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CONCLUSTON - THE LONG- T ERM I MPL I CATTONS OF CL TENCY

Thi s st udy has ar gued t hat t he Uni t ed St at es, by engagi ng I r ani n a cl i ency r el at i onshi p, hel ped underm ne a pr ocess of t ransi -t i on t owar d democr acy i n I r an and hel ped i nst al l an aut hor i t ar i an,r el at i vel y aut onomous cl i ent st at e under t he l eader shi p of t hel at e shah. The concept of cl i ency was i nt r oduced i n chapt er 1. I nchapt er 2 a t heor et i cal f ramewor k was d~vel oped f or i nvest i gat i ngt he i mpact of cl i ency on t he cl i ent ' s domest i c pol i t i cs. Chapt er 3gave an over vi ew of I r ani an pol i t i cs i n t he er a bef or e t heU. S. - I r an cl i ency r el at i onshi p was begun. I n chapt er 4 t he hi st or yof U. S. - I r ani an r el at i ons was di s cussed and U. S. i nt er est s i n I r ani n t he l at e 1940s and ear l y 1950s wer e exam ned.

The mai n br unt of t he ar gument pr esent ed her e came i n chapt er s5 and 6. Chapt er 5 det ai l ed t he U. s. r ol e i n t he 1953 coup and t hei mpl i cat i ons of t hi s coup f or I rani an pol i t i cs, bui l di ng on t hemat er i al pr esent ed i n chapt er 3. Chapt er 6 out l i ned t he ki nds ofassi st ance pr ovi ded by t he Uni t ed St at es t o I r an under t he cl i encyre l at i onshi p and t he mechani sms used by t he shah t o consol i dat eand mai nt ai n hi s di ct at or shi p. The l ast sect i on of chapt er 6br ought t hese t wo t hemes t oget her by di scussi ng how the assi s tancepr ovi ded under t he cl i ency r el at i onshi p f aci l i t at ed t hi s pr ocessof consol i dat i on.

I f t he basi c ar gument of t hi s st udy i s accept ed, what t hen wer e

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PAGE 212t he l ong- t erm i mpl i cat i ons of t he pol i cy of est abl i shi ng I r an as aU. S. cl i ent st at e? The i mmedi at e i mpl i cat i ons f or domest i c pol i -t i cs i n I r an ar e cl ear : af t er Zahedi and t he shah wer e i nst al l edi n pOWQr i n 1953 a twenty- f i ve year per i od of r epr essi ve and of t enbrut al di ct Qt or shi p ensued. But what r ol e, i f any, di d cl i encyul t i mat el y pl ay i n t he const el l at i on of soci al f or ces t hat l ed t ot he 1978- 79 r evol ut i on? Fur t hermor e. i f cl i ency di d cont r i but e i nsome manner t o r evol ut i on i n I r an, what gener al concl usi ons can bedrawn f or U. S. pol i cy el sewhere i n t he t hi r d wor l d?

1) I MP L I CAT I ONS F OR I RANI AN POL I T I CS

By t he ear l y 1960s, t he st at e i n I r Qn had become suf f i ci ent l yaut onomous and author i t ar i an t hat i t coul d act agai nst t he i nt er -est s of any gr oup i n soci et y w t hout r egard f or count er vei l i ngpol i t i cal pr essur es. Two pr of oundl y i mpor t ant event s occur r ed i n1963 whi ch made thi s emnent l y cl ear . Fi r st , i n J anuary 1963 t heshah announced pl ans f or a f ar - r eachi ng l and re form pr ogr am Asdi s cussed i n chapt er 6, t hi s pr ogram devast at ed t he pol i t i cal baseof t he dom nant , l andowni ng cl ass by br eaki ng t he f eudal bondswhi ch had pr evi ousl y l i nked peasant s t o t hei r l andl or ds. Second,a f ter t he gr adual r el axat i on of sanc t i ons agai nst open pol i t i calact i vi t y begi nni ng i n 1960, t he shah r esponded t o t he J une 1963upri s i ngs by r ei mposi ng t he harsh measures whi ch had hi t her t oprevai l ed. The ease w t h whi ch t hi s was accompl i shed i ndi cat edcl ear l y how l i t t l e power vi s - a- vi s t he st at e t he l ower and m ddl ecl asses act ual l y possessed.

