§§Ockham - Treatise on Universals (단행본 Ordinatio I d.2 qq.4-8)

c© Peter King, 1987; all rights reserved.

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: ORDINATIO 1 d. 2 q. 4∗

With regard to the identity and distinctness of God from the creature,it should be asked whether there is something common and univocal toGod and the creature, something that is essentially predicable of each. Butsince that question, and many things that are and ought to be said in thefollowing questions, depend on familiarity with the nature of the univocaland the universal, then for the clarification of what is and ought to be said[in the following questions] I shall first of all raise some questions about thenature of the universal and the univocal.

In line with this, I first ask whether that which is immediately andproximately denominated by a universal and univocal intention is somegenuine thing outside the soul, intrinsic and essential to those [things] towhich it is common and univocal, yet really distinct from them.

[ The Principal Arguments ]

That it is the case:[First Positive Argument]: It is a genuine thing, essential and intrinsic

to those [things] to which it is common. For, according to the Commentatorin his remarks on Met. 5 com. 7 ([Iuntina 8 fol. 52va]):

Those two men, universal and particular (namely to which music isaccidental), are essentially one.

But that which is essentially one with some real being outside the soul isa genuine thing and essential to such a thing. Hence the universal man is agenuine thing outside the soul and essential to those [things] to which it iscommon.

[Second Positive Argument]: It seems that the universal is a reallydistinct thing, since it is impossible for the same thing to be corruptibleand incorruptible; but universals are incorruptible and those [things] towhich they are common are corruptible; hence they are not the same thingas singulars.

For the opposite: The Commentator, in his remarks on Met. 12 com. 22[Iuntina 8 fol. 144va]:

∗ Translated from Guillelmi de Ockham opera philosophica et theologica: Opera the-ologica tom. II, cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, moderatorS. Brown (edidit Stephanus Brown, adlaborante Gedeone Gal), S. Bonaventure, N. Y.:impressa Ad Claras Aquas (Italia), 1970, 99–153. Ockham’s later additions are en-closed within |# . . . #|.

– 1 –

2 William of Ockham: Ordinatio 1 d. 2 q. 4

‘One’ and ‘being’ exist in virtue of universal things, which do not havebeing outside the soul.

Hence, according to the Commentator, universals do not have being outsidethe soul. But nothing that does not have being outside the soul is reallythe same as a being outside the soul. Therefore, etc.

[ Walter Burleigh’s View ]

Regarding the question: One view is that any given univocal universalis a certain thing really existing outside the soul in any singular whateverand pertaining to the essence of any singular, really distinct from any singu-lar and from any other universal, such that the universal man is one genuinething really existing outside the soul in any given man, and it is really dis-tinguished from any given man and from the universal animal and from theuniversal substance—and so for all genera and species, whether they aresubalternate or not subalternate. And thus, according to that view, thereare as many universals that are predicable in quid and per se primo modoof any singular that is per se in the genus as there are really distinct thingsin it, any given one of which is really distinguished from any other and fromthat singular, and all those things, in themselves in no way multiplied how-soever much singulars be multiplied, are in any given individual belongingto the same species.

[ Thirteen Arguments for Burleigh’s View ]

This view is argued for in many ways. First of all, by reasons—[ First Argument ]

Definition is primarily of substance and secondarily of accident, ac-cording to the Philosopher (Met. 7.4 [1030b4–14]). But definition is not pri-marily of the singular substance, according to [the Philosopher] (Met. 7.15[1039b20–1040a10]). Hence there is a substance other than singular [sub-stance], which is primarily definable. But that [substance that is primarilydefinable] is not separated from sensibles, since such [a separated substance]is not definable, according to the Philosopher himself in the same passage.Hence it pertains to the essence of the singular.

[First Confirmation]: This [first argument] is confirmed [as follows].Something in the genus Substance is definable, according to everyone. Butthe individual is not definable, since, if it were, I ask: what would be putinto its definition? Nothing but substance, according to the Philosopher(Met. 7.4 [1030b4–7]). Therefore, some substance would be put into itsdefinition—but not singular substance, since then either (i) the very singu-


William of Ockham: Ordinatio 1 d. 2 q. 4 3

lar substance itself is definable, which is impossible, since the same thingdoes not define itself, or (ii) another [singular substance is put into the def-inition, which is impossible], since no singular substance is truly predicableof another singular substance. Hence it is necessary that some universalsubstance be put into its definition. And, consequently, what was to beproved is established.

[Second Confirmation]: The [first argument] is also confirmed [as fol-lows]. Substance is defined by a definition strictly speaking, which is giventhrough genus and differentia. Next, I ask: is the genus [given in the defi-nition] either (i) a thing, or (ii) a concept (intentio)? [With regard to (i)]:if [the genus] is a thing, then it is not a singular thing, since no singularis a genus. Hence it is a universal thing, and it pertains to the essence ofthe species that has been defined—for otherwise that species would havebeen defined through an additional element, since [it would have been de-fined] through something that would be outside of its essence; hence, besidesthe singular thing, there is some other (universal) thing pertaining to theessence of the singular thing itself. [With regard to (ii)]: if, however, thegenus and the differentia [given in the definition of the species] were certainconcepts (intentiones), then against this: substance is defined only throughsubstances, according to the Philosopher (Met. 7.4 [1030b4–14]). Hence thegenus and the differentia are substances. Likewise, then substance wouldhave been defined by an additional element, since [it would have been de-fined] through intentions, which do not pertain to the essence of the thing.

[Third Confirmation]: Thirdly, the [first argument] is confirmed [asfollows]. The definition is truly predicated primarily of what has been de-fined. But [the definition] is not predicated primarily of some individual,since then it would have been predicated of nothing other than [that] indi-vidual. Nor is [the definition] predicated primarily of something extrinsicto the individual itself, since nothing of this kind truly exists, [for example],a rational animal. Hence [the definition] is predicated per se of somethingthat is not any individual, and nevertheless it is intrinsic to any given in-dividual. But there is nothing of this kind except a thing that is universal,really distinct from the individual and intrinsic to it.

[ Second Argument ]

Secondly, it is argued for as follows. Real science is about genuinethings outside the soul, since real science is distinguished from rationalscience in this regard. But no science is primarily about singular things.Hence there are some things outside the soul besides singular things.

[Proof of the Minor]: The minor premiss, [namely “no science isprimarily about singular things”], is clear according to the Philosopher



(Post. an. 1.4–5 [73b26–74a13] and Met. 7.15 [1039b20–1040a10]).[ Third Argument ]

This word ‘man’ primarily signifies some thing outside the soul, sinceevery univocal word has primarily one significate. For [the univocal word] isdistinguished in this regard from the equivocal word, which signifies many[significates] equally primarily. But it does not primarily signify some in-tention, since then it would be a name of a second-level intention. Likewise,then this [proposition]:

A second-level intention is a manwould be true without any [further] distinction, since a word always hasthe feature that it supposits for its significate on the basis of the institution[of the word]. But it is clear that [“A second-level concept is a man”] iseither simply false or should be distinguished. Hence this word ‘man’ doesnot primarily signify an intention. Hence it signifies some thing outside thesoul, and it does not primarily signify a singular thing, since it does notsignify [any] one [singular thing] before another. Hence it signifies something other than the singular, and not [some thing] that is extrinsic to thesingular. Hence [the word ‘man’ signifies a universal thing].

[ Fourth Argument ]

The intellect can understand man while not understanding some sin-gular man. But in understanding man, it understands a genuine thing.Hence there is some genuine thing that is understood at that point, distinctfrom any given singular man.

[ Fifth Argument ]

The primary adequate object of a real potency is a genuine thing.But the primary adequate object of any given potency (whether sensitive orintellective) is not some singular thing, since then nothing would have beenapprehended by that potency except (i) that singular thing, or (ii) underthe ratio of that singular [thing]—each of which is obviously false. Hencesome thing other than a singular thing is the primary adequate object of areal potency.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss, [namely “the primary ade-quate object of a real potency is a genuine thing”], is clear—especially withregard to sensitive potency, since nothing is apprehensible by a sensitive po-tency except a genuine thing. Hence nothing is its object, neither adequatenor non-adequate, except a genuine thing.

[ Sixth Argument ]

The primary subject of a real attribute (passio) is a genuine thing.But no singular thing is the primary subject of any given attribute, for



then that attribute would be appropriate to nothing but that of which thatsingular thing is said, according to the art of the Philosopher (Post. an. 1.4[85a13–86b38]). And, consequently, [the attribute] would not be appropriateto any other singular thing of the same ratio, which is obviously false. Hencea real attribute is primarily appropriate to a thing other than the singularthing.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss, [namely “the primary sub-ject of a real attribute is a genuine thing”], is clear, since the subject isnot more imperfect than its attribute. Hence if the attribute were real thesubject will be real.

[First Confirmation]: The [sixth argument] is confirmed by the Phi-losopher, De an. 2.7 [418b7–9]: transparency is present in air and in waterneither only through the ratio water, nor only by means of the ratio air,but by means of the ratio of a common nature. Hence that nature is ineach. Hence there is some common nature in each, differing from the other.

[Second Confirmation]: The [sixth argument] is confirmed, secondly,by De gen. et corr. 1.4 [319b22–24]: when water comes to be out of air,numerically the same transparency remains. And [it does not remain] bymeans of the ratio of the matter, since then it would always remain, asmatter always remains; nor yet by means of the ratio of a singular form,since no [form] of this sort is the same [throughout the change]. Hence [itremains] by means of the ratio of a common form. Hence there is somecommon form differing from any given singular form.

[ Seventh Argument ]

A natural agent, in acting, tends to a genuine thing. And [a naturalagent] does not tend to a singular thing, since by that ratio it would tendto one [singular thing] and to another, for it is equally related to any othersingular thing of the same ratio as [it is related] to that one, and conse-quently it would tend to an infinite [number], and so would be frustratedin its tendency since it can never produce an infinite [number]. Hence [anatural agent] tends to some thing that is distinct from singulars.

[ Eighth Argument ]

A generalissimum is either (i) a genuine thing, or (ii) only a conceptof the mind. [With regard to (i)]: if it were a genuine thing, then it iscertain that no singular thing is a generalissimum. For no singular thingof this sort is predicated of everything contained under the generalissimum,of which [contained things], nevertheless, the generalissimum itself is trulypredicated. Hence [the generalissimum] is another thing. [With regard to(ii)]: if it were a concept of the mind, then, since concepts can be many, it



would follow that there could be many generalissima of substance.

[ Ninth Argument ]

According to Porphyry ([Isag. 7]):The species is what is collective of many into one nature.

Hence ‘species’ expresses one nature beyond those many [things] that havebeen collected. Similarly ([Isag. 7]):

Many men are one man by participation in the species.But they are not one singular man. Hence there is some universal beyondparticulars.

[ Tenth Argument ]

According to the Philosopher (Cat. 2 [1a20–21]):Of these [things] that exist, some are said of a subject and are not in asubject.

And [things] of this sort are not accidents, since, according to [Aristotle]([Cat. 2 1a24–1b3]), accidents are in a subject. Therefore, since they exist,they are substances. But they are not singular substances, since, accordingto [Aristotle] ([Cat. 2 1b3–4]), they “are neither in a subject nor said of asubject.” Hence [they are universals].

[ Eleventh Argument ]

Cat. 5 [2a10–17]:Some substances are primary, and other [substances] are secondary.

Primary substances are singular substances. Hence besides singular sub-stance there is another substance, which is secondary [substance], namelythe genus or the species.

[Confirmation]: This is confirmed [as follows]. In the same passage,Aristotle says that, of secondary substances, the species is more substancethan the genus ([Cat. 5 2b8–9]). Hence genera and species are substances.And they are not singular substances, for then they would be primary sub-stances. Hence [they are universals].

[ Twelfth Argument ]

De int. 7 [17a38–39]:Of things, some are universals, others particulars.

But one [element] of a division is not the other [element of the division].Hence universal things are not particular things, nor conversely. Hencethey differ.

[ Thirteenth Argument ]

Top. 1.7 [103a7–8]:



‘Same’ is said in three ways: the same in genus, the same in species, thesame in number.

From this [passage] it is argued [as follows]. Here there is a threefold realidentity. But specific identity is not primarily appropriate to the individual,and neither is generic identity. Hence [they are primarily appropriate] tosome other things.

[ Six Arguments Against Burleigh’s View ]

That view is simply false and absurd; hence I argue against it.

[ First Argument ]

There is no thing that is numerically one, neither varied nor multiplied,in many supposits or sensible singulars, nor even in any given created indi-viduals [taken] together simultaneously. But such a thing, if it were posited,would be numerically one. Hence it would not be in many singulars andpertain to their essence.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss, [namely “there is no thingthat is numerically one, neither varied nor multiplied, in many supposits orsensible singulars, nor even in any given created individuals taken togethersimultaneously”], is obvious. For this is proper to the divine essence alone,[namely] that it is in many really distinct supposits without any divisionand multiplication.

[Proof of the Minor]: I prove the minor premiss, [namely] that such athing is numerically one, as follows. Whenever there are two really distinctthings that are equally simple, of which neither includes a greater pluralityof things intrinsic to it than the other, [then] either (i) each of those thingsis numerically one, or (ii) neither [of those things is numerically one]. Forthere is no greater reason that one of them be numerically one than theother. |# Or, if one of them includes a greater plurality [intrinsic to it]than the other, so that they are not equally simple, if the one that includesthe greater plurality and is less simple is numerically one, [then] the onethat includes the lesser plurality intrinsic to it and is more simple will benumerically one #|. But a universal and a singular thing, according to you[who hold this view], are two really distinct and equally simple things, |# orthe universal thing is more simple #|. Nor does the universal thing includea greater plurality of things intrinsic to it than the singular thing. Hence ifthe singular thing is numerically one, the universal thing will be numericallyone.

[Proof of the First Part of the Minor]: The first part of the minorpremiss of the syllogism, |# namely that the universal and the singular



thing are two really distinct things, #| is granted by the view.[Proof of the Second Part of the Minor]: The second part, |# namely

that the universal thing does not include a greater plurality of things [intrin-sic to it] than the singular thing,#| I prove as follows. If the universal thingincludes a greater plurality of things intrinsic to it, then it includes either (i)a greater plurality of universal things, or (ii) [a greater plurality] of singularthings. [With regard to (i)]: [it does not include a greater plurality] of uni-versal things, since I take one of those universal things |# that is included[in it], and I ask:#| either it includes a greater plurality than the singularthing, or not. If it does, I ask [the same question] about one of those [things]included [in it] as before. And so it will be established that some universalthing does not include a greater plurality of things than the singular thing,or there will be an infinite regress. [With regard to (ii)]: if it does not,then that universal thing that does not include a greater plurality of thingswill be just as numerically one as the singular thing, and, consequently,by the same argument, any other universal thing will be numerically one.Nor can it include a greater plurality of singular things, since then it wouldonly be distinguished from singular things as the whole [is distinguished]from a part—which is impossible even according to those [philosophers whohold this view], since according to them the singular essentially includes theuniversal itself and something more, and, consequently, the singular is thewhole and the universal the part, according to them. Similarly, what is tobe proved follows from this, since if any given part were numerically one,the whole will be numerically one.

[Confirmation of the First Argument]: The [first argument againstBurleigh’s view] is confirmed [as follows]. According to those [philosopherswho hold this view], anything included in the universal is included in any-thing contained per se under that universal. Hence anything included essen-tially in man is included essentially in Socrates, since anything pertainingto the essence of man pertains to the essence of Socrates. Hence the uni-versal never includes a greater plurality of |# universal or singular#| thingsthan the singular, and, consequently, [the universal] is equally as simple [asthe singular]. And, consequently, [the universal] is numerically one if thesingular be numerically one.

[Objections and Replies to the First Argument Against Burleigh’sView]

[First Objection]: If it were stated that [the universal] includes manythings, yet it does not [include them] insofar as they are intrinsic to it—

[Reply to the First Objection]: Against [this first objection, I reply asfollows]. An inclusion or containment of this sort does not exclude numerical



unity. For, indeed, God and matter and any given cause contain many reallydistinct things in this way, and yet any such thing, [namely God or matteror any cause], is numerically one.

[Second Objection]: If it were stated that the universal thing is reallyable to be shared by many and is really in many, but it is not in this waya singular, and hence although it does not intrinsically include a greaterplurality of things nevertheless it is not numerically one like the singular—

[Reply to the Second Objection]: Against this [second objection], Iask: how is [the universal] able to be shared by many and how is it inmany? Either (i) through an identity with many, and through its realmultiplication beyond the multiplication of those things in which it is; or(ii) [the universal], in itself neither multiplied nor varied, is shared by manyand is in these [things] from which it always remains really distinct. [Let usconsider each case in turn.]

[With regard to (i) in the reply to the second objection to the firstargument against Burleigh’s view]: if (i) [were said to be the case], [namelythat the universal is able to be shared by many and is in many through anidentity with many, and through its real multiplication beyond the multipli-cation of those things in which it is], then [there are the following objections].(a) [The universal] is not distinct from singulars but expresses singular

things themselves, if it is shared by them through identity.(b) Likewise, there is a contradiction in terms here [in the claim] that [the

universal] would be shared by them through an identity, since thisis the same as saying that the very things themselves are shared bythemselves.

(c) Likewise, if they are multiplied beyond the multiplication of individ-uals, then there really would be as many universals as singulars, andso none of them would be universal.

(d) Also, the [philosophers who hold this view] assert the opposite of thisin saying that [the universal] is simply another thing, not varied initself, yet really existing in many.[With regard to (ii) in the reply to the second objection to the first ar-

gument against Burleigh’s view]: if (ii) were said [to be the case], |# namelythat [the universal], in itself neither varied nor multiplied, is shared by manyand remains really distinct from them,#| such shareability or existence inmany does not exclude numerical unity, [for the following four reasons].(a) Because matter, which is numerically one, is in really diverse [things]

successively. Nor is [matter] more numerically one for existing in di-verse [things] successively than if it were to have existed in the same[things] simultaneously without [any] variation of it.



(b) Because if the same form were simultaneously to have perfected manymatters, [that form] would have been no less numerically one.

(c) Because, according to the fiction of the Commentator [In De an. 3com. 5 (Crawford 387–413).], even though the possible intellect is inmany men, it is nonetheless numerically one, since it is really distin-guished from any of them. Nor is [the possible intellect] multiplied initself, even though the men to whom [the possible intellect] is unitedare multiplied. Hence, in the same way, although that common man,which is assumed to be really distinct, is in many singular men, fromany one of which it is really distinguished, nevertheless if it were notmultiplied in itself but only the singular men in which it is were mul-tiplied, it will simply be numerically one.

(d) Because the divine essence, although it is shared by the distinct sup-posits also through identity, still, since it is not multiplied in itself butonly the supposits by which it is shared are multiplied, it is numeri-cally one. Hence so much the more if that common man were sharedby many such that it is in many [men], from any one of which it isreally distinguished, if it nevertheless were not multiplied in itself, butonly the singular men in whom it is were multiplied, it will simply benumerically one.[Confirmation of the Reply to the Second Objection]: That argument

is confirmed [as follows]. Any thing making a number along with anotherthing, such that it would be true to say that they are ‘many things,’ willeither be numerically one thing or numerically many things. For it is im-possible to have two things or three things unless there were many [things],any given [one] of which would be numerically one. But according to you[who hold this view], a singular thing and a universal thing are many thingsand several [things]. Hence a universal thing is either numerically one thingor numerically many things. And whichever [alternative] be granted, whatwas to be proved is established.

[Third Objection]: If it were stated that the major premiss [of the firstargument against Burleigh’s view], [namely “there is no thing that is nu-merically one—neither varied nor multiplied—in many supposits or sensiblesingulars, nor even in any given created individuals taken together simulta-neously”], is not true in every case, since the numerically one (like number[in general]) is not found in all things but only in continuous [things]—

[Reply to the Third Objection]: Against [this third objection, I replyas follows]. That response concedes what was to be proved, since then itcan truly and strictly be stated in its own way that the universal thing isnumerically one—just as the divine essence is numerically one, and just as



the possible intellect that is dreamed up by the Commentator is numeri-cally one, and just as any given angel is numerically one, and [just as] theintellective soul (according to the truth of the matter) is numerically one.And so, consequently, since every thing that is numerically one is genuinelya singular thing, the universal thing will genuinely be a singular thing.

[Confirmation of the Reply to the Third Objection]: The entire preced-ing argument is confirmed as follows. Every thing making a number alongwith another really distinct thing is numerically one thing or numericallymany things. But a universal thing of this sort, if it were posited, gen-uinely makes a number along with a singular thing. Hence [the universal]is [either] (i) numerically one thing, or (ii) numerically many things. But[the universal] is not numerically many things, since then it would be manysingulars. For according to those [philosophers who hold this view] (and intruth) every thing that is numerically one is singular, and so numericallymany things are many singulars. But no universal thing is many singulars,according to those who [philosophers who hold this view], since accordingto them it is really distinguished from all singulars. Hence [the universal] isnumerically one.

[Proof of the Major of the Confirmation of the Reply to the ThirdObjection]: The major [premiss] of that argument, [namely “every thingmaking a number along with another really distinct thing is numericallyone thing or numerically many things”], is clear, since all things making anumber are numbered, and consequently any of them is one in number.

[Proof of the Minor of the Confirmation of the Reply to the ThirdObjection]: The minor premiss, [namely “a universal thing genuinely makesa number along with a singular thing”], is also clear. For, according to those[philosophers who hold this view], the singular thing and the universal thingare many really distinct things, just as Socrates and the universal that ‘man’signifies are many things. And they are not infinitely [many]. Hence theyare finitely [many]. Hence they are two, or three, or four, or [many] in somedefinite number. And it is certain that they can only be said to be two(it is clear inductively). Hence [Socrates and the universal man] are onlytwo things. Hence they will genuinely be this pair, just as this man andthis angel make a pair. Hence each of those things (indicating here thatuniversal thing and that singular thing) genuinely is numerically one, justas this man, as much as that angel, is numerically one.

|# [Confirmation of the Proof of the Minor of the Confirmation of theReply to the Third Objection]: Again, this is confirmed [as follows]. Twouniversals, namely the universal man and the universal angel, are two thingsthat are really distinct of themselves or by some [things] intrinsic to them.



And they are not more than two. Hence each of them is genuinely one andnot many. And, in consequence, each of them is numerically one.

[General Confirmation of the Reply to the Third Objection]: All theaforementioned [arguments] are confirmed [as follows]. I ask for the sig-nificate of the phrase ‘numerically one’. And it is necessary to say that[‘numerically one’] either (i) signifies that which is one and not many, andthen what was to be proved is established, since then any given universalthing is one and not many; or (ii) signifies that which is one and not manyand not in many, and then the understanding, no matter how much it beone and not many, nevertheless if it were in many would not be numericallyone; and, likewise, the divine essence, since it is in many, would not benumerically one; and in the same way, if this form were in many compositesthrough divine power, it would not be numerically one,—all of which arefalse. Alternatively, it is necessary to say that [‘numerically one’] signifiesthat which is one continuous [object] and not many continuous [objects],and then an angel would not be numerically one, nor the divine essence,nor any intellective soul, nor any simple thing—which are absurd claims.And so, on the basis of all the aforementioned points, it is clearly obviousthat if there were such a universal thing, it will genuinely be numericallyone, just as an angel or a soul or any non-continuous thing [is numericallyone].#|

[ Second Argument ]

Secondly, I argue as follows: Every thing prior to some other thingthat is really distinct from it can exist without it. But according to you[who hold this view], that [universal thing] is prior and is really distinct.Hence it can exist without the singular thing.

I argue in another way as follows. When some thing that is reallydistinct from other things can exist without any given one [of them] takenseparately (and this by nature), and it does not essentially depend on anyof them, then it can exist without each of them taken together (and this bymeans of divine power). But according to those [philosophers who hold thisview], that universal thing that is signified by ‘man’ can really exist withoutany given singular man. Hence that universal thing could exist without anysingular thing by means of divine power.

(The [alternative] argument, and that proposition on which it is based,will be clarified in [Ord. 1 d. 9 q. 3]).

[Confirmation]: That [second] argument is confirmed [as follows]. Theindividual adds something beyond the nature, according to those [philoso-phers who hold this view]. And this makes something per se one alongwith that universal thing—since if it did not, then it would be something



that would be neither substance nor accident. Hence it does not seem toinvolve a contradiction that what is added be conserved by God withoutany universal nature advening, which seems absurd.

[ Third Argument ]

Thirdly, as follows: An individual belonging to some species can benewly created, no matter how many other individuals belonging to the samespecies previously created or produced remain. But creation is simply fromnothing, such that nothing essential and intrinsic to the thing precedes it inreal being. Hence no thing that is not varied, existing previously in any givenindividual, pertains to the essence of that newly created individual. For, ifthere were, then something essential would have preceded that thing, andconsequently it would not have been created. Hence there is no universalthing that pertains to the essence of those individuals, since if there were,that [thing] would have existed before every individual after the first oneproduced, and consequently all [individuals] produced after the first one hasbeen produced would not be created, since they would not be from nothing.

[ Fourth Argument ]

Besides, any singular thing can be annihilated without the annihilationor destruction of another singular thing on which it does not depend in anyway. Hence this man can be annihilated by God even though no other manis annihilated or destroyed. But in a case of annihilation, nothing intrinsicto the thing remains, neither in itself nor in anything in real being. Hencethere is not any such thing that is common to each [of the two things], sincethen that [common thing] would have been annihilated. Consequently, noother man would remain according to his own entire essence. And thusany given man would at least be corrupted, since when any given part isannihilated the whole is destroyed.

[Objection to the Third and Fourth Arguments]: If someone wereto raise the quibble against these arguments that something is created orannihilated when anything in it that is numerically one in it is created orannihilated, yet it is not necessary that the nature that is common to it andto others should at that point be created or annihilated—

[Reply]: On the contrary: Creation is simply from nothing, such thatnothing that is intrinsic or essential to the thing precedes [the creation].Likewise, nothing [which is intrinsic or essential to the thing] remains in thecase of annihilation. Hence if something that is essential to a creatable andannihilable thing were to precede [it] or remain [after it], [the thing] willneither be created nor annihilated.

[First Confirmation of the Reply]: This [reply] is confirmed [as follows].



That universal thing is as essential to the individual as any given particularthing [is essential to it]. For, according to those [philosophers who holdthis view], Socrates is just as essentially a man as he has this matter andthis form. Hence, just as Socrates can be annihilated or created only if thismatter as well as this form be created or annihilated, so too Socrates willonly be able to be created or annihilated if this thing which is essential tohim [either] beforehand be [simply] nothing or afterwards be simply nothing.

[Second Confirmation of the Reply]: Likewise, that common natureis more essential and intrinsic to the individual than any given matter orpotency of matter for material form. But if a material form were producedin prime matter and with regard to the potency of matter, [the individual]is not created—or, if the matter or the potency of matter were to remain,[the individual] would not be annihilated, according to those [philosopherswho hold this view]. Hence so much the more, if this [universal] thing that isintrinsic to the individual were to precede [it] or follow [it], is [the individual]not created or not annihilated.

[Third Confirmation of the Reply]: Likewise, I could with the sameease say that the thing will be able to be created if that which has beenadded to the nature beforehand were not a pure nothing, while neverthelessthe nature itself beforehand were a pure nothing, since each is essential toit.

[ Fifth Argument ]

Fifthly, I argue as follows: Either that universal or common man per-tains to the essence of Socrates, or it does not. If it does not, then it iscertain, according to those [philosophers who hold this view], that Socratesdoes not pertain to the essence of that common man, since then that com-mon man would not remain without Socrates, which they deny. Hence[Socrates and that common man] are two [things], neither of which pertainsto the essence of the other. Then I ask: do [Socrates and that commonman] produce something that is one per se? And if they do, then Socratesis not an individual, but rather will be a part of something that is one perse. Likewise, then [Socrates] would no more essentially be man than matteris the form with which it makes [something] that is one per se. [On theother hand], if [Socrates and that common man] do not make [something]that is one per se, and one is not an accident of the other, then each willbe a subsistent per se. And thus a Platonic Idea will exist, and it will bea subsistent that is one per se, yet coexisting with many. And many otherabsurdities follow—which nobody of sound mind would accept—if that uni-versal thing does not pertain to the essence of Socrates, nor along with some[added factor] produces [something] that is one per se.



[Objection]: If it were stated that the universal thing pertains to theessence of Socrates, and it is not the whole essence of Socrates (since thenit would not be a thing other than Socrates), and so it is an essential partof Socrates—

[Reply]: Many absurdities follow from this [objection]:[First Absurd Consequence]: Socrates would then no more be a singu-

lar thing than a universal [thing], since the whole is no more denominatedfrom one of its essential parts than from another—just as the composite isno more said to be the form than the matter, nor conversely, although theform is the more principal part.

[Second Absurd Consequence]: A singular thing would then genuinelybe the matter of the universal thing and the universal thing would be theform, or conversely. For either that added singular thing and the universalare either (i) of the same ratio, or (ii) they are of different [rationes]. [Withregard to (i)]: they are not of the same [ratio], for then one would be nomore universal than the other. [With regard to (ii)]: if they are of different[rationes], then all those [things] that are of differing rationes, if they make[something] that is per se one, are related as form and matter. Hence theuniversal and the singular thing are related as form and matter.

[Objection]: If it were asserted that this is true only when each ofthose things is singular—

[Reply]: This [objection] does not work. For I could say with the sameease that when each of the things is singular it is not necessary that theyare related such that one is matter and the other form.

[Third Absurd Consequence]: Third, it follows that any given accidentwould be genuinely and really composed out of diverse things that are reallydistinct, namely out of the universal nature of this kind and out of somethingadded to it. And in every case it would follow that there would be as manyreally distinct things in any given singular as there are universals univocallypredicable of the same [singular]. |# Again, Socrates would then be ofa different ratio from Plato, since those [factors] added to the universalswould be of diverse rationes.#|

[ Sixth Argument ]

Sixthly, I argue as follows: Every thing outside the soul in the genusSubstance is receptive of contraries. Hence if there were some universalsubstance, it will genuinely be receptive of contraries. But no universal isreceptive of contraries. Therefore, no such universal is a real thing in thegenus Substance.

[Proof of the Antecedent]: The antecedent, [namely “every thing out-side the soul in the genus Substance is receptive of contraries”], is clear



from the Philosopher saying that this is strictly proper to substance (Cat. 5[4b17–18]).

[Proof of the Second Part of the Minor]: Moreover, I prove that no such[universal] is receptive of contraries, for then, just as individual contrariescan be in diverse individuals in the same specialissima, so too those commoncontraries would be in the same universal together—which is impossible.

[Proof of the Consequence in the Proof of the Second Part of the Mi-nor]: The consequence—[namely “Just as individual contraries can be in di-verse individuals in the same specialissima, so too those common contrarieswould be in the same universal together”]—is clear. For those individualcontraries cannot exist unless their common universals were to exist. Henceit is necessary that those common contraries be in something that is primar-ily receptive [of them]. But [those common contraries] do not exist primarilyin some singular, nor in some singulars. Hence they exist primarily in someuniversal or in some universals. But it is not necessary that they be togetherin some universals, since it is possible that those singulars in which they ex-ist be singular accidents belonging to the same specialissima. For example,this intellective soul has knowledge with regard to some conclusion, andanother intellective soul is in error regarding the same conclusion. Thenknowledge in general, which precisely regards this conclusion, and error ingeneral, which is contrary to [knowledge in general], do not exist subjec-tively in diverse universals in respect of these intellective souls. Hence theywill exist subjectively in the same universal. Consequently, some contrariesexist together in the same subject primarily.

[First Confirmation]: The [sixth argument] is confirmed [as follows].According to those [philosophers who hold this view], contrareity is foundprimarily among universals, and so too incompatibility and opposition.Hence contrary universals will not in any way be able to exist in the samesubject primarily, |# which would nevertheless follow if the aforementionedview were true #|.

[Second Confirmation]: Likewise, it would follow that the universalthing would be primarily and per se changeable, since that which primar-ily and per se receives some thing subjectively is genuinely changed. Butaccording to the view [under discussion], it is necessary to hold that theuniversal nature receives primarily and per se a universal accident, which isits primary subject. Hence it is primarily changed. The consequent is false,since—according to everyone—acts, operations, and changes are primarilycharacteristic of singulars, and not of universals.

[Third Confirmation]: |# Likewise, then the same thing would be si-



multaneously in diverse places #|.1[Fourth Confirmation]: Likewise, there would follow a certain absur-

dity in theology, [namely] that something intrinsic and essential to Christwould be damned and miserable, by the misery that belongs to fault aswell as by the misery that belongs to punishment. For that nature that iscommon to Christ and to other men is informed both by blessedness in com-mon and misery in common, [misery] belonging to fault as well as [misery]belonging to punishment.

(Many other absurdities follow upon that view [under discussion], [ab-surdities] that—as with those given above, for all their irrationality andabsurdity—would not be adduced against [the view] but for the reason thatit was the view of many [philosophers], and still perhaps is held by many[philosophers].)

[First Confirmation of the Fourth Confirmation]: The [fourth confir-mation] is confirmed [as follows]. When in some [whole] there are two reallydistinct [things] that are informed by contraries, that whole is no more de-nominated by one of those contraries than by the rest. Hence if the universalhuman nature, belonging to the essence of Christ, is informed by the miserybelonging to fault as well as [by the misery] belonging to punishment—andit is certain that something that pertains to the essence of Christ is informedby blessedness—then Christ will no more be formally denominated ‘blessed’than ‘miserable’, which is absurd.

