2012-‐presidential-‐election/ [Accessed: 12.11.2013]


Picture 3.5: Optimization of Fundraising Webform [Source: http://kylerush.net/blog/meet-‐the-‐obama-‐campaigns-‐250-‐million-‐fundraising-‐platform/]

Fundraising techniques were really creative. According

to Professor Jarding’s categorization of fundraising we have seen alternative ways of raising money, such as many fundraising events, which he has held once revealing the country to gather supporters. Each visit of Obama or his surrogates, like Michelle Obama, Joe Biden or Bill Clinton has


brought together thousands of citizens. In their speeches they have always told how to support the President and that followers should navigate on the website and check barackobama.com. On the website one of the first instructions were once joining the campaign and second donating money.

A fairly appealing fundraising event was a dinner with the presidential couple. Every three month a dinner100 was drawn between donors in a certain period. This kind of an online lottery was organized even to win tickets for prestigious events, like concerts of supporters, political events or gala dinners organized by celebrities.

Another fundraising tactic was when supporters gave dinners for their contacts, like Anna Wintour101 or George Clooney102 who raised millions of dollars in one evening only by inviting friends and business partners.

The campaign had a wide variety of gadgets that they were selling on their online web shop: T-‐shirts, yard signs, mugs, pins, bottle openers and so on. The income of

100 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, Presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwWHOMJlYkI [Accessed: 17.10.2013] 101 The Huffington Post: Anna Wintour. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/anna-‐wintour-‐obama-‐fundraiser/ [Accessed: 11.11.2013] 102 The CNN: California as Obama Fundraiser. http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/11/politics/california-‐obama-‐fundraiser/ [Accessed: 09.10.2013]


the web shop was invested in the campaign.

You could find the Donation button on every platform: in e-‐mails, newsletters, mails, on the website, on the campaign’s

and Obama’s personal social media profiles, like Twitter, Facebook etc. Moreover they used text message fundraising too. As they possessed already the personal information saved in the database and even the data of your contacts; “you got a text message on your number saying you can send a reply stating how much they should charge on your credit card; and so they could have donations that differed from the options listed on the email, different than 5 or 25.”103

So as we can see raising money for the campaign was a core question in it’s setting, not only in it’s communication, but even in it’s internal structure.

103 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, Presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwWHOMJlYkI [Accessed: 17.10.2013]


3.5 Top Contributors

To maintain transparency not only the campaign’s incomes and spending have to be identified and shared, but donors’ name list also. The website called ‘opensecrets.org’ revealed all the related information, has set a search for donors and created lists of the top donors. It is not always possible to code every single donation in spite of all effort. “PAC contributions are virtually 100% identified, but many individual contributions simply cannot be categorized.”104 On the list you can see institutions, organizations and even universities. The organizations themselves did not donate, but the money came from the organizations' PACs, their individual members or employees and their families. Organization totals include subsidiaries and affiliates.105

104 Percent of Contributions Coded: https://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/include/percentcoded_pop.php [Accessed:12.05.2013] 105 Open Secrets, Barack Obama, Contributors: https://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/contrib.php?id=N00009638 [Accessed: 09.07.2013]


University of California

$1,212,245

US Dept of State $417,629

Microsoft Corp $814,645 DLA Piper $401,890

Google Inc $801,770 Sidley Austin LLP $400,883

US Government $728,647 Walt Disney Co $369,598

Harvard University $668,368 IBM Corp $369,491

Kaiser Permanente

$588,386 University of Chicago

$357,185

Stanford University

$512,356 University of Michigan

$339,806

Deloitte LLP $456,975 Comcast Corp $337,628

Columbia University

$455,309 US Dept of Justice $334,659

Time Warner $442,271 US D of Health Services

$309,956

Picture 3.6: Top Donors [Source: opensecrets.org]


The website has made and shared some interesting lists,

putting donors in a selective order. We can see top state donors, donors categorized by economic sectors and biggest industry company donors. Just to repeat myself, these donors are not the organizations themselves, but their employees, members or other affiliates and subsidiaries who raised the money.

Picture 3.7: Top State Donors [Source: http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php]


Picture 3.8: Top Industry Donors [Source: http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php]


Picture 3.9: Top Donors for Both Candidates from Industries [Source: http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/]


3.6 Results and Proportions

As we have seen at the beginning, campaigns, especially presidential campaigns have increased their funds because costs increased. The 2008 elections were record breaking in many senses, but only until the 2012 elections. Candidates raised a total of $1.8 billion, with Barack Obama raising an extraordinary $745 million while John McCain raised $368 million in 2008.106 Republicans have learnt the lesson from the 2008 elections’ fundraising and boosted it in 2012. Due to Citizen United the way campaigns are funded has fundamentally changed. Echoing Jim Messina, Republicans had numerous outside groups helping to increase their influence and spread their message and the GOP raised money through SuperPACs and other big-‐dollar donors. They have even announced a $120 million dollar campaign in April.107

But how did they deliver? What were the fundraising results? And from whom did both parties get the money? The following two charts aim to illustrate both, Democrat and Republican fundraising outcomes.

106 Johnson, D.W. [2011] 107 Jim Messina, Obama 2012 Strategy Briefing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k [Accessed: 25.05.2013]


Picture 3.10: Distribution of Donors [Source: http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-‐finance]

On the first one the proportion of big-‐ and smaller

donors can be seen clearly. We have already spoken about the Obama campaign’s successful reach out to everyday individuals, even students, pensioners or low-‐income voters, who could donate only a small amount to the campaign. In the first row we can see both candidate’s donors, where donations were maximized ($2500). 57 percent of Obama’s funds were raised of amounts smaller than $200. Not like Romney, who received 39% of his donations as amounts between $500-‐$2500.

The difference in the big and small donors’ proportion is well demonstrated on the second diagram, where dark green signs small individual contributions, whilst light green are the large contributors. Moreover we may note the difference between PAC contributions (Obama: $0; Romney $1,076,496) that we have already examined earlier.


Picture 3.11: Proportion of small-‐ and big donors [Source: http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php] 3.7 Spending

“Lastly, it is important to remember that money will do a campaign no good unless it is spent. It is not necessarily a bad thing for a campaign to spend more than what it takes in for a particular month. As Election Day nears, it makes sense to spend and deplete campaign treasuries.”108 As we could see campaigns

108 Dustin Cable: Who is winning the money game? Understanding campaign finance statistics. http://statchatva.org/2012/08/29/whos-‐winning-‐the-‐


increased their funds in the last couple of months, particularly around the debates, as voter excitement was higher in that period.

Campaigns were evenly outspent. They have used all the money they have raised. On the next table we can see how much the two teams have spent on the campaign.

Picture 3.12: Spending Related to Presidential Race [Source: http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php]

Without over explaining these comprehensible figures, let

us focus on the row of outside spending, where the Red Team raised almost 3 times as many funds as the Blue Team. Due to money-‐game-‐understanding-‐campaign-‐finance-‐statistics/ [Accessed: 01.10.2013]


these contributions the Red Team stole the Blue Teams thunder spending $1,238,090,807.

The finance operation expanded the organization’s capacity by delivering the funding needed to hire staff, open offices and provide resources. The finance team created many innovative programs, such as “Obama University” trainings for fundraisers, and affinity groups, such as the youth-‐focused Gen44 group. It also worked closely with the digital team to maximize campaign resources.109

In the same roundtable conference mentioned earlier, at Delaware University, David Plouffe has raised some interesting thoughts responding to a question regarding the paradoxity of spending always more money on campaign ads, investing more in television advertising, and at the same time witnessing a lower turnout. How is that possible? – asked the questioner. Plouffe replied the question accurately explaining the questioner that the campaign was ran only in 9 states not in the other 41. Therefore where the campaign was happening turnouts had to be higher, and this was a good sign. Regarding television ads, he measured spending in gross rating points, which is the index based on viewers and time of television you buy. He said “ The average is a kind of 1000 GRP which means that an average viewer sees your ad more or less 10 times. There were some markets where we were 3-‐4000 gross rating points, which would be historical and astronomical. In this election the Republican Super PACs were 9-‐10000 gross rating points, so in some states, like Nevada or Ohio for every 3 109 Legacy Report 2012, p. 33


republican ads you had one democrat.”110 And than he adds: “Big question for democracy is not only television ads but donations. We had only one individual, only one, who donated 100 million dollars to influence who the next president will be. And in 2016, if things are going into this direction than it won’t be about the candidate anymore, it won’t be about volunteers anymore or about the campaign plan, but it will be about super PAC games. I am not saying you wont have to deal with other issues, but if you don’t have a super PAC game that’s huge! You are not going to be able to win! This is a really really disturbing trend I think.”111

110 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 111 Idem.


4. Campaign Communication


“The Obama campaign in 2012 was 10 light-‐years ahead from a technology perspective in being able to identify voters, target voters, turn out voters.”

Steve Schmidt Senior Campaign Strategist GOP

(2012)

he communications team was responsible for media relations and external communications, working closely across the campaign to get out the President’s message,

define the opposition and shape the media environment. It worked across platforms – online, on the ground, and through the national, state, and constituency media – to communicate the campaign’s core message and define Romney before he got

T


out of the gate.112 Campaign communication is one of the most important

pillars within a campaign. We have mentioned some elements of this important asset, but in this chapter we will have an opportunity to enter into details and get some explanation from professionals and staff members of the 2012 Obama campaign, who gave many speeches on their field after the elections.

The chapter is divided in two parts, both external and internal communications are evenly important. With external communication we intend to study all those tools that served for voter connection and messaging. E-‐mails, Social Media, Youtube, the Website, Text Messaging and TV ads are general components of delivering the message of the campaign. We will have an insight how the Obama staff has improved it to implement something highly innovative and sophisticated.

Internal communication and it’s assets are less visible for simple users, but they are as important as outside communication, especially since we know that the core program of the campaign was organization building that embraced all the other campaign activities. For a better working organization it was fundamental to invent an internal information technological system that is easy to use also for basic users and has enough capacity to treat an enormous amount of data that composes a nationwide database.

Actually everything visible starts with communication. This 112 Legacy Report 2012, p.43


is the procedure that reveals planning. And the Obama campaign made it clear at a very early stage that they planned to communicate through new media, as they have announced their campaign on Youtube: “President Obama's campaign on Monday released a seven-‐minute video entitled "Forward," which they're using to kick off the general election.” -‐ writes CBS News on it’s website. Referring to Harvard Professor Steven Jarding it has high importance to be the first in defining our own position, the opponent and the battleground. In this sense we need to underline how this pitch “Forward” video implements all these key concepts: it perfectly describes the image of the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, by emphasizing his political achievement makes clear the goal to be reelected. Many campaign messages were expressed in this kick off video, that was consequently repeated on other forums, in other ads. Messages just like the economic stimulus package that saved 4.2 million jobs; the end of the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy discriminating against gays in the military; the end of the Iraq war; the changes to regulation of Wall Street and the credit card companies; the auto bailout and many other economical and social achievements that sign his path as milestones.113

Regarding the opponent, and his definition, as we did not have a specific name of the potential candidate since they were still in the primary race, the Republican Party was nominated and defined as overall. "Instead of working together to lift

113 CBS NEWS: Obama’s 2012 Campaign Pitch Forward, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obamas-‐2012-‐campaign-‐pitch-‐forward/ [Accessed: 12.03.2013]


America up, Republicans were waging a campaign to tear the president down," the narrator says as the video shows images of congressional Republicans.114 This statement echoes the opinion of Steve Schmidt, GOP campaign director, who highlighted it at a roundtable discussion at Delaware University, when he explained how Dems had an advantage by defining themselves whilst the GOP had to deal with the primaries.115

This is a good example how powerful new media and online communication can be if it is professionally used and well planned. Let us now come around this issue and understand why the Obama campaign was so efficient in his external communication. 4.1 External Communication “But he walks into the debate tonight with the upper hand in large part because he has been running the more subtle and sophisticated campaign.”116

Joe Klein Journalist (2012)

114 Idem. 115 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 116 TIME: Obama’s Swing State Success Explained: http://swampland.time.com/2012/10/03/obamas-‐swing-‐state-‐success-‐explained/ [Accessed: 11.05.2013]


4.1.1 Tendencies

Contemporary with the evolution of online communication, even human interaction has changed profoundly. The way we interact with each another changed profoundly, so did political campaigns: the way politicians communicate with voters, the way people react on campaigns and the way citizens, supporters, activists and voters interact among themselves and how they communicate one with another about elections and campaigns. The best way to demonstrate this evolution and it’s externalities is to list information technology inventions and their first use in political campaigns.117

117 Johnson [2011] pp.10-‐11


Websites 1992 Email 1992 Text messaging 2000 Blogging 2003 Social networking 2004 YouTube 2006 Twitter 2008

Picture 4.1: Online platforms’ first use in campaigns [Source: Johnson 2011]

Moreover we need to add one more row to this table,

Dashboard was used first in 2012. Though it served mainly for internal communication, it was the primary manner for voters to get involved, sign up and participate in the campaign.

Johnson raises a very useful question in his book and it serves as most important principle in defining a campaigns external communication: “Where does the public gets its information about political campaigns?”118. I would add even the aspect of where does the public gets it’s general information, the news? What kind of news do they require? How are these news interpreted and shared? What makes people follow issues or individuals?

118 Idem pp.13


I would refer to Teddy Goff, Digital Director119 of the President’s campaign, who gave a very clear picture on how the campaign treated IT evolution and tried to leverage the best way to get through to voters.120 Comparing to 2008 social media was a little bit different: Facebook was accepted by people, increasing it’s users consistently, Twitter -‐ as it was invented in 2006 -‐ it was only in it’s infancy and even smartphones weren’t so generally used (IPhone was only invented in 2007).

Technologies came a long way, we all have learnt to adapt many new platforms and we all use new surfaces on a regular basis. Teddy Goff believes that these online tools have a lot more power, and that for this reason technologies have to be treated very well. Taking an example, “if bad news in 2008 appeared on the web, people would have clicked away. But now, in 2012 they click away and then retweet it why it wasn’t good. This is a huge difference”.121

Nevertheless technological development and changes in users’ habits, many things haven’t changed in the past years -‐ such as the goals of the campaign to register voters, to recruit volunteers or to turnout the electorate. “It is important to not to lose sight of the fact that the people haven’t changed” -‐ adds Goff.

119 The Digital Team was actually that staff who was responsible for external communication planning and executing, whilst the Technology Team carried internal communication -‐ Campaign Legacy Report 2012 p.26 120 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012, Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013] 121 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012, Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013]


They have more equipment but feelings and personal need are right the same. Therefore the core principle of the Digital Team was: “If you value people and honor those values, than they will do a lot for us.”122

122 Idem.


4.1.2 The Digital Team’s Core Program

“The digital program was the most complex digital operation any political campaign has ever seen, and decisions were driven by rigorous testing and clear metrics.”123 The goals of the digital program were not different from goals across the campaign: recruit and organize volunteers, register voters, persuade voters, turn out the vote and raise money to manage pay for it all. Metrics such as downloads, clicks, follower growth were not set as goals, but helped only to measure efforts as leading indicators.

The main mission of the digital team was to engage supporters with each other to help to win this election in their own communities in an effective and simple manner. Therefore the Digital team, collaborating closely with the campaign’s Technology team expanded and engaged online communities of volunteers with innovating tools like Dashboard and the Call Tool.

They have invented new ways and have multiplied traditional forms of collecting voting information online -‐ like GottaRegister.com. All of these sites were set up to provide innovative platforms for users to share information and connect with their friends to exchange thoughts about politics and so persuade more and more people.124

Digital messages and digital messaging had two levels: first the national coordination that framed accurately the 123 Legacy Report 2012, p. 80 124 Legacy Report 2012, p. 81


communication strategy. Second each state ran its own digital program and could produce and boost state-‐related and local topics.

As the 2012 Obama Campaign Legacy Report (2012) writes, “The digital program was a key part of the success of the 2012 campaign.” They have invested in new areas, ideas and as a result, the campaign was able to engage more people and build a community of online supporters. Let us now focus on the various assets used in this mission.

4.1.3 The Campaign’s Website By 1996 several presidential candidates had their own

websites. Today it is unthinkable not to have a website. Moreover websites acquire many other functions besides providing information, as they mostly reinforce political attachments, mobilize activists to contribute funds and to volunteer their time and last but not least websites may be a decisive motivation for the electorate to vote.125

The campaign’s website works as an entrance to a universal field office. Clicking on ‘www.barackobama.com’ is a crucial moment when a potential supporter or an Obama fan meets the President and his campaign. There are numerous needs that a website has to satisfy: it has to be appealing, comprehensible, easy to navigate, informative, entertaining, engaging and coherent. The campaign team has experimented 125 Johnson pp.14.


many potential styles and structures to find the most appealing version for their website. As Teddy Goff said, the aim was to create a website that gives people a good experience to navigate on.126

The website ‘www.barackobama.com’ harmonizes with the American national colors, but gives a friendly impression. Its structure is relatively simple, it is not overwhelming but it prioritizes very well the occuring information. It gives a general picture of what main policies Obama fights for, or what the core issues are which form his policy-‐making, and on the other hand it always updates you with the latest news and is renewed regularly. Last but not least it gives you all the opportunity to join the campaign, to sign up or to donate, in one word to engage with the campaign.

Among numerous options to dialogue with the website, one is interconnectivity among all other Obama platforms such as all of the campaign’s social media profiles, that invites you to follow him through more of your “digital lifespace”. Moreover ‘Donate’ and ‘Sign up’ buttons were actually the first tool that could be seen once opening the site. If you had an account, the system remembered you and filled out brackets automatically. It worked as a safe payment system. According to Goff, “so once you save your credit card information we were sending you an email saying, that we already have all your information so if you want to donate then you just need to click here and you donate 5$, or click on the 10$ button and so you donate 10$. And 126 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, Presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwWHOMJlYkI [Accessed: 17.10.2013]


at the time people donated they got a message saying thanks and click here if you want to donate again.” 127 This is how they were able to raise millions of dollars through micro-‐ and small-‐amount donations and increase their databases with important information about followers.