I n addi t i on t o t hese dramat i c event s, t he st ate' s aut onomy f r omdomest i c pol i t i cal pressur es had an i mpor t ant bear i ng on i t s pol i -ci es i n a var i et y of ot her ar eas. Of perhaps great est concer n was

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P AGE 213i t s econom c pol i cy. The shdh' s Devel opment Pl dns pr omotedl arge- scal e, capi t al - i nt ensi ve i ndust r i al i zat i on at t he expense ofagr i cul t ur e and basi c i ndust r y. Hi gh- pr est i ge pr oj ect s such asnucl ear power pl ant s, st eel m l l s, and pet r ochem cal compl exeswer e bui l t under t he shah. These pr oj ects wer e poor l y- sui t ed f orI r an' s econom c condi t i ons. They pr ovi ded l i t t l e empl oyment f orI r an' s l ar ge unski l l ed workforce but r equi r ed l ar ge number s ofski l l ed t echni ci ans and engi neer s, most of whom wer e r ecr ui t ed i nt he Uni t ed St at es and Eur ope. Domest i c unempl oyment was aggravatedby t he l and r ef or m pr ogr am and by t he gener al negl ect of agr i cul -t ur e, whi ch r educed r ur al empl oyment and l ed t o massi ve ur banm grati on. Much of t he i ndust r i al i zat i on pr omot ed by t he shah wasexpor t - or i ent ed. These new i ndust r i es used a r el at i vel y smal lpr opor t i on of domest i cal l y- produced i nput s and di d l i t t l e t osat i sf y I ran' s gr ow ng demand f or cheap consumer goods. Lar gebottl enecks r esul t ed and i mpor t s gr ew at a r api d r at e. l

The rel at i ve aut onomy of t he st at e enabl ed t he shah t o pur suei l l - sui t ed and unpopul ar pol i ci es i n a var i et y of ot her ar eas aswel l . Despi t e occasi onal opposi t i on f r om t he Uni t ed St at es, t heshah sought t o bui l d up I r an' s armed f or ces t o t he poi nt wher et hey coul d cr edi bl y engage t he Sovi et Uni on. Bi l l i ons of dol l ar swere spent on weapons each year i n the 1970s and t ens of t housandsof f or ei gn advi sor s, most of t hem Amer i can, wer e br ought t o I r ant o pr ovi de t rai ni ng and suppor t . 2 The shah al so sought t o Wester-ni ze and secul ar i ze I r an. Vi r t ual l y ever y aspect of st at e pol i cyhad a West ern or i ent at i on. West er n cul t ur e, par t i cul ar l y Amer i cancul t ur e, became i ncr easi ngl y vi s i bl e. The shah pur sued pol i ci ~ssuch as l and reform and t he enf r anchi sement of women whi ch wer eanat hema t o t he or t hodox I sl am c communi t y. I n t he l at e 19705 hew t hdr ew m l l i ons of dol l ar s i n subsi di es whi ch had hel ped suppor tt he Shi ' i t e cl er gy. Much of t he shah' s f or ei gn pol i cy, such as hi scl ose r el at i onshi p w th I sr ael and hi s suppor t of t he Omanigover nment agai nst t he Dhof ar r ebel l i on, was qui t e unpopul ar as

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PAGE 214wel l .

As i n t he cases di scussed 1n sect i on 2 of chapt er 2. t he r el a-t i ve autonomy of t he st at e i n I ran enabl ed t he shah t o pur sueeconom c pol i ci es and pol i ci es i n ot her ar eas t hat ser ved nei t hert he i nt er est s of t he est dbl i shed upper cl asses nor t hose of t hel ower and m ddl e cl asses. However . unl i ke t hose cases. t he shah' spol i c i es wer e not di ct at ed by i mperat i ves such as a need f ori mpor t subst i t ut i on. Hence t her e wer e no pr essur es of any ki nd t of or ce t he shah t o pur sue pol i ci es t hat sui t ed I r an' s needs. Thi shad om nous l ong- t er m i mpl i cat i ons f or I r ani an pol i t i cs.

