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Reference ID Subject Created Released Classification Origin 10BOGOTA243 QUESTIONS

ABOUND ON WHETHER AIR STRIKE HIT INDIGENOUS TERRITORY 2010-02-122010-12-09

SECRET//NOFORNEmbassy Bogota05BOGOTA7402 U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT

URIBE 2005-08-042010-12-08SECRETEmbassy Bogota07PARIS3941 FARC HOSTAGES: GOF

LEAVING "NO STONE UNTURNED" TO 2007-09-192010-12-08SECRET//NOFORNEmbassy Paris

07PARIS4650 SARKOZY EAGER TO ACT ON COLOMBIA HOSTAGE SITUATION 2007-12-062010-

12-08SECRETEmbassy Paris08PARIS460 BETANCOURT HOSTAGE SITUATION RENDERS"POOR" 2008-03-122010-12-08CONFIDENTIALEmbassy Paris08BOGOTA1391 ARMED

FORCES COMMANDER PADILLA ON FARC, HOSTAGES, 2008-04-142010-12-08SECRETEmbassy

Bogota08BOGOTA2024 MARULANDA'S DEATH SPARKS SPECULATION ON FARC'S 2008-06-03

2010-12-08CONFIDENTIALEmbassy Bogota08BOGOTA2578 GOC REACHES OUT TO FARC, BUT

WILL CONTINUE 2008-07-162010-12-08CONFIDENTIALEmbassy Bogota09BOGOTA542

MILITARY'S HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES MEET RESISTANCE 2009-02-202010-12-08

CONFIDENTIALEmbassy Bogota09BOGOTA1588 AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD PRESSES

COLOMBIAN ARMY 2009-05-202010-12-08CONFIDENTIALEmbassy Bogota09BOGOTA1632

POLITICIAN WITH FARC CONTACTS REACHES OUT TO 2009-05-262010-12-08CONFIDENTIAL

Embassy Bogota09STATE83014 COMBATTING VENEZUELAN DIVERSION OF ARMS TO THE

2009-08-102010-12-08SECRETSecretary of State09BOGOTA2963 AMBASSADOR AND VP

SANTOS DISCUSS RESPONSE TO DAS 2009-09-162010-12-08SECRETEmbassy Bogota09BOGOTA3035 Uribe Informs Ambassador of DAS Investigation Developments 2009-09-22

2010-12-08SECRET//NOFORNEmbassy Bogota09BOGOTA3271 CNP HYPOTHESIS AS TO

ILLEGAL WIRETAPS MASTERMINDS 2009-10-272010-12-08SECRET//NOFORNEmbassy Bogota

09BOGOTA3441 XXXXXXXXXXXX TO AMBASSADOR: GOC ANGRY AT USG SILENCE ON

VENEZUELA; PROBLEMS WITHIN MOD; NO NEW PROSECUTOR GENERAL 2009-11-252010-12-

08SECRET//NOFORNEmbassy Bogota10BOGOTA13 Peace Commissioner Lays Out Way Ahead

on FARC, ELN 2010-01-072010-12-08SECRET//NOFORNEmbassy Bogota10BOGOTA201

DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S JANUARY 12, 2010 MEETING WITH 2010-02-092010-12-08

SECRET//NOFORNEmbassy Bogota10BOGOTA227 GOC CLAIMS SOME PROGRESS WITH FARC,

ELN 2010-02-112010-12-08SECRET//NOFORNEmbassy Bogota09BANGKOK1998 NEXT STEPS

ON THE VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION CASE IN 2009-08-132010-12-07SECRETEmbassy Bangkok

05MADRID1317 DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZAPATERO 2005-04-06

2010-12-07CONFIDENTIALEmbassy Madrid09STATE6423 C) IRANIAN OUTREACH TO LATIN

AMERICA 2009-01-232010-12-01SECRET//NOFORNSecretary of State08MADRID518 WHA

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON'S VISIT TO MADRID, 2008-05-092010-12-01CONFIDENTIAL

Embassy Madrid09BOGOTA3404 Colombian MFA Sounds Alarm about Citizenship Fraud 2009-

10-272010-11-30UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYEmbassy Bogota

Embassy colombia

VZCZCXYZ0000RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #0243/01 0432109ZNY SSSSS ZZHR 122109Z FEB 10FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTATO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2817INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DCRHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DCRHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL


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RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DCRHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DCRHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DCRUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DCRUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTARUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACASRUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMARUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITORUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMARUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DCS E C R E T BOGOTA 000243 SIPDIS NOFORNE.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/12TAG: PTER, MOPS, PINS, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, COSUBJECT: QUESTIONS ABOUND ON WHETHER AIR STRIKE HITINDIGENOUS TERRITORYREF: 10 BOGOTA 171CLASSIFIED BY: Brian A. Nichols, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON: 1.4(B), (C),

(D)

SUMMARY -------

1. (S/NF) Post has received disparate accounts of a January 30 air strike carried outby the Colombia Air Force that occurred in an area inhabited by indigenous on theborder of the Departments of Choco and Antioquia. Members of the Embera-Katiocommunity told us the strike hit the Urada-Jiguamiando Reservation injuring a coupleand their infant. However, Colombian Air Force officials said the strike occurred a fewkilometers outside the reservation in a suspected Revolutionary of Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC) camp. Leading newspaper "El Tiempo" reported a military judge isopening an investigation and the Colombian military has accepted responsibility for theincident, although they continue to argue the air strike was not on indigenous territory.Other information at Post suggests that the Colombian Air Force's version of eventsappears correct, although several details still remain unclear. What is certain is thisincident will increase tensions between the GOC and the indigenous, who are facing anincrease in conflict-related violence (septel). End Summary.

INDIGENOUS MAINTAIN MILITARY ERRED ----------------------------------

2. (C) On February 4, Poloff and USAID personnel met with XXXXXXXXXXXXof the Urada-Jiguamiando Reservatio XXXXXXXXXXXX, Embera-Katio indigenousmember XXXXXXXXXXXX, and Legal XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX,

XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, to hear theirversions of what happened during the January 30 incident. XXXXXXXXXXXX, saidthe air strike landed on an indigenous family's property while they were cooking

breakfast at 3:00 a.m. and injured three people: a mother, father, and their 20 day-oldbaby (a nine-year old son and aunt were also present, but had no serious injuries). He also told us the father was hit by shrapnelin the spine and will be unable to walk, while the mother had shrapnel removed fromher leg (see para . XXXXXXXXXXXX,, who visited the father in the hospital,confirmed he was in "serious" condition. The couple is currently being treated in a


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hospital in Medellin. XXXXXXXXXXXX, said the baby "looked" burned and wastaken to a hospital in Apartado, Antioquia, after being treated by the 17th Brigade. Hewas concerned that the military took the baby and aunt to a military hospital withoutconsulting the community members and that the baby remained separated from hismother.

3. (C) Both XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX, rejected the ColombianAir Force's explanation that the strike targeted the FARC, although they admitted theFARC has transited the reservation in the past. They also argued that the FARC couldnot have been in the area because the military had entered the zone in December 2009.Moreover, XXXXXXXXXXXX, countered assertions by the Colombian military thatthere was no good reason for the indigenous to be awake so early by stating that thisshowed a lack of understanding of their culture and Embera-Katio people often rise well

before dawn.

4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, confirmed the Indigenous Organization in Antioquia(OIA), which initially denounced the incident, is preparing a formal complaint againstthe military personnel responsible for the operation. He told us the Embera-Katio want

the military to assume the medical costs of the injured indigenous, provide reparationsto the whole community, and leave their indigenous territories.

MILITARY SAYS STRIKE HIT OUTSIDE INDIGENOUS TERRITORY --------------------------------------------- --------

5. (C) General Tito Pinilla, Chief of Air Operations in the Colombian Military, toldEmboffs on February 2 that the air strikes by the Seventh Division occurred 2.5kilometers outside of the indigenous reservation on a suspected FARC camp. He said an indigenous man and woman with no licit reason for being in thecamp had been injured in the raid. Pinilla also explained following the strike, a motherand her sick baby approached the convoy and were transported along with the suspectedFARC members to receive medical assistance, which may have generated someconfusion. However, he stated that neither the baby nor the mother had been injured inthe strike.

INVESTIGATION TO FOLLOW -----------------------

6. (U) On February 9, leading newspaper "El Tiempo" reported that a military judgeis opening an investigation. According to the article, the Commander of the 17thBrigade General Hernan Giraldo said the military "accepts responsibility of theincident," but he added the indigenous family strayed from their territory when theywent out to collect food. He argued it was "bad luck" that the military had received

information that the FARC's 34th Front would be at that site. General Giraldomentioned it was the first time something like this had occurred in the 18 months theyhad been operating in the zone. In an interview with the National Radio of Colombia(RCN) on January 31, President Uribe declared that the Colombian military is "carefulnot to bomb civilian areas infiltrated by illegal armed groups" and cited the "fewnumber of complaints against the military in the past eight years."

