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The Philosophical Contributions ofLudwig von MisesDavid Gordon*

A central theme unites Ludwig von Mises's frequent venturesinto philosophy. Mises believed tha t economics as he prac-ticed i t gave access to "a third class of the laws of nature."'The method of economics differed fundamentally from that of physicsand biology, the sources of the other classes of na tural law. A soundtheory of knowledge thus must place proper stress on deductiveinquiry into human action, the method of economics. The place ofeconomics in ethical theory is less direct; but here too, the results ofeconomic analysis closely circumscribe the available options in valuetheory.

In sum, Mises wrote philosophy a s an economist. Unlike his greatrival John Maynard Keynes, who held philosophical opinions thatmolded his economic views, for Mises the direction of causation wentin the opposite way: economics determined philosophy.2 I shall en-deavor to illustrate Mises's distinctive angle on philosophical ques-tions, concentrating principally on the theory of knowledge and eth-ics.

The guiding thread in Mises's theory of knowledge was the de-fense of economics. His discipline needed to be guarded againstmetaphysical assault and scientific attempts to eliminate the cate-gory of human action. In Mises's opinion metaphysical argumentscannot be used to challenge economics, since human beings cannot

*David Gordon is a senior fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute.This paper was prepared for consideration for a Ludwig von Mises prize that was

awared a t the Mises Institute's 10 th anniversary conference, October 9-11, 1992.1 amgrateful to Pat Heckman and Ralph Raico for the ir very helpful suggestions.

l ~ u d w i ~on Mises, Human Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,1963), p. 885.

'1 have attempted to show the influence of Keynes's philosophical views on hiseconomics in "Keynes's Fir st Principles," Dissent on Keynes, Mark Skousen, ed. (NewYork: Praeger, 1992), pp. 149-60.The Review of Aust ri an Economics Vo1.7, No. 1 (1994): 95-106ISSN 0889-3047

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96 The Review of Austrian Economics Vol. 7, No. 1attain the ultimate truth tha t metaphysicians seek. "It is beyond thepale of a rational inquiry to enter into an analysis of any variety ofmetaphysics, to appraise its value or its tenability and to affirm or toreject it.03 Thus all-embracing schemes, e.g., Hegel's depiction of thegrowth of the Absolute Idea to full self-consciousness, cannot rightlybe used to challenge economics. To claim, with Werner Sombart, thateconomics rests on a "method of isolation" which correct philosophyhas exposed as fallacious i s illegitimate.4 Economics, not metaphys-ics, sits in the driver's seat.But why? How does Mises know that metaphysical inquiry issterile? His argument is the following: In order to survive, humanbeings identify regularities in the world. Unless one can anticipatethat objects will behave in a fixed manner, action is impossible. Onecan do nothing if the world is, in William James's phrase, "a booming,buzzing confusion." The assumption that objects operate in a regularorder, however, cannot be proved. "There is no deductive demonstra-tion possible of the principle of causality and of the ampliativeinferences of perfect induction; there is only recourse to the no lessindemonstrable statement that there is a strict regularity in theconjunction of all natural phenomena.'15The assumption of regularity is not the only principle humanbeings use to categorize the world, but all other principles depend onit. Thus, if it cannot be proved that the world really is regular, noneof the other categories can be deductively derived. From the fact thathuman beings must think about the world in a certain way, it doesnot follow that the world really has the attributes we ascribe to it."In epistemology . . . we are dealing neither with eternity nor withconditions in parts of the universe from which no sign reaches ourorbit nor with what may possibly happen in future aeon^."^ It is thislimitation of our thought that closes our access to truth about meta-physics.

Like Immanuel Kant, then, Mises thought that the human mindgrasped the world only through i ts own categories. But this similarityhardly suffices to make Mises a strict Kantian. Unlike his greatpredecessor, Mises did not claim that a particular set of categories is a

3 ~ u d w i gon M ises, The Ult imate Foundation ofEconomic Science (Princ eton,N . J . :D . van Nostrand, 1962), p. v i .4~ consider the G erm an historical school in greater detail in The PhilosophicalOrigins ofA ustria n Economics (Au bur n, Ala .: Ludwig von Mises In stitute , 1993).5 ~ u d w i gon Mises, Theory and History ( Ne w Haven: Yale Un iversi ty Press , 1957),

p. 4.' ~ i s e s ,Ultimate Foundation, p. 15.