[Second Confirmation of the Fourth Confirmation]: The [fourth con-firmation] is confirmed [as follows]. Anything essential in Christ is unitedwith the divine Word. But nothing united with the divine Word is damnedor miserable. Hence there is no such universal nature that is receptive ofcontraries, e. g. [receptive] of blessedness and misery, in Christ.

[Objection to the Sixth Argument]: If you [who hold this view] wereto say that it is not the Philosopher’s intent that every substance is recep-tive of contraries, but rather that only primary substance [is receptive ofcontraries]—

[Reply]: On the contrary, just as there are universals of substances,

1 This later addition by Ockham seems to be wrongly placed. It is omitted entirelyin A, and it is a marginal comment in F. The critical edition, following the lead ofthe other manuscripts, inserts it at the very top of 121, right before the propositionbeginning “Many absurdities. . . ” But the paragraph following this begins “That last[point] is confirmed. . . ” (confirmatur istud ultimum), which can only refer to thetheological absurdity, and not to the later addition or to the general remark aboutmany absurdities. Therefore, I have inserted the later addition before the theologicalabsurdity.



so too are there universals of accidents. Hence whiteness or blackness incommon exist in some subject primarily, or in some [subjects primarily].But they do not exist primarily in singulars. Hence they exist primarily inuniversals. Therefore, etc.

The assumption is clear, since just as a singular accident is [related]to a singular subject, so too a common accident is [related] to a commonsubject. Hence just as a singular accident is in a singular subject, so tooa common [accident] is in a common [subject]. Consequently, if a singularwere receptive of contraries, the specialissima will be receptive of contraries.

[ Ockham’s Response to the Initial Question ]

Therefore, I respond to the question in another way: that no thingthat is really distinct from singular things and intrinsic to them is universalor common to them, since such a thing would only have had to be postulated[either] (i) for preserving the essential predication of one [thing] of another,or (ii) for preserving the knowledge of things, and (iii) [for preserving] thedefinitions of things—which are the reasons Aristotle suggests for Plato’sview [Met. 12.4 1078b27–34].

[Rejection of (i)]: Now (i) does not work, since by the very fact that[the universal] is held to be intrinsic to the thing and really distinct fromthe singular thing, it must be a part of the thing. But a part cannot bepredicated essentially of the thing [as a whole], just as neither matter norform is predicated essentially of the composite. Hence if [something] ispredicated essentially of a thing, it must not supposit for itself, but ratherfor a singular thing. But supposition of this kind can be preserved byholding that something that is not the whole thing, nor part of the thing, bepredicated. Hence, for preserving predication of this sort, it is not necessaryto hold that what is predicated is another thing and yet intrinsic to thething.

For example, that the predication:Man is an animal

or [the predication]:Socrates is an animal

be essential per se primo modo and in quid, can be preserved by holding thatwhat is predicated is neither really the subject nor part of the subject—justas well as [it can be preserved] by holding that what is predicated be anessential part of the subject. For if it were held that what is predicated bean essential part of the subject, I ask: what is denoted by the proposition?Either (a) [it is denoted] that the subject essentially be the very thing thatis predicated—and this is impossible, since the whole is never essentially



nor really its part. Or, (b) it is denoted that that which is genuinely a manis something that is genuinely an animal, that is to say, that that for which‘man’ supposits is the same as that for which ‘animal’ supposits, howsoevermuch the predicate that supposits not be that for which it supposits in thatproposition. But all of this can equally well be preserved by holding thatthe predicate not be the subject, nor part of it, as [it can] by holding that itbe part of it. For it is equally possible that something extrinsic to anothersupposit for it as that a part of it supposit for it. Hence, for preservingthat predication, it is not necessary to postulate something predicable andcommon pertaining to something to be intrinsic to it.

[Confirmation of the Rejection of (i)]: The [rejection of (i)] is con-firmed [as follows]. In that proposition:

Man is an animaleither (a) the terms supposit for themselves, or (b) they do not. [Withregard to (a)]: if it is the case [that the terms supposit for themselves],then this proposition would be false, since those terms are distinct, nor isthe one the other. [With regard to (b)]: if the [terms] do not supposit forthemselves, then, both according to the view recited previously and in truth,[they supposit] for things other than themselves. And it can be appropriatefor something extrinsic to supposit for something other than itself, just asmuch as [for something] intrinsic. Hence [it is not necessary to postulatesomething predicable and common pertaining to something to be intrinsicto it].

[Rejection of (ii)]: Nor is it necessary to postulate [something pred-icable and common pertaining to something to be intrinsic to it] due to(ii), for the same [reason]. It is sufficient for having real knowledge tohave propositions that are per se primo modo and secundo modo. Andthese [propositions] can be had without another thing of this sort—as willbe established in answering some arguments, and as has been proved inthe previous argument. Hence [it is not necessary to postulate somethingpredicable and common pertaining to something to be intrinsic to it].

[Rejection of (iii)]: Nor is it necessary to posit such a [universal] thingdue to (iii), for the same [reason], as will be clear shortly.

[ Five Persuasive Arguments ]

This point can be argued for persuasively by means of some logicalarguments [as follows].

[ First Persuasive Argument ]

First, that which is universally denied of some genus is not a thing perse contained under that genus. For example, if this [proposition]:



No animal is Awere true, A will not be per se contained under [the genus] animal. Butany given universal is universally denied of a genus of this kind, e. g. of thegeneralissimum Substance. For this [proposition]:

No substance is Ais simply true—let A be the universal signified by ‘animal’ |# or that sup-posits for that universal #|—and so too for any other [genus]. Hence nouniversal is some thing really contained under the genus Substance.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss is clear, since a genus is trulypredicated of everything contained per se under that genus.

[Proof of the Minor]: The minor premiss is clear [as follows]. I takethe thing that is brought in by ‘animal’ (according to you [who hold thisview]), and let it be A. Then this [proposition]:

No substance is Ais true. For no incorporeal substance is A, [and] likewise no corporeal sub-stance is A. The last [claim] is clear, since no inanimate body is A, andlikewise no animate body is A. The last [claim] is true, since no animateinsensible body is A, and likewise no animate sensible body is A. The last[claim] is true, since no man is A, no ass is A, and so on for all speciescontained under [the genus] animate sensible body, and hence no sensiblebody is A. This argument—[i. e. the proof of the minor premiss]—holdsthrough that rule [given by] the Philosopher (Top. 2.4 [111a33–34]):

Whatever any given species belonging to some genus is denied of, thatgenus is denied of the same.

Hence if this [proposition]:No substance is A

were true, A is not per se a thing that is contained under that generalissi-mum.

[ Second Persuasive Argument ]

Besides, there is an acceptable consequence from what is lower per seto what is higher, |# namely when the higher and the lower supposit for thethings contained [under themselves], although [the consequence] does notfollow when they supposit for themselves.#| Therefore, [the consequence]:

Man is a species; hence animal is a speciesfollows. And so I ask: how does ‘animal’ supposit [in the consequent]? Ei-ther (a) [the term ‘animal’ supposits] personally, and then this [consequent]is false, even according to those [philosophers who hold this view], since noanimal is a species. Or, (b) [the term ‘animal’ supposits] simply, and then[the consequent] is false, since then ’animal’ supposits for a common thing(according to those [philosophers who hold this view]) as for itself, and that



common thing is not a specialissima but a genus.

[ Third Persuasive Argument ]

Besides, the [consequence]:Every animal is corruptible per se and generable per se; hence this thing(indicating the universal thing brought in by ‘man’) is per se corruptible.

follows. And [the consequence follows] in the same way for all of the mostspecific universals contained under animal. [But] the consequent is false.Therefore, the antecedent [must be false]. And, consequently, [the proposi-tion]:

Every animal is per se corruptiblewould be false. Yet nobody denies this [proposition]. For this [proposition]:

Every body is mobilewould have to be denied for the same reason. And, consequently, [thisproposition]:

Every man is per se risible[would have to be denied], and every proposition in which an attribute(passio) is predicated of its subject with the mark of perseity would inevery case be false—which is absurd.

[Proof of the First Consequence]: The first consequence—[namely “Ev-ery animal is corruptible per se and generable per se; hence this thing (in-dicating the universal thing brought in by ‘man’) is per se corruptible”]—isclear. For there is an acceptable consequence from what is higher, as dis-tributed, to anything per se lower, |# which is a thing contained underit#|.

[Objection]: If it were objected that what is higher is not distributedover all per se lower [items], but only over singulars and not over universals—

[Reply]: Against this, [I say] that anything higher is distributed overthose [elements] to which it is more immediately related. Hence, since ac-cording to you [who hold this view] those universals are more immediate towhat is higher [than are the singulars], [the higher term] will be primarilydistributed over them.

[ Fourth Persuasive Argument ]

Besides, the genus is univocally predicated of the universal thing andthe singular thing—since if not, [the genus] is predicated of them equivo-cally, which the [philosophers who hold this view] deny. Hence [the genus]is equally distributed over one thing and over others. For there is no rea-son to say that it is distributed over one thing per se contained under [it]and not over others; indeed, I might with the same ease say that it is dis-tributed precisely over universal things as much as [it is distributed] over



those [items] that are immediately contained under the genus, and not oversingulars. Likewise, for whatever reason one universal is not distributedover such contained [items], neither is another. Hence a being (ens) is notdistributed over other universals but only over singulars. Consequently, this[proposition]:

Some being is universalwould be literally false—which is denied [by those philosophers who holdthis view].

[ Fifth Persuasive Argument ]

If this [proposition]:The specialissima is a substance

were true, ‘substance’ supposits either (a) simply, or (b) personally. [Withregard to (a)]: if [‘substance’ supposits] simply, then this [proposition] willbe false, since then the specialissima would be a generalissimum. [Withregard to (b)]: if [‘substance’ supposits] personally, [the proposition] willstill be false, since then it supposits for its supposits and for singulars, andconsequently the specialissima would be something singular.

Hence I say that there is no such thing that is universal and intrinsicto those [things] to which it is common.

[ Replies to the Arguments for Burleigh’s View ]

[ Reply to the First Argument ]

When it is accepted [by the argument] that “definition is primarily ofsubstance,” I say that for definition to be of something ‘primarily’ can beunderstood in two ways, [as follows].(A) That [the definition] be of that of which the definition is primarily and

adequately predicated, such that what is defined and the definitionconvert.According to (A), definition is not primarily of substance, since a

definition of this sort is primarily and adequately predicated of no substance.Rather, according to (A), definition is primarily of some one term that isconvertible with the definition, although the term is not really the definition.(What that term is will be stated later, [in Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 8]).

That a definition is of something ‘primarily’ can be understood inanother way, namely:(B) There is something whose parts are primarily expressed by such a

definition.And this [second way in which a definition is of something ’primarily’]

can be understood in two ways, since, like any superlative, ‘primarily’ can



be taken [either]:(B1) positively

or(B2) negatively

[With regard to (B1)]: if [‘primarily’ is taken positively], I still saythat definition is of nothing primarily, since nothing is primarily definable.For there is nothing whose parts should be expressed, except the singular,and the parts of one singular are not expressed through a definition before[the parts of] another [singular are expressed by the same definition]. [Withregard to (B2)]: [if ’primarily’ is taken negatively], I say that definition isprimarily of substance, since the parts of substance are primarily expressedthrough the definition.

When it is stated [in the first argument for Burleigh’s view] that “def-inition is not primarily of the singular substance,” I say that this is trueaccording to (A), since the definition is primarily and adequately predicatedof no singular substance.

Nevertheless, according to (B2), I say that definition is primarily of thesingular substance, since the parts of [the singular substance] are primarilyexpressed by a definition, and such a definition is not truly predicated ofsome other supposit per se.

An example [of (A)]: rational animal is a definition. This definitionis primarily of the term ‘man,’ since it is primarily and adequately predi-cated of that term. For it is predicated of nothing but what the term ‘man’is predicated of. The definition, if it should supposit personally, is trulypredicated of everything of which the term ‘man,’ when [‘man’] has per-sonal supposition, is predicated. Hence the definition and what is definedconvert, since for some [terms] to be convertible is for whatever the one ispredicated of so too the other is [predicated of], and conversely—if they wereto supposit personally, [that is], because, in the case of convertible [terms],it is always necessary that something be predicated of the one [of the pair]suppositing otherwise than personally that is not predicated of the other,and conversely. For example, ‘man’ and ‘risible’ convert, and yet risible isan attribute of man and man is not an attribute of man. According to (A),then, this definition rational animal is primarily of the term ‘man,’ whoseparts, nevertheless, are not expressed through the definition.

According to (B1), this definition is primarily of nothing, because onlythe parts of Socrates and Plato are expressed through the definition. Forjust as nothing is a rational animal except Socrates and Plato (and so onfor the other singular [men]), so too are the parts of nothing else expressedby the definition, and yet the parts of Socrates are not expressed before



[the parts] of Plato [are expressed], nor conversely. Hence the parts of none[of the men] are primarily expressed, namely such that the parts of one areexpressed before the parts of any other.

According to (B2), the parts of Socrates are primarily expressed by thedefinition, and likewise the parts of Plato [are primarily expressed by thedefinition], since the parts of nothing else are expressed as primary. And so,understanding ‘what is defined as primary’ in this way, I say that Socratesis what is defined as primary, and likewise Plato [is what is defined asprimary], and so on for any given man. For this definition is truly predicatedof anything that is such. Nor is [the definition] truly predicated of anythingelse that supposits for itself, but [it is predicated] only of those [terms] thatsupposit for singular men. Accordingly, if ‘man’ in the proposition:

Man is a rational animalwere to have supposited for something other than a singular man, that[proposition] would have been simply false. And thus nothing is imagin-able as a rational animal except this man or that [man], and so on for therest. Consequently, for the same reason, the real parts of nothing else areexpressed through that definition save the parts of this man and that one,and so on for the other singular [men].

[ Three Objections to the Reply to the First Argument ]

[First Objection]: The definition and what is defined are the samething. But the term ‘man’ is not the same thing as that definition. Hencethat term is not defined primarily.

[Second Objection]: Besides, the parts of no singular are expressedprimarily through the definition, since the definition is the principle of per-fectly knowing that of which the parts are primarily expressed through thedefinition. But the parts of no singular are perfectly known through thedefinition, since the [parts] of one [are known] no more than [the parts]of another, and thus either [the parts] of none or [the parts] of any given[singular are perfectly known through the definition]. But it is certain thatit is not [the parts] of any given [singular]. Hence [the parts] of none [areperfectly known through the definition].

[Third Objection]: The Philosopher says that definition is primarilyof substance ([Met. 7.4 1030b4–14]), and he says that singular substance isnot defined (Met. 7.15 1039b20–1040a10]). But [the Philosopher] does notequivocate. Hence another substance, which is not singular, is defined.

[ Replies to the Three Objections ]

[Reply to the First Objection]: With regard to the first of these [ob-jections], I say that the definition and what is defined are never the same



thing. For just as they are not the same term, so too they are not the samething. Still, this point notwithstanding, [the definition and what is defined]supposit for the same thing and precisely for the same thing; nor is something signified primarily and principally by one that is not signified by theother; nor is anything extrinsic connoted by either of them. And the au-thorities understand it in this way, should they say that the definition andwhat is defined are one thing, namely because they have one significate. Theauthorities—and also some modern [thinkers]—fully express this intention,although some of them do not point it out, when they frequently say thatthe definition and what is defined bring in the same thing and that theysignify the same thing. Consequently, they are not the same thing, just asneither are two signs or “bringers-in” one significate or what is brought in.

[Reply to the Second Objection]: With regard to the second [objec-tion], I say that the definition is not always the principle of perfectly knowinganything of which it is the definition. For sometimes—as will be establishedlater [in Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 5 (478.8–479.7)]—that of which there is a definitioncan be perfectly known without any definition. But it is quite true thatwhen a definition is had, the parts of something of which [the definition] isthe definition can be known to be in that of which it is the definition. Forexample, once diverse men are known, and are known in their diverse cir-cumstances, eventually this definition rational animal is acquired, namelyby knowing that every man is a rational animal. When this definition ishad by someone, if some man of whom he previously had no notion werepresented to him, [then] in virtue of the notion of the aforementioned suchdefinition he knows that that man, whom he did not know in himself exceptconfusedly (since he does not apprehend any given part of him distinctly),has really distinct parts, namely a body and an intellective soul. And hewould not know this unless he were to have and know that the stated defi-nition is a definition that is common to all men. Thus the definition in thisway leads to a notion—which is somehow distinct—of a singular thing, that[the definition] is of ’primarily’, according to (B2) above, but only whenthere co-exists [with the definition] a confused notion of the singular thing.Still, that singular thing is not strictly known distinctly through that defi-nition, but loosely, namely since [the things] predicable of it, which signifydistinct parts of the singular thing, are known. But how [they are known]will be stated later.

[Reply to the Third Objection]: With regard to the third [objection],I say that it is not unacceptable for the Philosopher to equivocate in dif-ferent passages, especially when in one passage he fully expresses that he isequivocating.



Alternatively, as regards the Philosopher’s and the Commentator’sintent in the different passages in Met. 7 ([which are cited in the first argu-ment for Burleigh’s view]), it can be said that they would frequently take’substance’ for a name or a term signifying substance. And then I say thatdefinition is primarily of substance, i. e. [the definition] is primarily and ad-equately predicated of a common name or [common] term that preciselybrings in a singular substance. And according to (A), as stated, definitionis not primarily of the singular substance.

[ Replies to the Confirmations of the First Argument ]

[Reply to the First Confirmation]: I say that no thing in the genusSubstance is definable according to (A), but rather [only] according to (B2).[Furthermore], I say that not any given substance ought to be put into itsdefinition, but rather terms precisely signifying substances ought to be put[into its definition]. And that is the way predicables are called ‘substantial,’namely [because] they are predicables that bring in substances alone. TheCommentator calls predicables ‘substantial’ in this fashion in Met. 7 com. 11[Iuntina 8 fol. 76rb], where he says that only

Three predicables are substantial, namely genus, differentia, and defini-tion.

That is: whatever is predicable of substance and only brings in substance iseither genus or differentia or definition. Nevertheless, these [predicables]—namely genus, differentia, and definition—are not substances, but are onlysigns bringing in substances. They are put into the definition, and notthe substances brought in by the genus and differentia, because nothing isbrought in by the genus animal except only something singular, and yetnothing of the sort is put into the definition.

[Reply to the Second Confirmation]: The same point [holds]. Thegenus and differentia, which are put into the definition of the species, arenot substances but precisely bring in substances, connoting no accident.Nevertheless, they do not pertain to the essence of the species. But it doesnot follow due to this [fact] that such a definition be through something addi-tional, since a definition is not called ‘through something additional’ becausesomething is put into that definition that does not pertain to the essence ofwhat is defined, but rather because something is put [into that definition]that brings in and signifies something beyond the essence of what is defined.For instance, the definition ‘whiteness is a discernible color of sight’ is [adefinition] through something additional, since the term ‘sight’ put here isbeyond the whole essence of whiteness and brings in something beyond thewhole essence of whiteness. And when it is said [in the second confirmationof the first argument for Burleigh’s view] that “substance is only defined



through substances, according to the Philosopher (Met. 7.4 [1030b4–14])”—I say that this [remark] should be understood as follows: that substance isonly defined through predicables bringing in precisely substances and notsome accident.

[Reply to the Third Confirmation]: I state that the definition is pred-icated of what is defined according to (A), not for itself, but for what isdefined according to (B2). For in the proposition:

Every man is a rational animalthe subject is what is defined according to (A), and it does not supposit foritself but for singulars, which is what is defined according to (B2).

[ Reply to the Second Argument ]

I state that real science is not always about things insofar as it is aboutthose [items] that are immediately known, but rather about other [items]that only supposit for things.

To understand this point—and because many things have previouslybeen and ought to be said for the sake of any [readers] who are untrainedin logic—it should be known that any given science, whether it be real orrational, is only about propositions insofar as it is about those [items] thatare known, since propositions alone are known.

Furthermore, according to Boethius (In De int. [REF]), the proposi-tion has a three-fold being: in the mind, in speech, and in writing. Thatis to say, some propositions are only concepts and understood, some arespoken, and some are written. Thus, if there were some other signs insti-tuted to signify in the same way as utterances and inscriptions [signify],a proposition would exist in those [new signs], just as there are in these[utterances and inscriptions]. Hence just as the spoken proposition is trulycomposed out of spoken words, and the written proposition is composed outof written words, so too the proposition that is only conceived is composedout of concepts or understandings (|# or by means of concepts or under-standings #|) that belong to the soul. Hence just as every spoken word canbe a part of a proposition in speech, so too every understanding can be partof a proposition in the mind—|# according to one view, or [every] conceptaccording to another view#|.

Moreover, just as a spoken word that is part of a spoken propositioncan have multiple supposition—namely material and personal and simple[supposition], as is clear in these spoken propositions that are heard by thebodily ears:(1) Man is a monosyllabic word

in which that word [‘man’] is taken materially, since that word (in thatproposition is true) there stands for and supposits for itself; likewise, [in the



proposition]:(2) A man is running

[the word ‘man’] there stands for [something] personally, because itsupposits for men themselves, not for the word [‘man’], since that word isnot able to run; furthermore, in that [proposition]:(3) Man is a species

that word [‘man’] supposits simply for something common—so too aconsimilar part of a proposition in the mind [can have multiple supposition].Putting aside every spoken word, since [the mental proposition] does not be-long to any language at all—just as Augustine says in The Trinity 15.10.19that there is some word that does not belong to any language—that part, Isay, of such a [mental] proposition can have simple supposition, and then itsupposits for something common; or it can have personal supposition, andthen it stands for and supposits for the very things that are signified, if itsignifies [significaret/significent] things; or it can have material supposition,and then it stands for and supposits for itself.

Due to this fact, I reply to the [second] argument [for Burleigh’s view]that just as the spoken proposition:

Every man is risibleis truly known—for just as it is true so too is it truly known, since everytruth can be known; moreover, none but a madman can deny that somespoken propositions are true and some false; who would say that he neverheard (by bodily ears) any lie? yet nothing can be heard by the bodily earsexcept a spoken word, just as nothing can be seen by the bodily eyes exceptcolor or light; hence some propositions precisely composed out of spokenwords are true, e. g. these [propositions]:

Every man is an animalEvery man is risibleEvery species is predicated in quid of many [things] differing in numberThe genus is predicated of many [things] differing in species

and so on for the other [propositions] that can be known—so too the propo-sition in the mind, which does not belong to any language, is truly known.

Now it is the case that the science of some spoken propositions ofthis sort is real and [the science] of other [spoken propositions] is rational,and nevertheless the [things] that are known and all their parts are trulyspoken words. Still, the parts of some [spoken propositions] supposit andstand not for themselves (namely [for] words), but for real external things(e. g. for subjects). Hence science of those [spoken] propositions is called‘real.’ Furthermore, other parts of other [spoken] propositions stand for themental concepts themselves; hence science of them can be called ‘rational’



or ’logical.’ And the science of these spoken propositions:Man is a monosyllabic word

andAnimal is a trisyllabic word

can be called ‘grammatical.’ Still, all such [spoken] propositions and alltheir parts are spoken words. And they are only said to pertain to differentsciences because the parts of different propositions supposit for different[subjects], [namely] because some supposit for things, others for mentalconcepts, and others for the spoken words themselves.

Hence it is in the same way, proportionately, for propositions in themind, which truly can be known by us in this life: all the terms of thosepropositions are only concepts and they are not the external substancesthemselves. Nevertheless, the terms of some propositions stand and suppositpersonally, namely for the external things themselves—for example, in such[propositions] as:

Everything mobile is partly in the terminus a quo [and partly in theterminus ad quem].Every man is risible.Every triangle has three [angles equal to two right angles].

and so on for the other [cases]. Hence the science of such propositions issaid to be real. However, the terms of other propositions supposit simply,namely for the concepts themselves—for example, in these [propositions]:

Every demonstration is based on primary and true [premisses].Man is a species.

and so on for the other [cases]. Hence the science of such [propositions] issaid to be rational. Hence it is not relevant to real science whether the termsof the proposition that is known are things outside the soul or are only inthe soul, so long as they stand and supposit for those external things. Thusfor real science it is not necessary to postulate some such universal thingsthat are really distinct from singular things.

Due to this fact, I say to the logical form of the [second] argumentthat ‘science is about things’ can be understood in three ways [as follows]:

(i) [‘Science is about things’] because the thing itself is known.There is no science of substantial things according to (i), especially becausenothing but the complex is known. However, the complex is not outside thesoul, except perhaps in speech or in a consimilar sign.(ii) [‘Science is about things’] because real things are parts of that which

is known.It is not necessary for real science to be about external things according to(ii).



(iii) [‘Science is about things’] because real things are those [items] forwhich what is known supposit.

Real science is about things according to (iii). But [real science] is notabout universal things, since no supposition for them takes place. For inthe mental proposition:

Every body is composed out of a singular matter and [a singular] formno supposition for some universal body takes place, since no such body(even if it were to exist) is composed out of a singular matter and a singularform. But science is about singular things according to (iii), since the termssupposit for singulars themselves. And the Philosopher does not deny thatscience is about singulars according to (iii), but [he denies that science isabout singulars] according to (ii), since the terms of the propositions thatare known are not singular things but are universals, about which there isscience according to (ii), for universals are the terms of the propositionsthat are known. And if he were at times to be found [to say] that science isabout universal things, he ought to be understood as [saying] that scienceis about universals that are predicable ¡of¿ things.

Briefly, then, regarding the Philosopher’s intent, it should be said thatreal science is not distinguished from rational science in that real science isabout things, such that the things themselves are the propositions that areknown (or parts of those propositions that are known), and that rational[science] is not about things in this way, but rather [real science is distin-guished from rational science] in that the parts, namely the terms of thepropositions that are known by real science, stand and supposit for things,whereas the terms of the propositions known by rational science are notthis way but those terms stand and supposit for other [items], [namely forconcepts or understandings]. Clear examples of the former are:

Every man is risibleAll men are capable of learning

and so on for the other [propositions] that are known by real science. [Clearexamples] of the latter are:

The genus is predicated in quid of [things] differing in speciesThe most specific species is only predicated of individuals

and so on for the other [propositions that are known by rational science].[ Reply to the Third Argument ]

I state that this word ‘man’ does not primarily signify some thing, ifthe ‘primarily’ be taken positively. However, if it be taken negatively, thenI state that [‘man’] signifies some thing primarily, since it signifies primarilyany given singular thing of which it is predicated.

[Objection]: If it were objected that then the word [‘man’] would be



an equivocal word, since an equivocal word is that which equally primarilysignifies many—

[Reply]: I reply that it happens that some word “[equally] primarily”signifies many in three ways, [as follows].

(i) [It happens that some word “equally primarily” signifies many”] be-cause it is thus imposed on one as if it were not imposed on another,and it is imposed by two impositions.For example, this is the case for the name ‘Socrates’ imposed on two

men, since the one person imposing this name ‘Socrates’ on this man didnot know anything about another man, and in the same way [the other]person imposing [this name ‘Socrates’] on that man did not know anythingof this one. A word of this sort is equivocal, and is called ’equivocal bychance.’(ii) It happens that some word “equally primarily” signifies many because

it is equally imposed on many, but by one imposition, such that theperson imposing [the word] no more intended that it signify this thingmore than another [thing].If nothing further should happen, the word can be called equivocal—

yet not [equivocal] by chance, but in some way [equivocal] by design. Forexample, if someone were to impose this name ‘Peter’ on precisely thesethree men, and does this by one imposition (|# which nevertheless is equiv-alent to many impositions #|), then this name [‘Peter’] is not equivocal bychance . Nor is it strictly univocal, since to any given univocal word therecorresponds one concept that is convertible with it. However, there is noconcept that is convertible with this word [‘Peter’], since either (a) the ulti-mate concept is either specific, and consequently common to all individualsof the same ratio; or (b) [the ultimate concept] is a concept proper to someindividual, and consequently there is no middle that is precisely commonto these [three] individuals and not to others. Thus the word [‘Peter’] isnot strictly univocal but rather equivocal, and this by design, and this isbecause it is imposed on these [three men] together in virtue of a certaindeliberation.(iii) It happens that some word “equally primarily” signifies many because

it is imposed by one imposition on all those [things] to which a de-terminate concept, possessed by the person imposing [the word], iscommon, such that they would be (as it were) ordained as signs—notthat the word would primarily signify that concept, but because itis imposed for signifying primarily and precisely all that of which theconcept is predicated, such that if the concept were predicated of someat one time and others at another time, the word varies its significates



in the same way.A word of this kind, equally primarily signifying many according to

(iii), is simply univocal. The word ‘man’ is of this kind. Hence [‘man’] issimply univocal. For the person imposing this word ‘man’ intended that itsignify every thing of which the determinate mental concept is predicated,such that when this concept is predicated of a thing that the word signifyit, and when not, not.

[ Reply to the Fourth Argument ]

I state that (|# according to one view #|) the intellect, understand-ing man [but] not understanding some singular man, does not understandone thing of the genus Substance, but only understands a certain mentalconcept. What that concept is will be stated later, [in Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 8].|# But according to another view any given singular man is genuinely un-derstood, not by a proper or equivalent cognition but only by a common[cognition]#|.

[ Reply to the Fifth Argument ]

I state that for something to be the “adequate object of some potency”can be understood in two ways, [as follows].

(i) [Something can be said to be the “adequate object of some potency”]because it is something apprehensible by the potency primarily, suchthat nothing is apprehended by the potency except under that ratio.

Now according to (i), I state that nothing is the adequate object of somepotency—and especially of a sensitive [potency], since this color is equallyprimarily apprehended by sight as that [color], and nothing is apprehendedbefore this color or that one, and so on for the other sensitive potencies.(ii) Something can be said to be the “adequate object of some potency”

not literally, but in that it is equivalent to one designated2 act, whichwill be this: “there is something of which being an object of such apotency or being apprehensible by such a potency is primarily andadequately predicated.”

According to (ii), there is some adequate object for any given sensitive po-tency. For there is something of which being the object of such a potency isadequately and primarily predicated. Nevertheless, the truth of the matteris that it is not an object of such a potency, nor can it be apprehended—neither per se nor per accidens—by such a potency.

For example, what is common—[for example] color—is that of whichapprehensible by the power of sight is primarily and adequately predicated.

2 Reading signato for significato.



For what is common, namely color, is predicated of all that which is ap-prehensible by the power of sight, and of only such—and this according tothe view that holds that light is not apprehended per se (whether this viewbe true or false is irrelevant to the matter at hand). Nevertheless, what iscommon, [namely] color, can be apprehended by the power of sight neitherper se nor per accidens, since the power of sight is only able to apprehendthe singular thing, or at least [the power of sight] is not able to apprehendthe genus.

[Reply to the Proof of the Major]: When it is claimed that “nothing isthe adequate object of a sensitive potency except a genuine thing,” it shouldbe said that this claim is literally true. Nevertheless, in that [the claim] isequivalent to this designated act: “being the object of a sensitive potencyis predicated of nothing but a genuine thing” (|# namely [a thing] that isoutside the soul #|), [the claim] is simply false. For being the object of thepower of sight is predicated of what is common, color, by saying “everycolor is visible.” Still, what is common is not a genuine thing |# outsidethe soul #|. The reason is because being the object of the power of sight isnot predicated of what is common for itself but rather for what falls underit. Hence, in a proposition of this kind, [what is common] has personal andnot simple supposition. Indeed, the [proposition]:

Color is visibleis true only for a singular color.

[ Reply to the Sixth Argument ]

I state that ‘real attribute’ is taken in two ways:(i) [‘Real attribute’ is taken] for something that is a genuine thing and

an accident of another thing.(ii) [‘Real attribute’] is strictly called a real attribute—that is, it is strictly

called an ‘attribute’ because it is predicable per se secundo modo, andit is called ‘real’ because it is an attribute bringing in a genuine thingoutside the soul, yet it is not [itself] a thing outside the soul.With regard to (i): I state that the subject of a real attribute is a

genuine thing, and a genuine singular thing. And in this way, an attributeis no more predicated of many than is its subject (which is a singular thing).

With regard to (ii): the subject of a real attribute is not a thingoutside the soul but a certain mental concept suppositing for things outsidethe soul. For example, in this proposition:

Every man is risibleit is clear that the subject is not some thing outside the soul but rather isa certain mental concept suppositing precisely for singular men themselves,since for the truth of that proposition it is precisely sufficient that ‘risible’



is truly predicated of any given particular man, and it is not required that[‘risible’] be predicated of any universal thing. For then a universal of thiskind could never be sufficiently induced from its singulars—which is againsttrue logic.

An argument for the principal conclusion can be constructed on thebasis of this, since all universal propositions are equally induced from theirsingulars. But there is some universal proposition that is sufficiently inducedfrom its singulars such that the predicate is incompatible with anythingother than singulars—for example, the [universal proposition]:

Every man is singular and numerically oneHence singulars suffice for verifying such universal propositions a parte rei,and so it is completely useless to postulate universal things of this kind.And the whole reason is because the terms in such propositions suppositpersonally and not simply (i. e. they supposit for singulars and not for them-selves).