GLEANING THE TRUTH ------------------


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7. (S/NF) Other information available at Post suggests that Pinilla's version of eventsis largely correct: a sensitive high-value target operation failed to hit the objective whilehe was at the site. Two indigenous, a male and female, were injured by debris (notshrapnel) resulting from the airstrike. It is not clear whether the injured female is, infact, the mother referred to in para two; we separately confirmed Pinilla's report that amother with a dehydrated infant did approach the military convoy before the incident to

request medical assistance. Post was also able to confirm that the strike was 2.5 kilometers from the village; GOC information suggests thiswas beyond the border of the indigenous reservation. According to other informationavailable at Post, some members of the Embera-Katio community admitted to harboringFARC members just a few days prior to the strike.

8. (S/NF) Comment: The contradictory versions of events make it difficult todetermine what happened. What is apparent is that the GOC has admitted someresponsibility for the mistiming of the bombing. The FARC is increasingly operating inor around indigenous reservations because of the legal and political complications thereservations present for the Colombian armed forces (reftel). The Colombian militaryknew of the sensitivities of mounting an operation so close to the indigenous

reservation, but believed it took the appropriate precautions. Perhaps the investigationby military justice will unravel the story. Either way, the incident will increase tensionsbetween the GOC and the indigenous, who are facing an increase in conflict-relatedviolence (septel). End comment. BROWNFIELD secret/inoforn

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable isnot available.S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BOGOTA 007402

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015TAGS: PRELPGOVMARRMOPSPHUMSNARCOSUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

REF: SECSTATE 134796

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (U) July 26, 2005, 4:00-5:30 pm, Casa de Narino, Bogota

2. (U) Participants:

U.S.---

R. Nicholas Burns, U/S for Political AffairsAmbassador William B. WoodCynthia Echeverria, P Special Assistant


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Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Polcouns (notetaker)Luis Guio, Interpreter

Colombia--------

Alvaro Uribe Velez, PresidentCamilo Ospina, Minister of DefenseActing Foreign Minister Camilo ReyesPresidential Communications Director Jaime BermudezFrancisco Gonzalez, MFA (notetaker)

-------Summary-------

3. (S) During a warm, productive and candid meeting, U/S Burns told PresidentUribe that President Bush would deliver a message of strong, continued support in

Crawford on August 4, in particular regarding GOC counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts. At the same time, noting differing views among some members ofCongress, Burns pressed for more progress on several long-standing human rightscases, including on San Jose de Apartado and Mapiripan, to strengthen the human rightscertification, and urged Uribe to rigorously and energetically implement the new justiceand peace law. He cautioned that, unless addressed, these negative perceptions couldaffect ongoing U.S. support for Colombia. He called on the President to make a public,renewed commitment to expeditiously adjudicate the human rights cases in question,and to do everything under his executive powers to accelerate progress. He also urgedthe GOC to respond to concerns that the justice and peace law impededextraditions. Heencouraged Uribe to visit Washington en route to the UNGA to make his case directlyto the Congress on both issues. Uribe assured U/S Burns that his government remainedcommitted to protecting human rights and that implementation of the new law would beaccelerated and rigorous. He had already urged the Prosecutor General to make a publicstatement on GOC efforts to complete itsinvestigation on San Jose de Apartado. On counter-narcotics efforts, Uribe said he waslooking for new ways to encourage families to abandon growing illicit drugs and engagethem in crop substitution programs. Burns encouraged newly-appointed Minister ofDefense Ospina to also visit Washington soon for discussions at DOD and State. Ospinaquipped that he was Secretary Rumsfeld's deputy in Colombia, "coordinating hisSIPDIS third front of the war on terrorism." Burns thanked Uribe for GOC efforts tosecure the release of the three U.S. hostages. While acknowledging that the French hadlaunched a

new campaign to pressure him to negotiate the release of Colombian-French hostageIngrid Bentancourt, Uribe was emphatic that he would make no deal that did not includethe three Americans. On Venezuela, Uribe was particularly candid. He called Chavez amix of someone with imperial sentiments and drunk with socialism. He said Chavez hasdreams of an hemispheric television station and a unified oil company, and was lookingto create a new coalition to confront the U.S. He urged the U.S. to reach out to those inthe hemisphere Chavez believes are his friends. Uribe, in resignation, lamented that,given Chavez's efforts to create a "new socialism," his total domination over


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Venezuelan institutions, the lack of opposition and checks and balances, and theprospects of hyper-inflation, political unrest was probably inevitable. End Summary.

--------------------------------------------- ---------------IDB and Colombian Ambassador to the U.S. Luis Alberto Moreno--------------------------------------------- ---------------

4. (C) Uribe arrived a few minutes late, explaining that he had just finished atelephone call with the president of Guyana, lobbying for Ambassador Moreno'scandidacy for president of the IDB. The election was the following day and Morenoneeded one more country to secure a win in the first round of voting. Uribe wasconvinced that if voting went into a second round, Brazil and Venezuela would form acoalition on behalf of the Brazilian candidate. U/S Burns said the U.S. was fully behindMoreno and had lobbied extensively as well (reftel). Uribe stressed that he would do aterrific job at the IBD but it would be extremely difficult to find a suitable replacementfor him as ambassador to the U.S. In the middle of the meeting, Uribe took a call fromhis counterpart from Ecuador who pledged to support Moreno. President Palacio toldUribe that Chavez had called him earlier in the day asking Ecuador to support the

Brazilian candidate.

-------------------------U.S. Support for Colombia-------------------------

5. (C) Uribe expressed appreciation for U/S Burn's visit as well as for ongoingsupport from the U.S., including the Congress and theembassy. "With the difficulties weface on a daily basis, U.S. assistance has been critical and I have no words to expressmy gratitude." U/S Burns underscored that the GOC had made tremendous progressfighting drugs and terrorism under Uribe's leadership, and U.S. support would continueas a result. Uribe acknowledged that the numbers of kidnappings, homicides, and drugseradicated or seizedremained high in absolute terms, but the numbers were decreasing in relative terms andthe trend lines were good. That said, while the reduction in coca production was

positive, he wanted to make an even greater effort in 2005 to achieve an even steeperdecline. We are winning the war, he said, but have not won yet and need to stay thecourse. The Ambassador noted that 100,000 hectares of cocaine had been sprayed in2005 so far, putting us 25 percent ahead of last year when total hectares sprayed reached135,000. U/S Burns noted that the Afghans in comparison had destroyed only 216 and ahalf hectares thus far. Our aim is to destroy drugs, said Uribe, and the GOC was alsoready to provide Afghanistan technical assistance and experience.

6. (C) Uribe reviewed GOC strategy for fighting narcotraffickers. This includedusing aerial and manual eradication, extradition, and crop substitution (i.e. alternativedevelopment initiatives). The GOC had the

political will to make adjustments to be even more effective. For instance, this yearGOC officials had accelerated manual eradication to complement aerial efforts. So far,they had eradicated 11,000 hectares with prospects to achieve 30,000 hectares by theend of the year.


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7. (C) Uribe said he wanted to reward communities who assisted military and policeforces discover illicit drug storage facilities hidden in the jungle. He was also looking atways to encourage families to abandon growing illicit drugs and engage them in a

program of crop substitution. (Note: Uribe reportedly made ad hoc comments during atown hall discussion last weekend in the department of Meta thatthe GOC would buy illegal crops of coca directly from farmers in exchange for a

promise from them to never grow coca again. This has met with criticism from theColombian Congress and presidential candidates. GOC officials subsequently clarifiedUribe's remarks by saying the GOC would pay for information from farmers about the

production and storage of cocaine.) Uribe understood the idea was controversial butbelieved it could provide results. The Ambassador responded that a reward forinformation that helped locate and seizedrugs was a solid proposal but purchasing drugs from growerswas another matter. The UN was already prepared to publicly criticize the idea. He toldUribe the USG would think about innovative ways to encourage small farmers toabandon growing illicit drugs and come back with some proposals. Perhaps a crediblenon-governmental organization could help. U/S Burns said he would also alert thePresident and Secretary that this was on Uribe's mind.

--------------------------------------------- ----------August 4 Meeting at Crawford/Split View from Washington--------------------------------------------- ----------

8. (C) U/S Burns said the President was looking forward to the meeting in Crawfordand he had come to Colombia, in part, to discuss how to ensure a positive result. Uribewould hear a message of strong, continued support from President Bush, in particularregarding GOC counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism efforts. Uribe repeated that hewanted even better results.9. (C) Burns noted that the view was different from some on Capitol Hill and in thehuman rights community. Concern over the lack of progress on several prominent,longstanding human rights cases, coupled with a perception that the new Law on Justiceand Peace governing AUC demobilizations was too lenient, was raising questions aboutGOC commitment to improving human rights in the country. Burns cautioned that thesenegative perceptions in the Congress could affect ongoing U.S. support for thesuccessor to Plan Colombia. He suggested Uribe arrive in Crawford with a sense of hisstrategy over the next five to six years for Plan Colombia follow on. Beyond theconcerns on human rights and the law, the budget for foreign assistance would be leanerin coming years. Multi-year commitments would not be possible. Thecase for ongoing support at similar levels would have to be made annually.