Due to all these reasons it was beneficial for the campaign when numerous people opened their website. They have directed all other potential websites they were using to this one, like the page of ‘Organizing for America’, and kept repeating the address ‘www.barackobama.com’ in their ads, on their Facebook profile and in every Youtube video they uploaded and in every speech they have held. The website was one fundamental component of the campaigns complex communication network.

4.1.4 Video Component and Youtube

We could describe the importance of the video content quoting David Plouffe, who said “nowadays if it doesn’t have a video component it doesn’t really go into media”128. This is worth for events registered, speeches made and even scandals, like we have seen it with the secret videotape made of governor Romney whilst speaking about 47% of the electorate in the United States -‐ we will get back to this videotape further on.

127 Idem. 128 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012]


Plouffe mentions video materials in connection with negative advertising too. He calls it ‘comparative ads’ that were run by the Obama campaign especially in the early months of the 2012 elections. “Using short cuts of Romney and interpreting his own words was the most powerful negative campaign”129 -‐ says Plouffe, as it deprives him from his role as a leader and credible politician.

Youtube became an important tool of political campaigning. The Obama campaign has extensively used it in 2008. “Barack Obama made the most use of this vehicle. posting 1,839 videos with an astounding 132.8 million viewers”130 -‐ writes Johnson -‐ “John McCain posted 329 videos with 26.3 million viewers.” Youtube suddenly became a platform that allowed presidential candidates to communicate with voters directly and form personal messages getting to viewers directly online. As we have previously mentioned the Obama campaign announced its start with a video called “Forward” released on its Youtube channel. This has its precedent in 2008, when Obama has decided to post a video on public campaign financing for the general election on Youtube and only during the first week more than 300,000 people viewed it. Moreover as a chain reaction, more than 4 million viewers watched Obama’s entire 37-‐minute speech on race relations in America.131 As a nother example the music video “Yes we can” set to one of his speeches, made by Will.i.am was viewed more

129 Idem. 130 Johnson [2008] p.15. 131 Idem.


than 10 million times by 2008 and more than 25 million by 2013.

The method remained the same, but their core messages have changed, according to CBS News report: “In 2008, the Obama campaign was arguing for hope and change. This year, the president's re-‐election campaign is asking Americans to move keep moving forward.”132 In other words this was the core image that they had to transmit with most of their videos that they have uploaded.

Today, in 2014 ‘barackobamadotcom’, Obama’s own Youtube channel, has 546,607 subscribers and 3,002 videos uploaded, millions of views regularly.

4.1.5 Emails E-‐mails are indispensable assets of our everyday life. As

Harper Reed, former Technology Chief said “we are getting addicted to emails.”133 Moreover the majority of the Internet users have a nearly limitless capacity of e-‐mails and they won’t unsubscribe no matter how many they’re sent.134 This is what the campaign had to work on and explore, this became one of

132 CBS News: Obama’s 2012 Pitch Forward: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obamas-‐2012-‐campaign-‐pitch-‐forward/ [Accessed: 17.05.2013] 133 Daily Download: Obama's 2012 Digital Campaign Strategy: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0POqVcGZRU [Accessed: 07.08.2013] 134 http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-‐11-‐29/the-‐science-‐behind-‐those-‐obama-‐campaign-‐e-‐mails


their most capable communication tools. Especially since in the recent years campaigns have become more interactive: posting pictures, videos, links to other information, hypertexts, and frequently including “Donate now” buttons. “Emails could spiral out virally, as supporters would send the message to friends and associates.”135

They have tested numerous times the various e-‐mails to find the best what fits the morale and has an impact. Therefore before sending out an electronic mail to the whole list of supporters and subscribers, they have elaborated a segmentation plan for every single email and always showed it to some focus groups.136

“We did extensive A-‐B testing not just on the subject lines and the amount of money we would ask people for,” says Amelia Showalter, director of digital analytics, “but on the messages themselves and even the formatting.”137 The staff of 20 writers produced and tested often as many as 18 variations.

Subscribers have seen weirdly overfamiliar e-‐mails that were emanated by the Obama campaign, especially since a casual tone was usually the most effective.138 “The subject lines that worked best were things you might see in your in-‐box 135 Johnson [2008] p.16 136Teddy Goff, Digital Director, Presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwWHOMJlYkI [Accessed: 17.10.2013] 137 Business Week: The Science Behind Those Obama Campaign Mails, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-‐11-‐29/the-‐science-‐behind-‐those-‐obama-‐campaign-‐e-‐mails [Accessed: 11.04.2013] 138 Business Week: The Science Behind Those Obama Campaign Mails, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-‐11-‐29/the-‐science-‐behind-‐those-‐obama-‐campaign-‐e-‐mails [Accessed: 11.04.2013]


from other people,” Fallsgraff says. “ ‘Hey’ was probably the best one we had over the duration.”139 Whilst for example the concepts of “I Need Your Support” or “Help Me on the Road to Victory” proved to be ineffective for the Romney campaign.140

Picture 4.2: Subject lines for the E-‐mails [Source: http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-‐11-‐29/the-‐science-‐behind-‐those-‐obama-‐campaign-‐e-‐mails]

On the picture above it can be seen why testing was so

important. Based on the outcome of the focus groups the team has calculated how much the different email versions and

139 Idem. 140 The Most Successful Email Subject Line was Hey: http://www.techi.com/2013/03/the-‐most-‐successful-‐email-‐subject-‐line-‐for-‐obamas-‐campaign-‐was-‐hey/ [Accessed: 11.11.2013]


subject lines would have risen. And we can see clearly “the different subjects – 2 million dollars of a difference only because the subject line is different.”141

“We were so bad at predicting what would win that it only reinforced the need to constantly keep testing,” says Showalter, Director of digital analytics.142 And as it seems she was right, as they have explored many unexpected hits: like profanity. “Dropping in mild curse words such as “Hell yeah, I like Obamacare” got big clicks. There was no such thing as the perfect e-‐mail.”143

Echoing Teddy Goff, people like to hear back what they have done, therefore the campaign tended to send measured results, for instance “supporters required to list the names of donors who gave $200 every 3 month. The campaign was publishing these lists, saying ‘official list of names who have built the campaign’. This worked as a reminder to people between 70-‐199$ to donate. And they were donating.” 144

The use of mild curse words, donate buttons and the discovery that the less appealing layouts seemed to work the best led to $690 million in funds raised for the campaign.

141 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, Presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwWHOMJlYkI [Accessed: 17.10.2013] 142 Business Week: The Science Behind Those Obama Campaign Mails, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-‐11-‐29/the-‐science-‐behind-‐those-‐obama-‐campaign-‐e-‐mails [Accessed: 11.04.2013] 143 Idem. 144 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, Presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwWHOMJlYkI [Accessed: 17.10.2013]


4.1.6 Social media “Our campaign has changed from 08 to 12 in so many

fundamental ways, think about it, so many people are on mobile devices now, Facebook is the dominant way people want to engage in politics, so you really have to adapt.” -‐ says Plouffe whilst reflecting on election aftermath.145 According to this the campaign emphasizes the online tools provided by social media, especially that social media is an adequate answer for our question previously raised: Where does the public gets its information about political campaigns?

To be efficient the campaign had to understand and adapt the language of Internet, as Teddy Goff admits146, they had to use a language that is social, rapid, and responsive. Simpy tumbling out messages on a daily basis doesn’t do any good to the campaign, unless there is an authenticity and a relationship built between voters and candidate.147

“A content that is short, funny, it is sharable, it sort of invites comments, uses imaginary, uses illusions.”148 -‐ says Goff. “If you find the sentence and content that speaks the language of the

145 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 146 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012, Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013] 146 Idem. 147 Johnson [2011] p.17 148 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012, Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013]


Internet and the people themselves than it will expand on it and even overflows it.”

They were monitoring all the tweets and posts. And so they were monitoring particularly the supporters, their user habits and interests. According to Harper Reed,149 Former Technology Chief, who said Twitter, Facebook and Instagram were used always by more and more people. And “if a friend shares it, than you listen to it more likely, you re-‐share, or retweet it more usually, therefore the online campaign gets more genuine.” says Reed.

Social media was not only used to reach out to a wide number of voters, but to sophisticate targeting. The use of Internet and especially email services and social media platforms helped tracking the habits and online behavior of every user. This phenomenon is actually known to all of us even though we might not consider it as a result of a well-‐planned and complex targeting procedure. We just simply need to think of advertisements that seem to appear randomly once logging in to our Youtube, Facebook or other social accounts. The targeting based on users’ habits contributed to a precise and professional identification in the campaign as well.

149 Daily Download: Obama's 2012 Digital Campaign Strategy: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0POqVcGZRU [Accessed: 07.08.2013]


a) Twitter Twitter was created in the early 2006 by Jack Dorsey to allow users to send short messages (just 140 characters) and therefore to keep up with friends.150 In the 2008 general elections’ campaigns many candidates, such as Barack Obama, Joe Biden or John Edwards have used Twitter as a campaign communication tool.151 Moreover Obama’s victory tweet shared on his profile became the most shared post ever right after it’s publication. He beated Justin Bieber with more than 200,000 re-‐tweets, Obama’s post was re-‐tweeted more than 650,000 times.152

150 History of Twitter: http://profilerehab.com/twitter-‐help/history_of_twitter [Accessed: 29.07.2012] 151 Johnson [2011] 152 CNN News: http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/showbiz/2012/11/07/the-‐buzz-‐today.hln&iref=videosearch&video_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2Fsearch%2F%3Fquery%3Dobama%25202012%2520victory%26primaryType%3Dvideo%26sortBy%3Ddate%26intl%3Dfalse [Accessed: 12.06.2013]


Picture 4.3: Obama Tweet after Elections Day [Source: http://www.cnn.com ]

Thanks to the tweeting, commenting, viewing modes,

Twitter is an interesting and challenging asset to influence general opinion about certain issues. “In just a few minutes there is a consensus evolving after events or happening. The consensus of who is winning, who is doing well, who made a mistake, who didn’t, and that is something that has to be understood about modern politics.” -‐ says Plouffe. “If there is an event that takes an hour and a half, your people out there will


not look at it holistically, but there will be a consensus that emerges right away, right within 10 minutes.’153 This is a phenomenon that had to be monitored and controlled continuously as opinion-‐sharing could easily escalate and than modify general image and the common perception of certain events and facts. Campaigns used creative ways to keep online conversations framed and directed.

Especially since the penetration of modern devices like smartphones and tablets, social media became an essential online platform to share opinions. It is not surprising than that since 2008, candidates have routinely added them to their repertoire of online communication devices.154

b) Facebook When you opened the Facebook profile of the President of the United States you could see the most important information highlighted but composed in a pleasant and friendly way.

153 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 154 Johnson [2011] p. 17


Picture 4.4: The Facebook Timeline of Barack Obama [Source: http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/03/02/six-‐things-‐we-‐learned-‐from-‐obamas-‐facebook-‐timeline/]

The page invites people to take a walk down the memory

lane in Obama’s life, viewing key moments and milestones from both his presidency and his personal accomplishments and memories.155 It combines with proficiency a profile of an individual and functions of the campaign, like the online store or the sign up and donate buttons. Message and image harmonize with the ones of other online platforms, like his website, his Twitter profile or even the videos shared on Youtube. Facebook shows life in the White House and on the road, plus he shares videos and links to his recent speeches, to

155 Six things we Learned from Obama’s Facebook Timeline: http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/03/02/six-‐things-‐we-‐learned-‐from-‐obamas-‐facebook-‐timeline/ [Accessed: 11.12.2013]


establish the issues that matter to him the most, like job creation records, student loans etc.

As Teddy Goff says, “Obama has 34 million Facebook fans – those people’s Facebook connections and their friends cover 98% of U.S.-‐based Facebook population. This is more than people who vote.”156 In a time where many voters are skeptical of political communication but trust the views of their own friends, this was incredibly important.157 This way people could help the campaign; even do their work more efficiently by addressing the right people and sharing an acceptable message with them. It was important to explore “how can we keep them engaged and treat them with respect, and give them an experience. Because [as much they can help], can Facebook users cause a lot of damage [to the campaign].”158

So Facebook was useful to connect to voters and communicate with them directly and to influence the communication between voters, to push them towards the communication of what the campaign wants them to dialogue about.

The Obama campaign has developed an innovative database system where they have added data gathered from Facebook. This means that the various social media’s data was united and merged with the campaign’s internal-‐database of voters that increased efficiency in identifying voters and 156 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012, Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013] 157 Legacy Report 2012 158 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012, Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013]


targeted messaging. The campaign managed to contact supporters, and only Obama-‐supporters through their Facebook profile and ask them to share some content with their friends. Moreover this database-‐system was able to filter even the supporter’s friends who were undecided or leaning voters, and once contacting supporters, they could ask for specific contacts: “Share with this and this of your friends! Here are your friends who live here and here. And so start with them. Contact them!” -‐ says Goff.159

This technological tool was important particularly in the GOTV period, since to many voters to get through Facebook was the only and best way as half of the targeted electorate was not reached by the campaign. They did not have a phone number to them, but 85% of these voters was a friend of a friend who was using Facebook.160

There was a significant difference between the two campaigns in social media usage. Republicans did not made any tactical difference in online messaging; they didn’t attribute strategic importance to these tools. Moreover there was even a kind of philosophical difference: for the President online communication was a helpful tool to give an impression of transparency and collaboration. These values were important to him even before using Internet as a campaign asset according to Teddy Goff, Digital Director of the 2012 Obama campaign.

159 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, Presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwWHOMJlYkI [Accessed: 17.10.2013] 160 Idem.


4.1.7 Web design

An important innovation of the Obama 2008 campaign was uniting and uniforming web design and print design, to bring the classical marketing tool of branding into politics. This was a new phenomenon at that time. The role of the Web designer and the Print designer were separate but their work was integrated into each other, especially because they were complementary parts of the same picture, making impression to be coherent and united. “It had to be the same what you see online, to that what you see on the paper.” -‐ says Thomas Scott, the online designer for the Obama campaign 2008.161

161 Lights on Making Ideas Happen, Scott Thomas: http://99u.com/videos/5821/scott-‐thomas-‐designing-‐the-‐obama-‐campaign [Accessed: 17.08.2013]


Picture 4.5: Web Designer and Print Designer -‐ Organigram [Source: http://99u.com/videos/5821/scott-‐thomas-‐designing-‐the-‐obama-‐campaign]

The picture above illustrates which were the tasks of the

both departments, web design and print design and how they coordinated the tasks to have a coherent image.

Even though in 2012 the principles of the campaign were basically the same: to have a coherent picture, friendly and eye-‐catching surfaces; it was essential to elaborate a clear-‐out design that highlights relevant information and enables voter-‐engagement.


4.1.8 Old media Even if we were specifically focusing on new media as

primary innovation in this argumentation, we should add old media to our repertoire. The campaign was not exclusively using only new media, but combined it with more traditional and recognized communication channels, such as television ads, newspaper articles and radio advertisements. New media was the key in many senses that helped to increase database and allowed a multi level search and targeting, but the campaign used for example television ads to reach voters who are not consumers or used less new media.

However the campaign planned strategically its old media appearances too. They made an important strategic decision to air television ads from May 2012 through Election Day, which constantly reinforced the President’s middle class-‐ oriented narrative and defined Romney as the wrong choice for working Americans. By planning early, thinking creatively and using all of the data at the campaign’s disposal, the campaign carried out media buys with an unprecedented degree of efficiency and precision, spending millions less than Romney but getting more ads in front of the right audiences. This careful planning helped mitigate the Republican spending advantage and helped frame the election on the campaign’s terms.

Television ads are measured in gross rating points, which show the amount of television a campaign buys. According to David Plouffe “the average is a kind of 1000 GRP, which means that an average viewer sees your ad more or less 10 times. There


were some markets where we were 3-‐4000 gross rating points, which would be historical and astronomical. In this election the Republican Super PACs were 9-‐10000 gross rating points, so in some states, like Nevada or Ohio for every 3 republican ads you had one democrat.”162

But it is hard to tell whose television advertising had a greater impact. Even if Republicans raised and spent more money on television advertising, Democrats apparently had invested very well in careful planning and creative productivity. This shows that ‘Obama for America’ unanimously won two Grand Prix awards at the Cannes Festival — one Titanium163 and one Integrated in the finales Saturday.164 "They turned (political advertising) from being one dimensional to something the whole country could contribute to. It was a fantastic idea." -‐ said David Droga, jury president and creative chairman, Droga5 in New York.165

New media, emails, phone applications, twitter and Facebook are important tools, but we can see, that old media was not excluded from the campaign’s communications portfolio. Content analysis and targeting were important in these cases too. And therefore "it was effective. You couldn't

162 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 163 Titanium has become an increasingly prestigious category since it sets a new standard for the advertising industry. 164 ABC News: Obama Campaign Takes Ad Prizes: http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Politics/story?id=7947528 [Accessed: 23.11.2013] 165 Idem.


ignore it. There will never be a political campaign that doesn't uses these tools."166

4.1.9 Three priorities: messaging, fundraising and organizing

Everything of the Digital program did fit into one of the

three priorities: fundraising, messaging, or organizing.167 The goals of the digital program were not different from goals of other parts of the campaign and it’s whole: voter registration, volunteer recruitment, organization, persuasion, turnout and fundraising.

a) Messaging

The frame of the campaign’s main message was based on

the President’s visions, that guided communications from the start till the end and helped the campaign stay on course, avoid distractions and maintain a consistent theme. The message was repeated while the campaign, from television ads to volunteer scripts they have used all their channels and platforms to make the meaning visible. The Obama campaign’s understanding of the electorate – who they are, what they care about and how to

166 Rich Silverstein, co-‐chairman and creative, Goodby, Silverstein & Partners. 167 Legacy Report 2012, p. 82


reach them was critical to its success168 such as the electorate’s understanding of the President and his campaign. This had to be a reciprocal understanding. Therefore amplifying the message of the candidate was important in the campaign.