I t i s obvi ousl y beyond t he scope of t hi s st udy t o gi ve adet ai l ed anal ysi s of t he or i gi ns of t he I r ani an r evol ut i on. Mostwr i t er s have f ocused on t he uni que abi l i t y of t he Shi ' i t e cl er gyt o mobi l i ze l at ent popul ar unr est . 3 Def ender s of t he shah speak ofcommuni st subver si on and suggest t hat t he pace of moder ni zat i onwas t oo r api d. 4 I r oni cal l y. t he shah hi msel f accused t he Uni t edSt at es and Br i t ai n of f oment i ng unr est and opposi t i on t o hi srul e. 5

Regar dl ess of where bl ame i s ul t i mat el y l ai d f or t he I r ani anr evol ut i on. t her e can be no doubt t hat popul ar r evul si on at t heshah' s pol i c i es pl ayed a key r ol e. Despi t e r epor t s t hat I r an' s oi lr esour ces woul d be depl et ed by t he end of t he cent ur y. t he shahcont i nued t o spend heavi l y on sophi st i cat ed m l i t ar y equi pment andhi gh- pr est i ge i ndust r i al pr oj ect s. These expendi t ur es i ncr easeddramat i cal l y af t er oi l pr i ces began t o r i se i n t he l at e 19605.Cor rupt i on among hi gh gover nment of f i ci al s and member s of t her oyal f am l y gr ew r ampant . The shah and hi s cl ose associ at esenj oyed an i ncr easi ngl y ext ravagant l i f est yl e. symbol i zed mostnot abl y by t he l avi sh Per sepol i s cel ebr at i ons of 1971, whi chrepor tedl y cost S100 m l l i on. 6 However . despi t e hi gh gr owt h r at es.ver y l i t t l e of I ran' s weal t h r eached t he i mpover i shed maj or i t y.

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PAGE 215The sl ums of Tehr an and ot her maj or ci t i es became bl oat ed i n t he19705. I ncome i nequal i t y worsened and t he l i t er acy r at e r emai nedunder 50 percent . 7

I r oni cal l y, I r an' s econom c si t uat i on became wor se 1n t he l at e19705, despi t e t he gr eat i nf l ux of oi l r evenues af ter 1973. Thequadrupl i ng of oi l pr i ces i n t hat year l ed t he shah t o dr aw upover l y- ambi t i ous pl ans f or econom c devel opment and moder ni zat i onof t he armed f orces. By 1976 l ar ge def i c i t s f or ced t he shah t oi mpl ement st r i ngent aust er i t y measur es and even bor row i n f or ei gncapi tal mar ket s. The shah' s el abor at e spendi ng pl ans caused sever eeconom c bot t l eneCKs and a subst ant i al i ncr ease i n t he i nf l at i onr at e. The cont i nued negl ect of agr i cul t ur e l ed m l l i ons of peas-ant s t o m grat e t o t he c i t i es and f or ced I r an t o i mpor t gr ow ngquant i t i es of f ood.

These econom c pr obl ems were a f undament al cause of unr estamong I r an' s l ower and m ddl e cl asses i n t he l at e 19705. 6 Beyondt hese econom c probl ems, t he cont i nued absence of meani ngf ul f ormsof pol i t i cal par t i ci pat i on and t he i ncr easi ngl y f r equent humanr i ght s abuses f ur t her al i enat ed t he l i beral opposi t i on, whi chbegan t o agi t at e agai nst t he shah. The gr ow ng t r ends of West er ni -zat i on and secul ar i zat i on out r aged t he mor e devout musl i ms and l edt he cl ergy t o become i ncr easi ngl y vocal .

