DemocracyinBolivia:FromSubalterntoCitizenAnAnalysisofthe2000CochabambaWaterWar

TomLorenzen

May2009SeniorThesisColoradoCollege

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“Alivingmancanbeenslavedandreducedtothehistoricconditionofanobject.Butifhediesinrefusingtobeenslaved,hereaffirmstheexistenceofanotherkindofhumannaturewhichrefusestobeclassifiedasanobject” AlbertCamus,TheRebel238

Inthe2000CochabambaWaterWar,thesubalternpopulation,inresponseto

theprivatizationofwater,collectivelypressuredthegovernmenttoabdicateits

contractualandlegalcommitmenttotheprivatization.Ataglance,thenatureofthe

victoryappearstobematerial,but,infact,whenviewedinitsgreaterhistorical

context,the2000WaterWarstandsasthedecisivemomentina500year‐old

identityconflict.

Thispaperwillfollowthehistoricprocessofidentitystrugglebetweenthe

hegemonicgovernmentandthepoliticallyinvisible“subaltern”.Thesubalternwill

bedefinedastheportionofthepopulationthatthegovernment:(1)renders

politicallyinvisibleviatheabsoluteexclusionfromparticipatingandcontestingin

thepoliticalsphere(2)economicallyobjectifiesthuslegalizingitsexploitation.

ThehistoryoftheBoliviansubalternbeginswithSpanishcolonialrule,

whichusedaracialcastesystemasitslegalfoundation.Thisformalizedsystemof

apartheidbothprohibited,ongroundsofracialinferiority,theindigenous

populationfromenteringthepoliticalsphereandlegalizedtheirenslavement.

Throughitspoliticalhegemony,theSpanishgovernmentdehumanizedandthus

objectifiedthesubalternasessentially“savages”.Afterindependence,theexploitive

treatmentofthesubalterncontinuedinasystemofinformalapartheid;thenew

republicintegratedthesubalternbutonlynominallyas“Bolivianothers”.

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AftertheRevolutionof1952,unifiedsectorsofthesubalternvia“forced

negotiations”gainedaccess,albeitlimited,tothepoliticalsphere;however,anew

oligarchicparty,relyingoncorporateclientelism,regulatedsubalternparticipation

andcontestation.Soonafterthe1952Revolution,asubsequentcounter‐revolution,

whichwouldlastuntil2000,systematicallyincapacitatedthesubalterns’abilityto

contestthegovernment.Bythe1990s,thegovernmenthadatomizedthemain

subalternorganizationsthathadbeencapableofchallengingthenational

government.

TheprivatizationofwaterinCochabambalegalizedtheexploitationofwater

serviceandthuspushedtheentirepopulationintoasubalternposition.Inreaction,

thesubalterncollectivelyarticulatedwaterasapublicgood,andsuccessfully

challengedthegovernment’shegemoniccontrolover“subalternity”.Waterwas

activelyarticulatedasacitizen’sright.Inthissense,acitizenisdefinedas:(1)one

whoispoliticallyvisibleviaactivepoliticalparticipationandcontestationinthe

politicalsphere(2)onewhoactivelycreateshisorherownidentityinthepolitical

sphere.

Oncewaterwassuccessfullyarticulatedinthepoliticalsphereasapublic

good,ittransmutedfromthematerialintotheimmaterial—inthat“water”became

thekeystoneofthe“citizen”identityinthepoliticalsphere.Throughthecollective

articulationofthepublicgood,thesubalterncantranscenditspoliticallyinvisible

statusandacquireaneffectualidentityofcitizenship.

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ReviewoftheLiterature

Thispaperwillexaminethehistorictransformationfromsubalternityto

citizenship.Thestrugglewithinthesubalternconditiondefinesthepoliticalhistory

ofBolivia.FromtheonsetofWesterninfluenceinBolivia,colonialruleused

governmentandlawasinstrumentsofexploitation.Governmentdidnotform

aroundnotionsofthepublicgood,ratherarulingoligarchydesignedgovernmentto

protecttheireconomicinterests.ThroughoutBolivia’shistory,theoligarchyhas

takenvariousforms,andyetitsexploitationofthemajorityhasremaineda

constant.

Bymeansofabsolutepoliticalexclusion,thegovernmenthasbeenableto

objectifythepoliticalidentityofthemajority.Inthispaper,politicalidentitywillbe

definedasthegovernment’sprescribedidentityforthesubordinatedsubaltern.In

otherwords,thegovernmentdefinesthetermsoftherelationshipbetweenthe

objectifiedmajority(thesubaltern)andthegovernment.Thetermsofthe

relationshipsuperimposeapoliticalidentityonthesubaltern.

OverthecourseofBolivianhistory,eachofthevariousoligarchic

governmentsdelineateddifferentsocialparametersofthesubalternand

correspondinglydifferentpoliticalidentitiesofthesubaltern.Forexample,under

Spanishcolonialrule,theSpanishstratifiedallindigenouspeoplesassubalternand

superimposedaracializedpoliticalidentityuponthem;threehundredyearslater,

the“Revolution‘52”oligarchycharacterizedthesubalterndifferentlyusingsocio‐

economicratherthanracialclassifications,whichwerereflectedina

“mestizaje/campesino”subalternpoliticalidentity.Inthispaper,Iwilldeducethe

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givenpoliticalidentityofthesubalternbasedongovernmentlawsandpolicies.It

isnecessarytonotethatthepoliticalidentitiesofthesubalternareonlyrelevantin

thepoliticalspherewherethegovernmenthashegemoniccontrol.

OntheUseof“Subaltern”

Iusetheterm“subaltern”primarilytoavoidessentializingtheBolivian

indigenouspopulation.Thereareanumberofindigenousethnicitiesandcultures,

whoseidentificationrelyonthemembersthemselves.Thegovernmentdefinesthe

subalternstatus,andthepoliticalidentityreflectsthepoliticalconditionorthe

degreeandnatureofsubalternity.Theterm“subaltern”isone,whichcanbeusedto

describetheentirehistoricevolutionoftheoppressed.Inthispaper,Iidentifyand

discusseachofthesehistoricconditions.The2000WaterWarsocialmovementcan

onlybeunderstoodwithinitsgreaterhistoricalcontext.

PartI:HistoricalBackground

TheColonialPeriod

PriortotheSpanishconquestoftheterritorythatisnowBolivia,theregion

wascomposedofvariousethnicpopulations—Guaranís,Aymarans,Incansanda

numberofAmazoniantribes.Inthe1570s,upontheconsolidationofcolonial

control,theSpanishreducedallnativepeoples,regardlessofethnic,culturalor

historicbackground,to“Indians”.TheSpanishrestructuredindigenousidentityasa

meanstosubjugationandexploitation.Thelegacyof“Indian”haspersistedtothis

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dayandisthereforecentraltounderstandingthecontemporarystrugglefor

citizenship.

TheSpanishcoloniesintheAndeanregionwereforemostorientedtoward

extraction—thiswascontingentondomination.Inordertomaintaincontrolover

thediverseethnicgroups,whichinhabitedgeographicallydividedregions,the

Spanishinstitutedasystemofindirectrule,calledthecacicazgosystem(Hyltonand

Thomson36).TheSpanishappointedauthorities,caciques,whowerechosenbased

onhereditary,Andeannobility,togovernoverdensesettlementsofindigenous

populationsandtoactasintermediariesbetweenthesettlementandtheSpanish

(HyltonandThomson36).Inexchangeforlimitedself‐government,communal

property,andtherighttopracticeculturaltraditions,thecaciazgosettlementswere

forcedtopayatributetax,aswellas,supplylabor.

Tofacilitatetheextractionofforcedlabor,theSpanishinstitutedamitayo

system.TheSpanishdividedtheregionbetweenCuzcoandPotosíinto16mita

districtsandrequiredeachdistrict,composedofcariazgosettlements,tocontribute

oneseventhoftheentiremalepopulationtooneyear’sserviceintheminesof

Potosí(Postero28).Withinonehundredandfiftyyears,thesilverminedfrom

PotosíamountedtomorethantripletheamountofsilverinEuropeanreserves,and

theextractioncostnothingshortofaholocaust—eightmillionindigenouspeople

losttheirlivesworkinginthemines(Postero28)(Dangl15).

Asanadditionalstipulationofthecariazgosystem,theSpanishenforcedthe

repartimientotax.Spanishgovernorsbought,oncredit,largeamountsof

commodities(suchasmulti‐coloredsilkstockings)frommerchantsandthenforced

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theindigenouscommunitiestobuytheproductsatahigherprice(Postero30).

Frequently,thesepurchaseswouldsendthesettlementintodebt,whichthe

governersusedaspoliticalleverageforcontinuedcontrol(Postero30).Inmany

cases,thecaciquessidedwiththecorregidoresinordertotakeacutoftheprofit,

which,inturn,dividedthecommunitiesagainstthemselvesandinhibitedunified

resistancemovements(Postero30)(HyltonandThomson37).

Inordertolegallyjustifythisexploitation,theSpanishdividedthepopulation

alongraciallinesintotwodistinctlegalapparatusescreatingadualdualrepublic.In

therepúblicadelosespañoles,theeconomicallyandpoliticallyhegemonic

(peninsulares,criollos,andmetizos)receivedpreferentialrightsandprivileges.In

therepúplicadelosindios,ontheotherhand,aseparatesetoflawsandinstitutions,

whichincludedthecariazgo,mitayo,andrepartimientosystemgovernedthe

indigenouspopulations.

Thelegallegitimacyofthedualrepublicwasgroundedinacastesystem

basedonbloodpuritythatrangedfromthepurest(theSpanish),tothemostimpure

(theIndians).Overtime,thelinebetweenthevariousracialstratificationsbecame

increasinglyblurredandarbitrary,butbecausethelegalapparatuswascontingent

uponthecastesystem,theSpanishcontinueditsusebutinamodifiedformat

(Postero28).The“Indian”cametobeidentifiedasonewholivedoncommunal

landwhowaspartofthe“workingtributarypopulation”(Postero28‐29).In

essence,theSpanishcolonyoperatedasanapartheidsystemthatallowedthe

Spanishtocontrolaspecificgroupofpeopleinordertocontinueexploitation.

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Bythelate18thcentury,anumberofresistancemovementsformedin

responsetotherepressivecariazgosystem.Attheheightoftheinsurrectionperiod,

anindigenousforceofmorethanonehundredthousandwasabletocapturea

multipleSpanishtowns(Postero31).In1781,TúpacKataribesiegedthecityofLa

Pazfor109days.Whiletheserebellionswereeventuallysuppressedbythe

Spanish,theydemonstratetheformidableresilienceoftheindigenouspopulation.

Neartheendofcolonialism,indigenouscommunitiesunderwentpolitical

changes.NancyPosterowrites:

“Andeancommunitieshadgraduallyshiftedtoamoredemocraticsystemofrepresentation,inwhichauthoritywasnotbasedonnobilityorstateregulation,butratheronaccountabilitytothecommunity.Thepowerthathadbeencentralizedattheapexofthepoliticalsystemwasdispersedtoanumberofsitesinthecommunity,particularlythroughthecivilcargosystem,arotatingsysteminwhichcommunityeldersdotemporarilycommunityservice”(Postero31).

Thisshiftfromtraditionalformsofleadershiptoamoredemocratic

structurewascriticalinBolivianhistory.Theeffectsofthisshiftareseentothisday

(Postero31).

TheRepublicanPeriod

DespiterevolutionaryrhetoricthathadchastisedtheSpain’streatmentofthe

Indians,therepublicans,afterindependencein1835,reinstatedcariazgosystemas

ameanstopayoffwardebtsaswellsasmaintaincontrolovertheindigenous

population(Postero32).Butastimepassed,duetothechangingdemandsofa

rapidlycapitalizingworld,thenewcriolloeliteneededtodevelopamodelof

citizenshipthatwouldallowthemtomoreefficientlyexploittheindigenous

populationforlabor.NancyPosterowrites:

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“The big paradox for liberals…was how to impose universaldefinitionsoffreelaborandcitizenshipandtomoldnationalculturesintohomogenouswholeswhileatthesametimecreatingsymbolsandcategoriesofinnatedifferencethatwouldsetlimitsonthoseuniversalideals—this would allow continued domination over the IndianOther”(Postero32).

ThenewBolivian constitution reconciled thisparadox. In the constitution,

althoughsuffragewas technicallyuniversal, inorder tovoteonehadtobeable to

readandwriteinSpanish;belandedorpayrent;andnotbeadomesticservant.The

qualifications were deliberately intentionally excluded the same indigenous

populationthatcomprisedtherepúblicadeindios.JustastheSpanishusedthedual

republic to sanction apartheid, the architects of the Bolivian constitution used

appearanceofuniversalliberalrightstojustifyaninformalsystemofapartheid.

In order to advance the nation‐state project, in 1874, the republican elites

passed a land reform,which ended the tribute andmade holding communal land

illegal. The intended effectwas twofold. First, by dissolving communal land, the

government sought to establish itself as the main source of political legitimacy.

Second, the communal land was sold in large tracts, which restructured the

traditionalagriculturesystemintolatifundios.

Political exclusion and the abolishment of community self‐governance

situated the indigenous population in an extremely vulnerable position. Without

land or political rights, in the republican period, the role of the new Indian

“Bolivian” was to provide cheap, slave‐like labor for an export‐oriented country

tryingtocompeteintheglobalmarket.

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The political identity of the Bolivian subaltern was worker/slave. While

nominallyBolivian,thesubalternretainedthedehumanizedstatusfromtheSpanish

period.Inthissense,thesubalternwasidentifiedasthe“Bolivianother.”

