Ddi 10 Cmr Generic

7/29/2019 Ddi 10 Cmr Generic

1/47

170979035.doc Dartmouth

2K10 1

DDI 10 CMR GenericDDI 10 CMR Generic ...........................................................................................................................................11NC .......................................................................................................................................................................... 2**********Uniqueness*********..............................................................................................................................5Uniqueness CMR Strong Now ............................................................................................................................6Uniqueness Brink.................................................................................................................................................8*********Links************..................................................................................................................................10Links Action Without Consultation ....................................................................................................................11Links TNWs........................................................................................................................................................13Links Iraq............................................................................................................................................................ 15Links Afghanistan............................................................................................................................................... 18............................................................................................................................................................................... 19Links South Korea..............................................................................................................................................20Links Japan......................................................................................................................................................... 21Links Asym.........................................................................................................................................................22**************Internal Links*******....................................................................................................................23Internal Link Angering The Military..................................................................................................................24Internal Links Modeling.....................................................................................................................................25

Internal Links Cooperation................................................................................................................................26Internal Links Failed States................................................................................................................................27***********Impacts**********..............................................................................................................................28Impacts Solvency................................................................................................................................................29Impacts Irregular War........................................................................................................................................30Impacts Irregular War (Iraq).............................................................................................................................32Impacts Readiness..............................................................................................................................................33Impacts Readiness (Civilian)..............................................................................................................................34Impacts Pakistan................................................................................................................................................35Impacts Pakistan Instability...............................................................................................................................36Impacts Terrorism..............................................................................................................................................37Impacts Soft Power............................................................................................................................................38

Impacts India......................................................................................................................................................39Impacts Iraq....................................................................................................................................................... 40***********Aff Answers*********..........................................................................................................................41

Aff Answers Non Unique ...................................................................................................................................42Aff Answers CMR Resilient................................................................................................................................ 44Aff Answers Impact Inevitable .......................................................................................................................... 45Aff Answers South Korea ................................................................................................................................... 46Aff Answers Civlian Link Turn .......................................................................................................................... 47

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

1


2/47


2K10 2

1NCA. Civlian Military Relations Strong, Despite McChrystal

AFP 7/14 [7/14/10, " Holbrooke: No US civilian-military split in Kabul "http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iqaoyPndfXzRPMz-kHjc5kvE5hbA]

Top US diplomats and military leaders in Afghanistan are "absolutely on the same page" in the wake of

General Stanley McChrystal's removal, special envoy Richard Holbrooke said on Wednesday. "We areabsolutely on the same pagewhen it comes to the overall strategy and working together," Holbrooketold the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a hearing focused on the civilian front of the faltering campaign. Theveteran diplomat had been asked by Democratic Senator Robert Menendez about a Rolling Stone magazine profile in whichMcChrystal and his aides heaped scorn on US diplomats and decisionmakers in Washington, including Holbrooke. Thearticle led US President Barack Obama to fire McChrystal, replacing him with General David Petraeus, while someRepublican US senators pressed the White House to clean house completely on the civilian side of the war effort.Holbrooke said the attacks on him in Rolling Stone -- an unnamed McChrystal aide said the general viewed the diplomat asa "wounded animal" fearful for his job and therefore "dangerous" -- "made no difference" to how he did his job. He calledthe article "extraordinarily unfortunate" in that it led to the end of McChrystal's career, while praising Obama's dismissal of

the general as "a completely correct decision" that "was necessary to do." Holbrooke said he has "workedseamlessly" with Petraeus in the past despite some "tactical disagreements" and that the currentcivilian-military partnership in Kabul "is the best one I've ever seen." "We're in good shape here and Iam fully satisfied about it," Holbrooke told the panel.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

2


3/47


2K10 3

1NC

B.. Reducing foreign military presence sparks massive backlash that undermines CMR

Kohn 8 - Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, Winter 2008, Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, World Affairs, online: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html

Yet imagine the outcry any one of these proposals would provoke, and the resistance it would generatefrom the services, agencies, and congressional committees whose ox was being gored. The delegation or defensecompany about to lose a base or a weapons contract would certainly howland mobilize.Organizational change in any bureaucracy provokes enormous and almost always successful resistance. In thePentagon,the battles have been epic. The world has a say in all this, too. The next administration will take office nearly twenty yearsafter the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet the American military establishment is essentially the same one created in the 1940s and 1950s to deter the SovietUnion. The United States today boasts four independent armed services with the same weapons, upgraded and more capable to be sure, as those known to

George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, and Curtis LeMay. Not only are the ships, planes, tanks, vehicles, and guns similar, butthey are organized similarly, performing virtually the same roles and missions assigned them in the late 1940s. The UnitedStates after 1989 did not demobilize. It downsized. Successive administrations cut the budget by ten percent and the sizeof the force by about 25 percent, while the Pentagon substituted regional threats for the Soviet menace in its planning. Evenin the midst of a Global War on Terrorism, neither the generals nor their bosses in the White House and Congress havebeen able to rethink the purpose, organization, command and control, or even operation of the armed forces . Two decades is along time. The decades between 1895 and 1915, 1935 and 1955, and 1975 and 1995 all involved paradigm shifts in Americas role in the world and in its

national security requirements. Todays security situation differs no less radically from the Cold War for which todays military establishment wasdevised. Are these the armed forces we really need? Bitter fights over strategy, budgets, weapons, and roles and missions dating back sixty-plus yearssuggest the question may not be answerable in any practical sense. To understand fully just how difficult it will be to raise fundamental concerns aboutdefense policies, consider the recent confusion over what exactly the role and purpose of the National Guard and reserves ought to be. A week before 9/11,I participated in a roundtable discussion of the subject for the Reserve Forces Policy Board. There was general agreement that reserve forces shouldconcentrate more on homeland defense and less on backstopping active duty forces on the battlefield. Yet the former head of the National Guard Bureauinsisted, without evidence and in the face of great skepticism, that the Guard and reserves could do both. The past five years have proved him wrong;reserve forces are underequipped and stretched thinner than the active duty army and Marine Corps. Today, a congressionally chartered commission on the

National Guard and reserves still struggles with how to shape and organize the reserves (particularly the National Guard, which reports to each stategovernor unless summoned for federal service). Admittedly, the National Guard and reserves possess unusual political power and since 1789 have beenmore resistant to rational military policy than any other part of the national security community. Robert McNamara, who transformed American defensemore than any other Pentagon leader, failed utterly to budge the Guard and reserve. None of his successors possessed the nerve even to try. But the

problem cannot be avoided. As the commission wrote in bureaucratic understatement, in March 2007, the current posture and utilization of the NationalGuard and Reserve as an operational reserve is not sustainable over time, and if not corrected with significant changes to law and policy, the reserve

components ability to serve our nation will diminish. All the more so because Iraq and Afghanistan compose the first

substantial, extended military conflicts the United States has fought with a volunteer force in more thana century. Todays typical combat tour of fifteen months is the longest since World War II. Expensive procurement programs are underway, butsooner or later they will be robbed to pay for other costs, such as war operations, the expansion of ground forces, or medical and veterans costs. Already,the Project on Defense Alternatives has proposed cutting two Air Force wings, two Navy wings, and two aircraft carriers for a total savings of more than$60 billion over the next five years. Eventually, the bill comes due, either in blood, defeat, or political crisis. As the old Fram oil filter advertisement put it,Pay me now, or pay me later.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

3
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html


4/47


2K10 4

1NCC. Weak CMR destroys readiness.