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97ordon: Philosophical Contributions o f Misesnecessary presupposition of experience. To Mises, the categories areones that human beings now in fact use. He essays no transcendentalargument in the style of the Critique of Pure Reason to derive them.7Indeed, as we have seen, he specifically denies that the causalprinciple can be demonstrated.

Instead of a logical derivation of the categories, Mises offers anevolutionary 'fjust so" story Human beings who did not use the assump-tion of regularity would be unable to survive. Their more fortunaterelatives who did use this category would by comparison flourish.Through a process analogous to biological selection, a set of commoncategories gradually became entrenched i n th e human mind.'

At first sight, one might be inclined to object to Mises's evolution-ary argument in this way: If people who use the regularity principlesurvive, while these who do not do so perish, what is the explanationof this fact? Does it not show that the regularity principle is true? Ifso, how can Mises assert t hat the principle cannot be proved?

But this objection fails: Mises is entirely right. From the fact thatusing a principle aids survival, i t does not follow that the principleaccurately characterizes reality. We do however know that th e worldhas this property: those in i t who use the principle have a n advantageover nonusers. Perhaps the best explanation of the success of ourcategories is that they accurately describe the world, but this is veryfa r from a proof that they do.' Further, a s Mises well knew, the entireevolutionary scheme is ~~ e c u l a t i v e . ' ~

In spite of Mises's claim that the principle of regularity cannot beproved, he places great st ress on it. The "strict regularity" t ha t hefinds in all natural phenomena leads him to reject indeterminism inquantum mechanics. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle limits ourknowledge: it does not show that the law of causality is false forsubatomic particles.11

7 ~ o rn exce ll en t a ccou n t o f Kant 's philosophy, see Paul Guye r, Ka nt an d the C laim sof Knowledge (C ambridge: Cam bridge Un ivers i ty P ress , 1987). Adm i t t ed ly , some "psy-chologis ticn in terpretat ions o f Kant put h im closer to Mises , bu t th e s imi lar i ty i s n ogreater tha n th at between Mises an d, say, Herber t Spencer.' ~ i s e s ,Ult im ate Fou nda tion, p. 15.' p e t e r L i p t o n , I nf er en c e t o t h e B e s t E x p l a n a t i o n ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1991),pp. 172-73, disc usse s t h e bes t exp lana tion argum ent for r ea l ism.

1 ~ i s e spresents hi s evolutionary account as a "speculation." Ult ima te Fou nda tion,p. 15. In m y view, evolut ionary epis temology su f fe rs f rom debi l i ta ting objections. Forimpor tant cr i t ic isms , see T ho m as Nagel , The View from Nowhere (Ox ford: OxfordUnivers i ty Press , 1986) and Ralph W alker , The Coherence Theory of D u th (Lon don :Rout ledge, 1989).or Mises's r e jec tion o f inde term in i sm in qu an tu m mechanics , see Theory andHistory , pp. 88-89.

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98 The Review of Austria n Economics Vol. 7 , N o. 1Mises's position appears vulnerable. He thinks that the principle

of regularity is an essential category of the human mind; we mus tthink in accord with it. But if this is right, should we not considerindeterminacy in nature unthinkable? Even if Mises is right to rejectreal uncertainty in nature, how does he account for the fact that theopinion he opposes can be genuinely considered? On his view it isabsurd on its face. He might respond that, after all, quantum mechan-ics is very counter-intuitive. The paradoxes we encounter in this fieldillustrate Mises's contention that our categories of thought apply onlyto the world we know.

But what has all this to do with economics? Mises's account ofregularity in nature sets the stage for a contrast. The study of humanaction does not proceed by inductive generalization from perceivedregularities. Instead, its method is deductive and its starting pointthe concept of action. Through an analysis of this concept, the prin-ciples of economics can be deduced. "Action and reason are congenericand homogeneous; they may even be called two different aspects ofthe same thing."12

Can Mises maintain consistently his contrast between the studyof human action and the sciences of natural phenomena? Humanbeings are part of the natural world: why then do they stand immunefrom the principle of regularity? Mises believes that "determinism isthe epistemological basis of the human search for knowledge."13 If heis right, has he not undermined his fundamental philosophical goal-the defense of Austrian economics?