[Objection]: If it were objected that this proposition:Man is primarily risible

is true; hence either (a) [it is true] in that ‘man’ has personal supposition—and then [the proposition] is simply false, since no man is primarily risible;or (b) [it is true] in that [‘man’] supposits for a concept—and then too[the proposition] is false, since then it is denoted that the concept is pri-marily risible, which is obviously false, since that concept neither primarilynor secondarily is able to laugh; hence [the proposition] must be true inthat it supposits for something mediate between the singular thing and theconcept –

[Reply]: I reply, as stated to the fifth argument, that [the proposition]:Man is primarily risible

is literally false, just as the [proposition]:Something is the primary and adequate object of some potency

[is literally false]. Yet it is true according to the understanding of those whospeak correctly, because they understand one designated act through that[proposition], namely this: “risible is primarily predicated of man.” Andin that designated act, ‘man’ has simple supposition and supposits for aconcept, since being risible is primarily predicated of that concept, [though]not for itself but for singular things. Hence in the corresponding exercisedact, which will be this [proposition]:

Some man is risible‘man’ will have personal supposition. Just as in the designated act “thegenus is predicated of the species” [the term] ‘genus’ supposits for a concept(since the concept of the genus is predicated of the concept of the species not



for itself but for things), so too in the corresponding exercised act, whichought not to be exercised as:

The species is a genusbut rather as:

Man is an animalthe terms will have personal supposition.

[ Replies to the Confirmations of the Sixth Argument ]

[Reply to the First Confirmation]: I state that sometimes an attributeis present in many through a common nature outside the soul, since there issomething that is the same in them, remaining in them successively. How-ever, sometimes [an attribute] is said to be present in them through thecommon nature not through informing [them] but rather through predica-tion, since [the attribute] is predicated primarily of the common nature, i. e.of something common to their natures. The Philosopher understands it inthe second of these two ways [in the passage cited in the first confirmationof the sixth argument for Burleigh’s view], as [will be shown in Ord. 1 d. 2q. 6].

[Reply to the Second Confirmation]: The same point applies to the[second confirmation]. For numerically the same transparency only remainsif numerically the same subject were to remain, since even according tothose [philosophers who hold this view] an accident that is numerically oneis primarily in a subject that is numerically one.

[ Reply to the Seventh Argument ]

I state that a natural agent, in acting, tends to a genuine singularthing, since it tends to that which is primarily and per se produced. Butthe singular thing is primarily and per se produced. Hence [the naturalagent tends to the singular thing]. And when it is said [in the seventhargument for Burleigh’s view] that [the natural agent] tends to one singularthing no more to than another, since it is equally related to all, I reply thatit determinately tends to one [singular thing], namely that [singular thing]that will be determinately produced [by the agent]. Accordingly, since thesame [singular thing] is what is tended towards by the agent before andafter [the production], and since the agent tends to some one [singular thing]determinately as primary, that is the thing tended towards by the naturalagent. Nor is the natural agent equally related to any given singular, just asnot any given [singular] is indifferently produced. More will be said aboutthis point, nevertheless, in [Ord. 4 q. 1].

[Objection]: If a quibbling objection were raised against this [reply]and against the other preceding [replies] that this [proposition]:



Some person promises that he will give another person some horseis true, and, at that point, I [who raise this objection] ask: either he promisesto the other person (a) some singular thing; (b) a universal [thing]; or(c) a concept. [With regard to (a)]: Not a singular thing, since he nomore promises one [horse] rather than another. Thus either he promises nohorse, and so could keep his promise while giving no horse, or he promisesany horse whatever, and so could not keep his promise except by givingany horse whatever. [With regard to (b): If he were to promise a universalthing, what was to be proved will be established. [With regard to (c)]: If[he were to promise] a concept, then this is not true, since he promises agenuine thing. Likewise, then he could keep his promise while not givingsome real horse but only a certain concept.—

[Reply]: That quibbling only ought to have been put in here becausesome [philosophers], proclaiming themselves to know logic, ponder suchchildish matters, due to which they hold many absurdities regarding thesupposition of terms. But treating this would be an exceedingly lengthyand tedious matter. Hence I pass over it, and state that he promises agenuine singular thing, since in that proposition:

He promises another person a horsethe [term] ‘horse’ supposits personally for singular horses. Accordingly,such a person would never fulfill his promise if he were to give somethinguniversal, [but] only were he to give some particular horse. Accordingly,just as he promises a singular thing by saying “I promise you one particularhorse,” so too [he promises a singular thing] by saying “I promise you ahorse.”

And it does not follow when it is said [in the objection] that he no morepromises one singular thing rather than another, and so either promises no[horse] or any given [horse]. Rather, it is the fallacy of ’figure of speech,’going from one mode of supposition to another—just as [the same fallacy ispresent] in arguing as follows:

Every man is a singular man, but is no more one singular man thananother; hence every man is either any given singular man or nobody.

For in the first [premiss] ‘singular man’ supposits merely confusedly, and inthe second [premiss ‘singular man’] supposits confusedly and distributively.So it is in the case at hand. In the proposition:

I promise you a horsethe [term] ‘horse’ supposits merely confusedly (or in some similar way), sinceit does not supposit confusedly and distributively, and it is the case thatany given singular is inferred under a disjunction, such that the consequentwould be a disjunctive predicate and not a disjunctive [proposition]. For



[the consequence]:I promise you a horse, and so I promise you this one or that one or thatother one (and so on for all present or future [horses])

correctly follows, but the disjunctive [proposition] does not follow; indeed,[the consequence]:

I promise you a horse; hence I promise you this horse or I promise youthat horse or I promise you that other horse (and so on for the other[horses])

does not follow—just as [the consequence]:Every man is an animal; hence every man is this animal or that animal(and so on for each [man])

correctly follows, but the disjunctive [consequence]:Every man is an animal; hence every man is this animal or every manis that animal (and so on for the other [men])

does not follow. It is so in many such cases, since often the predicate-termhas merely confused supposition, or some [supposition] consimilar to [merelyconfused supposition], without a preceding distributive sign. |# Yet at thepresent I do not care whether it literally would have merely confused sup-position or not, and so #| let these matters be omitted, since they pertainto logicians. Nevertheless, ignorance of these matters produces many dif-ficulties in theology and in other real sciences, which, if these and similarchildish matters were perfectly known, would be quite easy or would includeno difficulty at all.

[ Reply to the Eighth Argument ]

I state that the generalissimum is a mental concept. Yet how it is onegenus will be clear in [the reply to the tenth argument].

[ Reply to the Ninth Argument ]

I state that Porphyry holds that the species is one and collective ofmany into one nature—not a real [nature], but into one [term] that bringsin the natures of many. Hence it is called one nature ‘by signification,’ sinceit is one [term] bringing in many [items]. And in the same way, [Porphyry’sremark] “many men are one man by participation in the species” [shouldbe understood] as neither numerically one man nor one common man, sinceeven according to those [philosophers who hold this view] no man is the com-mon man. Rather, [Porphyry] holds that one ‘man’ is predicated of manymen contained under one species (since another participation is not possi-ble). That is, one term of which ’man’ is predicated when ‘man’ suppositssimply, yet if it were predicated of many men it would supposit personally.

[ Reply to the Tenth Argument ]



It should be said that since the Philosopher [writes] as a logician in theCategories, he principally treats names and terms in propositions, and sofrequently attributes something to a term in a proposition that is attributedto a thing, and sometimes conversely. And the reason for this is that thepure logician does not have to say whether universals, which are the termsof propositions, be things outside [the soul] or only in the soul, or in speechor in writing, and so he does not draw the distinction.

Thus I state that his understanding in the [complete] passage [partiallycited in the tenth argument for Burleigh’s view] is this. Of these [things]that exist, i. e. of the names and terms bringing in those [things] that aretruly outside the soul and genuine things, some are said of a subject,i. e. [some are said] of primary substance, since the very terms themselvesare said of primary substance not for themselves but for primary substanceitself, and nevertheless are not in a subject, i. e. they do not bring insome thing existing in the subject. And, conversely now, some are saidof a subject, not for themselves but for a thing, and are in a subject,i. e. they bring in a thing existing in a subject. Thus the term always has thesame supposition in the designated act, and yet in the two correspondingexercised acts it has varied supposition, since in one [exercised act it has]simple or material [supposition], and in the other personal [supposition].

[ Reply to the Eleventh Argument ]

I state that [in the cited passage] there is no division of somethinginto distinct things when [substance] is divided into primary and secondary[substance], but there is a division of those [items] that are put into thecategorial line, of which some can be genuine things and others are simplynot things that are substances. The reason for this is that substance, whichis a generalissimum, is predicated of all such [items] per se and in quid.Although it is predicated of some [items] per se, e. g. [it is predicated] ofthings (|# if a thing be predicated#|)—however, it is predicated of other[items], e. g. [it is predicated] of concepts, not for themselves but for things,since in such propositions the terms do not supposit for themselves andsimply, but rather [they supposit] for singulars themselves and personally.For example, in this proposition:

Man is an animaland in this one:

Every animal is a bodyand in this one:

Every body is a substancethe terms do not supposit for themselves and simply, but instead for singu-lars and personally. Still, any of these [propositions] is per se primo modo.



Likewise, the term ‘substance’ is predicated of any of those [terms]. In thesame way, and on this account, those terms are put into a categorial line;and these terms alone (or consimilar [terms]) are related as higher-level andlower-level. Thus the division of substance, which is a generalissimum, isinto those [items] that are predicated of many and into those [items] thatare not predicated of many.

[Reply to the Confirmation of the Eleventh Argument]: Species arecalled “more substance than the genus” because some more imperfect [el-ements] are brought in through the genus than through the species (|# atleast [through] some [species] #|), since [species] are closer along the cate-gorial line to the individual itself, which alone is a real thing (res) in thegenus, even according to the Philosopher’s arguments that he puts forwardin the same passage [cited in the confirmation of the eleventh argument forBurleigh’s view].

[Objection]: If the objection were raised [to this reply to the con-firmation] that the Philosopher assigns some properties to be common toprimary and secondary substance that are only suitable to a thing, such as[the property] being susceptible to contraries—

[Reply]: It should be stated that [Aristotle] says that they are commonnot through real inherence, but rather through true predication. And such[properties] can be truly predicated of concepts, not for themselves but forthings. For example, being an animal is truly predicated of this word ‘man’when this proposition:

Man is an animalis spoken. Yet [the property being an animal] is not predicated of this word‘man’ for itself, but rather for the singular thing for which this word ‘man’supposits. Accordingly, it is not denoted that this word ‘man’ is an animal,but that the thing that this word signifies is truly an animal.

[ Reply to the Twelfth Argument ]

The same point [applies]. That [division] is a division of terms bringingin genuine things, since some are universals and others singulars, and theyare called ‘things’ because they bring in genuine things.

[ Reply to the Thirteenth Argument ]

I reply that identity is threefold: (i) real, because it is appropriateto real things themselves; but (ii) numerical identity is appropriate to onething alone; furthermore, (iii) specific identity is not appropriate to oneindividual alone but is appropriate to many individuals, such that it is notpredicated of any given one [individual] but rather of many [individuals].And that this is the Philosopher’s intent is clearly obvious, since in the same



passage he says ([Top. 1.7 103a8–14]):[Things] [are the same] in number of which the names are many, whereasthe thing is one, for example a tunic and a coat. [Things are the same]in species that, although they are many, are indifferent according to thespecies, for example a man [is indifferent] to a man, and a horse to ahorse. For any given [things] that fall under the same species are called‘the same in species.’ Likewise, any given [things] that fall under thesame genus are called the same in genus, for example a man and a horse.

From this passage it is clear that ‘the same in species’ or ‘the same in genus’are not said of anything that is not an individual. Instead, they are said ofthe very individuals themselves, such that Socrates and Plato are the samein species, and this man is the same in genus as that horse—that is to say,as Aristotle explains, that Socrates and Plato are contained under the samespecies, and this man is contained under the same genus under which thathorse is contained. |# Thus I concede that there is some identity that is lessthan unity or numerical identity, but such identity is not of some universal,but rather is of the singulars themselves taken together, as Socrates andPlato are one in species. #|

[ Replies to the Positive Principal Arguments ]

I reply to the first [positive] principal argument that this [proposition]:The universal man and a particular man are essentially one

is literally false. Nor does the Commentator intend this. Instead, he intendsthat they are one essentially because one is essentially predicated of theother and brings in the essence of the other, yet it does not really pertainto the essence of the other.

It should be stated [in reply] to the second [positive principal argu-ment] that universals, whether they be incorruptible or not, are not incor-ruptible real things (res). Nevertheless, they can be called ‘incorruptible’because, according to the Philosopher’s intent, being is always predicatedof them, such that this [proposition]:

Man existsis always true (|# if that proposition be formulated#|). However, being isnot always predicated of some sensible singular, according to the intentionof the Philosopher, since this [proposition]:

This exists(picking out any given singular) is contingent.

[ End of the Question ]




Secondly, I ask whether what is universal and univocal is a genuinething outside the soul that is really distinct from the individual, yet reallyexisting in it, really multiplied and varied.


That it is so: It is a thing outside the soul that is really distinct fromthe individual. For, according to the Commentator in his remarks on Met. 7com. 46 [Iuntina 8 fol. 93rb]:

‘Universal’ does not signify substance, unless [it signifies] the substancethat ‘part’ signifies.

Hence the thing signified by the universal is a part. But the part is reallydistinguished from the whole. Hence [the universal is really distinct fromand existing in the individual]. Moreover, the fact that [the universal] ismultiplied and varied is clear by the same point, since the part is varied inrelation to the variation of the whole of which it is a part, and this even ifit be a part of many wholes at once.

For the opposite position: Every thing outside the soul that is reallydistinct from the individual, yet really existing in it and really multipliedand varied, is an essential part of it or an accident of it. But between thewhole and the part (likewise between the subject and the accident) there isa proportion such that if one were singular the other will be singular. Henceevery such thing is genuinely singular, and, consequently, is not universal.

[ William of Alnwick’s View ]

There is one view regarding this question that is attributed to theSubtle Doctor by some people, just as the view recited and disproved in thepreceding question is also attributed to him by others. And it is the viewthat the universal is a genuine thing outside the soul that is really distinct[from other things] by means of one contracting differentia, yet really ismultiplied and varied through a contracting differentia of this kind.


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[ Four Arguments Against Alnwick’s View ]

But, on the contrary, this view seems to be simply false.

[ First Argument ]

Every thing that is really distinct from another thing is distinguishedfrom that other thing either of itself or through something intrinsic to it.But the humanity that is in Socrates, according to this view, is really distin-guished from the humanity that is in Plato. Hence [the humanity that is inSocrates] is distinguished from [the humanity that is in Plato] either of itselfor through something intrinsic [to it]. Hence, putting aside all contractingdifferentiae, these humanities are distinguished. But they are not distin-guished in species. Hence [they are distinguished] numerically. Hence eachof them is numerically one and singular of itself, without the contractingdifferentia.

[ Objections and Replies ]

[First Objection]: If you were to claim that these humanities are notper se in the species, since precisely individuals are per se in the species,and so [these humanities] are not of themselves distinguished numerically—

[Reply]: This [objection] is worthless. For although forms are not perse in the species, but rather only composites [are per se in the species],nevertheless two forms, even putting aside the matters, are genuinely dis-tinguished numerically—whence two separated souls are numerically distin-guished. Hence notwithstanding the fact that the humanities of Socratesand Plato are not per se in a species, they are, nevertheless, numericallydistinguished, putting aside any real differentiae whatsoever.

[Second Objection]: If you were to claim that these humanities areonly distinguished through their contracting differentiae—

[First Reply]: The humanity of Socrates, according to you [who holdthis view], is really distinguished from the differentia contracting that hu-manity. Hence it is really distinguished either (i) of itself, or (ii) throughthat contracting [element]. Not through that contracting [element], sincenothing is distinguished from a through a itself, but rather is especially thesame as a itself through a. Hence this humanity is of itself distinguishedfrom the contracting differentia. Hence there are two things that are reallydistinct of themselves in this case. But this is not possible unless each werenumerically one. Hence that humanity, which is really distinct from thatcontracting difference, is numerically one. Hence it is of itself numericallyone and numerically distinct. Hence it is neither a this nor numerically onethrough the contracting differentia, but rather through itself.



[Second Reply]: Likewise, when anything is really distinguished ofitself through something that is extrinsic to it, it is distinguished of itselffrom anything else that is extrinsic to it for the same reason. Hence if thehumanity of Socrates is really distinguished of itself from the contractingdifferentia, by the same reason it is really distinguished of itself from thehumanity of Plato.

[First Confirmation of the Replies to the Second Objection]: Thispoint is confirmed [as follows]. It does not seem to be a contradictionthat the humanity of Socrates be separated from the contracted differentia,and likewise for the humanity of Plato. Then I ask: that humanity, notvaried, that belonged to Socrates, either (i) is really distinguished fromthe humanity that belonged to Plato, or (ii) is not [really distinguishedfrom the humanity that belonged to Plato]. [With regard to (i)]: if itis [really distinguished from the humanity that belonged to Plato], whatwas to be proved—that they are really distinguished of themselves—hasbeen established, since they are not distinguished through the contractingdifferentiae, since they are not these [contracting differentiae]. [With regardto (ii)]: if they are not really distinguished—on the contrary, it is impossiblefor two things not making [something] one per se to make or to be one perse except through a real composition. Hence those humanities are reallycompounded. Consequently, what was to be proved—that they are reallydistinguished of themselves—has been established, since parts belonging tothe same composite are always really distinguished of themselves or throughsome [elements] intrinsic to them.

[Second Confirmation of the Replies to the Second Objection]: Besides,it is not unacceptable that—at least by divine power—any given absolutething be intuitively seen without the sight of another absolute thing. Hencethe humanity that is in Socrates can be intuitively seen without the con-tracting differentia, and, in the same way, the humanity that is in Plato [canbe intuitively seen without the contracting differentia]. But such a personwill see these [humanities] to be distinguished in place and position—I donot care whether [they are distinguished] by quantity or not, since it is notrelevant at all—and so he will see them to be distinguished. But nobodyknows any [things] distinctly and in particular to be essentially distinguishedunless he were to know in particular the intrinsic distinctive principle. Hencethese humanities are distinguished of themselves, and consequently they are[each] of themselves a this.

[ Second Argument ]

Secondly, I argue [as follows]. If humanity were one in one case andanother in another case, there will be as many specialissimae as there are



individuals. The consequent is false, since then there would be as manygeneralissima as individuals, which seems absurd.

[Proof of the Consequence]: The consequence is clear, since if ‘hu-manity’ were to express the specialissima, [then] either (i) the humanitybelonging to Socrates or [the humanity] belonging to Plato, or (ii) some-thing that is neither the former nor the latter. [With regard to (i)]: if (i)[be granted], then [it expresses] no more the one [humanity] rather thanthe other. Hence there are two humanities in this case, each of which isa specialissima. Consequently, there are two specialissimae. [With regardto (ii)]: if (ii) be granted, I raise a question about that humanity that isneither [the humanity of Socrates] nor [the humanity of Plato]. Either itis a genuine thing outside the soul (and the view disproved in [Ord. 1 d. 2q. 4] reappears), or is only in the soul (and then no universal is outside thesoul).

[Alternative Version of the Second Argument]: In the same way, itcan be argued [as follows]. If man be a species, I raise the question forwhat the [term] ‘man’ supposits: either (i) for a thing outside the soul,or (ii) for a thing in the soul. [With regard to (ii)]: if (ii) [be granted],what was to be proved has been established. [With regard to (i)]: if (i) [begranted], [then] either (a) that thing is Socrates, or it is neither varied normultiplied in Socrates and Plato, and then the first view, [refuted] in [Ord. 1d.2 q. 4], reappears, or (b) it is varied and multiplied, and what was to beproved has been established, [namely] that there are as many specialissimaeas individuals. And it follows from this that no thing is a species, since thenno thing is common, since neither that which is in Socrates nor that whichis in Plato [is common], and there is nothing—by hypothesis—besides them.Hence [no thing is a species].

[ Third Argument ]

Besides, thirdly as follows. That thing that is determined to one andis not indifferent to many is not a universal. But the humanity that isin Socrates, according to you [who hold this view], is determined to one,nor can it be found in another. And, according to this view, there is nohumanity save that which belongs to Socrates or Plato. Hence no thingoutside the soul is universal.

[Objection]: If it were objected that it is not incompatible of itself forthe humanity that is in Socrates to exist along with another contractingdifferentia, but rather it is determined through something extrinsic to thisindividual—

[Reply]: On the contrary, that which through no potency can agreewith many is not really and positively common. Hence if that thing that



is in Socrates through no potency can be in another, it is not really andpositively common. Instead, it will be less common than this form or thismatter, since each of these can, through divine power, be in many (at leastsuccessively).

[ Fourth Argument ]

Besides, just as it is not incompatible with the nature of itself thatit exist with another degree, so too it is not incompatible with the degreeof itself to exist along with another nature. Hence there will be just asmuch commonness in that contracting individual degree as there is in thecontracted nature.

[Confirmation]: This is confirmed [as follows]. According to this view,the contracting individual degree really exists along with many contractednatures, namely along with the nature of all genera and species that arepredicable of the individual. Hence that degree will really be more commonto diverse universal natures than any given nature [is common to] diverseindividuals.

[Objection]: If you [who hold this view] were to say that in this casethere is no commonness through predication, but rather the commonnessbelonging to coexistence—

[Reply]: This [objection] does not work. For there can precisely bea commonness of the common nature with respect to individuals, sinceaccording to this view that universal nature is really distinct from the in-dividual. Hence there is no ¡commonness¿ through predication, but ratheronly through a certain coexistence, or just as a part is common to the whole.

[ Reply to the Question ]

Therefore, I say to the [initial] question that in the individual there isnot any universal nature that is really distinct from the contracting differ-entia, [for the following reasons].

[First Argument]: Such a nature could only be postulated [in theindividual] if it were an essential part of the individual itself. But there isalways a proportion between the whole and the part, such that if the wholebe singular and not common, any given part is proportionately singular inthe same way, since one part cannot be more singular than another. Henceeither no part or any given [part] of an individual is singular. But not no[part]. Hence any given [part].

[Second Argument]: Likewise, if there were two such really distinct[items] in the individual, it does not seem to include a contradiction thatone could exist without the other. And then the individual degree could



exist without the contracted nature, or conversely—each of which is absurd.[Third Argument]: Likewise, alnost all the arguments put forward in

[Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4] against the view disproved there show that there would beno such nature.

[ Reply to the Positive Principal Argument ]

With regard to the [positive] principal argument, I declare that ‘uni-versal’ in some way signifies a part when that universal is the genus withrespect to many composites that are distinct by means of [their] specificforms. The reason for this is that in any given significate of [‘universal’]there must be found one part of the same ratio, but not another part thatis so. Hence [‘universal’] is said to signify that part more than another.How this should be understood will be clear in [Ord. 1 d. 8 q. 2]. Hence theuniversal is not really a part, and hence it need not really be multiplied.





Thirdly, I ask whether something that is universal and univocal isreally outside the soul, distinct from the individual in virtue of the natureof the thing, although not really distinct [from the individual].


It seems that it is: The nature man is a this. Yet it is not a this ofitself, since then it could not be in another. Hence [it is a this] throughsomething added to it. And it is not [a this] through [something] reallydistinct, since by the same reason the nature whiteness would be a thisby something really distinct that is added [to it], and then this whitenesswould be really composite, which seems false. Thus the nature is a this bysomething formally distinct that is added [to it].

For the opposite: No nature that is really individual is really univer-sal. Hence if that nature really were that individual, it will not really beuniversal.

[ Statement of Duns Scotus’s View ]

It is said, as regards this question, that in a thing outside the soul thenature is really the same as the differentia contracting it to a determinateindividual, yet formally distinct [from it]. And this [nature] of itself isneither universal nor particular, but rather it is incompletely universal in thething and completely [universal] according to its being in the understanding.

And since that view is, I believe, the view of the Subtle Doctor, whoexcelled other [philosophers] in the subtlety of his judgment, I thus wish toset forth distinctly here that whole view (which he put forward scatteredin different passages), not changing his own words that he puts forward indifferent passages.

And it pertains to this Doctor’s intent that ([Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 1 nn.29–34:Vat. 7 402.5–405.2).]):

∗ Translated from Guillelmi de Ockham opera philosophica et theologica: Opera the-ologica tom. II, cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, moderatorS. Brown (edidit Stephanus Brown, adlaborante Gedeone Gal), S. Bonaventure, N. Y.:impressa Ad Claras Aquas (Italia), 1970, 160–225. Ockham’s later additions are en-closed within |# . . . #|. In Ockham’s extended citations of Scotus, { . . . } indicatestext of Scotus that has been omitted by Ockham, and � . . . � indicates text that hasbeen added by Ockham (according to the appropriate edition of Scotus).

– 1 –


(S1) Apart from numerical unity, there is a real unity that is less thannumerical unity

(S2) This [real unity that is less than numerical unity] agrees to the verynature that is in some way universal.Hence the contractible nature can be compared to:

(1) the singular itself(2) numerical unity(3) universal being(4) the unity that is less than numerical unity

[in each of the following sections].[ 1. The Nature Compared to the Singular ]

If [the nature] be compared to the singular itself, [Scotus’s] view putsforward [the following theses].(S3) The nature is not of itself a this but [is only a this] through something

added [to it].(S4) That added [factor] is not (a) a negation; (b) some accident; (c) actual

existence; (d) matter.(S5) That added [factor] is in the genus Substance and intrinsic to the

individual.(S6) The nature is naturally prior to that contracting [factor].

Accordingly, [Duns Scotus] says ([Ord. 2 d. 3 1 qq. 5–6 nn. 187–188,Vat. 7 483.9–484.9]):

Every {quidditative} beingness—whether it is partial or total—of somegenus, is of itself indifferent {as quidditative beingness} to this beingnessand that one, such that as quidditative beingness it is naturally prior tothat beingness as it is a this; and as it is naturally prior, just as ‘beinga this’ does not agree to it in virtue of itself, so too its opposite is notincompatible with it in virtue of its ratio; and just as the composite doesnot include its beingness {by which it is formally} this � composite�)insofar as it is the nature, so too neither does the matter insofar as it isthe nature include its beingness (by which it is this matter), nor doesthe form {insofar as it is the nature include its [beingness (by whichit is this form)]}. Hence the beingness [of the individual differentia] isneither matter nor form nor composite, inasmuch as any given one ofthese is the nature—but it is the ultimate reality of the being (ens)that is the matter or � the being� that is the form or � the being�that is the composite, such that anything common and yet determinablecan still be distinguished, insofar as it is one thing, into many formallydistinct realities, of which this one is formally not that one: the latteris formally the beingness of singularity, and the former is formally the



beingness of the nature. Nor can these two �beingnesses� [Scotus:realitates] be as thing and thing, in the way in which� these realities�can be: the reality whence the genus is taken and the reality whencethe differentia is taken (from which the specific reality is� sometimes�taken); rather, always in the same [thing] (whether as a part or as thewhole), they are formally distinct realities of the same thing.

From this [passage] it is clear that his view puts forward [the followingtheses] with regard to the contracting differentia.(S7) The individual differentia is not quidditative.

(S6*) The nature is naturally prior to that contracting differentia.(S8) The opposite of that individual differentia, namely another individual

differentia, is not incompatible with the nature in virtue of itself, justas that individual differentia does not agree to [the nature] of itself.(This is true in every case, in the whole as well as in its parts.)

(S9) Likewise, the individual differentia and the nature are not distin-guished as thing and thing.

(S10) [The individual differentia and the nature] are only distinguished for-mally.

(S11) The nature is different with different contracting differentiae. ([Scotus]puts this [thesis] forward elsewhere.)Accordingly, [Duns Scotus] says ([Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 41, Vat. 7 409.6–

9]):‘Every substance existing per se is proper to that of which it is [thesubstance]’ ([Met. 7.13 1038b10–11]). That is, either it is of itself proper[to that of which it is the substance], or {it is}made proper by somethingcontracting it—and assuming this contracting [factor], it cannot be inanother, although being in another is not incompatible with it of itself.

Accordingly, on this account, he says that the Idea (which is attributedto Plato) is not the substance of Socrates. Accordingly, the same passagecontinues ([Vat. 7 409.11–13]):

The idea will not be the substance of Socrates, since it is not the na-ture of Socrates—for it is neither proper to Socrates of itself nor madeproper to him such that it would be only in him, but, according to him(�namely [according to] Plato�), is [equally] in another.

He puts forward similar views elsewhere in diverse passages.[ 2. The Nature Compared to Numerical Unity ]

However, if that nature be compared to numerical unity, [Duns Scotus]likewise puts forward [the following theses].

(S12) The nature does not have numerical unity of itself(S13) [The nature] is not that which is immediately denominated by any



given real unity.(S14) [The nature] is, nevertheless, numerically one.(S15) [The nature] is not really something one in two individuals by any

given real unity, but only in one [individual].Accordingly, [Duns Scotus] says ([Ord. 2 d. 3 1 qq. 5–6 ns172–175,

Vat. 7 476.15–478.2]):I concede that there is no real unity of something existing in two individ-uals, but [there is a real unity of something existing] in one [individual].And when you object ‘whatever is in numerically the same individualis numerically the same,’ I reply first by � another� more obviousexample: whatever is in one species is one in species, hence color inwhiteness is one in species; but it does not follow that ‘therefore it doesnot have a unity lesser than the unity of the species.’ For, it is notedelsewhere (namely in [Ord. 1 d. 8 n. 214]) that “something can be called‘animate’ denominatively, as the body, or [it can be called ‘animate’]per se primo modo, as man” (and in this way a surface is called ‘white’denominatively, and a white-surface is called ‘white’ per se primo modo,since the subject includes the predicate)—in this way I say that the po-tential, which is contracted by the actual, is informed by the actual,and through this it is informed by the unity consequent upon that ac-tuality or that act; and so it is one by the unity proper to the actual,but in this way it is denominatively one (it is not of itself one in thisway, neither primo modo, nor through an essential part). Thus color inwhiteness is one in species, yet not of itself or primarily or per se, butonly denominatively; however, the specific differentia is one primarily,since ‘being divided into specifically many [elements]’ is primarily in-compatible with it; whiteness is one in species per se, but not primarily,since [it is one] through something intrinsic to it (namely through thedifferentia). I therefore concede that whatever is in this stone is nu-merically one, either primarily or per se or denominatively: ‘primarily,’perhaps as that through which such unity agrees to the composite; ‘perse’ [as] this stone, of which that which is primarily one by this unity isper se a part; ‘denominatively’ only {as} that potential that is perfectedby this actual, which is (as it were) denominatively with regard to itsactuality � and its unity�.

[ 3. The Nature Compared to Universal Being ]

However, if the nature be compared to universal being, in the thirdway [of those listed above], then [Duns Scotus] puts forward [the followingtheses].

(S16) [The nature] of itself is not completely universal.



(S17) [The nature is only universal] in that it has being in the understanding.(S18) Commonness, not singularity, agrees to [the nature] of itself.

Accordingly, [Duns Scotus] says ([Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 37, Vat. 7 406.11–407.9]):

The universal in act is that which has some indifferent unity accordingto which � it� is in proximate potency to be said of any given sup-posit, since, according to the Philosopher in Post. an. 1.4 [73b26–33],the universal is what is one in many and pertains to many. Indeed,nothing—according to any given unity—in the thing is such that ac-cording to that unity it is precisely [Scotus: praecisam] in proximatepotency to any given supposit in the predication stating ‘this is this’.The reason for this is that although being in some singularity otherthan that in which it is is not incompatible with something existing inthe thing, nevertheless it cannot be truly said of anything lower-level,�namely� that ‘any given one is it’. For this is only possible as regardsnumerically the same object actually considered by the intellect—which,indeed, as understood has also the numerical unity of the object, ac-cording to which the same thing is predicable of every singular, stating‘this is this.’

And [Duns Scotus] adds ([Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 38, Vat. 7 407.20–408.3]):{Therefore}, what is not of itself a this is common in the thing, andconsequently not-this is not incompatible with it of itself. But such acommon [thing] is not the universal in act, because it lacks that indiffer-ence by which a universal is completely universal, namely according towhich the same (by some identity) is predicable of any given individual,such that ‘any given one is it’.

Again, in the same passage [Duns Scotus] adds ([Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n.42,Vat. 7 410.4–14]):

Commonness and singularity are not related to the nature as beingin the intellect and genuine being outside the soul, since commonnessagrees to the nature outside the intellect, and � similarly� singular-ity; commonness agrees to the nature of itself, and singularity agreesto the nature through something in the thing contracting [the nature],but universality does not agree with the thing of itself. Hence I con-cede that a cause of the universality should be sought. Still, no causeof commonness other than the nature itself need be sought; and, posit-ing commonness in the very nature according to its proper beingnessand unity, one must necessarily seek a cause of singularity, which addssomething more to the nature of which [the singularity] is.

[ 4. The Nature Compared to the Lesser Unity ]



If, fourth, the nature be compared to the unity that is less than nu-merical unity, [Duns Scotus] puts forward [the following theses].

(S19) The [lesser] unity is not beneath the quidditative ratio of the nature.(S20) The [lesser unity] is predicated of [the nature] per se secundo modo.