--------------------------------------

Concern about Progress on Human Rights--------------------------------------

10. (C) Burns reiterated the concern of some that the GOC was not acting quicklyand concretely enough in adjudicating outstanding human rights cases, in particularregarding Mapiripan, now seven years old, Arauca, and the February massacre in SanJose de Apartado. He recommended Uribe authorize a public statement that the GOCwould make a renewed effort to act quickly in successfully bringing these cases toconclusion. While recognizing that several were being adjudicated in the courts, Burns


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also urged Uribe do everything under his executive powers and discretion to accelerateprogress. The Secretary still had to certify to Congress on the human rights situation andhad already delayed it in the hopes further progress could be reported. Without acredible certification, there was a danger thatsome members of Congress would attach additional restrictionsto future aid to Colombia. The Department needed "to see in your statements and

actions a renewed determination and commitment to address these cases," he said.

11. (C) Uribe said he understood the situation. He was confident the new Fiscal(Prosecutor General) would do everything he could to accelerate the ongoinginvestigations. He had already asked the outgoing Fiscal to make a public statement inthe next few days on the status of the GOC investigation on San Jose de Apartado. Healso defended his Administration's record, noting that the number of such incidents had

been dramatically reduced under his presidency and that the GOC response had beenthoroughly transparent. He again committed to call the Prosecutor General to ensure astatement on San Jose de Apartado was released before Crawford.

-------------------------

Law for Justice and Peace-------------------------

12. (C) Uribe told the U/S that he had met with Spanish judge Balthazar Garzon andother leaders for three hours during his recent visit in Spain to discuss the law. Garzonhad said the law was too lenient because there was no balance between the gravity ofthe crime and the length of the sentence. Uribe agreed but told Garzon it was the priceof a peace process. It had to be compared to previous demobilizationlaws in Colombia which had no justice component, and laws dealing with other peace

processes around the world. For the first time, the GOC secured approval of a law forpeace with justice, he insisted. There was no pardon for atrocities; the concept of justiceand reparations was on the books in Colombia for the first time. Uribe also insisted thatthe law would apply to all illegal armed groups who wanted to demobilize. He stressedthat many complained the law was tootough for the guerrillas and too weak for the paramilitaries. The guerrillas continued toinsist they would accept only amnesty and no jail time. In his view, the law struck a

balance equally applicable to all illegal armed groups. At the same time, heacknowledged that compromises had to be made. The investigatory scheme set out inthe law was satisfactory to get to the truth, but in a country which usedto average over 30,000 assassinations a year, to investigateeverything was an unrealistic dream.13. (C) U/S Burns said he had met with human rights NGOs earlier in the day. Manywere critical of the law and believed it endorsed impunity. He had responded that the

U.S. supported the law, and was convinced it would be effective with rigorous andenergetic implementation. The GOC had to ensure the law was aggressively applied.Uribe agreed and per U.S. suggestions, would demand that the law's implementation beaccelerated and rigorous. He had alreadycommunicated this to Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo. Ambassador alsosuggested that, as the GOC defines the process, it make its decisions public. The GOChad to be pro-active in explaining how it intended to implement the law. Critics werefilling the void while the GOC remained silent. For example, a local NGO told U/S


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Burns there would be no meaningful investigation under the law. You can answer this,said the Ambassador. U/S Burns also encouraged Uribeto come to Washington on his way to the UNGA in mid-Septemberto make his case to the Congress. Uribe agreed.

14. (C) U/S Burns said the impact on extraditions was another concern on the law. It

would be useful for the GOC to respond to NGO assertions that law impededextraditions. Uribe insisted that it did not/not impede extraditions and the GOC wouldcontinue extraditing criminals to the U.S. He acknowledged, however, that there would

be some instances when he would delay extraditions, in particular forparamilitary "ringleaders," as a lever for their future behavior. U/S Burns insisted thatthe U.S. wanted to see anyone who violated U.S. law or harmed U.S. citizens remainsubject to extradition.

-----------------------MOD Visit to Washington-----------------------

15. (C) U/S Burns said the U.S. was ready to discuss enhanced mil-to-mil relationswhen GOC officials were ready. He encouraged newly-appointed Minister of DefenseCamilo Ospina to visit Washington soon for discussions at DoD and State. Ospinareadily agreed and Burns said he would take back Ospina's interest to SecretaryRumsfeld. (Note: In a subsequent conversation with the Ambassador, Ospina saidColombia wants the deepest possible defense relationship, butthat there continued to be a dispute within the government asto timing. In general, the GOC is of the view that nothingimportant should happen before the Constitutional Court onre-election, mid- to late-September. President Uribe andOspina expect to have their thinking sorted out before themeeting with President Bush in Crawford.)

---------------------------------U.S. Hostages/Humanitarian Accord---------------------------------

16. (C) U/S Burns thanked President Uribe for ongoing GOC efforts to secure therelease of the three U.S. hostages held by the FARC for over two years. Anything morethe GOC could do would be greatly appreciated. Burns said the U.S. would continue torely on the GOC's guidance and wisdom and was prepared to help in any way. Uriberesponded that the GOC continued to work closely with the Embassy. If there were anymilitary operation the U.S. believed should be undertaken to secure the hostages'

release, his forces would "stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S." in carrying it out.17. (C) Uribe said he was scheduled to meet the mother of Colombian-Frenchhostage Ingrid Betancourt later in the day. French Prime Minister Dominique DeVillepan was pushing him hard to negotiate Betancourt's release as part of ahumanitarian exchange. He stated emphatically that he would not go forward with anydeal that did not include the three Americans. Uribe stressed that he would refuse anyexchange that included GOC-held FARC members guilty of crimes under theColombian Constitution. He would also insist that FARC


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prisoners released as part of an humanitarian exchange be immediately deported toFrance with GOF guarantees that theydid not return to Colombia and re-join FARC ranks. Uribe promised to keepAmbassador Wood apprised of all details on any negotiations that could affect the U.S.hostages. He also predicted that the FARC would be more inclined to negotiateseriously now for such an exchange if the

Constitutional Court approved presidential re-election. However, the FARC would waituntil a new government was in place if re-election was shot down by the court.

---------Venezuela---------18. (C) U/S Burns told Uribe that the Secretary appreciatedhearing his views on how to handle Chavez during her Aprilvisit. She was determined not to make Chavez into something

bigger by responding to every jab. President Bush was alsofocused on Venezuela and looked forward to a discussion atCrawford. The U.S. had no ministerial contact with the GOV

at this point and welcomed Uribe's insights.

19. (S) Uribe noted that Chavez had been quieter in the last two months and had, forexample, agreed to extradite FARC leader Chiguiro to Colombia without a formal GOCrequest. Nonetheless, he did not trust Chavez. He never talked to him alone; he always

brought along Foreign Minister Barco or some other witness. On GOV links to theFARC, Uribe said Chavez has told him that he does not protect the guerrillas but couldnot deny that some in his political organization supported them. Uribe complained thatChavez had little opposition now. There was no balance of power within thegovernment. All decisions were ultimately made by him. Uribe stressed that Chavez hadan effective stump speech: he claims to be distributing the country's oil wealth throughsubsidies to the populace while previous governments stole it. This was a powerfulmessage and hard to contradict. Uribe also expressed surprise that the Venezuelan

business community was not more jittery, given Chavez's efforts to create a "newsocialism." The Venezuelan economy could also move into hyper-inflation, he

predicted. Already, inflation had increased to 17-20%, compared to 5% in Colombia.

20. (S) According to Uribe, Chavez was a mix of someone withimperial sentiments, drunk with socialism. He believed that Chavez, with presumedsupport from President Lula, hoped to create a new coalition to confront the U.S. He hasmay dreams, said Uribe, including a hemispheric television station (Telesur) and theunification of oil companies on the continent into a regional "petrosur." He encouragedthe U.S. to improve relations with Uruguay and others in the region Chavez believed

were his supporters.21. (S) Finally, Uribe said he was becoming more and more resigned to the notionthat, given the current situation in Venezuela, political unrest was inevitable.DRUCKER secret


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VZCZCXYZ0002PP RUEHWEB

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018TAGS: PGOVPINRCOSUBJECT: ARMED FORCES COMMANDER PADILLA ON FARC, HOSTAGES,PALANQUERO, REGIONAL RELATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield.Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------SUMMARY-------

1. (S) Colombian Armed Forces Commander Padilla stressed tothe Ambassador on April 4 that the GOC would do all it couldto support the French humanitarian operation seeking IngridBetancourt's release, though he doubted its prospects forsuccess. Padilla said GOC continued its efforts to locateall of the hostages, including the three Americans. He alsoasked for continued USG assistance and intelligence sharing


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on U.S. hostages, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Padilla reiteratedPresident Uribe's request for an agreement on a CooperativeSecurity Location (CSL) in Palanquero this year. The ArmedForces Commander said he remains committed to removingmilitary personnel believed to be involved in criminalactivity or human rights violations. END SUMMARY,

-----------------------------FRENCH HUMANITARIAN OPERATION-----------------------------

2. (C) General Padilla told the Ambassador on April 4 thatearlier that day he had met with the French, Spanish andSwiss ambassadors to discuss the French humanitarianinitiative on Ingrid Betancourt. (Note: The FrenchGovernment dispatched an air ambulance to Colombia earlierthat week to provide emergency medical attention toBetancourt. It remained parked at Bogota's air base since

arrival.) Padilla saw almost no chance that the French wouldgain access to Betancourt, but said that the GOC was doingeverything it could to assist the GOF to ensure it could not

be blamed for the operation's failure. The GOC agreed to letthe GOF base planes in Colombia, fly wherever they wanted,suspend military operations in areas to which the GOF wantedto travel, and to assist in any other way necessary tofacilitate a Betancourt release by the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (FARC). He said the GOC would oppose theuse of Venezuelan helicopters or involvement of VenezuelanPresident Chavez in the operation, and would offer the Frenchthe use of GOC helicopters if needed. Padilla said "the bestthing about this operation to date is that the FARC is theone being blamed for intransigence."