TheRevolutionof1952

Increasedsubalternprotestcharacterizedtheearlypartofthetwentieth

century.Peasantsandworkers,wholivedunderdeplorableconditions,articulated

demandsforland,theendofrepressiveworkingconditions,accesstoagriculture

markets(whichweredominatedbythelatifundios),andpoliticalrightsand

representation.

Asamajorcatalysttosubalternprotest,theChacoWarofthe1930s,forthe

firsttimeinBolivianhistory,unifieddividedsectorsofthesubaltern,mostnotably

minersandpeasants.Thewarresultedinthedeathsofover100,000Paraguayans

andBoliviansandthelossofBolivianterritory.Thesheerdevastationofthewar

strengthenedthesubalternalliancesandcontributedtoapoliticalenvironmentthat

wasconducivetopoliticalchange.

Intheyearsfollowingthewar,militarizedpeasantsandminerveterans,who

formednewpeasantandtradeunions.Pactsbetweenruralandurban

organizationsenabledcoordinatedboycotts,strikesandprotests(Dangl19)

Resistancetothegovernmentwasfiercestintheruralareas,especiallyinthe

Cochabambavalley,wherepeasantmilitiasstagedattacksonthelatifundios.Many

ofthesesubalterngroupswereabsorbedintoanewnationalparty,theMovimiento

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NacionalRevolucionario(MNR),whichwascontrolledbydisenfranchisedurban,

whitemiddleclassman.

Inordertobuildanationallyunifiedmovementcapableofchallengingthe

oligarchy,theMNRchanneledindividualgroupstowarditsownpoliticalaims.

LeadersoftheMNRrealizedtheimmensepoliticalpotentialofaminer‐peasant

coalitionandso“toorganizetheircooperation,theMNRtookadvantageofthe

coloniallegacyofcorporatistsocialvaluesandsectoralorganizations”(Postero38).

OnApril10th1952,themobilizedforcesoftheMNRtookLaPazbyforceand

supplantedtherepublicanoligarchy

Onceinpower,theMNR,undertheleadershipofthenewpresidentVictor

PazEstenssoro,movedquicklytoplacatethepressingdemandsofthevarious

groupsthathadenabledtherevolution.OnlythreedaysafterthecouptheBolivian

Workers’Center(COB),arecentlyformedminersunion,demandedthefull

nationalizationofthemines.ByOctober31,1952,theMNRhadcompliedand

institutedCOMIBOL—aworker‐runminingcompany,whichassumedcontrolover

163minesand29,000workers(Dangl21).InJulyof1952,thegovernment

establisheduniversalsuffragebringing80%ofthepreviouslyexcludedpopulation

intotheelectorate(Dangl21).InAugustof1953,inordertoappeasethepeasant

militias,theMNRpassedanAgrarianReformAct,which,intheory,wassupposedto

redistributeland;butbecauseofinternalfracturingwithintheMNR,thislawwas

nottrulyenforced(Dangl22).Sweepingreformhadcreatedanunstablepolitical

climate,which,astimewenton,becamehardertomanage.

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Eachoftherevolutionarysubalterngroups,whichwereorganizedby

economicsector,pressuredthegovernmenttomakereformswithintheirparticular

sector.Becausethesegroupswerelargeandmilitarized,theMNRpoliticalelites

hadtomakeconcessions.Asameanstomaintaincontrol,theMNRelitesresorted

togoverningbyclientelism.MerileeGrindlewrites,

“Whileinpower,thepartybecameskilledatrespondingtospecificneedsofspecificgroupsandatdistributingjobsandresourcestosupportersinanefforttoestablishandmaintainorder.Overtime,thisresponsebecamemoreembeddedinthedynamicsofeverydaypolitics,andeventuallysuchsupportfortheMNRreflectedresponsetotheparticularisticneedsoforganizedgroupsratherthanidentificationwithaprogramorevenaleadershipgroup”(Grindle336).Sincethestatehadcontrolovertheresourcesespeciallyrevenuefromthe

mines(whichaccountedforover95%ofallexportsand45%ofstaterevenue),

politicianscouldusefundsinordertopurchasesupport.TheMNRdividedthe

subalternpowerbytheselectiveuseofpatronage(HyltonandThomson78).

Also as ameans to consolidating their power, theMNRelites attempted to

mollifythesectoralandethnicradicalizationbycreatingaunitarynationalidentity.

The MNR elites did not politically recognize individual ethnicities, rather they

createdtheirownunitarynationalidentity:themestizo.JavierSanjinéswrites

“The1952Revolutionhademphasizedthepoweroftradeunionsandpeasantmilitias,andtheIndianhadbeentied,withgreatpoliticalzeal,tothesemovements…ThisbindingofthepeasanttothestatewasparticularlyevidentinthepeasantunionismoftheQuechuazonesaroundCochabamba,wheretheprocessofmestizajewasmuchmoreintenseandprolonged(Sanjinés14).

TheMNRelitespoliticaluseofmestizoindicatesthecontinuationofthe

Republicannation‐buildingproject;theunitaryidentitywasdesignedtoblurthe

differencesbetweeneconomicsectors,ethnicities,classes,levelsof“bloodpurity”

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and“civilizationessences”andunitethecountryaroundasingleBolivian(MNR)

identity(HyltonandThomson80).Theelitesdefinedthenewmestizocitizenas“a

consumerandproducerofmerchandise,aspeakerofSpanishandanaspiranttoa

westernidealofcivilization”(Cusicanqui177).

Inordertoestablishcontroloverthevarioussubalterngroups,whichwere

organizedwithintheeconomicsectors,MNRgovernmentsponsoredsindicatos

(workerunions)andcreatedacampesinoministry,whichco‐optedpeasantmilitias

(Postero39).Theworkerprogramsdirectlyconnectedthesubalterngroupstothe

stateandthusfostereddependency.Thepoliticaleffortsoftheeliteswerechiefly

focusedonpreventingthedissolutionofthestateandthereturntopoliticalchaos.

Duringthisperiod,theminersunionsandthepeasantmilitiashadthepowerto

directlyinfluencethepoliticalactionsoftheMNRelites.Therewasnoseparation

betweenthewhimsofthesesubalterngroupsandpoliticalcapabilityoftheMNR

elites.Duetothepoliticalforceofthesesubalterngroups,theMNRelitesdeveloped

astyleofgovernmenttomeettheirneeds.Viaclientelism,theMNRelitesmanaged

theircontrolovergovernment.

Inthisstyleofgovernment,thesubalternindividualcouldonlyparticipatein

thepoliticalsphereasacampesinoorasaworker.SincetheMNRmaintained

powerbybuildingclientelisticcoalitionswiththemainsubalterngroups,the

generalelectionsweremeaningless.TheMNRelitesonlyacknowledgedthe

associationsthatwereneededforpowerstability.Becauseofthisclientelistic

systemofpolitics,theonlyavenueofsubalternpoliticalrepresentationwasthrough

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thesindicatosandthepeasantunions.Thismodeofparticipationandcontestation

wasseverelylimited.

Theunions,suchastheCOB,thathaddirecttieswiththeMNReliteswere

hierarchicalandbureaucratic.Whiletheunionswieldedsubstantialpower,these

werenotdemocraticorganizations,butratherwereoftencontrolledbycorrupt

leaders(Postero39).Furthermore,subalternworkerswereobligatedtojointhe

unions,andassociatetheirpoliticalviewswiththeunion.Withhopesofindividual

representationlimitedtostate‐controlledassociations,thesubalternremained

politicallymarginalized.AstheMNRconsolidatedpower,themarginalizationofthe

subalternwasincreased.BenjaminDanglwrites,“Astimewenton,right‐wing

elementswithintheMNRco‐optedandweakenedthesocialmovementsthathad

broughtittopower,pushingtheradicallaborandagrariangroups—particularlythe

COB—outofthepoliticalsphere”(Dangl22).

Whilepoliticaldisenfranchisementcontinued,theMNRrevolutiondidhavea

positiveeffectonthesubalternstatus.Newlawsandpoliciesimprovedliving

conditions,andpeasantsandworkersdidgainexperienceinthepoliticalsphere.

TheCOB,whichcontrolledthestate’smostvaluableindustry,wasespecially

powerfulduringthistimeandwasthereforeabletoobtainsignificantreforms.

Bythe1960s,theMNRelitepowerfragmentedandwanedintodissolution.

ThedownfalloftheMNRresultedfromitsinabilitytomanageincreasinglyradical

sectordemands.AsitbecameobviousthattheMNRwasmoreconcernedwiththe

maintenanceofpoweroveractualreform,therevolutionaryregimebegantolose

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politicallegitimacyamongsubalternorganizationsthathadplacedthepartyin

power.This,inturn,ledtoincreasedradicalizationandpoliticalchaos.

Morethananything,theMNRcollapsedbecauseitlackedapolitical

backbone.Theunificationofthesubalternhaddissolvedafterthemainobjectiveof

theRevolutionhadbeenachieved.BecausetheMNRhadmadeitselfonewiththe

subaltern,thestatewaspulledinalldirections.Therewasnocheckonacceptable

politicalbehavior,norwasthereanagreedupondirectionorvision.Politically

dividedindividualsectorspursuedtheirownagendasoftenattheexpenseofother

subalternsectors.Theclientelisticcoalitionsystemofgovernancethatdeveloped,

asameansofmaintainingorder,establishedamaterial‐basedrelationshipbetween

thegovernmentandthesubaltern.Thepoliticalparticipationandcontestationof

thesubalternwaslimitedtobiddingforgovernmentpatronage.Forthesubaltern,

therewasnowaytochallengetheactualinstitutionvialegitimatemeans—thiswas

thecauseforthefractionalizationandultimatelyendoftheMNRgovernment.

TheCounter‐Revolution:1964‐1982

Inresponsetothepoliticalupheaval,themilitarycapitalizedonthepolitical

fragmentationoftheMNR,usurpedpowerin1964.ThemilitarycoupledbyRené

BarrientoswassupportedbytheUnitedStateandassumedaColdWaranti‐

communistideology.Afterthecoup,theBarrientosregimecouldnotrelyonthe

militaryaloneforcontrolbutneededthesupportofthesubaltern.Inorderto

securecontrol,theBarrientosregimeexploitedthesectoraldivisionscreatedbythe

MNRandbarteredanalliancewiththepeasantmilitiasandusedthissupportinits

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effortstosuppresstheminersunions,whichstoodasthemostformidable

challengestotheregime.TheMilitary‐PeasantPactformalizedanagreement,which

gavepeasantsland,education,andstate‐developmentfunds,inexchangeformilitia

support.Relationsbetweentheregimeandthepeasantswerefacilitatedby

Barriento,whospokefluentQuechuaandwouldroutinelytravelbyhelicopterto

peasantcommunitiestogiveoutsuchthingsassoccerballsandtelevisions(Hylton

andThomson84).InJuneof1967,thegovernmentandapeasantmilitiamassacred

eighty‐sevenmen,womenandchildreninaminingtown(SanJuan)outsideof

Potosí.ForrestHyltonandSinclairThomsonwrite,

“Thoughminers struck for the next twoweeks in protest, they hadsuffered a historic defeat. Their “peasant brothers”—Quechua‐Aymaras and mestizos—were against them, or at best indifferent.ThisiswhatRene’Zavaletareferredtoasthe“isolationoftheBolivianproletariat”(HyltonandThomson84).

This event and others dramatically alienated the two largest subaltern

sectors.Italsomarksasignificantdevelopmentingovernment‐subalternrelations.

TheBarrientosdictatorshipbegan theprocessof separating thegovernment from

direct subaltern influence. This was the counter‐revolution. The MNR had

established direct relations with the subaltern via economic and clientelistic

integrations. Enormoussubalternorganizationsthusheldpowerinthosesections

of the political sphere and demanded recognition in the decision‐making process

that concerned their sectors. In this sense, in theMNR period, the subaltern did

haveaccesstothepoliticalspherebutonlyinalimitedsense—withintheinfluence

oftheirparticularsector.Barrientossoughttoretakecontroloverthesectorsthat

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wereunderthesubalterninfluence.Beginningwiththeminingsector,thecounter‐

revolutionremovedthesubalternfromthepoliticalspherepiecebypiece.

In1971,BoliviangeneralHugoBanzer took controlof thegovernment. At

thispoint, statepowerwasmorewidelyconsolidatedand thus theBanzerregime

wasnolongerreliantonthesupportofpeasantmilitias.Becauseofthis,Banzerwas

able to exclude and suppress a wider range of the subaltern. Numerous protests

wereviolently suppressed. In theMassacreof theValleyof1974 inCochabamba,

the government suppressed a peasant protest and killed between 80 and 200

protestors—nottenyearsbefore,thispeasantregionhadbeenheartofsupportfor

theBarrientosregime(HyltonandThomson86).

UnderBanzer,thesubalternwasremovedfromthepoliticalsphere,butthis

did not preclude the subaltern frommaking demands to the government. Nancy

Posterowrites:

“Sindicatos obtained concessions from the government for itsconstituentsthroughmobilizations,strikes,andthethreatofpopularviolence. Thuspoliticiansandsindicatossharedpowerinanuneasytruce, an equilibrium regularly broken by violence and conflict”(Postero132).RenéZavaletacalledthispoliticalsystemof “forcednegotiations” thepoder

dual (dual power) (Postero 132).During this time, the poder dualwas a defining

featureofBolivianpoliticsthatoccurredwithacyclicalregularity:subalternworker

unions would force the government to negotiate directly, the government would

then placate with promises and concessions (or outright suppress the protest);

thesepromisewerethenignored,which,inturn,forcedmoreprotests(Postero132‐

133). Sincethesubalternworkerpopulationwassolargeandsincetheeconomy

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wassodependentuponsubaltern labor, thesubalternworkerorganizationshada

considerable amount of power. The subaltern did not have direct access in the

politicalspherebutitcouldstillimpressuponit.