Mises's response provides a key to understanding his thought.Determinism does apply to human beings: "What a man does at anyinstant of his life is entirely dependent on his past, that is, on hisphysiological inheritance as well as of all he went through in hisprevious days."14 But we do not know how human thought and actionare determined by these factors. Determinism is thus of no use in thestudy of human action. Instead, we must assume that the mindoperates autonomously. To claim this is not to assert that the mindreally is independent of the physical world: this contradicts whatMises takes to be a basic assumption of science.

Instead, "[mlethodological dualism refrains from any propositionconcerning essences and metaphysical constructs. It merely takesinto account the fact that we do not know how external events . . .

121Ylises,H um an Act ion , p. 3 9 .1 3 ~ i s e s ,heory and H is tory , p. 7 4 .141bid.,p. 77.

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99ordon: Philosophical Co ntribu tions of Misesaffect h um an thou gh ts, ideas, a n d judgm ents of value."15 Mises 'svindication of praxeology, then, is this: In spite of the principle ofregularity, we do not know how hu m an th ou gh t is determined. Theo-r ies th a t ass ign par t icular causes to thought t h us ar e metaphysica l,not scientif ic, and must be rejected. Two features of this argumentrequire s tress. F irst , in l ine w ith his wish to defend economics ra th e rthan support a phi losophy of his own, Mises assumes as l i t t le aspossible. He does not ass er t th a t hu m an beings a re metaphysicallyfree: he c ontents himself wi th th e claim th a t in economics they m us tbe t reated as rat ional actors . More quest ionably, he manifests ast ro ng host il ity to metaphysics .Mises's view of h u m an action provides add it iona l evidence th a the is not a str ict K antian . As we hav e jus t seen , Mises 's position isth a t hum an beings m ust be t rea ted a s ra t ional ac tors, s ince we donot know how act ion is determined. Kant 's wa s in p ar t th e reverse.He thought th a t th e rea l or noum enal se lf i s not d e termined. I t i s notth at we have no access to the laws tha t d e termine hum an action, asMises believes: we really a re free.16 I n th e world a s we know it , i .e. ,the phenomenal world, th e s i tua t ion i s o therwise. H um an action i sdetermined by th e de sire for happiness.17In this l at te r view, K an t a n d Mises ar e qu i te close. Mises l ikewiseassumes t h a t " [hlappiness . . . is th e only ult im ate end."" We alwaysaim to achieve the highes t ranked of our preferences tha t we th inkat tainable. Mises does not assume that we can freely choose ourpreferences: freedom, a s he conceives i t , is th e u se of rea so n to achieveou r goals. B ut thi s sim ilarity, to my mind , is not sufficient to placeMises in the K an tian camp.''

In t h e theory of knowledge, the n, Mises is sat isfied w ith a verymodest conclusion: neither physical science nor metaphysics pose achallenge to economics. Th e l im ited n at u re of Mises 's claim, however,failed to secure him imm unity from at tac k. Th e logical posi tivis ts ( th e"Vienna Circle") a dva nce d views th a t, if accepted , placed praxeologyin per il . Mises regarded i t a s a vi tal ta sk to reply to posi tivism, an d

151bid.,p. 1.16For an important analysis of Kant's conception of freedom, see "Reason andAutonomy in Grundlegung 111" in Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1989),pp. 51-65.17For the comparison of Mises and Kant, I am indebted to discussion with RalphRaico." ~ i s e s , heory and History, p. 13. In support of his view, Mises surprisingly citesLudwig Feuerbach.l g ~ h emain reason is that in my view Kant does attribute strong free will to thenoumenal self.

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100 The Review of Austrian Economics Vol. 7 , N o. 1I think his efforts in th is a re a constitute his most valuable contribu-tion to the theory of knowledge.

The clash of the positivists with praxeology resulted from theirtheory of meaning." Briefly put, they held that deduction cannot giveus any knowledge about the empirical world. All necessary t ru ths areanalytic; they are tautologies th at are empirically meaningless. Sincepraxeology proceeds by deduction from a necessarily true axiom, thethreat posed by positivism is apparent. Economics is supposed toapply to the world: it is not "an unearthly ghostdance of bloodlesscategories." If the method i t uses must fail of i ts purpose, Misesianeconomics is ruined.