-----------------------U.S. HOSTAGE OPERATIONS-----------------------

3. (S) Padilla underscored to the Ambassador that the GOCcontinues to work toward the freedom of all of the FARC heldhostages. The Colombian military is still working to locatethe U.S. hostages with special operations forces deployed in

the south. If located the COLMIL stands ready to assist innegotiating the release or cooperating on the rescue of thethree U.S. hostages held by the FARC in close coordinationwith the USG. The Ambassador assured Padilla that the USGwill give the highest priority possible to providingintelligence assets for ongoing efforts to locate thehostages. Padilla agreed a USG-GOC "lessons learned"exercise on hostage issues would be useful and could be doneat the end of April at the SOUTHCOM-Defense Minister level.


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--------------------------------ESTABLISHING A CSL IN PALANQUERO--------------------------------

4. (C) Padilla reminded the Ambassador that on April 1

President Uribe had stressed his desire to conclude anagreement for a CSL at Palanquero in 2008. Padilla said theGOC understood that announcing a CSL at Palanquero would

provoke a reaction from the Venezuelans and Ecuadorians. TheGOC would never say so publicly, but that was what the GOCwas looking for. Padilla said Uribe's support meant the GOCwould rapidly respond to a USG request on Palanquero. TheGOC did not expect Palanquero to be operational in 2008, butwanted an agreement concluded. Padilla told the Ambassador

he would call the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff aswell as the U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander on the issue.

---------------------VENEZUELA AND ECUADOR---------------------

5. (C) Padilla said that from a military perspective, he wassatisfied with the way the recent border dust up withVenezuela and Ecuador played out. The Colombian military sawthat the Venezuelan Armed Forces were considerably weakerthan they had believed. In contrast, the Ecuadorian militaryshowed it was a much more professional, if smaller, forcethan its Venezuelan counterparts. Padilla acknowledged thatthe Colombian military needed to reestablish its bilateralrelations with the Ecuadorians, but said this would taketime. He again asked for continued intelligence exchange onVenezuela, and also sought any additional intelligence theUSG could provide on Ecuador. The Ambassador committed tolooking into the matter, but reminded Padilla both countries

benefited by keeping the intelligence relationship quiet.Padilla agreed.

--------------------------------------------- -------HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORRUPTION PROBLEMS IN THE MILITARY

--------------------------------------------- -------6. (C) Padilla said he remains committed to removing military

personnel believed to be involved in improper criminalactivity or human rights violations, even if there isinsufficient evidence to bring legal action against them. Heasked if the USG could help the GOC identify suchindividuals. The Ambassador said we shared Padilla'sconcern, but did not want to substitute ourselves for the


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Colombian legal process or to undercut Colombianinstitutions' capacity-- and responsibility--to policethemselves. He promised to get back to Padilla on the humanrights issue.BROWNFIELD secret

VZCZCXYZ0003OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #2024/01 1551921ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 031921Z JUN 08 ZDKFM AMEMBASSY BOGOTATO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3044INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0498RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN 9467RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 6233RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 1810RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 6903RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4446RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITYRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002024

SIPDIS

FOR WHA/AND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2018TAGS: COPTERPGOVPRELSNARSUBJECT: MARULANDA'S DEATH SPARKS SPECULATION ON FARC'SFUTURE

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer

Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------Summary-------

1. (C) Most GOC officials and outside analysts believe thedeath of FARC founder Pedro Marin (Manuel Marulanda) willhave little impact on the FARC's approach to a humanitarian


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hostage exchange or broader peace talks with the GOC. PeaceCommissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo called new FARC leaderGuillermo Saenz (Alfonso Cano) a "Leninist ideologue" whowill need to consolidate his leadership position. PoloDemocratico official Daniel Garcia Pena agreed Cano iscommitted to "all forms of struggle," and predicted he will

try to strengthen ties with Venezuela. Restrepo and otherobservers speculated that Marulanda's death will acceleratedesertions and fragmentation within the FARC, creatingopportunities for the GOC to pursue deals with individualcommanders. End Summary

--------------------------------------------- ---Marulanda's Death: Improved Prospects for Peace?--------------------------------------------- ---

2. (U) The death of FARC founder and long-time leader PedroMarin (Manuel Marulanda) has triggered speculation about what

this means for the FARC's approach to a humanitarian hostageexchange, prospects for broader GOC-FARC peace talks, and theFARC's military strategy. In the immediate aftermath ofMarulanda's death, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchnersaid Marulanda's death "raises great hope" and urged new FARCleader Alfonso Cano to release the FARC's civilian hostages.Similarly, Yolanda Pulecio, mother of FARC hostage and former

presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, called Cano a"cultured and progressive man" and said any FARC move torelease the hostages would be well-received by theinternational community.

--------------------Or More of the Same?--------------------

3. (C) Still, in its May 27 communique acknowledgingMarulanda's death--and the appointment of Guillero Saenz(Alfonso Cano) as his successor--the FARC ratified its

proposal conditioning humanitarian exchange talks on theGOC's demilitarization of Florida and Pradera municipalities.GOC Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told us May 30that Marulanda's death will not lead to any progress on a

humanitarian accord or peace process in the near future.Cano is a "Leninist ideologue" who founded the ColombianClandestine Communist Party and the Bolivarian Movement. Inthe short-term, he will need to consolidate his position andwill not be able to show any sign of weakness. In fact,Restrepo said Cano may push for heightened military action toshow he is in charge.

4. (C) Restrepo downplayed the notion of a rivalry between


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Cano and FARC military leader Jorge Briceno (Mono Jojoy),noting that Cano's political hard-line complements Jojoy'smilitary toughness. It would have been more difficult forCano to assert control if Raul Reyes, who saw himself as theFARC's political leader, were still alive. Restrepodismissed the other Secretariat members as lacking stature,

saying the Secretariat is effectively a Cano-Jojoyorganization. New Secretariat member Jorge Torres (PabloCatatumbo) functions as Cano's secretary; Milton Toncel(Joaquin Gomez) will follow Jojoy's line; Rodrigo Londono(Timochenko) is an "errand boy" who does not command anytroops and lives in Venezuela; and Luciano Marin (IvanMarquez) also spends most of his time in Venezuela.

5. (C) Former Peace Commissioner for Presidents Barco andGaviria Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo told us the FARC identifiedCano as Marulanda's eventual successor near the end of theCaguan process. He agreed with Restrepo's assessment that

the FARC would not change its strategy in the short-term,noting that "the Secretariat functions as a collegialdecision-making body." Marulanda's death signals a

generational shift in the FARC leadership, with power passingfrom the peasant founders to more urban, Communist Partyeducated leaders who were active in protest movements in the1970s, but the group's commitment to armed confrontation isunlikely to change.

6. (C) Polo Secretary General and former President Samperpeace advisor Daniel Garcia Pena also predicted Marulanda'sdeath will mean little to the FARC's day-to-day management ofthe war. Marulanda was a FARC icon and unifying figure, butthe transition to Cano--who was Marulanda's choice--wasrelatively smooth. The murder of Secretariat member ManuelMunoz (Ivan Rios) by his own men and the desertion of NellyAvila (Karina) were bigger blows to the group because of whatthey say about FARC morale. Garcia Pena views Cano as anintransigent ideologue who is less pragmatic than Jojoy andis committed to "all forms of struggle." He added that theFARC has yet to name a replacement for Raul Reyes as head ofthe FARC's International Relations Department, making any

change in position on a humanitarian accord more difficult.Restrepo noted that the disruption of the FARC'sinternational network after Reyes' death will also complicateany FARC shifts on an exchange.