Katarismo:IndigenousIdentity

The Katarismo movement was the most influential subaltern social

movement during the counter‐revolution. Katarismowas originally developed in

the mid‐1960s as a counter‐narrative to the homogenizing‐mestizo policies

mandatedbytheMNR.DevelopedbyAymaranintellectuals,the“Indian”ideology

called for therecognitionof “IndianrightswithinamulticulturalBolivia” (Postero

42). Drawingfromhistoricalresistancefigures,suchasTúpacKatariwholaidthe

1781 siegeonLaPaz,Katarismoengenderedahistoric‐ethnicnationalism. Javier

Sanjinéswrites,

“ThetwogreatachievementsofKatarismowere,first,toperceivethecontinuityofcolonialismthatmarkstheothersideofmodernity,and,second, to see that politically the Indians formed a national ethnicmajority(Sanjinés14‐15).

WhereassocialmovementsduringtheMNRperiodmadedemandsdirectlytothe

state,Katarismodemandedthecompleteoverhaulofthestate.Initsmostmilitant

forms,Katarismo sought to overthrow the government and establish autonomous

indigenousnations.

The articulation of an Indian identity, albeit one not acknowledged by the

state,helpedtomendsubalternsectordivisions.Usingancestralcommonality,the

katarista “Indian” identity unified both miners and peasants—rural and urban

dwellers. In the period between 1977 and 1984, Bolivian peasant unions, which

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previouslyhadbeenintenselymestizajeintheirself‐identification,begantojointhe

Katarismo movement (Sanjinés 15). In the late 1970s, this identification‐shift

culminatedwhentheConfederaciónSindicalÚnicadeTrabajoadoresCampesinosde

Bolivia (Unified Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Worker Unions CSUTCB), a

federation that organized and channeled peasant’s political goals, began working

withtheTupajKatariRevolutionaryMovement(MRKT)(Sanjinés15).

Katarismoprovidedaforumforthesubalternpopulationtodiscusstheissue

of indigenous identity. Thisdebateoccurredautonomously fromthegovernment,

whichhadpoliticallyexcludedthequestionofidentity.Whileconsensusamongthe

different factionsofKatarismowasneverreached, theveryprocessofholdingthe

debate had important effects. Katarismo represents the first government‐

independentattemptatanarticulationofanational identity. Rejecting thestate’s

definition of the “citizen”, the subaltern population began to define their own

conceptionofwhatitmeanstobe“Bolivian.”Katarismothusenabledthesubaltern

population to identify itself as separate from the government’s imposed political

identity.

TheNeoliberal“BigBang”

In1982,Bolivianreturnedto“democracy”.Rightswerenominallyrestored,

andthesubalternremainedexcludedfromnationalpolitics.Apartycoalitionthat

representedeliteinterestssharedpower.In1985,VictorPazEstenssoro,whohad

recentlyreturnedtopoliticsafterbeinginexile,orchestratedthePactoPorLa

Democracy(PactforDemocracy)betweenthemainparties.Theagreementcalled

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forlegislativestabilityinordertoimplementneoliberalstructuralreadjustmentsin

ordertorecoverthefailingeconomy.Thecountryinthechaoticyearsafterthe

revolutionhadacquiredamassiveamountofinternationaldebt.This,alongwitha

collapseintheworldtinprices(Bolivia’smainexport),sentBolivian’seconomyinto

hyperinflation—in1985,inflationhadreacheditspeakof27,000%(Hyltonand

Thomson95).WithunanimouspoliticalsupportguaranteedbythePactfor

Democracy,Estenssorhadthepoliticalpowertooverhaultheeconomyandcontain

protest.

UnderpressurefromtheWorldBank,EstenssorowiththeaidofAmerican

economistJefferySachsliberalizedtheBolivianeconomy.The1985liberalreforms

oftheNewEconomicPlanwerecomprehensiveandextreme:markets,salariesand

priceswerederegulated;theBolivianowasde‐dollarized;thetraditionalagriculture

structurewasdismantled;andthetinindustrywasprivatized.Thesocialcostof

thesereformswasenormousasthelivingconditionsforworkersinboththe

agricultureandminingsectorsignificantlydeteriorated.

Theliberalizationoflaborlawsdisempoweredthesubalternworker

organizations,which,inturn,erodedthesubalternworker’scapacityto“force

negotiations”withthestate.Laborlawswererestructuredtobenefitbusiness

ownersandcurtailthebargainingpoweroftheunions.Thesechangesespecially

affectedtheminingsector.Thenewlyprivatizedmineslaid‐off20,000miners,who

werethen“relocated”bythegovernmenttoindustrialcitiesaroundthecountry

(HyltonandThomson95‐96).In1986,theEstenssorogovernmentsanctioneda

massacreofaminersprotest,theMarchinDefenseforLife.OscarOliverawrites,

21

“Todaythankstothisassault,whichcoincidedwithaworldwideminingcrash,nota

singleunionizedworkerremainsinthemines”(Olivera13).Withoutcollective

bargainingpower,theminers,whohadnottheirjobs,wereforcedtoworkin

conditionsdictatedbyownersofthemines.

Theneoliberalreformsalsoerodedthepowerofpeasantorganizations.

Sincethereformsreorientedtheeconomytomaximizeexports,thepriceof

agriculturepricesplummeted—thiscausedmanysmallpeasantfarmstocollapse.A

droughtandalivestockepidemicintheintheearly1980sexacerbatedtheeffectsof

theeconomy(Goldstein71).Thousandsofpeasantsmigratedfromthealtiplanoto

industrialcitiesortotheburgeoningcocainemarketintheChapare(Goldstein71).

Thisdispersionfragmentedthesolidarityofoncepowerfulpeasantorganizations.

ThereformsoftheNEPcompletelyrestructuredthesubalternlaborforce.

Peasantandminermigrationtoindustrialcitiesledtoamassiveinfluxinformaland

informalmanufacturingindustryjobs.In1986,therewere83,000inthe

manufacturingindustry;by1991,thisnumberhadincreasedto150,000and

reached231,000in1995and390,000by1997(Olivera107).Whiletheindustrial

manufacturingsectorexpanded,unemploymentremainedhigh.By1991,morethan

45,000minersandstateadministratorsand35,000factoryworkers(duetofactory

shut‐downs)hadlosttheirjobs(HyltonandThomson95‐96).From1989to1996,

thenumberofworkersinpermanentjobsdeclinedfrom71%to29%(Olivera107).

Reflectiveofthelackofformalemploymentopportunities,in1991approximately

60%oftheurbanpopulationsubsidedoff““informal”activities,andofthose

families,halfwereunabletomeetbasicfoodcosts”(HyltonandThomson96).

22

Desperateconditionscombinedwithliberalizedregulationsfragmentedthe

subalternworkforceandhinderedtheformationofasignificantsocialmovement.

Intheurbanindustrialsector,theunstableneoliberalmarketprecludedsubaltern

workerorganizations.Thenewlaborlawsgaveemployers“flexible”useofthe

workforce.Subalternworkerswerestrippedoftheirrightstobasicjobsecurity,

adequateworkingconditions,andafairsalary(Olivera107).OscarOliverawrites:

“Thegrowingfragmentationofconditionsinwhichproductionactivitiestake

place,andtheuncertaintyandinsecurityofemployment,makeseachmembera

“traveling”worker,bouncingamongthesmallfactory,commercialworkplace,

agriculturelabor,andbacktotheshopfloor”(Olivera107).

Temporarycontractuallaborandthethreatofjobterminationpreventedthe

formationofworkerorganizations.Also,thiseconomicinsecuritycreatedadivided

andcompetitiveworkeratmosphere,whichfurtherinhibitedworkercollaboration

(Olivera107).

The1985NEPandthesubsequentatomizationofthesubalternworker

completelyunderminedthePoderDualthathaddefinedBolivianpoliticsfrom1952

to1985.Bydismantlingthecountry’slargestunionsandfragmentingthesocial

relationsofthesubalternworker,thegovernmentendedthecycleof“forced

negotiations”andthereforeseparateditselffromthelastvestigesofsubaltern

control.Inapoliticalsystemdominatedbyclientelismandcorporatism,this

developmentrenderedthesubalternpoliticallypowerless.

Withoutpoliticalpower,thevoiceless,amorphoussubalternpopulationhad

nopoliticalidentitywithinthecontextofthestate.WhileKatarismoprovidedan

23

identityoutsideofthestate,itwasunabletosecureapoliticalidentityforitself

insidethestate.Theethnic‐basedclaimsofKatarismowerenotconsidered

politicallyviablesincethegovernmentrefusedtheethnicdebateentirelyandonly

acknowledgedthemestizajeasthenationalethnicity.Furthermore,because

Katarismowasneverabletoarticulateandconsolidateaunifiedmovementcapable

offorcingnegotiations,itnevergainedalegitimatepoliticalidentity.

Bydissolvingworkerorganizations,thegovernmentdelegitimizedthe

politicalidentity‐constructofthe“peasant”andthe“sindicalista.”Intheyears

between1952to1985,workerorganizationsgainedpoliticalviabilityalbeit

indirectlythroughforcingnegotiations.Onlybycompletelyidentifyingoneselfwith

thepoliticsoftheworkerunioncouldasubalternindividualobtainalimited

politicalvisibilityinthepublicsphere.Duringthecounter‐revolution,subaltern

politicalidentitydependedupontheunion’sabilitytoforcenegotiationsandthe

government’stoleranceoftheunion.Therefore,after1985,thedisbandingofthe

workerorganizationsdissolvedthepoliticalidentityofthesubalternworkersince

thegovernmentwasnolongerforcedtoacknowledgetheorganizations.Inthe

midstofhorrendouslivingconditions,thesubalternwasagainpoliticallyinvisible.

MulticulturalDecentralization

Intheearly1990s,theBolivianeconomy,despitethepromisesofthe1985

reforms,wasstillinastateofdisarray.Characterizedascorruptandoverly

centralized,theBoliviangovernmenthadmadelittleprogresswithits

modernizationplan.In1993,GonzaloSánchezdeLozada,whohadbeenthechief

architectoftheNEPunderEstensorro,waselectedpresidenthavingrunonaquasi‐

24

populistplatformpromisingsocialandeconomicreform;Lozada’svice‐president

selection,VíctorHugoCárdenas,aformerKataristaleaderandintellectual,helped

legitimizehispledgesamongindigenouspopulations(HyltonandThomson99)

Onceinpower,theLozadaadministrationshedthe“mestizaje”ethnicpolicyand

declaredBoliviatobe“multicultural”—meaningthegovernmentwouldformally

recognizeethnicdifferences.Althoughthispolicychangeappearedtobeasignof

socialprogress,Lozadausedthesemblanceofpopulistreformtocontinuethe

implementationofneoliberaleconomicreforms(HyltonandThomson).

Politicallyframedasacommunityempowermentproject,theLawofPopular

Participation(LPP),promulgatedin1994,decentralizedthedistributionofstate

revenue.Inordertocircumventthecorruptandinefficientcentralgovernment,

undertheLPP,thegovernmentchanneleddevelopmentfundstoinstituted

communitydevelopmentorganizations,OrganizacionesTerritorialesdeBase

(OTBs).Theseorganizations,whichwererunbycommunity‐electedleaders,were

givencontrolovertheappropriationofstate‐grantedfunds.Intheory,theOTBs

wouldallowthegovernmenttomoredynamicallyrespondtolocalproblemsby

utilizingcommunityparticipationandinitiative(Postero131).

WhiletheOTBsallowedthesubalterngroupstoparticipateingovernment,

theirparticipationremainedregulatedbythecentralgovernment.DanielGoldstein

writes,“ParticipaciónPopularenabledthenationstatetoidentifyandregulatelocal

basecommunitiesbydeterminingtheforumsuchcommunitiesmusttakeandthe

meansbywhichtheymustoperate”(Goldstein80).Byimposingastate‐controlled

politicalstructureatthelocallevel,thegovernmentunderminedthelegitimacyof

25

preexistingformsofcommunityorganization,suchasneighborhoodassociationsor

peasantunions;andthusextendedpoliticalhegemonyoveraportionofthe

populationthathadpreviouslyresidedoutsidedirectgovernmentcontrol(Hylton

andThomson99).

Havingalreadyerasedallformsofthesubaltern’spoliticalidentity(by

dismantlingtheworkers’organizations),thegovernment,throughmulticulturalism

andtheLPP,attemptedtoimposeanewidentityuponthesubalternpopulation.In

thedecentralizedpoliticalsystem,thepoliticalparticipationofthesubaltern

populationwaslimitedtoregulated,communityactivism.PurposelytheOTBsdid

notprovideaforumtocontestorparticipateinnationaldecision‐making;ratherthe

spanofpoliticalcontestationwasdelimitedtolocaldecision‐makingregarding

developmentprojects(Postero132).Sincethegovernmentonlyacknowledged

subalternswhoparticipatedintheOTBs,subalternpoliticalidentitywasconfinedto

thestate’sdefinitionofacceptablesubalterncontestation.

In spite of the narrow scope of contestation in the OTBs, the subaltern

communities did gain valuable skills in the practice of government. Through the

processofcoordinatingdevelopmentprojects(suchasdiggingawell),communities

strengthened organizational structures (Postero 218). Also, in the participation

process communities developed their sense of political rights. Nancy Postero

writes:

“Bylearning“techniquesoftheself”—suchpersonalskillsasrationalparticipation,effectivemoneymanagement,and,mostimportant,“responsibilization”–IndianleaderspreparedfortheexerciseofcitizenshipinmulticulturalBolivia”(Postero218).

26

Thus,theOTBsgavesubalternmembersfirst‐handexperienceinan

extremelylimitedportionofthepoliticalsphere.Theseskillswouldlaterbeapplied

inthearticulationofnewformsofsocialmovements.