Accordingly, [Scotus] says ([Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 34, Vat. 7 404.17–22]):I understand ‘nature has a real unity less than numerical unity’ in thisway: and although [the nature] does not have [that unity] of itself,such that it is intrinsic to the ratio of the nature (for “horseness is justhorseness,” according to Avicenna in Met. 5.1 [fol.86va]), neverthelessthat unity is a proper attribute of the nature according to its primarybeingness.

[ Six Arguments for Scotus’s View ]

The principal conclusion of this view is argued for in many ways.

[ First Argument ]

[Scotus, Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 3 (Vat. 7 392.10–12)]:Whatever is present in something per se in virtue of its ratio is presentin it in any given thing; hence if the nature man were of itself a this, inwhatsoever there is the nature man, that would be this man.

[ Second Argument ]

[Scotus, Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 4 (Vat. 7 393.1–3)]:[If] one of [a pair of] opposites agrees with something of itself, the otheropposite is incompatible with it of itself; hence if the nature is of itselfnumerically one, numerical multiplicity is incompatible with it � invirtue of itself�.

[ Third Argument ]

[Scotus, Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 7 (Vat. 7 394.4–10)]:The object insofar as it is an object is naturally prior to its act, and theobject is singular of itself in that “prior [condition]” since this alwaysagrees with a nature not taken secundum quid or according to the beingthat it has in the soul; hence {the intellect} understanding that objectunder the ratio universal understands it under a ratio opposed to itsratio,

namely insofar as it is universal, “for as it precedes act it is determined ofitself to the opposite of the ratio,” namely [the ratio] universal.

[ Fourth Argument ]

[Scotus, Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 ns8–10 (Vat. 7 395.1–5)]:



The real, proper, and sufficient unity of anything [which] is less thannumerical unity is not of itself one by a numerical unity (or is not of itselfa this); but the proper, real, or sufficient unity of the nature existing inthis stone is less than numerical unity; therefore, [it is not of itself oneby a numerical unity].

[Proof of the Major]:The major is clear of itself, since nothing is of itself one by a unitygreater than the unity sufficient to it: if the proper unity that is due tosomething of itself were less than numerical unity, numerical unity wouldnot agree to it in virtue of its nature and according to itself. Otherwise,precisely in virtue of its nature it would have greater and lesser unity,which are opposites with regard to the same [thing] in the same [respect],because a multiplicity [which is] opposed to a greater unity can obtainwith a lesser unity without contradiction, [while] the multiplicity [itself]cannot [obtain] with a greater unity that is incompatible with it. Hence[they are opposites, and so the major is proved].

[Proof of the Minor]:1

If there is no real unity of the nature less than [its] singularity, and everyunity other than the unity of singularity and [the unity] of the specificnature is less than real unity, then there will be no real unity less thannumerical unity. But the consequent is false, as I shall prove in [seven]ways; therefore, [the antecedent is false, and so the minor is proved].

[ First Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

The first way [to prove that there is a real unity that is less than nu-merical unity] is as follows. According to the Philosopher in Met. 10.1[1052b18], “In every genus there is a first ‘one’ that is the standard andmeasure of all those [items] that belong to that genus.” This unity of thefirst measurer is real, since the Philosopher proves that the primary ratioof measure agrees to one, and in turn states how that to which the ratiomeasure agrees in every genus is one [1052b19–1054a19]. This unity [ofthe first measurer] is of something insofar as [the first measurer] is firstin the genus; {therefore, it is real}, since the things measured are realand really measured. Real being (ens reale), however, cannot be reallymeasured by a [mere] being of reason (ens rationis); hence [the unity]is real. {Furthermore}, this � real�2 unity is not � of singularity�3,

1 Proofs of the minor premise from Scotus, Ord. 1I d. 3 1 q. 1 nn. 11–28 (Vat. 7 396.1–402.3).

2 Scotus: autem.3 Scotus: numeralis.



since there is nothing singular in a genus that is the measure of all those[items] that are in that genus—|# for, according to the Philosopher inMet. 3.3 [999a12–13], in individuals belonging to the same species itis not the case that this [individual] is prior and that [individual] pos-terior. Although the Commentator talks about the prior constitutingthe posterior [Met. 3 com. 11], nevertheless [this has nothing to do withthe claim that the unity of the first measurer is less than numerical],since � . . . � the Philosopher’s intent here is to agree with Plato thatin individuals of the same species there is no essential order, � and soon �. Hence no individual is the per se measure of those that are inits species—and therefore, [this kind of unity is] neither numerical norindividual unity.

[ Second Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

Besides, secondly, I prove that the same consequent [in the proof ofthe minor premiss in the fourth argument], [that there is no real unityless than numerical unity], is false, since according to the Philosopherin Phys. 7.4 [249a3–8] comparison comes about in the atomic speciesbecause there is one nature—not, however, in the genus, since the genusdoes not have such unity. This difference [between generic unity andspecific unity] is not [a difference] of unity according to reason, sincethe concept of the genus is {as} numerically one in the intellect as theconcept of the species; otherwise no concept would be said in quid ofmany species (and thus no concept would be a genus), but there wouldbe as many concepts said of species as there are concepts of species, andthen in each of the predications the same [thing] would be predicatedof itself. Similarly, the unity or disunity of a concept is not relevant tothe Philosopher’s intent here, namely [whether there is] a comparisonor not. Hence {the Philosopher} means here that the specific natureis one by the unity of the specific nature; he does not, however, meanthat it is one in this way by a numerical unity, since in numerical unityno comparison comes about. Therefore, [specific unity must be real andless than numerical unity].

[ Third Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

Thirdly, according to the Philosopher in Met. 5.15 [1021a9–12], ‘thesame’, ‘similar’, and ‘equal’ are all founded on ‘one’, {such that althoughsimilarity has as a foundation a thing of the genus Quality}, still, sucha relation [of similarity] is not real unless it has a real foundation anda {proximate} ratio of being founded on the real. Therefore, the unitythat is required as the foundation of a relation of similarity is real.



However, it is not a numerical unity, since nothing which is one and thesame is similar or equal to itself.

[ Fourth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

Fourthly, in one real opposition there are two primary real extremes [ofthe opposition]. Now contrareity is a real opposition, which is apparentbecause, putting aside any operation of the intellect, one [opposite] re-ally corrupts or destroys the other, and [it does so] only because they arecontraries; hence each primary extreme of this opposition is real {and[is] one by some real unity}. However, {each [primary] extreme} [of thisreal opposition] � is one by some real unity [which is] not� numericalunity, since then precisely this white or precisely that white would be aprimary contrary of this black, which is unacceptable, since then therewould be as many primary contraries as there are contrary individuals.Therefore, [the unity of each primary extreme of a real opposition is lessthan numerical].

[ Fifth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

:Fifthly, for any one action of sense there is one object, according tosome real unity; but not a numerical [unity]; hence there is some realunity other {than numerical unity}.Proof of the Minor:4 A potency cognizing an object in this fashion,namely insofar as it is one by this unity, cognizes it insofar as it isdistinct from anything that is not one by this unity. But sense does notcognize an object insofar as it is distinct from any given thing that isnot one by that numerical unity—{which is apparent} because no sensedistinguishes this ray of sunlight to numerically differ from another ray,though nevertheless they are diverse due to the proper motion of theSun. If all the common sensibles, for instance diversity in place or site,were put aside, and if two amounts (quanta) that are completely similarand equal in whiteness were posited to be together by divine power, sightwould not there distinguish two white [things]. If, nevertheless, it wereto cognize one of them insofar as it is one by a numerical unity, it wouldcognize it insofar as it is one and distinct by numerical unity!

[Confirmation of the Proof of the Minor]:According to this, it could be argued that the primary object of senseis one in itself by some real unity, � at least of the object of one actof sensing�, since just as the object of this power, inasmuch as it is

4 Reading minor for maior.



an object, precedes [any action of] the intellect, so too it precedes anyaction of the intellect with regard to its real unity.

[ Sixth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

Sixthly, if every real unity is numerical then every real diversity is nu-merical. But the consequent is false, since every numerical diversityinsofar as it is numerical is equal, and so all things would be equallydistinct—and then {it would follow that} the intellect could abstractsomething no more common from Plato and Socrates than from Socratesand a line, and any given universal would be a pure fiction of the intel-lect.The first consequence, [namely ‘if every real unity is numerical thenevery real diversity is numerical’], is proved in two ways [as follows].First, since one and many, and same and diverse, are opposites (fromMet. 10.3 [1054a20–21 and 1054b22–23]), in however many [ways] oneof the opposites is said so too is the other one said (from Top. 1.15[106b14–15]); therefore, to any given unity there corresponds its proper[kind of] diversity.Second, the [first consequence] is proved as follows: each of the extremesof any given diversity is one in itself, and in the same way in which itis one in itself it seems to be diverse from the other extreme, such thatthe unity of one extreme seems to be per se the ratio of the diversity ofthe other extreme.[First Confirmation of Scotus’s Sixth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]: Thisis also confirmed in another way, since if the only real unity in this thingis numerical, whatever unity there is in that thing, it is numerically onein virtue of itself; hence this [thing] and that [thing] are primarily diverseaccording to every beingness in them, for diverse [things] agree in noone at all.[Second Confirmation of Scotus’s Sixth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]:This is also confirmed in that numerical diversity is for this singular notto be that singular, assuming the beingness of each extreme. But suchunity is necessarily [possessed] by each extreme.

[ Seventh Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

Furthermore, even were no intellect to exist, fire would generate fire anddestroy water, and there would be some real unity in form of the gen-erator to the generated, according to which the generation is univocal.The generation is not made to be univocal by the intellect consideringit; {rather, [the intellect] cognizes it to be univocal}.

[ Fifth Argument ]



[Scotus, Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 31 (Vat. 7 402.18–403.2)]:{Besides}, Avicenna says in Met. 5.1 [fol.86va] that ‘horseness is justhorseness—it is of itself neither one nor many, neither universal norparticular’; � therefore, [there is some real unity less than numericalunity]�.

[ Sixth Argument ]

[Scotus, Ord. 1 d. 2 2 qq. 1–4 n. 398 (Vat. 2 354)]:{Besides}, it is impossible for the same [thing] to completely differ aparte rei from something and to really agree with it; but Socrates reallydiffers from Plato and really is the same as him; therefore [there is somereal unity less than numerical unity].#|

[ Ockham’s Argument Against the Formal Distinction ]

The position [of Scotus] can be argued against in two ways.

[ Argument Against the Formal Distinction ]

It is impossible in the case of creatures for some [items] to differ for-mally unless they be really distinguished. Hence if the nature is in some waydistinguished from that contracting differentia, they must be distinguishedeither: (i) as thing and thing; (ii) as being of reason (ens rationis) andbeing of reason; (iii) as real being and being of reason. But (i) is deniedby [Scotus], and likewise (ii). Hence (iii) must be granted. Hence a na-ture that is in any way distinguished from the individual is only a being ofreason.

[Proof of the Antecedent]: The antecedent is clear [as follows]. If thenature and that contracting differentia were not the same in all ways, thensomething can be truly affirmed of one and denied of the other. But thesame cannot be truly affirmed and truly denied of the same thing in thecase of creatures. Hence [the nature and the contracting differentia] are notone thing.

[Proof of the Minor in the Proof of the Antecedent]: The minor pre-miss is clear [as follows]. If [it were not the case], every way of establishinga distinction among things in the case of creatures disappears, for contra-diction is the most powerful way of establishing a distinction among things.Hence if in the case of creatures exactly the same can be truly affirmed andtruly denied of the same thing (|# or something [suppositing] for the samething#|), no real distinction can be established among them.

[Confirmation]: This point is confirmed [as follows]. All contradicto-ries possess equal incompatibility. But the incompatibility between being



and non-being is such that if A exists and B does not exist, it follows thatB is not A, and so too for any given contradictories.


[First Objection]: If it were said that it is true for primary contradic-tories that it happens that real non-identity is established through them [inthis way], yet this does not happen through other contradictories—

[Reply]: On the contrary, the syllogistic form holds equally in anysubject-matter. Hence this is a good syllogism:

Every A is B, and C is not B; hence C is not A.Consequently, it is true regarding A and non-A that, if this is A and thisis not A, that this is not this, just as [it is true that] if this exists and thisdoes not exist, this is not this. Hence it is likewise in the case at hand: ifevery individual differentia is of itself proper to some individual, and thenature is not of itself proper to some individual, it follows that the natureis not the individual differentia, and this really.

[Second Objection]: If it were said that this argument does not hold,because the divine essence is the Son, and the Father is not the Son, andyet the Father is the essence—

[Reply]: This answer is not sufficient. For just as it is unique in Godthat three things are numerically one thing, and hence that numericallyone thing is any given one of the three things, and yet [any given] one ofthose three things is not the others, so too it is unique and exceeding allunderstanding that [the consequence]:

The Son is numerically one essence, and the Father is not the Son; hencethe Father is not the essence

does not follow. And so that uniqueness should be postulated only wherethe authority of Sacred Scripture compels it. Hence such a consequence [asthat given in the reply to the first objection] ought never to be denied in thecase of creatures, since no authority of Sacred Scripture compels it there(|# since in the case of creatures no one thing is many things and any given[one] of them #|).

[Third Objection]: If it were said that a consequence of this kind is ac-ceptable if the pair of the premisses were taken without any determination,and so

Every individual differentia is proper to some individual, and the natureis not proper [to some individual]; hence the nature is not really theindividual differentia

follows correctly. But then the minor premiss is false. Furthermore, [theconsequence] does not hold in all cases if [the premisses] were taken undera certain syncategorematic determination, such as ‘of itself’ or ‘per se’—



[Reply]: This [objection] does not work. For just as there is syllogisticform in uniformly modal [premisses] as well as in [uniformly] assertoric [pre-misses] (and likewise there is syllogistic form that is mixed out of these [kindsof premisses]), so too there is syllogistic form, mixed as well as uniform, inother propositions taken with other syncategorematic determinations, suchas ‘per se,’ ’insofar as,’ and the like. Consequently, there is syllogistic formin this case:

Every man per se is an animal, and no stone per se is an animal; henceno stone is per se a man (and consequently in all cases no stone is aman)

just as much as [there is syllogistic form] in this case:Every animal of necessity is a substance, and no accident of necessity isa substance; hence no accident of necessity is an animal.

Likewise, this is an acceptable mixed syllogism:Every man per se is an animal, and nothing white is an animal; hencenothing white is a man.

Thus, in the same way, this will be an acceptable syllogism:Every individual differentia is of itself proper to some individual, andthe nature is not of itself proper [to some individual]; hence the natureis not the individual differentia.

Likewise, this will be an acceptable syllogism:No individual differentia is really common, and the nature is reallycommon; hence the nature is not really the individual differentia

and the premisses are true. Hence the conclusion is too.[Confirmation of the Reply]: This point is confirmed [as follows]. Just

as an assertoric conclusion always follows from necessary propositions, sotoo an assertoric conclusion follows from premisses with the mark of perseity,and this because the per se is necessary. Hence just as [this consequence]:

The nature necessarily is communicable, and the contracting differentianecessarily is not communicable; hence the contracting differentia is notthe nature

follows syllogistically and formally, so too [the consequence]:The nature per se is communicable to many, and the contracting dif-ferentia of itself is not communicable to many; hence the contractingdifferentia is not the nature

follows [syllogistically and formally].Nor does it avail to say that the conclusion [of this consequence] is

true, e. g. that the contracting differentia is not the nature even though itis not really distinguished from [the nature]. For [the consequence]:

[The nature and the contracting differentia] are not really distinguished,



and each is a thing; hence they are really the same; hence the one isreally the other

follows. And, in addition, “hence the one is the other” [follows]. Conse-quently, the predication of the one of the other is true.

The next-to-last consequence, [namely “hence the one is the other”],is clear. For ‘really’ is not a determination that distracts or diminishes [thesupposition], just as ‘formally’ does not. Consequently, there is a formalconsequence from something taken with such a determination to it takenper se, according to the rule [laid down by] the Philosopher in De int. 13[22a14–23a27].

[General Confirmation of the Reply to the Third Objection]: |# Theentire preceding argument is confirmed. For just as this syllogism:

No differentia is common, and the nature is common; hence the natureis not the differentia

is governed by the dictum de omni et nullo, so too this [syllogism]:No differentia is of itself common, and the nature is of itself common;therefore, the nature is not the differentia

is governed by the dictum de omni et nullo.#|

[ Seven Arguments Against Scotus’s View ]

In the second way, it can be argued against [Scotus’s] view that it isnot true even assuming that there were such a [formal] distinction.

[ First Argument Against Scotus’s View ]

Whenever one of [a pair of] opposites really agrees with something,such that it is genuinely and really denominated by [that opposite], whetherthey agree with it in virtue of itself or through something else, [then], withthis obtaining and not changed, the other of the [pair of] opposites will notreally agree with it; instead, it will simply be denied of it. Yet according to[Scotus], every thing outside the soul is really singular and numerically one,even though one is singular of itself and another [is singular] only throughsomething that has been added [to it]. Hence no thing outside the soul isreally common, nor one by means of a unity that is opposed to the unity ofsingularity. Hence there really is no unity except the unity of singularity.


[Objection]: If it were said that these two unities are not really oppo-sites, and that in the same way singularity and commonness are not reallyopposed—

[First Reply to the Objection]: On the contrary, if they are not reallyopposed, then it cannot be inferred from any opposition that they primarily



agree to the same a parte rei. Hence it cannot adequately be inferred (a)that what is the same and through the same in all ways be one by this unity,[which is numerical], and by that [unity, which is less than numerical], and(b) that what is the same and through the same in all ways be singular andcommon.

[Second Reply to the Objection]: Besides, whenever the consequentsare incompatible the antecedents will also be incompatible. But this [con-sequence] follows:

A is common or one by a lesser unity; hence a multiplicity that is op-posed to a greater unity (i. e. numerical multiplicity) obtains along withA

And [this consequence] follows:A is one by a greater unity; hence a multiplicity that is opposed [to agreater unity] (i. e. numerical multiplicity) does not obtain along withA

But ‘numerical multiplicity obtains along with a’ and ‘numerical multiplicitydoes not obtain along with a’ are incompatible. Hence ‘a is one by a lesserunity’ and ‘a is one by a greater unity’ are incompatible. Yet according to[Scotus], the [proposition]:

A is one by a greater unityis true, since he says that the nature is numerically one. Hence the [propo-sition]:

A is one by a lesser unityis false (always taking ‘A’ for the very nature that he always calls one by alesser unity). And if the nature were not one by a lesser unity, so much theless would anything else be.

[Proof of the Assumption in the Second Reply]: The assumption isclear according to [Scotus], since he says ([Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 n. 9, Vat. 7395.11–13)]):

Whenever a multiplicity [which is] opposed to a greater unity can obtainalong with a lesser unity without contradiction, the multiplicity cannotobtain along with a greater unity that is incompatible with it.

[Objection to the Second Reply]: If it were said that this form of argu-ing does not hold, since blackness obtains along with a man and blacknessdoes not obtain along with something white, and yet a man is white, and‘a’ is a man and he is white—

[First Reply]: This [objection] doesn’t work; taking ‘obtaining’ uni-formly, one or the other of those [propositions] is false. Taking ‘obtaining’actually, then this [proposition]:

Blackness obtains along with Socrates



is false, if Socrates were white. However, taking [‘obtaining’] potentially,then this [proposition]:

Blackness does not obtain along with something whiteis false, for blackness can obtain along with something white, e. g. somethingwhite can be black or have blackness. Accordingly, although blackness isincompatible with whiteness, nevertheless it is not incompatible with thatwhich is white. Consequently, [blackness] is not incompatible with some-thing white (since these two terms ‘something white’ and ‘that which iswhite’ convert).

[Second Reply]: Besides, what [Scotus] says—that a multiplicity thatis opposed to a greater unity can obtain along with a lesser unity, withoutcontradiction—seems incompatible with another remark, in which he saysthat the nature and the individual differentia do not really differ. For whenany two [items] are really the same, whatever can through divine powerreally be one of them, can be the other. But that individual differentia can-not be numerically many really distinct [items]. Hence the nature, which isreally the same as that contracting differentia, cannot really be many. Nor,consequently, can [the nature] be some thing other than that contracting dif-ferentia. And thus the nature is not compatible with numerical multiplicity,without contradiction.

[First Confirmation of the Second Reply]: This argument is confirmed[as follows]. Anything that is really universal, whether it be completelyuniversal or not, is really common to many (|# or at least can be reallycommon to many#|). But no thing is really common to many. Hence nothing is universal in any way.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss is obvious. For the universalis distinguished from the singular through this feature: that the singularis determined to one, whereas the universal is indifferent to many (in thatway in which it is universal).

[First Proof of the Minor]: The minor premiss is obvious. For no thingthat is really singular is common to many. But every thing, according tothose [philosophers who hold this view], is really singular. Hence [no thingis common to many].

[Second Proof of the Minor]: Likewise, if some thing brought in by‘man’ is common to many, it is either (i) the nature that is in Socrates, or(ii) the nature that is in Plato, or (iii) some third [nature that is different]from them. [With regard to (i)]: it is not the nature of Socrates, since thatin virtue of which he is really a singular cannot be in Plato. [With regardto (ii)]: it is not the nature of Plato, on account of the the same [reason].[With regard to (iii)]: it is not a third nature, since there is no such [nature]



outside the soul—for, according to these [philosophers who hold this view],every thing outside the soul is really singular.

[Second Confirmation of the Second Reply]: It is confirmed, secondly,[as follows]. That which cannot be communicated to many even throughdivine power is not really common. But, for any given thing that is pickedout, that [thing] cannot be communicated to many by divine power, becauseit is really singular. Hence no thing is really and positively common.

[Objection]: If it were said that although being in many is incompati-ble with the nature, nevertheless it is not incompatible with it of itself buton account of what has been added [to it], and along with this [addition] itis one through real identity—

[Reply]: On the contrary, that ‘non-incompatibility’ of itself is notpositive. Consequently, that commonness (such that something would becommon) is not positive, but rather it is only negative. Consequently, thereis no positive unity, except only numerical unity.

Besides, I can attribute such negative lesser unity to that individualdegree, since it is certainly not numerically one in virtue of itself and per seprimo modo. And taking ‘non-incompatibility in virtue of itself or per se’in this way, namely in that it is opposed to ‘agreeing to something per seprimo modo’, this [proposition] will be true:

Being in many is not incompatible with that individual differentia invirtue of itself

orBeing one by a unity less than numerical unity is not incompatible with[that individual differentia] in virtue of itself

since its opposite is false, namely that the individual differentia per se primomodo is numerically one (according to those [philosophers who hold thisview]).

[ Second Argument Against Scotus’s View ]

Secondly, mainly in line with this [second] way [of arguing againstScotus’s view], I argue as follows. If the nature were common in this fashion,it would follow that there would be as many species and genera as thereare individuals, since the nature of Socrates is a species, and the nature ofPlato [is also a species] for the same reason. Then I argue: whenever some[items] are really many, each of which can be called a species, then there aremany species. But so it is in the case at hand. Hence [there are as manyspecies and genera as there are individuals].

This [second argument] is confirmed [as follows]. The multiplicationof an attribute (passio) follows upon the multiplication of [its] proximatesubject. Yet according to [Scotus], that lesser unity is an attribute of the



nature. Hence just as the nature is multiplied, so too will the attribute(since it is real) be multiplied. And consequently, just as there really aretwo natures in Socrates and Plato, so there will really be two lesser unities.But that lesser unity either is commonness or is inseparable from common-ness, and consequently inseparable from what is common. Hence there aretwo common [items] in Socrates and Plato, and consequently two species.And consequently Socrates would fall under one common [item] and Platounder another, and thus there would be as many common [items]—evengeneralissima –as there are individuals. And these [results] seem absurd.


[First Objection]: If it were said that a thing is not completely uni-versal, but rather only [is completely universal] in that it is considered byan intellect—

[First Reply]: On the contrary, I raise a question about that which isimmediately denominated as universal: either (i) it is precisely a genuinething outside the soul, or (ii) it is precisely a being of reason, or (iii) itis the aggregate of a real being and a being of reason. [With regard to(i)]: if (i) were granted, what was to be proved—that a singular thingis simply and completely universal—is established, contrary to their ownclaim, since according to those [philosophers who hold this view] nothingoutside the soul is a thing unless it be really singular. Consequently, thesame thing that is really singular is common, and it is no more the onethan the other. Hence there are as many completely universal [items] asthere are singulars. [With regard to (ii)]: if (ii) were granted, it followsthat no thing is universal, neither completely nor inchoately, neither inact nor in potency. For that which cannot be reduced to completion andact by divine power that it somehow exist, is not such, neither in potencynor inchoately. This is true where what is reduced to one act does not invirtue of this fact remain in potency to another act, as is the case in thedivision of the continuum ad infinitum and when something is in potency tocontradictories—as is not so in the case at hand. Hence if precisely a beingof reason is completely universal and in act, and in no way a thing outsidethe soul, it follows that a thing outside the soul is in no way universal, oneno more than another. [With regard to (iii)]: if (iii) were granted, whatwas to be proved is established. For the multiplication of the whole or theaggregate always follows upon the multiplication of any given part. Henceif what is completely universal is an aggregate of a thing and a being ofreason, there will be as many such aggregates as there are things outsidethe soul any given one of which is a part of the whole aggregate. And thus itwill hold that there will be as many generalissima as there are individuals.



[Second Reply]: Besides, just as the nature is one in many and per-tains to many and is predicable of them, so too what is common is one inmany and pertains to many and is predicable of them. But this is sufficientfor something to be completely universal, according to those [philosopherswho hold this view]. Hence anything common has whatever is required forsomething to be completely universal. Consequently, [anything common haswhatever is required] for something to be completely a species or a genus.Yet according to those [philosophers who hold this view], as recounted [inDuns Scotus, Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 42 (Vat. 7 410.4–14)] ([cited above]), com-monness agrees to the nature in virtue of itself outside the intellect. Henceso does being completely universal. Consequently, from the fact that thereare as many common [items] as individuals, as proved [in the precedingparagraph], it follows in point of fact (ex natura rei) that there are as manygeneralissima as there are individuals.

[Confirmation of the Second Reply]: This is confirmed [as follows].If the nature that is in Socrates is genuinely common, then, since whenSocrates is destroyed anything essential to him is destroyed, it follows thatsomething common would be genuinely destroyed and annihilated. But itis certain that something common continues to exist, in virtue of which anindividual [such as Plato] continues to exist. And from such a contradictiona real distinction can be inferred, according to those [philosophers who holdthis view]. Hence one of those common [items] is not really the other.Consequently, when they exist, they are many [and not one].

[Second Objection]: If it were said that the nature is not common invirtue of the fact that it has been made appropriate to Socrates throughthe contracting differentia—

[Reply]: On the contrary, according to [Scotus], this commonnessagrees to the nature outside the intellect ([Duns Scotus, Ord. 2 d. 3 1 q.1n. 42, Vat. 7 410.4–14; cited in 166.10–11 above]). Hence I ask what ‘nature’supposits for in this case: either for (i) a real being, or (ii) a being of rea-son. Now (ii) cannot be granted, since this would include a contradiction.If [‘nature’] supposits for a real being, then [it supposits] either (a) for areal being that is singular, or (b) for some real being that is not really sin-gular. If (a) [were granted], then it is not common, and consequently is notcommon in virtue of itself. If (b) were granted, then it is some thing outsidethe soul that is not really singular, which the [philosophers who hold thisview] nevertheless deny, since they say that the nature is really numericallyone and singular.

[ Third Argument Against Scotus’s View ]

Thirdly, I argue as follows. The humanity in Socrates and the human-



ity in Plato are really distinguished. Hence each of those [humanities] isreally numerically one. Consequently, neither is common.


[First Objection]: If it were said that these natures are only distinctthrough those added differentiae, just as each of them is numerically oneonly through the added differentia, and hence neither is of itself singularbut rather is of itself common—

[First Reply to the First Objection]: On the contrary, every thing isessentially distinguished either of itself or through something intrinsic toit from any other thing from which it is essentially distinguished. But thehumanity that is in Socrates is essentially distinguished from the humanitythat is in Plato. Hence [the humanity of Socrates] is distinguished eitherof itself or by something intrinsic to it from the [the humanity of Plato].Hence it is not [distinguished] by something extrinsic that is added to it.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss is clear [for the following fourreasons].(1) It is nothing at all to say that Socrates is distinguished from this ass

through Plato essentially.(2) Likewise, being the same and [being] diverse immediately follow upon

being. Hence nothing is the same or diverse from anything throughsomething extrinsic.

(3) Likewise, according to the Philosopher and the Commentator, Met. 4.2[1003b24 and Averroes, Iuntina tom.8 fol. 32r], every being is onethrough its essence and not through what is added [to it]. Hencenothing is numerically one by something added. Hence the naturethat is in Socrates, if it be numerically one, will be numerically oneeither of itself or by something essential to it.

(4) Likewise, if the nature were numerically one, then it is not common.Consequently, it is not common of itself. For the determination ‘ofitself’ is not a distracting or a diminishing determination; hence thereis an acceptable consequence from an absolute determinable negationto a negation determinable with this determination. Hence just as[the consequence] “Socrates is not a man; hence he is not necessarilya man” follows, so too does “The humanity that is in Socrates is notcommon, and so it is not common of itself.”[Confirmation of the First Reply]: This is confirmed. Whenever some-

thing is said “to agree to another of itself” not positively but negatively, asit is said that the creature is of itself a non-being and that matter is of itselfa privation—which [examples], and similar ones, are literally false, but aretrue in that they are equipollent to certain negative [propositions], such as:



Matter is not of itself formedand

The creature is not of itself such a being–although it is not necessary that it actually be present in that to whichit is said to agree in virtue of itself, still, at least by divine power, it cansimply be present in it, just as the creature can be a non-being or mattercan be deprived or be a privation. Hence, likewise, the humanity that isin Socrates can be common to many men. The consequent is impossible;hence the antecedent is too.

Proof of the falsity of the consequent: when some [items] are reallythe same, it is impossible that one be really the same as the other unless theother be really the same as it. Now this is true in the case of creatures, andit is even true in God in some way, since although it is not true to say thatthe Father is the Son, notwithstanding the identity of the Father as well asof the Son with the divine essence, nevertheless it is true to say that theFather is that thing that is the Son. Hence, because the humanity that isin Socrates is really the same as the contracting differentia, if the humanitythat is in Socrates can really be the same as the contracting differentiain Plato, it follows that this contracting differentia and that contracting[differentia] could be one thing. Consequently, some one thing could beSocrates and Plato. And this includes a contradiction.

[Second Reply to the First Objection]: Besides, whatever is distin-guished a parte rei from something that does not pertain to its formalunderstanding can be intuitively seen without it, according to that Doctor.And he also puts it forward that the divine essence can be intuitively seenwithout a Person. Hence the humanity that is in Socrates can be intu-itively seen without the contracting differentia, and, in the same way, thehumanity that is in Plato can be intuitively seen without any contractingdifferentia. Consequently, since those humanities are distinguished in placeand subject, such an intellect—[one that intuitively sees the humanities inthis way]—can distinguish the one from the other without any contractingdifferentia. And this would not be possible if they were precisely distin-guished by their respective contracting differentiae. Hence of themselvesthey are distinguished numerically.

[Confirmation]: This is confirmed [as follows]. Such an intellect canformulate a negative proposition of this kind, by stating:

This is not thisand it can know this [proposition] to be true. Hence that thing of itself isnot the other thing.

This is confirmed [as follows]. According to that Doctor, [items] that



are formally compossible or incompatible are compossible or incompatibleby their formal rationes. Hence, for the same reason, whatever [items] aredistinguished or are the same by their formal rationes are distinguished orare the same. Hence if these humanities (e. g. [the humanities] of Socratesand Plato) are really distinguished, they will be distinguished by theirproper formal rationes and through no added [elements]. Consequently, anygiven one of them of itself, without anything added, is really distinguishedfrom the other.

[Proof of the Assumption]: The assumption is clear, since [Duns Sco-tus] says ([Ord. 1 d. 2 1 qq. 1–4 n. 377, Vat. 2 377.10–13]):

It should be noted that just as incompatibles are incompatible in virtueof their proper rationes, so too there is non-incompatibility or compos-sibility in virtue of the proper rationes of the compossibles.

[Objection]: If it were said that from the fact that you, [William of Ock-ham], say ‘those humanities’ when you say “those humanities are reallydistinguished,” you include those contracting differentiae, since the [hu-manities] are ‘those’ only through those contracting differentiae, and so aredistinguished by their formal rationes, since those [contracting] differentiaepertain to the formal ratio of those humanities such that, putting asidethose differentiae, only an indistinct humanity remains—

[Reply]: On the contrary, whenever any [items] are distinguished aparte rei in any given way, a term that would precisely stand for one andnot for the other can be imposed. (Indeed, otherwise there could not beany true proposition denoting the distinctness of the one from the other.)Hence I impose this term ‘A’, which would precisely stand for that whichin Socrates is formally (and not really) distinguished from the contractingdifferentia. For, according to [Scotus], there is something in Socrates that isformally distinguished from the contracting differentia, which neverthelessis really the same as that [contracting] differentia, and so is really singular.I also impose this term ‘B’, which would precisely stand for that which isformally distinguished from the contracting differentia in Plato, and yet isreally the same as that contracting differentia. Then I raise the questionwhether A and B are (i) really the same, or (ii) not [really the same].[With regard to (i)]: if [A and B] are [really the same], then, withoutvarying them in any way, they are really distinguished. Consequently, thereis something that is really indistinct in Socrates and in Plato, which those[philosophers who hold this view] deny, since they claim that nothing reallyindistinct is the same in Socrates and in Plato. [With regard to (ii)]: if[A and B] are not really the same, then they are really distinguished, andso [they are distinguished] through their proper formal rationes. But these



[proper formal rationes] do not include those contracting differentiae, byassumption. Thus what was to be proved—that they are distinguished ofthemselves—is established.