New media and especially social media was part of the core program as it allowed the campaign to communicate with people who are reluctant and neutral towards politics and political issues. The Digital team’s task was to communicate a consistent message in a captivating form that people share it, to give users a good experience while dealing with the President and his policies and find those elements of it that can affect user’s life, make them interested in issues and illuminate stories in an appealing way.169 They created illustrative info-‐graphics and used humor regularly on social media platforms, as it was an easy manner to get to people.170

For example tax policies were a core point in the President’s politics and in the campaign thematic but is not an issue everyday people like to deal with. The Digital team had to find an alternative way to make people understand their point of view and make the message get through. For this reason they established a new website called ‘romneytaxplan.com’, where when the viewer wants to click on the ‘details’ button that flipped away. This really simple website was liked for 1.1 million times and was re-‐tweeted and shared by hundreds of 168 Idem. 169 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013] 170 Daily Download: Obama's 2012 Digital Campaign Strategy: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0POqVcGZRU [Accessed: 07.08.2013]


users. And more importantly they haven’t only shared only this site by re-‐tweeting it, but even an additional supplementary site that explained the Obama tax policies.

As the Digital team found it necessary to speak the ‘language’ of the Internet they have arranged some direct-‐voter communication, such as the chat function on Facebook. Moreover, using social media as an average person, the President increased significantly his acceptance and credibility. According to Goff the President’s access to ‘Reddit.com’171 has provoked unexpectedly numerous reactions. “And Obama did it. And people loved that he did it. Already the fact was convincing. That he understands how communication changes and how social media is crucial. It showed them that he cares about them and that they matter. And the fact that he took this kind of interview where he has no control made people understand who he is and his character, not just his policies.”172 -‐ explains Goff adding that politics are not only about policies, but are about emotions and about the person. Therefore they always aimed for communicating emotions not only facts and figures.

Another case was when they have conducted a chart showing only numbers of job creation in the Obama

171 Reddit.com is is a social news and entertainment website where registered users submit content in the form of links or text posts. Users then vote each submission "up" or "down" to rank the post and determine its position on the site's pages. Areas of interest called “subreddits” organize content entries. 172 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013]


administration. There was no logo, no name on it; they have just let it speak for itself. It was more powerful because it wasn’t branded, but only pure facts were illustrated, says Goff.173 According to him, the Digital team has experimented many innovative ways of online communication and they have learnt much about voter online behavior on their way, like that the negative ads are not shared on Facebook as much, but topics like LGBT rights, women issues or environment were more likely to be liked, as there were the issues people were sharing more on their own accounts and profiles.

b) Fundraising

As we have already seen, fundraising is critical for a

campaign’s success. Since many factors have changed recently that determine campaigning in general and fundraising too, the fundraising strategy of the Obama campaign had to face new challenges and invent a new method for the 2012 period. The Digital team’s role and responsibility in fundraising was significant as they focused on the optimization.174 They needed to optimize every single feature to increase the potential incomes, such as e-‐mails, design, donate buttons, websites and so forth.

The success in fundraising approved predictions wrong regarding the decrease paragoned to the loss of enthusiasm

173 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013] 174 Legacy Report 2012, p.82


after Obama’s first presidential run. “It was also a testament to the campaign’s leadership, including Messina, who invested heavily in digital efforts early, and the campaign’s digital team, run by Teddy Goff, Marie Ewald and Blue State Digital’s Joe Rospars, who were able to fine-‐tune their tactics and techniques for raising money electronically.”175

c) Organising

Digital organizing helped bridge the gap between online

activity and offline action. The goal was that the experience of online supporters doesn’t differ from the experience of offline volunteers. “Innovative online tools and tactics were force multipliers, allowing the campaign to engage a large number of people in creative ways, leverage the social graph of our supporters and ultimately build the grassroots power.”176

Their aim was to connect people online and offline. To do so they invested much effort to improve an IT system that helps them in this process. One of their most important achievement and everyday tool was Dashboard that functioned just like the user had a Field Office on his or her desktop. According to Goff, this program was a kind of online volunteer system that connected supporters both online with each other and offline with events.177 175 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed:12.11.2013] 176 Legacy Report 2012, p. 83. 177 For more information go to Chapter 4.2.5 on page 105


Important innovation was moreover the campaign’s Facebook App that proved to produce significant results in contacting supporters directly. It allowed the campaign to overlay its own voter files with the networks of its supporters and their friends. In the final weeks of the campaign, they used this information to ask supporters to get in touch with their friends who were targeted voters in key swing states via Facebook, with specific requests for everything from voting early to watching persuasion videos. This meant that for example John Smith from New York, who was an Obama supporter, signed up or liked the relative Facebook pages and in the campaign John received messages from the organization indicating to get in touch with his former school mate Jane Frank from New Hampshire and with Joe Dayton from Ohio to tell them to vote for the President.

In all, more than 600,000 supporters shared items with an estimated 5 million individual targets through this system.178 The exact number of people reached, however, is not known, due to the high traffic on the system on Election Day, so they were forced to take a significant proportion of voter activity offline to free up server space.

But we will speak about how the campaign maximized its connections and how they managed to filter beneficial connections and what role social media has played in targeting.

178 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed:12.11.2013]


4.1.10 Conclusions Whilst in 2008 the main online communication tools were

websites and emails, in 2012 social network took the floor, mainly because that is where people spend most of their non work digital time.

“In 2008 they have just sent out a mail saying check in with ur friends from swing states and tell them to vote for Obama. In 2012 they knew a lot more, so if you had a friend on Facebook who lived in Virginia than you just got a goaled message to speak with that specific person.”179 This example demonstrates how much IT have improved in the past decade and so did campaign communication due to the introduction of all these tools that we discussed earlier.

Political communication has undergone some important transformations. According to Johnson180, there are six properties that distinguished new technology from the old one:

1. The newer technologies have greatly increased the volume of information, as the online information consumption has increased to.

2. They allowed instant communication in ‘real time’ with no regard to space, and for this reason campaigns developed immediate response mechanisms.

179 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 180 Johnson [2011] p.21


3. Newer technology increased the viewer’s control of what will be received and when it will be received. Referring to Obama administration official Cass R. Sunstein, people tend to get information not from the main news sites, but from other secondary sites that filter and interpret news. This attitude makes part of the phenomenon of ‘cyberpolarization’181.

4. Increased the sender’s control of who receives the message, comments, shares that can be as beneficial as harmful. Rumor campaigns, for example, specifically violate ethics and norms of professional journalism.

5. The phenomenon of a decentralized control over the mass media. Candidates saying something that he or she would regret, candidates photographed in an awkward moment and any other registered moments, for example the 47% speech by Romney, that was videotaped can spread on the web and generate a viral response.

6. Newer technologies have allowed a much greater two-‐direction communication as it came bottom up and open-‐sourced. “This is a big transformation in how campaigns operate, and it boils down to the power of one, the feeling that one individual can make a difference.”182 Activists and even casual voters could feel a sense of sharing and participation.

In accordance with Plouffe who said “I am sure that between 12 and 16 or 16-‐20 there will be a huge progression in 181 Johnson [2011] p.24 182 Jose Antonio Vargas, “Something Just Ckicked,” Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐dyn/content/article/2008/06/09/AR2008060902826.html [Accessed:11.09.2013]


technology”183, even Teddy Goff said that new media “is the future, how businesses will use the internet and where politics go.”184 The general direction won’t change -‐ people will have more connection, more power and more access to information, to each other, to tools, and resources and companies. Interactions between users, clients or voters can influence the outcome of a company or a party to be successful or not. General opinion tends to be generated online. “This is not only a marketing challenge anymore, good advertising won’t solve the problem. [...] It is a lot easier to have a good advertising if your service is good. How to give a people the good experience: this is the questions companies have to find the answer.”185

However the diffusion and integrity of new media changes interpersonal communication and for this reason companies and parties need to understand and adapt innovative ways to lead public opinion. Therefore “external communication will continue to be a foundation of campaigns of the future to engage the existing supporter base, find people online and move them up the ladder of engagement” -‐ can we read in the Legacy Report made by Organizing for America.186

183 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 184 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012, Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013] 185 Teddy Goff, Digital Director, President Obama’s 2012, Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-‐E1UbyHnyw [Accessed: 11.12.2013] 186 Legacy Report 2012, p.86


And to end our chapter about external communication, let us sum up some milestones in the campaign’s digital communication:187

- The overall likes on Facebook increased from 19 million to 45 million over the course of the race

- The overall Twitter followers increased from 7 million to 23 million

- The picture where Obama embraces his wife which was posted and shared on Facebook on Election Night has generated the biggest online traffic in history: 4.4 million likes and 582.000 shares

- More than 358,000 offline events with approximately 1.1 million RSVPs on the internal social network, Dashboard

- More than 1 million people downloaded the campaign’s Facebook App

4.2 Internal Communication “This campaign has to be metrics-‐driven! We will measure every single thing in this campaign!”

Jim Messina Campaign Manager

(2012)

187 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed:12.11.2013]


Technology played a significant role in the 2012 campaign as a force multiplier. The Obama campaign trusted experts with high-‐level technical talent from outside politics to boost integration of product developments together with subject-‐area political expertise. “At the campaign's Chicago headquarters, a team of almost 100 data scientists, developers, engineers, analysts, and old-‐school hackers have been transforming the way politicians acquire data—and what they do with it. They're building a new kind of Chicago machine, one aimed at processing unprecedented amounts of information and leveraging it to generate money, volunteers, and, ultimately, votes.” -‐ writes Harper Reed, Chief Technology Officer on his blog.188

This way the campaign gave green lights to opportunities for real innovation, such as the use of analytics to drive electoral strategy and the creation of products like Dashboard, Narwhal, and Targeted Sharing189. The first thing the technology team focused on was to establish a platform that could host and support all of the subsequent applications. As we have mentioned previously in relation with fundraising, since 2011 the campaign’s IT team collaborated with one of their vendors, Blue State Digital190 (Blue State), to experiment

188 Harper Reed’s Blog: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/harper-‐reed-‐obama-‐campaign-‐microtargeting [Accessed: 12.12.2013] 189 Legacy Report 2012, p. 89 190 Blue State’s Website: http://www.bluestatedigital.com [Accessed: 12.11.2013]


and develop a certain background system that was able on the one hand handle exponentially increasing data-‐traffic and on the other store a specially significant amount of data.

4.2.1 Metrics-‐driven campaign “This campaign has to be metrics-‐driven! We will measure

every single thing in this campaign!” -‐ said Jim Messina in one of the campaign’s Youtube video that explains it’s strategy.191 For this reason the campaign was highly metrics-‐driven, guided by the belief that decisions should be supported by pure data and that programs should set and achieve quantifiable goals. Referring to Messina the key of success “is measuring the progress: set goals and track progress, be efficient and innovative, learn together and adapt.”192 It was not kept as a secret that the campaign had always prompt and updated figures, various statistics and they made clear since the beginning, that key concept of the campaign is measuring everything. Nevertheless public details about these data collecting and handling procedures were in short supply as the campaign guarded what it believed to be its biggest institutional advantage over Mitt Romney’s campaign: data.193

191 Jim Messina, Obama 2012 Strategy Briefing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k [Accessed: 25.05.2013] 192 Idem. 193 TIME: Inside The Secret World of Quants and Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama Win: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-‐the-‐


Among many detailed metrics, like funds raised, volunteer shifts scheduled, voter registration forms collected, voters contacted, political and constituency leaders engaged, and other digital metrics numbers were that index that have set the standards for all departments.

Some metrics were more important than others in gauging the impact of the organization, but at the end of the day, “reports focused heavily on the number of conversations volunteers had on the phone or at the doors, which helped the campaign chart whether it was achieving the contacts necessary to win votes”.194 Referring to Rayid Ghani “chief scientist” for the Chicago headquarters, the campaign worked as business: “the goal was to maximize the efficiency of supermarket sales promotions”.195

As we have previously mentioned they have used many ways to gather data from potential voters: phone banking and canvassing were the primary tools of adding or updating information stored. But they have used events, visits and surrogate visits to list all the attendees’ data gathering their tickets filled out with their information. They have used social media to increase their database, and encouraged voters on all

secret-‐world-‐of-‐quants-‐and-‐data-‐crunchers-‐who-‐helped-‐obama-‐win/ [Accessed: 04.09.2013] 194 Legacy Report 2012, p. 94 195 TIME: Inside The Secret World of Quants and Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama Win: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-‐the-‐secret-‐world-‐of-‐quants-‐and-‐data-‐crunchers-‐who-‐helped-‐obama-‐win/ [Accessed: 04.09.2013]


of their online platforms to sign up. Moreover lot of the data was given, self-‐reported.196

This database was finetuned as they had many relevant information gathered to voters. Therefore the managed not just “list names and numbers, but also ranked names in order of their persuadability, with the campaign’s most important priorities first. About 75% of the determining factors were basics like age, sex, race, neighborhood and voting record. Consumer data about voters helped round out the picture.”197 This allowed them to maximize targeting and mobilizing, as they knew where and whom they needed to contact to increase their efficiency. As Harper Reed said, “instead of targeting ads, we maximize the physical targeting. So that we know where to knock – we don’t waste the nobody’s time.”198

196 Daily Download: Obama's 2012 Digital Campaign Strategy: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0POqVcGZRU [Accessed: 07.08.2013] 197 TIME: Inside The Secret World of Quants and Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama Win: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-‐the-‐secret-‐world-‐of-‐quants-‐and-‐data-‐crunchers-‐who-‐helped-‐obama-‐win/ [Accessed: 04.09.2013] 198 Daily Download: Obama's 2012 Digital Campaign Strategy: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0POqVcGZRU [Accessed: 07.08.2013]


4.2.2 Merging systems

After the 2008 general elections, you could hear much about the Obama campaign’s digital achievements and it’s high-‐tech success, but they haven’t revealed their weak point: they had various databases that didn’t share data. They couldn’t manage to unite the information collected from pollsters, fundraisers, field workers and consumer databases as well as social-‐media and mobile contacts with the main Democratic voter files in the swing states.199 As 2012 Campaign legacy states “our data integration system solved a problem that organizations all over would love to solve: We were able to take data from all of our disparate systems and merge them, allowing more people to be better contacted.”200 In the end, this data was more reliable and more accurate than the previously built systems. This new version of the database was not only able to identify voters and contact them efficiently, but it also allowed the campaign to run tests to predict how certain kind of appeals will affect voters. “We could [predict] people who were going to give online. We could model people who were going to give through mail. We could model volunteers,” said one of the senior advisers about the predictive profiles built by the data. “In the end, modeling

199 TIME: Inside The Secret World of Quants and Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama Win: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-‐the-‐secret-‐world-‐of-‐quants-‐and-‐data-‐crunchers-‐who-‐helped-‐obama-‐win/ [Accessed: 04.09.2013] 200 Legacy Report 2012, p. 89


became something way bigger for us in ’12 than in ’08 because it made our time more efficient.”201

Moreover this united database assured viewers and supporters a facilitated access and an easier use of the system, since one of the biggest problems was solved, that all of the applications required multiple user account and passwords. “In May 2012 we let all users own a single identity, resulting in increased convenience, signups, logins and stability for the duration of the campaign.”202

As mentioned earlier the campaign focused firstly on the settlement of a united and high-‐capacity platform, in order to have a stable base to implement further programs and applications. Let us give an insight to the system called Narwhal and to two of the additional programs, Dreamcatcher and Dashboard.

4.2.3 Narwhal In 2008 the campaign knew very little about the 13 million

people who had registered for online updates. They didn’t know their age or gender or party registration. Without the ability to filter its recipients based on those criteria, the campaign stuck to safe topics for email blasts and reserved its 201 TIME: Inside The Secret World of Quants and Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama Win: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-‐the-‐secret-‐world-‐of-‐quants-‐and-‐data-‐crunchers-‐who-‐helped-‐obama-‐win/ [Accessed: 04.09.2013] 202 Legacy Report 2012, p. 89


sharp-‐edged messages for individual delivery by direct mail or phone call.203

In the 2012 campaign Obama’s team has implemented a project-‐code, named Narwhal that aimed to link with each other previously separate repositories of information, so that every detail collected about a voter was available to every department and systems of the campaign. In two words and from a pure technology standpoint, this allowed the campaign to move faster with more stability. In addition it allowed not having downtime during GOTV.204

At the beginning of the mission the priority was to connect the different systems and their stored database, that made it possible for users to use only one account instead of registering multiple times so having multiple profiles on the various platforms. This meant that if someone is a donor, an online activist, an offline voter, a volunteer at the same time, he or she wouldn’t have been registered in various lists, but would have gotten only one profile where all these information are signed. In other words the data stored in different places was merged into one system that managed to connect every relevant information with another.205 In fact at the beginning 203 Obama’s White Whale: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/02/project_narwhal_how_a_top_secret_obama_campaign_program_could_change_the_2012_race_.2.html [Accessed: 12.06.2013] 204 Legacy Report 2012 205 Obama’s White Whale: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/02/project_narwhal_how_a_top_secret_obama_campaign_program_could_change_the_2012_race_.2.html [Accessed: 12.06.2013]


“permanently linking the campaign’s various databases in real time has become one of the major projects for Obama’s team”, when finally they managed to integrate all data in one system. This system was called Narwhal. As the project was successful, it managed to merge the multiple identities of individuals into only one single, unified profile.