Onthemacro‐level,thelimitedparticipationofferedbytheLPPprovideda

politicaldistractionasthegovernmentcontinuedtoliberalizetheeconomy(Hylton

andThomson99).Between1995and1997,theoilandgas,telecommunications,

airline,electricity,andrailroadcompanieswereprivatized(HyltonandThomson

99)(Postero131).Decentralizationwasforemostamodeofpoliticalcontrol;using

politicaldistractionandinstituted,regionalfragmentation(decentralization),the

governmentwasabletocontinueimplementingtop‐downeconomicreform.

AsanunintendedconsequenceoftheLPP,thedecentralizationofstatefunds

transferredthecorruptionthathadplaguedthecentralgovernmenttothe

municipallevel.Overtime,politicalpartiesandNGOsestablisheddominanceover

theOTBs,andsubsequentlytheseorganizationsbecamethenucleiofclientelism

andcorporatism(Postero218).Again,evenatalocalgovernmentlevel,the

subalterncommunitieswerecontrolledanddeniedlegitimateparticipationand

contestation.Becauseoframpantcorruption,theOTBslostmuchoftheirlegitimacy

amongcommunities.Disenfranchisedsubalterncommunitiesthusbeganexploring

othermodesofobtainingpoliticalpower.

LeadingUptotheWaterWar:TheHistoryofCochabamba

Foundedin1571,Cochabamba,oncereferredtoasthe“silo”ofBolivia,wasa

mostlyrural,grain‐producingdepartment.Upuntilthe1950s,rural,Quechua

27

peasantsconstitutedthemajorityoftheDepartment1ofCochabamaba’sdenizens.

ThelatifundiossystemdominatedagricultureintheCochabambavalleyuntilthe

endofthe19thcentury,when,duetochangingtrendsineliteinterests2,piqueros,

peasantsmallholders,wereabletopurchasesmallplotsofland(Goldstein57).In

the1940s,frustratedbyinequitablelanddistributionandthemonopolythat

latifundioscontinuedtoholdovertheagriculturemarket,piquerocommunities

formedmilitiasandforcefullyclaimedlatifundioland.Later,thesemilitiasplayeda

seminalroleintheRevolutionof1952.

Beginningwithamigrationwaveinthe1950s,thedemographicof

Cochabambaunderwentamajortransformation.VeteransfromtheChacoWarof

the1930sandAymaranpeasantsfromthealtiplano,uprootedbydrought,migrated

tothecityofCochabambainsearchofopportunitiesinthe“thrivinginformal

economycenteredonsmallscale‐scalecommercialopportunitiesintheCancha3,

artisanalandindustrialwork”(Goldstein72).Inthe1980s,asaresultofthe

neoliberalreforms,Cochabambaexperiencedasecondwaveofurbaninflux.

Cochabambareceivedanumberof“relocated”minersfromPotosíandOruro,and

Aymaranpeasantsfromthealtiplano,whohadmigratedbecauseoffalling

agricultureprices,drought,andalivestockepidemic(Goldstein71).

MigrationcontributedtotherapidurbanizationofthecityofCochabamba.

From1950to1976,Cochabamba’spopulationincreasedfrom80,000to204,000

1ThereisaDepartmentofCochabamba(thestate)andacityofCochabamba(thecapital).2Duringthistime,economicelitesreorientedtheirintereststowardurbancommerce,industryandtrade.3TheCanchaisamassiveindigenousmarketplacethatoperatesasaclearinghouseforthedepartment’sagricultural,industrialandartisanproducts.

28

(Goldstein62).By1992,Cochabamba’spopulationhadreached408,000thousand,

andforthefirsttimethepercentageofurbandwellersoutnumberedthepercentage

ofruraldwellersinthedepartment—from1950to1992,thepercentageorurban

dwellershadincreasedfrom24%to52%(Goldstein71).BythetimeoftheWater

Warin1999,theurbanpopulationhadgrownto500,000(Dangl58).

Theurbaninfluxfarexceededthecity’sabsorptioncapacity,andthisledto

thedevelopmentoflargesquattersettlements(marginalbarrios)ontheperiphery

ofthecity.Withalackofaffordablehousingwithinthecityproper,migrantsseized

andoccupiedlandillegally(Goldstein29).Thesesettlementsexistedwithoutaccess

togovernmentservices—transportationinfrastructure,electricity,policy,wateror

sewage.Insteadofattemptingtodeveloptheperi‐urbanareasandestablish

control,inthemid‐1970s,themunicipalgovernmentdeclaredthesettlements

illegalandofficiallybeganapolicyofexclusion—inotherwords,theperi‐urban

settlementsweremadeinvisibleandthuscompletelyignored(Goldstein79).The

policydeclaredthelargest,mostimpoverishedsettlementsintheSouthtobe

“congelado”(frozen),essentially,amandateddenialofbasiccivilrights(Goldstein

79).In1993,80%oftheperi‐urbanbarrioswereconsideredillegal,constituting

40%ofthecity’stotalpopulation(Goldstein79).Withamandatedillegalstatus,the

governmentcompletelydeniedtheperi‐urbansquattersapoliticalidentity.Butas

DanielGoldsteinwrites,“Theunintendedconsequenceofexcludingthese

neighborhoodsfrommembershipinthecityhadbeentopreventthestatefrom

penetratingandcontrollingtheexcludedbarrios”(Goldstein79).Toaddressthis

issue,in1993,themunicipalgovernmentadoptedapolicyof“inclusion.”

29

InasimilarimplementationofSánchezdeLozada’spolicyofmulticultural

decentralization,ManfredReyesVilla,themayorofCochabamba,decentralizedthe

distributionofdevelopmentfunds.Villa’snewprogramof“inclusion”was

politicallycastassociallyprogressive.UndertheguidanceofVilla’stechnocrats,the

governmentestablishedTalleresZonalesinsixofthemarginalbarriosdeemedmost

inneed.ComparabletotheOTBs,theTalleresZonaleswerelocalgovernment

bodies,whichprovidedtechnicalandadministrativeassistancetocommunity

developmentprojects(Goldstein87).

JustastheOTBsweredesignedtoestablishgovernmentlegibilityinethnic

communities,theprimaryfunctionoftheTalleresZonaleswastolegalizethe

squattersettlementsandestablishcontrol.Inordertoreceivedevelopment

assistance,eachbarriofirsthadtobecomelegal.Theprocesswasabureaucratic

andlegalmaze,whichinvolvedfilingpaperworkandhiringanarchitectto

standardizeindividuallots(Goldstein87).Throughthebureaucraticprocessthe

squatterwastransformedintoataxpaying“citizen”intheeyesofthegovernment.

ThedevelopmentambitionsotheTalleresZonalesfellshortduetoalackof

elitemunicipalsupport(Goldstein83).Forthemostpart,themarginalbarrios

remainedwithoutgovernmentservices—evenwiththenewlegal“citizen”status,

peri‐urbandwellersremainedwithoutapoliticalidentity.Theonlysignificant

changeintheirrelationwiththegovernmentwasthattheperi‐urban“citizens”had

topaytaxes,includingforthe“congelado”period(Goldstein87).Retainingtheir

subalternstatus,theperi‐urban“citizen”,asdefinedbythegovernment,was

actuallya“voicelesstaxpayer.”

30

PartII:TheWaterWar

ThePoliticsofWater:TheHistoryofSEMAPA

Inmanyways,thehistoryofSEMAPA(ServicioMunicipaldeAguaPotable

Alcantarilldo),Cochabamba’smunicipalwaterservice,encapsulatestheoverarching

themescharacterizingBolivianpolitics.Inthemid‐1960s,themunicipal

government,facedwitharapidlygrowingpopulation,beganlookingforforeign

assistancetoimproveitswaterservice.In1967,theInter‐AmericanBankgranteda

fourteenmilliondollarloanthatstipulatedmunicipalownership—thecontract

situatedthemayorastheheadoftheexecutiveboard(Shultz11).Fromits

inception,SEMAPAandtherevenueitgeneratedwasusedasamunicipalslushfund

supportingavastclientelisticnetwork.Thecompanyquicklybecamemiredin

corruptionandwasconsistentlyunabletomeetthedemandsofCochabamba’s

populationgrowth.

ThemanagementofSEMAPAreflectedtheoverallinequitiesof

Cochabamba’spoliticallandscape;servicefavoredthewealthysectionsofthecity

andwasnearlynon‐existentintheimpoverishedneighborhoodsoftheSouth

(Shultz12).In1999,priortothewaterwar,only57%ofthepopulationhadwater

connectionsand48%hadsewage(Shultz14).A1997investigationfoundthat

whilethenorthernmorewealthypartofthecityhadcloseto90%coverage,inthe

South,lessthanhalfofthebarrioshadconnectionswithSEMAPA(Shultz12).

Withoutwaterservice,thesecommunitieshadtoprovideforthemselves.

31

ThosewhowerenotconnectedtoSEMAPAeitherobtainedwaterfromwater

tankersorcommunitymanagedwells.Sincethetankerserviceswereprivately

ownedandunregulated,thequalityofthewaterwasoftenlessthanadequate.

SometankercompaniesdrewtheirwaterfromtheRioRocha,ahighlypollutedriver

thatbisectsthecity,andminimallytreatedit,beforedeliveringittothebarrios

(InterviewASICASUR).

Manybarriosorganizedwatercommitteestodigwellsandlaypiping

infrastructure.Inthelate1990s,therewerearound5,000to7,000independent

wellsdugandmanagedprimarilybyneighborhoodwatercommittees(Shultz14).

Inthesecommunities,accesstothewellwateriscontingentuponactive

participation—fund‐raising,4laborcontributionfortheconstruction5andconstant

management.Inordertofacilitatetheprocess,mostcommunitieshaveformed

watercommittees,whicharelocallygoverned,autonomous,democratic

neighborhoodassociations.Thewatercommitteesremaindemocraticandfree

fromco‐optationorclientelismbecauseoftheirsmall‐scale:everymemberofthe

communitydirectlyparticipatesinthemanagementofwater(InterviewASICASUR).

InSacaba,abarriointheSouthofCochabamba,Ivisited,alocallymanagedwell,

whichprovidedapproximately200familieswithtwenty‐fourhourservice

(InterviewMario).Basedonmyinterviewsandresearch,Iestimatethatmostwater

committeesmanagewaterforabout100‐600families.Furthermore,these

4FundsareraisedeitherfromwithinthecommunityorbyobtainingoutsidefinancialsupportfromNGOsorthegovernment.5Inmostcases,NGOsorthemunicipalgovernmentprovidethetechnicalsupportwhilethecommunitycontributesthelabor.

32

committeesprovidethemselveswiththeirownmaintenancefunds—waterrather

thanprofitistheintendedgoalofthewatercommittees.

WaroftheWells:PracticefortheWaterWar

Inthe1990s,thelargeaquiferbeneathCochabambaandthesurrounding

areabecameapoliticized,highlycontestedresource.Politicalproblemsregarding

theappropriationofwaterbeganinthe1970s;duetoclimatechangeanda

mushroomingurbanpopulation,CochabambawasnolongerabletorelyonAndean

run‐offtomeetitswaterneeds(Shultz13).Inresponsetoanacutewatershortage,

thegovernmentdrilledten120‐meterwellsintheVintoDistrictofQuillacollo

Province(aboutfifteenmilesoutsideCochabambaproper).Communitymembers

protestedtheprojectoutofafearthatthedeepwellswoulddry‐uptheirportionof

theaquiferwhichtheyreliedonforirrigation.Despitethegovernment’spromises,

thesefearscametofruition.

WhentheCochabambasufferedanotheracutewatershortagein1994and

thegovernmentproposeddrillinginadistrictclosetoVintoasasolution,

communitymembersrecalledthelessonsfromthemid‐1970s.Atthetime,70%of

theagriculturalareassurroundingCochabambawerepermanentlyirrigatedwith

muchofthewatersupplyrelyingontheaquifer(Shultz14).Muchlikethemembers

oftheperi‐urbanwatercommittees,farmers,managedtheirirrigationsystems

collectivelyinirrigators’organizations.Thesetight‐knitfederations,basedon

traditionalegalitarianvalues,hadastrongmobilizationcapacity(Interview

FEDECOR).Whenthegovernmentproposeddrilling,theirrigators’organizations

politicizedandrecastthemselvesasdefensecommittees.Inspiteoforganizinga

33

10,000personmarchinAprilof1995,thedrillingwentaheadasplanned—butwas

movedtomilitarylandandconstructedunderpoliceprotection(Assies20).

Again,in1997‐1998,thegovernmentproposeddrillinginresponsetoyet

anotheracutewatershortage.Andagain,despiteprotests,thedrillingbeganon

armyland;however,bymid‐1998,communityprotestorsforcedtheengineersoff

thelandanddrillingstopped(Assies20).Reflectingthegovernment’surbanbias,

municipalandnationalleaderslabeledtheirrigators“criminals”(Assies20).

Regardlessoftheirrigators’smallvictory,tensionscontinued.

Inresponsetocontinualgovernmentthreat,thedefensecommitteesfrom

variousruralcommunitiesconsolidatedthemselvesandformedFEDECOR6

(FederaciónDepartamentalCochabambinadeOrganizacionesdeRegantes).The

organizationalstructureofFEDECORwasdistinctfromtheestablishedhierarchical

trade‐unionstructureinthatitoperatedasapoliticalforumforthevarious

irrigators’organizationstodiscusstheissuewater,strategizeandcoordinate

mobilizationsonanevenplane.FEDECORalsofacilitatedtheeducationofits

members,“ThroughmeetingsandworkshopsthelocalbasesofFEDECORbecame

familiarwiththedebateoverwaterlegislation”(Assies21).