Besides, according to [Scotus] this [proposition]:A is really incompatible with the contracting differentia of Plato

is true. Hence it is incompatible with it through its formal ratio. Henceis really distinguished from it through its proper ratio. Hence it is reallydistinguished of itself, and this only numerically, since it is distinguishedneither in species nor in genus. Hence of itself it is numerically one.

If it were said that whatever [items] are incompatible or compossibleare incompatible or compossible by their proper rationes or through some[elements] really the same as them—

This [objection] doesn’t work. For it is clear that just as, according tothat Doctor, in that passage he is speaking not only of the incompatibilityand compossibility of things that are really distinct but also of the incom-patibility and compossibility of those [items] that are only formally distinctor are compossible, so too it is clear as regards the case of the divine essenceand divine relation. Hence a and b of themselves will be distinguished orwill be really the same, even putting aside those [contracting] differentiae.And they are not really the same, since if they were they could never bereally distinguished. Hence they are really distinguished of themselves.

[ Fourth Argument Against Scotus’s View ]

Fourthly, I argue as follows. If the contracted nature were really dis-tinct from every contracting degree, the nature would be numerically onein virtue of itself, as proved above in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4]. Hence, since thatnature is no less one due to its real identity with the contracting differentia,it follows that it will be numerically one in virtue of itself.

This is confirmed [as follows]. The nature loses nothing of its unitythrough the fact that it is really the same as that which is fully one. Hence[the nature] will be of itself one through the fact that it is really the sameas the individual differentia no less than if it were really distinguished fromthe individual differentia.

This [confirmation] is confirmed [as follows]. According to that Doctor,whatever order any [items] have if they be really distinct, they have the sameorder in the case in which they are distinguished in some way (yet not really[distinguished]). But if the contracting differentia and the nature were reallydistinguished, they would have an order as two [items] of which either wouldbe numerically one in virtue of itself, and one would be in virtue of itselfpotency and the other act. Hence they will have a consimilar order in thecase in which they are distinguished formally.



This confirmation is more obvious as regards the nature of the genuswith respect to the specific differentiae. For if (a) the nature color werenot really the same as the specific differentia of whiteness, and (b) thenature color were not really the same as the [specific] differentia of black-ness, and, nevertheless, (c) those natures were distinguished of themselves—[then] they would have the order of the more perfect to the more imperfect.Hence in the case in which they are now not really distinguished from thespecific differentiae but are really distinguished among themselves, they willhave the same order of themselves. And this would only be possible werethey distinguished of themselves, since it is a contradiction that some [items]be related as the more perfect and the more imperfect unless they be dis-tinguished of themselves, since the perfect and the imperfect are necessarilydistinguished. Hence if now those specific natures of themselves were tohave the order of the more perfect and the more imperfect, they would bedistinguished of themselves.

[ Fifth Argument Against Scotus’s View ]

Fifthly, it would follow that the degree [of the individual differentia]would be as equally communicable as the nature—rather, it is in fact com-municated to many universals. And this is incompatible with the naturein respect of individual differentiae. Hence the individual degree is no lesscommunicable than the nature.

[ Sixth Argument Against Scotus’s View ]

That [individual] differentia and that nature are either of the sameratio or of different [rationes]. If they are of the same ratio, then the one isno more singular of itself than the other. If they are of different [rationes]–

Against this: those [items] that are one thing in the case of crea-tures are not of different rationes; but the individual differentia and thecontracted nature are one thing; hence [they are not of different rationes].

Likewise, there is a greater or equal likeness and agreement amongthose [items] that are one thing than among those [items] that are reallydistinguished. Hence they are able to agree in their properties and attributesmore or equally, while they are all yet equally simple or composite. Hence ifthe individual degree contracting the nature man and the individual degreecontracting the nature ass agree in this attribute, that each is of itself athis, the individual degree and the nature (which is really the same as that[individual] degree) will be able to agree equally in that same attribute.

Likewise, A and B, which are really the same, are no less of the sameratio than A and D, if they be really distinguished. But the nature that isin Socrates and the nature that is in Plato, which are really distinguished,



are of the same ratio. Hence so much the more will the nature of Socratesand the contracting differentia be of the same ratio.

|# Likewise, then Socrates would include something of a ratio thatdiffers from all that which is in Plato. And this is false, since then Socratesand Plato would not simply be of the same ratio.#|

[ Seventh Argument Against Scotus’s View ]

Seventhly, if the nature were contracted in this way precisely by thecontracting differentia [from which it is] only formally distinct, real univo-cation could equally be postulated, i. e. of something real a parte rei thatis univocal to God and creatures, just as such a univocation can be postu-lated with respect to any given individuals in the case of creatures. Theconsequent goes against these [philosophers], who hold precisely that thereis some concept that is univocal to God and to the creature and not some-thing a parte rei, just as they hold ex parte alia.

[Proof of the Consequence]: The consequence is clear [as follows]. Suchunivocation should only be denied because there would follow in God acomposition out of something that is contracted and something that con-tracts. But, assuming a formal distinction, no composition follows, sincethose [items] that are only formally distinct do not produce composition, asis clear in the case of the divine essence and [divine] relation. Hence suchunivocation is not incompatible with the divine simplicity.

[Confirmation]: The [proof of the consequence] is confirmed [as fol-lows]. There is no more reason that those formally distinct [items] producecomposition than do others, although they are more distinguished than theothers. For by whatever reason degrees in the formal distinction are postu-lated, by the same reason degrees in a composition out of formally distinct[items] will be postulated.

This [confirmation] is confirmed [as follows]. Just as when some [items]are really distinguished, whether they are more or less [distinguished], if theywere to make [something] that is per se one, there is no greater reason thatthese produce composition than those, although these less than those, sotoo if some [items] were formally distinguished and make [something] that isper se one, there is no greater reason that these produce composition thanthose. Hence either all formally distinct [items] making or constituting[something] that is per se one produce composition, or none do.

[ Six Incorrect Statements in the Formulation of Scotus’s View ]

Again, running through [Scotus’s] remarks—many points seem to bestated incorrectly in his manner of putting them forward.



[ First Incorrect Statement ]

First, [Scotus] says:The nature is naturally prior to this beingness as it is a this.

This is not true [for the following reasons].(i) For the same reason, since there is a formal distinction between the

essence and relation, the essence would be naturally prior to the rela-tion. And this is false.

(ii) According to [Scotus’s] own remarks elsewhere, anything that is priorin nature to something else can, through divine power, come to bewithout the posterior. But this is impossible for the nature, since it isreally the same as the contracting differentia.The assumption is clear, because [Scotus] holds that it is this to be

prior to another: to be able to be without it and not conversely.

[ Second Incorrect Statement ]

Second, [the thesis (S5)]:The individual differentia is not quidditative

seems to be stated incorrectly. For anything that pertains to the essence ofsomething that is per se in a genus pertains to its quiddity, and consequentlyis a quidditative beingness. But this individual differentia pertains to theessence of an individual that is per se in a genus. Hence [the individualdifferentia is quidditative].

[Objection]: If it were said that it is required that [the individual differ-entia] be a communicable beingness, since every quiddity is communicable—

[Reply]: This seems to be a senseless remark. For just as you, [Scotus],hold that every quiddity is communicable, so too might I with the same easehold that every real quiddity is communicable to [items] that are distinctin species, and so specific beingness will not be quidditative beingness. Itseems, then, that one ought to say that every beingness that pertains tothe essence of some thing that is per se one and existing per se in a genusis a quidditative beingness, such that whether it be communicable or in-communicable is irrelevant. More exactly, one ought to say (as will be clear[later]) that no real quidditative beingness is communicable except as formis communicated to matter or in the sort of way in which a distinct thingis communicated to a distinct thing.

[ Third Incorrect Statement ]

Third, [the thesis (S8)]:The nature is indifferent of itself, and yet really is the contracting dif-ferentia

seems to be stated incorrectly. For, as has been argued, that which is of



itself indifferent is indifferent. But what is indifferent is not really the sameas what is really non-indifferent. Hence the nature and the contractingdifferentia are not really the same.

This point is confirmed [as follows]. If [the nature] were of itself in-different, it is either (i) really indifferent of itself, or (ii) not. If (ii), thenit does nothing for the case at hand. If (i), then it can really be communi-cated, which was disproved before [in the discussion of the second incorrectstatement in the formulation of Scotus’s view]. [Now] it follows from thispoint that [the thesis] that the nature is of itself indifferent and yet madeproper through identity [with the contracting differentia] seems to be statedincorrectly. For if [the nature] were really [of itself indifferent], being in an-other is incompatible with it in this regard. Hence it is not of itself common(except perhaps negatively).

[ Fourth Incorrect Statement ]

Fourth, [the theses (S12) and (S16)]:The nature really is numerically one, although it is of itself commonand it is numerically one only denominatively

seems to be stated incorrectly. When some [items] make or constitute [some-thing] that is one per se, for whatever reason an attribute or property ofthe one denominates the other, the converse [holds] by the same reason.For example: for whatever reason a property of the matter is predicateddenominatively of the form, a property or an attribute of the form will bepredicated denominatively of the matter by the same reason. Hence, sincethe nature and the contracting differentia make [something] that is one perse, for whatever reason ‘numerical unity’ is predicated denominatively of thenature such that the nature really is numerically one, by the same reason‘lesser unity,’ which is an attribute of the nature itself, will be predicateddenominatively of the individual differentia such that the individual differ-entia will really be common and one by a lesser unity. Consequently, thesingular as a whole, by the same reason, will be denominated by each unity.Thus the singular will be no more numerically one than common, or it willbe one by a lesser unity.

From this point, it is clear that [Scotus’s] analogy [with color andwhiteness] supports the opposite [position]. For just as the specific differ-entia cannot be called one by a unity lesser than specific unity would be, sotoo the unity of the genus cannot be called one by a unity greater than theunity of the genus would be.

[ Fifth Incorrect Statement ]

Fifth:



The universal in act is that which has some indifferent unity, [accordingto which� it� is in proximate potency to be said of any given supposit]

seems to be stated incorrectly. For then it would be necessary that theuniversal in act would be one in many and [said] of many. But I raise thequestion whether that universal is a being of reason, and consequently isonly one in many singulars outside the soul through predication (which isbeing said of many). Hence, distinguishing being in many from being saidof many, [the thesis] is not true. If, however, that universal were outsidethe soul, then it is in the thing according to some unity.

[ Sixth Incorrect Statement ]

Sixth:Commonness, and likewise singularity, agree to the nature outside theintellect

seems to be stated incorrectly. For nothing outside the intellect is common,since outside the intellect everything is really singular.

[ Ockham’s Reply to the Initial Question ]

Therefore, I answer the question in another way.[ Two Theorems ]

First, I prove this theorem:[Theorem 1]: Any given singular thing is singular of itself.

I argue persuasively for it as follows.[First Argument for Theorem 1]: Singularity immediately agrees to

that of which it is. Hence it cannot agree to itself through something else.Hence if something be singular, it is singular of itself.

[Second Argument for Theorem 1]: Besides, that which is singularis related to being singular just as that which is universal is related tobeing universal. Hence that which is singular cannot become universal orcommon through something added to it, just as that which is commoncannot become singular through something added to it. Hence whatever issingular is singular through nothing added [to it], but rather of itself.

The second theorem:[Theorem 2]: Every thing outside the soul is really singular and numer-ically one.

[First Argument for Theorem 2]: Every thing outside the soul is either (i)simple, or (ii) composite. [With regard to (i)]: if it be simple, then it doesnot include many things. But every thing that does not include many thingsis numerically one, for any such thing and one other consimilar thing areprecisely two things. Hence each of them is numerically one. Hence every



simple thing is numerically one. [With regard to (ii)]: if it be composite,one must eventually arrive at a definite number of parts. Consequently,any of those parts will be numerically one. Consequently, the whole thatis composed out of these [parts] will be numerically one or will be one byaggregation.

[Second Argument for Theorem 2]: This [second conclusion] can alsobe argued for in this fashion. I take that thing that you do not hold to be asingular thing, and I raise the question whether it includes (i) many things,or (ii) not. [With regard to (ii)]: if not, I take some really distinct consimilar[thing], and I argue as follows. These things are really distinct and are notinfinite in number; hence they are finite in number—and only in a duality,as is clear. Hence there are precisely two in this case. Consequently, each ofthem will be numerically one. [With regard to (i)]: if, however, it includesmany things and not an infinite [number], then [it includes] a finite [number].Consequently, there is a [finite] number of things in this case. Thus any ofthose included [things] will be numerically one and singular. It follows fromthese points that any given thing outside the soul is singular of itself, suchthat it itself, without anything added [to it], is that which is immediatelydenominated by the concept (intentio) of singularity. Nor are there anygiven possible [things] a parte rei, however distinct, of which one would bemore indifferent than the other, or of which one would be more numericallyone than the other—unless perhaps one were more perfect than the other,as this angel is more perfect than this ass. Thus any given thing outsidethe soul will of itself be a this. Nor is there any cause of individuation to besought (except perhaps intrinsic and extrinsic causes when the individualis composite). Rather, there would more be a cause to be sought how it ispossible for something to be common and universal.

[ Response to the Initial Question ]

Hence I respond to the formulation of the [initial] question [as follows].That which is universal and univocal is not really something ex parte reiformally distinct from the individual. That it is not only formally distinctis clear, since then, whenever a superior were predicated of an inferior, thesame would be predicated of itself, since the superior and the inferior wouldbe the same thing. The consequent is false, since then the same genus wouldnever be predicated of diverse species, but now this would be predicated andnow that, which seems unacceptable.

[ Replies to the Arguments for Scotus’s View ]




I state that ‘being present in something’ can be taken in two ways.Either:(a) really

or:(b) according to predication

(as the predicate is said ‘to be present’ in the subject of which it issaid)

Now according to (a), it is true that, for whatever something is presentin, it is present in it in whatsoever. This is not necessary according to (b),if the subject were a common term; hence [the consequence]:

If the nature man were of itself a this, that in whatsoever there is thenature man, that is this man

does not follow.Nevertheless, the proposition:

The nature man is of itself a thisshould be distinguished—though perhaps not literally—in that ’the natureman’ can supposit simply or personally, i. e. in that [‘the nature man’] canstand for [either]: (i) a thing outside the soul, or (ii) for itself. [With regardto (ii)]: if (ii), this [proposition]:

The nature stone is of itself a thisis false, for then it is denoted that the mental concept, which is the universal,is of itself this stone. And this is false, since that concept cannot be thisstone either of itself or through any given power, although [the concept]could be truly predicated of it, not for itself but for an external thing.[With regard to (i)]: if (i) were accepted, then this [proposition]:

The nature man is of itself this manis true. Nevertheless, there obtains along with this that the nature man is ofitself that man—rather, that the nature man is not of itself this man. For,because ‘the nature man’ is a common term, they will be able to be trueas two subcontraries, each of which is verified of now one and now anothersingular. For then they are equipollent to these particular [propositions]:

Some nature is of itself this [man]which is verified for this nature, and:

Some nature is not of itself this manwhich is verified for another nature that is not this nature. And in the sameway, just as these [propositions]:

A man is Socratesand:

A man is Platoobtain together, so too these [propositions]:



The nature man is of itself this manand:

The nature man is of itself that manobtain together.

When [Scotus] says:If the nature man were of itself this man, then in whatsoever there is thenature man, that is this man

I reply that, literally, [the consequence] does not follow formally. Rather,it is the fallacy of ‘figure of speech,’ in that one mode of suppositing isexchanged for another. For in the [antecedent]:

The nature man is of itself this man‘the nature man’ supposits determinately there, whereas in the consequent,it rather supposits merely confusedly.

Nevertheless, whatever may be the case regarding this matter, this[proposition]:

In whatsoever there is the nature man, that is this manwill be true, since it has one true singular, namely [the singular proposition]:

In whatsoever there is this nature man, that is this manAnd then, by arguing as follows:

In whatsoever there is the nature man, that is this man; the nature manis in that man; hence that man is this man

there is a fallacy of the consequent, since [the conclusion] is argued for onthe basis of [premisses] which are all indefinite. But one should uniformlysay as regards the diversity of these propositions, of which one is denied andthe other conceded, just as [one says] regarding these [propositions]:

Of any man the ass is running[and]:

The ass of any man is running.|# Still, it should be noted that when [the proposition]:

The nature man is of itself this manis stated, it ought to be understood such that the [grammatical] constructionis intransitive, that is, as:

The nature that is (a) man is of itself this man #|[ Replies to the Second Argument ]

[First Reply]: I concede that, to whatever one [of a pair] of oppositesagrees of itself, the other opposite is incompatible with it of itself. Andhence, since the nature is of itself a this, in that ‘nature’ supposits person-ally, I then concede uniformly that numerical multiplicity is incompatiblewith the nature—that is:

(i) Being in another is incompatible with the nature



and:(ii) Being in many is incompatible with the nature

[With regard to (i)]: now (i) is verified for one singular, because be-ing in another is incompatible with this nature. Nevertheless, there obtainsalong with this that being in another is not incompatible with the nature.Instead, being in another agrees to the nature of itself (|# i. e. being anotheragrees to the nature #|), and this is verified for another singular. For, asstated [in the reply to the first argument for Scotus’s view], they are two in-definite [propositions]. Consequently, since the subject supposits personallyin them, they are equipollent to two particular [propositions], each of whichhas some true singular. Consequently, each is simply true. [With regard to(ii)]: that [proposition] is true for any given singular, since being in manyis incompatible with any given nature.

[First Objection to the First Reply]: If it were said that being predi-cated of many is not incompatible with the nature, and so neither is beingin many incompatible with it—

[Reply to the First Objection]: I reply that the antecedent, [namely‘being predicated of many is not incompatible with the nature’], should bedistinguished [as follows]. [First], in that:(a) the subject can supposit personally

According to (a) [the antecedent] is simply false, since it is false forany given singular, namely:

[Being predicated of many] is not incompatible with this natureand:

[Being predicated of many] is not incompatible with that natureand so on for each [nature]. Alternatively:(b) the subject can supposit simply

According to (b) the antecedent is true. For then it is denoted that thecommon [term] ‘nature,’ which is not in the thing but only in the mind, canbe predicated of many—not for itself but for things. Now according to (a),the consequence is acceptable, since the subject supposits personally in theantecedent as well as in the consequent. According to (b), [the consequence]is not valid, since then the subject supposits simply in the antecedent and[the subject supposits] personally in the consequent, and so there is a fallacyof equivocation in the third mode. Yet if the subject of the consequentcould have simple supposition, the consequent would have be denied andthe consequence would have to be denied, taking ‘being in’ for ‘being insomething really and subjectively’—for the nature is not in any singular inthis way, that is to say, what is common is not subjectively in any singular.

[Second Objection to the First Reply]: If it were said that the same



thing is a this-something (hoc aliquid) and is distinguished from every otherthis-something, but the nature of itself is not distinguished from anotherthis-something, for then it would not be this stone; hence stone of itself isnot this stone—

[Reply to the Second Objection]: I reply that, as before, the claim:The nature stone is itself distinguished from every other this-something

is true for one singular, in that the subject supposits personally. Likewise,the claim:

The nature stone is of itself another stone than that [stone]is true for another singular. And then it does not follow that another stonewould not be a stone, just as [the consequence]:

Man is distinguished from Socrates or man is not Socrates; and man isSocrates; thus Socrates is not Socrates or is distinguished from Socrates

does not follow.[Second Reply to the Second Argument for Scotus’s View]: The [sec-

ond] principal argument [for Scotus’s view] also supports the opposite [po-sition]. For just as when to whatever one [of a pair] of opposites agrees ofitself, the other opposite is incompatible with it of itself, so too when towhatever one [of a pair of] opposites agrees, to the same [thing], so long asthe [first] opposite agrees to it, the other opposite is incompatible with it.For example, if being white agrees to Socrates, so long as Socrates is whitethe other opposite, namely that he be black, cannot agree to him. Hence ifthe nature stone is this, the nature stone, so long as it is this, cannot bein another Thus so long as [the nature stone] is this stone it cannot be anystone but the one it is. Hence it is clear that the argument works againstitself. And so, for [Scotus] and for me, [the argument] should be answeredas stated [here].

[ Reply to the Third Argument ]

It should be stated that one object is naturally prior to the act itselfand another not. And so the universal is never naturally prior to the actitself. Nor is it—namely the universal in act—the proper ratio of the objectof the intellect, since, as will be clear in [Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 6], the primary objectof the intellect (by the primacy of generation) is the singular itself, and thisunder its proper ratio and not under the ratio universal.


I state that the unity of the nature existing in that stone is nothing thatdoes not equally primary belong to that stone. Nevertheless, I distinguish[senses] of ‘unity’ [as follows].

(i) ‘Unity’ is said in that it precisely denominates something that is one



and not many, not one in comparison to something else that is reallydistinct from itAccording to (i), I state that every real unity is numerical unity. Al-

ternatively:(ii) ‘Unity’ is said in that it denominates many, or one in comparison to

something that is really distinct [from it]According to (ii), specific unity denominates Socrates and Plato, and

generic unity denominates this man and this ass. It is not something in anyway distinct from the individuals themselves, but immediately denominatesthe individuals themselves. Accordingly, just as it is truly said that Socratesand Plato are one or are the same in species, and Socrates is the same inspecies as Plato, so too it is truly said that this man and this ass are thesame in genus, and that this man is one or is the same in genus as thisass—that is to say, that they are contained under the same species or underthe same genus. The Philosopher explicitly holds this analysis in Top. 1.7[103a6–14], as noted in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4]. And according to (ii), I concedethat not every real unity or identity is numerical. But this unity does notagree to the nature as distinct from individuals in any way. Instead, itimmediately agrees to the individuals themselves (or to one in comparisonwith the rest, which is the same).

But since the [seven] arguments [Scotus gives for lesser unity] goagainst (i), I therefore respond to them [one by one].

[ Reply to Scotus’s First Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

When it is said [in Scotus’s first proof] that, according to the Philoso-pher [Met. 10.1 1052b18]:

In every genus there is a first ‘one’ that is the standard and measure ofall those [items] that belong to that genus

I state that, as will be clear in [Ord. 2 q. 11 (REF)], that the measure issometimes a genuine thing outside the soul, eg cloth is measured by thewrist, and at other times the measure is only a certain concept in the mind.The first measure ought to be one by a numerical unity. But this [claim]—that in every genus there is only one that is the measure of all else—is false.But if it were to have some truth, it ought to be understood such that inevery genus there is something that is the measure of all else distinct inspecies. However, it is not necessary that it be the measure of all else,whether they are distinguished in species or not And in this fashion thereare many [items] of which any is a measure of all else distinct in species,and any of them is one by numerical unity.

When it is said that:The unity of the first measurer is real



I state that if ‘first’ were taken positively, this [proposition] is false due toa false implication, since nothing is a first measurer in this way. However,if [‘first’] were taken negatively, I concede this [proposition], since there aremany such first [measurers], namely any given individual belonging to thatspecies (especially if each were equally simple).

When it is said that:No singular is the measure of all those [items] that are in that genus

I concede that [no singular is the measure] of individuals belonging to thesame species [as it]. But [that singular] is the measure of all [items] that aredistinct in species; and this suffices for the case at hand. |# Yet nevertheless,it should be noted that the Philosopher is speaking either principally orsolely of those [items] that belong to the same species, as is clear by hisexamples in [Met. 3.3 999a12–13 (cited in Scotus’s first proof of a real lesserunity)], and [he is speaking] of those [species] that have individuals of whichsome are greater and others are lesser. And he holds that something thatis less than the others would be the measure of the others, yet not [themeasure] of all individuals belonging to that species, but only [the measure]of those [individuals] that are not so small. #|

[ Reply to Scotus’s Second Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

I state that “comparison comes about in the atomic species” neitheraccording to the unity of the concept, nor precisely according to numericalunity, nor precisely according to specific unity—whether it be put forwardas it was put forward in the beginning of the resolution of this argument orit be put forward in the false manner of imagining of some [philosophers]—since then there would be a comparison in every atomic species. But thereis a comparison on this account, since many individuals belonging to thesame species can make one individual, and so where many [items] |# thatare not distinct in place and subject #| can make one [individual], theresuch a comparison should be put forward, and not elsewhere. And sincethis is possible for individuals belonging to the same species and not forindividuals belonging to diverse species, a comparison is then put forwardin the atomic species and not in the genus. For example, this white is calledwhiter than another white, since it has many parts of whiteness (|# in thesame primary subject #|), and if in this way many parts of whiteness andblackness were to occur together in order to make per se one color, thatcould be called more colored than the other.

When it is said that:The comparison does not come about according to numerical unity

[this proposition] is true in the first way of speaking about numerical unity.And then [the comparison] comes about according to specific unity, since it



comes about according to two [items] each of which is numerically one. Noris any third [item] that is distinct from those two in any way required.

[ Reply to Scotus’s Third Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

I state that, postulating similarity to be a relation that is really distinctfrom its extremes, it should then be said that in this case there are twosimilarities having two real foundations, of which each is numerically one.And so that ‘one’ is not the ratio of founding the similarity of the same toitself, but rather is the ratio of founding the similarity of itself to the other.

Furthermore, ¡what¿ the Philosopher understands with regard to ‘nu-merically one’ is clear, for as soon as he described how ‘similar’, ’same’, and‘equal’ are said according to one, he afterwards adds ([Met. 5.15 1021a12–13]):

One is the principle and measure of numberHence [Aristotle] does not understand, with regard to any unity of anything,that it is not numerically one.

But should it never be conceded that this unity is the ratio of foundingthis relation?

It should be said that, according to those [philosophers] who maintainthese relations to be really distinct, it should no more be maintained thatunity is the proximate ratio of founding similarity than relations of anothermode. But there is a difference in the fact that, for these relations, some realunity according to (ii)—described at the beginning of the resolution of this[fourth] argument [for Scotus’s view]—is required, which is not required forrelations of another mode. For at least specific unity is required for these[relations], which is not necessarily required for the other [relations of aanother mode] (although sometimes there is unity of this sort there).

[ Reply to Scotus’s Fourth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

I state that for some things to be the ‘primary extremes of a realopposition’ can be understood in two ways. Either:

(i) They are those [items] of which being really opposed is primarily pred-icated positively. Yet it is not predicated of them for themselves, inthat they have simple supposition, but rather [it is predicated of them]for singular things, in that they have personal suppositionor:

(ii) They are really contraries in the thingNow according to (i), the extremes of a real opposition are not real,

since this term ‘being really opposed’ is not predicated primarily and ade-quately of any given things. Rather, [it is predicated] of concepts for things,if the predication be in the mind; or [it is predicated] of [spoken] words for



things, if the predication be spoken; and so forth. Nevertheless, it oughtnot to be conceded that [the extremes of a real opposition] are literally con-traries. Instead, it should be stated uniformly as it was previously statedfor the case of the primary adequate object of a sensitive potency and theprimary subject of a real attribute ([Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4]). According to (ii),there are not only two extremes of a real opposition, but there are many—asthere are many real oppositions. And accordingly, this whiteness and thisblackness are really opposed. Likewise, that whiteness and that blacknessare really opposed. And regarding these cases, it is precisely true that oneof the contraries corrupts the other, and that each of them is numericallyone, since nothing corrupts another except as numerically one.

When it is said that:. . . then [precisely] this white [or precisely that white] would be a pri-mary contrary of [this] black

I state that, strictly, white is not contrary to black but whiteness [is con-trary] to blackness. And I concede that this whiteness is primarily contraryto blackness in that the ‘primarily’ is taken negatively, since it is contrary toblackness and nothing prior to it is contrary to blackness. However, in thatthe ‘primarily’ is taken positively, nothing is primarily contrary to blacknessin this way.

[First Objection to Ockham’s Reply]: If it were said that:One is contrary to one

and so many are not contrary to blackness—[Second Objection to Ockham’s Reply]: Likewise, [if it were said that]:

Contraries can be in the same[but] not two individuals—

[Third Objection to Ockham’s Reply]: Likewise, [if it were said that]:Contraries are maximally distant

but two individuals are not maximally distant—[Reply to the First Objection]: I state that the Philosopher is speaking

of what is one in species, not [what is one] in number. And it has been statedhow specific unity is real and a parte rei ([at the beginning of the resolutionof this fourth argument for Scotus’s view]). For this is nothing other than aparte rei being some [group of] many [items] that are contained under thesame species, according to the Philosopher in Top. 1.7 [103a10–12].

[Reply to the Second Objection]: I concede that “contraries can be inthe same,” at least successively. And so I state that it is not a contradic-tion that water be hot, and [hot] to the fullest [extent], just as there is nocontradiction that [water] be most fully cold (if there be any stopping-pointin such forms [of heat and cold]).



[Reply to the Third Objection]: I state that “contraries are maximallydistant” by the distance that can exist between individuals belonging todiverse species. Still, of which a maximal specific distance is required forcontrareity, and of which not, will be stated elsewhere.

[ Reply to Scotus’s Fifth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

I state that the object of one sensation is one by a numerical unity.When it is said [in Scotus’s proof of the minor premiss] that:

A potency cognizing an object in this fashion, namely insofar as it isone by this unity, cognizes it insofar as it is distinct from all else

I state that [the potency] cognizes that which is distinct from all else. And[I state that the potency] cognizes it under that ratio through which it isdistinguished from all else, since that ratio (which is the very thing itself)immediately terminates the act of cognizing. Yet it is not necessary on thisaccount that [the power] can discern it or distinguish it from all else. Thereason is that more is required for discretive cognition than for apprehensivecognition, since discretive cognition is never in act except with respect todistinct [objects]. Nor yet is it sufficient that distinct [objects] be appre-hended, unless they of themselves be dissimilar or be distinguished in placeor position. And this is true when all such apprehended [objects] are apt tomake [something] one per se, as is the case for sensible qualities, and not forany given intellections or loves of the will, neither for intelligences nor forsouls. And so no matter how much such [objects] be apprehended, it is notnecessary that they be able to be discerned, due to the greatest similarityamong them. Nevertheless, if [the potency in question] is an intellectivepotency, it can cognize the [object] to be distinct from all else. Yet if somedefinite [object] were singled out, it is not necessary that [the intellectivepotency] be able to cognize it as distinct from this one, for some universalcan be known and yet many singulars [can] fail to be known. But sense,strictly, cannot cognize it to be distinct from anything, since this pertainsto the complex notion by which it is known that this is not this. Yet sensecan discern this from one [thing] and not from another, and sometimes itcan discern this from this and sometimes not, due to some variation a parterei.

This argument is confirmed [as follows]. Sense discerns the more whitefrom the less white. Then I raise the question: does it apprehend one of theseprecisely (i) under the ratio common, or (ii) under the ratio singularity?[With regard to (i)]: if (i), and they agree in that [ratio common], then [sense]does not discern [them] through it. If (ii), what was to be proved, thatit is apprehended under the ratio singularity, is established—not that theconcept (intentio) singularity would be the terminating ratio, but that that



which is immediately denominated by this concept would be immediatelyterminating.

[Reply to Scotus’s Confirmation of the Proof of the Minor]: I statethat the primary object of the intellect in the primacy of generation is oneby a numerical unity, and it precedes [the action of the intellect]. But theprimary object [of the intellect] in the primacy of adequation, if howeverthere be any such, is not one by a numerical unity, nor does it precede [theaction of the intellect], as will be stated later ([Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 1]).

[ Reply to Scotus’s Sixth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

I concede that, in the way in which every real unity is numerical, thatevery real diversity is also numerical in that way. For even specific diversityis numerical, since, according to the Philosopher ([Met. 5.9 1018a6–19]),whatever [items] are diverse in genera are diverse in species, and whatever[items] are diverse in species are numerically diverse. Accordingly, numer-ical diversity is more in the genus as regards specific diversity, since [theconsequence]:

They are diverse in genera or species; hence they are numerically diversefollows, but not conversely.

When it is said [in Scotus’s sixth proof of a real lesser unity] that:Every numerical diversity insofar as it is numerical is equal

I state that this [proposition] is simply false. For then it would follow thatevery diversity would be equal, since ‘insofar as’ is not a distracting deter-mination. Nevertheless, if the consequent [of Scotus’s proof] be understoodsuch that all those [items] that only differ numerically are equally diverse,[this proposition] can be conceded in the case of these [items] that are notsusceptible to greater and lesser nor [susceptible to] more and less.

[Objection]: If it were objected that every numerical unity is equal,and so every numerical diversity is equal—

[Reply]: I state that it does not follow under the understanding inwhich the antecedent is true, just as [the consequence]:

Whatever [items] are equal are equally equal (since equality is not sus-ceptible to more and less), and so whatever [items] are unequal areequally unequal

does not follow. It is the case for such [items] when one [of a pair] ofopposites is susceptible to more and less and not the other, and it is so inthe case at hand.