Cohn Graduate Student in Political Science at Duke 1999 (Lindsay, "The Evolution of the Civil-Military "Gap" Debate,"www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/cohn_literature_review.pdf)

There do seem to be a few positions which appear more often than others in the literature: one is that there is a necessary

cultural gap between the military and the civilian, and that particular gap is positive. The military needs its distinctiveculture, and as long as it is dependent on the surrounding society for recruits, funding, and services, thecultural divide cannot become dangerously wide.74 However, the lack of contact between military andcivilian life - embodied in the dwindling numbers of veterans in the population and especially in government,75 in thetiny numbers of people who have any knowledge of or significant intercourse with military personnel ,in the growing numbers of service-members who come from military families, and especially in the blatant political

disagreement between the military and the civilian elite - is troubling. The divide is especiallytroubling because the military has developed a contempt for the society it is supposed to protect, andcould possibly turn on or abandon that society in some way. Equally troubling are civilian officialswho do not understand the military and its capabilities and limitations, and are apt to use it ininappropriate ways, straining it beyond what it can bearand threatening the national interest orsecurity. The situation is troubling because it harms recruiting, leading to shortfalls in manpower, low

morale, declining quality in the ranks, and reduced effectiveness.76

D. Readiness deters war lack of readiness means inevitable intervention

JackSpencer, Defense and National Security Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, 9-15-2K, THE FACTS ABOUT MILITARYREADINESS, Heritage Foundation Reports, N. 1394, P. 1 TP

U.S. military readiness cannot be gauged by comparing America's armed forces with other nations'militaries. Instead, the capability of U.S. forces to support America's national security requirementsshould be the measure of U.S. military readiness . Such a standard is necessary because America may confront threats from manydifferent nations at once. America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given

war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its

interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to formalliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has littlesaliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the

broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy,the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "musthave the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression intwo distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, theUnited States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson,and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two majortheater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned

America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines inAmerica's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to

defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out againstAmerican allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state ofmilitary readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regionsof vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

4


5/47


2K10 5

**********Uniqueness*********

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

5


6/47


2K10 6

Uniqueness CMR Strong Now

CMR Is On the Uptick Petraeus is Bending Backwards to Ensure It

NYT 7/3 [Mark Landler, 7/3/10, " Let's, Er, Try to Work Together", www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/weekinreview/04landler.html]

It is tempting to conclude that the arrival of General Petraeus will consolidate the supremacy of thePentagon in the war effort. He certainly starts out with great prestige in Washington, drawn from his performance in Iraq,and his status as the intellectual father of the strategy. But there are reasons to believe that the State Departmentwill continue to play a substantial role, if onlybecause that is what General Petraeus wants. He haspledged a unity of effort between the civilian and military operations, and he met withAmbassador Eikenberry at a NATO meeting in Brussels so the two of them could fly into Kabul together onFriday. For all the parallels between Afghanistan and Iraq, there are key differences that will require robust diplomacy. InIraq, General Petraeus was able to turn the tide by peeling away Sunni leaders who were willing to work with Americanforces against jihadi extremists. But in Afghanistan, any similar process requires Pakistan's cooperation. Afghanistan'sneighbor has influence over powerful players like the Haqqani network, which is closely allied with the Taliban, and it is asanctuary for leaders of the Afghan Taliban. Officials say that General Petraeus plans to shuttle between Kabul andIslamabad, conferring on issues like reintegrating Taliban fighters into Afghan society. But it easy to imagine that in thenegotiations for a broader political settlement between Mr. Karzai and the Taliban, the general could turn to Mr. Holbrooke,

whom he described last week as his wingman. Mr. Holbrooke, after all, played a central role in the Dayton peace accords,

which ended the war in Bosnia. One of the reasons the selection of General Petraeus was such amasterstroke was that he understands the importance of a civilian-military effort , said John A.Nagl, a retired Army officer who is now president of the Center for a New American Security, a Washingtonresearch group, and who helped write the counterinsurgency handbook under General Petraeus. He'll bend over

backwards to make it work.

Petreaus is Revitalizing CMR

FOXNews 7/4 [7/4/10, " Petraeus Appeals for Military-Civilian Cooperation in Afghanistan "http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/07/04/petraeus-appeals-military-civilian-cooperation-afghanistan/]

Gen. David Petraeus, in a July 4 message to troops and diplomats in Afghanistan, called for a "team effort"between the military and civilian sides of the waras Sen. John McCain continued to question whether that'spossible. Petraeus formally took command in Afghanistan Sunday after Gen. Stanley McChrystal resigned over divisive

comments he and his aides made in a magazine article last month. The comments underscored the tension that

existsbetween the military and civilian teams -- something the incoming general is aiming to smoothover immediately. "This endeavor has to be a team effort. We must strive to contribute to the 'Team of Teams' at workin Afghanistan and to achieve unity of effort with our diplomatic, international civilian and Afghan partners as we carry outa comprehensive, civil-military counterinsurgency campaign," he wrote Sunday. Petraeus made a similar plea in remarks to

troops upon taking command. "Cooperation is not optional," he said.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

6


7/47


2K10 7

Uniqueness CMR Strong Now

McCrystal Humbeled Both Sides CMR Strong

NYT 7/3 [Mark Landler, 7/3/10, " Let's, Er, Try to Work Together", www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/weekinreview/04landler.html]That, at least, is one way to read the conversation, especially in light of the harsh comments about civilian officials that

General McChrystal had allowed members of his staff to make in front of a reporter. But another is that the McChrystalepisode and rumors that Ambassador Eikenberry might be replaced have chastened officials onboth sides, and that both now want to avoid a zero-sum game between State and Defense in

Afghanistan. There, more even than in Iraq, the military and civilian sides need each other.

Obamas cabinet decisions rebuilt CMR

Desch, 09 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-Making at Texas A&M's George H. W. BushSchool of Government and Public Service, (Do the troops love Obama or hate him?http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/25/obamas_civil_military_relations]

Despite the pessimistic tone of Kohn's article, he was surprisingly up-beat at our panel. The root of this optimism was his

belief that both the senior military leadership and the Obama administration are eager to reestablish better relations after the

acrimony of the last sixteen years. Kohn was impressed with Obama's pragmatism on this front: The new President hadtaken steps to cover his flank by appointing a number of retired senior officers to his cabinet and otherhigh-level positions, including General James Jones as National Security Advisor, General Shinseki as Secretary ofVeterans Affairs, and Admiral Dennis Blair as Director of National Intelligence. Also, Kohn thought that Obama'sdecision to keep on Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense was an astute move, not only given thesecretary's success in rebuilding the bridges to the military that his predecessor burned, but alsobecause having a Republican in this position will make it hard for Republicans to criticize Obama'sdraw-down in Iraq or conduct of the war in Afghanistan. Finally, at the purely atmospheric level, he commendedthe Obama for striking the right cord in dealing with the troops, sending the First Lady on her first official trip to visit Ft.Bragg and shying away from rekindling the military culture wars by taking a lower key approach to such hot-button issues

as rescinding the gay ban. I agree with Kohn that both President Obama and the current military leadership haveso far taken positive steps to try to heal the civil-military rupture. But I have an even simpler explanation forthe apparent change in atmospherics: After the last eight years of the Bush administration's meddling in, andmismanagement of, military affairs, even a Democrat doesn't look too bad these days to our men andwomen in uniform. That's at least one thing for which we can thank the last administration.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

7


8/47


2K10 8

Uniqueness Brink

CMR is dangerous, but obamas concessions of troop increases are keeping it afloat

Gerson 7-14 [Michael Gerson, journalist, 7-14-2010, Orchestra of one man bands Washington Post, posted on patriotpost.com,http://patriotpost.us/opinion/michael-gerson/2010/07/14/orchestra-of-one-man-bands/]