Mises's most important argument against the positivists was asimple one. They purport to banish metaphysics and follow science, buttheir own position is metaphysical. "[Tlhe epistemology of positivism isitself based on a definite brand of metaphysi~s."~'f positivists accu-rately took note of praxeology, they would be forced to abandon theirviews. Praxeology is a deductive discipline that, contrary to positivistdogma, does give us knowledge of the real world.To declare illegitimatean existing science because i t violates a philosophical doctrine is itselfillegitimate: Metaphysics cannot overturn science.

The force of Mises's point is twofold. First, he himself agrees withthe positivists that philosophy is subordinate to science. When heclaims that a philosophic doctrine cannot overturn a conclusion ofscience, he speaks on his own behalf. But, more fundamentally, hisargument works against the positivists even if one disagrees withMises's view about the relation of science to philosophy. The positiv-ists do agree with him here: his argument is thus an effective adhom.inem retort against them. They, the opponents of metaphysics,are themselves engaged in metaphysics if they reject praxeology.22

Mises uses the same response to Karl Popper's falsifiabilitycriterion. Popper, unlike the positivists, did not take all metaphysicalstatements to be meaningless. He instead adopted the more limitedposition that all scientific statements must be capable of being provedfalse. The theorems of praxeology, insofar as they are deductivelyderived from a self-evident axiom, fail this test: nothing can falsifythem.

2 0 ~ o r full account of the logical posi t iv is ts , see J . Alberto C off a ,The SemanticDa di t ion from Kant to Carnap: Zb the Vienna Station (Cam bridge: Cambridge Unive r-si ty Press, 1991)." ~ i s e s , ltim a te Fo un da tio n, p. v i .'*For a discu ssion o f ad horninern argum ents in philosophy, see Henry W .Johnston e, Jr., Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument (U niv er sit y Par k,Penn.: Dialogue P re ss , 1978),pp. 5-12.

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101ordo n: Philosophical Co ntribu tions of M isesMises's reply is characteristically forthright. If Popper wishes to

classify praxeology as unscientific, that is h is affair. The proper testsof praxeology are the truth of its axioms and the validity of itsarguments. Why should it matter whether praxeology meets thecriterion of science proposed by a part icular writer? Why does i t countagainst a sta tement tha t i t is metaphysical in Popper's sense?

Here once more Mises uses an ad hominem argument. Like thepositivists, Popper contended that definitions do not describe realessences: they a re arbit rary proposals for the use of a term.23Misescleverly uses thi s view against Popper to show that h is own charac-terization of scientific statements is a n arb itrary proposal.

Mises ha s another argument that uses positivist doctrine againstitself. "[Tlhe proposition tha t there a re no synthetic a priori proposi-tions is itself a . . .synthetic a priori proposition, for i t can manifestlynot be established by experience."24A positivist might deny th is andassert tha t the claim was an inductive generalization. But then whatjustifies him in rejecting s tandard examples of a priori propositions,e.g., "whatever is colored is extended," not to mention the theoremsof praxeology? Alternatively, a positivist might claim that the dis-puted statement is analytic, but i t is unclear what would ground thisassertion.

Mises does not confine his criticism to refutations of the kind jus tdescribed. He directly examines the main contentions of the logicalpositivists and finds them wanting. The positivists claim that thepropositions of mathematics and logic are tautologies. But even if th isis true, we can learn something new from mathematical or logicali n v e s t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~ven if all the theorems of geometry are restatementsof the axioms used in their proofs, i t does not follow that we can a tonce grasp the theorems when we learn the axioms. The distinctionMises draws here resemble Aquinas's separation of propositions "self-evident in themselves" from those "self-evident to

Mises's criticism of the positivists seem eminently well taken; buteven if one adheres to that philosophy, Mises has the resources toprotect praxeology. He calls the propositions of economics synthetica priori truths, but it is not a t all clear t h a t he h as in mind w hatthe positivists wish to exclude. What does Mises mean by a- .

2 3 ~ o rPopper's "anti-essentialismn ee Karl Popper, The Open Society and ItsEnemies , 2 vols. (New York: Harper, 1967),pp. 9-21.2 4 ~ i s e s ,l t imate Foundation,p. 5.2 5 ~ i s e s ,uman Action, p. 38.2 6 ~ q u i n a sses this distinction in his criticism of St. Anselm's argument for theexistenceof God.