Moreover Narwhal allowed the campaign to identify turf-‐precisely the targeted voters offline and at the same time to target the receivers of its online communication accurately. Moreover it managed to sophisticate the message, because when it came to sensitive subjects like same-‐sex marriage or contraception, the campaign could rely on its extensive predictive models of individual voter behavior and preferences to find friendly recipients.206

More broadly, Narwhal brought new efficiency to the campaign’s operations. “No longer will canvassers be dispatched to knock on the doors of people who have already volunteered to support Obama. And if a donor has given the maximum $2,500 in permitted contributions, emails will stop hitting him up for money and start asking him to volunteer instead.”207

4.2.4 Dreamcatcher ‘Share your story’ -‐ on certain websites you could see it

written, “Tell us why you want to be involved in this campaign”.

206 Idem. 207 Idem.


But how did this exactly work and was what is used for? “How has the work President Obama has done benefited you? Why are you once again standing for change?”208 These questions and more importantly the answers given to these questions were fundamental to the campaign for many reasons. First, it made people think. They were asked to reflect on why they feel connected to the President, what they know and think of his policies. Once you attract attention and motivate voters to think and get engaged, it is more probable that they will stay on board or even be more involved. This way campaign communication made the first step to define and stabilize the voter’s dedication. This was important even in the volunteer trainings. The first question they always needed to answer was: Why are you here with us? What brought you to the campaign? Why are you volunteering for the President? This way the volunteer defined his or her primary motivations and settled devotion.

The program named ‘Dreamcatcher’ led by Rayid Ghani, was made moreover to help the campaign turn feel-‐good projects like “share your story” into a source of valuable data for sorting through the electorate. On the one hand to build the society-‐based, person-‐focused image of the campaign, on the other hand Obama’s analysts used the data to build sophisticated statistical models that allowed them to sort

208 SLATE: Project Dreamcatcher, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/01/project_dreamcatcher_how_cutting_edge_text_analytics_can_help_the_obama_campaign_determine_voters_hopes_and_fears_.html [Accessed: 11.11.2013]


voters by their relative likelihoods of supporting Obama (and of voting at all).

Lastly ‘Dreamcatcher’ was used to predict views on particular issues, and Obama’s target makers developed a few flags that predicted binary positions on discrete, sensitive topics—like whether someone was likely pro-‐choice or pro-‐life.209

4.2.5 Dashboard What is Dashboard? The best way to describe it is

probably to say that it was the campaign’s internal social network for and of supporters that made it easier for it’s users, the volunteers to organize online or offline and to contribute to the campaign's efforts in general. Like on a social media platform in general users had their own profile, which they could update and fill out with information. Actually these information were important for other users just like for the campaign itself, as they gathered more data for their database with inserting Dashboard user’s information.

Filling in your name and address, Dashboard allocated you automatically to a neighborhood and offered you many options to engage. For example you could find the closest local office and events around you, your neighborhood team or even you could sign up and become one neighborhood team member (NTM).

209 Idem.


It was an easy-‐to-‐use asset to volunteer even from your own living room and for example do some phone banking. After a short introduction and training Dashboard provided the user a list of potential voters to contact, with all of their relevant information and their phone numbers.

This application allowed users various options to get involved. It allowed you to join specific groups, not only on a geographical basis, but even on an interest-‐base. It provided information and news relevant to group’s interests, where the user has signed up. For example if me as a woman has signed up in the Women4Obama group, I would have received regularly information about policies and initiatives that concentrate on women.

There was always a ‘Fired Up’ button that directed the user to the campaign’s Youtube channel. It linked some videos that cheered the user up and gave a hyped and positive motivation to get involved or continue volunteering.

Although the Dashboard launch was later than hoped, it turned out to be a great way for volunteers to organize online. There are statistics of how users who used Dashboard were more productive and how people who normally couldn’t volunteer were able to get on board this way. Just like rural users who were far from a field office.210 Expressing it with figures, this meant that folks who signed up organized more than 358,000 offline events over the course of the campaign.



There were 1.1 million RSVPs to those events on Dashboard.211 Many tools motivated users to organize locally, for instance users could attend events, search for events nearby or organize events, invite friends and share events on their Dashboard.

In addition to organizing, it could be used for messaging. Messaging in many ways: others among themselves, group mailings or the campaign with its followers. It was used to inform people who have signed up and registered. During GOTV for example, the campaign used Dashboard to send about 3 million messages to its users.212

211 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed:12.11.2013] 212 Legacy Report 2012, p. 89


5. The last 80 days of the campaign


n this chapter we will focus on the operational functioning of the Obama campaign. We will examine how the organization was built day by day and what were voter

contacts alike. We aim to evolve a pragmatic and practical point of view that helps us to imagine and understand how all the previously explained features were realized and have worked out in the reality. Therefore I have chosen an irregular and alternative way of analysis, I will guide you through what I have experienced. I will share with you information from my perspective as a volunteer who has worked in the Obama 2012 campaign in its last 3 months.

I am certain that this technique of argumentation is irregular but I aim to give an additional sense to the average description of campaign techniques this way. To explain why each volunteer, who entered the door of a local office, no matter where he or she came from, or what he or she knew about the campaign, about Barack Obama or about campaigning in general, could become a determinative

I


component of this nationwide organization, or at least feel so. As one of my colleagues said: “Just imagine, the number of the voters you will speak in these months you work here, could be the same amount of people that decided the presidential race 4 years ago in this state. This means that you make the difference.”

5.1 Where did I come from? Sometimes when I speak about the Obama 2012 campaign

at university lectures, conferences or even with friends, one of the first questions people ask me is “But how did you get there?”. I have participated at an international youth summit in Washington DC, where reproducing the G8-‐G20 summits, youngsters from 20+ different countries came to work on a Final Communiqué. This document summarizes the more hundred participants’ observations, analysis and suggestions of current global economic issues and it was passed to relevant national and global stakeholders and decision-‐makers. Short after this conference I received the information about being a Fellow in the 2012 Obama campaign and as time frame was pushing I agreed right away. The online application form was fairly extensive, asking about main data, motivations, previous activities, asking to upload a curriculum, motivation letter and letter of reference. Among the questions they provided you the options to chose from swing states and asked for the applicant’s preference in which state he or she wants to be a Fellow. I have selected New Hampshire.


Two days later that I have submitted my application, I received an email and short after a Skype call, where I had a conversation with one of the Regional Field Organizers. Apparently my application was uploaded to a common database, where staff could list the relevant applicants. After a few days, I received my letter of acceptance, inviting me to join the Portsmouth Organizing for America Field Office for the next 80 days of the campaign till Election Day. I became a Fellow.

5.2 The first 24 hours

I arrived from Rome to Boston, then took a bus and got to

Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Staff members came to pick me up and brought me to my new home, that was by an elderly lady, Eva. She, as an Obama supporter wanted to contribute to the campaign and the President’s reelection, therefore she offered her apartment to host a fellow, me. As axiomatic this gesture for her was, so surprising for me it seemed that someone ‘donates’ a room in her apartment for a political campaign.


On my first day I was asked to join an event and help with coordinating on the spot. More than 7000 people gathered

together next to the Town Hall, in the Park. Lines were extremely long, but people patiently waited the gates to be open. You could see numerous volunteers running up and down, giving instructions, distributing water and providing assistance to organizers. Security check and more lines, when they finally opened the doors and the mass started to flow to the podium. You could see different sectors

railed off for the press, for disabled and elderly people, for VIP and for security. Lifted seats were available in the back and organizers assured that everyone receives a small bottle of water as the sun was up high and crowd was expected to wait for hours till the first speakers start.

The list of the speakers was long and everyone was waiting for the President to arrive. A disabled little girl sang the national anthem to open the ceremony. Local representatives and the Mayor gave motivational speeches, after it an Obama campaign staff member shared in her speech why she decided to join the campaign and what we, as audience can do to get the President reelected.


And Joe Biden arrived. The audience was thrilled, everyone was waving their ‘ObamaBiden’ shields that they received at the entrance and loud applauses accompanied almost every sentence of the Vice-‐President. Once he left the podium we knew that the President was arriving.

And suddenly the music got louder, crowd started to cheer loudly and Barack Obama just run down the way up to the podium waving and smiling, whilst he greeted the rampageous crowd. Whilst speaking he used his Teleprompters as usual to perform his speech, in fact he was reading out loud from the two transparent glass plates showing the written text with a leaser light. However he addressed his message to the crowd standing there in the Park of Portsmouth in a very personalized way, starting with the story of one of his first visit to this town.

The main message of the speech was fitting in the campaign’s frame completely, according and strengthening other communicational channels’ messages: what is at stake, what we are fighting for, how we will win this race and what you can do


to win this election. It was the first time, but definitely not the last one, when he repeated these two expressions: “knock on some doors, make some phone calls”.

The event closed with all speakers, the President and his surrogates standing on stage, waving to the crowd. Music was upping general mood and journalists and photographers were taking tons of pictures.

Once our star guests disappeared, people started to leave the spot. Organizers were busy with buses carrying attendees to their cars, many of them volunteered to give a lift to others. After hours of crisis management, staff arrived back to the office, so did I. This was the first time when I saw this place, the

Field Office that became my life space for the next months. At this point I couldn’t observe everything, I was jetlagged, tired and most importantly, overwhelmed by the happenings that day, my very first day.


5.3 The office

The Field Office that carried approximately 30.000 voters in Portsmouth213 and its neighborhood was located close to the city center next to a grocery store. A 120m2 space was furnitured and gave place for some tables, a big round table, a corner for computers, some other tables with many wired and wireless phones and a welcome table, with some pins and bumper stickers.

Bay, a twenty something young man was the one who has settled the OFA Office on this spot and has gathered furniture and equipment to make this empty space useful, worked for the campaign since spring, 2011. He came from Texas to Portsmouth to establish the Obama campaigns local representation. Arriving almost 20 month prior the elections turned out to be reasonable and beneficial, particularly for organization building: to get known people in town, get in touch with democratic forces and groups whit whom he could cooperate, know more about people’s habits, the city and the neighborhood. Moreover such a long presence made him to be accepted and known in town, as a consequent even the OFA Field Office became part of Portsmouth.

Ohio, Florida, Iowa, Wisconsin and Virginia were those states that were the most crowded by Obama campaign Field

213 Wikipedia, Portsmouth: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portsmouth,_New_Hampshire [Accessed: 26.08.2012]


Offices. These offices, local democratic forces and the campaign’s main online platforms encouraged people to get on board, form Neighborhood Teams and gather team members since the beginning. “Building an organization like this takes time.”214 – you can read in the Legacy Report. For this reason they started to organize staff on the ground in April 2011, so that the campaign had the time to build nearly 10,000 Neighborhood Teams with 30,000 Core Team Members and they managed to scheduled 2.2 million volunteers – 80 percent more than in 2008.215 They have worked out of 813 local field offices, more than twice as much as the Romney campaigns established in swing states.

This is what you can clearly see on the following chart.

214 Legacy Report 2012 p. 19 215 Idem. p.20


Picture 5.1: Number of Campaign Field Offices [Source: http://themonkeycage.org/2012/11/06/mapping-‐romney-‐and-‐obama-‐field-‐offices/]

The Romney campaign once understanding the importance

of local offices, in mid-‐October they have set a ‘Victory Office’, as they named it, right next to ours, but apparently they did not have enough time to become familiar with people and


neighborhood, so they couldn’t contact so many voters, persuade volunteers and maximize their local outcome.

The next two charts show what an advantage the Obama

campaign had with recognizing the importance of acting locally and with establishing Field Offices in advance. The table shows how intensive the force-‐concentration of both campaigns were in the battleground states. It was made with a special reference to the period between the 31st of August and the 25th of October.


Picture 5.2: The growth of Field Offices in Swing States [Source: http://mischiefsoffaction.blogspot.it/2012/09/the-‐asymmetric-‐ground-‐game.html]


As staff members of the campaign said: “Our organization was effective because it was led by local volunteers who knew their communities. Our supporters built an innovative grassroots organization unlike any American politics had ever seen.”216



5.4 Two days training

At the beginning of my Fellowship I was sent for a two

days training, where just like me, other 80 Fellows participated. I did not exactly know what ‘Fellow’ meant at that time, or what I will have to do, not even what the campaign’s structure and strategy were, so I was eager to understand more about everything.

First I got explained who a ‘Fellow’ was: “The Obama Organizing Fellowship is the formal name for the campaign’s national organizing internship program. It had a rigorous application process (less than 25 percent acceptance rate), comprehensive kickoff trainings, and full integration into the campaign’s work and structure. Many of the best Fellows continued as campaign staff or volunteer leaders, hitting the ground already trained, tested and ready to go.”217 So these two days were that ‘comprehensive kick off training’ that the campaign has planned for Fellows.

Training was fundamental for the campaign, they believed that well trained staff and volunteers could be an important tool to gain advantage; therefore they have created the first national training department. A national training team built a national curriculum, that they taught to training staff in battleground states who adapted those programs to meet local needs. The intention was to take over elements from various

217 Legacy Report 2012, P. 73


organizing theories and modify them to best develop the staff and volunteers.218

They have elaborated different training programs respectively to different core activities and staff roles, and used them also to recruit diverse staff members, promote an environment of excellence and learning within the campaign. Trainings were given and held regularly in the campaign, it was treated as a process. The belief behind it was that this “benefits both those being trained and those doing the training by providing a space for growth, healthy debate, exchange of ideas and solidification of campaign programs”.219

In this sense the two days were fundamental for the Fellows and for staff members too as this event was a fundamental part of the procedure trainings meant in this campaign. Staff members doing these trainings were responsible for the Fellows and their results in the next months and fellows gained the basic knowledge to know how they can support the campaign the best. Moreover these two days strengthened the devotion of every participant.

At this kick off training participants received a ‘Field Manual Book’ and were explained every important detail relevant to their future job: the campaign’s strategy, the concept of swing states, how the campaign builds its organization and what the core program is. To make these topics more comprehensible viewers were involved in the training by answering questions, doing some team building, 218 Idem. p. 71 219 Idem p.71


discussing certain topics with the person sitting next to them and simulating what has been heard. As the heart of the campaign was phone banking and canvassing, the basic rules of these activities were explained and done on this training.

Among many interesting information I would like to highlight just some details, like the power of the personal story. The first time I have heard a participant’s personal story was on my first day’s event. At this training I have understand that the reason why someone joins the campaign can be the most powerful reason to vote for the President. Therefore after analyzing the Obama campaign’s core policies we needed to figure out what our personal connection to these were. Healthcare or study loans it didn’t matter, important was only to connect a story and so engage with other voters.

The other important element was when we were practicing the ‘Hard Ask’, the momentum when the volunteer asks the voter to join the campaign and vote for the President. Not only did they simulate it and practiced it with us, but they have prepared us even for negative answers and made sure we won’t lose our enthusiasm even if we get rejected several times.

As we have mentioned the training and its useful feature were meant to be beneficial for both the participants and trainers, for now and for long term projects of Organizig for America. As Jon Carson, executive director of the Organizing for Action said: “One of our major goals is to train the next


generation of grassroots organizers to this work so that they’ll be ready to take on the fights in the future”.220

220 Jon Carson, Executive Director OFA, Outlines Next Steps:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_mvu35FrFg [Accessed: 04.08.2013]


5.5 Neighborhood Teams

Just like trainings, the organization of the campaign was

based on a certain kind of pyramidal system. If you were contacted by a volunteer and lets say you join the campaign, you get your training and preparation from that volunteer or some of the staff members the volunteer got your name. And so you receive a list of people whom you contact and after it there might be new volunteers who join because of you contacting them. This is why personal communication was fundamental and this is how the campaign was growing. “This will always be a volunteer lead organization”221. After the 2008 and 2010 experiences the campaign decided to organize in teams, as they believed that it was the most efficient, effective, rewarding, and sustainable way to organize; neighborhood teams contacted ultimately more voters in a neighborhood than volunteers working independently.222 Among many benefits of organizing in teams is that volunteers who were organized in teams spent more time volunteering than those who did not (56% of team members gave more than 10 hours to the campaign while only 40% of non-‐team members volunteered at that level in 2008).223

221 Jon Carson, Executive Director OFA, Outlines Next Steps: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_mvu35FrFg [Accessed: 04.08.2013] 222 Field Staff Manual 2012, p.31 223 Idem p. 31


31

BUILDING NEIGHBORHOOD TEAMS

You already read and learned about neighborhood teams as a core part of our strategy

and that your primary role as an Organizer is to build and support neighborhood teams

of volunteers who work together to recruit volunteers and contact voters in their turf.

But how does one organizer build a team of people who can do all that work?

Stepping Back: Why Teams Again?Our experiences in 2008 and 2010 taught us that organizing in teams is the most efficient, effective,

rewarding, and sustainable way to organize. Neighborhood teams will ultimately contact more voters in

a neighborhood than volunteers working independently. Here are some of the biggest benefits of the

team system:

-Teams contact voters, and the more teams, the more persuaded and registered voters we can talk to.

leadership and also cover every precinct in the state;

- More and more people will want to volunteer as we get closer to Early Vote and Election Day; you

cannot organize them all on your own, especially for Get-Out-The-Vote.

- Working as a team empowers people to own their work and hold each other accountable.

neighborhood team, and at the state level understanding their role within a state-wide structure;

in teams spent more time

volunteering than those

who did not (56% of team

members gave more than

10 hours to the campaign

while only 40% of non-team

members volunteered at

that level;

Picture 5.3: Volunteer Hours per Week in 2008 [Source: Field Staff Manual]

The campaign paid attention to make people join and feel

that they equally contribute to something that is a common goal of everyone. The best method of organization building and its structure was the so-‐called ‘Neighborhood Team Model’. A Neighborhood Team was a “group of individuals working together with a leader to organize a specific area.”224 Every team was lead by an NTL, a Neighborhood Team Leader who was responsible for recruiting, coaching, and leading a group of at least three Core Team Members (CTMs). CTMs filled specific roles on their team, even though the roles didn’t matter as all members of the team leadership structure worked together to organize actions and events. Each team owned all of the

224 Legacy Report 2012, p.19


volunteer recruitment and voter contacts in their turf and had a unique home in Dashboard, the campaign’s online organizing platform. Moreover all teams had specific goals to help the campaign to win on November 6—the goals for each team in a state added up to the voters they needed to register, persuade and turnout in order to win that Battleground State or help support it if not in a Battleground.225

The neighborhood team model was the most effective model because it was focused on local volunteers from the community; the campaign broke its goals down into manageable sizes and gave ownership of each piece and member of the effort to local volunteer grassroots teams.226 The next picture shows how a Neighborhood Team was set up.