[Implications]: As for what is suggested in this [sixth] argument [fora real lesser unity], [namely] that (i) if every diversity were numerical theintellect could no more abstract something common from Socrates and Platothan from Socrates and a line; and that (ii) any given universal would be a



pure figment of the intellect—[Reply to the First Implication]: As regards (i), I state that from

the fact that Socrates and Plato of themselves differ only numerically, andSocrates is most similar to Plato in substance, putting all else aside, theintellect can abstract something common to Socrates and Plato that willnot be common to Socrates and whiteness. Nor should another cause besought, except because Socrates is Socrates and Plato is Plato, and each isa man.

[Objection]: If it were objected that Socrates and Plato really agreemore than Socrates and an ass, and so Socrates and Plato agree in somethingreal in which Socrates and an ass do not really agree, but not in Socratesnor in Plato; hence [they agree] in something in some other way distinct,and that [in which they agree] is common to each—

[Reply]: I reply that literally it ought not to be conceded that Socratesand Plato agree in something or in some [things], but rather that (a) theyagree with respect to ‘somethings,’ since [they agree] of themselves, andthat (b) Socrates agrees with Plato not ‘in something’ but ‘with respect tosomething,’ since [he agrees with Plato] of himself.

[Objection to the Reply]: If it were said that Socrates and Plato agreein man—

[Reply]: I state that the ‘man’ [in this proposition] can supposit [either](i) simply, or (ii) personally. According to (i), [the proposition] can beconceded, since this is nothing other than to say that ‘man’ is one common[term] that is predicable of Socrates and Plato. Yet [according to to (ii)]—if the ‘man’ were to supposit personally for some thing–[the proposition] issimply false, since they agree in no man, nor do they agree in some thing,but they agree with respect to things, since [they agree] with respect tomen, since of themselves [they are men]. |# Therefore, I respond to theformulation [of the question] that Socrates and Plato of themselves reallyagree more than Socrates and an ass, yet not in something that is real.#|

[Reply to the Second Implication]: As for the [second implication]about the figment, it is clear how the universal is a figment and how not.

[Reply to Scotus’s First Confirmation]: I state that for some [items]to be ‘primarily diverse’ can be understood in two ways:

(i) [Some items are said to be ‘primarily diverse’] because nothing is oneand the same in each, but whatever is in one simply and absolutely ofitself is not something that is in the other.According to (i), I concede that all individuals are of themselves pri-

marily diverse, unless perhaps the case were otherwise for individuals fromone of which another is generated according to the numerical identity of the



matter in each.(ii) Some [items] are said to be ‘primarily diverse’ when one is immediately

and primarily denied of the other, and so when one is not immediatelydenied of the other, such that a negative [proposition] composed outof them is not immediate, then they are different and not only diverse.According to (ii), all individuals belonging to the same species are

primarily diverse, since an immediate negative proposition is composed outof them. Likewise, all species contained immediately under some genus areprimarily diverse, since an immediate [negative] proposition is composed outof them. And so Socrates and Plato are primarily diverse according to (ii).But Socrates and this ass are not primarily diverse, since this [proposition]:

Socrates is not Platois immediate, whereas this [proposition]:

Socrates is not this assis not immediate, because this [proposition]:

No man is this assis more immediate. Hence what is generally said is not said well, [namely]that “those [items] are primarily diverse that agree in nothing, and those[items] are different that agree in something.” Rather, those [items] areprimarily diverse of which neither differs from another by something morecommon of which the other is first denied, whereas those [items] are differentof which one is denied of the other, since something more common than itis first denied of the same. |# That is, those [items] are primarily diversewhen nothing more common to another one of them is the middle [term]for inferring a negative [proposition in which] one [is denied] of the other.Those [items] are different when something more common to another oneis the middle [term] for inferring a negative [proposition] in which one isdenied of the other. For example, this man and this ass differ, since ’man’is such a middle [term], and likewise ‘ass’ [is such a middle term]. For thissyllogism:

No man is an ass, and this man is a man; hence this man is not this assis acceptable. #|

And that this would be the Philosopher’s intent is clear from Met. 10.3[1054b23–25], where he says:

Difference and diversity are not the same. For it is not necessary thatthe diverse be diverse from what it is diverse in something.

That is, it is not necessary that there be something more common to thatwhich is diverse, of which that from which it is diverse is first and imme-diatey denied—just as for Socrates to be diverse from Plato it is not nec-essary that there be something more common to Socrates, of which Plato



is immediately denied, and [denied] of Socrates only mediately. But that[proposition]:

Socrates is not Platois immediate. The Philosopher puts forward as the reason ([Met. 10.31054b25–26]):

Every being is either diverse or the same.That is, every being—whether it have what is more common of which some-thing else is first denied or not—this being is the same or diverse fromany other being, however picked out. [The passage continues (Met. 10.31054b26–27)]:

But what differs from something, differs in something.That is, everything differing from something differs through something thatis first and more common, of which the other is immmediately denied, anddenied of it only mediately. For example, this man differs from an assthrough ‘man,’ of which ‘ass’ is immediately denied, and [‘ass’ is denied]of that man only mediately. (|# It should be noted that when I say thatman to differ from an ass through ‘man,’ I take ’to differ through some-thing’ as I explain in [Ord. 1 d. 8 q. 4], when I explain how something differsfrom another through an essential differentia. And so ‘to differ throughsomething’ is taken equivocally in different places. #|) And this is what [thePhilosopher] adds afterwards ([Met. 10.3 1054b27–28]):

Accordingly, it is necessary for there to be the same something, by whichit differs.

This ought not to be understood as: “there is the same something by whicheach differs from the other,” since this is impossible, for then they wouldmore agree rather than differ in that [something]. Instead, the [passage]should be understood as: “there is the same something by which, as if itwere a middle [term], this differing [thing] is shown to differ from that [one].”For example, that man is not a quantity is shown through ‘substance’ as ifit were a middle [term], by speaking as follows:

No substance is quantity, and man is a substance; therefore, no man isa quantity.

And so that middle [term] is more common than it is different, for it alwaysis a genus or species of it. And this is what the Philosopher says ([Met. 10.31054b27–29]):

Furthermore, this very same [something]—supply: “by which what is different differs from another”—

—[is] the genus or the species—supply: “is the genus or species with respect to that which is different, andis not the differentia of it—



—for surely that which is different differs in genus or in species.And thus it is empty to claim that those [items] that are different differ intheir differentiae and agree in the genus, if they be in a genus. Instead,it ought be said that they differ in their genera, or in species, or in their[several] species, not a parte rei but in the denial—mediate or immediate—of one of the other. And the Philosopher puts forward examples, saying([Met. 10.3 1054b29–30]):

[Some things are different] in genus, of which there is no common matter,nor mutual generation. For example, [those things differ in genus] ofwhichsoever there is a different categorial form (figura).

Notice that those [items] that are in distinct categories differ in genus, andconsequently differ in species. [The passage continues (Met. 10.3 1054b30)]:

[But those things differ] in species, of which the genus is the same.Nevertheless, the species are diverse.

Accordingly, I state that man and whiteness differ in their genera,since each has a higher-level genus through which the denial of one of theother can be framed, according to the technique that the Philosopher treatsin Post. an. 1.15 [79a34–b23]. Furthermore, whiteness and substance differin genus, since although whiteness has a genus through which a negative[proposition] in which whiteness is denied of substance (or conversely) canbe proved, even though substance does not have such a genus. But thesecommon [items], substance and quality, do not differ in genus or in species.And thus, since the Philosopher says that all different [things] (in that’different’ is distinguished from ‘diverse’) differ in genus or in species, andSocrates and Plato differ neither in genus nor in species, it is clear that theydo not differ. But Socrates and this ass do differ, since they differ in species.

[First Objection to the Reply to Scotus’s First Confirmation]: If itwere said that this is against the Philosopher’s intent, since in the samepassage he immediately adds afterwards ([Met. 10.3 1054b30–31]):

But ‘genus’ is said as both are called the same, differing according tosubstance.5

Hence it seems, according to [the Philosopher], that those [items] that areimmediately contained under a genus are different.

[Second Objection to the Reply to Scotus’s First Confirmation]: Like-wise, the Commentator, discussing the same passage, [says] ([Iuntina 8fol. 122rb]):

5 The sense of the passage as translated here is correct for the Latin, but that is anartifact of William of Moerbeke’s translation of Aristotle’s Greek text. Aristotle’sGreek would properly be translated into English as: “What each of the different[things] are called the same as, is called the genus.”



Those [things] that differ through formal differentiae are those of whichthe genus is one.

[Third Objection to the Reply to Scotus’s First Confirmation]: Again,[the Philosopher says] (Met. 5.9 [1018a12–15]):

All those [things] that are diverse, being the same something, are called‘different’: and not only in number, but in species, or in genus, or inproportion. Further, [things are called ‘different’] of which the genusis diverse—both contraries and whatever [things] have diversity in sub-stance.

[Reply to the First Objection]: I state that the genus is that which,as the same, is predicated of any [things] differing in substance, since everygenus is predicated of many differing in species. Nevertheless, not all those[things] of which it is predicated differ. For an immediate proposition iscomposed out of [only] some [things] of which [the genus] is predicated, andnot out of other [things of which the genus is predicated].

[Reply to the Second Objection]: I state that some [things] that differthrough formal differentiae have the same genus, and, in every case, allthings outside the soul that really differ through formal differentiae havethe same genus, since only individuals belonging to diverse species are such[as to differ through formal differentiae]. Nevertheless, it is not necessarythat all [things] that have the same genus differ through formal differentiae,as will be made clear in [Ord. 1 d. 8 q. 3].

[Reply to the Third Objection]: I say that the Philosopher takes ‘dif-ferent’ in this passage insofar as it precisely agrees to things. And then allthings whatsoever are diverse and are being the same something, not byidentity but by essential predication—i. e. the same something is predicatedof them truly and in quid. And not only in number, i. e. and those thingsare not only diverse according to number, as are individuals belonging tothe same species, but (supply: they are diverse) either in species, in genus,or in proportion. Such diverse [things], I say, are different. Nevertheless,not all diverse [things] are different. For a real being and a being of reasonare diverse, yet they are not different, since nothing that is the same is pred-icated of them in quid—|# according to the view that holds that a beingof reason has only objective being (esse obiectiuum); according to another[view], something is predicated of them in quid.#| Afterwards, [Aristotle]puts forward other modes of difference ([Met. 5.10 1018a20–1018b8]).

[Objection]: If it were said that those [things] that differ agree morethan those that are only diverse, and so this man and this ass would agreemore than this man and that man—

[Reply]: I state that, taking ‘difference’ as the Philosopher takes it



(Met. 10.3 [1054b25–28]), different [things] do not always agree more thanprecisely diverse [things]. But it is sufficient that they differ with respect tomore [things]—i. e. that of more [things] that are truly said of one of themthe other would be truly denied. For example, of more [things] that are saidof that man, this stone is truly denied than this man [is truly denied]. Andso that man and this stone differ, but not as do this man and that man.

[Reply to Scotus’s Second Confirmation]: [This confirmation is an-swered] by the same [remarks].

[ Reply to Scotus’s Seventh Proof of a Real Lesser Unity ]

I state that were no intellect to exist there would be some real unity ofthe generating fire with respect to the engendered fire, according to whichthe generation would be called univocal. But that unity would not be saidof something that is one, but rather it would be said of many really distinct[things], as stated. And so [there need be no lesser unity].


As regards the citation from Avicenna, I state that [the proposition]:Horseness is just horseness

ought not to be understood such that horseness would be neither one normany, neither in the intellect nor in the world (in effectu), since horsenessreally exists in the world and really is singular. For just as horseness reallyis created by God, and likewise horseness is really distinct from God, sotoo horseness is really and truly singular. But Avicenna understands thatthese [features] do not agree to horseness per se primo modo, nor is any ofthem put into the definition [of ‘horseness’], as he himself explicitly states([Met. 5.1 fol. 86v]).

[Objection]: Suppose it were said that, according to Avicenna andaccording to other philosophers, horseness is of itself indifferent that it besingular and that it be universal. I [who raise this objection] ask: how isthis [claim] true? Either in that ‘horseness’ supposits (i) simply, or (ii)personally.

[With regard to (i)]: if [‘horseness’ were to supposit] simply, then thatconcept is not indifferent, since in no way can [the concept] be a singular.Hence the supposition is not simple when the term supposits for the concept,which is contrary to [the hypothesis].

[With regard to (ii)]: if [‘horseness’] were to supposit personally, then[the claim] is false, since then [‘horseness’] supposits for singulars, and noth-ing singular is indifferent in this fashion.

Hence it seems that apart from the supposition for the concept andfor the singular thing itself it is necessary to postulate a third [alternative],



when the term supposits for the very quiddity that is absolutely indifferentto either [being singular or being universal] –

[Reply]: I reply—uniformly to some of the previous remarks–that this[proposition]:

Horseness is not of itself universal, nor particular, but indifferent tobeing universal and [to being] singular

is only true in that one designated act is understood through it, which isthis:

That being universal and being singular can be indifferently predicatedof horseness.

And in that designated act, ‘horseness’ has simple supposition. But in thetwo true corresponding exercised acts, ‘horseness’ will have diverse suppo-sition. For in one [exercised act], namely in this one:

Horseness is universal[‘horseness’] will have simple supposition. And in the other [exercised act],namely in this one:

Horseness is singular[‘horseness’ will have] personal supposition. For example, this [proposition]:

Of man, there is predicated both word and runningis true, and in it ‘man’ has material supposition, since each is predicated ofthe word ‘man.’ And two true exercised acts correspond to this designatedact, namely this one:

Man is a wordin which ‘man’ supposits materially, and this one:

A man runsin which ‘man’ supposits personally.


I state that when agreement and difference occur together, it is notunacceptable for them to agree to the same [thing] in the same [respect].And so it is not unacceptable that some [things] agree specifically but differnumerically. This is clear through an appropriate example. For it is certainthat the contracted nature really agrees with the individual differentia, sinceit is really the same thing, and yet the nature is distinguished in some wayfrom the contracting differentia. I then raise the question: (i) does it agreeand differ in the same [respect], or (ii) does it agree in one [respect] anddiffer in another? [With regard to (i)]: if in the same [respect], I have whatwas to be shown, [namely] that the same [thing] really agrees with the samein the same indistinct [respect] and is distinguished formally. And I mightwith the same ease say that Socrates agrees with Plato in the same speciesand is distinguished numerically, and so in every case for all such. [With



regard to (ii)]: if, however, it agrees in one [respect] and differs in another,I raise a question regarding those [items]—since they are distinguished insome way, and yet they agree (since they are one thing)—do they agreeand are they distinguished in the same [respect], or do they agree in one[respect] and are distinguished in another? And so either there will be aninfinite regress, or it will come to a halt where the same thing agrees withsomething in the same [respect] and in the same way also is distinguished[from it] in the same [respect]. And I might with the same ease say that thesame [thing] agrees with something in the same species, and is numericallydistinguished from the same [thing with which it agrees].

[First Objection]: If it were said that, putting every intellect aside,there is a greater agreement in fact between Socrates and Plato than be-tween Socrates and this ass; hence in fact Socrates and Plato agree in somenature in which Socrates and this ass do not agree—

[Second Objection]: Unless there were a greater agreement betweenSocrates and Plato than between Socrates and this ass, a specific conceptcould no more be abstracted from Socrates and Plato than from Socratesand this ass—

[Reply to the First Objection]: I state that the consequence framed[in this first objection] is not valid, just as [the consequence]:

Intellectual nature really agrees to God (in virtue of the fact that it isan image of God) more than insensible nature (which is not an image[of God])

does not follow. Nevertheless, they do not agree in anything real that wouldbe distinct from them in some way, even according to those [philosopherswho hold this view], but certainly of themselves they agree the more. Andit is so in the case at hand: Socrates and Plato of themselves agree morethan Socrates and this ass, putting all else aside. Likewise, a real beingagrees with God more than a being of reason, and yet God does not agreewith the creature in anything (except perhaps in a concept).

[Reply to the Second Objection]: [The solution] is clear from this [replyto the first objection]. There is a greater agreement between Socrates andPlato than between Socrates and this ass—not due to something that isdistinct in some way, but of themselves they agree the more.

[Confirmation]: This reply is confirmed by their remarks. For I taketwo individual differentiae contracting the nature man: these differentiaeagree more than one individual differentia contracting the nature man andone individual differentia contracting the nature whiteness.

Proof of this [claim]: the individual differentia contracting the natureman agrees with the contracted nature, since it is really the same thing as



it. But that contracted nature, e. g. the nature of Socrates, agrees with thenature of Plato more than [it agrees] with the nature whiteness. Hence itagrees more with the individual contracting differentia. Consequently, fromfirst to last, the individual differentia of Socrates agrees with the individualdifferentia of Plato more than [it agrees] with the individual differentia ofthis whiteness, and it is certain that it is really distinguished from it. Henceeither (a) it agrees with one more than with the other in the same respect,or (b) it agrees with one in one [respect] and with the other ¡in another [re-spect]¿ [+ et alio D: cfr. Ockham 223.5]. [With regard to (a)]: if in the same[respect], and it agrees with one and is really distinguished from the other inthe same respect, then what was to be shown is established—[namely] thatsomething can agree with another and be distinguished from it in the same[respect]. [With regard to (b)]: if it agrees with one in one [respect] andwith the other in another [respect], then the individual differentia wouldinclude many [things] and there would be an infinite regress, each of whichis unacceptable.

[First Objection to the Confirmation]: If it were said that the individ-ual differentia of e. g. Socrates agrees with the nature of Plato and with theindividual differentia of Plato not per se or in virtue of itself but throughthe contracted nature more than with the nature of this whiteness—

[Reply]: On the contrary, just as the individual differentia of Socratesagrees more with the nature of Plato, so too conversely the nature of Platoagrees with the individual differentia of Socrates more than [it agrees] withthe individual differentia of this whiteness. Hence it agrees more either (a)in virtue of itself; (b) through the contracting individual differentia; (c)through the nature of Socrates. [With regard to (a)]: if (a), then it iscertain that it is distinguished in virtue of itself; hence the same thing isdistinguished from and agrees with something in the same [respect]. [Withregard to (b)]: [yet] (b) cannot be granted, since then that individual differ-entia would agree with one individual differentia more than with another.[With regard to (c)]: nor can (c) be granted, since something is never reallythe same as another through something extrinsic to it and really distinctfrom it.

[Second Objection to the Confirmation]: If it were said that althoughit agrees with the individual differentia in virtue of itself, nevertheless it isonly distinguished from it through another individual differentia—

[Reply]: On the contrary, the nature of itself is distinguished from ev-ery individual differentia in vortue of itself. For, according to those [philoso-phers who hold this view], it is not incompatible with it in virtue of itselfthat it be without any individual differentia. Besides, two individual dif-



ferentiae, in virtue of the fact that each is a creature, agree more than thecreature and God, and it is certain that they are distinguished. Hence it isnecessary to postulate that the same [thing] is distinguished and agrees inthe same [respect], or one must postulate an infinite regress.


It is clear that the nature stone of itself is a this, and so the naturestone cannot be in another. Nevertheless, there obtains along with thisthat the nature stone of itself is not a this, but also in another, since theyare two indefinite [propositions], verified by different singulars.

|# Nevertheless, it should be noted that this [proposition]:The nature stone is in a stone

is literally false. But it ought to be granted that the nature stone is astone—yet of Christ it can be allowed that human nature is in Christ—nevertheless, [this claim] is generally conceded. But if it were understoodthat the nature stone were genuinely in the stone as if [the nature] were insome way distinct, it is simply false. However, if it were understood thatthe nature is the stone, it is true. #|





Fourthly, I ask whether that which is universal and common as uni-vocal is in any way really a parte rei outside the soul.


That it is: According to the Commentator, Met. 7 com. 11 ([Iuntina8 fol. 76r]):

The definition is the same as the substance of the thing.Hence it is in some way outside the soul, and consequently all its parts arein some way outside the soul. But the definition is composed of universals.Hence [the universal is outside the soul].

That it isn’t: Opposites cannot be appropriate to the same [thing].But everything outside the soul is simply singular. Hence no [thing] is inany way universal.

[ Statement of the Common View ]

All the [philosophers] whom I have seen are in harmony on the conclu-sion of this question, saying that the nature, which is in some way universal(at least potentially and incompletely), is really in the individual, although(1) some [philosophers] say that [the nature] is really distinguished [fromthe individual]; (2) some [philosophers say] that [the nature] is only for-mally [distinguished from the individual]; (3) some [philosophers say] that[the nature is not distinguished from the individual] in any way in fact, butrather that [the nature is distinguished from the individual] only accordingto reason or through the consideration of the intellect.

[ First Way of Holding the Common View ]

Accordingly, some [philosophers] say that in the case of creatures thereis a definite form that has absolutely no unity in fact and by its nature, butin itself it is naturally divided and has unity only according to reason’sunderstanding, such that in the primacy of this unity, free from the positiveadjunction of any form, it does not subsist in any individual; such is theform of the genus, which in fact only exists as divided by the forms of the


– 1 –


species. There is another form that is one and individual and divided fromall else in fact and by its nature, such that it subsists in supposits withnothing formal added to it; such is the form of any most specific species,whose unity is only according to reason; ‘undivided,’ I say, although ofitself [it has] subjective parts. Therefore, this view holds that the form ofthe genus is not simple and one of itself, but of itself is divided; yet theform of the species is one and simple of itself, and as such it is universal,but the form as designated in this supposit is particular, such that the viewholds that the form of the genus as well as the form of the species subsistsin singulars, although in one way and another in each [case].

[ Second Way of Holding the Common View ]

Other [philosophers], however, hold that the thing according to itsbeing in the world (in effectu) is singular, and the same thing according toits being in the intellect is universal, such that the same thing according toone being or according to one consideration is universal and according tothe other being or according to the other consideration is singular.

[ Third Way of Holding the Common View ]

There are some modern [philosophers] who hold that the same thingis universal under one concept and singular under another concept. They[present their view] as follows:

Being higher or lower agrees to a thing only in comparison to the in-tellect, for, according to Avicenna in Met. 1, one and the same thingis singular under one understanding or concept and is universal underanother. In this way, I say that every thing posited [to exist] outsidethe soul is, by that very fact, singular; and this singular thing is natu-rally apt to move the intellect [both] to conceiving it confusedly and toconceiving it distinctly. I call the concept ‘confused’ by which conceptthe intellect does not distinguish this thing from another; in this waySocrates moves the intellect to conceiving that he is a man, and by thatconcept the intellect does not distinguish, nor distinctly know, Socratesfrom Plato. Now I say that [something] higher with regard to Socrates,such as man or animal, does not signify any thing other than the thingthat is Socrates, yet such that he is conceived confusedly, and such thathe moves the intellect to conceiving himself (though in a confused way).So, I say that “Socrates is a man” is the predication of a higher of alower, which is nothing else but that Socrates is Socrates, and Socratesis man absolutely (as confusedly conceived). Accordingly, the truth ofthe matter is that Socrates is man, animal, and body; all these are reallyone, nor do the higher and lower exist except according to the intellect’s



considering, in the way stated.

[ Twenty-Three Arguments for the Common View ]

Therefore, all these views hold that the universal and the singular arereally the same thing and differ only according to reason; and in this theydiffer from the three views described in [Ord. 1 d. 2 qq. 4–6]; still, they allagree in [claiming] that universals are in some way a parte rei, such thatuniversals really are in singulars.

There are many arguments given to support this common view.[ First Argument ]

That which is really divided into genuine things is a genuine thing;but the form of the genus, and, similarly, the form of the species, is reallydivided into genuine things insofar as [it is divided] into subjective parts,and in the same way every universal is divided into its real subjective parts;therefore, anything such is a genuine thing outside the soul.

[ Second Argument ]

Everything that is genuinely the essence of some thing and is includedin the quidditative understanding of some thing outside the soul is a genuinething outside the soul; but every genus, every species, and, in each case,every universal predicable in quid of a genuine thing outside the soul isof the essence of [what is] lower [than it] and is included essentially inthe quidditative understanding of anything per se lower; therefore, [theuniversal is a genuine thing outside the soul].

This is confirmed [as follows]. Every thing outside the soul can be trulyand perfectly and distinctly understood without that which is in some waya genuine thing or intrinsic to [a genuine thing]; but no individual can betruly or distinctly understood without understanding [something] higher perse, as for example Socrates cannot be understood without understandingman or animal or something higher; hence anything [which is] higher withregard to Socrates is of the essence of Socrates, and consequently a genuinething outside the soul, since no being of reason is of the essence of a thingexisting outside the soul.

[ Third Argument ]

There is something in the world [which is] communicable to many byidentity, but only a universal is such; therefore, the universal is somethingreally existing in the world.



[ Fourth Argument ]

All [things] that are in a categorial line are genuine things and notmerely beings of reason; but genera as well as species are posited in acategorial line; therefore, genera as well as species are genuine things outsidethe soul.

The major premiss is obvious [by the following three proofs].[First Proof]: The genus is predicated univocally and in quid of every-

thing contained per se under the genus, but nothing is predicated univocallyof a real being and a being of reason; therefore, all [things] that are in acategorial genus either are real beings or are beings of reason—and it iscertain that not all are beings of reason, and so they are all real beings.

[Second Proof]: Nothing contained per se under something [which]immediately divides something common is contained per se under somethingcontained under some other division. For example, if substance is dividedby corporeal [substance] and incorporeal substance, nothing contained perse under corporeal substance is contained per se under something containedunder incorporeal substance. But being is divided by its first division intobeing outside the soul and being of reason; therefore, no being of reason canbe contained under some category, since real being outside the soul is dividedinto the ten categories; hence, since genera and species are contained undersubstance, which is one category, they cannot be contained under being ofreason, and consequently they are not beings of reason but real.

[Third Proof]: If genera and species were beings of reason, then, sincebeings of reason are varied with the variation of understandings, it followsthat genera and species would be varied by the variation of understandings,and so there would be as many genera of substance as there are understand-ings.

[ Fifth Argument ]

There is some distinction between the supposit and the nature, forotherwise [the proposition]:

Man is humanitywould be as true as [the proposition]:

Man is manbut the supposit is a parte rei, and so too is the nature, since otherwisethere would be no distinction in things; hence the universal is in some waya parte rei.

[ Sixth Argument ]

Boethius says that the species is the whole being of individuals; thusthe species is the same thing as the individuals; thus it is a parte rei.



[ Seventh Argument ]

The author of the Liber de sex principiis asks the question whetheruniversals come about from nature or through art. He answers that theycome about from nature, but nature operates in a hidden way in universals,for it produces universals by producing singulars; therefore, every common-ness ‘proceeds from singularity’ (as he says). From this it may be arguedas follows: that which comes about from nature has being outside the soul,and the universal comes about from nature; therefore, [the universal hasbeing outside the soul].

[ Eighth Argument ]

Top. 4.4 [124b11–12]: If the genus is destroyed the species and theindividual are destroyed, but the destruction of a being outside the soulnever follows upon the destruction of a being in the soul; therefore, thegenus is outside the soul.

[ Ninth Argument ]

The Philosopher, in Post. an. 1.8 [75b24–25] says that demonstrationsare of the perpetual and the incorruptible. And Grosseteste, in the sameplace, says that “it is obvious that demonstration comes about from theuniversals discovered in singulars,” and so, universals are genuinely outsidethe soul.

[ Tenth Argument ]

The Philosopher, in [Post. an. 1.31 87b32–33], says that the universalis always and everywhere. And Grosseteste, in the same place, says:

If we understand universals in Aristotle’s way, as forms discovered inthe quiddities of singulars or particulars, by which the particular thingsare what they are, then that the universal is everywhere is nothing otherthan that it is in any given particular. To be everywhere is to be in everyone of its places. And the places of these universals are the singulars inwhich the universals are.

[ Eleventh Argument ]

The Philosopher, in Phys. 1.1 [184a21–23], says that the confused arebetter known to us, but beings in the soul are not better known to us;therefore, universals are not precisely beings in the soul.

[ Twelfth Argument ]

The Commentator, Phys. 1 com.4 [Iuntina 4 fol. 3rb]:By ‘universals’ [Aristotle] intends the most universal [things] that canbe discovered in these things in the natural world.

Hence universals are in singulars.



[ Thirteenth Argument ]

[The Commentator, Phys. 1] com. 13 [Iuntina 4 fol. 6vb]:The concepts (intentiones) of which the name ‘being’ is said, namely[the concepts] ‘universal’ and ‘individual,’ differ greatly.

Hence the universal is genuinely a being.

[ Fourteenth Argument ]

[The Commentator, Phys. 1] com. 15 [Iuntina 4 fol. 7rb]:The name ‘being’ is said of the universal and particular concept, i. e. ofthe individual.

[ Fifteenth Argument ]

[The Philosopher], Met. 3.4 [999b34–1001a1]:We call the singular numerically one, and the universal what is in [thesingular].

[ Sixteenth Argument ]

[The Philosopher], Met. 4.9 [1018a3–4]:Socrates is not in many, on which account ‘every Socrates’ is not said.

[ Seventeenth Argument ]

[The Philosopher], Met. 7.1 [1028a13–15]:[The term] ‘being’ signifies the essence (quod quid est) and the individ-ual; hence each is a real being.

[ Eighteenth Argument ]

The Commentator, Met. 7.2 [Iuntina 8 fol. 72va]:It is clear that the first [thing] of which the name ‘being’ is said is simplyand principally that which is said in response to [the question] ‘whatis this individual?’ (indicating an [individual] existing per se); and thequestion is raised about [its] substance.

From this, it may be argued as follows: that which is a more principalbeing than some accident is a being outside the soul, and according to theCommentator the universal is of this kind; [therefore, the universal is a realbeing outside the soul].

Likewise, the response to the [question] ‘what is it?,’ for substance,is not only a being in the soul, since [a being in the soul] is not of thequiddity of an external thing; but the response to ‘what is the individual?’is not [given] through the individual but through a universal belonging toSubstance; therefore, [universals have real being outside the soul].

Likewise, [the Commentator] says that “the question is raised about[its] substance”; but this question is about the universal, just as the response



is [given] through the universal; therefore, [universals have real being outsidethe soul].

[ Nineteenth Argument ]

[The Commentator], Met. 7 com. 3 [Iuntina 8 fol. 73ra]:These (i. e. quiddities) are substances, since they are parts of substancesthat are in fact substances, that is, particulars.

[ Twentieth Argument ]

[The Commentator], Met. 7 com. 4 [c.iii Iuntina 8 fol. 73rb]:The sign that substance is more obvious to us than accidents, that is,universal substances [are more obvious to us] than universal accidents,is that to know an individual of Substance through its substantial uni-versals is more perfect than to know it through its universal accidents.

[ Twenty-First Argument ]

[The Commentator], Met. 7 com. 10 [Iuntina 8 fol. 75rb]:Let us consider substance, which the definition signifies.

Hence the metaphysician considers substance, which the defintion signifies,and does not consider some individual; therefore, [the metaphysician con-siders the universal].

[ Twenty-Second Argument ]

[The Commentator], Met. 7 com. 11 [Iuntina 8 fol. 76rb]:The substance of a thing is that which is given in response to the [ques-tion] ‘what is this individual of Substance?’ Hence we describe thatsubstance by a dialectical description, which is that which the wordthat gives the essence of the thing, which is the definition, signifies.And it is that which is said per se, i. e. what is predicated essentially;and [Aristotle] suggests that [what is predicated essentially] is the firstkind of essential predicable, namely the definition.

From this passage it is clear that the definition signifies substance, which ispredicated essentially and primo modo; but such a predicate is only predi-cated of many; therefore, [it is universal].

[ Twenty-Third Argument ]

[The Commentator], Met. 7 com. 40 [Iuntina 8 fol. 90vb]:Here [in Aristotle’s text] it is stated what the substance that is quiddityis, and how this substance is predicable of that which is substance, andthat which [characterizes] it in that it is universal.

Therefore, some substance is predicable in that it is universal.



[ Ockham’s Arguments Against the Common View ]

I argue against this view, and, first of all, against its main thesis: itdoes not seem that there is some thing outside the soul that is universal,except perhaps through voluntary agreement.

[First Argument]: Those [things] that are opposites require distinct[things] to which they primarily agree, but universality and singularity are[opposites] of this sort (according to all those [holding the common view]);hence those [things] that are immediately and primarily denominated bythese [opposites] are distinguished. Thus they are are either distinguishedformally, which was disproved in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 6]; or they are distinguishedas thing and thing, and consequently we are back to the first or secondview disproved in [Ord. 1 d. 2 qq. 4–5]; or they are distinguished either asbeing of reason and being of reason or as real being and being of reason.It is certain that that which is singular primarily and immediately is not abeing of reason; hence that which is primarily and immediately denominated‘universal’ is only a being in the soul, and consequently is not in a thing.

[Second Argument]: Either the same thing is really and formally sin-gular and universal, or not; it cannot be said that it is not, as proved in[Ord. 1 d. 2 qq. 4–6]. But if it is, I argue against this: that thing that issingular is not predicable of many, and that which is universal is predicableof many; therefore, they are not the same. And this is to argue as follows: itis impossible for contradictories to be primarily verified of the same [thing],and ‘predicable of many’ and ‘not predicable of many’ are verified of thesingular and the universal [respectively]; hence they are not the same.