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102 The Review of Austrian Economics Vol. 7, No. 1"synthetic"proposition?As discussed above, he replies to the claimthat mathematical propositions are tautologies with the point thatwe can learn something new from some tautologies. Does he mean bya synthetic proposition, then, one tha t gives us new knowledge? If hedoes, his position is perfectly consistent with that of his positivistfoes. They are concerned to exclude propositions tha t, in their senseof the terms, are both necessary and non-analytic. So far as I candetermine, Mises did not take a position on this issue; he neitherasserts nor denies, e.g., that the predicate of the action axiom is"contained in the subject. He offers no formal account of syntheticpropositions, however, so the suggestion that praxeology is immunefrom positivist attack in this way is conjectural.Even if this suggestion is rejected, much of praxeology is stillunder no threat from the positivists. Although "[alll the concepts andtheorems of praxeology are implied in the concept of human action," itsinquiries are restricted "to the study of acting under those conditionsand presuppositions which are given in reality."27To accomplish this,subsidiary postulates must be added to the axiom of action, e.g., theassumption that labor has negative utility. But "[tlhe disutility of laboris not of a categorical and aprioristic character. We can without contra-diction think of a world in which labor does not cause uneasiness, andwe can depict the state of affairs prevailing in such a world."28

If praxeology includes empirical propositions, why would positiv-ists object to it? They do not reject the use of logic in science: theyinstead think that logic by itself will not provide us with knowledgeof the empirical world. But "[elconomics does not follow the procedureof logic and mathematics. It does not present an integrated system ofpure aprioristic ratiocination severed from any reference to reality."29The only theorems of praxeology, then, that conflict with positivismare those that do not include any empirical propositions in theirderivation. Mises has powerfully argued that logical positivismshould not be accepted; and, by extending points that Mises makes,we can show that praxeology is in little danger from it .

Of course economists influenced by positivism have followedmethods of inquiry radically a t variance with Mises's precepts. Manyof them place great reliance on empirical testing, while Mises thinksthis unnecessary and in many cases not possible. Milton Friedmangoes so far as to say that the assumptions of a n economic theory may

2 7 ~ i s e s ,u m a n Action , pp. 64-65.28~bid.,. 65; footnote number omitted.?bid., p. 66.

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103ordon:Philosophical Contributions of Misesbe false , as long as th e theory g en era tes correct predictions. A gre aterdivergence from M ises would be difficult to imag ine. B ut n one of the seviews follows from t h e verifiability criterion of m ean ing. A positivistsym pathet ic to praxeology m ight t ak e t h e axiom of action to be acommon sense empirical proposition, known by introspection to betrue.30On e fu rth er point requires m ention. If praxeology i s co nsiste ntw ith posit ivism, does th is invalid ate one of Mises's key a rg um en tsag ain st th e positivists? T h e very existenc e of praxeology, he claim s,refutes their view of science. But if praxeology is consistent withposit ivism, m us t not this ar gu m en t be withd rawn ? As usual , Misesis on safe ground: al l th a t is required is a m odification of i t . M ises canpose t h is di lem ma to posit ivist d etrac tors: i f praxeology contradictsthe ir views, i t s exis tence a s a science refutes them ; if i t does not , theycannot object to i t . And in a ny case, M ises s t i l l ha s intac t a l l his otherargu m ents ag ains t th e posi tivis ts .Mises's prim ary aim in epistemology, I have endeav ored to show,was to defend economics. "With reg ard to praxeology t h e er ro rs of th ephilosophers are due to their complete ignorance of economics andvery o ften to th e ir shock ingly insufficient know ledge of history."31 Inethics , his main goal was s imilar but not ident ical . In his view,economics does not by itself support any ethical conclusions. But ifone acknowledges a value judgment th a t he thin ks almo st universallyacceptable, th e estab lishm ent of a free m ark et i s impe rative. Misesrecognized t h a t v arious schools of ethics ha d objections to t h e freem ark et , an d his a im in th is branch of philosophy was to defend themarket f rom at tack. His method was a radical one: he denied thepossibility of objective e thics a ltogeth er. If Mises i s corre ct, al l eth ica lobjections to th e free ma rk et im m ediately fai l.I n Mises's view, i t m ake s s ens e to ask: given a certa in e nd , howcan t h a t end be best achieved? If someone wishes to bui ld a house,th e quest ion of how h e can be s t u se h i s r e sources to do so a dm i t s ofa n ob jective response . W hethe r t o bu ild t h e ho use i s up to h im; howbes t t o do so is no t. R a t iona l i ty i s a m a t t e r of m ean s , no t ends . Them at t e r i s , however, som ewh at complicated by th e f ac t t h a t a n endcan i tsel f be a m ean s to a fu r th er end.32Mises in fac t holds tha t