225 Field Staff Manual 2012, p.33 226 Field Staff Manual 2012, p.8


Picture 5.4: Neighborhood

Team Structure [Source: Field Staff Manual]

As you can see, the main organizational principle was the so-‐called Snowflake model that was represented by the shape of a snowflake. “The leader is in the center but not the focal point or at the top of a hierarchy. Relationships among team members hold the snowflake together and ensure the team is working toward common goals in their turf.’ – writes the Field Staff Manual.227 The Manual among much useful information described some of the following relevant points of organization building:

-‐ Neighbourhood Team Leaders -‐ Core Team Members

227 Field Staff Manual 2012, p.32

33

Think about a successful team you have been a part of. Why was it successful? How are you

defining success? What made you want to stay with that team?

Think about an unsuccessful team experience. Why did that team fail?

Neighborhood Team Structure and MembershipA Neighborhood Team Leader (NTL) is responsible for recruiting, coaching, and leading a group of at

least three Core Team Members (CTMs) who fill specific roles on their team. Each team owns all of the

volunteer recruitment and voter contact in their turf and has a unique home in Dashboard, our online

organizing platform. No matter the role, all members of the team leadership structure work together to

organize actions and events. All teams have specific goals to help us to win on November 6—the goals for

each team in a state add up to the voters we need to register, persuade and turnout in order to win that

Battleground State or help support it if not in a Battleground.

Neighborhood Team Leader

CanvassCoordinator

Phone BankCoordinator

Voter Registration Coordinator

Others

ETC.

Data Coordinator

Digital Lead


-‐ Expectations of an Active Neighborhood Team -‐ Testing and Confirming Neighborhood Team

Members -‐ Neighborhood Team Building Phases and Tactics

All this information and tool has contributed to the “innovation that has been built in the last 6 years” that contributed to the building up of “the largest grass-‐root network in the history of politics”.228 5.6 The Firsts

The two main activities of volunteering were phone banking and canvassing. As the Legacy Report writes: “The campaign’s neighborhood teams allowed the organization to reach out and have persuasion conversations with millions of voters across the country. Over the course of the campaign, volunteers recorded 150 million door knocks and phone calls, a number that includes persuasion conversations but also volunteer recruitment and turnout attempts.”229

The following chart shows how the number of people involved in the campaign has increased mainly because of the numerous personal conversations made on the phone and at the doorstep.

228 Jon Carson, Executive Director OFA, Outlines Next Steps: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_mvu35FrFg [Accessed: 04.08.2013] 229 Legacy Report 2012, p.44


Picture 5.5: Exponential Increase of Personal Conversations [Source: Legacy Report 2012]

To explain these two main activities well, I will share my own experiences about the first time when I did it. 5.6.1 Phone banking First it is important that we highlight the fact that before every phone banking session volunteers received training. So did I. To support the explanation that the staff member gave me, they have landed out a paper with the description (sent from the HQ) of that specific phone call I was about to make. Some of the most important points were to introduce yourself and tell that you are a volunteer in the Obama campaign. We always aimed to speak with that specific person who was on our list. We never accepted others from the same household to state that person’s political views. If the person was not home,


or no one answered the phone we just ticked the right box on our sheet. Once speaking with the person we wanted to we jumped into the middle, in order to be efficient and don’t lose time it was suggested to get to the point with the ‘Hard Ask’ – that I already knew from my first training: “Do you already know whom you vote for?”. And here we had 5 different possibilities of answers:

• Obama • Leaning Obama • Undecided • Leaning GOP • GOP

In accordance with the answer we could proceed with different pathways.

1. If the person said he or she is a Romney voter, we thanked his/her time and said good bye.

2. If the person was an Obama voter the aim was to convince him or her to join the campaign and volunteer with us. Give an explanation and motivation how this works and try to set a specific date when the person will show up in the office.

3. If we were speaking with an undecided voter we always offered our help to answer questions, clear some doubts, explain our own story, in one word to make that person become an Obama voter.

Calls like this were not longer than 2-‐3 minutes; therefore we could speak with numerous people in a very short time. We always tried to do these phone calls in a timeframe when


people tend to stay at home, as these numbers were most of the time wired phone numbers. As we arrived into different stages of the campaign the theme and structure of these calls have changed too, but we will speak about it later. An evergreen rule was to note every answer down, because the goal was to register our results on Dashboard that on the one hand measured our efficiency and results and on the other hand it sent our data to the HQ’s database, we discussed earlier. After a couple of days of phone banking an elderly man showed up in our Field Office, called John Titus. He said he came in because a young woman from Europe has called him and asked him to join. John Titus was the first volunteer whom I have recruited!


5.6.2 Canvassing

Canvassing means door-‐to-‐door conversation that was the other main activity we were doing in the campaign. To understand more the idea of canvassing and why it is needed and how the campaign has motivated people to join I would like to quote some parts of an introductory video on Youtube, made by Jeremy Bird, Deputy National Field Director, who spoke in regard of a pledge canvass project.230 “Change has to come from us. We have to show that ordinary Americans across the country are discussing the need for bald action and demanding this new direction. […] So today we’re going out to our communities and we’re asking our neighbors to join us by signing a pledge and declare their support for President Obama’s plan. […] We want to create a powerful display of support. Neighborhoods by neighborhood, block-‐by-‐block, as proof that Americans are ready for real change on these key issues. “ Speaking with neighbors was used for recruitment and also was beneficial to grow the movement and build a nationwide

230 Jeremy Bird, Deputy national field director, Pledge Project Canvass Training Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4NKllI3AfM [Accessed: 17.08.2013]


network to support the campaign. The objective was to engage, recruit and mobilize people in turfs where the canvassers were sent. Every time before going out every volunteer received training in canvassing. Following the 9 basic steps in local canvassing told by Jeremy Bird let us sum up what a successful canvass was alike:

1. Pick your canvass location strategically Every two canvasser received a house-‐list from a turf from the local staff members to walk through. This was called door-‐to-‐door neighborhood.231 To maximize the number of doors that canvassers were able to go to they walked the same streets but one of them knocked on the houses with odd numbers, the other one with even numbers. Turfs were different as some of them were more rural or more central.

2. Approach people with a positive attitude We needed to put some stickers on our jacket or use signed clipboards as we wanted people to trust us and know from a distance that we represent the Obama campaign. Moreover the next rule was important: “Smile as you approach people. Stay positive during the conversation. To get their attention ask them if they know about Organizing for America. If someone does not want to talk to you or gets argumentative don’t worry, just move on. So stay positive and remember this is the way we

231 The other type of canvassing is the high traffic public areas canvassing.


change politics.”232 Engaging with non-‐supporters is not only wasting of a time but can be really demotivating. For this reason the campaign has always suggested leaving people who are GOP supporters.

3. Share your own personal story We have already mentioned what a useful tool a personal story can be when persuading. “Tell people why you are personally motivated to come out today. Nothing is more powerful than your story. Let them know that what’s at stake for you personally as well as for this country.”233

4. Explain people what is at stake It was necessary to underline how important this election was and why people should have participated and voted. In my case the reason that I came from oversees just to support the President was a tangible reason.

5. Make the hard ask and ask them to volunteer locally The campaign wanted people to commit and to get in their friends, neighbors, family and colleagues to sign up and volunteer. Therefore canvassers were collecting as many signatures as they could every day. So it was important to ask: “Would you sign up to support the

232 Jeremy Bird, Deputy national field director, Pledge Project Canvass Training Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4NKllI3AfM [Accessed: 17.08.2013] 233 Idem.


President?” The campaign was building local power and a strong neighborhood.

6. Let them know where to find us We had to tell them where our Office was and how to get there. We have shared even our website with them: www.barackobama.com as a resource for more information. Moreover we have spoken about the opportunities how to get involved and have left some brochures if they asked us.

7. Tally your results and enter your data As we already know entering the data had high importance as this was that made our work visible. We had to count the numbers of people contacted and make sure to enter all of our data. This data will allow the campaign to communicate with the people whom the canvassers talked that day and let them know how to stay involved with their local group.

And now let us see in detail what did inserting data mean. 5.6.3 Inserting Data Inserting data was crucial for many reasons. First because data review helped filtering voters and targeting them. Updating a centralized system with the outcomes of every conversation the campaign


underlined and supported its decision-‐making process with facts. As the Legacy Report writes: “Identifying who and how strongly a voter supports a candidate (support ID) is the most important piece of information, and is collected in every voter contact.”234 Each state created reports that tracked progress to goal, which helped drive strategic decisions. For example if the original assumption was a contact rate between 15 and 30 percent, but the data showed that the contact rate was lower than expected and so more attempts were required in order to have conversations with the necessary number of voters. Inserting data was important even because it contributed to measure our work. Staff members were asked to enter as many data as possible regarding general numbers. We had to fill out online documents that asked numbers to review weekly, daily. This allowed everyone from campaign leadership to volunteer leaders to assess their and the campaign’s effectiveness. Thirdly inserting data made it possible to establish and then track progress toward persuasion goals. “Understanding how many voters needed to be persuaded was a starting point, but it was also necessary to ask key questions like “How many contacts are necessary to persuade the right number of voters?” and “What type of questions should we ask those voters during persuasion conversations?”.235 So the system could calculate some numerical objectives that had to be reached to say that

234 Legacy Report 2012, p. 47 235 Legacy Report 2012, p. 47


the campaign is successful. Only relative numbers had comprehensive sense. 5.7 Let the community grow

As the campaign began people started to feel more connected and asked to join actively. The chart below shows the manners and their distribution of voter contact and how volunteers got involved. They had the opportunity to join through a variety of outlets.

Picture 5.6: How volunteers first got involved [Source: Legacy Report 2012]

As the Legacy Report explains: “At all points in the neighborhood team development process, volunteer recruitment was essential. This month’s new recruit could be next month’s team member, and a team leader down the road. Teams at every stage of development need members and a regular pool of


volunteers to make calls, knock doors and register voters.”236 In order to persuade as many volunteers as possible team members and staff members invented many ways to connect to voters. In my case I would highlight three events that increased voter devotion and volume. First the Local Democrats who have helped the campaign’s work and our Field Office with coordinating members in accordance with the campaign’s strategy. They have organized a Gala Dinner where all the money raised was spent afterwards on the campaign itself. They gave honours to Democrats who manifested extraordinary results and local dems maintained some interest-‐focused groups, just like the club of writers who have written articles in the local newspaper about the campaign and the President. Second once I was asked by an NTL, Sue Hubberd to help to organize a house party she planned to hold especially for women in the neighborhood. We have planned every detail from what to eat, to where to park and have invited some friends and friends of friends who wanted to know more about the campaign for a little house party. Staff members and myself have spoken why we support this campaign and why we participate; moreover we explained how the ladies can participate in the campaign. This specific house party was made primary for networking, but sometimes people in town have organized house parties for phone banking for example. Third I would like to highlight our Wednesdays’ nights, as those were the most crowded evenings in our Office. At the end of the 236 Idem. p 27


campaign period, Wednesdays were a kind of women’s day off as almost every participant of that day female was. Many of them brought food to eat; we had almost a buffet in our office. Moreover a woman, who was a masseuse, offered 15-‐20 minutes massage to every participant. This evening was the highlight of the week, not only because it was an own community but because we delivered numbers that evening as we spoke with hundreds of people on the phone and recruited numerous of them who joined the weekend or the next week. Besides these events and special features the most common way we recruited people to volunteer was when someone came in to ask some stickers, magnets or yard signs. Those who entered to get some campaign gadgets where Obama supporters but were not necessarily volunteers. We always tried to encourage them to join and help the President, as phone banking brings more votes as a yard sign. 5. 8 Debates

Political debates between the two candidates towards the end of the race are a tradition in American political history. Both parties and their representatives have the opportunity to negotiate about the rules of the debates – where it will be, who the moderator will be, what the main topics will be, if the candidates are seated or are standing, if the audience asks questions or not, if the audience sits around the two or if it is a frontal public etc. Every single detail has to be designed and


known to give an adequate training to the candidates and prepare them for every scenario.

This time we had 3 presidential and one vice-‐presidential debate. See the timetable below.

Date Location Topic First Oct

3 University of Denver, Texas

Domestic Policy

Vice-‐presidential

Oct 11

Center College in Danville, Kentucky

Foreign and domestic policy

Second Oct 16

Hofstra University in Hempstead, New York

Town meeting format including foreign and domestic policy

Third Oct 22

Lynn University in Boca Raton, Florida

Foreign Policy

Picture 5.7: Debate Calendar [Source: http://www.uspresidentialelectionnews.com/2012-‐debate-‐schedule/2012-‐presidential-‐debate-‐schedule/]

Tickets for each debate were controlled by the Commission

on Presidential Debates and were extremely limited since the debates were primarily produced for television. The majority of tickets were distributed to host university students and faculty through a lottery system.237

237 Presidential Elections, Debated: http://www.uspresidentialelectionnews.com/2012-‐debate-‐schedule/2012-‐presidential-‐debate-‐schedule [Accessed: 04.01.2013]


Each debate was broadcasted live on several television channels, like C-‐SPAN, ABC, CBS, FOX and NBC, as well as cable news channels including CNN, Fox News and MSNBC among others. These events were watched by millions of viewers and gained a high visibility and importance as Election Day was approaching.

According to Nielsen the first debate was followed by 67,5 million viewers, the second by 65,6 and the third by 59,2 million. The most watched network for the debate was NBC, with 12,4 million total viewers. Fox News, which came in third with 11,5 million, hit a record for its most-‐watched scheduled telecast ever.238

The Portsmouth Field Office and its staff have organized debate watching evenings where we have invited volunteers to join, bring something to drink and enjoy the broadcast together. I highlighted this event not only because this meant that 15-‐30 people were watching the debate from one device that meant that we indirectly uppered the statistics, but we could witness how general opinion was evolving whilst watching the debate. This echoes the phenomenon David Plouffe explained at a roundtable conference: “The other interesting thing is twitter. In just a few minutes there is a consensus evolving after events or happenings. The consensus of who is winning, who is doing well, who made a mistake, who didn’t, and that is something that has to be understood about

238 Los Angeles Times: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/23/entertainment/la-‐et-‐st-‐obama-‐romney-‐third-‐debates-‐ratings-‐20121023 [Accessed: 11.12.2012]


modern politics. If there is an event that takes an hour and a half, your people out there will not look at it holistically, but there will be a consensus that emerges right away, right within 10 minutes.”239 These observations reflect on the importance of digital platforms and their coordination that we discussed earlier.

Picture 5.8: First Presidential Debate’s Perceptions [Source: http://blog.sibylvision.com/?p=168] According to our discussion at one of our lectures at Harvard Kennedy School, Professor Steve Jarding asked students what

239 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012]


they thought about the debates. In case of the first debate, students’ opinion was echoing what we could read in the newspapers, that Obama did not perform very well. The President didn’t do any mistake but seemed to be the shadow of himself. This was firstly because Denver, where the debate was held is up in the mountains, where there is less oxygen. Governor Romney who has spent there days prior the event got used to this climate. Secondly Romney had prepared for this debate for days, not like the President, who was kept busy with work. Thirdly, as Prof. Jarding explains, the President needed to stay presidential. A debate that requires candidates to be a little bit provocative and more self-‐confident is hardly suitable to a president who needs to be neutral and calm. Moreover Romney played a surprising game with having a flexible opinion on certain issues, as Plouffe said: “We had to prepare for Romney who was fairly elastic. More elastic that we had envisioned.”240 As David Plouffe said: “There is always some turbulence in landing this plane. We were not the strongest ones in the first round. The President didn’t make any mistake but had a solid performance. In the meantime Gov. Romney is a strong debater; he rescued his primary nomination by debating, by dominating the paper forms.”241 Moreover he adds this answer to the question about his reactions after the first debate: “Well, we had to ensure we didn’t have another first debate. We had to

240 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 241 Idem.


work on it, presentation wise and message wise. And there was no opinion-‐difference on the need of improvement between the president and us.”242 Nevertheless the impression of a weak performance that you can see on the chart next page, the campaign could use it to increase the financial support. This success in fundraising approved those predictions wrong that envisioned a loss of enthusiasm after Obama’s first presidential run. OFA managed to reach out and frame general opinion, ask people their support and keep them on board. “It is also a testament to the campaign’s leadership, including Messina, who invested heavily in digital efforts early, and the campaign’s digital team, run by Teddy Goff, Marie Ewald and Blue State Digital’s Joe Rospars, who were able to fine-‐tune their tactics and techniques for raising money electronically.”243

242 Idem. 243 The TIME: Exclusive Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008: http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ [Accessed:12.11.2013]


Picture 5.9: Perceptions of the candidates before and after debate

Moreover the President and his team have gained back that they have lost in the next debates. As Plouffe said: “The race did not fundamentally change. Our support level stayed relatively constant. Romney accelerated those gains he would have gained in October. All of a sudden he gained all of them on one night. […] But the structure of the race has never really changed.”244 In the second debate with Joe Biden the Democratic Party showed a strength and professionalism that was grounded in the Vice-‐President’s experiences. Moreover the second and the third debate went much smoother even for the President, partially because of the set of the debate and the moderator that kept timeframes and issues in order. 244 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012]


In every case the campaign’s had to put an effort in bringing back the President and the campaign where it belongs as soon as possible. “We had to jump that bar that people think: “OK, he had just a night-‐off but he is back. […] But it was really challenging as in the next 2 weeks we were the team who couldn’t shoot straight and Romney had all the opportunities to take advantage and have his momentums.”245 Even thought the campaign management believed that debates were not the president’s strength they tried to prepare him to be as good as possible. As they said “We didn’t have to win that but just collect enough points. We definitely won the second debate and we really dominated the third debate. And the way voters look at these debates is really that they look at it as a package.”246 And as some critics wrote: “But he walks into the debate tonight with the upper hand in large part because he has been running the more subtle and sophisticated campaign.”247 5.9 47 % But not only the Obama campaign had its ups and downs. Even the Romney team had to finish some difficulties. One of these was the governor’s 47% gaffe, a videotape where the governor

245 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 246 Idem. 247 TIME: Obama’s Swing State Success Explained: http://swampland.time.com/2012/10/03/obamas-‐swing-‐state-‐success-‐explained/ [Accessed: 11.05.2013]


valuates the current situation and his chances in a manner he wouldn’t necessarily do in a wide public. See the text below:

“There are 47% of the people who will vote for the president no matter what. All right, there are 47% who are with him, who are dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims, who believe the government has a responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to you-‐name-‐it. That’s an entitlement. The government should give it to them. And they will vote for this president no matter what. And I mean the president starts off with 48, 49…he starts off with a huge number. These are people who pay no income tax. Forty-‐seven percent of Americans pay no income tax. So our message of low taxes doesn’t connect. So he’ll be out there talking about tax cuts for the rich. … My job is not to worry about those people. I’ll never convince them they should take personal responsibility and care for their lives. What I have to do is convince the 5–10% in the center that are independents, that are thoughtful, that look at voting one way or the other depending upon in some cases emotion, whether they like the guy or not.”248

248 The ‘47% tape’ and the man who revealed the real Mitt Romney: http://www.msnbc.com/the-‐ed-‐show/the-‐47-‐tape-‐and-‐the-‐man-‐who-‐revealed-‐the-‐r [Accessed: 12.04.2013]


Someone of the present people videotaped this speech – later it turned out that it was a waiter – and this videotape got viral in just a few hours. This happening underlines some facts we have highlighted earlier. First that technology plays an important role. This videotape some years ago would have been only an audiotape, but if it were an audiotape today it wouldn’t necessarily get into the news. But as it was videotaped it got immediately distributed, moreover people shared it and re-‐tweeted it immediately with some comments and interpretation. This tape moreover and its content put the Romney campaign into bad shape as is was a manifesto of the fundamental misunderstanding of the country Romney wanted to lead. “Because he said that those 47% are the takers of this country who don’t pay federal income taxes. So you, here in the room, who are the makers, are victimized by these 47%. But he can not do anything about it, so he can’t deal with it. But the core of the misunderstanding was, that the basic of the Republican Party was coming from that 47%.”249 – says Steven Schmidt, GOP Campaign Manager.