BecauseFEDECORwashorizontallystructured,theissuesunder

considerationhadtobeclearlyarticulatedinordertomaintainthecohesivesupport

ofthevariousirrigators’organizations.Beforebeingabletoengageintheprocess

ofdebateandconsensusbuilding,membersfirsthadtounderstandtheissue—this

requirededucation.Onceeducated,memberscollectivelydeterminedthebestplan

6CochabambaDepartmentFederationofIrrigators’Organizations

34

ofaction.Thus,member‐activistswereunifiednotoutofobligationbutratherbya

commonunderstandingoftheissue(FEDECORinterview).Inthedevelopmentof

civilsociety,thispointiscrucial.

AlsoinresponsetotheWaroftheWells,theCochabambachapterofthe

SocietyofBolivianEngineers(SIB)becamepoliticallyinvolvedinthewaterissue.

Initially,thisgroupstaunchlysupportedthegovernment’spolicyofdrilling,butas

factsmountedtheSIBchangeditsposition(Assies21).Overtime,itbecameclear

thatthecostly,corruptdrillingprocess,whichhadbothnegativesocialand

environmentaleffects,wasnotthismostproductivesolutiontothewatershortages.

TheSIBjoinedFEDECORandwithitstechnicalexpertisehelpedprovidealternative

solutionstodrilling(Assies21).Atthetime,theSIBwasoneoftheonlyurban

organizationstosupporttheruralcause,FEDECORandthecalltoenddrilling

(Assies21).TheSIB,aprofessionalorganization,wasalsooneofthefirstnon‐

subalternorganizationstojointhewaterdebate.

ThePrivatizationofWater

ThemannerinwhichwaterwasprivatizedinCochabambaeffectively

alienatedandangeredasubstantiallywidespectrumofthepopulation.In1999,the

Boliviangovernment,havingincurredmassiveamountsofdebtduringthe

neoliberalreformation,wenttotheWorldBankseekingrelief(Dangl59).Usinga

$600milliondollardebt‐reliefpackageasleverage,theWorldBankforcedthe

Boliviangovernmenttoundergoyetanotherroundofstructuraladjustments,

35

includingtheprivatizationofSEMAPA.7Inasupposedlyfreeandopenauctionfor

theCochabambawatercontract,theWorldBank,dubiouslyonlyreceivedonebid—

fromtheAmerican‐basedBechtel,theworld’slargestconstructioncompanywith

annualearningsthatnearlytripletheGDPofBolivia(Dangl61).TheBolivian

governmentandAguasdeTunari(thesubsidiarycorporationownedbyBechtel)

negotiatedthetermsofthecontractinsecrecyandbehindcloseddoors(Olivera8‐

9).

Thefairlyone‐sidedstipulationsofthecontractdemonstrateaclear

transgressionoftraditionalconceptionsofsovereignty.Theforty‐yearcontract

guaranteeda16%annualrateofreturnregardlessofitsperformance,and

determinedpriceincreasesbasedontheU.S.consumerpriceindex(Olivera10).

Furthermore,“Therewasaclauseinthecontractstatingthatthecontractitself

supersededanyothercontract,lawordecree”(Olivera10).Essentially,thecontract

privilegedBechtel’sinterestsoverwellbeingoftheBolivianpeople.Theentire

processwasundemocratic;and,finalizingthis,thesuperintendentofenergy,who

wasnominatedbyCongressforaten‐yearterm,“promulgated”thecontractof

behalfoftheBoliviangovernment(Olivera10).

InordertoprovideacomprehensivelegalframeworkfortheTunaricontract,

themunicipalgovernment,beforethecontractcameintoeffect,passedWaterLaw

2029,whicheffectivelyprivatizedallwaterinCochabamba.Thelaweliminatedthe

irrigators’righttopracticetraditionalwaterusosycostumbres—thecommunal

irrigationsystems—andendedtheguaranteeofwaterdistributioninruralareas7“In2002,inaninternalreport,thebank’sownauditorsconfirmeditwas,infact,coercionthatsettheCochabambaprivatizationinmotion”(Shultz15).

36

(InterviewFEDECOR).Inbothruralandurbanregions,thewellsandpiping,that

hadbeenconstructedandmaintainedbythecommunities,becamepropertyof

Bechtelwithoutreimbursement.Law2029evenwentsofarastoprivatize

rainwateroutlawingtheconstructionanduseofrain‐collectiontanks.Withno

regardtothe‘politicallyinvisible’,governmentelites,criminalizedtraditional

conceptionsofwaterandsacrificedthecountry’ssovereigntyinordertofacilitate,

essentially,corporateAmericanprofiteering—tosaytheleast,thisinfuriatedmany

Cochabambans.

TheDynamicsofSocialMovementLanguage

TheCochabambaWaterWarbeganinNovemberof1999immediatelythe

contractwaspromulgatedontheruralcountrysidewhereorganizations,having

gainedexperienceduringtheWaroftheWells,werewellpreparedtochallengethe

privatizationofwater.Irrigators’organizationsactingautonomouslyandalsooften

incollaborationwithFEDECORorchestratedtheconstructionofroadblocksonthe

majorhighwaysleadinginandoutofthecity(Shultz2008,16).Thetight‐knit

organizationalstructureoftheirrigators’organizationsallowedforahighly

effective,andstrategicimmobilizationofthecity.Inspiteoftheconstant

dismantlingoftheroadblocksbythepolice,whousedrubberbulletsandteargasto

dispersetheirrigators,theorganizationswereabletostophighwaytravelfor

extendedperiodsoftime(Dangl62).

Havinganestablishedbaseofknowledgeregardingwater,theirrigators’

werewellawareofthefutureimplicationsoftheprivatization.Whereastheurban

37

populationwaslargelyinexperiencedinregardstowaterpolitics,therural

irrigatorshaddeepculturalties,whichtheyfeltinclinedtofightindefenseof.For

hundredsofyears,irrigatorshadmanagedtheirwatercommunallywithtraditional

usosycostumbres.However,ownershipforthissystemwasnotconsidered

communal;rather,traditionalirrigatororganizationsconceiveofwaterasbelonging

toPachamama(MotherEarth).InthefiveinterviewswithirrigatorsthatI

conducted,withoutfail,everyone,whenspeakingabouttheWaterWar,first

mentionedPachamama.Theprivatizationofwaterunderminedthelegitimacyof

theirtraditionandoverallworld‐view.

Inadditiontothesocialeffect,privatizationthreatenedtheirrigators’

economicsecurity.Priortoreceivingthemonthlybill,thepresidentofFEDECOR

predictedwiththeanticipatedratehikesthatbetween15,000and20,000farmers

wouldbeputoutofbusiness(Assies22).Furthermore,thecontractdramatically

reducedtheamountofirrigationwaterguaranteedtotheruralareas(Assies22).

Clearly,WaterLaw2029andtheTunaricontractjeopardizedtheirrigators’

livelihoods;butitisnotpossibletodelineatebetweensocialoreconomic

infringementsassignifyingtheimpetusforprotest.PoliticalanthropologistArturo

Escobarwrites:

“Socialmovementsmustbeseenequallyandinseparablyasstrugglesovermeaningsaswellasmaterialconditions,thisis,asculturalstruggles.Areeconomiesnotculturalformsanyway?Dotheynotentailprofoundculturalchoices,astheanthropologyofmodernitydemonstrates?CertainlyHomooeconomicusisnotaculturallyneutralsubject.“Materialneeds”and“technologies”arepermeatedbyculturalcontents.Everynewtechnologyinauguratesaritual—awayofdoingthings,ofseeingtheworld,andoforganizingthesocialfield.Howthen,couldwebrushasidetheconsiderationoftheculturalcontentof“economies”?”(Escobar69).

38

Boththe“irrigationtechnologies”oftheirrigatorsthatphysicallytransect

thevariousplotsandprovidewaterforassociationoffarmersandthe

spiritual/communalconceptionofwaterascommunalcreateacultureofwater.In

otherwords,thesocialwatertraditionofPachamamaaswellastheeconomic

livelihoodofthefarmerreflexivelyreinforcetheothertothepointwherethey

cannotbeseparated.

Therefore,thelanguagedevelopedintheWaterWarprotestwasfullof

loadedterms.Thewordsusedinprotest,suchasPachamama,usosycostumbres,

neoliberalism,Americanimperialism,lossofsovereignty,injustice,all

simultaneouslycarriedeconomic,social,historical,politicalandthuscultural

connotations.Forexample,irrigatorsconstruedtheculturalideaPachamamaasthe

ultimatejustificationforthecommunaltraditionofwaterpractice,andtherefore,

alsoastheultimatedefenseagainsttheeconomicandpoliticalinjusticesurrounding

theconditionsofprivatization(InterviewFEDECOR).InthecontextoftheWater

War,theculturalsignificanceofPachamamaisconcurrentlypro‐Boliviantradition,

anti‐Americanimperialism,aswellas,anti‐government‐sponsoredinjustice.

Inasense,thelanguageoftheWaterWarestablishedamoredefinedformof

irrigatorculturebydemarcatingboundariesbetween“irrigatorculture”and

unacceptablyinvasive“Otherculture.”Thedevelopmentofsocialmovement

languagethereforereflectstheprocessofdiscoveringandarticulatingone’sown

culture.ToreferagaintoArturoEscobar,

39

“Cultureisnotsomethingthatexistsintheabstract;itisembeddedinpractices,intheeverydaylifeofpeople.Cultureis(madeof)people’spractices.Encounterswithotherswhoaredifferentfromusintensifytheawarenessofourowncultureandmakeusrealizehowwethinkandfeelinsomewaysratherthanothers,thatis,thatwehave“aculture””(Escobar70).

Ontheindividuallevel,cultureisexpressedasidentity.Beforeprivatization,

intheeyesofthegovernmenttheirrigatorswerepoliticallyinvisible,butthisdid

notnecessarilyaffecttheculturalidentityoftheirrigatorsbecausetheywerestill

abletoengageinthedailypracticeoftheirculture.Conversely,sincetheirrigators’

weredeniedtheright“topractice”governmentasapartoftheirdailylives,they

derivedlittleidentityfromtheBoliviangovernmentinthepoliticalsphere—thatis

tosay,sincetheirrigatorswereexcludedfromthepoliticalsphere,theircultural

spheredeveloped,persisted,andexistedindependently.But,sinceprivatization

directlyaffectedthedailypracticeoftheirrigators’culturalidentity,this,inturn,

createdanidentity‐basedconflict.

Inordertocounterthethreattoidentity/culture/livelihood,theirrigators

firsthadtoarticulateaconceptionofthe“collectiveself”.AccordingtoArturo

Escobar,beforetheunifyingmovement,theidentityofindividualsandcommunities

arecharacterizedbyamultiplicityofmeanings,calledthe“pluralityoforientations”

(Escobar78).Escobarwrites:

“Theconstructionofcollectiveidentities“hastwoaspects:theinternalcomplexityoftheactor(thepluralityoforientationsthatcharacterizeshim),andtheactor’srelationshipwiththeenvironment(otheractors,opportunitiesandconstraints)”…Becausealloftheseaspectsareladenwithmeaning,actorsareleftwiththeonlypossibilityofbuildingcollectiveidentitiesthroughthearticulationofmeaning”(Escobar78).

40

Theunity,whichbindsthemembersofamovement,doesnotemerge

passively,butratheritmustbeactivelycreated.Beforethemovement,themeaning

ofwords,suchaswater,variedbetweenindividualsandcommunities,anditexisted

inthepassiveculturalsphere.Meaningintheculturalsphereispassivesince

cultureis,aswasmentioned,peoples’everydaypractices—andthereforecultureis

notexperiencedas“culture”ratheras“everydaylife.”Withinthecontextofone’s

ownculturalenvironment,peoplearenottypicallyabletoseparatethemselvesfrom

their“dailyculture.”Cultureissimplylived—itisnotactivelyexpressedassuch

(undernormalcircumstances).Forexample,intheculturalsphere,words,suchas

water,areamorphousintheirmeaning.Culturaltraditionsandthepluralityof

meaningsofwords,whichvaryfromindividualtoindividual,arepassivelyaccepted

as“dailylife.”

When“dailyculture”isthreatened,meaningmovesfromthepassivecultural

spheretotheactivepoliticalsphere.Immediately,outofaculturalconfrontation,

onedevelopsaself‐awarenessofone’sowndailylife.Whathadbeenpassivelylived

becomesactivelydefined.Thisprocessisprincipallyenactedthroughthecreation

ofalanguageofcollectivemeanings.The“dailylife,”thatwasoncecharacterized

byapluralityofamorphousmeanings,iscodifiedinapoliticizedlanguage.The

meaningofeachwordisdistilledtoitsculturalcommondenominator—thisgives

thewordsaunifyingpower.

Whilethespecificculturaltraditionsofeachcommunityvaried,theirrigators

collectivelydistilledandcreatedapoliticalvocabularywithwords,suchas

Pachamama,usosycostumbres,etcetera.Everypoliticizedwordofasocial

41

movementimplicitlyexpressesacollectivesentiment:toresistandovercomethe

threat.Asthemovementprogresses,meaningbecomesincreasinglymorepolitical.

Inotherwords,eachwordbecomesmoreexpressiveofitsimplied/intendedend.In

ordertomakedemands,onehastobeabletocommunicateabasisforthedemands.

Thewordsthemselvesarethusremovedfromtheirculturalcontextandfully

submittedtothepoliticalsphere.

Theprotestlanguagedevelopedbytheirrigatorshelpedbridgethedivide

betweentheruralandurbansectorsofCochabambansociety(Dangl62).Urban

protestersadoptedthecultural‐basedlanguage,whichwasmoredevelopedinthe

ruralareas.BeforetheWaterWar,theuseofculturallanguage,suchasPachamama,

wasnotaspredominantintheurbanpopulation’sconceptionofwater;asthe

movementgainedmomentum,however,theurbanprotestorsassumedamore

cultural,“Bolivian”identity.