3 0 ~ h e s eemarks should not be taken as a defense of positivism. In my own view,the verifiability criterion ought to be rejected; further discussion is in myPhilosophicalOrlg ins , pp. 36 ff. Rather, I am here addressing the question: if one did accept theverifiability criterion, how much of Austrian economics could be retained?-3'~ises ,Human Action, pp. 32-33; footnote number omitted.3 2 ~ i s e s ,heory and History, p. 1 3 .

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104 The Review of Austrian Economics Vol. 7 , No. 1"[hlappiness in the purely formal sense in which ethical theoryapplies the term is the only ul timate end." Mises meant by this thatwe want things not for their own sake but for the satisfaction,assessed purely subjectively, which we expect them to bring us.

Mises's notion of values stands in opposition to two competingtypes of theory, and he explicitly opposed both. Some philosophersmaintain that there are objective goods or ends "out there in theworld." Regardless of what people think, certain things just are goodor bad. Franz Brentano, a leading advocate of this position, main-tained that value judgments were "correct" or "incorrect," analo-gously to the tr ut h or falsity of factual propositions. Mises rejectedBretano's account; unfortunately he did not discuss Bretano's argu-m e n t ~ . ~ ~gainst aesthetic objectivism Mises is scathing: "Onlystil ted pedants can conceive the idea that there ar e absolute normsto tell what is beautiful and what is not."34

Some proponents of objective ethics agree with Mises th at valuesare not properties that objects possess. Nevertheless, ethics is notsubjective, since reason can show that we stand under certain obli-gations, regardless of the ends we happen to have. Mises has littletime for this position. He says ofit s foremost proponent: th e "weakestpart of Kant's system is his ethics."35

By dismissing objective ethics, Mises has prepared the way forhis own defense of the free market. Mises's primary concern tovindicate economics suggests a n additional motive for his subjec-tivist conception of values. Someone who believes in objectivevalues in th e style of G. E . Moore but also accepts Austrian eco-nomics needs to fit two different kinds of value into his intellectualsystem. By accepting only subjective values, a drastic intellectualsimplification becomes possible; and Mises may have found thetemptation to wield Occam's razor too st rong to resis t. More prosai-cally, as an economist Mises was thoroughly familiar with subjec-tive values an d may have found any other approach conceptuallyuncomfortable. This in par t accounts for th e fact th at Mises sayslittle to support his condemnation of objective values: he treats theissue as vir tually self-evident.

3"bid., p. 36 , n. 1. Brentano's vie ws are presented in h is The Origin of OurKnowledge of Right and Wrong, R. M . Chisholm and Elizabeth Schneewind, trans.(Atlantic Highlands, N . J .: Hu ma nities P ress, 19 69). An interesting discussion ofBrentan o on value judgm ents may be found in Thomas L. Carson, The Status ofMorality (Dordrech t: D. R eidel, 19 84) .3 4 ~ i s e s , heo ry a n d H i st or y, p. 6 3 .3 5 ~ ~ d ~ i gon Mises, Socialism (London: Jona than C ape, [I9361 1951 ), p. 43 0.

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Gordon: Philosophical Contributions of Mises 105Although Mises does not usually address in detail the arguments

of value-objectivists, on one occasion he does so, with illuminatingresults.The political philosopher Leo Strauss claimed that many termsin our language fuse descriptive and evaluative components. If, onecalls someone cruel, the judgment rests on factual criteria. Stalinacted cruelly, e.g., in bringing about the death of millions of Russianpeasants. This judgment is not, to reiterate, a matte r of subjectiveassessment; but is objective in exactly the same way as "Stalin wasLenin's successor." Yet to call someone cruel implies a negative evalu-ation of him. Thus, contrary to the value subjectivists, languageimposes certain value judgments on us. To maintain that all valuesare subjective is to ignore for a large number of terms the criteria ourlanguage establishes.