The military-civilian gap on Afghan policy remains wide. There is little doubt that Biden and America's ambassador toAfghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, remain skeptical of the mission. And there are reasons for skepticism, including Afghan

corruption and lack of effective administration. But one of the largest reasons for pessimism is created, or at leasttolerated, by the president himself -- the discord among administration officials. This was supposed to be theprocess presidency -- thoughtful, careful and deliberative. But Obama turns out to be a poor manager of people. Leaderssuch as Biden, Petraeus, Eikenberry and Mattis may be individually impressive. Together, they seemlike an orchestra of one-man bands. A team of rivals requires a decisive president. But Obama had ended upsplitting differences that ought not to have been split. He supported the military's strategy and trooprequest, while accepting a deadline for beginning withdrawal that is now just 12 months away -- adeadline regularly reaffirmed by White House officials and Democratic congressional leaders. Thisapproach has a contradiction at its core. One of the main military priorities in Afghanistan is to peel off that portion of the

bad guys -- called by American strategists the "10-dollar-a-day Taliban" -- who might be won over by a combination ofintimidation and outreach. But why should these rebels tie their fate to a retreating power?

Changes in military power made by the white house has put relations on the brink

Seymour M. Hersh, staff writer for the New Yorker, 7/7/08(http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh?printable=true#ixzz0uNbc91NG)

The law cited by Sheehan is the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, known as Goldwater-Nichols, which defined the chainof command: from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on tothe various combatant commanders, who were put in charge of all aspects of military operations, including joint training

and logistics. That authority, the act stated, was not to be shared with other echelons of command. Butthe Bush Administration, as part of its global war on terror, instituted new policies that undercutregional commanders-in-chief; for example, it gave Special Operations teams, at military commandsaround the world, the highest priority in terms of securing support and equipment. The degradation ofthe traditional chain of command in the past few years has been a point of tension between the WhiteHouse and the uniformed military.The coherence of military strategy is being eroded because of undue civilian influence and directionof nonconventional military operations, Sheehan said. If you have small groups planning andconducting military operations outside the knowledge and control of the combatant commander, bydefault you cant have a coherent military strategy. You end up with a disaster, like the reconstructionefforts in Iraq.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

8
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh?printable=true#ixzz0uNbc91NGhttp://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh?printable=true#ixzz0uNbc91NG


9/47


2K10 9

Uniqueness Brink

Multiple causalities make the relations between Obama and the military on the brink

Sarah Sewall and John P. White, staff writers for the Boston Global, 1/29/09

(http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/01/29/the_civil_military_challenge?mode=PF)

President Obama has inherited a compounding set of problems - ongoing global military operations,long-deferred strategy and budget choices, and stark new economic realities. Anticipating the end ofexpanding budgets and unquestioned supplemental funding, the services will begin circling the wagonsto defend programs and budget shares. All parties in the defense community will face enormousinstitutional pressure to protect their equities in the Pentagon and in the field with the help of allies inCongress. This is hardly an auspicious environment for building trust and cooperation.Obama must not only fortify a relationship that has accumulated significant strains and enduredoccasional malpractice, he must make it strong enough to withstand inherent frictions and toughdecisions. Several problems require attention from senior leaders - and are key barriers to restoring strategic and fiscaldiscipline within the Pentagon. The changes needed will only be manifested if the senior leadership, military and civilian,

work together.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

9
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/01/29/the_civil_military_challenge?mode=PFhttp://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/01/29/the_civil_military_challenge?mode=PF


10/47


2K10 10

*********Links************

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

10


11/47


2K10 11

Links Action Without Consultation

Without military involvement in civilian discussions, CMR deteriorates

Cohen in 97 (Eliot A. Cohen is a professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, JohnsHopkins University USA, Spring 1997, Science Direct-Orbis http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V45MCTRS-42&_user=4257664&_origUdi=B6W5V-45MCTW3-

4N&_fmt=high&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F1998&_rdoc=1&_orig=article&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userd=4257664&md5=ab4f40b1551d11312a3ef79a8795f60b)

The American military faced similar dilemmas after the Civil War and World War I, for a brief time after World War II,and following the Vietnam War. At least one lesson clearly emerged from those experiences: the military profession darenot withdraw into an ethical cocoon and take on a defensive posture. Instead, it must make a prudent and positive response

to the travails imposed on it and not shrink from articulating its views in the public square. In short, senior militaryofficers must reshape the very notion of military professionalism by candidly admitting the impact of politics onthe militarys ability to do its job and daring to practice constructive political engagement. This wouldappear to violate the sacred code of silence by which the U.S. military is strictly apolitical, offerstechnical advice only, and goes out of its way to honor the principle of civilian control. But only through constructivepolitical engagement can military professionals legitimate their role in policy debates, provide a dear

boundary between defense policy and merely partisan politics, and provide the American public with aclearer understanding of military life and culture. Nor are constructive political engagement and loyalty to thecountry, civilian leadership, and the Constitution in any way incongruous. Indeed, such constructive political engagement,far from threatening to make the military an independent actor, presupposes that the military is dependent upon a variety of

political actors and the public at large. It is because the U.S. military is under such tight civilian control that itneeds to make its voice heard in civilian councils. Any number of issues might fall within the scope ofconstructive political engagement, but the two most critical are the so-called democratization of themilitary (the convergence or divergence between the military and society) and the problematical utilityof military force in the foreign policy contingencies of the century to come. These issues are interconnectedand have a profound impact on the militarys operational effectiveness, To be sure, it has been an article of faith amongmilitary professionals and civilians alike that a wall exists in America between the military and politics. But that faith is notonly historically invalid, it denies current reality. The American domestic landscape and the international strategic

landscape are, and have always been, politically and militarily inextricable, while the use of military force has always beenshaped by political considerations. If the skill, wisdom, and experience residing in our officers corps are to be tapped by our

national leadership, the military profession itself must be philosophically broadened and encouraged toinvolve itself judiciously in the policy arena. This would include the development of a morecomprehensive view of politics, greater sensitivity to the realities underpinning the American politicalsystem, and more assertive presentation of the military viewpoint within the parameters of Americandemocracy.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

11
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-45MCTRS-42&_user=4257664&_origUdi=B6W5V-45MCTW3-4N&_fmt=high&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F1998&_rdoc=1&_orig=article&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=ab4f40b1551d11312a3ef79a8795f60bhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-45MCTRS-42&_user=4257664&_origUdi=B6W5V-45MCTW3-4N&_fmt=high&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F1998&_rdoc=1&_orig=article&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=ab4f40b1551d11312a3ef79a8795f60bhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-45MCTRS-42&_user=4257664&_origUdi=B6W5V-45MCTW3-4N&_fmt=high&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F1998&_rdoc=1&_orig=article&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=ab4f40b1551d11312a3ef79a8795f60bhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-45MCTRS-42&_user=4257664&_origUdi=B6W5V-45MCTW3-4N&_fmt=high&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F1998&_rdoc=1&_orig=article&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=ab4f40b1551d11312a3ef79a8795f60bhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-45MCTRS-42&_user=4257664&_origUdi=B6W5V-45MCTW3-4N&_fmt=high&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F1998&_rdoc=1&_orig=article&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=ab4f40b1551d11312a3ef79a8795f60bhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-45MCTRS-42&_user=4257664&_origUdi=B6W5V-45MCTW3-4N&_fmt=high&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F1998&_rdoc=1&_orig=article&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=ab4f40b1551d11312a3ef79a8795f60bhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-45MCTRS-42&_user=4257664&_origUdi=B6W5V-45MCTW3-4N&_fmt=high&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F1998&_rdoc=1&_orig=article&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=ab4f40b1551d11312a3ef79a8795f60b


12/47


2K10 12

Links Action Without Consultation

Consistent decisions and involvement of military in decision-making key to CMR

Sarah Sewall and John P. White, staff writers at the Boston Globe, 2009, The Civil-Military Challenge

http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/01/29/the_civil_military_challenge/?page=2

We interviewed several dozen former secretaries and deputy secretaries of defense, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, service chiefs, and combatantcommanders. While their views differed significantly depending upon their experiences, several themes emerged across six former administrations.