----------------FARC-Chavez Ties----------------


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7. (C) Garcia Pena expects Cano to try to strengthen theFARC's political ties with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez,since Chavez provided the group important "political oxygen"

before the Colombian military attack on the Reyes camp inEcuador. Chavez will need to be careful about supporting theFARC given the Reyes computer files, but Chavez and important

sectors of his movement continue to see the FARC as apotential military ally in the event of a U.S. invasion.Hence, Chavez will continue to look for ways to help the FARCand, to a lesser extent, the ELN. Restrepo also believesChavez will continue to help the group, but said Marulanda'shistorical role held a special attraction for Chavez. Withhis passing, Chavez would no longer have an interlocutor ofequal stature within the FARC.

--------------------------------------------- ---------Prospects for Increased FARC Desertions, Fragmentation--------------------------------------------- ---------

8. (C) Prior to Marulanda's death, local ICRC delegateBarbara Hintermann said the increasing Colombian military

pressure on the FARC was disrupting Secretariatcommand-and-control over FARC fronts, giving greater autonomyto individual FARC commanders and leading to more desertions.She speculated that the death of FARC Secretariat membersRaul Reyes and Ivan Rios would accelerate FARC desertions,including some senior FARC officials. Presidential advisorJose Obdulio Gaviria told us Marulanda's demise completes theSecretariat's disintegration. The Secretariat's memberscannot communicate or take decisions. Only Cano and Jojoygive it a sense of national structure and international

projection. He said the GOC needs to try to negotiate apartial peace deal with Jojoy--who he considers morereasonable than Cano--or to seek deals with individual frontcommanders.

9. (C) Restrepo told us that on May 22, he spoke with FARCcommander Jose Cabrera (Fabian Ramirez) who questionedRestrepo about the legal benefits he might receive if he wereto turn himself in with Ingrid Betancourt. Ramirez said hedid not have physical control of Ingrid, but implied he might

be able to negotiate her release as well. Restrepo notedthat Ramirez' profile--substantial narcotics wealth managedby his family, unhappiness with his superiors, and concernabout the FARC's future--applies to other FARC commanderssuch as 1st Front commander Gerardo Aguilar (Cesar). He

promised to keep us posted as the Ramirez situation evolves.

--------------------------------------------- -------The ELN Path: Internal Division and Military Decline


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--------------------------------------------- -------

10. Former Foreign Minister and current Cambio editor

Rodrigo Pardo speculated that Marulanda's passing opens theprospect that the FARC will end up like the ELN after the

death of "Father Manuel Perez" in 1998. Without itslong-time leader, the ELN has entered a steady process ofdecline, characterized by internal divisions, diminishingmilitary capacity, and erratic participation in peace

processes with the GOC.

BROWNFIELD confidential

VZCZCXRO8638PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMCRUEHMT RUEHNGRUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVCDE RUEHBO #2578/01 1982038ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 162038Z JUL 08FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTATO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3641

INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITYRUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1473RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0331RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1340RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 002578

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2018TAGS: PGOVPRELPREFPTERPHUMCOSUBJECT: GOC REACHES OUT TO FARC, BUT WILL CONTINUEMILITARY PRESSURE ON GROUP

REF: BOGOTA 2506


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Classified By: Political Counselor John CreamerReasons 1.4 (b and d)

SUMMARY-------1. (C) Peace Commissioner Restrepo told us the GOC has

reached out to establish direct contact with the FARC, butdoes not feel any pressure to move quickly on a peaceprocess. The GOC believes Cano is isolated from otherSecretariat members, and will continue military efforts tokill or capture him. Restrepo said the GOC must force Canoto understand that negotiations offer the only way out forthe FARC (and for him); the GOC is prepared to provide Canoand other FARC leaders a "dignified" exit. Despite rulingout further international facilitation, Restrepo said the GOCcould consider an international accompaniment or verificationrole once a serious process begins. The GOC remains willingto talk with the ELN, but sees little prospect as long as ELN

leaders reside in Venezuela. End summary.

FARC REJECTS GOC TALKS--SUGGESTS NICARAGUA------------------------------------------2. (U) The FARC Secretariat issued a letter June 26 thatstated the group would not directly negotiate with the GOC,and instead wanted a meeting with Nicaraguan President DanielOrtega to discuss "issues of war and peace." The letter,addressed to Ortega, thanked "Commandante Daniel" for his"support through these difficult moments" and for providingasylum to two FARC fighters brought to Nicaragua after theMarch 1 attack against FARC number two Raul Reyes in Ecuador.In a July 5 communique, the Secretariat admitted that theGOC's July 2 rescue of 15 hostages was a "reversal," butinsisted the group would continue its fight. The Secretariatreiterated its interest in a humanitarian exchange of"political" hostages for FARC members captured by the GOC,

but did not mention its long-standing demand that talks onsuch an exchange be conditioned on the GOC's demilitarizationof Pradera and Florida municipalities.

GOC REMAINS READY TO TALK-------------------------

3. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told us July11 that the GOC remains committed to pursuing direct talkswith the FARC and has reached out to FARC leader Alfonso Cano(reftel). If the FARC responds positively to the GOCoverture, the GOC will send an emissary to lay the groundworkfor an eventual FARC-Restrepo meeting. The GOC would notinsist on a FARC release of hostages as condition for talks,

because the GOC knows the FARC would not accept this. Still,Restrepo said the GOC does not feel any need to move quickly


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on talks with the group. Instead, it will try to establishcontact and allow Cano to analyze his deterioratingsituation. Restrepo stressed that the GOC will continuemilitary operations to kill or capture Cano. The GOC needsto force Cano to understand that talks are the FARC's (andhis) only way out.

INTERNAL FARC PROBLEMS AS OBSTACLE----------------------------------4. (C) Restrepo said Cano remains isolated, and has littlesupport from, or contact with, other members of theSecretariat. The isolation creates opportunities that theGOC may be able to exploit, especially if military pressurecan further break FARC command and control systems. The GOCis prepared to offer Cano and other FARC leaders a"dignified" way out of the armed struggle, but does not wantto fall into the trap of allowing the FARC to use peace talksto rebuild its military capacity. Restrepo said a major

obstacle to a successful peace process is Cano's continuedcommitment to a "Leninist" approach to politics.

GOC: POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLES FOR INTERMEDIARIES--------------------------------------------- -5. (C) The GOC does not need or want international ordomestic facilitators with the FARC, but has not ruled out afuture international "accompaniment" or verification role ifthe FARC begins to negotiate in good faith. Restrepo saidthat Operation "Checkmate" freed the GOC from French and U.S.

pressure to advance on an humanitarian accord. He added thatAlvaro Leyva, Carlos Lozano, Frenchman Noel Saenz, and Swiss

BOGOTA 00002578 002 OF 002

Jean Pierre Gontard had not been reliable facilitators.

6. (C) Restrepo said the French accepted the GOC 'srevocation of their facilitation role with more grace thanthe Swiss, who insisted on continued engagement. On June 15,Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran announced an investigationagainst Gontard for allegedly carrying $500,000 in cash for

the FARC. The Swiss Foreign Ministry issued a press releaseon July 14 denying the charges and calling on the GOC to"cease its attacks" against Gontard.

GOC: ELN INCAPABLE OF TAKING DECISION ON PEACE--------------------------------------------- --7. (C) Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo told us asuccessful peace process with the ELN remains impossible,

because ELN leaders lack the capacity to take decisions and


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do not control the group's armed fronts. The ELN remainsweak militarily, but some fronts in Arauca, Cauca, and Narinohave strengthened due to their heavy involvement innarcotrafficking. Jaramillo said the ELN is better than theFARC at political organizing, but added that its leaders donot have a vision of what role they might play in a

democratic Colombia.

8. (C) Restrepo said key ELN leaders view Colombianrealities through a Venezuelan lens and therefore feel little

pressure to move on peace. Moreover, they will not enterinto a peace process that is not linked to the FARC.Restrepo said ELN fronts cooperate with the FARC onnarcotrafficking in some areas, and maintain a political

profile in Arauca, Catatumbo, Narino, and southern Choco dueto narcotrafficking. ELN leaders continue to pursue theirold strategy of seeking contact with civil society and theinternational community instead of with the GOC. Still,

Restrepo said the GOC would meet with the ELN if anopportunity presented itself--a scenario which would likelyonly occur if ELN leaders were forced to leave Venezuela.