Mises vigorously dissented. He considered three examples givenby Strauss: "cruelty," "prostitute," and "pressure In eachinstance, Mises maintained, one can either use the term in questionin a value-neutral way or substitute another term that lacks thevalue-charged nature of the original. It is thus false that linguisticconsiderations prevent one from separating fact and value.This is not the place for an assessment of the dispute. Rather, itis the existence of the dispute itself that merits notice. During thelate 1950s and early 1960s one of the most important arguments inmodern moral philosophy took place between Philippa Foot andElizabeth Anscombe, on the one hand, and R. M. Hare, on the other.(All three were a t the time teachers of philosophy at Oxford Univer-sity). Foot and Anscombe adopted precisely the position of Strauss:there are criteria for the use of terms such a s "rude" or "courageous."Once a term of this sort is applied, no separate act of evaluation isnecessary: the terms are already valuational. Thus descriptive crite-ria imply an evaluative stance, and the "is-ought dichotomy" is atleast in these instances false.

Hare demurred, in terms reminiscent of Mises: "But the primaryevaluative words are so classified just because their descriptivemeaning is secondary, and is therefore more able to give way whenattitudes change, the evaluative meaning remaining ~naltered."~'

3 6 ~ i s e s ,heory an d History, pp. 299 ff . Strauss's ar gume nt is in his Natu ral Righta n d History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 50 ff.3 7 ~ .M. Hare , "Reductio a d Absurdum of Descriptivism" in hi s Essays in Eth ica lTheory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 122. Philippa Foot's side of the a rgumentis in her Virtures a n d Vices (Berkeley a nd Los Angeles: University of California Press,1978). For Anscombe, see her "Modern Moral Philosophy" in Collected PhilosophicalPapers (Minneapolis: Universi ty of Minnesota Press, 1978), vol. 3, pp. 26-42.

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106 The Review of Austrian Economics Vol. 7 , N o. 1Like Mises, Hare maintains that no description irrevocably commitsus to an evaluation.

In both ethics and epistemology, then , Mises's contributions arisein the course of a defensive campaign on behalf of Austrian economicsand the free market. If so, what lessons can be drawn about the wayto study Mises's philosophy?

Most fundamentally, his philosophy must be approached throughhis own writings, taking particular note of the manner in whicheconomic theory suggests to him philosophical positions. The greatestmistake one can make in this a rea, I venture to suggest, is to assignMises to a philosophical school and to interpret his economics on thatbasis. As an example of what must be avoided let us consider theascription to Mises of a "Bergsonian" 'view of time. When Misesdiscusses time in economics, he has in mind time as experienced byhuman beings, particularly in action. It does not follow from this thatMises should be saddled with either Bergson's criticism of time inphysical science as an abstraction or his defense of the intuitive graspof real duration.

Mises cites Henri Bergson on just a few occasions, and his re-marks hardly constitute a ringing endorsement of his views. Heagrees with Bergson that for human beings the real present isgrasped in action. But he also states: "it is not recollection thatconveys to men the categories of change and of time, but the will toimprove the conditions of his life."38This in context appears to be acriticism of Bergson.

Again, Mises notes: "it is true, a s Bergson has seen with unsur-passed clarity, that between reality and the knowledge that sciencecan convey to us there is a n unbridgeable gulf. Science cannot grasplife directly . . . . But if one thinks one has thereby pronounced anunfavorable judgment on science, one is mistaken."39 Mises's conclu-sion is totally un-Bergsonian. The exact similarities and differencesbetween Mises and Bergson are not our present concern. I havetouched on the topic simply for purposes of illustration. Some think-ers are best approached through the careful search for sources andinfluences. At least in philosophy, Mises is not among them.

3 8 ~ i s e s , um a n A ction, p. 100.The passage crit icizes Edmund Husserl as well a sBergson. I have not discussed the patently absurd claim that M ises was a phenomenolo-g i s t .3 9 ~ ~ d ~ i gon M ises, Epistemological Problems of Econom ics (N ew York: N ew YorkUniversity Pres s, 1981),p. 46; footnote number om itted.