One finding is that senior civilian and military leaders often lack a common understanding of roles andreciprocal responsibilities within the partnership. The traditional shorthand that "civilians make policy and themilitary executes" is overly simplistic, masking the intricate mutual dependence of the parties. Forexample, civilians may not see their policymaking role as accompanied by a responsibility to ensure that military concerns about policy implementationhave been fully addressed. Military leaders may define their substantive advising role narrowly and perform it only in response to civilian inquiry. Thesemisunderstandings have proven costly in national security decision-making.

In addition, the parties largely fail to harness the inherent frictions in the relationship. The roles of various civil and military actorsabut and overlap in practice, particularly when multiple civilian authorities (including members ofCongress) are engaged. Managing the inevitable tensions without rancor or overreaction is a key responsibility of the civilian leadership.

Transparent and consistent decision-making processes would also help clarify roles and build trust incivil-military relations, particularly in terms of reinforcing the importance and scope of militaryadvice. When that process is inclusive, it is viewed by military actors as more satisfactory - even if theoutcomes are not preferred by military actors.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

12
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/01/29/the_civil_military_challenge/?page=2http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/01/29/the_civil_military_challenge/?page=2


13/47


2K10 13

Links TNWs

Nuclear reductions cause a civil-military split over irresolvable value issues.

Megorden, 2k [Cadet Kima, United States Air Force Academy, EPISTEMOLOGY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCEMANIFESTATIONS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS http://www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE01/Megorden01.html]

As stated by the Triangle Institute of Security Studies, the civil-military gap appears to be wider in the realm of ideas andvalues than in specific policy issues. Civilians tend to propose reductions in the nuclear arsenalwhereas military members tend to want to keep the force structure status quo. This diversion is aproduct ofthe Cold Warmentality of effective deterrence. It is problematic on the part ofcivilians who, for the most part, failto understand both the complexities and efficacy of nuclear deterrence strategy. However, it is problematic on the partof some members of the military community who think that a focus on nuclear deterrence alone can best provide fornational security. The gap in nuclear ethics is rooted in the civilians discomfiture of the size of themilitary in the Post-cold war world. The civilian sector does not see nuclear deterrence as an element of USnational security; it sees it simply as piece of military weaponry. Naturally, if there is no longer a monolithic enemy like the Soviets, then whyhave the weapons that were built up strictly for that enemy? The deterrence that is provided by nuclear weapons is seen as unnecessary bythe civilian sector if there is no enemy. With a less visible, peacetime force, much of the civilian sector sees nuclear weapons as simply an instigator, not a

deterrent to nuclear war. However, the civilian sector is stuck in a Cold War mentality just like the military

sector. The Cold War nuclear paradigm was very numbers based. Retaliation naturally called for a numbers basedphilosophy. However, in a post-cold war world, it seems that the debate continues to focus on numbers. Thecivilian sector wants drastic reductions or even an elimination of nuclear weapons; the military sector wants to keepthem. In a multi-polar world, is there a way to definitively say that we can set an exact number that willeliminate the moral dilemmas and keep national security? Both sides seem to be missing the fundamental natureand mission of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is a means to prevent other nations from questioning our power, thus creatingstability and even saving lives. It does this by instilling fear into other nations. It is other our adversaries fear of the intention of our nation to posenuclear retaliation if they violate a set of conditions that prevents certain horrific attacks. Political scientists define this fear as power politics or cost-

benefit evaluations; most philosophers define it as a morally imperfect means to preventing an even more morally problematic end. However, in a post-cold war environment, it is feasible to say that we are in a time where other elements of national deterrence (dissuasion and denial) are more effective in

instilling fear in other nations, therefore more effective and ethical in ensuring our survival. Members of the civilian sectorthat proposeelimination of nuclear weaponry need to realize the lower emphasis of nuclear deterrence in national security

strategy.They need to realize that the reason that

nuclear deterrence had the lead role in Cold War was because itwas the most effective avenue at the present time. However, a complete reverse is not possible. Pandora hasbeen let out of the box, and cannot be put back in. The most moral way the United States has of reducing immoral intentions ofnational deterrence is to maximize other elements of fear instilled by denial and dissuasion. This puts the immoral intention of nuclear retaliation lower on

the list of deterrence options. The military and civilian sides of the debate need to learn to extend theirdiscussions beyond those of reductions yes or no. If not, both sides will be stuck in a bi-polar debateover numbers while the opportunity to reduce nuclear retaliatory intentions pass us by.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

13


14/47


2K10 14

Link TNWsMilitary oppositionfears changes to one leads to slippery slope.

Sauer 5 Tom Sauer, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Politics, University of Antwerp, Former Research FellowInternational Security Program, 1997-1999, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2005. [Nuclear Inertia: US

Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War, p. 87-8]

Changing one element of the nuclear policy could have had majorconsequences for the posture as a wholeas force structure, declaratory, and operational policy are intimately linked. The military therefore fearedthat in case they would agree to change a minor element, they would open Pandora's box.The defence establishment was afraid that giving away (parts of) the nuclear business would stimulatedemands for reductions in other domains as well . It wasextremely afraid that it had to reduce its size considerably as had been thecase afterthe First World War and Second World War. The major premise of the CS defenceestablishment after the Cold War became to give away as littleas possible. RichardKolus, chief historian of the Air Force in the 19BPs, wrote in 1994: 'By BillClinton's inauguration a year ago, the military hadaccepted "downsizing" andreorganization, but not changes that invaded too dramatically the traditionalfunctions of each of the individual armed services,or that changed too radically the[PAGE 88] snail composition of the forces, or cut too deeply into combat readiness, orotherwise undermined the qualityand ability of the military to fulfill itsfunctions.. Powell's larger motives were to establish a floor for the defence cuts heknew to he inevitable, and to work

nut a coherent strategy and force structurewhich would prevent the kind of helter-skelter debilitating reductions common toprevious demobilizations after

American wars. A shift from maximum tominimum deterrence had to he blocked in order to prevent the furtherunravellingof the defence department as a whole.

Defense industry ensures opposition contracts and constituencies.Borger 9/20 [Julian, guardian staff, Obama faces battle with Pentagon hawks to achieve nuclear-free goal, 20 September 2009http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/pentagon-obama-nuclear-arms/print]

Joseph Cirincione, head of the Ploughshares Fund which sponsors debate on nuclear policy, said Obama was not just up againstexisting doctrine, but against a huge industry. "There is $54bn spent [annually in the US] on nuclearweapons and weapons-related programmes. That's a lot of contracts and a lot of jobs, and right now it'sa battle for budgets," Cirincione said. "The new weapons programmes are seen as a way of guaranteeingfunding and jobs in the infrastructure. Obama is trying to convince [the weapons establishment] that he is going to look after them inways other than building new weapons."

Pentagon would oppose the plan posture review proves.