249 Steven Schmidt, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012]


5.10 Bill Clinton visits NH

As we have mentioned it earlier local visits of the President and his surrogates were a common way of increasing support and local enthusiasm. We had numerous visits and events in the last months in New Hampshire and one of them was the visit of Bill Clinton.

Our Field Office, as it was close the event’s place, was asked to help in coordination and voter invitation. We received the tickets for the event that looked like those that I have seen the first day. Volunteers were asked to call people that were registered as Obama supporters or Lean Obama supporters to ask them if they wanted to join the event. Occasions when people showed up for their tickets were good opportunities to involve new members who would volunteer to the campaign afterwards.

The other important detail about the tickets was the data collection. I remembered from my first time witnessing such an event, people had to fill out one part of the ticket. This time that I participated in the whole organization I understood why this important was. Staff members had to collect these sheets


controlling everyone if their information is legible. And afterwards we had to register all the data on Dashboard.

Moreover staff had to follow up with attendees, by calling them and asking for a short feedback and than asking them to volunteer. As in most of the speeches speakers have drawn attention to volunteering, phone banking and canvassing, we could refer to Bill Clinton’s words and ask them to sign up and volunteer.

5.11 Hurricane Sandy In the last weeks of the campaign a hurricane named Sandy has attacked the East Coast, exactly New York and it’s neighborhood. Even though people were more or less prepared for this natural disaster Sandy caused much trouble to that area. Let us analyze Sandy from our campaign point of view. Nevertheless the Obama administration paused their campaign for the first couple of days after the hurricane’s attack, many think the Obama campaign would have lost without such an unpredicted event. Another controversial fact was GOP governor Chriestie’s embrace of President Obama in New Jersey. On the other hand Democrats say, that governor Chriestie’s embrace after Hurricane Sandy was a noble thing but did not play a role in the outcome of this election. People haven’t


switched their views in those closing days. 250 As Plouffe said: “We had the best data that any campaign has ever had in American political history. The race did not change pre-‐Sandy or post-‐Sandy. […] There was a set of voters who had yet to make a decision and they’ve allocated it the way we thought they will allocate it, and Sandy was not a driver of it.”251 Even though this happening dominated the news appropriately for two or three days, so the Romney campaign had a hard time punching through that. So this could have been a tactical concern for the Obama campaign, but here the problem is that a Democratic president and a Republican governor working together is news. Referring to Schmidt, GOP Campaign Manager answering the same question as Plouffe: ”The tendency is to say that the election was determined by the last thing that happened as opposed to the accumulation of things that happened over a two-‐year period. […] It wasn’t Sandy but because of the accumulation of events and the demographic issues we talked about earlier.”252 5.12 Evolution of the message Now that we know the background and some details about organization building and how the structure was settled for the

250David Plouffe, Election Aftermath: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY [Accessed: 14.11.2012] 251 Idem. 252 Idem.


campaign’s operation, we can jump into the subject of what volunteers have communicated. What do I mean with this point? We have seen that Field Offices were set up in the critical states to represent the campaign and to involve locals and coordinate them to achieve the common goals set by the headquarters. The management based its decision-‐making process on the information volunteers delivered and staff reported. They managed to adjust the main message of communication to these information moreover they sophisticated their targeting by knowing more about local responses to the campaign’s reach out. As we know the goal was to increase the number of voters who would vote for the President. This was possible by persuasion, by voter extension and finding new voters. As time has passed and we were approaching Election Day the core message changed too. It went through an evolution from information gathering, to mobilizing, early voting, voter registration and at the very end voter turn out. But now let us see what the most important milestones were till November the 6th, to draw the frames of this content evolution. The Legacy Report has divided happenings into 5 Phases.253 Phase 1: 2011 (April to December): 2011 marked the first phase of the campaign. They have launched the campaign and worked to re-‐engage past volunteer leaders and recruit new volunteers, both online and offline. They set up infrastructure, figured out processes, and began setting strategic priorities. The summer organizer program, house parties, one-‐on-‐one 253 Legacy Report 2012, pp.13-‐16


conversations and planning sessions were effective tools for building the organization. Phase 2: Capacity and Team Building (January onward): As the calendar turned to 2012, the campaign transitioned to hiring and training the first large wave of staff, writing plans and opening offices. The core goals were recruiting volunteer leaders and building the organization. This phase overlapped with all other phases until the end of the campaign because organization building never stopped until GOTV, and organization building couldn’t be separated from voter contact and other action used to test and expand the organization. Phase 3: Increased Conversations with Voters (Mid-‐March to August): As the Republican Primaries ramped up, the campaign increased persuasion to undecided voters, continued to register unregistered voters and began to mobilize supporters to vote. The Republican Primaries increased enthusiasm and provided opportunities to train volunteers and test the turnout operation both online and offline. During this phase, President Obama and other principals and surrogates began holding campaign rallies, which increased a sense of urgency. The communications and media teams effectively defined Romney during this time and helped amplify the President’s forward-‐looking message for middle-‐class prosperity and security. Phase 4: Post-‐Convention (September to October): The campaign went into high gear as people tuned in more to the election following the Convention. The campaign increased registration before deadlines, organized around debates, turned out supporters for Early Vote and prepped for GOTV.


This is the phase of the campaign where specifically branded Days of Action were not as important, because every weekend was a Day of Action. The timeline in detail in this 4th phase went the following:

• September 4-‐6 – The Democratic National Convention in Charlotte

• September 8, 2012 – Voter registration drives: Thousands of volunteers organized across the country to get voters registered ahead of deadlines.

• September 10, 2012 – Supporters close the fundraising gap: The campaign announced that grassroots supporters helped close the fundraising gap with Romney and Republicans in August —the first time since April.

• September 27, 2012 – Early Vote: Early Vote begins in Iowa and would later begin in many other states. Volunteers managed a comprehensive early vote program to encourage supporters to take advantage of the convenience of voting early.

• October 3, 2012 – First Presidential Debate. President Obama and Mitt Romney faced off in the first Presidential debate.

• October 11, 2012 – Vice Presidential Debate: Vice President Biden and Paul Ryan faced off in the Vice Presidential debate.

• October 16, 2012 – Second Presidential Debate: President Obama and Mitt Romney faced off in a town hall meeting with voters to debate foreign and domestic


policy. • October 22, 2012 – Final Presidential debate: President

Obama and Mitt Romney faced off in the final presidential debate, on foreign policy.

Phase 5: Early Vote and Get Out The Vote (October to November). As this is an important phase that brings many innovations to the structure and communication we will dedicate an internal chapter to the GOTV mission. In accordance with this broad timeline drawn above, I would like to refer to the Chapter 2.4.4. Core Program that has explained the main activities the campaign has evolved: Persuasion, Registration and Turn out. According to this the campaign communication has changed in these months that we will examine in the following chapters. 5.12.1 Voter registration

Voter registration was a core part of the campaign’s strategy in almost every state. Leadership looked at polling, assessed current trends in the electorate, and understood the necessity of expanding the electorate. The Obama campaign then worked for months to expand the electorate by collecting voter registration forms. Running an effective voter registration program was possible only with the correct planning, organizational capacity and creative tactics.254



The campaign proved to be right on the issue of the necessity of expanding the electorate. They registered 1.8 million voters on the ground so these voter registration numbers outpaced 2008 and exceeded the margin of victory in three key states.

Picture 5.10: Voter Registration and Margins [Source: Legacy Report 2012] First it was crucial to set voter registration goals for key demographic groups – like Latinos, Women and African Americans. Second the campaign has used various voter registration tactics to gain as many new supporters as possible. Tactics were255:

• Voter Registration in High Traffic Locations • Events and Days of Action • Relationship Building • Youth Registration • GottaRegister

255 Idem.p, 39

35

VOTER REGISTRATION

Voter registration was a core part of the campaign’s strategy in almost every state.

Leadership looked at polling, assessed current trends in the electorate, and understood

the necessity of expanding the electorate. The Obama campaign then worked for

months to expand the electorate by collecting voter registration forms. Running an

effective voter registration program was possible only with the correct planning,

organizational capacity and creative tactics.

The campaign registered 1.8 million voters on the ground, not including every voter

who downloaded a form online. The campaign’s voter registration numbers outpaced

2008 and exceeded the margin of victory in three key states.

“A team member told the story of how he got a man of almost 75 years of age to register to vote for the first time. The man’s wife said she had been trying for years to get him to register. These are the stories that

keep you motivated to go the next mile to get the President re-elected.”

-MARGARETTA, NEIGHBORHOOD TEAM LEADER IN PENNSYLVANIA

State Registration Forms Collected by OFA

Obama Margin of Victory

Florida 361,176 74,309

Colorado 156,860 137,948

Nevada 95,973 67,806


• Voter Registration Auditing.

As an example let me explain you how the project Women4Obama worked in New Hampshire in the last couple of months. Statistics showed that in New Hampshire women might be that demographic group that has to be persuaded and registered with a special attention. Hence I was chosen to coordinate this project two female staff members of the state’s headquarters came to our field office and gave me a training on how to realize the project and achieve the designed numbers.

I have invited women supporters and female volunteers for a short workshop and have explained the program. They have contributed in sharing characteristics that describe the area. We had to find crowded places where mainly female voters pass. With the help of our local women, we picked some frequented places in the neighborhood and went out in pairs to engage with women and ask them if they needed any information about registration. So we gave out some literature to women who were interested and involved some of them in the campaign to come and volunteer with us. 5.12.2 Persuasion The second way the campaign generated votes was by persuading undecided voters to support President Obama. As with voter registration, persuasion was a priority for the entire campaign that we could even see previously.


Finding the right messengers to deliver this persuasion message was critical. Ensuring that even national issues are presented in the language of the individual’s own backyard was important. The bottom line was simple: the more familiar and local the messenger is to the voter, the better the results.256 This is why the campaign emphasized the set up of local field offices where staff members managed to dialogue directly with local democrats who supported their work. In this sense staff’s role was to be the messenger between local communities and the campaign’s decision makers. To report data gathered from volunteers to the HQ and to give clear indications to the volunteers received from the HQ. It was important to direct local volunteers to the right voters and focus their efforts in the right places. The task of the headquarters was to define precisely whom they should have contacted. This is what phone banking and canvassing were used for. 5.12.3 Turn out -‐ GOTV Till GOTV period the campaign aimed to multiply the number of volunteers helping out in recruitment. But in the last 3 weeks of a time I would rather say that the field offices multiplied themselves to be able to get in touch with as many vote as possible. In other words the system got multiplied not only participants. 256 Legacy Report 2012, p 45


This GOTV period marked the final phase of the campaign. The key goals were to fill all GOTV and Election Day shifts and to provide supporters with information on where, when and how to vote. The campaign continued to drive Early Vote turnout and chase outstanding absentee ballots, where applicable. Volunteers conducted at least two dry runs from staging locations to prepare. Finally, volunteers motivated supporters to vote, promoted citizens’ voting rights, and conducted Election Day and Election Night reporting until the final vote was counted.257 In the last couple of weeks staff members were looking for talented and dedicated volunteers who might lead hubs for the GOTV project. Every Field Office worked on setting up various staging locations to get in touch with local people especially because their task was to “organize themselves out of the job”. Nearly 20,000 living rooms, garages, and other locations all across the country transformed into Election Day hubs, known as “staging locations.” These Election Day hubs deployed trained volunteers out in their own neighborhoods to knock on doors and to ensure that every last supporter has voted for President Obama and other Democrats at the correct polling places.258

257 Legacy Report 2012, p. 58 258 Field Staff Manual 2012, p.8


It is important to underline that those local Election Day hubs were not managed by staff, but by trained and tested local community leaders. Staff has spent weeks and sometimes months (even years) recruiting, getting to know, and signing up volunteers who were able to manage an upcoming flow of local volunteers. 259 Every staging location had a Director that coordinated the volunteers showing up. We had a Canvass Captain that explained how to do the canvass and depending on how big and frequented that staging location was many volunteers helped in coordination. We as staff have always prepared the folders of

turfs the canvassers had to walk through and staging directors confirmed people why have signed up to join us on time. We had 3-‐4 shifts per day on these GOTV weekends, in each shift 20-‐30 people went out to know on some 30-‐40 doors per person. Many of them have arrived even from surrogate states, like at my staging location in Rye I had many canvassers

259 Idem. p,9


coming from Massachusetts to help us out locally. The lists of voters they had to turn out to vote have been worked through and cultivated for months prior to Election Day, so that volunteers spent their valuable time talking only to people who support President Obama and other Democrats. They helped before Election Day too, having conversations with undecided voters, helping to register local people to vote, and encouraging as many of the supporters as possible to participate in Early Voting opportunities. Our main message in these canvassing and on our literature was where to go to vote and when and what it is required to vote, and last but not least, we asked everyone to not to forget to vote. GOTV made it possible to have approximately 85.000 phone calls and knock on 86.000 doors on November the 3rd, Saturday in New Hampshire, a state with 1.200.000 citizens.260 5.13 Election Day

The election is always

held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November. On the morning of November 6th, polling booths opened in all 50 states and in

260 State directorate told us on a conference call that night.


Washington DC and around 100 million votes were expected to be cast. Counting began immediately and when voting finished in the evening we got our first glimpse of the exit polls, surveys carried out throughout the day that gave an idea of who won. But what did the thousands of campaign staff and volunteers do this day?

We were doing several different type of activities contemporary: some of the volunteers offered their cars and driving services to the campaign, where a staff member in the field office focused on this issue and coordinated in the last couple of weeks the needs and the offers.

Our staging location was running really intensively that day, shifts were full and people were coming continuously. Everyone got his or her turf to go through. There was just one question: Did you already vote? If the question was yes, canvassers scored out that name and so the list got shorter. The goal was to get to every Obama supporter on our list and remind them to vote.

Some of the volunteers were giving their support at the locations where people went to vote – usually at schools, sport halls or town halls. They were cheering people who arrived and baring in their minds the names they had to vote for by holding boards.


Around 6-‐7PM when the turfs were walked through 4 times, when our staging location was closing just like the polls, we went back to the Office with some others to watch together the broadcasts about the results. One by one we were excitedly watching the outcomes of each states. Exit polls were each time squeezing our stomach.

And around 11PM on the East Coast even tough we didn’t know the result of all states (Florida was missing), it became clear that one side has prevailed. The losing candidate called the winner to concede. Both men gave a speech: Obama claimed victory and after a while Romney admitted defeat. The process is simple: once a candidate gets a majority of members from across the states, the election is almost over in the public's mind. In fact the Electoral College members do formally meet and vote for the president. College members are not legally bound to vote for the winning candidate or according to their party allegiance, but instances when they have not are rare.261 Electoral college votes are formally counted in front of Congress the following January that is followed by the inauguration ceremony. Nevertheless the final results were clear and quick, “there is always the possibility -‐ as happened in 2000 -‐ that at the end of Election Day we may still not know who's won. The result could either be too close to call without counting every vote or else legal battles over election procedures may delay the result or force a recount. It could even be a tie, with both candidates stuck 261 Federal Register: http://www.archives.gov/federal-‐register/electoral-‐college/about.html [Accessed: 09.04.2013]


at 269, in which case the House of Representatives would vote choose the next president.”262 As well as voting for president, Americans were also electing all 435 members of Congress's lower house, the House of Representatives, and one-‐third of the Senate. Plus, they were voting for a medley of local and state officials. We were really happy and glad at the end of the day and overwhelmed and exhausted at the same time. We made history.

