RESEÑA M. DOBRY

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Sociologie des crises politiques. La dynamique des mobilisations multisectorielles by MichelDobryReview by: Lauri KarvonenActa Sociologica, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1989), pp. 427-430Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4200772.

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ActaSociologica1989 (32), 4:427-430

Book ReviewsMichel Dobry: Sociologie des crises politiques. La dynamique des mobilisationsmultisectorielles. resses de la FondationNationelle des SciencesPolitiques, Paris1986(319 pp.)Ifthere s one elementcommon o all the variousdefinitions f 'crisis', t is probablythe notionthat a crisis s an exceptional, or at least a 'non-routine' tate of affairs.In political terms, a crisis is a (potential) turning point, a situation where afundamentalchange in political relationships s a distinct possibility. Quite inaccordancewiththisview,muchof thetheoretically rientedworkhasaxiomaticallylookedupon crisesasruptures npoliticalbehavior.And sincecrisesareexceptionalstatesof affairs, heircausesareusually oughtoutsidethe routine phereof politicalactivity.MichelDobryaccepts ittle of this. His study is an ambitiousargumentationorthe followingpropositions:1. Crisesareexplicable n termsof social andpoliticalcontinuity ather handrastic

change. The actors,arenasand principalstrategiesare the same as those thatproduceandregulateroutinepolitics.2. If we wishto gainaproperunderstanding f a politicalcrisis,we mustconcentrateon the event of the crisis tself, not on its 'causes','preconditions',antecedents'or anythingelse that preceded t.3. Thecrucial actordeterminingheoutcome of politicalcrises s (just as in routinepolitics) the mobilization f resourceson the partof the involvedactors n orderto attaindesiredgoals. The specificcharacteristic f a crisis s the 'conjuncturalfluidityof socialrelations'.This uncertaintyand variabilitymakesit difficult odetermine the value of the variouskinds of resources at the disposal of theinvolvedactors(economicmeans,coercion,massaction,parliamentaryctivity,andso on). In fact their value can be expectedto fluctuateconsiderablyn theprocess of the crisis.Chapter one presents the basic rationale behind 'the hypothesisof continuity'.Accordingto Dobry, it is misleading o refer crisisbehavior to the pathology ofpolitics. Instead,a 'Clausewitzian' erspectivestressingthe strategicand tacticaldeliberations f involvedactors s proposed.The basicelementsguiding heprocessof a politicalcrisis are the 'moves' (coups) made by the variousactors in ordertoattainstrategicand tactical goals. From the point of view of sociologicaltheory,these movesrepresentdifferentwaysof utilizingresources.Typically, rises nvolvea conflictualresourcemobilization.At the same time, Dobryunderlines hat thecooperative element is often just as importantin crisis situations. In fact, themixedsituation,wherecooperativeand conflictualmotives coexist and coincide ischaracteristic f politicalcrises.Dobry'semphasison strategicactionleads him to

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add still anotherelement to his hypothesis: here is nothing hat justifies he notionthat the mobilizationof resources n connectionwith a political crisis is primarilycarriedout by discontented,oppositionalor dominatedgroups 'challengers'o theexisting order). Quite the contrary,the crucial resourcemobilizationoften takesplace in the best-organizedsegments of the society, inside the 'agents of socialcontrol' themselves. Finally, Dobry stresses that his theoreticalperspectivedoesnot concernthe specialways in whichthe resourcemobilizations merge and spreadthroughout he politicalsystem.The second chapter contains a critical review of three differentorientations(Dobry: 'trois illusions') in the sociologicalstudy of politicalcrises. The firstofthese, termed l'illusion 6tiologique, is characterizedby an orientationtowardscausality and an emphasison explanatoryfactorsthat precede the event of thecrisis. In otherwords,the processof the crisis tself is not at the centerof attention;the possibility hat the processof a crisismight evolve autonomouslyn relation oits causal antecedents s not considered n this tradition.As representatives f thismode of reasoning,Dobry scrutinizes he 'theoryof the J-curve'by JamesDaviesand DavidEaston'sidea of a 'zone of transition'.He findsthat bothauthors ail todetermine he criticalthresholdvalues of their crucialvariables 'tolerablemargin'and 'minimum evel of support',respectively).They both resort to ex post factoreasoning,which lends their analysis an air of circularity.Neitherof the theoriesmakes any contribution o the understanding f the processof a politicalcrisis,tosay nothingof the resource mobilizationwhich, according o Dobry, is the veryessence of a crisis.