Borger 9/20 [Julian, guardian staff, Obama faces battle with Pentagon hawks to achieve nuclear-free goal, 20 September 2009http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/pentagon-obama-nuclear-arms/print]

Five months ago in Prague, Barack Obama used one of his first foreign policy speeches to call for a world free of nuclear weapons. Ever since then the

White House has been engaged in a race to turn that declaration into real-world policy. The first obstacle is the Pentagon.According to officials with knowledge of the inter-agency bargaining, the US defence departmentproduced a draft nuclear posture review that did not just fall short of Obama's vision. In some ways itappeared to be moving in the opposite direction. The current Pentagon take on US nuclear doctrineenvisages maintaining a stockpile of thousands of weapons for the foreseeable future, partly in the name of"extended deterrence". Supporters of that doctrine argue that without a large arsenal, allies abroad will lose confidence in Washington's willingness andcapacity to defend them from attack.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

14


15/47


2K10 15

Links Iraq

Civilian micromanagement of military strategy in Iraq destroys the trust and CMR necessary in

irregular warfare and counterinsurgency

Patrick M. Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, September 20 08Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations, online

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdf

In both Afghanistan and Iraq there are questions about the quality of the planning to govern either country. Part of theproblem may have stemmed from defining the objective as regime change, with humanitarian assistance and reconstruction as potential missions, withoutasking the basic questions about who would govern the country, how they would do so, and who had the mission to govern at both the central and locallevel.Yet all might agree that, in the absence of clear objectives, it is easy to confuse military activity with progress and difficult to judge how militaryoperations fit into the overall civil-military effort or how well they are contributing to resolving a problem consistent with national interests.Acknowledging both the difficulty and importance of defining goals and objectives, George Marshall once quipped that, if one gets the objectives right, alieutenant can write the strategy. Not surprisingly, the development of goals and objectives is often the first point of tension in civil-military relations at

the highest levels of government.Despite the positive developments in Iraq , questions remain over how laborshould be divided and civilian and military activities coordinated to support counterinsurgencyoperations in foreign theaters. Today, the need for overall political leadership and coherence appears greater but achieving it more difficult. At thesame time , a distant, top-down style of strategic management or micromanagement of the complex tasks inremote contested zones seems quixotic. So we ask ourselves, how does irregular warfare alter our thinking about civilmilitary relations? Is the

putative decline in civil-military relations permanent, serious, and crippling? Or conversely, is it sui generis to a conflict such as Iraq or Afghanistan andoverblown in terms of the problems it presentsdepending mainly on individual actors and therefore manageable, given the right set of personalities? Towhat degree does command and control structure contribute to, or detract from, the ability to integrate civil-military efforts? And at what levels and inwhat venues should civil-military efforts be integrated in an irregular war? The war that we are in and must win (to paraphrase Secretary of Defense

Robert Gates) pits us against nonstate groups that seek to advance extremist agendas through violence. Accordingly, irregular warfare will bethe dominant form of conflict among adversaries in the early years of the 21st century. To succeed in these messy and profoundly

political wars, the United States needs a framework that appropriately and effectively balances therelationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the best use of their unique and complementary portfolios.

CMR in Iraq high now but the Plan has the government ignore the will of the military, crushing CMR.

Patrick M. Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, September 20 08

Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations, onlinehttp://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdf

Persistent irregular conflict poses difficult new challenges for command and leadership and civil-militaryrelations in general. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq amply demonstrate these challenges. The Iraq engagement began with a short, conventional warthat aimed massive military power to defeat a hostile state and depose its leader. The Commander in Chief, with the approval of civilian leaders inCongress, authorized the action, and military commanders carried it out successfully. But after the initial goals were achieved, the engagement in Iraqrapidly devolved into a counterinsurgency. Similarly, as conflict in Afghanistan shows, in an irregular war against an asymmetric, non-state threat, thetraditional lanes of authority no longer clearly separate the activities of the political leaders responsible for managing the engagement, the military

commanders responsible for executing it, and the civilian officials responsible for diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction. As thewar in Iraq progressed beyond the initial stage of regime removal, civil military relationships began to break down asthe war transmogrified into a counterinsurgency operation. Beginning in 2007 with the so-called surge, adramatic rapprochement occurred that featured greater collaboration between U.S. civilian and military

authorities and a more constructive melding of military, political, and diplomatic means to achievestability. Although there are questions about why that same degree of cohesion did not develop earlier, the surge offers insight into thelevel of cooperation and communication needed in irregular warfare between military officerswhosetraditional duties to apply force spill over into peacekeeping and nation building activitiesand civilian officials who bear the dominant role in

building a framework for peace, good governance, and diplomatic ties that support long-term U.S. national interests.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

15
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdfhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdfhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdfhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdf


16/47


2K10 16

Links Iraq

A leak shows that military officials think deployment in Iraq is key

Feaver 9/21 9 [Peter, professor of political science at Duke University and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies,Foreign Policy: Woodward Discloses Troops Needed, 9/21/2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113022583]

4. The leak makes it harder for President Obama to reject a McChrystal request for additional troopsbecause the assessment so clearly argues for them. The formal request is in a separate document, apparently, but it isforeshadowed on every page of the Initial Assessment. Presumably, the McChrystal assessment and request is shared byPetraeus and, I am told, also by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That does not make it irrefutably correct, but it does make this issuenow the defining moment in civil-military relations under President Obama's watch. Obama has the authority and the responsibility to make a decision thatruns counter to what his military leaders are requesting, but it is a very difficult thing for him to do.

5. The toughest part in the report from the point of view of the Obama White House is the twin claim that (i) under-resourcing the warcould cause the war to be lost, and ( ii) the resources need to show up in the next year. The former puts theresponsibility for success/failure squarely on the desk of the President and the latter, because of the long lead times needed to send additional resourcesinto the theater, says that failure could result from choices made or not made in the next few weeks. And it said that a few weeks ago.

The military is anxious about withdrawl.

Ackerman 8 [Spencer, The Washington Independent, 11/13, Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible,http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible]

One early decision that many in the military likely look to is whether Obama holds to his position on withdrawing from Iraq according to a fixed

timetable. As with the country as a whole, there is no unanimity of opinion on Iraq within the military. But at the very least, the war is morepersonal to the military than it is to the civilian population. Many view this withdrawal with anxiety.

Withdrawal from Iraq will put CMR at a new low.

Brian Downing, published political and military historian, AT 6/11 8, Will it be Obamas War?http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF11Ak01.html

The US military will also oppose large-scale withdrawal. The generation of officers who learned hard

lessons in Vietnam are almost all gone now, leaving successors who are only vaguely wary of foreignquagmires. The torch has been passed to a new generation that believes in one main lesson from Vietnam: futurewars must be seen through. The military thinks it has turned a corner in Iraq and that General DavidPetraeus' troop "surge" is working well. It will ally with like-minded members of the US Congress, conservative media and think-tanksto argue the stay-put message. If a Democratic president were somehow able to overcome opposition towithdrawal, he would bring bitter enmity between the generals and his party, which is already dislikedfor its lineage to the antiwar movement of the Vietnam years and for trimming defense budgets. Leaving Iraq - cutting and running, asit is often called - would poison civil-military relations as never before in the nation's history.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

16
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113022583http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possiblehttp://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF11Ak01.htmlhttp://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113022583http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possiblehttp://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF11Ak01.html