Ul t i mat el y, nei t her t he l i ber al opposi t i on nor t he cl er gy r eal -l y " l ed" t he I r ani an r evol ut i on. The i nher i t or s of t he Nat i onalFr ont were poor l y- or gani zed and di vi ded among t hemsel ves, as wasi ndi cat ed by t hei r subsequent f ai l ur e t o pr event t he conser vat i vecl er gy f r om assum ng compl et e cont r ol . The cl er gy was al sopoor l y- or gani zed and di vi ded. Ayat ol l ah Khomei ni , whose f i r eyspeeches and r ol e i n t he 1963 demonstrat i ons made hi m t he mostpr om nent member of t he cl er i cal opposi t i on, had not been i nsi deI r an f or al most f i f t een year s. The I sl am c Republ i can Par t y, whi ch

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P AGE 216now hol ds power i n I r an, was not even f or med unt i l af t er t he r evo-l ut i on.

T he l i ber al oppos i t i on di d s er ve t o cat al yz e t he oppos i t i on byc i r cul a t i ng pet i t i ons and or gani z i ng demons t r at i ons i n t he year sbef or e t he r evol ut i on. T he c l er gy, by vi r t ur e of t he i mpor t anc e ofShi ' a I s l am i n I r ani an cul t ur e and t he pr ot ec t i on af f or ded i t byt he mos ques ( whi c h t he s hah' s f or ces coul d not eas i l y penet r at e) ,was abl e t o mobi l i z e cer t ai n s egment s of I r ani an s oc i et y, not abl yt he ur bani z ed peas ant s who l at er f or med t he mai n s oc i al bas e oft he pos t - r evol ut i onar y I s l am c r egi me. However , nei t her t he l i ber -al oppos i t i on nor t he c l er gy had i n any s ens e pr epar ed f or a r evo-l ut i on. I t was onl y i n t he f al l of 1978 t hat t he ant i - s hahdemons t r at i ons t ook on t he appear ance of a r evol u t i onar y upheavalr at her t han s i mpl y popul ar unr es t . T he I r ani an r evol ut i on wast r ul y pr aet or i an: i t was an out bur s t f r om t he ver y bel l y of I r an,gui ded but not l ed by t he c l er gy and t he l i ber al oppos i t i on, whi c hexp i a t ed t he ~hah but had nei t her t he f or es i ght nor t he l eader s hi pt o r epl ace hi m wi t h a r egi me t hat was mor e j us t andf o r wa r d - l o ok i ng.

2) I MP L I C AT I ONS F OR U. S . I NT ERES T S

A f undament al r eas on f or engagi ng I r an as a U. S. c l i ent was t omake t hat count r y mor e s t abl e. However , i f c l i ency pl ayed as i gni f i cant r ol e i n mak i ng t he s t at e mor e aut onomous and aut hor -i t r ai an i n I r an, and i f t hes e cons equenc es i n t ur n s et t he s t agef or r evol ut i on, t hen t he pol i c y of es t abl i s hi ng I r an as a U. S .c l i ent c r eat ed a s er i ous par adox f or U. S. pol i cymaker s : whi l ec l i ency had undoubt edl y made I r an mor e s t abl e i n t he s hor t t er mi t s l o ng- t er m r es ul t was qui t e t he oppos i t e. F ur t her mor e, not onl y

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PAGE 217was I r an suddenl y unst abl e af t er t went y- f i ve year s of cl i ency. i twas vi rul ent l y ant i - Amer i can as wel l . A pol i cy t hat i n t he 19505and 1960s seemed benef i ci al f or U. S. i nt er est s appear ed by t he endof 1979 t o have been ext r emel y shor t - s i ght ed.

I f such a par adox I S i nher ent I n cl i ency r el at i onshi ps. ar et her e ways I n whi ch t he pat ron can achi eve t he same gener al goal sw t hout pr oduci ng t hese undesi r abl e consequences? Thr ee possi bi l -i t i es come t o m nd.