A shift of focus fromthe causesof a crisisto its effects is no solution,either. Thisis the implication of Dobry's examination of 'l'illusion de l'histoire naturelle'.This researchorientation is representedby the comparativestudy of the greatrevolutions.It departs rom the idea thatthereare certainregularitiesn the 'marchof history' expressedin the sequence of events and stages leadingup to the endresult. These uniformities anbe uncoveredwith the aid of the 'regressivemethod':one startsfrom the result itself, the revolution,and works one's way back to theinitialcausesby reconstructingheentirechainof intermediate auses.Thistraditionof scholarship s commendedby Dobry for its comparativeorientationand for itsrejectionof the singularity f historical vents.On theotherhand, tslogicprecludesthe study of historical sequences which, despite substantialsimilaritieswith theones leading up to revolutions,'had the inelegance'of resulting n somethingelse.Moreover, 'the naturalhistoryof revolution' is insensitiveto the fact thatmajorevents can have minor causes and vice versa:many a spectacularevent has onlymarginal ffects on the course of history,whereaschangesof minoramplitude antriggeroff majorturning points.Finally, I'illusionheroique'has the shortcomingof disqualifyinghe studyof theprocessof the crisis in structural erms. This is, in a way, a paradox,becausethemain works representing his tradition ay great stress on structural actorswhenexplainingthe causes of crises. The approachpresentedby Almond et al. in thelargeprojecton politicalcrisisand politicaldevelopmentcarriedout at StanfordUniversity s used as an example. This projectused structural-functionalheoriesto explain periods of political calm, whereas the process of politicalcrisis wasstudied n termsof coalitionand eadership heoryonly. Dobryfinds hat the borders428



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betweenthe variousstages from stabilityto crisis were fixedratherintuitively nthe Stanfordproject. Moreover, he criticizes the idea that a set of explanatoryfactorsshouldsimplybe abandonedwhenmovingfrom one phaseto another: lesvariables independantes . . . cessent-elles d'exister A partir du moment oiu l'onpasse de la phase II a la phase III ...?' Dobry concludes that the Stanfordmodel loses on two counts;it fails to graspthe structures haracteristic f criticalconjunctures nd t offers no key to the tacticalactivityof theprotagonists f crises.The remainder f the book, nearlytwo hundredpages, is devoted to a discourseon thedynamics f multisectoralmobilizations.According oDobry, acharacteristicfeature, indeed almost a definition of politicalcrises, is the coincident resourcemobilization n severalsectors('autonomous ocialspheres'; his stands n contrastto 'restrictedmobilizations'whichoccurwithinone sector at a time).Thiselaboratetheoretical discussionis backed by numerous empiricalexamples from manycountries and historicalperiods (France1934, 1947, 1958and 1968, Japan 1868,Italy1919-22,Germany1918-23, Bolivia1952,Iran1978-79,etc.) It goes withoutsaying hatonlythe mainideascanbe summarizedwithinthe confinesof a review.In Dobry'sview, complexsocieties are characterizedby the existence of fairlyautonomous ectorswhichdefine and control the interests of their members andinteractwithothersectors o pursue ectoralgoals.Inroutineperiods, heautonomyof these sectors is secured by several mechanisms,rangingfrom formal legalsafeguards o a generalattitudeof non-interference etween them. In otherwords,there is a 'limitedzone of tacticalinterdependence'between them. The strategicinteractionbetweensectorstakes placein variousarenas:a sector can be involvedin severalarenassimultaneously.In acrisis,theautonomyof sectors s reduced hrougha multisectoralmobilizationof resources. notherwords,acrisis s aperiodof 'enlarged acticalnterdependence'between societal sectors. The intrinsiclogic of interest aggregationand rep-resentationwithineachsectorcrumblesas the normallywell-entrenched rocess ofsectoralresourcemobilizations affectedbysimultaneous rocesses n othersectors.Consequently, crisis s accompanied yadesectorization f socialrelations.Dobryalsospeaksof a 'disobjectivation':heinstitutional rrangements, ulesandcustomswhichregulate the relationsbetween sectors are no longer considered as givenconstraints or action, an objective expressionof sectoral ogic. For the involvedactors, a crisismeans a period of structuraluncertainty.The normalguidelineswhichstructurepoliticaland social action have been pushedaside. The value ofthe variousresourcesat theirdisposal s difficult o assess, as the applicabilityandefficiencyof differenttypes of resourcestends to changerapidly.It is, however,notonly the structures f actionthat tend to evaporate.By the sametoken, humanperceptionsof social realitytend to be redefined.In other words, actors tend toreappraisehe goalsandlimitsof politicalaction as well as the legitimatewaysandmeans throughwhich this action should be carried out. Thus, the process ofdelegitimatization f social authorityis, contraryto the customaryview in theanalysisof crises and revoluttions, product of the multisectoralmobilizationofresources,not a cause or antecedent of the crisis.