ConnectingtheDots:ForminganAssociationofAssociations

InadditiontoFEDECOR,otherorganizationshadbecomeinvolvedinthe

issueofprivatization.PuebloenMarchwasoneofthefirsturbangroupstoprotest

theprivatization.Theorganizationconsistedofenvironmentalists,architects,

economists,andsomeelectedofficials,who,priortotheWaterWar,hadprotested

relevantissuesinthecity’smainplazaeveryTuesday(Olivera27).Asnewsofthe

eminentprivatizationemerged,PuebloenMarchaacquainteditselfwiththeissue

andbeganprotestingeveryTuesdayintheplaza(InterviewFEDECOR).

42

InJulyof1999,inreactiontothegovernment’sproposedplanstoprivatize

SEMAPA,agroupofengineersformedtheCommitteefortheDefenseofWaterand

thePopularEconomy(DefenseCommittee)8.Thecommitteeorganizedurban

protestsagainsttheirpredictionsofratehikes.BeforeNovember,theextentof

urbanprotests,however,waslocalizedtoprofessionalgroups.

Adifferentorganization,theCivicCommittee,attemptedtodiscreditthe

accuracyoftheDefenseCommitteepredictions(Assies22).Formedinthe1970s,

theCivicCommitteewasoriginallybroad‐basedwitharangeoforganizationsand

expressedregionaldemandsagainstthecountry’scorruptionauthoritarianregime;

overtime,however,theorganizationhadcomeunderthecontroloflocalbusiness

elitesandhadthuslostmuchofitspopularlegitimacy(Assies22).Inordertogive

theprivatizationthepoliticalappearanceofhavingpopularsupport,ManfredReyes

VillapublicallylegitimizedWaterLaw2029andtheTunariContractbyutilizingthe

supportoftheCivicCommittee,whichgavetheprivatizationthepolitical

appearanceofhavingpopularsupport.Intheplanningphasesoftheprivatization

ofSEMAPA,VillaReyesexcludedtheCDWPEandincludedtheCivicCommitteeas

the“representative”ofthepeoples’interests(Assies22).

IncontrasttotheCivicCommittee,theFabrileswasanurbanorganization,

whichbecameasubstantialactorintheWaterWarthatactuallyrepresenteda

broadportionofthepopulation.Inthe1990s,Fabrilesemergedinresponsetothe

NEP‐instigatedtrade‐unioncrisis:

“TheFDTFChasmaintainedapresenceinthelocalmediatoinformthepopulationaboutlaborconditionsandsoughttoorganizeunions

8ManymembersofPuebloenMarchaalsoparticipatedintheCDWPE.

43

inthesmallfactoriesandsweatshopsthatmakeuptherestructuredindustrialsectoreventhoughtheGeneralLaborLawprohibitsunionizationwithfewerthan20workers”(Assies23‐24).Withitsopen‐doorpolicyandcreativeresponsestothelaborcrisis,Fabriles

hadgarneredwidespreadsupportanda“significantmoralweightinthecity”

(Assies24).ThoughtheFabriles,initsdefenseoftheworkers,actedasadefacto

union,theorganizationwasnottraditionallystructuredasaunioninthattheitdid

notcollectfeesorhaveobligatorymembership.Mostly,theorganizationhelped

individualworkersfindsolutionstowork‐relatedinjustices(Olivera26).

OnNovember12,afteraseriesofpreviousnegotiationsinitiatedby

FEDECOR,Fabriles,theDefenseCommittee,andFEDECORcollectivelyformedthe

Coordinador(CoordinadoradeDefensedelAguaydelaVida).9OscarOlivera,the

presidentofFabriles,becamethepresident;OmarFernández,thePresidentof

FEDECOR,becametheVicePresident;andGabrielHerbas,thepresidentofthe

DefenseCommittee,becamethegeneralsecretary.

TheCoordinadoraencompassedaconglomerationofitsfounding

organizations’strengths10.ThemergerbetweenFEDECORandFabrilesunitedthe

ruralandurbansubalternpopulationsoverasingleissue;inregardstothehistory

ofBoliviansocialmovements,thistypeofalliancewasararity.Whereasinearlier

socialmovementsthegovernmentwasabletoco‐optorsuppresscertainsocial

sectors,witharural/urbanunification,thewidersocial‐baseprovedresilientto

governmentcontrol.9CoalitioninDefenseofWaterandLife10ItshouldbementionedthatwhiletheCoordinadorawascentralintheorchestrationoftheWaterWar,manyorganizationsandassociationsoperatedindependentlyindefianceoftheprivatization.Giventhescopeofthispaper,IwillfocusontheactionsoftheCoorinadora.

44

Organizationally,theCoordinadoraadoptedthecoordinatingstructurethat

FEDECORhadusedduringtheWaroftheWells.Aspartofahorizontallyorganized

associationofassociation,eachofthememberorganizationsretainedfullautonomy

overtheiractions.ThroughouttheWaterWar,theCoordinadoraprovidedbroader

strategieswhileindividualorganizationsandassociationsacted,attimes,

independently—maintainingroadblocksandorganizingneighborhoodprotests

(InterviewFEDECOR)(Assies25).Also,aswasmentioned,FEDECORwasableto

contributetheirrigatorcultural“language”thatithadpreviouslydeveloped,which

greatlyenhancedtheCoordinadora’sabilitytoarticulateitself.

TheDefenseCommittee,alongwithmembersfromPuebloenMarcha,

providedtheCoordinadorawiththenecessarytechnicalexpertise.TheTunari

contractandWaterLaw2029wereriddledwithtechnocratjargonthatrequiredthe

professionalexpertiseoflawyersandeconomiststodecipher.Intermsof

articulatingpoliticaldemands,understandingtheproblemandpossiblesolutionsis

critical.Also,thesupportofmiddleclassprofessionalsallowedtheCoordinadorato

transcendtheclass‐struggleimage.

WaterWar

Whilenumerousprotestshadoccurredintheruralareasimmediatelyafter

privatization,largeurbanprotestdidnotbeginuntilpeoplebeganreceivingtheir

monthlybillsinDecember.HigherthanAguasdeTunarihadpromised,theaverage

ratehikewas51%(43%forthepoorestusers)(Shultz19).Insomeareas,people

hadtheirmonthlybillincreaseby300%(Olivera10).Inacitywithamonthly

45

minimumwageof$41dollars,thepriceincreasescouldnotbeafforded(Olivera8).

NotonlydidAguasdeTunariraisetheirrates,butthecompanyalsochargedpeople

formorewaterthantheywereconsuming(McKissick5).Ultimately,the

unreasonablewaterbillsservedasthecatalystfortheurbanstruggle;however,the

natureofthisstrugglewasnotinitsessencematerialoreconomicallybased.As

wasmentionedinregardstotheirrigators,theWaterWarwasaculturalstruggle,

onewhichsoughttodefendthedailylife.Thesocialcostprivatizationwasnot

simplyaneconomicburdenbutanunjustculturalinfringement.

OnJanuary11,theCoordinadoracollaboratedlooselywiththeCivic

Committeeandorganizedanindefiniteshut‐ownofthecityinprotestoftherate

hikes.IntheearlystagesoftheWaterWar,theCivicCommitteeattemptedto

appearasrepresentativeofthepeople.Thesuccessofthisprotestwaslargely

dependentupontheroadblocksoftheirrigatorswhoeffectivelycut‐offallhighway

transportation.Aftertwenty‐fourhours,theCivicCommitteewithdrewitssupport

ofthestrike,butthemassiveprotestcontinuedunderthedirectionofthe

Coordinadora(Assies25).ThislegitimizedtheCoordinadoraintheeyesofthe

governmentandtrivializedtheCivicCommitteeintheeyesofthepeople(Assies

25).Withthecityfullyimmobilized,thegovernment,havingunsuccessfullybroken

themobilizationwithteargas,optedfornegotiations.

TheJanuary13thnegotiationsinvolvedthemunicipalgovernment,Civic

CommitteeandCoordinadora.Thegovernmentstatedthatitwouldrevisethe

WaterLaw2029andtheAguasdeTunaricontract,butthatitwouldnotchangethe

rates.Furthermore,thegovernmentstatedthatitwouldreviewthedemandsmade

46

bytheCoordinadorawithinthreemonths.Thegovernmentsapparentappeasement

wasmerelyanattempttooutlastanddissolvetheCoordinadora:“Thegovernment’s

negotiatingtacticatthisstagewastotrytostrikeadealwiththeCivicCommittee,

marginalizetheCoordinadora,andmaintainanappropriatelevelofsecurityfor

investment”(McKissick6).

Soonafterthenegotiations,thearrivalof1000heavilyarmedDalmatians,

theequivalentofBolivianspecialforces,revealedthegovernmentstrueintentions

(Shultz19).Reminiscentoftheauthoritarianyears,PresidentHugoBanzer,who

hadbeendemocraticallyallowedtoreturntopower,gavetheordertosendthe

Dalmatians.

Inspiteofthegovernment’sattempttoendtheprotestswithempty

promisesandincreasedrepression,thedemonstrationsandroadblocksnotonly

continuedbutalsointensified.TheCocaleros,cocagrowersfromtheChapare,who

hadextensiveprotestexperiencestrugglingagainstanti‐narcoticsmissions,joined

themovement.Inresponsetoincreasedpressure,thegovernmentmadeasecond

attemptatappeasementandstatedthatitwouldfreezetheratehikesat20%

(Assies25).Protestorsdidnotheedtothisconcessionanddemonstrationsonly

intensified.

After70civiliansand51policemenwerewoundedand172arrests,the

CatholicChurcharrangedforanadditionalroundofnegotiations(McKissick6).On

February6th,thegovernmentsignedadealwhichincludedthecreationofa

committeetostudythewaterrates,arevisionofthewaterrates,aproposalfora

generalwaterlaw,whichwouldrespectruralcommunitytraditions,andthe

47

revisionofWaterLaw2029within45days(Assies25).Again,through

appeasementthegovernmentattemptedtomarginalizetheCoordinadora.

Inordertoassessthepoliticalwillofthepeopleaswellasmaintainthe

cohesionofthemovement,inearlyMarchtheCoordinadoraheldapublic

referendum(ConsultaPopular)completelyindependentofthestate.Inpreparation

forthereferendum,forthreedaysactivistsfirstset‐upworkshopsinruraland

urbancommunitiestoeducatethepeopleaboutthecomplexitiesoftheissue.More

than50,000people,onetenththeelectorate,willinglyparticipatedintheConsulta

Popular,whichinturnestablishedthat90%ofthepopulationwasinfavorof

cancellingtheTunaricontract(Assies27)(Shultz26).TheConsultaPopularhelped

legitimizetheCoordinadorabothfromaninternalandexternalperspective;inthat,

itdemonstratedthattheCoordinadorawascommittedtothepeople’sinterestsand

thattheCoordinadorahadconsolidatedaconsiderableamountofpopularsupport.

WhiletheCivicCommittee,whichclaimedtorepresentthepeople,wasmaking

dealswithManfredReyesVillaandthemunicipalgovernment,theCoordinadora

establisheditselfastheexecutivevoiceofthemovement(McKissick6).

InlateMarch,frustratedwiththegovernment’sinaction,theCoordinadora

demandedareturntonegotiationsbyApril4thandthreatenedtoorganizeanother

massprotest.Meanwhile,operatingindependently,otherorganizations,suchasthe

ConferaciónSindicalÚnicadeTrabajadoresCampesinosdeBolivia(CSUTCB)11

beganroadblockinghighwaysallaroundthecountryandmadeitsownsetof

11UnitaryUnionConfederationofBolivianPeasantWorkers

48

demands.FEDECORalsomaintaineditshighwayroadblocksontheoutskirtsofthe

city(Assies26).

“ThegovernmentandtheCivicCommitteecongratulatedthemselvesontheseemingimpotenceandisolationoftheCoordinadora.Galindo12statedthat“thereisnothingtonegotiate.”Onthenextday,April5,however,thousandsofCochabambinos,amongthemavarietyofwatercommitteesaswellsastheheavytransportworkers’unionanddelegationsfromtheruralareas,filledthePlaza14deSeptiembre”(Assies28).Atthispoint,thousandsofactivists,representingmanyorganizations,

converged,andtheCoordinadoradidnothavefullcontrol.Thepoliceshadbeen

orderedtostanddown,ratherthanantagonizethecrowd,andsotheactivistsno

longerhadavisibleenemytounifyagainst(Dangl65).Realizingthepotentialfor

spontaneoussocialcombustion,theCoordinadoraorganizedasetofmeetingsand

assembliestoonceagaingaugethewillofthepeople—inamediatedmanner.

TheCoordinadoraarrangedthreelevelsofpublicdeliberations.Thefirst

leveloperatedasatown‐hallassemblyandenableddirectcommunityparticipation.

Workerorganizationandneighborhoodorganizations,suchaswatercommittees,

formedassemblieswithintheirparticularsectors,forexampletheirrigation

farmers’assembly.Withinthesecommunitylevelassemblies,allmembershadthe

opportunitytopersonallyvoicetheiropinionsandparticipateinthepolitical

process(Olivera37).Eachassemblyafterreachingconsensusthensentadelegate

tothenextlevelofmeetings—theCoordinadoraassemblies.

IntheCoordinadoraAssemblies,informalrepresentativefromeachsector

wereonlyallowedtospeakonthebehalfoftheirsector.Additionally,inorderto

12ThePrefectoftheDepartmentofCochabamba

49

speakandbeheardatthesemeetings,communitieshadtohavedemonstrateda

commitmenttoaction(i.e.roadblocks)(Dangl65).TheseCoordinadoraAssemblies

“werewherethecommuniquéswerewrittenandstrategicanalysistookplace

(Olivera38).GiventheorganizationalstructureoftheCoordinadora(an

associationofassociations),communitiesandorganizationswerenotonlyinvitedto

butalsonecessaryinthestrategicplanningofthemovement.