[Objection]: If it were objected that the universal is predicated ofmany only by an act of the intellect constructing [the predication], and soa thing that of itself is not predicated of many can be predicated of manyby an act of the intellect constructing [the predication]—

[Reply to the Objection]: This objection does not work, because notonly do ‘predicated of many’ and ‘not predicated of many’ contradict eachother, but ‘predicable of many’ and ‘not predicable of many’ contradict eachother. Similarly, ‘being able to be predicated of many’ and ‘not being ableto be predicated of many’ contradict each other, and prior to any act of theintellect the universal can be predicated of many and the singular cannot bepredicated of many; therefore, without any act of the intellect, the universalis not the singular.

[Second Reply to the Objection]: Furthermore, I appeal to the argu-ments of the Philosopher [in Met. 7.13 1038b10–11] through which he provesthe conclusion that no universal is substance, as follows: the substance of



a thing is proper to that of which it is the substance, and the universal isproper to nothing, but rather [only] common; therefore, the universal is notsubstance.

[Objection to the Second Reply to the Objection]: If it were objectedthat the Philosopher intends to prove that the universal is not substanceprimarily or strictly —as the Commentator argues in Met. 7 com. 45 [Iuntina8 fol. 93r]:

The substance of any given thing picked out is proper to it, but theuniversal is common to many, and so the universal is not strictly sub-stance.

Hence it is not proved absolutely that [the universal] is not substance, butonly that it is not strictly substance—

[Reply to the Objection to the Second Reply to the Objection]: Thisreply does not work, since the Philosopher’s intent is to argue against thosewho hold universals to be substances, as did the platonists. As [the Philoso-pher] describes it, [the platonists] held that universals are proper substancesand common substances. Accordingly, they said that certain substances areparticular and certain ones common. Hence it is not sufficient for [thePhilosopher] to prove against them that they are not proper substancesunless he were to prove that they are not substances. Thus he argues asfollows:

[1038b12–15]: If the universal that is common to many [is substance], itis either [the substance] of all or of one. It is not possible that it is [thesubstance] of all; hence it will be the substance of one, and consequentlyall to which it is common will be that one, which is impossible.

Secondly, [the Philosopher] argues as follows [1038b15–16]: the universal iswhat is predicated of some subject; but substance, in fact, is not predicatedof any subject; hence the universal is not substance.

Thirdly, [the Philosopher] argues as follows [ibidem. 1038b23–27]: justas it is impossible that the individual be composed out of qualities, sincethen quality would be prior to an individual of Substance, so too it is impos-sible that the individual be composed out of [anything that is] not concrete(hoc aliquid). Thus no universal is part of substance, and, consequently,since [the universal] does not exist per se, it will not be substance in anyway.

Fourthly, [the Philosopher argues as follows (1039a3–11)]: nothingcomes to be from two [things] in act; hence when some [things] are dis-tinguished |# and produce [something] one per se,#| one must be potencyand the other act. And, in consequence, if the universal were substance andsomething were added to it, it would be necessary that they be related as



act and potency, which is inadmissable.Fifthly, [as the Philosopher notes (1039a2–3)]: then there would be a

third man.Again, in Met. 10.2 [1053b16–17], the Philosopher says that it is im-

possible for something universal to be substance. With regard to this, theCommentator says in com. 7 [Iuntina 8 fol. 120rb]):

Since it is stated in the treatise on substance and the genera of beingthat it is impossible for something universal to be substance, it is clearthat a universal is not substance.

And later:Since universals are not substances, it is clear that ‘common being’ isnot a substance existing outside the soul, just as any common ‘one’ isnot substance.

Furthermore:‘One’ and ‘being’ are predicated as universals, which have being only inthe soul.

Again:Since universals are not substances, hence neither are genera substances.

Again:Nor are genera substances, since genera are universals.

From these citations it is clear that universals only have being in the soul;hence they are not in an external thing.

Similarly, by the fact that ‘being’ and ‘one’ are universals, [the Philoso-pher] proves that they are not substances [in Met. 12.4 1070b7–9], and sono universal is substance.

The Commentator says in Met. 12 com. 21 [Iuntina 8 fol. 144va]:‘One’ and ‘being’ are among universal things, which do not have beingoutside the soul.

Hence, the universal is not outside [the soul].Again (ibidem. com. 27 [Iuntina 8 fol. 146va]):

The universal principle does not exist outside the soul, but only indi-viduals [exist outside the soul].

Just after this:No universal generates or is generated.

Hence the universal is not in the thing.Again (ibidem. com. 28 [Iuntina 8 fol. 146vb]):

There is no demonstration with regard to the particular, although infact [the particular] alone is a being.

Thus in fact the universal is neither substance nor outside the soul. Heholds the same in Met. 7 com. 2, com. 20, com. 21, com. 30, and in nearly an



infinite number of other places.

[ Ockham’s Arguments Against the Ways of Holding the Common View ]

[ Argument Against the First Way ]

I ask: how are the nature and the designation of the nature distin-guished? If in no way, then the nature is no more universal than the des-ignated nature. If in some way, then it is either according to the thing oraccording to reason. If the former, this was disproved earlier, in [Ord. 1 d. 2qq. 4–6]. If the latter, it follows that one of them, [i. e. either the nature orthe designated nature], is only [a being] of reason, as was stated in [Ord. 1d. 2 q. 2]; and that there is no mediate [kind of] difference [in the case of]creatures is also clear from that [earlier] discussion.

[ Argument Against the Second Way ]

I argue as follows. When something precisely denominates anotheraccording to something extrinsic, to whatever that extrinsic [factor] agrees,that denominating it can proportionately agree to it. Thus if that thing,which really is singular, is universal according to its being in the intel-lect, this is possible only according to intellection, and so, any given thingthat can be understood can, similarly, be universal in the same way. ThusSocrates can be universal and common to Plato according to his being inthe intellect. Similarly, the divine essence, according to its being in theintellect, could be universal, although in its real being in the world it is themost singular of all—all of which are absurd.

This is confirmed [as follows]. When something is incompatible of itsnature with another thing, it cannot agree with it through anything ex-trinsic. But, for any given thing, it is incompatible with it of itself thatit be common to another thing; hence commonness cannot agree with anything through something extrinsic. And so, whether that thing that is sin-gular is understood or is not understood, it cannot be common or universalaccording to any being it has.

[ Argument Against the Third Way ]

For the same [reasons] it is clear that the third way [of holding thecommon view] is simply false and not intelligible, since it holds that thesame thing confusedly conceived is universal. For, if the thing confusedlyconceived is universal, I ask: what is that thing? Let it be A. Then Aconfusedly conceived is universal, and consequently A confusedly conceivedis common to B. Then “B is A confusedly conceived” is a predication of ahigher of a lower, and so Socrates is Plato confusedly conceived, and Godis a creature confusedly conceived.




[First Objection]: It is objected to this argument that it does notfollow, since the consequence:

Animal is Socrates confusedly conceived, and Plato is an animal; there-fore, Plato is Socrates confusedly conceived

is invalid, on account of a varied middle [term]: the word ‘animal’ is takenfor one thing in the major and another in the minor, since in fact nothingis common to them; just as ‘animal’ signifies Socrates confusedly conceived,so too [‘animal’] signifies Plato confusedly conceived—

[Reply]: But this [objection] is neither true nor logical. For when onesays:

Animal is Socrates confusedly conceivedthe [term] ‘animal’ supposits either simply or personally. If personally,then ‘animal’ is not only Socrates confusedly conceived, but also ‘animal’is Socrates distinctly conceived, since then there is one indefinite [term,namely ‘animal’], having one true singular [version], namely:

This animal is Socrates distinctly conceivedindicating Socrates. However, if ‘animal’ supposits simply, then it eithersupposits for some genuine thing, or only for a being in the soul, or foran aggregate. If for a thing, then some genuine thing is common, andconsequently a genuine thing is predicated truly of another thing. And so,just as:

Socrates is an animalor:

An ass is an animalis simply true, so too:

An ass is Socrates as conceivedwill be true, since according to you [who hold this view] what is common,for which ‘animal’ supposits in [the proposition]:

An animal is Socrates confusedly conceivedis Socrates as conceived, and is in no way distinguished from Socrates asconceived; hence whatever is predicated of one is also [predicated of] theother. If each were to supposit personally, then just as [the proposition]:

An ass is an animalis true in that ‘animal’ supposits personally, so too [the proposition]:

An ass is Socrates as conceivedwill be true in that the predicate supposits personally.

[Second Objection]: Furthermore, [Henry of Harclay] says that. . .being higher or being lower agree to a thing in comparison to theintellect



[Reply]: This is simply false, since no thing, howsoever considered[by the intellect], is higher, just as no thing, howsoever considered [by theintellect], is indifferent.

This reply is confirmed [as follows]. If something extrinsic were tomake Socrates be white, something genuinely in the thing is white, althoughnot from itself but from an extrinsic cause; hence, if in the same way theintellect were to make a thing higher, the thing will genuinely be higherand indifferent, though not from itself but only by the intellect confusedlyconceiving the thing; and so contradictories are asserted in saying thatthe same thing is both higher and lower, and that nothing in the thing iscommon or indifferent.

[Third Objection]: Furthermore, [Henry of Harclay] says that a thingunder one concept is singular and under another is universal—

[Reply]: This is false, since a thing [which is] singular of itself is notuniversal in any way or under any concept. And the reason is that thereis always a formal consequence from a determinable taken with some non-distracting and non-diminishing determination to the [determinable] takenabsolutely. And thus “a thing under such a concept is universal; hence athing is universal” follows formally; the consequent is false, just as “a thingis indifferent” is false according to those [who hold this view]; therefore, theantecedent is simply false.

[First Objection to the Reply]: If it were said that this is a distractingor diminishing determination, since ‘being understood,’ ‘being conceived,’and the like are distracting or diminishing determinations, and so just as[the consequence]:

Caesar as imagined is, and so Caesar isdoes not follow, so too

A thing under such a concept is universal or indifferent, and so a thingis universal or indifferent

does not follow—[Second Objection to the Reply]: Likewise, [if it were said that] ac-

cording to you, [William of Ockham], [the consequence]:Man in common, or the common man, is a mental concept, and so manis a mental concept

does not follow—[Reply to the First Objection] Now [the first objection] does not hold,

since these are neither distracting nor diminishing determinations. Thereason for this is that a determination is ‘diminishing’ when a denominatedpart of some whole is expressed by that determination, as is clear in saying:

An Ethiopian is white in respect of his teeth



For here the denominated part is expressed, and if the denomination ofsuch a part does not suffice for the denomination of the whole, then it is a‘diminishing determination.’ And then there is the fallacy secundum quidet simpliciter, not by arguing to the determinable taken absolutely but byarguing to the determination taken absolutely, as for example in arguing asfollows:

An Ethiopian is white in respect of his teeth, i. e. has white teeth; there-fore, an Ethiopian is white

This is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter. Still, there is no fallacy ininferring the determinable taken absolutely, as in

[An Ethiopian is white in respect of his teeth, i. e. has white teeth];therefore, an Ethiopian has teeth

But such a [denominated] part is not expressed in the proposition:The universal is Socrates confusedly conceived

and so here there is no diminishing determination. Similarly, if there werea diminishing determination, one could infer the determinable taken abso-lutely, inferring:

[The universal is Socrates confusedly conceived]; therefore, the universalis Socrates

Yet there would be a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter in inferring theabsolute determination, for example inferring:

[The universal is Socrates confusedly conceived]; therefore, the universalis confusedly conceived

and so, what was to be proved is established.Similarly, these determinations are not distracting, since a determina-

tion is ‘distracting’ when it is absolutely incompatible with the thing, or atleast with the existence [of the thing] to which [the determination] is added;yet [the determination] denominates it, since it strictly and correctly de-nominates something that was part of it, as is clear for ‘dead’ in the phrase“dead man,” since it is impossible that a man exist and nevertheless thathe be dead. Still, the phrase “dead man” is taken according to commonusage, since the body that was part of him is truly dead. But it is clearthat this cannot be said for the case at hand; hence these determinationsare not distracting.

This clarifies the [purported] counterexample [in the first objectionabove], since in ‘Caesar as understood’ there is no distracting determinationnor diminishing [determination]. Hence [the consequence]:

Caesar as understood is; therefore, Caesar isfollows absolutely, and similarly

Caesar as imagined is; therefore, Caesar is



also follows.[Objection]: If it were objected that, according to the Philosopher

in his Sophistical Refutations 1.5 [166b37–167a20], this is a fallacy secun-dum quid et simpliciter, since there is always such a fallacy when arguingfrom something taken secundum quid to something taken simpliciter (orconversely)—

[Reply]: I say that there is no fallacy secundum quid et simpliciterhere in

Caesar as imagined is; therefore, Caesar isbut rather there is a formal consequence. But according to Aristotle thereis a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter here:

Caesar is imagined; therefore, Caesar isNor is there always a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter in arguing from adeterminable taken with a diminishing determination to [the determinable]taken absolutely, but this manner of arguing is only one mode of that fallacy.There is another mode when one argues from some proposition having apredicate to [a version of the proposition] secundum adiacens, e. g. in arguing

Socrates is imagined; therefore, Socrates isSimilarly

When no rose exists, a rose is understood; therefore, a rose isSimilarly, according to the Philosopher,

White is not man; therefore, white is notIt is obvious that there is a fallacy here, since the consequence is invalid,and so is in error due to some fallacy. But it is clear inductively that [theinvalidity] is due to no other [fallacy], for it seems especially to be in errordue to a fallacy of the consequent, which yet is not so, since it neither followsin this way nor conversely; just as

Caesar is imagined; therefore, Caesar isdoes not follow, so too the converse [does not follow].

The same [reply] holds for the second example. Hence, whenever some-thing is predicated that is equally suited to being or to non-being, whetherone argues affirmatively or negatively, there is always a fallacy secundumquid et simpliciter. And this is what the Philosopher says, that being quidand being simpliciter are not the same, just as being imagined and being arenot the same; similarly, not being quid and not being simpliciter are not thesame, just as not being man and not being are not the same. Nevertheless,‘being imagined’ is neither a diminishing nor a distracting determination,as ’not being man’ or ‘being man’ [are neither diminishing nor distractingdeterminations]. Therefore, when there is an argument from a determinabletaken with a determination [which is] neither diminishing nor distracting to



the determinable taken absolutely (in the aforementioned way), the ruleholds; and this is so if the determination is affirmative, not negative, as forexample:

Socrates is a white man; therefore, Socrates is a manfollows. Nevertheless, it does not follow negatively: “Socrates is not a whiteman; therefore, Socrates is not a man” [does not follows]. In all cases, itdoes not formally follow negatively, but affirmatively.

[Reply to the Second Objection]: I say that the [second objection] doesnot work, since in the consequent ‘man is a mental concept’ the subject canhave simple or personal supposition. If simple, it is then an acceptableconsequence. If personal, the consequence fails according to the variationof the supposition, since in the first [part of the consequence] it suppositssimply and in the second [part of the consequence it supposits] personally;hence there is a fallacy of equivocation in the third mode. And so, just as[the proposition]:

Some man is a species or a universalshould simply be denied, since in the proposition the [term] ‘man’ can onlyhave personal supposition due to the added particular sign [‘some’], so tooin the same way [the proposition]:

Some thing confusedly conceived is universalshould simply be denied. Thus it is impossible for the same thing to beuniversal under one concept and singular under another.

From these [remarks] it is clear that what is commonly said is in-correct: that the same thing under one intention is universal and underanother singular, or that according to such being it is a man and accordingto another being it is not a man but something else, and many such similar[statements]—such as if a thing were considered in one way then it is thisand if it were considered another way or under another consideration it issomething else. For such propositions involving such determinations en-tail propositions [which are taken] absolutely without those determinations.Otherwise, with equal ease I might claim that a man, according to one beingor under one consideration or concept, is an ass, and under another is a cow|# and under another is a lion, #| which is absurd. Thus such [assertions]are extremely inappropriate ways of speaking, removed from any kind ofscientific discourse.


Therefore, I answer the question in another way, saying that no thingoutside the soul, neither per se nor by something added [to it], real or [only]of reason, nor howsoever it may be considered or understood, is univer-



sal; such that it is as impossible for some thing outside the soul to be inany way universal (except perhaps by a voluntary agreement, as the word‘man,’ which is a singular word, is universal) as it is for a man, by whateverconsideration or whatever being, to be an ass. For when something is suit-able to another only denominatively, whether by something informing [it]or by something simply extrinsic [to it], the denominating [factor] equallyagrees to all to which the informing or extrinsic [thing] is related uniformly.For example, if something were completely discernible by the sense of sightprecisely due to the whiteness informing it, whatever is equally white willequally be discernible [by the sense of sight]; therefore, if a thing, by theconsideration of the intellect (which is something totally extrinsic to thething), is universal, whatever is equally understood will be universal, andso everything understood will be universal.

[Objection]: If it were said that a thing is not universal as understoodin any way at all, but only as understood confusedly, and so not every thingis universal (this is the third [way of holding the common] view, recountedabove)—

This response does not work [for the following four reasons].[First Reply]: Firstly, because with a thing precisely understood dis-

tinctly, a proposition can be formed in which the higher is predicated of thelower, just as if Socrates were intuitively seen and whatever is in Socrateswere intuitively seen (at least by divine power), such an intellect [seeingSocrates] can know that Socrates is a man, which is an animal; therefore,without any confused understanding proper to something, the higher is ob-tained, and consequently the universal or the common [is obtained].

[Second Reply]: Besides, then God would genuinely be a universal,since God, according to you [who hold this view], can be understood con-fusedly; hence, if a universal is a thing understood confusedly, God willgenuinely be a universal, or God as understood confusedly will genuinely bea universal.

[Third Reply]: What is more, sight can see something confusedly, andso, by whatever reason a thing as understood confusedly is held to be auniversal, for the same reason a thing as seen confusedly will be held to beuniversal; which is absurd.

[Fourth Reply]: Furthermore, as will be stated in [Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 5],no simple thing can be understood confusedly if it be understood, and yet,with respect to simples, it is genuinely universal.

I say, therefore, that by no consideration or concept can something besuitable to a thing except as only an extrinsic denomination, and these areprecisely such that they are primarily suitable to the act of understanding



(intellectio) or the consideration, and so a thing can be called ‘understood.’A thing can also be called ‘conceived,’ and a thing is subject and a thingis predicate, |# according to one view,#| since this is nothing other thanthat a thing is understood by this act of understanding. So, whatever canbe understood by an act of understanding can correctly be called ‘subject’or ‘predicate’ or ’part of a proposition,’ |# according to this view, #| andso on for the rest: all of which can thus be predicated of the divine essenceas well as of creatures. And hence, if some things were universal and othersnot, this is not due to the understanding, which is related to everything uni-formly, but will be from the nature of the thing and due to some diversityin the world, such that one [thing] in the world is related to universal beingdifferently from another; consequently, there is in the world some distinctionor non-identity between that which is denominated by the concept of uni-versality and that which is denominated by the concept of singularity—theopposite of which was established in Ord. 1 d. 2 qq. 4–6.

Furthermore, I argue as follows: Socrates is not universal according toany being or consideration; neither is Plato, nor this ass, nor that ass, andso on, picking out all singular things; hence no thing is universal accordingto any being or concept or consideration. The consequence is clear, arguingfrom all singular [claims] to the universal [claim]. The antecedent is clear,since there is no more reason why any one singular [claim] should be truethan another; but “Socrates is not universal according to any being orconsideration or concept or mode” is true, since if he were I might for thesame reason claim that Socrates is Plato in some mode, and a man undersome mode is an ass and a stone and whiteness—which are all absurd.

Similarly, if the same thing were really universal and singular, in everypredication of a higher of a lower there would be a predication of the samething of itself, since the universal would be predicated of the particular,which are the same thing, according to you [who hold this view]—which isabsurd.

Therefore, I say that the universal is neither really nor subjectively inthe thing itself of which it is the universal, no more than the word ‘man,’which is a genuine quality, is in Socrates or is in that which it signifies. Noris the universal a part of the singular in respect of which [the singular] isuniversal, no more than the word is part of its significate. Still, just as theword is truly and without any distinction predicated of its significate, notfor itself but for its significate, so too the universal is truly predicated of itssingular, not for itself but for its singular.

And this is the intent of the Philosopher and the Commentator; in-deed, [this is the intent] of all philosophers correctly investigating universals.



Whence the Commentator says in Met. 7 com. 44 [Iuntina 8 fol. 92vb]:When [Aristotle] states that what definitions signify are the substancesof things, and definitions are composed of universals that are predicatedof particulars, he begins to carefully examine whether universals are thesubstances of things or not, but only as they are the substances of theparticulars of which those universals are predicated. And this is neces-sary in showing that the forms of individual substances are substances,and that in the individual there is no substance except the particularmatter and form out of which [the individual] is composed.

Some citations in this question and the preceding ones come from this au-thority. First, that definitions are not the substances of things, but thatthey signify the substances of things, since he says “what definitions signifyare the substances of things,” such that definitions are signs, and the sub-stances of things are signified, and the sign is not the significate. Secondly,that definitions do not signify universals, and thus when they signify thesubstances of singular things, they signify some singulars, since he says that“definitions are composed of universals”; hence those universals are not sig-nified by the definition but are signs and parts of the definition signifyingthose particulars, since there is no middle between the universal and theparticular. Thirdly, it is held that universals are truly predicated of par-ticulars, since in a particular individual there is only particular matter andform.

[Objection] And if it were objected that primary substance is only[made up of] particular matter and form, and yet in the individual there issecondary substance that is neither the particular matter or form—

This is against the intent of the Philosopher and the Commentator,since by the same reason it should be said that in the individual there isnothing not universal, for the secondary substance there is only universal.

Similarly, if the Philosopher and the Commentator only prove thatprimary substances are not universals, and thereby prove that [universals]are not substances, by the same reason they should prove that particularsare not substances, since [particulars] are not secondary substances. If an-imal is divided by man and ass, it should be equally proved that a man isnot an animal because [he is] not an ass for the same reason it was provedthat an ass is not an animal because [it is] not a man.

Fourthly, it is held that universals are not substances, nor are partic-ulars composed of them.

Again, [the Commentator, in Met. 7] com. 45 [Iuntina 8 fol. 93r]:Therefore, let us say that it is impossible for anything that is called‘universal’ to be the substance of some thing, although they express the



substances of things.Hence universals are not substances, nor are they of the substance of something, but only express the substances of things, like signs.

Again, [the Commentator, in Met. 7] com. 47 [Iuntina 8 fol.93va]:Since it is stated that universals as understood are the dispositions ofsubstances. . .

(he calls [what is] predicable of substances ‘dispositions of substances,’ asin the preceding comment)—

it is impossible that they be parts of substances existing per se.If it is objected that the Philosopher and the Commentator do not prove thatuniversals are not substances absolutely but that they are not substances[which are] separated from individuals, as Plato held—

The Philosopher’s progress is contrary to this [objection], since hefirstly shows that universals are not substances, and secondly that they arenot exemplars such as Plato held.

The Commentator, in Met. 8 com. 2 [Iuntina 8 fol. 99ra], says:It is settled that the form and its parts are substances, and that theuniversal is neither substance nor genus since it is something univer-sal. Thence [Aristotle] says ‘but with regard to exemplars’ etc., andhe intends that these [exemplars] were not examined in the precedingdiscussion and that they will be examined later, since some say thatthere are separated substances other than sensible substances.

Hence the Commentator’s intent is that the Philosopher, in Met. 7, provessimply that universals are not substances, and afterwards shows that thereare not such separated substances.

[ Replies to the Arguments for the Common View ]


I say that that which is divided into genuine things, as a genuinecomposite [is divided] into its parts essentially included in it, is a genuinething; in this way a body is divided into its integral parts and a whole intoits essential parts; and such a division occurs really, outside the soul. Butwhen something is divided into genuine things as a sign [is divided] into itssignificates, [the division] is not necessary, no more than [it is necessary]that that which is divided into substances be a substance, as some wordis divided into substances as into its significates. The species, and likewisethe genus, is divided in this second way, since the species or the genus orany given universal is completely unaltered by such a division, nor are those[things] into which it is divided really parts, any more than many significates



are parts of the word signifying [them].[ Reply to the Second Argument ]

I say that in all cases a higher is never of the essence of a lower, nor isincluded essentially in the lower, nor in its quidditative understanding; nev-ertheless, [the higher] is predicated essentially of the lower, since it expresses(declarat) the essence of the lower or expresses itself of the lower |# or thething imported by the lower,#| and this is [what it is] to be predicated inquid or per se primo modo and essentially. Whence, just as according tosome, ‘being’ expresses some one concept that is not of the essence of Godnor his essential part, since then something real would be univocal to Godand creatures, which they deny, and yet it is predicated in quid and perse primo modo of God and of creatures,—thus I say in the case at handthat nothing a parte rei is univocal to any given individuals, and yet thereis something predicable in quid of individuals. Similarly, just as some saythat the universal, which is numerically one object and predicable of anygiven supposit by a predication stating ‘this is this,’ does not exist in theworld, because nothing in the world is predicable in this way, and yet thepredication is called ‘essential’ and ‘in quid’ and ‘per se primo modo’—thusI say that in every case the predication of a higher of a lower is not thepredication of something that is outside the soul in the world in any way,and consequently that which is predicated is not part of the thing nor ofthe essence of the thing, and yet is predicated in quid of things. The reasonfor this is that it is not predicated for itself but for those things of which itis predicated.

[Objection]: If it were said that then it would be the same to say“Socrates is a man” as [to say] “Socrates is Socrates”—

[Reply]: I reply that this does not follow, since although ‘man’ in thefirst [proposition] supposits for Socrates and can only be verified of Socrates,still, that which is predicated is something else; and hence, although there issomething the same for which the predication in each is made, still, since itis something else that is predicated, it is not the same proposition. Similarly,although in [the proposition]:

Socrates is a manthe [term] ‘man’ supposits for Socrates, yet not precisely for Socrates, sincepotentially—in the logician’s way of speaking—it supposits for any givenman, since it is deducible from any [man], and the term in such cases alwayssupposits for the same [things], since [it supposits] for all of which it isverified. Nevertheless, [the proposition]:

Socrates is a manis only verified of Socrates. Hence [the two propositions]:



Socrates is a manSocrates is Socrates

do not say the same.[Reply to the Confirmation of the Second Argument]: I say and allow

(as will be made clear later) that a thing can be understood not only con-fusedly but also perfectly and distinctly, without understanding [anything]higher. And when

Socrates cannot be understood without understanding animalis said, I say that this [claim] can be distinguished (whether literally or not,I don’t care), since ‘animal’ can supposit simply, and then [the proposition]is false, because then it states that Socrates cannot be understood withoutunderstanding this common animal, and this is simply false; or it can sup-posit personally for a thing, and I grant this. In this [latter] way Socratescannot run unless an animal is running, for [the consequence]:

Socrates is running; therefore, an animal is runningnecessarily follows; yet it is not necessary that the common animal is run-ning. In this way, man cannot be understood without also understandingbeing, and yet man can be understood without this common being beingunderstood, according to those [who hold this view], especially if what iscommon is not something real, as they say.

[ Reply to the Third Argument ]

I say that nothing is communicable to things by identity except forthe divine essence to the three supposits (with which it is really the same);and hence it should not strictly be granted that the nature is communicatedto the supposit, unless perhaps it is said that human nature is communi-cated to the Word, and then it is not communicated to it by identity butshould be said more correctly that the nature is the supposit, as will beshown in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 11]. Hence, just as those [holding this view] haveto say that being, which is univocally common to God and creatures, is notcommunicable to anything by identity, since then something real would beunivocal to God and creatures, (as according to those [holding this view]something real is univocal to Socrates and Plato), so too I say that in everycase nothing univocal is communicable to its univocates by identity.


I say that not everything that is in a categorial line, containing per se[elements] ordered as higher and lower, is a genuine thing outside the soul,but some such are only beings in the soul.

[Reply to the First Proof of the Major]: I concede that the genusis predicated in quid and univocally of everything lesser than it. And I



further concede that something is predicated univocally and in quid andper se primo modo of a real being |# or of a pronoun picking out a realbeing #| and of a being of reason, yet not for a being of reason but for athing, since that being of reason will not have simple supposition but ratherpersonal [supposition]. hence the genus is predicated of the species, not forthe species, since the act to be exercised is not ‘the species is the genus,’ but[the genus] is predicated of the species for a thing, and so the designatedact to be exercised is ‘man is an animal,’ such that each term stands fora thing personally. Thus the others have to say that being, and similarlyreal being, is predicated per se primo modo of knowledge in general, and yetknowledge in general is not something real |# outside the soul, #| since thensomething real would be univocally common to God and creatures. Hence‘being,’ which is precisely univocal to real beings, is predicated univocallyand in quid of real being and of being of reason, but then that ‘being ofreason’ does not supposit for itself but for a thing. Accordingly, when

All knowledge is a real beingis said, this is a predication in quid, and for this it is only required that thisknowledge, which is God, is a real being, and it is not required that therebe a common and univocal real being. Thus, I say that for the truth of

Every man is an animalit is sufficient that this man is an animal, and that that man is an animal,and so on for all the other singular things, and it is not required that whatis univocal to these men is an animal. And so for these [propositions]:

Every animal is a substanceEvery body is a substanceEvery color is a qualityEvery concept is a quality

and so forth.[Reply to the Second Proof of the Major]: This [proof] proceeds from

dividings, [where] what is divided is verified of each of them for a thing; butwhen what is divided does not stand for a thing but for something else, [thedivision] is not necessary. Hence if genera and species were substances, theycould not be beings of reason in any way; but the truth of the matter is theyare not substances. Therefore, I say that for something “to be (or to becontained) under some genus” can be understood in two ways [as follows].

(i) [Something is “in a genus”] because it is that of which for itself |# orof the pronoun picking it out #| the genus is verifiedAccording to (i), only singulars are contained in a genus, since only

singulars are substances and only singulars are qualities, and neither speciesnor genera are contained in this way under the genus Substance.



(ii) Something is “in a genus” because it is that of which the genus is trulypredicated, not for itself [but for things]According to (ii), genera and species are in a genus. The claim [put

forward in the second proof of the major premiss of the fourth argumentfor the common view] taken for what is contained according to (i) is true,but not [taken] for what is contained according to (ii).

[Reply to the Third Proof of the Major]: The reply will be clear inOrd. 1 d. 2 q. 8.


I say that sometimes there is even a real distinction between the natureand the supposit, as for example between the supposit of the Word and theassumed nature; but at other times there is absolutely no distinction a parterei. Still, these concepts, namely ‘supposit’ and ‘nature,’ are distinguished;and hence that something is a nature and yet not a supposit, which stillwas previously a supposit, can be verified, but this is only possible throughcorruption or through real assumption, as discussed in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 11 and3 q. 1]. And when it is claimed that [the proposition]:

Man is humanitywould then be true, I say that unless some imported syncategorematic modein the name ‘humanity’ in common usage prevents it, that this [claim] shouldliterally be granted. Nevertheless, [the proposition]:

Man is humanityis contingent, even without the corruption of humanity.


I say that it is not Boethius’s intent that the species is the wholebeing of individuals, but that [the species] expresses the whole being ofindividuals, as in a certain way a sign that is not signified. This is true ofthe most specific species in every case, though it is not true of the genus inevery case. Still, how this should be understood will be clear in [Ord. 1 d. 8q. 3].

[ Reply to the Seventh Argument ]

I say that nature operates in a hidden way in universals, not that itproduces those universals as something real outside the soul as somethingreal, but because in producing the knowledge of them in the soul, as itwere in a hidden way—at least |# immediately or#| mediately—[nature]produces those universals, in the way in which they are apt to be produced.And hence every commonness is natural in this way, and proceeds fromsingularity; nor need that which comes about from nature in this way beoutside the soul, but can be in the soul.



[ Reply to the Eighth Argument ]

I say that ‘if the genus is destroyed’ should be understood as thatwhatever the genus is truly denied of, the species and the individual arealso truly denied of. For example, if a stone is not an animal, it is not aman, it is not an ass, it is not Socrates. Nevertheless, it is not necessarythat if that which is the genus did not exist (whether this is possible orimpossible) that the individual would not exist.

[ Reply to the Ninth Argument ]

I say that the Philosopher holds that demonstration is of the perpetualand the incorruptible, i. e. of necessary propositions. With regard to Gros-seteste, who wants to rescue [Aristotle], one can say that [Grosseteste] un-derstands that demonstration is of universals discovered in singulars, sincethose universals are truly predicable of singulars, such that [those universals]are in singulars by predication.

[ Reply to the Tenth Argument ]

The universal is not always and everywhere, unless because ‘to besomewhere’ is predicated of the universal not for itself but for a thing when-ever it is predicated of a singular. In every case, whatever is predicated ofa singular or of a pronoun picking out a singular is also predicated of theuniversal taken particularly. With regard to Grosseteste, [I say] that heintends the same here, if he is not to deviate from the Philosopher and fromthe truth.

[ Reply to the Eleventh Argument ]

Universals are called ‘better known’ not because they are known be-fore singular incomplex notions, but because they are more common andin many, and common characteristics are known from many and of many,suppositing not for themselves but for things, as specific characteristics areknown of specific [things], as will be clear in [Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 6].

[ Reply to the Twelfth Argument ]

According to Damascene ‘being in’ is in one way the same as ‘beingsaid of’; and understand the Commentator in this way [when he says] herethat “they are in things,” since they are said of particular things.

[ Reply to the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Arguments ]

I say that ‘real being’ is said of the individual and of the universal, notin that the universal stands for or supposits for itself, but for particulars.