17/47


2K10 17

Links Iraq

Withdrawal Would Tank CMR

Kohn in 08 (Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina, winter 2008Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,//http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil

military.html//)It follows that no candidate will be elected without promising some sort of disengagement. An American withdrawal would probablyunleash the all-out civil war that our presence has kept to the level of neighborhood cleansing andgangland murder. Sooner or later that violence will burn itself out. But a viable nation-state that resembles democracy as we know itis far off, with the possibility that al-Qaeda will survive in Iraq, requiring American combat forces insome form for years to come.In the civil-military arena, the consequences of even a slowly unraveling debacle in Iraq could be quite ugly. Already, politicians and generals have been

pointing fingers at one another; the Democrats and some officers excoriating the administration forincompetence, while the administration and a parade of generals fire back at the press and anti-warDemocrats. The truly embittered, like retired Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, who commanded in Iraq in 2003 04, blame everyone andeverything: Bush and his underlings, the civilian bureaucracy, Congress, partisanship, the press, allies, even the American people. Last November,

Sanchez went so far as to deliver the Democrats weekly radio addressand, with it, more bile and invective. Thomas Ricks, chief military

correspondent of the Washington Post, detects a stab in the back narrative . . . now emerging in theU.S. military in Iraq. . . . [T]he U.S. military did everything it was supposed to do in Iraq, the rest ofthe U.S. government didnt show up, the Congress betrayed us, the media undercut us, and theAmerican public lacked the stomach, the nerve, and the will to see it through. Ricks thinks this account iswrong in every respect; nonetheless, I am seeing more and more adherents of it in the military.If the United States withdraws and Iraq comes apart at the seams, many officers and Republicans willinsist that the war was winnable, indeed was all but won under General David Petraeus. The newadministration will be scorned not only for cowardice and surrender, but for treacheryfor renderingmeaningless the deaths, maiming, and sacrifice of tens of thousands of Americans in uniform. The betrayedlegions will revive all of the Vietnam-era charges, accusing the Democrats of loathing the military and America and ofwishing defeat. The resentments will sink deep into the ranks, at least in the army and the Marines, much as the Praetorian myths

about Vietnam still hold sway today in the Pentagon. The responsenamely, that the war was astrategic miscalculation bungled horribly by the Bush administrationwill have no traction. There will only

be a fog of anger, bitterness, betrayal, and recrimination.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

17
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html


18/47


2K10 18

Links Afghanistan

Withdrawal from Afghanistan sparks military backlash

Carter 10 Sara A. Carter, National Security Correspondent for the San Francisco Examiner, May 4, 2010, U.S. military growingconcerned with Obama's Afghan policy, online: http://www.sfexaminer.com/world/U_S_-military-growing-concerned-withObama_s-Afghan-policy-92723004.html

The Obama administration's plan to begin an Afghanistan withdrawal in 2011 is creating growing friction inside theU.S. military, from the halls of the Pentagon to front-line soldiers who see it as a losing strategy.Critics of the plan fear that if they speak out, they will be labeled "pariahs" unwilling to back the commander in chief, said one officer who didn'twant to be named. But in private discussions, soldiers who are fighting in Afghanistan, or recently returned from there, questioned whether it is worth the sacrificeand risk for a war without a clear-cut strategy to win.

Retired Army Reserve Maj. Gen. Timothy Haake, who served with the Special Forces, said, "If you're a commander of Talibanforces, you would use the withdrawal date to rally your troops, saying we may be suffering now but wait 15 months when we'll haveless enemy to fight."

Haake added, "It plays into ... our enemies' hands and what they think about us that Americans don't have the staying power, the stomach, that'srequired in this type of situation. It's just the wrong thing to do.No military commander would sanction, support or announce awithdrawal date while hostilities are occurring."A former top-ranking Defense Department official also saw the policy as misguided.

"Setting a deadline to get out may have been politically expedient, but it is a military disaster, " he said. "It's as bad as[former U.S. Secretary of State] Dean Acheson signaling the Communists that we wouldn't defend South Korea before the North Korean invasion."

SQ plans dont link, they arent abrupt. Abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan angers Gates.

Roxana Trion, writer for The Hill, December 2, 2009, Gates opposes troop withdrawal deadline for Afghanistan, The Hill, online:http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/70165-gates-clinton-and-mullen-defend-afghan-plan

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he opposed setting deadlines for U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan as hedefended President Barack Obamas new war strategy.

Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff Adm. Mike Mullen on Wednesday made their firstrounds on Capitol Hill to publicly sell Obamas Afghanistan war plan to conflicted lawmakers still trying to digest the presidents announcement.Obama announced on Tuesday he will send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, some as early as the next few weeks. The president also announced hisgoal of beginning a U.S. troop withdrawal by the summer of 2011.

Gates said he agrees with the presidents July 2011 timeline but he would not agree with any efforts to set a

deadline for complete troop withdrawal. I have adamantly opposed deadlines. I opposed them in Iraq, and I oppose deadlines in Afghanistan. But what the president hasannounced is the beginning of a process, not the end of a process. And it is clear that this will be a gradual processand, as he said last night,based on conditions on the ground. So there is no deadline forthe withdrawal of American forces inAfghanistan, Gates told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday afternoon. July 2011 is not a cliff.

Pulling out of Afghanistan will deteriorate CMR.

Michael Leon, staff writer @ Veterans Today, Veterans Today 6/27 10, Nothing is Going Right for USA in Final Phase inAfghanistan http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/27/nothing-is-going-right-for-usa-in-final-phase-in-afghanistan/

Although Gen McChrystal has been sacked and replaced with Gen David Petraeus but not without creatingtension in civil-military relations. In case the situation in Afghanistan spins out of control and coalitionforces are forced to hurriedly exit in disgrace, or fatalities mount up, it is bound to further aggravate

civil-military relations in USA. However, prompt action by Obama has dispelled the lingering impression that Pentagon has become morepowerful than White House. He has reasserted his authority by this act and demonstrated that he is in full command.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

18
http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/27/nothing-is-going-right-for-usa-in-final-phase-in-afghanistan/http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/27/nothing-is-going-right-for-usa-in-final-phase-in-afghanistan/


19/47


2K10 19

Link Afghanisan

The military does not support withdrawal from AfghanistanJim Mannion, staff writer at AFP, 6/10/2010, US officials downplay July 2011 withdrawal from Afghanistanhttp://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hz33CLCwbhtiuwTXWaZkaPfvP4Xg

US Defense Secretary Robert Gates rejected suggestions Sunday that US forces will move out ofAfghanistan in large numbers in July of next year under a deadline set by President Barack Obama. "That absolutely has not been decided,"Gates said in an interview with Fox News Sunday. His comment was the latest indication that the magnitude of thedrawdown, if not the deadline itself, is the subject of an intensifying internal debate at a time when aNATO-led campaign against the Taliban is going slower than expected . Vice President Joe Biden, an early skeptic ofthe US military buildup in Afghanistan, was quoted as telling author Jonathan Alter recently: "In July of 2011, you're going to see a whole lot of peoplemoving out. Bet on it." White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel did not deny the Biden quote when asked about it, but, like Gates, said that the size ofthe drawdown would depend on conditions on the ground. "Everybody knows there's a firm date. And that firm date is a date (that) deals with the troopsthat are part of the surge, the additional 30,000," he said in an interview with ABC "This Week." "What will be determined at that date or going into thatdate will be the scale and scope of that reduction," he said. General David Petraeus, the commander of US forces in the Middle East, said last week that insetting the deadline for the surge last year, Obama's message was "one of urgency -- not that July 2011 is when we race for the exits, reach for the light

switch and flip it off." Petraeus told lawmakers he would be duty-bound to recommend delaying theredeployment of forces if he thought it necessary. In the same hearing, the Pentagon's policy chief, Michelle Flournoy, said a

responsible, conditions-based drawdown would depend on there being provinces ready to betransferred to Afghan control, and that there be Afghan combat forces capable of taking the lead.Officials have said that training of Afghan security forces has gone slower than expected, in part becausethere are not enough trainers.