Transitioningtothethirdlevel,leadersoftheCoordinadoratookthemost

importantstrategicquestionstothecabildo—townmeeting.Theactivistgathering

involvedbetweenfiftyandseventythousandpeople,whorespondedtothe

Coordinadora’svariousproposalsthroughcollectivesentiment.OnApril5,

Coordinadoraleadersproposedtogivethegovernmenttwenty‐fourhoursto

abrogatetheTunaricontract.Unwillingtowait,thecrowddeclinedand

subsequentlymarchedtoandpeacefullyoccupiedtheAguasdeTunarioffice.In

effect,theCoordinadorawasunabletochanneltheenergyofthecabildotowardits

owngoals.

DemandingtheannulmentoftheTunaricontractandtherevisionofWater

Law2029,massivecrowdsoccupiedthemainplazaonboththe6thandthe7thof

April.Conflictintensifiedwhenthepolicebeganarrestingorganizationleaders.On

April8,PresidentHugoBanzerdeclaredaninetyday“stateofsiege.”National

governmentofficialsjustifiedthesiegesayingthatdrugtraffickerswereresponsible

forthedisorder.Telltailsignspointedtoaneminentmassacre.Thenew

developmenthadinflamedpeopleallaroundthecountryandcountrywideprotests

increased(Assies29).Themilitaryevenwentsofarastocuttheelectricityofnew

50

stationstopreventthedisseminationoftheprotest(Assies29).Thatday,aftera

snipershotandkilled17year‐oldHugoDaza,themovementhadintensifiedand

wasbeyondthegovernment’scontrol.

ByApril9,thegovernmentofficiallyannouncedtheterminationoftheTunari

contract.Thenextday,anagreementbetweenthegovernmentandthe

CoordinadorareinstatedSEMAPAwithfullmunicipalownership.AndbyApril11,

WaterLaw2029wasrescindedandreplacedbyLaw2066,proclaimedbyBanzer,

whichcontainedthirtyarticles.Themainpointsof2066involved“(1)the

possibilityofcreatinganationalwatercouncilwasleftopen;(2)insteadoffive‐year

licensespeasantsandindigenousorganizationsnowhadtoregisteronlyfor“the

usefullifeofservice”;(3)inconcessionareastheconcessionaireswouldnothave

monopolyrightsandwatercommittees,cooperatives,andotherusosycostumbres

wouldberecognized;and(4)ratestructuresweretobeestablishedinconsultation

withthemunicipalitiesandthelocalunitsofPopularParticipation”(Assies30).In

essence,thegovernmentfullyrecognizedthepoliticaldemandsoftheWaterWar

socialmovement.

PartIII:Analysis

HistoricRebellion:FromSubalterntoCitizen

Citizenshipisaquestionofsovereignty—thatistosay,aquestionofcontrol

overlaw.MichaelOakeshottwrites:

“Incivilassociationthevalidityofalawliesneitherinthewisdomoftheconditionsitimposesuponconduct,noreveninitspropensitytopromotepeace,butinitsbeingthecommandofthesovereignand

51

(althoughthisisobscure)initsbeingeffectivelyenforced”(Oakeshott262).

Duringthecolonialperiod,theSpanisholigarchywasthesovereign.The

lawsdecreedbytheSpanishweredesignedtoprotectandfacilitatetheirinterests,

whichwereprimarilyconcernedwiththeexploitationoftheindigenouspopulation.

Thedualrepublicsystemofgovernancedefinitivelydemarcatedthedivision

betweenthesovereignandtheindigenoussubaltern.WithintheSpanishpolitical

sphere,indigenousparticipationwaslegallyimpossible—andtherefore,the

subalternwascompletelydeniedasovereignstatus.

Intermsofpoliticalidentity,theSpanishimposedaunitaryidentity,based

onraceandeconomicobjectification,uponthesubaltern.Legalizedinthedual

republic,asingularpoliticalidentityencompassedtheentiresubaltern:Indian

savage/slave.Therewerenodelineationsbetweenthevariousformsofeconomic

objectifications(i.e.noformaldivisionoflabor).TheSpanishextractedthetypeof

laborfromasinglesubalternpool(usingthecariazgosystem)whenitneededit(i.e.

toworkinthemines).

Althoughthesubalternwasunifiedinitsobjectifiedidentity,thisdidnot

correlatewithactualsubalternunity.TheSpanishmaintainedphysicalsubaltern

divisionsusingthecariazgosystem,whichineffectisolatedcommunities.Atthis

point,thesecommunitieshadnobasisforthecollectivearticulationofacommon

demand.Theculturalidentities,atthistime,remainedgroundedinpre‐colonial

indigenoustradition,and,asidefromtheSpanishexploitation,therewasnothingto

linkthevariousindigenouscommunities.Thus,atthispoint,therewasnocommon

senseofselfinwhichtobaseacommondemand.Furthermore,giventheseverityof

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theSpanishexploitation,alliancesbetweencariazgocommunitiesweredifficultto

arrange.

Theentireweightofthesovereignpusheddownuponthesubalternleaving

noroomforthesubalterntoorganizewithintheresistancesphere.Idefinethe

resistancesphereasthesocialspacewherethesubalterncanorganizeandresist

thesovereign.Indiagram1,theSpanishsovereigndirectlyexertsitsforceonthe

subaltern.Thehegemonicsovereignwasprincipallyconcernedwiththe

exploitationthesubaltern,andthesubalternhadnomeansofpushingback.Inthis

period,therewasnospaceforthesubalterntoresist.

DuringtheRepublicanperiod,theBoliviancriollooligarchywasthe

sovereign.InordertocreateaunifiedBoliviannation‐state,therepublicansended

thedualrepublicsystem,andincorporatedthesubalternintothesamelegal

frameworkasthesovereign.DespitethenominaluniversalityofBolivianrights,the

sovereignlegalsystem,throughitsspecificationsforcitizenship(ex.voting

requirements),nonethelessexcludedthesubalternfromparticipatinginthe

politicalsphere.

InthenewBolivianstate,thesovereignmodifiedthepoliticalidentityofthe

subaltern.Theeliminationofthecariazgosysteminturnfacilitatedthecreationof

aformalizeddivisionoflaborthatcouldmeettheneedsofacapitalizingworld.In

ordertoincreasesovereigncontrolandeconomicefficiency,thesovereign

standardizedthesubalternidentitybyeliminatingcommunityself‐governanceand

byrequiringculturalhomogenization,suchaslearningSpanish.Thesovereignno

longerrecognizedthesubalternas“Indians”butratheras“Bolivianothers.”This

53

newpoliticalidentityretainedeconomicobjectificationasitscore.Thesovereign

maintaineditsexploitivepracticesbydenyingthe“Bolivianother”rights(see

diagram2).

Inregardstotheculturalidentityofthesubaltern,the“Bolivianother”

politicalidentitydidhaveaunifyingeffect.Intherepublicanperiod,inadditionto

thecollectiveexperienceofexploitation,thesubalternsharedanationality.Also,

becauseofthedivisionoflabor,thesubalternbegantounifywithinvarious

economicsectors.Thecaraizgocommunity,oncethecenteroftheculturalidentity,

wasreplacedbylargepeasantandminerorganizations.

Outsidetherepublicansovereign,thesubalternhadincreasedspacefor

resistance(seediagram3).UnliketheSpanishsovereign,whichdirectlyexploited

thesubaltern,therepublicansovereignindirectlyfacilitatedtheprivatized

exploitationofthesovereign.Whileconditionsremainedharsh,thesovereign

playedalessactive,oppressiveroleintheexploitationprocess(ex.suppressing

strikes).Thisgavethesubalterntheopportunitytoorganize.

Withintheresistancesphere,thesubalternarticulateditselfintheeconomic

sectors.Largepeasantandminerorganizationsmadedemandsforbetterworking

conditionsandrights.Inthissense,thesubalternidentitywithintheresistance

spherewasprimarilyeconomicallybased.AftertheChacoWar,partsofthe

subaltern,especiallytheveterans,didincorporatenationalismintotheiridentity,

butbyandlarge,resistanceidentitywasgroundedintheeconomicsectors.The

formationoftheseidentitiesindicatestheexistenceofpoliticalidentityspace

betweenthesovereignandthesubaltern—sincethesovereigndidnotdirectly

54

controltheexploitationandthusidentityofthesubaltern,thesubalternhadroom

(theability)toorganizeamovementintheresistancesphere.Forthisreason,the

subalternwaseffectiveintheRevolutionof1952.

Intheyearsimmediatelyfollowingtherevolution,thesubalternandtheMNR

oligarchywereessentiallyone,andyettherewasnosovereign.Thevarioussectoral

groups,whichweredivided,andtheMNRoligarchyeachhadtheirownagendaboth

whenfightingandinpower.Thesectoralgroupssoughttoadvancetheirparticular

sectors,andtheMNRoligarchysoughttoconsolidateitspower.Atthispoint,each

groupinvolvedwasdefactosovereignbutonlyinanextremelylimitedsense—over

thelawsregulatingtheirownsector.Becausethesovereigntywasdivided,there

wasnoinstitutionalized,all‐inclusivenotionofsovereignty,whichwouldhave

transformedthesubalternintocitizens.

Thus,intheseearlyyearsaftertherevolution,thegovernment,asan

institution,wasnotsovereignbutrathertheindividualactorsingovernment(see

diagram4).Tocounterthechaosofthis,theMNRoligarchydistancedthe

subaltern’sdirectinfluenceandconsolidatedsovereignpower.TheMNRoligarchy

usedclientelismtomanagethesubalternsectordemands.Thesubalternwas

separatedandisolatedwithinthesectorsbythematerialconcessions;thisfurther

preventedatrueimmaterialparticipationandcontestationascitizens.

Thisperiodcementedthesubalternpoliticalidentityaseitherpeasantsor

sindicalistas.Outsideoftheseidentities,thesubalternwasinvisible;insidethese

identitiesthesubalternhadtheopportunitytowingovernmentconcessions.

Subalternfragmentationwasthemostsignificantdrawbacktothispoliticalidentity.

55

WhilethesubalternhadpoliticalspacetoresisttheMNRoligarchy,theresistance

wasneverunifiedbyacommonvision.JustastheMNRoligarchyobjectively

identifiedthesubalterninthepoliticalsphereasworkerunionists,intheresistance

sphere,thesubalternconceivedoftheirresistanceidentitiesasworkerunionists.

Asseenindiagram5,intheMNRperiod,thereweremultipleresistancespheres

thatexistedoutsidethedirectcontroloftheMNRoligarchy.Ultimately,thisledto

thedeepeningoffactionallinesandtheradicalizationofdemands,which,inturn,

ledtothedownfalloftheMNRgovernment.

Inthecounter‐revolutionperiodfrom1964to1982,thedictatorships

reestablishedahegemonicoligarchicsovereign;thisprocessinvolvedincreasingthe

politicalspacebetweenthepoliticalsphereandtheresistancespheres.Atfirst,

undertheBarrientosregime,thesovereignmanipulatedandturnedthesubaltern

sectoralresistancespheresagainstthemselves(i.e.peasantsvs.miners)(see

diagram6).Oncetheresistancesphereoftheminerswasdecreased,thesovereign

wasabletominimizetheinfluenceofthepeasantunions.Eventhoughthe

sovereigndisempoweredthesubalterndirectinfluenceongovernment,the

subalternretainedsomeofitssovereigntywithinitsownsector.

Thepoderdualdynamicwascharacterizedbytheinterplaybetweenthe

sovereignandtheresistanceofthesubaltern.Thesovereigndidnothavethepower

tocompletelyeliminatetheresistancespheresofthesubaltern,andthesubaltern

didnothavetheunifiedpowertoaccessthepoliticalsphere,butitdidhavethe

powertopressurethesovereign.Indiagram7,theresistanceandsovereign

politicalspheresareseparate,andthecentralsovereignpreservestheirdivisions.

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NeoliberalismandtheNEPeconomicreformsof1985dissolvedthe

resistancespheres.Therestructuringoflaborlawsalongwiththecollapseofthe

miningindustryatomizedthesubalternworker.Becausethesubalternhad

articulateditselfineconomictermsintheresistancesphere,aftertheneoliberal

reforms,theresistancespheresdissipatedconcurrentlywiththeunions.This

markedtheendofthepoderdual,aswellas,thesubalternabilitytopressurethe

politicalsphere.Indiagram8,thesovereignhasconsolidatedhegemonicpower

andfragmentedallformsofsubalternresistanceorganization.

Havingeliminatedtheresistancesphere,thesovereignnolongerhada

meansofdirectlycontrollingthesubaltern.Whenthereisaresistancesphere,itis

easyforthesovereigntoidentifyandthusoppresstheparticulargroupof

subalterns.Withouttheresistancespheres,thesovereignhadnomeansofcreating

anobjectifiedidentity,whichwouldallowthesovereigntocontrolthesubalternby

preventingtheemergenceofnewresistancespheres.

Indirectly,thesovereigncontrolledthesubalternvianeoliberalism.

Subalternworkerrightsandorganizationswereeithernonexistentorpowerless.In

thissense,thedirectcontrolofthesubaltern,whichwasindirectlysupportedbythe

sovereign,wasinthehandsoftheprivatebusinesssphere.