The f i r st i s t o escal at e t he cl i ency r el at i onshi p. Af t er t heI rani an r evol ut i on. cr i t i cs of t he Car t er Adm ni st r at i on char gedt hat i t had " l ost I r an" by f ai l i ng t o pr ovi de appropr i at e assi s t -ance t o t he shah I n hi s hour of need. Si m l ar charges wer e madew t h r espect t o t he Somoza di ct at or shi p i n ~ car agua. The i deabehi nd t hese char ges was t hat t he gover nment s i n quest i on coul dhave been kept af l oat i f t he Uni t ed St at es had gi ven t hem suf f i -ci ent assi st ance i n t he f orm of m l i tar y and econom c ai d. orper haps a m l i t ar y i nt er vent i on. Whi l e i t i s possi bl e t hat U. S.assi st ance coul d have saved t hese gover nment s, i t i s doubt f ul t hatanyt hi ng shor t of a pr ol onged U. S. m l i t ar y occupat i on woul d havebeen adequat e. Thi s ki nd of "Vi et nam sol ut i on" woul d have beenext r emel y unpopul ar i n t he Uni t ed St at es. and hence ver y di f f i cul tt o i mpl ement . I t woul d not . i n any case, have i mpr oved pr ospect sf or a t ransi t i on t o democr acy i n t hese count r i es.

A second possi bi l i t y i s t o cease i nvol vement i n cl i encyr el at i onshi ps al t oget her . I sol at i oni sm of t hi s ki nd i s so unpopu-l ar i n t he Uni t ed St at es t oday t hat i t can be r ul ed out as a pr ac-t i cal al t er nat i ve t o cl i ency. The gl obal i nt er est s acqui r ed by t heUni t ed St at es i n t he post war er a si mpl y coul d not be mai nt ai nedw t hout kQY cl i ent s such as Sout h KorQa. t hQ Phi l i PPi nQs. andPanama.st r ong

Fur t hermor Q, i n t he absence of concr et e measur es t o bui l ddemocrat i c i nst i t ut i ons, si mpl y abr ogati ng cl i ency

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PAGE 218r el at i onshi ps w t h count r i es such as t hese coul d l ead t o t hecol l apse of t hei r gover nment s under pr aet or i an onsl aught s such ast he one whi ch t oppl ed t he shah. A mor e del i ber at e and peacef ulpr ocess of t r ansi t i on i s cl ear l y pr ef er abl e.

A t hi r d possi bi l i t y whi ch may hol d mor e pr om se i nvol ves usi ngt he l ever age i nher ent i n m l i t ar y and econom c ai d and ot hert ransf er s occur r i ng under a cl i ency r el at i onshi p t o pr essur e t hecl i ent gover nment f or soci al and pol i t i cal r ef or ms. Thi s appr oachwas, i n f act , pur sued f or a br i ef per i od i n t he ear l y 1960s i nI r an when t he Kennedy Adm ni st r at i on exer t ed pr essur e on t he shaht o enact cer t ai n r ef or ms. 9 Lever age of t hi s ki nd can be used t of or ce t he cl i ent gover nment t o st op abuses of power , t hus di r ect l ycount er i ng some of t he undesi r abl e consequences of cl i ency. I t canal so be used t o pr omot e democr at i c i nst i t ut i ons such as r epr esen-t at i ve par t i es and f ree el ect i ons, as wel l as soci al r ef orms suchas l i t er acy and publ i c educat i on pr ogr ams whi ch can enhance t hel ong- t erm prospect s f or democracy.