262 BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/americas/04/us_election/election_process/html/rules.stm [Accessed: 12.12.2012]


6. Results and Reflections


“You have to understand changing American electorate to understand presidential elections. But you better not overlearn the lessons of passed elections, because the country and the battleground changes so rapidly.”

David Plouffe Former Campaign Manager

(2012)

lthough I agree with David Plouffe, who said that “it takes a long time to reflect on an election”263, it is useful to have a review on the results trying to find the whys

to them.

263 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DBV9BkdfZiPY&app=desktop (Accessed: October 9, 2013)

A


As many analysts say, demographic aspect was quiet important as it has contributed to the definition of the outcome, and we need to take it in consideration as the country is changing and it is changing rapidly. But that is, I think, not the core reason why the President won the election. “But as the American people are taking presidential election seriously, they are focusing on the direction the president would take a lead in economical questions, on foreign issues, on social questions. And voters are always thinking about the future, so the next 4 years.”264 This is why it was important to make people understand and believe that the President would be capable to lead the country, more capable than the his opponent. This is why the early negative campaign so helpful was. The country is evenly divided and historically the elections were always incredibly close. Even though they say that the victory in 2008 results were an exception, 47% of the country was voting against Obama that time around too. In other words it was not a clear path to win in 2008 neither in 2012. Moreover given the economy, given the divisions in the country, closer elections were predicted. But that being said Obama and his campaign have still won their electoral collage, maybe not with a landslide but with a clear majority. Their popular vote margin approached 3%, which was a healthy margin.265

264 Idem. 265 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DBV9BkdfZiPY&app=desktop (Accessed: October 9, 2013)


As Plouffe has predicted in 2008, the electorate became more diverse, more moderate and lot more younger. This meant many changes and challenges that the campaign had to face and both parties had to work hard to take advantage on these demographic characteristics. But critics say, that Republican analysis was rather based on wishful thinking instead of realistic data, not like the Democratic party’s campaigning. Predictions moreover showed some specific groups of the society that got more significant and decisive, like the electorate that consists more of young people and the Latino group that increased visibly. 266 Plouffe’s philosophy was common for the whole Obama campaign: “You have to understand changing American electorate to understand presidential elections. But you better not overlearn the lessons of passed elections, because the country and the battleground changes so rapidly.”267 This is why they collected an never-‐ending amount of data and have updated their database continuously to have a confident, credible and realistic decision-‐making process. In every sense we shouldn’t forget the fact, that elections are decided only by a small percentage of the electorate, the undecided voters. This makes elections a little bit rigid and more unpredictable. As Plouffe said: “Our research in Florida, in Virginia, Colorado and New Hampshire, stayed pretty constant because this election was very rigid for a very-‐very long time. There were very few undecided voters at a play. Romney dropped 266 Idem. 267 Idem.


in September, because they didn’t have a great convention, because the 47%, but it was an unnatural drop. He gained all that back pretty quickly after the first debate, so once he did that there was very few voters at play in reality. In states like Ohio and Colorado there were 3 or 4 percent of the electorate that were in play during the final week.”268 And so after months of campaigning only Indiana and North Carolina went to red from blue and swing states decided the elections. See tables below that show outcomes in states that were in the game, the so-‐called battleground states.

Picture 6.1: Results in swing states



Picture 6.2: Expections and Real Outcomes


6.1 Demographics Demographics have decided the elections. It was fundamental to analyze and know the electorate and recognize changes in its composition as it brought new characteristics and made campaigns and parties face new challenges. Both, the Democratic and the Republican parties have invested in voter-‐analysis as this framed their messages. But which were these social groups and whom did the two parties approach them? First young voters. Young voters actually exceeded the turn out of the four years, to the surprise of most analysts. The Obama campaign emphasized the engagement with young voters through college activities that involved only university students. Here the policy about student loans of the Obama administration was a crucial key issue. Numerous young staff members worked in the campaign that could connect to young voters. And many messages and ads were produced specifically for young voters and first time voters. Second the African-‐Americans. In spite of Obama not being a completely new phenomenon as a black nominee like in 2008, and the fact that the excitement of having the first African-‐American president was 4 years ago, the African-‐American determination was still visible. 269



Third, women. Women are an interesting social group as this subgroup is not homogeneous, but profoundly heterogenic. The Obama campaign has invested significantly in women with registering them, addressing them and creating departments focusing only on them (such the Women4Obama group in our Field Office). Women were an important target for the campaign. For this reason Scarlett Johansson was asked to speak at the Democratic Convention – as we have seen it earlier. Even Republicans were speaking to women in their campaign, but not necessarily to the same group. As Andrew Coyne said, Republicans were appealing mainly to married and white women, as GOP were speaking only to them.270 Bill Schneider raised even an additional aspect, economics. “Women feel, because they are, economically vulnerable on the marketplace. The difference between married and unmarried women is the economical safety.” But than he continues: “The essential difference between the two parties is, that the Republican Party thinks that economical growth is sufficient: if you get the economy growing people will take care of themselves. Democrats believe economic growing is necessary, but is not sufficient, there will be still people out there who’re vulnerable, who are discriminated against for, disadvantaged, and for them you have to protect the safety net. As long as republicans threat the safety

270 Andrew Coyne, 2012 US election reaction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F66S33fpDd8 [Accessed: 12.06.2013]


net, that Paul Ryan does directly, they won’t appeal to women.”271 And lastly fifth, the Latino voters. Latino voters are the fastest growing demographic group, more Latino votes were casts in 2012 (71,27%) then in 2008 (67,31%).272 Despite the growth of their participation, Dems did better as they even won the Cuban vote for the first time in history in Florida. But Hispanic voters are “willing to give their votes to the Republican party they just have to figure out the path forward”.273 “Who is left?” answers the question Bill Schneider: “Older white men.” “GOP is the party of white old man and nevertheless Obama lost many votes on this group, he managed to put together a coalition including a lot of women, especially unmarried working women, young people, racial minorities, foreign-‐born citizens. They came out to protect their victory of 2008.” 274 The democrats were targeting so many social groups – Hispanic, Latinos, married women, feminist women etc. – that republicans didn’t have enough space and social groups to convince to win the presidential election. According to Steven Schmidt, GOP campaign manager “how do we reassemble a coalition of voters in a changing country to get a majority of the vote – and this is

271 Bill Schneider, Idem. 272 2012 US election reaction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F66S33fpDd8 [Accessed: 12.06.2013] 273 Idem. 274 Idem.


what David and the Obama campaign has understood so brilliantly”. 275 “This was a victory of a so called NEW AMERICA, because the demographics of the United States are changing.”276 6.2 Why did Republicans not win? As Steve Schmidt, the GOP campaign manager once said, the “GOP has a demographic problem. Has a message problem. Has a policy problem. And in the execution of the campaign it has a technology problem.”277 Even if we are not so strict to the GOP, we might try to discover like many other analysts, why the Republican Party has lost this election. First of all it is important to stick to the disadvantage they had due to their primaries and the relatively late start in campaigning. They were late in many senses. First they started late to build out their technological background. We could see how important technology and database systems were in the Obama campaign. But we have seen it too, that it took more than a year to set it up, in addition

275 Steven Schmidt, Election Aftermath, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DBV9BkdfZiPY&app=desktop (Accessed: October 9, 2013) 276 2012 US election reaction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F66S33fpDd8 [Accessed: 12.06.2013] 277 David Plouffe, Election Aftermath, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DBV9BkdfZiPY&app=desktop (Accessed: October 9, 2013)


to their know how brought from 2008. The Romney campaign on the other hand just started to set the system up once the campaign has started. “The Obama campaign in 2012 was 10 light-‐years ahead from a technology perspective in being able to identify voters, target voters, turn out voters.”278 Second they were late in building up an image. The GOP has left the Obama campaign to define their position and didn’t let them a chance to design their own image. “The GOP should have shown a reasonable image and an appealing face instead of listing “yahoos” – moderate is not so much about your policies but its more the future temperamenting your tone. Even if you put through radical policies but you have to seem a reasonable and thoughtful person.”279 Given the shadow of the negative ads broadcasted by the OFA campaign at the beginning, Romney couldn’t manage to brake out his cage. Moreover as analysts say that Romney had difficulties with finding he consensus with the Republican Party, to represent a moderate point of view without losing the further right votes. Just as Professor Clifford Orwen said: “The thing is that Romney was a moderate only by republican standards, but he had to move for the further right to get the republican nomination. And so the democrats have defined him as a candidate from the far right and he could never escape from the imputation.”280

278 Steven Schmidt, Idem. 279 Bill Schneider, 2012 US election reaction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F66S33fpDd8 [Accessed: 12.06.2013] 280 Clifford Orwen, Idem.


The party did not identify well what their electors needed and/or did not manage to communicate out clearly, partially because the Democratic opposition, partially because of the late start and partially because of weak candidates. As Andrew Coyne, Columnist in Post Media News once said: “Obama didn’t run in his platform but ran against republicans. Mapped the differences between republicans and democrats and called his folks to come out.”281 And so in the meantime it was true “It was not that much an Obama victory but a republican loss.” 282 First, because “Republicans have lost senator seats in a lot of places where they really should have won and that indicates a real basic weakness in the Republican party.” Second because “It was a loss of an election they should have won on a presidential level. And on the state level of the senate races in Missouri and Indiana they lost because of extremely weak candidates.”283 Last but not least referring to the demographic aspect of the elections, as we have seen earlier “GOP’s base is democratic and it is not as if the republican party is wildly divergent from its base in the opinions and policies that promotes, is that the base seems to be an insufficient basis for forming a winning presidential electoral coalition.”284

281 Andrew Coyne, 2012 US election reaction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F66S33fpDd8 [Accessed: 12.06.2013] 282 Andrew Coyne, 2012 US election reaction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F66S33fpDd8 [Accessed: 12.06.2013] 283 Clifford Orwen, Idem. 284 Idem.


6.3 Reflections

According to David Plouffe: “Our campaign has changed from 08 to 12 in so many fundamental ways” and yes it did. The Obama campaign in 2012 has again opened new ways to 21st century campaigning. They not only increased proficiency and punctuality in voter identification and targeting, they managed to increase voter connection and reach out. Based on their digital background campaign management had a confident and reality-‐based decision-‐making process knowing promptly their battleground. Volunteering was well-‐organized and well-‐coordinated, multilevel and contained numerous activities. It made possible thousands of voters to contribute to the campaign with engaging with multiple other voters persuading undecided electorate. The campaign could focus their efforts in turfs that required support. Personal connection not only increased Obama supporting electorate, but voting willingness, volunteering and donating.

Even though they managed to design coherent image, they addressed to each social subgroup a personalized and individualized message that was complementary to the big picture.

The Obama campaign was well planned and well-‐executed that fitted perfectly in that specific historical background and added a new milestone to the political history of the United States of America.


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Obama fundraiser at George Clooney's home nets $15 million, CNN Politics online [ May 11, 2012] http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/11/politics/california-‐obama-‐fundraiser/ (Accessed: January 12, 2013) The CNN: California as Obama Fundraiser. http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/11/politics/california-‐obama-‐fundraiser/ [Accessed: 09.10.2013] Third Presidential Debate, CNN Politics – Elections Center [October 22, 2012] http://edition.cnn.com/election/2012/debates/third-‐presidential-‐debate (Accessed: April 4, 2013) CNN: Election 2012 Calculator: http://edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2012/ecalculator#?battleground [Accessed: 22.11.2012] CNN News: http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/showbiz/2012/11/07/the-‐buzz-‐today.hln&iref=videosearch&video_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2Fsearch%2F%3Fquery%3Dobama%25202012%2520victory%26primaryType%3Dvideo%26sortBy%3Ddate%26intl%3Dfalse [Accessed: 12.06.2013] Huffington Huffington Politics: http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/2012/results


Huffington Post, Pace, Julie: Obama 2012: President Wins The Way His Campaign Predicted [August 11, 2012] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/08/obama-‐2012-‐campaign_n_2092452.html (Accessed: March 1, 2013) The Huffington Post: Anna Wintour. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/anna-‐wintour-‐obama-‐fundraiser/ [Accessed: 11.11.2013] Info Please InfoPlease.com, Barack Obama: Campaign Issues http://www.infoplease.com/us/government/presidential-‐campaign-‐2012-‐obama-‐issues.html (Accessed: October 20, 2013) Issues of the Obama campaign: http://www.infoplease.com/us/government/presidential-‐campaign-‐2012-‐obama-‐issues.html [Accessed: 20.11.2012] Information Please: http://www.infoplease.com/us/government/presidential-‐campaign-‐2008-‐barack-‐obama.html [Accessed: 11.10.2012] Information Please: http://www.infoplease.com/us/government/presidential-campaign-2012-obama-issues.html [Accessed:15.10.2012] Information Please: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0930136.html [Accessed: 03.08.2013 InfoPlease.com Barack Hussein Obama, Jr.


http://www.infoplease.com/us/government/presidential-‐campaign-‐2008-‐barack-‐obama.html (Accessed: April 13, 2013) New York Times Back to Work: Obama Greeted by Looming Fiscal Crisis, The New York Times. [November 8, 2012] http://image2.magazine3k.com/data_images/2012/11/08/1352371124.jpeg (Accessed: December 12, 2012) How Obama Won Re-‐election, The New York Times online. [November 7, 2012] http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/11/07/us/politics/obamas-‐diverse-‐base-‐of-‐support.html?_r=0 (Accessed: November 11, 2012) Lizza, Ryan: Obama’s swing Voters, The New Yorker online [February 6, 2012]: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/02/obamas-‐swing-‐voters.html (Accessed: March 9, 2013) Presidential Elections’ Results http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results/mobile/president (Accessed: December 2, 2012) President Exit Polls, The New York Times online. http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results/president/exit-‐polls President Map, The New York Times online. http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results/president


NY Times: Electoral Map; http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/ratings/electoral-‐map [Accessed: 28.03.2013] Silver, Nate: Swing Voters and Elastic States, FiveThityEight Blog , The New York Times online. [May 21, 2012] http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/swing-‐voters-‐and-‐elastic-‐states/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 (Accessed: Mai 23, 2012) The 2012 Money Race: Compare the Candidates, The New York Times online http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-‐finance (Accessed: October 9, 2013) The New York Times: Paths to the White House, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/11/02/us/politics/paths-‐to-‐the-‐white-‐house.html?_r=1& [Accessed: 22.07.2013] Politico Politico: http://www.politico.com/2012-‐election/ Plenty of Pitballs for Obama and Romney: http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/politico-‐ebook-‐plenty-‐of-‐2012-‐pitfalls-‐for-‐obama-‐and-‐romney-‐85152.html Barack Obama, Mitt Romney both topped $1 billion in 2012, Politico [ July 7, 2013]


http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/barack-‐obama-‐mitt-‐romney-‐both-‐topped-‐1-‐billion-‐in-‐2012-‐84737.html (Accessed: September 2, 2013) Real Clear Politics: Romney vs Obama -‐ California: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/ca/california_romney_vs_obama-‐2009.html [Accessed: 14.04.2013]

Real Clear Politics – New York: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/ny/new_york_romney_vs_obama-‐2868.html [Accessed: 14.04.2013] Real Clear Politics – Arkansas: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/ar/arkansas_romney_vs_obama-‐2918.html [Accessed: 14.04.2013] Real Clear Politics – Texas: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/tx/texas_romney_vs_obama-‐1945.html [Accessed: 14.04.2013] BarackObamadotCom – Youtube Carson, Jon, Executive Director of Organizing for Action, outlines next steps for the grassroots organization, BarackObamadotcom -‐ YouTube [January 19, 2013] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_mvu35FrFg&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D4_mvu35FrFg&app=desktop (Accessed: July 14, 2013) Forward, BarackObamadotcom -‐ YouTube [April 30, 2012] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1WbQe-‐wVK9E&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D1WbQe-‐wVK9E&app=desktop (Accessed: February 17, 2013)


Pledge Project Canvass Training Video, BarackObamadotcom -‐ YouTube [ March 11, 2009] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4NKllI3AfM&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Db4NKllI3AfM&app=desktop (Accessed: May 26, 2013) The Road We've Traveled, BarackObamadotcom -‐ YouTube [March 15, 2013] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2POembdArVo&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D2POembdArVo&app=desktop (Accessed: April 9, 2012) ObamaBiden Inside the Cave: An In-‐Depth Look at the Digital, Technology, and Analytics Operations, Obama for America (ObamaBiden) http://enga.ge/download/Inside%20the%20Cave.pdf (Accessed: March 4, 2013) 2012 Obama Campaign Legacy Report, Obama for America (ObamaBiden) http://secure.assets.bostatic.com/frontend/projects/legacy/legacy-‐report.pdf (Accessed: December 28, 2013) Key People-‐President Barack Obama, Obama for America http://www.p2012.org/candidates/obamaorg.html Youtube


Daily Download: Obama's 2012 Digital Campaign Strategy: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0POqVcGZRU [Accessed: 07.08.2013] David Plouffe and Steve Schmidt, Election Aftermath, UnivDelaware -‐ YouTube [ November 19, 2012]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BV9BkdfZiPY&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DBV9BkdfZiPY&app=desktop (Accessed: October 9, 2013) Election 2012: Aftermath and Aftershocks, FRCAction -‐ YouTube [ November 8, 2012] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rxz8f6yk-‐Q8&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DRxz8f6yk-‐Q8&app=desktop (Accessed: February 13, 2013) Jeremy Bird, Deputy national field director, Pledge Project Canvass Training Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4NKllI3AfM [Accessed: 17.08.2013] Jim Messina, Obama 2012 Strategy Briefing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k [Accessed: 25.05.2013] Jim Messina: Paths to 270 Electoral Votes: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7Y-Q9ZY5Ao [Accessed: 10.11.2012] Jim Messina: April Fundraising and Path to 270: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTKPNaEgTXo [Accessed: 10.08.2013]