BROWNFIELD confidential


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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019TAGS: PGOVPRELPREFPHUMMOPSMCAPKJUSCOSUBJECT: MILITARY'S HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES MEET RESISTANCE

REF: A. 2008 BOGOTA 4165

B. BOGOTA 0401


SUMMARY--------1. (C) The Defense Ministry (MOD) continues to step upinvestigations into reports of murders committed by Army

personnel, and has fired fifty-one officers and enlisted menimplicated in the incidents--including 27 dismissed as aresult of the Soacha murders. The MOD is also working to fix

breakdowns in intelligence, operational planning andlogistics that contribute to human rights abuses, as well asto implement clearer rules of engagement. Still, some seniormilitary officials continue to resist the MOD's efforts,arguing that human rights concerns are overstated and thatthe new policies are harming the war effort. Army CommanderGeneral Oscar Gonzalez has impeded investigations of abuses

by limiting the mandate of the Army Inspector General. WithDefense Minister Juan Manuel Santos likely to depart soon tolaunch his presidential campaign, senior military andcivilian officials say it is key that President Uribe appointa Minister equally committed to human rights if the current

progress is to be maintained. End Summary

MOD IMPLEMENTS CORRECTIVE MEASURES----------------------------------2. (C) Since October 2008, the MOD has dismissed fifty-oneofficers and enlisted men implicated in extrajudicialkillings: 27 Army personnel were fired in October 2008 forthe Soacha killings; 13 more were dismissed in November 2008for murders in Cordoba; and 11 others were dismissed from LaPopa Battalion in January 2009 for killings in Cesar. Inaddition to the investigations, the MOD is implementing the

15-point plan announced by MOD Santos in November 2008 toimprove the military's human rights record and deter abuses(see reftel A). The MOD is developing clearer rules ofmilitary engagement and is designating those criminal bandsthat are legitimate military targets and those that should besubject to law enforcement action. The GOC also modified aninternal directive regulating rewards payments to informantsto avoid situations such as the "Rojas" case where the GOC

paid for FARC Secretariat member Ivan Rios' hand (and later


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his corpse).

IG'S MANDATE LIMITED--------------------3. (C) Army Inspector General (IG) Major General CarlosSuarez, who was made IG by MOD Santos with the specific

mandate to investigate extrajudicial killings, told us onFebruary 13 that he and two trusted members of his team arethe only personnel who investigate alleged murders committedkillings by Army personnel. The investigations follow themodel used by Suarez in investigating the Soacha murders, andexamine the operational, intelligence, logistical andadministrative components of supposed military operations.Suarez clarified that his role is not criminal ordisciplinary, but rather administrative. He cannot dismissany personnel on his own, and can only make recommendationsto the Army Commander, Armed Forces Commander, or the MOD.For example, he recommended that 28 Army officers and other

personnel be dismissed from the Popa Battalion due to theiralleged roles in killings in Cesar, but Army Commander OscarGonzalez approved the removal of only 11 officers.

PROBLEM WIDESPREAD AND BAD TACTICS----------------------------------4. (C) Suarez said the extrajudicial execution problem waswidespread. He stated that the Soacha phenomenon originatedin the 4th Brigade in Medellin (commanded at one time by bothformer Army Commander Mario Montoya and current ArmyCommander Oscar Gonzalez). The practice later spread toother brigades and commands in the region, including theJoint Caribbean Command. Suarez said the insistence by somemilitary commanders on body counts as a measure of successdespite MOD directives to the contrary--coupled with somecommanders' ties to criminals and narcotraffickers--led tothe specific pattern of murders committed in the Soacha andother cases. He noted that the body count system--and theresulting murders--not only undermined the Army's legitimacy,

but also created a false illusion of success. As a result,the "false positives" diverted resources and attention awayfrom the main fight against the FARC.

SENIOR LEVEL RESISTANCE TO CHANGE---------------------------------5. (C) Suarez said he continues to enjoy the support of MODSantos, Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo, and ArmedForces Commander Freddy Padilla. Still, he faces resistancefrom some active duty officers supported by a group ofretired generals and right-wing politicians. Suarez notedthat he was imposed on Army Commander Gonzalez by Padilla,and that Gonzalez opposes his work. He acknowledged that


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Gonzalez tried to intimidate witnesses not to testify aboutmurders committed by the 11th Brigade in Sucre, and saidGonzalez tries to limit his office's resources.XXXXXXXXXXXX echoed Suarez's comments,noting that Gonzalez has transferred personnel from Suarez'soffice, reduced his bodyguard contingent, and tried to

restrict the IG's mandate. Suarez added that his family hasreceived indirect threats due to his work. His staff issearching for an email allegedly circulating within themilitary which shows photos of the members of the MODCommission that investigated the Soacha murders with X'sdrawn through them.

6. (C) Beyond the military, Suarez said retired generals suchas Montoya and former 17th Brigade Commander Rito Alejo delRio are working with right-wing politicians like formerMinister Fernando Londono to undercut Santos' human rightsinitiatives. He cited a February 12 "El Tiempo" Op-ed in

which Londono complained that the dismissals over theso-called "false positives" had emasculated the military,leaving officers too scared to conduct operations andreturning the tactical initiative to the FARC. Jaramillotold us that some officers are mounting a campaign involvinglegal action, intimidation, and slander to harass thoseofficers and civilians committed to cleaning up the Army.Jaramillo noted that former Colonel Mejia--who faces criminalcharges for his role in the La Popa murders--has filedcomplaints with the Inspector General's Office (Procuraduria)against him and Prosecutor General Human Rights Officedirector Sandra Castro for allegedly forcing witnesses totestify against him.

BATTLE OVER URIBE'S EAR-----------------------7. (C) Suarez observed that President Uribe continues to viewmilitary success in terms of kills, leaving him susceptibleto the arguments of some military officers and politiciansthat the MOD's emphasis on human rights is overstated and isharming the war effort against the FARC. Jaramillo confirmedthat the group's arguments are gaining some traction withUribe. Suarez said the President needs to understand that

the previous enemy combat death reports included manynon-FARC, creating a misleading view of progress andpromoting both bad tactics and officers.

8. (C) Suarez and Jaramillo discounted charges that theSoacha investigations and other MOD human rights initiativesare discouraging military operations against the FARC, notingthat the Army units which have achieved the greatest resultsagainst the terrorist group were not involved in the murders.


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Suarez said Army Operations Chief Major General CarlosSaavedra agrees that the human rights impact on operationshas been minimal (Embassy's own analysis supports Suarez andSaavedra's conclusions. See reftel B). Still, Suarez andJaramillo said that with MOD Santos likely to depart soon tolaunch his presidential campaign, President Uribe's choice of

the next MOD will be key. If the next MOD does not shareSantos' strong human rights commitment, the progress achievedto date could be reversed.BROWNFIELD confidential


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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019

TAGS: PHUMPRELPGOVMARRMASSMCAPMOPSPTERCOSUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD PRESSES COLOMBIAN ARMYCOMMANDER ON HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: A. BOGOTA 01352B. BOGOTA 00613

Classified By: Ambassador William R. BrownfieldReasons 1.4 (b and d)


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SUMMARY-------

1. (C) The Ambassador met Colombian Army Commander OscarGonzalez on May 8 to voice concern over extrajudicial killings and other human rights

abuses. Gonzalez said the Army's Human Rights Directorate is facilitating theProsecutor General Office's (Fiscalia) investigations of human rights cases and isworking to improve human rights training. He noted that the Army also meets regularlywiththe ICRC and UNHCHR to discuss human rights cases. Gonzalezsaid reports of extrajudicial killings have fallen sharply since last October, but concededthat the Soacha killings did "incalculable damage" to the Army's image. TheAmbassador reiterated our interest in working with the Army to eliminate human rightsviolations by introducing more effective rules of engagement and strengthening theinvestigatory role of the Army Inspector General. End Summary.

2. (C) On May 8, Ambassador Brownfield met with Colombian Army Commander

General Oscar Gonzalez. The Ambassador voicedconcern over extrajudicial killings and reiterated our interest in working with the Armyto eliminate human rights abuses. Gonzalez said the Army is committed tostrengthening respect for human rights. The Army's Human Rights Directorate isfocused on receiving human rights complaints and directing them to the appropriateoffices, tracking andverifying human rights cases, managing human rights training for officers and rank-and-file soldiers, and facilitating cooperation with the Fiscalia in investigations. Gonzalezsaid the Directorate is not involved in the legal defense of military personnel accused ofhuman rights violations, leaving this task to a non-governmental organization funded

by voluntary contributions from military officers and headed by a retired officer. TheAmbassador agreed that the legal defense of military personnel is an important issue,

but said it should not be handled by the Directorate.

3. (C) Gonzalez said the Army tries to maintain transparency on human rights issues,citing the International Committee of the Red Cross's regular meetings with militaryfield commanders and its semi-annual human rights reports to the Defense Ministry andservice commanders. He noted that the UN Office of the High Commissioner on HumanRights (UNHCHR) also regularly visits divisional commanders to review reports ofextrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses. Gonzalez said the Army isextending operational legal advisors to the battalion level and is encouraging theseadvisors to meet with their Fiscalia counterparts to familiarize them with military

planning and operations. The Army is also assigning liaison officers to both the Fiscalia

and the Inspector General's office (Procuraduria).4. (C) Gonzalez acknowledged that the Soacha killings last September did"incalculable damage" to the Army's image. Still, President Uribe's dismissal of 27officers and non-commissioned personnel last October has led to a sharp drop in reportsof extrajudicial killings, with the Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP)reporting only one case since then (see reftel A). Gonzalez added that he had

just dismissed a battalion commander in Covenas, Sucre, for failure to exercise propercontrols in an extrajudicial killing case. He noted that the Fiscalia had just ordered the


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detention of seven soldiers in the killing of the husband of indigenous activist AidaQuilcue last December (see reftel B).