Usi ng t he l ever age i nher ent l y avai l abl e i n a cl i ency r el at i on-shi p t o pr omot e pol i t i cal l i ber al i zat i on may enabl e t he pat ron t oachi eve t he par t i cul ar goal s t hat l ed t o i t s i nvol vement w t houtpr oduci ng t he l ong- t er m i nst abi l i t y t hat may r esul t . However , t wopot ent i al pr obl ems may ar i se whi ch can ser ve t o l i m t t he degreeof l ever age avai l abl e t o t he pat r on i n t hi s r egar d. Fi r st , t hepat ron may be heavi l y dependent on t he cl i ent f or ser vi ces such asbasi ng r i ght s whi ch ar e of vi t al i mpor tance t o i t . By t hr eat eni ngt o w t hdr aw t hese ser vi ces, t he cl i ent can ef f ect i vel y bl ockattempt s by t he pat r on t o pr essur e i t . l O Second, i n pr omot i ngpol i t i cal l i ber al i zat i on, t hi s ki nd of pr essur e may al so pr omot enat i onal i st sent i ment s i n t he cl i ent count ry whi ch ar e opposed t ot he cl i ency r el at i onshi p or i n ot her ways conf l i ct w t h t he i nt er -est s of t he pat r on. Whi l e usi ng l ever age t o pr omot e l i ber al i zat i on1n t hi s way can t hus pr esent del i cat e t radeof f s f or t he pat ron, i t

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PAGE 219may never t hel es s be t he onl y al t er nat i ve t o t he k i nd of di sas t r o u sl ong- t Qrm conSQqUQnCQS of cl i Qncy whi ch occur rQcl i n I r an.

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P AGE 220FOOTNOTES TO THE CONCLUSI ON1) For cr i t i cal anal yses of t he shah' s econom c pol i ci es seeRober t Gr aham I r an: The I l l usi on of Power ( Haw Yor k: st .Mar t i n' s, 1980) , chs. 1, 3; Fr ed Hal l i day, I r an: Di ct at or shi p andDevel opment ( Har mondswor t h: P engui n, 1979) , c hs . 5, 6; Abol Has s anBani sadr . " Devel oppement de l a Consommat i on Du Fut ur et M ser e. "i n Paul Vi ei l l a and Abol - Hassan Bani sadr . Pet r ol e et Vi ol ence( Par i s: Ant hr opos. 1974) , pp. 69- 135.2) U. S. Senat e, Comm t t ee on F or ei gn Rel at i ons , U. S . Mi l i t ar vSal es t o I r an, Comm t t ee Pr i nt , 9~t h Congr ess, 2nd 5essi on, J ul y1976.3) For exampl e see M chael M J. Fi scher , I r an: Fr om Rel i gi ousDi s8ut e t o Revol ut i on ( Cambr i dge: Har var d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. 1980) ;var l OUS ar t i cl es i n Ni kki R. Keddi e ( ad. ) . Rel i Qi on and Pol i t i csi n I r an ( New Haven: Yal e Uni ver si t y Pr ess. 1983) ; and Theda Skoc-pol . "Rent i er St at e and Shi ' a I sl am i n t he I r ani an Revol ut i on. "Theo rv and Soc i e t y. Vol . 11, No. 3, May 1982, P P . 265- 2 83.4) See f or exampl e Ashr af Pahl evi . Faces i n a M r ror ( Engl ewoodCl i f f s: Pr ent i ce- Hal L 1980) . ch. 8.5) Mohammad Reza Pahl evi , Answer t o Hi st or y ( New Yor k: St ei n andDay, 1980), pp. 14, 23.6) The New Yor k Ti mes, Oct ober 12, 1971, 39: 2.7) Er vand Abr aham an. "St r uct ur al Caus9s of t heRevol ut i on, " MERI P, No. 87 , May 1980, pp. 21- 26. I rani an8) For excel l ent di scussi ons of t he econom c causes of t he I r ani anr evol ut i on see Gr aham I r an: The I l l usi on of Power , and Rober t E.Looney, Econom c Or i gi ns of t he I r ani an Revol ut i on ( New Yor k:P er gamon, 1982) .9) See f oot not e 28 of chapt er 6. above. Many peopl e bel i eve t hatt he shah embr aced l and r ef orm and t he ot her measur es enact ed undert he Whi t e Revol ut i on i n or der t o def l ect such pr essur e.10) For a di scussi on of t hi s pr obl em see Rober t O. Keohane, "TheBi g I nf l uence of Smal l Al l i es. " For ei qn Pol i cy, No. 1, 1971, pp.163- 181.