Jim Messina: Obama 2012 Strategy: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH0fiMGvW2k [Accessed: 12.03.2013] Jon Carson, Executive Director OFA, Outlines Next Steps: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_mvu35FrFg [Accessed: 04.08.2013] Teddy Goff, Digital Director, Presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwWHOMJlYkI [Accessed: 17.10.2013] The Wall Street Journal online The Wall Street Journal online, National, Romney vs. Obama [Last updated: November 8, 2012] http://projects.wsj.com/campaign2012/mobile/polls#cand=Romney&race=5&region=US&src=rcpo (Accessed: June 29, 2013) The Wall Street Journal online, Rappaport, Liz and Mullins, Brody: Goldman Turns Tables on Obama Campaign [October 10, 2012] http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444752504578024661927487192 (Accessed: January 23, 2013) The Washington Post Jose Antonio Vargas, “Something Just Ckicked,” Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐dyn/content/article/2008/06/09/AR2008060902826.html [Accessed:11.09.2013]


The Washington Post online, Balz, Dan: How the Obama campaign won the race for voter data. [July 28, 2013] http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-‐the-‐obama-‐campaign-‐won-‐the-‐race-‐for-‐voter-‐data/2013/07/28/ad32c7b4-‐ee4e-‐11e2-‐a1f9-‐ea873b7e0424_story.html (Accessed: August 23, 2013) The Washington Post online. Eggen,Dan: Obama fundraising powered by small donors, new study shows. [ February 8, 2012]: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-‐fundraising-‐powered-‐by-‐small-‐donors-‐new-‐study-‐shows/2012/02/08/gIQANfKIzQ_story.html (Accessed: January 12, 2013) The Washington Post online, Exit polls 2012: How the vote has shifted. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐srv/special/politics/2012-‐exit-‐polls/table.html Time, Swampland Time Swampland, Scherer, Michael: Exclusive: Obama’s 2012 Digital Fundraising Outperformed 2008 . [November 15, 2012] http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-‐obamas-‐2012-‐digital-‐fundraising-‐outperformed-‐2008/ (Accessed: October 11, 2013)


Time Swampland, Scherer, Michael: The 2012 Money Race: Romney Relies on Big Donors, While Obama Taps the Grassroots Time Swampland. [July 26, 2012] http://swampland.time.com/2012/07/26/the-‐2012-‐money-‐race-‐romney-‐relies-‐on-‐big-‐donors-‐while-‐obama-‐taps-‐the-‐grass-‐roots/ (Accessed: December 3, 2012) Time Swampland, Scherer, Michael: Inside the Secret World of the Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama Win, Time Swampland. [July 26, 2012] http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-‐the-‐secret-‐world-‐of-‐quants-‐and-‐data-‐crunchers-‐who-‐helped-‐obama-‐win/ (Accessed: April 7, 2013) TIME: Obama’s Swing State Success Explained: http://swampland.time.com/2012/10/03/obamas-‐swing-‐state-‐success-‐explained/ [Accessed: 11.05.2013] Wikipedia Barack Obama presidential campaign, 2012, Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_Obama_presidential_campaign,_2012 (Accessed: January 17, 2013) Political action committee, Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_action_committee Republican Party presidential primaries, 2012, Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Party_presidential_primaries,_2012


Steve Schmidt, Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Schmidt United States presidential election debates, 2012, Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election_debates,_2012 Wikipedia, Portsmouth: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portsmouth,_New_Hampshire [Accessed: 26.08.2012] Wikipedia: Swing states, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swing_state [Accessed: 23.03.2013]

Wikipedia: Swing State, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swing_state#cite_note-‐3 [Accessed: 12.02.2013]

Other Relevant Pages ABC News online, Howard, Theresa: Obama Campaign Takes Top Ad Prizes http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Politics/story?id=7947528 (Accessed: July 25, 2013) About Kyle Rush, KR-‐kylerush.net http://kylerush.net/about-‐kyle-‐rush Afriprov.org, Rev. Joseph G. Healey, M.M.: Campaign Slogans of Barack Obama in the US


http://www.afriprov.org/index.php/news-‐archive/443-‐campaign-‐slogans-‐of-‐barrack-‐obama-‐in-‐the-‐us.html (Accessed: November 8, 2013) Barry, Frank: Social Media Fundraising, Obama and the 2012 Presidential Election, npENGAGE [October 3, 2012] http://www.npengage.com/social-‐media/social-‐media-‐fundraising-‐2012-‐presidential-‐election/ (Accessed: April 27, 2013) Bloomberg Business week ,Green, Joshua: The Science Behind Those Obama Campaign E-‐Mails[November 29, 2012] http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-‐11-‐29/the-‐science-‐behind-‐those-‐obama-‐campaign-‐e-‐mails (Accessed: April 12, 2013) Blue State Digital’s homepage: http://www.bluestatedigital.com [Accessed: 12.05.2013] Cable, Dustin: Who is winning the money game? Understanding campaign finance statistics. http://statchatva.org/2012/08/29/whos-‐winning-‐the-‐money-‐game-‐understanding-‐campaign-‐finance-‐statistics/ [Accessed: 01.10.2013] Campaign Tracker: http://www.2012campaigntracker.com CBS News: Condon, Stephanie: Obama’s 2012 campaign pitch: “Forward” [April 30, 2012] http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obamas-‐2012-‐campaign-‐pitch-‐forward/ (Accessed: February 1, 2013)


CBS NEWS: Obama’s 2012 Campaign Pitch Forward, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obamas-‐2012-‐campaign-‐pitch-‐forward/ [Accessed: 12.03.2013]

CBS News: Obama’s 2012 Pitch Forward: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obamas-‐2012-‐campaign-‐pitch-‐forward/ [Accessed: 17.05.2013] CDS News online, Gay marriage shift gives Obama fundraising boost, [May 11, 2012] http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gay-‐marriage-‐shift-‐gives-‐obama-‐fundraising-‐boost/ (Accessed: April 27, 2013) Daily News online, Election 2012: Obama re-‐elected to second term [November 6-‐7, 2012] http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/election-‐2012-‐america-‐decides-‐long-‐campaign-‐article-‐1.1197585 (Accessed: December 3, 2013) Derrick Harris: Data doesn’t play politics — and most of it suggests Obama will win, Gigaom [ November 5, 2012] http://gigaom.com/2012/11/05/data-‐doesnt-‐play-‐politics-‐and-‐most-‐of-‐it-‐suggests-‐obama-‐will-‐win/ (Accessed: April 8, 2013) Ed Grabianowski: How the Swing States Work, How Stuff Works http://people.howstuffworks.com/swing-‐state1.htm Federal Election Commission, Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal. http://www.fec.gov/pindex.shtml


Federal Election Commission, Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal: http://www.fec.gov/pindex.shtml FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAWS, THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION [April, 2008] http://www.fec.gov/law/feca/feca.pdf (Accessed: October 21, 2013) Fivethirtyeight blog: As Nation and Parties change, Republicans are at an Elecotral College Disadvantage http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/as-‐nation-‐and-‐parties-‐change-‐republicans-‐are-‐at-‐an-‐electoral-‐college-‐disadvantage/ [Accessed: 06.04.2013] Fivethiryeight Blog: The 2012 Election in a relative sense: http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/the-‐2012-‐election-‐in-‐a-‐relative-‐sense/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [Accessed: 10.04.2014] Fleishman, Craig: Obama Campaign Strategy How We Win [January 15, 2013] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tag/obama-‐campaign-‐strategy (Accessed: October 17, 2013) Frank Barry: The Power of Social Fundraising and Friends Asking Friends [INFOGRAPHIC], [May 17, 2012]: http://www.npengage.com/social-‐media/the-‐power-‐social-‐fundraising-‐and-‐friends-‐asking-‐friends-‐infographic/ (Accessed: August 9, 2013) Gallup Group: Conservatives remain largest ideological group: http://www.gallup.com/poll/152021/Conservatives-‐Remain-‐Largest-‐Ideological-‐Group.aspx [Accessed: 13.09.2013]


Gallup Group: Record High Americans Identify Independents: http://www.gallup.com/poll/151943/Record-‐High-‐Americans-‐Identify-‐Independents.aspx [Accessed: 17.09.2013] Hacker News, Every 100ms of latency costs Amazon 1% of profit https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=273900 Harper Reed’s Blog: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/harper-‐reed-‐obama-‐campaign-‐microtargeting [Accessed: 12.12.2013] Historical Presidential Election Information by State, 270 to WIN http://www.270towin.com/states/ History of Twitter: http://profilerehab.com/twitter-‐help/history_of_twitter [Accessed: 29.07.2012] Kyle Rush, Expert in Optimization: http://kylerush.net/blog/meet-‐the-‐obama-‐campaigns-‐250-‐million-‐fundraising-‐platform/ [Accessed: 18.03.2013] Kwek, Glenda: The man behind The Man: how a strategist called Jim got Barack Obama back into the White House, The Sydney Morning Herald [November 8, 2012] http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-‐election/the-‐man-‐behind-‐the-‐man-‐how-‐a-‐strategist-‐called-‐jim-‐got-‐barack-‐obama-‐back-‐into-‐the-‐white-‐house-‐20121108-‐2906c.html (Accessed: June 19, 2013) Lights on Making Ideas Happen, Scott Thomas: http://99u.com/videos/5821/scott-‐thomas-‐designing-‐the-‐obama-‐campaign [Accessed: 17.08.2013]


Lopez, Hugo Mark & Taylor, Paul: Latino Voters in the 2012 Election, Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project [November 7, 2012] http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latino-‐voters-‐in-‐the-‐2012-‐election/ (Accessed: June 19, 2013) Los Angeles Times online, Mason, Melanie and Tanfani, Joseph: Obama, Romney break fundraising records[ December 7, 2012]: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/07/nation/la-‐na-‐campaign-‐money-‐20121207 (Accessed: February 18, 2013) Mother Jones, Murphy, Tim: Inside the Obama Campaign's Hard Drive[ September-‐October, 2012] http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/harper-‐reed-‐obama-‐campaign-‐microtargeting (Accessed: August 29, 2013) NARA-‐ US National Archives and Records Administration, Who selects the Electors? http://www.archives.gov/federal-‐register/electoral-‐college/electors.html#selection [Accessed: 12.01.2013] NARA-‐ US National Archives and Records Administration: http://www.archives.gov/federal-‐register/electoral-‐college/about.html [Accessed: 25.01.2013] New Republic, Galston, William: The Biggest Challenge Facing Both Romney and Obama[January 19, 2012]: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/99764/2012-‐election-‐data-‐analysis-‐polarized-‐partisanship (Accessed: April 18, 2013)


Obama’s White Whale: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/02/project_narwhal_how_a_top_secret_obama_campaign_program_could_change_the_2012_race_.2.html [Accessed: 12.06.2013] Open Secrets Top Contributors– Center of Responsive Politics https://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/contrib.php?id=N00009638 (Accessed: November 23, 2013) Open Secrets, 2012 Presidential Race,– Center of Responsive Politics http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php MDG Blog, Political Fundraising in the Social Media Era [Infographic], http://www.mdgadvertising.com/blog/political-‐fundraising-‐in-‐the-‐social-‐media-‐era-‐infographic/ New York Post online, Geoff Earle: Obama campaign tell-‐all reveals major tensions. [September 13, 2013] http://nypost.com/2013/09/13/obama-‐campaign-‐tell-‐all-‐book-‐reveals-‐major-‐tension/ (Accessed: November 13, 2013) Percent of Contributions Coded: https://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/include/percentcoded_pop.php [Accessed:12.05.2013] Pethő András: Az ellenfél epusztítása része a munkának, Origo online [ September 29, 2013]


http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20130929-‐az-‐amerikai-‐elnokvalasztasi-‐kampany-‐titkai.html (Accessed: November 24, 2013) People-‐Press: www.people-‐press.org, DETAILED PARTY IDENTIFICATION TABLES, http://www.people-‐press.org/files/legacy-‐detailed_tables/Detailed%20tables%20for%20Party%20ID.pdf People and Press: A Closer Look at the Parties in 2012: http://www.people-‐press.org/2012/08/23/a-‐closer-‐look-‐at-‐the-‐parties-‐in-‐2012/ [Accessed: 12.06.2013] Progressive Policy Institute, Marshall, Will: Obstacle Course: Obama and the 2012 Electoral Landscape. [February, 2012]: http://progressivepolicy.org/wp-‐content/uploads/2012/02/2.2012-‐Marshall_Obstacle-‐Course_Obama-‐and-‐the-‐2012-‐Electoral-‐Landscape.pdf (Accessed: March 9, 2013) Pro Publica, Al Shaw: Who are the Super PACs’ Biggest Donors?[ December 7, 2012] http://projects.propublica.org/pactrack/contributions/tree (Accessed: October 18, 2013) Real Clear Politics, General Election: Romney vs. Obama http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/us/general_election_romney_vs_obama-‐1171.html (Accessed: December 12, 2013) Silver, Nate: By The Numbers, Forbes online [June 11, 2012] http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2012/11/06/nate-‐silver-‐by-‐the-‐numbers/ (Accessed: March 6, 2013)


SLATE: Project Dreamcatcher, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/01/project_dreamcatcher_how_cutting_edge_text_analytics_can_help_the_obama_campaign_determine_voters_hopes_and_fears_.html [Accessed: 11.11.2013] Social Media Fundraising, Obama and the 2012 Presidential Elections: http://www.npengage.com/social-‐media/social-‐media-‐fundraising-‐2012-‐presidential-‐election/#sthash.R4Tgfgqg.dpuf [Accessed:02.04.2013] Stat Chat, Who’s winning the money game? Understanding campaign finance statistics, [ August 29, 2012]: http://statchatva.org/2012/08/29/whos-‐winning-‐the-‐money-‐game-‐understanding-‐campaign-‐finance-‐statistics/ (Accessed: March 28, 2013) Telegraph, US Election Guide: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/us-‐election/9480396/US-‐Election-‐guide-‐how-‐does-‐the-‐election-‐work.html [Accessed: 02.02.2013] The Daily Beast, Michael Tomasky: The Path to Victory in November for Barack Obama and the Democrats[January 31, 2012]: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/30/the-‐path-‐to-‐victory-‐in-‐november-‐for-‐barack-‐obama-‐and-‐the-‐democrats.html (Accessed: July 12, 2013)


The Statistics Portal, Monthly fundraising of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney in the 2012 elections from January to October 2012 http://www.statista.com/statistics/242980/monthly-‐fundraising-‐of-‐barack-‐obama-‐and-‐mitt-‐romney-‐in-‐the-‐2012-‐elections/ (Accessed: April 29, 2013) The Power of Social Fundraising and Friends Asking Friends: http://www.npengage.com/social-‐media/the-‐power-‐social-‐fundraising-‐and-‐friends-‐asking-‐friends-‐infographic/ [Accessed:04.09.2013] Third Way. Michelle Diggles and Lanae Erickson: 2012 Showdown: Battle for the Obama Independents, [February, 2013] http://content.thirdway.org/publications/485/Third_Way_Report_-‐_2012_Showdown_Battle_for_the_Obama_Independents.pdf (Accessed: October 10, 2013) Time News Feed, Zafar, Aylin: Six Things We Learned from Obama’s Facebook Timeline [March 1, 2012] http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/03/02/six-‐things-‐we-‐learned-‐from-‐obamas-‐facebook-‐timeline/ (Accessed: January 19, 2013) USA Today, Schouten, Fredreka: Obama tops recent presidents in fundraising attendance, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-‐03-‐07/obama-‐campaign-‐fundraising/53402226/1


Wimble, Lorie: The most successful email subject line for Obama's campaign was "hey", TECHi. [March 8, 2012] http://www.techi.com/2013/03/the-‐most-‐successful-‐email-‐subject-‐line-‐for-‐obamas-‐campaign-‐was-‐hey/ (Accessed: May 29, 2013) WPO – Web Performance Optimization, stevesounders.com [May 7, 2010] http://www.stevesouders.com/blog/2010/05/07/wpo-‐web-‐performance-‐optimization/ (Accessed: November 16, 2013) 2012 Presidential Debate Schedule, 2016 ELECTION CENTRAL [October, 2012] http://www.uspresidentialelectionnews.com/2012-‐debate-‐schedule/2012-‐presidential-‐debate-‐schedule/ (Accessed: March 21, 2013) 99U, Scott, Thomas: Designing the Obama Campaign, http://99u.com/videos/5821/scott-‐thomas-‐designing-‐the-‐obama-‐campaign (Accessed: September 18, 2013)


Appendix Twentieth Century Campaigning

Twenty-First Century Campaigning

Consultants dominate in creating strategy, in maintaining message discipline, in communicating with public, and getting voters out to vote on election day

Consultants dominate; online component becomes integral part of campaign

Top-down approach More fluid, with ideas, direction, and support from grassroots

Television as most important communication medium

Television important, but explosion of new media, free media online

Relatively more time to craft messages, responses, and analysis

Campaign speeds up; running at 24/7 speed

Much of campaign based guesswork, instinct, and past experience

Heavier reliance on research, data, metrics to guide the campaign

Fundraising through big ticket items; expensive direct mail solicitation; few small-amount donors

Big ticket fundraising important; small-amount donor opening up through inexpensive online technology

Except for presidential contents, Greater involvement of


limited involvement of citizens, beyond voting

citizens, activists; sense that campaign is directly connected to them

How did modern campaigning change. Johnson [2011]


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The last 80 days before the elections. Strategic planning in the Obama campaign

Flóra Anna Rétfalvi is Communications Consultant at SPAR Magyarország and Vice President at Young European Leadership. She got MA in Governmental Sciences at LUISS University and was Fellow at the political campaign of Barack Obama “Organizing for America”

The Last 80 Days Before the Elections

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Transcript of The Last 80 Days Before the Elections