5. (C) The Ambassador underscored our interest in promoting more effective rules ofengagement and in strengthening the Army Inspector General's investigative capacity.Both measures would help eliminate human rights abuses. Gonzalez agreed these steps

would be useful in improving the Army's human rights record, and said he wouldwelcome other suggestions in this regard. Gonzalez actively participatedin a May 11 meeting chaired by Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo and ArmedForces Commander General Freddy Padilla to discuss new rules of engagement anddevelop an effective training program. The meeting adopted the two rules ofengagement (ROE) concept--a more permissive set (red card) which allows for use oflethal force as a first option, and a more restrictive set (blue card) which allows for useof lethal force only in self-defense or as a last resort.The group called for the ROEs to be finalized by the end of May. Brownfield

confidential


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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019TAGS: PTERPRELPGOVPHUMMOPSCOSUBJECT: POLITICIAN WITH FARC CONTACTS REACHES OUT TO


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EMBASSY


SUMMARY

-------1. (C) At the urging of National Conciliation Commissionofficial Father Dario Echeverri, Polcouns met with XXXXXXXXXXXX--a politician who was previously authorized by the GOCto transmit messages to the FARC. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed he had nospecific message for the USG, but wanted to establish a"relationship" with the Embassy. He agreed conditions arenot ripe for GOC-FARC peace talks, but said FARC Secretariatmember Pablo Catatumbo believes that USG participation would

be key to any eventual peace process. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the FARCis trying to regain political visibility with its recentunilateral hostage releases, and dismissed the notion that

FARC leaders Alfonso Cano and Mono Jojoy are rivals. EndSummary.

2. (C) Polcouns met with XXXXXXXXXXXX politician XXXXXXXXXXXXat the Catholic Bishops Conference facility in Bogotaon May 14. The GOC was aware of the meeting, which wasorganized and attended by National Conciliation CommissionSecretary-General Father Dario Echeverri. XXXXXXXXXXXX said FARCSecretariat member Jorge Torres Victoria (Pablo Catatumbo),his primary FARC contact, had encouraged him to establishcontact with the Embassy. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that he did not

bring a message from the FARC for the USG, but said he wantedto establish a "relationship" with the Embassy that could

prove useful in the future. He said Catatumbo is convincedthat USG participation in any eventual peace process with theGOC would be key to success. XXXXXXXXXXXX was authorized by theGOC to transmit messages to the FARC from July 2008 untilMarch 2009.

FARC PLAYING POLITICS WITH HOSTAGES-----------------------------------3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said there is nothing humanitarian about theFARC's recent hostage releases. The FARC released the

hostages to regain some political visibility and relieveitself of the economic and security costs incurred in holdingthem. Several FARC commanders have openly complained toXXXXXXXXXXXX that the hostages are a growing burden due toColombian military pressure. He said the FARC Secretariatrealizes that Uribe will never agree to a humanitarianaccord, but wants to continue with the releases to maximizethe political impact. Still, he felt the FARC will not freeany more hostages unilaterally unless Uribe reverses his


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current stance and allows Senator Piedad Cordoba toparticipate.

TIME NOT RIPE FOR PEACE TALKS-----------------------------4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said conditions are not ripe for GOC-FARC talks

aimed at starting peace negotiations due to the on-goingpresidential election campaign and the deep distrust on bothsides. Still, he said that at an appropriate moment in thefuture, a gesture from the USG to the FARC, such as allowinga representative of a U.S. non-governmental organization toaccompany a meeting between the GOC and the FARC, could

provide an impetus to start talks.

5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said he worked with then Peace CommissionerLuis Carlos Restrepo in early 2008 to develop and implement

projects targeting the rural (campesino) population in Vallede Cauca, with FARC knowledge and consent. He noted that

Catatumbo had even facilitated some of the GOC's meetingswith campesino leaders. XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed he worked todevelop a similar project in southern Tolima, but said theeffort stalled due to opposition from then Defense MinisterJuan Manuel Santos, who argued that the project was "merelyfeeding the guerrillas." In contrast, Restrepo believed thatworking with the campesinos was a way for the GOC to buildconfidence and establish contact with the FARC.

FARC LEADERSHIP NOT DIVIDED---------------------------6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX dismissed the notion that FARC Secretariatleaders Guillermo Saenz (Alfonso Cano) and Jorge Briceno

(Mono Jojoy) are rivals, claiming that Jojoy, Cano andCatatumbo are good friends. XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that Jojoy lacksCano's and Catatumbo's educational background, but said Jojoyunderstands that the FARC's struggle is political, notmilitary. XXXXXXXXXXX said all three FARC leaders wanted to dropthe FARC's demand for a demilitarized zone as a condition fora humanitarian exchange long before Operation Check (Jaque),

but then FARC leader Marulanda had refused.

7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said Jojoy accepts Cano's leadership andsupports his effort to develop a more active politicalstrategy. He added that while Cano originally was perceived

by rank-and-file FARC as an intellectual rather than afighter, his ability to survive constant Colombian military

pressure over the last year has begun to enhance his imageamong FARC fighters.Brownfield confidential


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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2019TAGS: PGOVPRELPHUMPINRKJUSASECCOSUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND VP SANTOS DISCUSS RESPONSE TO DASSCANDALS

REF: BOGOTA 2921

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield, Reasons 1.4 (b,c,d)

SUMMARY-------

1. (S/NF) The Ambassador met with Vice President FranciscoSantos and Administrative Department of Security (DAS) Director Felipe Munoz onSeptember 15 to discuss DAS wiretapping scandals (reftel). The Ambassador made

clear that the USG was close to severing all relations with the DAS. He stressed theneed to investigate fully and to proactively address public perception. VP Santos hadalready reached the same conclusions, and even included dissolvingthe DAS as an option. Going forward, the GOC plans to expeditiously transfer the DAS'

judicial responsibilities to other agencies, publicly ask an international body (e.g.,Interpol) to launch an in-depth investigation, and enlist outside intelligence experts to

prepare a roadmap for restructuring DAS and its intel function. The GOC will alsoconsider asking a respected, independent foreign dignitary (such as a former head ofstate) to lead these investigation and reorganization efforts. Munoz hopes to reschedule


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his canceled travel to Washington to provide explanations to the State Department andthe U.S. Congress. End Summary.

THE USG IS VERY CONCERNED-------------------------

2. (S/NF) The Ambassador noted continued scandals and leaks from DAS,suggesting illicit and unlawful activity. The GOC has been unable to publicly get out infront of the scandals. He said the USG was close to severing all relations with the DAS,and informed Vice President Santos that he had instructed the Embassy's intelligenceand law enforcement agencies to be ready to transfer cooperation and support to otherGOC entities. The Ambassador stressed the need to investigate the scandals fully andtransparently, and to publicize investigation and restructuring efforts.

VP UNDERSTANDS SITUATION IS DIRE, WANTS TO KNOW WHO IS BEHINDATTACKS-----------------------------------3. (S/NF) VP Santos had already reached the same conclusions

and noted that the remarks by the State Department spokesperson were strong. He saidthe GOC wanted full investigations and justice, and that any additional scandals wouldlikely force the GOC to close DAS (closure would have to be approved by Congress).He called the DAS' troubles a clear victory for criminals, as DAS operations are frozenand surveillance equipment is under lock and key. He noted thatthe DAS has had a series of corruption problems and surveillance scandals over the pastdecades, but assured the Ambassador that no officially-sanctioned illegal surveillancehas occurred since former DAS director Jorge Noguera was fired in November 2007.

4. (S/NF) VP Santos repeatedly stated that he felt an external or internal anti-Uribeforce --Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC), narcotraffickers, the Cuban government, corrupt DAS employees, or politicalopposition parties-- was behind the attacks on the DAS. He said this "very dark force"knows it can use the USG and Congress (he named a U.S. Senator) as a pressure point,and feared that Police Intelligence (DIPOL) could be its next target. VP Santos askedfor USG help inidentifying those responsible.

ACCELERATING DAS RESTRUCTURING------------------------------

5. (S/NF) Munoz described plans to restructure DAS, transferring its judicialcomponents to other GOC entities and slashing staff within the next 60 days. VP Santos

responded by instructing him to accelerate the process and to do as much as possiblewithin the next week. The Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) must be involved in thetransferof about 100 pending cases, some of which must remain in DASfor trial and legal reasons. Munoz will work with prosecutors and USG agencies toimmediately transfer as many cases as possible. Munoz said that the cases may betransferred to the CTI (the investigative unit of the Prosecutor General) as an interimmeasure.


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6. (S/NF) The Ambassador said the GOC better have a Plan B. If another DASscandal erupted, our Plan B was to terminate all association with DAS. Immediately.

PUBLICLY ENLISTING INDEPENDENT HELP-----------------------------------

7. (S/NF) Taking the Ambassador's advice into account, VP Santos said the GOCwould seek to announce by September 21 that it was requesting an international body(e.g., Interpol or the OAS) to launch an in-depth investigation into the DAS scandals.VP Santos is keen to have FBI involvement in the investigation, but the Ambassadorwarned that any USG participation must be under the umbrella of an international body,and even then we would be very hesitant to participate. The Ambassador stressed thatthe investigation must havefull access and authority.