Pull out from Afghanistan destroys military confidence in CMR

Kurt Volker, senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and former Ambassador to NATO, June 26, 2010. ACUS, Volker onAfghanistan Command Change http://www.acus.org/highlight/volker-afghanistan-command-change TP

Kurt Volker, senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and former Ambassador to NATO, asseses the impact of the relief ofStanley McChrystal and his replacement with David Petraeus will have on the Afghanistan mission in Sunday's Washington

Post. Two problems arose with the McChrystal flame-out: First is the challenge to presidential

leadership, which President Obama dealt with swiftly and effectively by firing Stanley McChrystal andreplacing him with David Petraeus. The second -- and bigger -- problem is that many inside and outsidethe military believe what McChrystal and his aides said. They feel our commitment lacks teeth: that they arenot given the resources, time, rules of engagement and political/civilian backing necessary to succeed.The July 2011 pullout date -- even if it is explained away in clarifying comments -- remains an albatross on thewhole operation. Enemies, allies and, apparently, our own military doubt our commitment to winning.The lack of trust between and among military and civilian implementers reveals that we lack the unityof effort needed for success. This is a huge rift in the execution of a vital U.S. strategy. Putting Petraeus in placecan help tighten up the military side of the equation, including its cooperation with the civilians. Butregaining the confidence of the military will require changes on the civilian side as well. Mostimportant, we must end the mismatch between strategy and timeline. The president and every senior

American official below him must convey an unshakable resolve to win. No qualifiers, no timelines:just determination.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

19
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hz33CLCwbhtiuwTXWaZkaPfvP4Xghttp://www.acus.org/highlight/volker-afghanistan-command-changehttp://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hz33CLCwbhtiuwTXWaZkaPfvP4Xghttp://www.acus.org/highlight/volker-afghanistan-command-change


20/47


21/47


2K10 21

Links Japan

The military, especially Gates, thinks involvement in Japan is important.

McCormack 9 - Gavan McCormack, emeritus professor at Australian National University, coordinator of The Asia-PacificJournal: Japan Focus, November 16, 2009, The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vs Hatoyama, online: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250

As the year wore on and as the new agenda in Tokyo became apparent before and after the August election, the confrontation deepened. Warnings became

more forceful. Kurt Campbell told the Asahi there could be no change in the Futenma replacement agreement. [23] Michael Green, formerly George W.Bushs top adviser on East Asia, though moved under Obama to the private sector at the Centre for International and Strategic Studies, warned thatit would indeed provoke a crisis with the US if the Democratic Party were to push ahead to try to re-negotiate the military agreements around the Okinawa issue. [24] Gregson, forthe Pentagon, added that theUS had no plans to revise the existing agreements. [25] Ian Kelly, forthe State Department, stated that therewas no intention on its part to allow revision. [26] Kevin Maher(also at State) added a day later that there couldbe no reopening of negotiations on something already agreed between states . [27] A senior Department of Defensespokesperson in Washington said it would be a blow to trust between the two countries if existing plans could not be implemented. [28] Summing upthe rising irritation in Washington, an unnamed State Department official commented that The hardest thing right now is not China. Its Japan. [29]The drumbeats of concern, warning, friendly advice from Washington that Hatoyama and the DPJ had better not implement the partys electoral

pledges and commitments rose steadily leading up to the election and its aftermath, culminating in the October Tokyo visit by Defense Secretary Gatesand Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Michael Mullen. Gates is reported to have insulted his Japanese hosts, refusing to attend a welcoming ceremony

at the Defense Ministry or to dine with senior Japanese Defense officials. [30]Gates message was no-nonsense:The Futenma relocation facility is the lynchpin of the realignment road map. Without the Futenmarealignment, the Futenma facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation toGuam, there will be no consolidation of forces and the return of land in Okinawa. [31]

The military is against withdrawal from OkinawaEric Talmadge, staff writer for the Associated press, Marine Times 2/19 10, General: Okinawan troops a benefit, not aburdenhttp://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/02/ap_stalder_okinawa_021910/

Lt. Gen. Keith Stalder, commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said the more than 13,000Marines on Okinawa play a key role in securing the region from threats such as North Korea, and said

the presence should continue. Im frequently concerned when I hear the word burden used as a description, Stalder said. I suggest thatit is an obligation under the alliance to do the hosting and basing of U.S. forces. And for that, thegovernment of Japan gets the services of one of the best and biggest militaries in the world. The U.S.troops on Okinawa and particularly the future of the sprawling Marine Corps Air Station Futenma have become a contentious issue betweenWashington and Tokyo. Under a post World War II pact, the United States has about 50,000 troops in Japan. Most of the U.S. bases are concentrated onthe island of Okinawa, which was a bloody battlefield during the war and was under U.S. jurisdiction until 1972. To lighten Okinawas load, both sideshave agreed the Futenma base should be closed and about 8,000 Marines shifted to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. But Japans new coalitiongovernment is divided over calls that a replacement for Futenma should be located off Okinawa or outside of Japan altogether. Washington wants Japan tostick to an agreement made with the previous administration in Tokyo to relocate the base farther north on a less populated part of Okinawa, and says the

transfer of the 8,000 Marines to Guam cannot move forward until the new site on Okinawa is finalized. Stalder, in an interview with The AssociatedPress, said the issue should not be looked at as a local problem, but should be seen from the regional strategic perspective. He said the troops on Okinawacontinue to serve a key deterrent and stabilizing role, need to be close to potential hot spots like North Korea and Taiwan and are now well positioned to

deal with other humanitarian or security contingencies in the region. Youve got to have forward-deployed ground forces. In our case, thathappens to be the Marines, he said. Okinawa, if you look at the map, is strategically in maybe the

perfect place in the region. From there, you deter a lot of potentially bad events, and you can geteverywhere you need to get very quickly. He said that moving the Marines off Okinawa completelywould compromise the U.S. militarys ability to respond to crises because troops would have to becalled in from Hawaii or the west coast of the United States. Days lost truly equate to lost lives, hesaid. If you are trying to deploy from farther away, people are going to die because it took you too long to get there.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

21
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/02/ap_stalder_okinawa_021910/http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/02/ap_stalder_okinawa_021910/


22/47


2K10 22

Links Asym

Gates is pursuing a strategy geared towards assymetrical warfare

(Michael Klare , Defense Correspondent and Prof. Peace and World Security @ Hampshire College, The Nation, The Gates

Revolution, 4-15- 2009, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090504/klare)

The preliminary Defense Department budget announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates on April 6 represents the mostdramatic shift in US military thinking since the end of the Vietnam War. Gates merely hinted at the magnitude of theproposed changes, claiming only that he seeks to "rebalance" the department's priorities between conventional and irregularwarfare. But the message is clear: from now on, counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict will be the military's principalcombat missions, while other tasks, such as preparing for an all-out war with a well-equipped adversary, will take adecidedly secondary role.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

22


23/47


2K10 23

**************Internal Links*******

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

23


24/47


2K10 24

Internal Link Angering The Military

Angering the Military Collapse CMRAckerman 8 [Spencer, The Washington Independent, 11/13, Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible,http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible]

The single biggest mistake Obama could make would be to completely discount the advice of themilitary senior leadership and those of his combat commanders who have the most experience dealingwith the issues, said the anonymous senior Army officer. Even if he does not discount it, but is perceived todiscount it, the relationship will be largely going backto the Clinton era, and will take years to repair.Thats not something you want to do in a time of war, which most of the nation has forgotten.