Inordertomoredirectlycontrolthesubaltern,thesovereigninitiated

multiculturaldecentralization.TheLPPattemptedtoobjectivelydefinethe

subaltern’srelationtothesovereign,inthatitchanneledpoliticalactivismaway

fromthesovereignintotheOTBs(seediagram9).TheOTBs,whichhadbeen

designedbygovernmenttechnocrats,allowedonlyalimitedamountofparticipation

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andcontestation,butdidnotgivethesubalternaccesstoactualsovereigndecision‐

making.WhiletheOTBsprovidedapoliticaldistraction,thesovereigncontinued

implementinglawsreflectingitsneoliberalinterestsatthenationallevel.Because

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theOTBsbecamemiredbycorruption,theylosttheirlegitimacyintheeyesofthe

subaltern,andthustheintendedoutcomeoftheOTBswasneverfullyrealized.

ThesuccessoftheWaterWarresultedfromtheunificationofsmall

resistancespheres.Groups,suchasFabriles,FEDECOR,watercommittees,

neighborhoodassociations,smallprofessionalassociations,developed

autonomouslyinalimitedpoliticalspacethatwasnotdirectlyorindirectly

oppressedbythesovereign.Giventheirsmallsize,thegroupswereinvisibleinthe

politicalsphere,andwerethusabletoevadethesovereign.Forexample,water

committeesdevelopedinneighborhoodsasameanstoprovidethecommunitywith

water.Thesovereigndidnotinhibitthistypeoforganizationasitwasseenas

necessarytothesurvivalofthesubaltern.Togiveanotherexample,thesovereign

didnotdirectlysuppressFabrilesbecause,byandlarge,theorganizationnever

garneredsufficientsubalternsupporttoactuallyposeathreattothesovereign.In

thecaseofFEDECOR,whilethesovereigndidsuppressFEDECORintheWarofthe

Wells,itdidnotdismantletheirrigators’associations,whichconstitutedthetrue

coreofFEDECOR.

Largely,thesegroupsfirstorganizedasameanstomeetspecific,localneeds

andthuswereinseparablefromthecommunitiesinwhichtheyoperated.The

resistanceidentitieswithineachofthesegroupswasnoteconomicallybased,aswas

thecasewithpreviousresistancegroups,butprimarilylocallybased.Whereas

institutionalizedandhierarchicalunionswereeasilysubduedwithforceandco‐

optation,communityorganizations,whichhaddemocraticinternalstructures,were

abletoresistthesovereign’straditionaltactics.

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Individually,theresistancesphereswereunabletoeffectivelypressurethe

sovereign;however,collectively,whenunifiedbythepublicgood,theseresistance

spheresactuallybecamethesovereign.TheimplementationoftheWaterLaw2029

andtheTunaricontractdirectlythreatenedthelivelihoodsoftheentire

Cochabambasubalternpopulation.Thenatureofthisthreatfirstaffectedthe

particulargroups(irrigators,workers,watercommittees)passiveculturalsphere.

Intheculturalsphere,theissueofwaterismaterialinitssignificancetothe

community.Forexample,water,fortheirrigators,wasessentialtotheirsurvivalas

irrigators.

Intheprocessoftransmutingwaterfromthepassiveculturalspheretothe

activeresistancesphere,watertransformedfromthematerialtotheimmaterial.

Whilethematerialsignificanceofwaterdifferedineachsubalterngroup,the

immaterialsignificancewasuniversal:inallcommunitiesandorganizations,just

accesstowaterwasessential.Thus,thepublicgoodisthecollectivearticulationin

theresistancesphereoftheimmaterialessential.

Theoligarchicsovereign,despiteitsmanyattempts,wasunabletomaterially

placateorforcefullyoppressthedemandsofthesubalternresistancespheres.

Ironically,theatomization,thatwastheproductoftheneoliberalperiod,facilitated

thearticulationofthepublicgood.Hypothetically,hadthereonlybeenafewlarge

unionorganizationsmakingademandforwater,thesovereigncouldhaveeasily

suppressedorco‐optedinthegroupswithpatronage.ButinthecaseoftheWater

War,theentireatomicsubalternwasunifiedbyanimmaterialdemandthatcould

notbeboughtoff.

60

Throughthearticulationofthepublicgoodandthesubsequent

immobilizationofcityofCochabamba,thesubalternbecamesovereignoverwater.

Theoligarchicsovereignlostitscontroloverthesovereigntyofwaterwhenitlost

controloverthesubaltern.Throughthestrikesandmassprotests,thesubaltern

gainedhegemoniccontroloverwater.

Atthispoint,itisnecessarytoreexaminethedemographicsoftheoligarchic

sovereignandthesubaltern.BecausetheWorldBankcoercedtheBolivian

sovereignintoprivatizingwater,theBolivianoligarchicsovereigndefacto

surrendereditssovereignty.WhilemembersoftheBolivianoligarchicsovereign

stillbenefittedfromtheTunaricontract,thecontract,andthusBechtel,heldthatit

wastheultimatesovereignwhenitcametotheissueofwater.Thestipulation

guaranteeing16%returnsregardlessofperformanceperfectlyillustratesthispoint.

Ineffect,theentireBolivianpopulationwasplacedintoasubalternpositionbythe

exploitivecontract.Forthisreason,manyBoliviansinboththeupperandmiddle

classjoinedthetraditionalsubalterninthefightforsovereignty.

ThepassingofWaterLaw2026,whichreplacedWaterLaw2029,

transformedthesubalternintocitizens.Afterexpellingtheoligarchicsovereign

(Bechtel),thesubaltern,representedbytheCoordinadora,cementeditssovereignty

intheformoflaw.Thehegemonicprotectionofthislawisnotmaintainedbythe

oligarchicgovernment13butratherbythecitizens,whowereoncethesubaltern.It

isreasonabletosaythatwaterwillneveragainbeprivatizedinCochabamba—not

13Here,Iuseoligarchicgovernmentinsteadofoligarchicsovereignbecausetheoligarchicgovernmentisnolongersovereignoverwater.

61

simplybecauseoftheexistenceofalaw,butbecauseoftheexistenceofasovereign

defenderofthepublicgood.

TheWaterWartransformedthesubalternintocitizens.Law2026endedthe

exploitiveuseofpower,andnowthe“people”notanoligarchyholdsovereignty

overwater.Citizenshipisdefinedastheabsenceofasubaltern;inotherwords,

citizenshipnecessitatesuniversality.Concerningthecontemporarypoliticsofwater

inCochabamba,allpersonsarepoliticallyvisible,inthatallCochabambanscan

participateandcontesttheissueofwaterinthepoliticalsphere.SincetheWater

War,theoligarchy,withoutitsexclusivehegemonicforce,hasnotbeenableto

significantlyexcludeanyCochabambansviarepressionorco‐optation—everyoneis

sovereignandthuspoliticallyonanequalplane(seediagram10).

Inregardstothepoliticsofwater,althoughcitizenshiphasbeenestablished,

thisdoesnotmeanthatissueofwatermanagementhasbeensolved.Infact,in

manyways,therealwaterwarhasonlyjustbegun.Questionsovermanagement,

service,ownership,anddevelopmentremainunsettled.ShouldSEMAPAbesocially

orpublicallyowned?HowcanSEMAPAmoredemocraticallyrepresentthewillof

thepeople?Howandtowhatdegreeshouldthepublicbeabletoparticipateand

62

conteststrictlytechnicalissues?Inwhatwaysshouldservicebeextended?How

shouldSEMAPAintegrateautonomouswatercommittees?(Aguilar62)Howcan

theinstitutionaltransparencybeincreasedinordertopreventcorruption?

Currentlyindividualcitizensandcitizenorganizationsactivelyand

competitivelyareaddressingthesequestions.Ononeendofthepoliticalspectrum,

governmentelitesareattemptingtoreestablishinstitutionalcontroloverSEMAPA.

Giventheirexperience,resourcesandclientelisticconnectionsingovernment,the

eliteshavehadsuccess.TravisDriessenwrites:

“Themayor,reinforcedbyhistechnocraticstaff,hasusedthisofficetoconstructpoliticalcampaignstoconsolidatehiselectoralsupportwithOTBpresidentsbyofferingthemaccesstoserviceprovisions”(Dreissen4).

Usingtheirpoliticaladvantages,theelitesatthispointhavepreventeda

majorsocialoverhaulofSEMAPA;theireffortsandinterests,however,havenot

goneunchecked.In2007,theCitizenDirectors(CDs),anelectedcivilianoversight

bodythatsitsontheSEMAPAboardofdirectors,revealedthatonemilliondollars

hadbeenlosttocorruption(Dreissen5).Asaresult,theexecutivedirectorwas

forcedtoresign.

Inadditiontocurtailingtheeliteagenda,citizenshavecontinuedthe

democratizationofSEMAPA.Groups,suchastheCoordinadora,haveworkedto

changetheinstitutionalstructureofSEMAPA’sbureaucracyandhaveadvocatedthe

decentralizationofdevelopmentprojects.TravisDriessenwrites:

“Astheseprogressiveactorsarduouslychipawayattheformidablepowerstructureandstrengthentheircapacitiesintheprocess,theirgoalsforthesocialappropriationofthecompanystillappeartobeachievable”(Dreissen5).

63

Perhaps,thegreatestchallengetotheprogressivecitizensisreachinga

consensus.EvenimmediatelyaftertheWaterWar,theCoordinadorawasinternally

fracturedoverwhatreformstopursue.Groupsweresplitbetweensupporting

socialorpublicownership.Thisdivision,likemanyother,haspreventedtherapid

advancementoftheprogressiveagenda.

InthewakeoftheWaterWar,theunityofdirectionhasdissipated.The

futureofwaterinCochabambaisnowinthehandsofCochabambancivilsociety.

Bothprogressiveandconservativegroupsarecompetitivelyengagedintheprocess

ofdeterminingthedetailsofhowthepublicgoodshouldbemanaged.Asofnow,it

istrulydifficulttodefinitelysaywhichsideis“winning”.Inmanyrespects,the

competitivenatureofthewaterissueishelpingtoestablishatraditionofactive

engagement(viaactiveparticipationandcontestation)ofthecitizen.

Inspiteofthehotlydebate,waterpoliticsinCochabambahasnotspunoutof

control.Thisisbecauseboththeconservativesandtheprogressiveengagetheissue

withintheparametersofthepublicgood.Ifwaterservicedoesnotremainjust,the

sovereignwillreassertitself.ThisdistinguishestheWaterWarfromtheRevolution

of1952.DuringtheRevolutionof1952,thesubalternneverarticulatedapublic

good;eachsubalternactorhaditsownsenseofthegood,andthis,inturn,ledto

politicalpandemonium.TheWaterWaravoidedthischaos,inthat,itwasguidedby

acommonvision.Inthissense,thepublicgoodcontainedandregulatedtherange

ofpoliticalactivism;thisisnecessaryconditionforagenuinecitizen‐basedcivil

society.

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CompletingCitizenship

ThecitizenshipthatarosefromtheWaterWarislimitedinitsscope.Since

thesubalternestablisheditselfassovereignoverwater,citizenshipisonly

applicabletoissuesconcerningwater.Inrespecttootherissues,suchaslabor

rights,manyBoliviansremainpoliticallyinvisible,assubalterns.Anoligarchic

sovereigncontinuestodominatemuchofthepoliticalsphere,thusperpetuating

exploitationandsubalternity.

However,theWaterWardidcreateaboundary,guardedbythecitizenand

thepublicgoodthattheoligarchicsovereigncannottransgress.Inotherwords,the

outcomeoftheWaterWarestablishedalimitonthereachoftheoligarchic

sovereignsincethe“people”,ascitizens,aresovereignoverthepoliticsofwater.

ThecontemporaryBolivianpoliticalsystemcontainstwodistinctconcentric

politicalspheres.Theoligarchicsovereigngovernswithinthecentralsphere;their

interestsaremaintainedbytheexclusionandsubordinationofthesubaltern.The

oligarchicsphereexertsanoutwardpressuretopreventthesubalternfrom

entering.

Encirclingtheoligarchicsphere,thecitizenspheredemarcatesthelimitsof

theoligarchicsovereign’sreach.Thecitizensphereexertsaninwardpressureon

theoligarchicsphere.Thesuccessfularticulationofthepublicgoodinstillsanotion

ofpoliticalrights.Subalterns,whoexperiencetheempowermentoftheirlimited

citizenship,seektoadvancetheirpoliticalrightsinotherareaswheretheyare

suppressed.

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Ifmultiplepublicgoodsarecollectivelyandsuccessfullyarticulatedand

established,thecitizensphereexpandswiththeseincreasesinsovereignty.

Citizenshipiscompletedonlywhenthecitizensphereovertakestheoligarchic

sovereign—thatistosay,whenthecitizenbecomesfullysovereign,freefrom

exploitationandpoliticalinvisibility.Atthisfinalstage,thepoliticalsphereis

universal,andthecitizenscollectivelyupholdthesovereigntyofitslaws.

TheWaterWarpromptedanationalmovementtowardtheadvancementof

theBoliviancitizen.In2003,inresponsetoaoligarchicgasexportationplan,across

thecountry,theBoliviansubalternroseupinprotest.Intheend,aftermass

proteststhatimmobilizedthecountry,theplanwascanceled,PresidentLozadawas

oustedfrompower,andthenationalizationofthegasindustrybecamepartofthe

publicgood.

InMarch2005,EvoMoralesbecameBolivia’sfirstpresidentofindigenous

ancestry.Sincehiselection,Moraleshaspassedanumberoflawsandconstitutional

reformsthatreflectanintenttoendsubalternity.Incertainregions,however,these

lawshavenotbeenfullyenforced,demonstratingthattheMoralesadministrationis

notfullyincontrolofthepoliticalsphere.Regardless,afterfivehundredyearsof

subjugation,theascensionofanindigenousleadertothepresidencyhashad

momentoussymboliceffectontheonceinvisibleindigenouspopulation.Whilein

Bolivia,IaskedastudentifhethoughtMoraleswasapopulist,heresponded,“The

movementwillgoonwithorwithouthermanoEvo.”

66

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