8. (S/NF) VP Santos said the GOC would seek the help of several non-DAS intelexperts (either from other countries or perhaps retired Colombians) to embedthemselves in the DAS and develop a roadmap for restructuring the DAS intel function.

He was initially leaning towards the CIA, Scotland Yard and MI-6, but wondered ifthose entities would accept a public profile. Ambassador was very skeptical about USG

participation.

9. (S/NF) Finally, the GOC will consider asking a respected, independent foreigndignitary (such as a former head of state) to lead these investigation and reorganizationefforts. VP Santos was considering both regional and global options, which he'd have toclear with President Uribe. Some of the countries and individuals listed in the initial

brainstorm were: Ricardo Lagos (Chile), Vicente Fox (Mexico), Fernando HenriqueCardoso (Brazil), Australia, India, and even Russia or Cuba. The Ambassador pursedhis lips severely at the last two.

AMBASSADOR TO ENGAGE URIBE DIRECTLY-----------------------------------

10. (S/NF) VP Santos noted that President Uribe did not fully understand the depthof the crisis, and recommended that the Ambassador raise the gravity of the situationand ideas on the way forward directly with Uribe. The Ambassador agreed to have thatconversation at the earliest opportunity.

RECORDING OF EMBASSY OFFICIAL: IT WASN'T DAS!---------------------------------------------

11. (S/NF) Turning to the leaked wiretap of a conversation between a magistrate andan Embassy official (reftel), VP Santos and Munoz said the GOC's investigation showedthat the recording was done by an outsider. They assured the Ambassador that DASequipment (both fixed and mobile) could not have been used, and said an independentRussian surveillance expert had studied the matter and reached thesame conclusion. VP Santos said the recording could have been done by anyone,including a disgruntled DAS employee. The Ambassador said that the Embassy'sinvestigation also concluded that DAS equipment was probably not used.


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THE NEXT SCANDAL?-----------------

12. (S/NF) News magazine Semana has received another, not-yet-public leakinvolving USG intel support for DAS and Ecuador's ties with the FARC. VP Santos saidthat Foreign Minister Bermudez had already spoken to the Ecuadorian FM in case the

story breaks. Although the GOC has asked Semana to refrain from publishing the storyfor national security reasons, VP Santos thinks it will become public. Munoz noted thatthe employee who leaked the information was undergoing polygraph testing, and wouldhopefully be prosecuted quickly. The Ambassador pointed out that he would likelyagain haveto answer difficult media questions.

COMMENT

-------

13. (S/NF) Santos himself said DAS may be in its death throes. He may be right. The

price to restore its public credibility may be higher than the GOC is prepared to pay.Brownfield secret

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/22TAGS: PGOVKJUSPRELPHUMPINRASECCOSUBJECT: Uribe Informs Ambassador of DAS Investigation Developments

REF: BOGOTA 3018 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(C), (D)

SUMMARY-------1. (S/NF) President Alvaro Uribe emphasized to the Ambassador andDCM on September 21 that he is determined to get to the bottom ofthe scandals surrounding the Administrative Department of Security(DAS) (see reftels). New evidence indicates that the orders forimproper wiretaps, including of an auxiliary magistrate (and hisleaked conversation with a U.S. Embassy official), were obtainedthrough legal channels. As DAS Director Felipe Munoz foreshadowed

three days earlier, Uribe has begun the process of dismantling theDAS and reassigning its functions to other entities, and would welcome internationalassistance in standing up a leaner intelligence agency. The scandals turned the DAS intoa domestic and international liability. Per Munoz, the DAS' judicial functions will betransferred to the Colombian National Police (CNP) and the Prosecutor General'sOffice. The CNP will also take over the Interpol role, and the CNP or Ministry ofInterior and Justice will assume responsibility for protecting at-riskindividuals. The Ambassador welcomed the decision to dismantle theDAS and Uribe's commitment to fully investigate the scandals.Munoz hopes to meet with USG officials in Washington on November5-6. End Summary.

PERMISSION FOR IMPROPER WIRETAPS WAS LEGALLY OBTAINED-----------------------------

2. (SBU) President Uribe emphasized to the Ambassador and DCM onSeptember 21 that he is determined to get to the bottom of thescandals surrounding the Administrative Department of Security(DAS). Uribe was accompanied by Defense Minister Gabriel Silva,Colombian National Police (CNP) Chief Oscar Naranjo, DAS DirectorFelipe Munoz, Vice Foreign Minister Clemencia Forero, and MFA NorthAmerican Affairs Coordinator Adriana Maldonado.

3. (S/NF) An extremely animated and agitated Uribe phoned ActingProsecutor General Guillermo Mendoza at the top of the meeting toask for an update on his investigation into the DAS wiretap scandal--which Uribe set to speakerphone for the Ambassador to hear.Mendoza reported that Prosecutor General's Office investigators hadfound two signed judicial orders regarding two distinct cases, onea kidnapping case and the other an extortion case. The orderslisted Auxiliary Magistrate Ivan Velasquez' cellular telephone


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number as a target in those cases. The legal judicial ordercarried the signatures of prosecutors from Bogota and Fusagasuga,Cundinamarca.

IT IS UNCLEAR WHO IS BEHIND THE WIRETAP REQUESTS---------------------------

4. (S/NF) Mendoza continued that investigators must now determinewhy the prosecutors signed the orders. The intercept requests camefrom the Prosecutor General's Technical Investigation Corps (CTI)and the CNP's anti-kidnapping police (GAULA), Mendoza said. (Note:

Separately, DEA Bogota obtained copies of the orders, which showthat the improper wiretaps were legally obtained. End note.)Prosecutor General Mendoza explained that the intercepts from thesenumbers were the source of the recordings leaked to the news weekly"Semana," including the recorded conversation between Velasquez anda U.S. Embassy official. In response to Uribe's query, Mendozasaid that his office has not determined who leaked the recordings

to Semana.

5. (S/NF) DAS Director Munoz said that his investigation found thatprosecutors in Leticia and Choco had been colluding with DASofficials to illegally tap telephones. However, the investigationremained open. MOD Silva offered that he has received indicationsthat prosecutors involved in the Velasquez case received illegal

payments to bank accounts in the United States. However, he hasnot yet determined who had made the payments or why. Silva askedfor the Ambassador's help in tracking down the details. TheAmbassador agreed, but stressed that all such assistance must flowthrough law enforcement channels. Munoz and CNP Director Naranjoexplained that the wiretap judicial order went through the GOCconsolidated judicial wire intercept program "Esperanza." WhileDAS is a consumer of Esperanza products through its judicial policefunction, it does not control or administer Esperanza. Munoz saidthat he has audited the DAS terminal that receives Esperanza

products but not the central Esperanza program or other customers.

URIBE COMMITTED TO A FULL INVESTIGATION---------------------------------------6. (S/NF) An impassioned Uribe said that the legal document put thescandal in an entirely different light. He urged Prosecutor

General Mendoza to call a press conference and explain this newdevelopment. Uribe recalled that German Chancellor Angela Merkel,UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Navy Pillay, andPresident Obama had expressed their concerns about the DAS to himand that his administration has been under a cloud as a result ofit. He wanted this revelation known before he saw world leaders onthe margins of UNGA. Uribe excoriated Munoz for his failure toresolve the scandal months earlier and for the delay in discoveringthe legal wiretap order.


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7. (S/NF) Uribe agreed with the Ambassador that a thorough andtransparent investigation into past DAS misdeeds is vital. Hestressed that the GOC will clarify what happened in the past and

punish those responsible. Uribe reiterated his comments fromSeptember 19 to the press that a conspiracy of extradited former

paramilitary leaders and current criminals was conspiring to impugnthe credibility of the government. He said that the past sixmonths has been an ordeal for him, with many questioning hishonesty. President Uribe said that he would get to the bottom ofthe scandal to demonstrate his own and his government's honesty andcredibility.

INTERNATIONAL HELP IN REFORMING INTEL-----------------------------------

8. (S/NF) In response to the Ambassador's suggestion, Uribe saidthat the GOC would welcome technical help to organize the successor

agency to the DAS from Interpol or another competent internationalagency. Uribe rejected creating an eminence gris panel to adviseon the new agency, saying the problems were technical and not political.

9. (S/NF) On September 18, Munoz told the Ambassador that the DAShas prepared an inventory of cases that it works with U.S. law enforcement through itsvetted units, and will transfer those cases to other institutions in an orderly way and inclose coordination with Embassy law enforcement attaches. Munoz said that the GOChasdrafted a new policy document on intelligence and promised the Ambassador a copy ofthe draft. Munoz said that the Australian andBritish governments have offered help in organizing the newintelligence agency, and that USG help would be

Embassy Colombia ][Wkleaks

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Transcript of Embassy Colombia ][Wkleaks