Dobry'swork s highlyoriginalandsuggestive.He is wellread n boththeoreticalandempirical erms,andhe keeps a criticaldistanceto the work of others as wellas to his own text. Still, the maincontributionof the book lies in its initial focus429



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and a numberof brilliantoccasionalobservationsrather han a worked-out,readilyapplicable DobryModel' for the study of political crises.It is not difficult o agreewith the authoron the necessity of a strongerfocus on the part of socialscientistson the process andthe dynamicsof politicalcrisis tself. Thus far, this hasto a largeextent been the domain of journalismand historiography.This is all the moreimperativeas Dobry convincinglydemonstratesthat much of the conventionalwisdom n previous heorizing e.g. asconcerns he temporalcelationships etweendifferentphenomena)may be fundamentallywrong.His criticalremarks bout theprocessof escalation and the role of institutionalsolutionsare examples of noveland theoreticallyhighly valuableobservations.At the same time, the bulk of histext containing the implementationof his theoreticalcredo remainsabstractandpartlyelusive even after a close reading.It does not make thingsbetterthat Dobryhas chosen to use empirical llustrations d hoc, rather han n the formof intensivecase studies with clearly operationalized oncepts.Dobry'sexaminationof the three theoreticalorientations s competentand fullof keen observations.At the same time, its functionin the context of this book isopen to criticism.For one thing, Dobry's classificationof these theoriesappearssomewhat artificial.From the point of view of his own theory,all these studies arein fact 'etiological' in character,since they place a majoremphasison the causalantecedents of the crisis. These kinds of classificationswill, however, remain amatterof interpretation nd taste. What s far more importants thatDobry,whileconvincinglycriticizing hese theorieson their own premises, is largelybarkingupthe wrong ree as concerns heirrelation o his ownwork. With the partial xception

of the Stanford model, these theories do not primarily aim at explainingthedynamicsof a processbut the factorsthattriggered ff that process.It maybe thatthis is an extremelydifficultandelusivejob, andit maybe that muchof the researchhas failed to produce convincing answers. The fact remainsthat the dependentvariable n these studies is not the same as in Dobry'swork. A stronger ocusonthe dynamicaspectsof politicalcrisescanin nowaycall therelevanceand egitimacyof 'etiological'studies in question.We need both the fork and the knife.Finally,one mightturnDobry'scriticismaroundby askingwhetherthe processof resourcemobilization n a crisis can be studiedin total isolationfrom its causes.Crisesare not simply dynamicinteractions; hey have a content, they are aboutsomething.This 'something' sdifferentially elatedto the various ectorsof society.Therefore, the kind of resource mobilizationthat takes place and the degree towhichdifferent sectoral ogics'are affected can be expectedto varydependingonthe substanceof the crisis.This substance,in turn, tends to be relatedto the wayin which the crisis emerges. Consequently,the content of the crisisprovidesanintimatelink between its antecedentsand its dynamicprocessaspects.In sum, theline drawnby the author between the emergenceand the processof crisesseemstoo definite as a guidelinefor empiricalanalysis.This criticismnotwithstanding, ociologiedes crisespolitiquesrepresentsa majorcontribution o the studyof politicalcrises. In order to reachthe widestpossibleinternationalreadership, t wouldcertainlydeserve an Englishtranslation.Lauri KarvonenDepartmentof PoliticalScience, Abo Academy

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