[ Reply to the Fifteenth Argument ]

We say the universal is in these [things] by predication.



[ Reply to the Sixteenth Argument ]

The same point holds, that Socrates is not in many, i. e. is not said ofmany.

[ Reply to the Seventeenth Argument ]

[I say that the term ‘being’] signifies the essence [quod quid est ], in thatthe essence is called universal, as the higher signifies everything lower thanit, however low they may be, whether primo modo or secundo modo,|# andin this certain order,#| as was said [in the reply to the second argumentfor the common view] above.

[ Reply to the Eighteenth Argument ]

[I say] that these universals are more principally called ‘being,’ sincethe more noble and worthy and prior being is verified of them, not in thatthey supposit simply but in that they supposit personally; and so, the desig-nated acts are understood by such propositions. I answer all those citationsin the same way.

[Objection]: If it were said that what he declares the quiddity of theindividual substance to be is substance, and that is universal; therefore, [theuniversal is substance]—

[Reply]: I reply that that here he understands one designated act bythat claim, namely that substance is predicated of such just as the genus ispredicated of the species, and yet the species is not the genus. Elsewhere,where he says that such are not substances, one understands [him] literally.And so here he does not contradict himself, since he explains how he earlierunderstands propositions which seem to contradict each other.

[ Reply to the Nineteenth Argument ]

As we have said repeatedly, the Philosopher and the Commentatorunderstand by ‘the quiddities of substances’ the form that is one part of thecomposite, as is clear in com. 7, com. 9, com. 21, com. 44, and many otherplaces. Thus I concede that the quiddities of substances are substances,since these quiddities are particular parts of substances.

[ Reply to the Twentieth Argument ]

It is more perfect to know through the substantial universals, and soon, because these are predicable in quid, and others are not.

[ Reply to the Twenty-First Argument ]

The metaphysician considers the substance that the definition signi-fies, since that substance is that for which many propositions are verified.



[ Reply to the Twenty-Second Argument ]

The definition signifies the substance that is predicated, not that ititself is thus predicated in itself, but that the sign of it is predicated, andthat is the very definition itself.

[ Reply to the Twenty-Third Argument ]

The real quiddity is not predicated in itself but only in that it isuniversal, i. e. its universal is predicated; and this is how the Commentatorspeaks, which is not literally true, although the sense [of his claims], whichhe explains in other places, is true.


With respect to the principal argument, I say that it should literallybe conceded that the definition is neither really nor formally the same as thesubstance of the thing, but that by this [claim] one understands a designatedact, which is predicated of the definition to be really and in all ways thesame as what is defined; and thus it should be exercised as:

‘Rational animal’ is the same as ‘man’ in all waysand this is true.

[Objection]: If it were said that in this wayThe genus is the same as the species in all ways

would be true, and thatAn attribute is the same as its subject in all ways

sinceAnimal is the same as man in all ways

andThe risible is the same as man in all ways

[are true]—[Reply]: I reply that the Commentator understands still more by that

claim, namely [he understands] such a designated act, which should beexercised in the way described, and further [he understands] the claim thatnothing is signified by the definition that is not signified by what is defined,and conversely, although in one way and another; and the second [clause]fails in the [purported] counterexamples adduced.





Fifthly, I ask whether what is universal [and] univocal is somethingreal existing subjectively somewhere.


That it is: The universal primarily moves the intellect. But thatwhich primarily moves the intellect is something real. Hence [the universalis something real].

For the opposite view: Everything real is singular. But the universalis not singular, as shown [in Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 7]. Hence [the universal is notsomething real].

[ Four Views ]

There could be diverse views regarding this question, many of whichI hold to be simply false—yet I would place any of them before any viewdisproved in the preceding questions ([Ord. 1 d. 2 qq. 4–7]).

[ The First View ]

The first view could be that the universal is a mental concept, andthat this concept is really the intellection itself, such that then the uni-versal would then be the confused act of understanding a thing. And thisintellection, since it no more understands one singular than another, wouldbe indifferent and common to all singulars; and thus, in that it would bemore confused or less confused, it would be more universal or less universal.

[First Objection]: It can be argued against this view that something isunderstood in any act of understanding, and so something is understood bysuch an act of understanding; and it is not something singular outside thesoul, since it is [of] one [singular] no more than another, nor [of] what existsany more than what doesn’t exist; hence either nothing such or anythingsuch is understood in that act of understanding; and not anything, |# sincethen an infinite number would be understood by that act of understand-ing; #| therefore, nothing [is understood in that act of understanding].


– 1 –


[Second Objection]: Furthermore, what terminates an act of under-standing is called a ‘mental concept’ by everyone; but such an act of under-standing does not terminate itself primarily, since there is no more reasonthat one act of understanding terminate itself than another [act of under-standing]; and so, since the act of understanding of Socrates does not termi-nate itself primarily, neither does this act of understanding terminate itselfprimarily. Therefore, the concept is not this act of understanding.

[ The Second View ]

The second view could be that the universal is some sort of appear-ance (species) that, since it is equally related to every singular, is called‘universal’; and so it is universal in representing and yet singular in being(in essendo).

[First Objection]: But this view seems to be false, since, as will bestated in [Ord. 2 qq. 14–15], such an appearance is not necessary.

[Second Objection]: Secondly, the universal is held to be that whichis understood through the intellect’s abstraction; but the appearance is notunderstood in this way, since either it is understood in itself, and then, aswill be clarified in [Ord. 2 qq. 14–15], it is necessarily understood primarilyintuitively, or it is understood in another, and, consequently, as will beclarified in [Ord. 2 qq. 14–15], that other [thing] is universal with respect tothis one, and then I raise the same question of it as before; hence there willeither be an infinite regress or the appearance will not be the universal.

[Third Objection]: Furthermore, the universal would then not be ab-stracted but would truly be generated, since it would be a genuine quality,generated in the intellect.

[ The Third View ]

There could be another view that [the universal] is some genuine thing,following upon the act of the intellect, which would be a likeness of the thing;in this way, it would be universal, since it would be equally related to all.

[Objection]: Yet this view does not seem true, since everything that isin the intellect is either an act or an attribute or a habit; but none of thesecan be held to be the thing [described] by this view.

[ Concordance of these Three Views ]

These views agree in the claim that the universal would be in itself agenuine singular thing and numerically one, though with respect to externalthings it would be universal and common and indifferent as regards singularthings and, as it were, a natural likeness of these things, and, because ofthis, it could supposit for external things. And [external things] would bein some way related to that universal as a statue to [things] similar to it: it



would be in itself singular and numerically one, yet indifferent to the [things]similar to it, nor would it lead more to the notion of one than of another.Similarly, according to these [views], those who would hold that aside fromthe act of understanding there would be an appearance or a habit in the soulwould no more have to say that the act of understanding is really universalthan the appearance or the habit, nor conversely, since any of these wouldbe indifferent to all singulars.

These views cannot easily be disproved, nor are they as implausibleor contain such obvious falsehoods as the views disproved in [Ord. 1 d.qq. 4–7].

[ The Fourth View ]

Fourth, there could be a view that nothing is universal of its naturebut only by convention (institutio), in the way in which a word is universal,since no thing of its nature has to supposit for another thing, nor be trulypredicated of another thing, just as no word does [of its nature] but onlythrough a voluntary agreement; and so, just as words are universals, andpredicable of things, by convention, so too all universals.

[Objection]: But this view does not seem true, since then nothingwould be a genus or species of its nature, nor conversely, and then God andsubstance outside the soul could equally be as universal as anything in thesoul, which doesn’t seem true.

[ Ockham’s Old View ]

Hence [the question] can plausibly be answered in another way: thatthe universal is not something real having subjective being, neither in thesoul nor outside the soul, but only has objective being in the soul, andis a certain fiction, having such being in objective being as an externalthing has in subjective being. And this is so in the way that the intellect,seeing some thing outside the soul, fashions a consimilar thing in the mind,such that, if [the intellect] were to have productive power as it has fictivepower, it would produce such a thing in subjective being outside [the soul],numerically distinct from the former [thing], and [that which is produced]would be proportionately similar [to that former thing], as it is for thearchitect. Just as the architect, seeing some external house or building,fashions in his soul a consimilar house and afterwards produces somethingconsimilar [which is] external, and is only numerically distinct from the theformer [house], that fiction in the mind from the sight of some external thingwould be an exemplar. Thus just as the fictitious house, if the fashioningwere to have some real productive power, is an exemplar for the architect,



so too the fiction would be an exemplar for the one fashioning it. And that[fiction] can be called ‘universal,’ since it is an exemplar and indifferentlyrelated to all external singulars, and due to this likeness in objective beingit can supposit for external things that have consimilar being outside theintellect. And so in this way the universal, which is only a certain fiction,does not exist through generation but rather through abstraction.

Therefore, I first give some arguments to prove that there is somethingin the soul having only objective being without subjective being.

[ Seven Arguments for the Existence of Objective Being ]

[First Argument]: This is clear, firstly, because according to philoso-phers ‘being’ is divided, in its primary division, into ‘being in the soul’ and‘being outside the soul,’ and ‘being outside the soul’ is divided into the tencategories. Then I ask: how is ‘being in the soul’ taken here? Either for thatwhich only has objective being, and so what was to proved is established;or for that which has subjective being, and this is not possible, since thatwhich has true subjective being in the soul is that which is contained underthe being that is precisely divided into the ten categories, since [it falls]under [the category of] Quality. The act of understanding—and, in everycase, each accident informing the soul—is a genuine quality, just as heat orwhiteness, and so it is not contained under that part of the division that isdivided from [the kind of] being that is divided into the ten categories.

[Second Argument]: Furthermore, figments have being in the soul andnot subjective [being], since otherwise they would be genuine things, andso a chimaera or a goat-stag and the like would be ¡genuine¿ [verae/vera]things; therefore, [figments] are something that only have objective being.

[Third Argument]: Similarly, propositions, syllogisms, and the like,which logic deals with, do not have subjective being; hence they only haveobjective being, such that their being is being known; therefore, there aresuch entities having only objective being.

[Fourth Argument]: Similarly, artifacts in the mind of the artificer donot seem to have subjective being, as neither do creatures in the divinemind before their creation.

[Fifth Argument]: Similarly, [as regards] the ‘respects of reason’ gen-erally held by Doctors, I ask: either they only have subjective being, andthen they are genuine things and real; or only objective being, and thenwhat was to be proved is established.

[Sixth Argument]: Similarly, according to those holding other views,‘being’ expresses a univocal concept, and yet no other thing.

[Seventh Argument]: Similarly, everybody (as it were) distinguishesfirst-level and second-level concepts, |# without calling second-level con-



cepts some real quality in the soul. Hence, since they are not really external[things], they could only have objective being in the soul.#|

[ Seven Arguments for the Objective Being of the Universal ]

[First Argument]: Secondly, this view would hold that the fiction isthat which is primarily and immediately denominated by the concept ofuniversality and has the ratio object, and it is that which immediatelyterminates an act of understanding when no singular is understood. Indeed,in objective being [the fiction] exists just as the singular exists in subjectivebeing. For this reason it can of its nature supposit for those singulars ofwhich it is in some way a likeness. Some predicates bringing in genuinethings are verified of it, yet not for itself but for things. And it is that onethat is predicated of many, such that it is not varied: otherwise no genuswould be truly predicated of many species, but necessarily would be one[species] and another [species], and there would be as many genera as thereare species; rather, the genus could differ from the species in no way, norwould the genus be in more than the species. For, if it were so, I ask howthe genus differs from the species? [If it is said to differ] a parte rei, this wasdisproved [in Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 6]. Similarly, granted that it is distinguished aparte rei, then I ask: either the genus ([which is] not varied) is predicated ofmany species, or not. If it is, I have established what was to be proved, thatsomething neither varied nor multiplied is predicated of many, and is notin the thing—except according to the view stated in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4]—andso, is only in the mind. If, however, nothing [which is] neither varied normultiplied is predicated of many, then the genus is not in more than thespecies or the individual, since certainly the species as varied is predicatedof many, and the individual as varied and multiplied is truly predicated ofmany. If, however, the genus is distinguished from the species in a mentalconcept, either the same concept is predicated of many, or not, and onlythe same concept is varied and multiplied. If so, I have established whatwas to be proved, that the same concept, neither varied nor multiplied, ispredicated of many, but not for itself, since then those ‘many’ [of which it ispredicated] would be one and not varied, which is impossible. If not, then nodistinction between the genus and the species can be given, and especiallywith regard to greater and lesser commonness. Therefore, something [whichis] the same, neither varied nor multiplied, is predicated of many, and I callthat concept a fiction, in the way described previously.

[Second Argument]: Similarly, the subject is the same in a universalproposition and a particular [proposition], not only in spoken propositionsbut also in mental propositions (which are of no [spoken] language). In thelatter, no thing is put as subject, only a certain concept. Thus it can be



said that a word is the universal, and genus and species, but only by anagreement, so a concept [which is] a fiction in this way, abstracted fromsingular things already known, is universal of its nature.

[Third Argument]: Someone can employ this manner of speaking, call-ing the concept and the universal such a fiction, for this seems to be theway Augustine speaks, and his account may seem to some the best dealingwith these matters. This is clear in his The Trinity 8.4.7, where he says:

It is necessary that when we believe in some bodily things that we do notsee but have read of or heard of, the mind fashions to itself somethingin the lineaments and forms of bodies just as it occurs to our thinking,which is either not true or, if it is true, can happen only in the rarest ofcases.

And he adds:Who indeed, reading or hearing what the Apostle Paul wrote or whatis written about him, does not fashion in his soul an appearance of theApostle and all those whose names he recounts?

And afterwards:The appearance of the Lord Himself in the flesh, which is one, is never-theless fashioned and varied by the diversity of innumerable thoughts.

It is possible to argue, on the basis of this authority, as follows: the intellectcan fashion something entirely consimilar to something seen no less than[the intellect can fashion] from things seen something consimilar to some-thing not previously seen; but, from many appearances [which he has] seen,someone can fashion something consimilar to the appearance of the Apostleor of Christ or of someone else whom he has never seen; therefore, it is notinappropriate that the soul can fashion something consimilar to some indi-vidual [which is] seen or intuitively known, and so that fiction will not be areal being but merely cognized. Just as according to Augustine somethingelse is suggested by such a fiction, so too by the fiction [fashioned] fromsomething seen, all things consimilar to what was previously seen are (as itwere), suggested and signified. This is nothing else than to affirm or denysomething of such a fiction, not for itself but for the thing from which itis fashioned or can be fashioned. For example, someone seeing a singularwhiteness fashions [something] consimilar in his soul, just as the architectfashions [something] consimilar in his soul from a house [which he has] seen[directly] or as depicted, and he predicates such attributes of that whiteness:

Whiteness is a colorWhiteness is discernible by sight

and so on. He does not intend that the fiction is a color or discernible bysight, but that any given whiteness from which [such a fiction] can be fash-



ioned is a color or discernible by sight. Accordingly, since he cannot knowevery whiteness outside [the soul], he uses that fiction for every whiteness.

[Fourth Argument]: Furthermore, Augustine says in The Trinity 8.4.7:Nor do we have as part of our faith in the Lord Jesus Christ that whatthe soul fashions to itself, perhaps far different than what is the case andthat which we think according to the appearance of man, is the Saviour.Indeed, we have, as it were a rule, an implanted idea of human nature,according to which whatever we see as such we immediately think to bea man.

From this it is clear that, although due to the diversity in shape and colorand other accidents in diverse men we can fashion diverse [fictions] that arenot similar to every man (or perhaps [are similar to] no man), nevertheless,we can have a notion of some fiction that is equally related to all men,according to which we are able to judge of anything whether it is a man ornot.

[Fifth Argument]: That I might fashion something consimilar to [some-thing] previously seen, such that if I were to have productive power and notmerely fictive power I might really produce such [a consimilar thing], is clearfrom Augustine, The Trinity 8.6.9, where he says:

Since I had heard from many people and believed that it is a great city,as it was described to me I fashioned an image in my soul of it as I wasable.

And afterwards:If I could bring forth that image from my soul [and put it] before theeyes of men who were familiar with Alexandria, surely they would allsay either “That is not it!” or, if they were to say “That is it!,” I wouldbe extremely surprised, and regarding it in my soul (i. e. [regarding] theimage as a quasi-picture of [Alexandria]) I still would not know it.

From this authority is clear (i) that such [fictions] can be fashioned, and, ashe states immediately before the cited passage, all the more so from whatis seen in itself than from what is not seen in itself but seen imperfectlyin other consimilar sights; (ii) that this fiction is called a ‘likeness’ or an‘image’ or a ‘picture’ of a thing, and, as he says in the same place, it is calledthe ‘word’ of a thing; (iii) it is clear that the fiction is an object known bythe intellect. And according to (i)–(iii), [such a fiction] can be a term in aproposition, and supposit for all those of which it is the image or likeness;and this is to be universal and common to them.

[Sixth Argument]: Again, in The Trinity 9.6.11, treating there howfrom things [which are] seen diverse [fictions] are fashioned, and how ac-cording to that diversity of those bodies some fictions are similar to those



from which they are fashioned, and for making which the fictions are used,he concludes at the end of the chapter:

Therefore, we judge of these [bodies] according to the [fiction] and thatwe discern by the regard of our mind’s reason; and they are eitherpresent, which we touch with our bodily senses, or absent, which werecall by images fixed in our memory, or we fashion from it such alikeness as we ourselves, if we wanted to and were able, would construct.

From this, it is clear that such fictions are in objective being as others arein subjective being, and if the intellect were to have productive power, itwould make them to be similar in subjective being.

[Seventh Argument]: Augustine explicitly states that the mind fash-ions such [fictions] from what is previously known, and that as known theyare that according to which the intellect can judge others, in The Trin-ity 10.2.4 when he says:

He fashions an imaginary form in the soul by which he is aroused tolove. However, from what does he fashion it, except from those thingsthat he already knew? Yet if he were to find what is praised to bedissimilar to the form fashioned in his soul and most familiar in histhoughts, perhaps he will not love it.

And he immediately states how according to such a likeness those singu-lars are known in it and are loved in it in some way, none of which wouldbe true unless such fictions were to have a certain commonness as regardsthose [singulars] and to be consimilar to those [singulars] from which theyare fashioned. And I call such commonness ’universality’ |# according toone view, #| nor does |# this view #| posit any other [commonness] exceptperhaps through an agreement, as a word or some sign conventionally im-posed is called ‘universal.’

[Objection]: If it were objected to all this that it is not possible tofashion such [fictions] except from composite bodies, namely in that theirparts are conjoined in different ways by the intellect; however, this is notpossible for spiritual or simple [things] not having such a diversity of parts—

[Reply]: But [Augustine] himself opposes this [objection], in The Trin-ity 10.3.5, where he holds that the soul can fashion [something] consimilarto itself, and this figment will not be the soul itself but will truly be knownby the intellect. Accordingly, he says that the mind

perhaps does not love itself, but it loves that which it fashions of itself,perhaps quite different from [the way] it is; or, if the mind fashions[something] similar to itself, then when it loves this figment [the mind]loves itself before it knows it, since it regards that which is similar toit; therefore, it knows other minds from which it fashions [a fiction] for



itself, and so is known to itself generically.From this, it is clear that such a fiction can even be had of the soul, whichis simple, and this fiction is known as a genus, which is common; and thisis what was to be proved.

Therefore, |# according to this view,#| it should be noted that thefiction is called by Augustine the ‘image’, ‘likeness’, ’phantasm’, and ‘ap-pearance’; and these fictions are said by Augustine to remain in memory inthe absence of sensibles, according to a habit immediately inclining to theirbeing understood. Thus they are there in proximate potency (as it were),inasmuch as the intellect can produce them in the being appropriate to themas a means to those absent [things]. However, [the intellect] cannot, by sucha habit as a means, produce external bodies in the being appropriate tothem, since the being suitable to [external bodies] is real being.

[ Seven Doubts About Ockham’s Old View ]

But there are some doubts about the aforesaid [view].[First Doubt]: It does not seem that something can have objective

being unless it has subjective being somewhere; hence such fictions genuinelyhave subjective being, at least in the mind. This is confirmed: anything thatis, is either substance or accident.

[Second Doubt]: It seems that such [fictions] are not similar to things,since no accident can be assimilated to substance, and the fiction is moredistant from substance than any accident; therefore, [the fiction] cannot bea likeness of a thing outside the soul.

[Third Doubt]: It does not seem that such fictions are universals, sinceit was said that if the intellect were to have productive power and not merelyfictive power, it would produce consimilar external [things]; but if externalconsimilar [things] were produced, those that are produced would no morebe universals than anything else, all of which, for the same reason, would benumerically distinct, as is clear with regard to the house produced from sucha likeness and the house previously known from which the similar [house]was fashioned; therefore, in the same way, these fictions are not universalsin being fashioned.

[Fourth Doubt]: The fourth doubt is about syncategorematic, connota-tive, and negative concepts: from where can they be obtained or abstracted?For if [they are said to be obtained or abstracted] precisely from things, it isnot clear how they could be distinguished from other concepts. Moreover,that there are such concepts is clear, since to every spoken proposition therecan correspond a consimilar one in the mind, and so to the propositions“Every man is an animal” and “Some man is an animal” there correspond



distinct mental propositions; therefore, something corresponds to to the sign[of quantity] in one proposition that does not correspond to the other.

[Fifth Doubt]: The fifth doubt is about the claim that the spokenword is universal. This seems false, since then a word would be a genusor species, and consequently one entire categorial ordering would be in onesubalternate genus of Quality.

[Sixth Doubt]: Similarly, then numerically one accident would be agenus as regards many substances, since numerically one word [would besuch a genus].

[Seventh Doubt]: Similarly, then there would be innumerable mostgeneric genera, just as there are innumerable words [which are generic].

All of these seem absurd, and many other absurdities seem to follow.

[ Replies to the Doubts About Ockham’s Old View ]

[Reply to the First Doubt]: Those holding this view would say thatthere are some beings of reason that do not have, nor could they have, anysubjective being. Just as before the Creation creatures had no subjectivebeing and yet were known by God, so too something can be fashioned bythe created intellect that has no subjective being. And when it is claimedthat “whatever is, is either substance or accident,” it is true that whateveris outside the soul is substance or accident, yet it is not [the case] thatwhatever is objectively in the soul is either substance or accident.

[Reply to the Second Doubt]: The [philosophers holding this view]would say that such fictions are not really similar, but are more dissimilarand distant from substance than accidents; nevertheless, they are in ob-jective being as others are in subjective being; and the intellect, from itsnature, has the ability to fashion such [fictions] of what it knows to be ex-ternal. Therefore, just as [the intellect] can fashion [fictions of] what it doesnot know, and yet it knows many things according to which it can fashionsuch [fictions], so too it can fashion [fictions of] what it knows.

Reply to the Third Doubt]: The [philosophers holding this view] wouldsay that such fictions are universals. Still, if these [fictions] were producedin real being, they would not be universals, for then they would simply beof the same ratio as other things [which have real being], nor would therebe a reason for one to be universal any more than the rest. But since, infact, they are not of the same ratio, since the fiction is simply not an animalor a man, thus it may be said that one is more universal than the rest.

[First Objection to the Reply to the Third Doubt]: If it were said thataccording to Grosseteste the universal is not a figment—

[Second Objection to the Reply to the Third Doubt]: Likewise, [if



it were said] that then there would be as many universals as there areintellects—

[Reply to the First Objection]: The universal is not a figment of thesort to which there does not correspond something in subjective being con-similar to that which is fashioned in objective being, as is the case for thechimu’ra. The chimu’ra is fashioned as something composed out of diverseanimals, and, as such, cannot be something in the world. [However], theuniversal is a figment of the sort to which there corresponds somethingconsimilar in the world; for example, when there is fashioned somethingcomposed out of soul and body, that fiction is universal. Similarly, if ahouse were fashioned in the mind before it were produced, that fiction isnot a figment like the chimæra or something of the sort.

[Reply to the Second Objection]: At present I don’t care whether thefigment or the concept is varied with the variation of intellects or not. The[philosophers holding this view] would say that the most generic genus ofSubstance either is simply one and not varied or is one by equivalence,in which manner others say that the same is predicated in these spokenpropositions:

Socrates is a manand

Plato is a manFor [the word ‘man’ in each spoken proposition] is really different, but nev-ertheless [the word ‘man’] is the same by equivalence, as they (correctly)say, since it would have the same force if in all such propositions numericallythe same word that was spoken in one proposition were spoken in place ofthe other in the other proposition and conversely. And it is so in the case athand: there are only ten most generic genera by equivalence, whether thereare simply only ten or not, whether what is predicated is varied |# or thegenus is varied#| or not.

[Reply to the Fourth Doubt]: The [philosophers holding this view]would say that syncategorematic and connotative and negative concepts arenot concepts abstracted from things, suppositing of their nature for things,or signifying them in a way distinct from other concepts. Hence they wouldsay that no syncategorematic or connotative or negative concept—exceptonly by agreement, in which manner all such [things] by agreement are pred-icated of a word or of other signs—and, in every case, neither grammaticalnor logical modes can be more suitable to these concepts of themselves than[any other] concepts, but are only used conventionally. Moreover, such con-cepts can be imposed or can be abstracted from words, and this is in fact theway it happens, either always or commonly. For example, the grammatical



mode that is singular in number, nominative in case, masculine in gender,and so on, is suitable to the word ‘man’; and other grammatical modes aresuitable to the word “man’s.” Similarly, it is suitable to the word ‘man’that it determinately signify a thing per se. This is not suitable to the word‘every,’ but rather that [the word ‘every’] only signify [in combination] withanother [word]. It is similar for the word ‘not,’ and for ‘per se’, ‘insofaras,’ ‘if,’ and syncategorematic [words] of this sort. Then, from these words[which] signify in this way, the intellect abstracts common concepts predica-ble of them, and imposes those concepts to signify the same as what thoseexternal words signify. And, in the same way, [the intellect] forms from such[concepts] propositions [which are] consimilar to [spoken propositions] andhave the same properties spoken propositions have. Just as [the intellect]can agree that such concepts signify in this way, so too it can agree thatthose concepts abstracted from things signify under the same grammaticalmodes under which the [corresponding] spoken words signify. Still, this ismore appropriate to abstract concepts than spoken words, in order to avoidequivocation, since those concepts are distinct just as the spoken words are,although they are not all distinct; other concepts are not distinct. Thusany such proposition should be distinguished, for example the propositioncorresponding to the [spoken] proposition “Man is men,” “Man is man’s,”and so forth. As it is laid down for these [cases], it should be laid downanalogously for all connotatives, negatives, and syncategorematics, as areverbs like ‘is’, ‘runs’, and so on.

[Reply to the Fifth Doubth]: The [philosophers holding this viewwould say] that a word itself is genuinely universal, although it is not [uni-versal] of its nature but only by a conventional agreement. Similarly, theywould grant that a word is a genus, a species, a most generic genus, and soforth. Nor is it any more inappropriate to attribute such [characteristics] toa word by a conventional agreement than to attribute to complex spokenwords that they are true and false, necessary and impossible. It is trulysaid that these words are true and that those words are false, for none buta madman can deny that many falsehoods and lies are told, and similarlythat many truths and necessities are spoken. In the same way, the [spokenproposition]:

Man is an animalis true per se primo modo, and the spoken [proposition]:

Man is risibleis true per se secundo modo, and the spoken proposition:

A man is an assis impossible. Similarly, in [the proposition]:



Man is an animala common term is put as the subject and [a common term] is put as thepredicate, and the genus is similarly predicated of the species.

[First Objection to the Reply to the Fifth Doubt]: If it were said thata spoken proposition is true or false only because it is the sign of a true orfalse proposition in the mind, and so, similarly, some spoken word will be agenus or a species only because it is the sign of a genus or a species [in themind]

[Second Objection to the Reply to the Fifth Doubt]: Likewise, [if itwere said] that then the same term could be a genus and a species, sinceone man can impose a word to signify all individuals [which are] such andanother man [can impose] the same [word] to signify all those [individualsthat are] such—

[Reply to the First Objection to the Reply to the Fifth Doubt]: It canbe granted that some spoken proposition is true although it is not the signof some proposition in the mind; still, in fact, any [such proposition] can bethe sign of a proposition in the mind. In the same way, it can be grantedthat any word that is a genus or a species can be the sign of a genus ora species in the mind, and in fact is a sign ordered to any such [genus orspecies in the mind].

[Reply to the Second Objection to the Reply to the Fifth Doubt]:The [second objection] is puerile. Still, it should literally be granted thatnumerically the same word, according to different impositions, is genus andspecies. Nor is this more inappropriate than to grant that numericallythe same word is univocal and equivocal, and that numerically the sameproposition is necessary and impossible. (|# Everyone should grant these[claims] unless a proposition [were to be] called ‘true’ precisely in that itsignifies the true and not the false, and so forth for the others. #|) For theword ‘man’ among the Latins is simply univocal, and the same word amongthe Greeks or others could be imposed to signify many [things] equallyprimarily, and so among them it would be simply equivocal. In the sameway, [the proposition]:

Every dog is an animalis simply true, and it is also simply false, since it has one true sense andone false [sense], i. e. the same proposition is true and false.

[Reply to the Sixth Doubt]: I say that, with regard to anything com-mon it is not inadmissible for one entire categorial ordering, which contains[elements] predicable per se primo modo, to be in one subalternate genussuch that they are things of this category, just as was said previously withregard to beings of reason; nor is this inadmissible, except as thought to be



by those not understanding it.[Reply to the Seventh Doubt]: [I say] by the same [remarks] that it

is not inadmissible for one word to be a genus conventionally, just as it isnot inadmissible for some word to be predicated of another [word] per seprimo modo. Accordingly, those holding (7) and similar falsehoods shouldgrant in consequence that no one can say anything true or false, nor wouldanyone ever hear lies or truths, and, in the same way, that neither truthsnor falsehoods can be written, and other absurdities that would horrify anyhuman community.

[ Ockham’s New View ]

|# Those who are displeased by the view of fictions of this sort in objec-tive being can hold that the concept and anything universal is some qualityexisting subjectively in the mind, which of its nature is a sign of an exter-nal thing—just as a word is a sign of a thing by a conventional agreement.Hence it can be said that for every [logical or grammatical mode]: just asthere are some words and signs that are categorematic, signifying externalthings by a voluntary agreement properly and per se, and there are some[words] that are syncategorematic, which do not signify but only consignify[in combination] with others, and there are some [words] signifying in oneway and some in another way due to their different grammatical character-istics, so too there are some qualities existing in the mind subjectively towhich such [characteristics] are analogously suitable of their nature, as theyare suitable to words through a voluntary agreement. Nor does the fact thatthe intellect is able to elicit some qualities that are naturally signs of thingsseem any more inappropriate than that brute animals and men naturallygive forth some noises by which it is naturally suitable that they signifysome other [thing]. Nevertheless, there is this difference: brute [animals]and men do not give forth such sounds except to signify some attributesor some accidents existing in themselves; the intellect, however, since it isa greater power with regard to this, can elicit qualities to naturally signifyanything.

According to this view, it should be said that every universal and mostgeneric genus is a genuine singular thing existing as a thing of a determinategenus, [namely, a thing of the genus Quality]; nevertheless, [such a quality]is universal by predication, not for itself but for the things that it signifies.Thus the categorial order of Substance is a composite or aggregate of manyqualities naturally related as higher and lower, i. e. that one [element] inthe [categorial] order [of Substance] is of its nature a sign of more andanother [element in the categorial order of Substance is of its nature a sign]



of fewer, just as if such an ordering were to come about from words. Still,there would be this difference: words ordered as higher and lower do notsignify that which they signify except by a voluntary agreement, but [suchqualities] signify naturally and are of their nature genera and species. Nordo such arguments as that quality is not predicated of substance, or thatone category is denied of anything contained under another category, workagainst this view; for such claims, and many others that could be adduced,are true when the terms supposit personally. For example, [the proposition]:

Substance is not qualityis true if the terms were to supposit personally; nevertheless, if the sub-ject were to supposit simply and the predicate personally, [the proposition]would be granted according to this view. Therefore, many such [objections]to this view do not work.

Nevertheless, this view can be held in different ways. In one way, [itcould be held] that the quality existing subjectively in the soul would bethe act of understanding itself; and this view can be stated, and argumentsagainst it can be resolved, as I have said elsewhere. In another way, itcould be held that the quality would be something other than the act ofunderstanding and posterior to that act of understanding; and then [thisview] could accomodate the motives for the view of the fiction in objectivebeing as is touched on elsewhere, where I have more fully expressed the viewabout the concept or intention of the soul, holding that it is a quality of themind.


I take any of these three views to be plausible, and which of them ismore true I leave to the judgement of others.

Nevertheless, I do hold this, that no universal, unless perhaps it isuniversal by a voluntary agreement, is something existing outside the soulin any way, but all that which is of its nature universally predicable of manyis in the mind either subjectively or objectively, and that no universal is ofthe essence or quiddity of any given substance, and so too for the othernegative conclusions that I have stated in [Ord. 1 d. 2 qq. 4–7].#|


I say that that which primarily moves the intellect is not universal butsingular, and hence the singular is primarily understood in the primacy ofgeneration, as will be clear in [Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 5].



§§Ockham - Treatise on Universals (단행본 Ordinatio I d.2 qq.4-8)

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