Obamas military actions determine the fate of CMR suspicion among military leaders and politicians.Kohn in 08 (Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina, winter 2008Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civilmilitary.html)

When a new president takes office in early 2009, military leaders and politicians will approach one anotherwith considerable suspicion. Dislike of the Democrats in general and Bill Clinton in particular, and disgust forDonald Rumsfeld, has rendered all politicians suspect in the imaginations of generals and admirals. Theindictments make for a long list: a beleaguered military at war while the American public shops at the mall; theabsence of elites in military ranks; the bungling of the Iraq occupation; the politicization of General David Petraeus by theWhite House and Congress; an army and Marine Corps exhausted and overstretched, their people dying, their commitments

never-ending.Nearly six years ofDonald Rumsfelds intimidation and abuse have encouraged in the officercorps a conviction that military leaders ought toare obliged topush back against their civilian masters.Egged on by Democrats in Congressand well-meaning but profoundly mistaken associates who believe themilitary must hold political leaders accountable for their mistakessome flag officers now opine publicly and seemingly

without hesitation. Though divided about Iraq strategy, the four-stars unite in their contempt for todayspolitical class and vow not to be saddled with blame for mistakes not of their own making.

For its part, the new administration will enter office mindful and jealous of the militarys iconic status inthe public mind, even if, ironically, the rhetoric of politicians does much to inflate that prestige. In truth, increasingpoliticization of the armed forces has generated considerable cynicism and distrust among elected officials of every stripe,

kept private only out of fear of appearing not to support the troops. The new administration, like its predecessors,will wonder to what extent it can exercise civilian control. If the historical pattern holds, theadministration will do something clumsy or overreact, provoking even more distrust simply in theprocess of establishing its own authority.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

24
http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possiblehttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possiblehttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html


25/47


2K10 25

Internal Links Modeling

Civil-military relations are modeled globally they are key to consolidate democratic transitions

Perry 96 (William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, 1996, The Trilateral Commission, Preventive Defense, 5/13http://www.trilateral.org/nagp/regmtgs/96/0523perry.htm)

We have long understood that the spread of democracy to more nations is good for our national security. And it has beenheartening this past decade to see so many nations around the world come to agree with us that democracy is the bestsystem of government. But as the nations of the world attempt to act on this consensus, we see that there are important stepsbetween a world-wide consensus and a worldwide reality.Democracy is learned behavior. Many nations today havedemocracies on paper which in fact are extremely fragile. Elections are a necessary but an insufficient condition for a freesociety. It is also necessary to embed democratic values in the key institutions of the nation . And that is what isdramatically lacking in the nations of the former Soviet Union and in some of the former Warsaw Pact nations.I believe thatour Defense Department has a key role to play in this effort, in virtually every new democracyin Russia, in the newlyfree states of the former Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern Europe, in South America, in the Asian Tigers. In all ofthose countries, the military represents a major force. In many cases, it is the most cohesive institution. It often contains alarge percentage of the educated elite, and it always controls key resources. In short, it is an institution that can eithersupport democracy or subvert it. We must recognize that each society moving from totalitarianism to democracy will betested at some point by a crisis. It could be an economic crisis, it could be a backslide on human rights and freedom, a

border or ethnic dispute. When such a crisis occurs, we want the military to play a positive role in resolving the crisisnota negative role by fanning the flames of the crisis, or even using the crisis as a pretext for a military coup . In these newdemocracies, we can choose to ignore this important institution or we can try to exert a positive influence. We have chosenthe latter. And believe me we do have an amazing ability to influence, if were only willing to use it. Every military in theworld looks to the U.S. armed forces as a model to be emulated. That is a valuable bit of leverage and we can put it to usecreatively in our preventive defense strategies. In addition, if we can build trust and understanding between the militaries oftwo neighboring nations, we build trust and understanding between the two nations themselves.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

25


26/47


2K10 26

Internal Links Cooperation

History proves cooperation key to successKohn in 08 (Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina, winter 2008Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,//http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civilmilitary.html//)

When the relationship workswhen there is candor, argument, and mutual respectthe result aligns national interest andpolitical purpose with military strategy, operations, and tactics. The collaboration between FranklinRoosevelt, his secretaries of war and navy, and the heads of the two armed services is considered the model in thisregard. Each side kept the other mostly informed; the military were present at all the major alliedconferences; Army Chief of StaffGeorge C. Marshall spoke candidly with the president and consulteddaily with Secretary of WarHenry Stimson. When the relationship does not workwhen the two sides dont confer, dontlisten, dont compromisethe decisions and policies that follow serve neither the national interest norconform to the bitter realities of war. The distrust, manipulation, and absence of candor that coloredrelations between President Lyndon Johnson, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and his seniormilitary advisors offers a case in point; to this day Robert Strange McNamara arouses hatred and contempt among military officerswho were not even born when he ruled the Pentagon.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

26
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.htmlhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html


27/47


2K10 27

Internal Links Failed States

Domestic CMR key to success in failed state conflicts

Frederick Barton and Noam Unger, 9. Barton is Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project and Senior AdviserInternational Security Program at the CSIS. Unger is fellow and policy director of the Foreign Assistance Reform project atBrookings. civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity , http://csis.org/publication/civil-

military-relations-fostering-development-and-expanding-civilian-capacity.

The security rationale for stability and development in poor and fragile states is based on the understanding that strengthening the economy of states andensuring social equity are in the short and long term interests of the United States. Stable states pose the United States with far fewer security challenges

than their weak and fragile counterparts. Indeed, stable states with healthy economies offer the United States opportunities for trade andrepresent potential partners in the fields of security and development. In contrast, weak and failing states pose seriouschallenges to the security of United States, including terrorism, drug production, money laundering and people smuggling .In addition, state weakness has frequently proven to have the propensity to spread to neighboring states, which in time can destabilize entire regions.While the group acknowledged that the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are particular in scope and complexity (and may not be repeated in the near future

by the U.S.), participants broadly concurred that the lessons of these challenges are that the United States must improve and expand its stabilization and

development capabilities. In particular, cases such as Pakistan and Nigeria, huge countries with strategic importance, make clearthat a military response to many internal conflicts will be severely limited. As such, increased emphasis on civilian capacitywithin the U.S. government and civil-military relations in general, will greatly improve the United States ability to respondto such crises in the future .

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

27


28/47


2K10 28

***********Impacts**********

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM

28


29/47


2K10 29

Impacts Solvency

Loss of CMR destroys plan implementationSulmasy and Yoo, 7 [Glenn Sulmasy, Judge Advocate, Associate Professor of Law, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and John YooProfessor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute,Challenges To Civilian Control Of The Military: A Rational Choice Approach To The War On Terror, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1815 (2007),

http://www.uclalawreview.org/articles/content/54/ext/pdf/6.1-10.pdf

Military resistance to civilian policies with which military leaders disagree could take several formsshort of an outright refusal to obey orders. Military officers can leak information to derail civilianinitiatives. They could "slow roll" civilian orders by delaying implementation. They could inflate theestimates of the resources needed, or the possible casualties and time needed to achieve a militaryobjective. And perhaps a relatively unnoticed but effective measure is to divide the principal-if thenumber of institutions forming the principal increases, it will be more difficult to monitor theperformance of the agent and to hold it accountable. Deborah Avant argues, for example, that civilians exercisegreater control of the military in Great Britain

Ddi 10 Cmr Generic

Documents

Transcript of Ddi 10 Cmr Generic