cosmides_1985_chap3

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Chapter 3" Di f f e r ences i n Exper i en cen:

P ro po se d e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h e e l u s i v i t y of t h ec o n t e n t e f f e c t o n t h e Wason s e l e c t i o n t a s k

A number of t h e o r i e s a t t e m p t i ng t o e x p l a i n t h e e l u s i v econ ten t e f f e c t on th e Wason se l e c t io n t a sk have appea red i n t h el i t e r a t u r e . Most a g r e e t h a t t h em a t ic c o n t e n t e nh an ce s l o g i c a lp er fo rm an ce b e ca us e t h e m a t i c r u l e s a r e f a m i l i a r , w he re as a b s t r a c tr u l e s a r e u n f am i li a r . The t h e o r i e s d i f f e r i n t h e i r e xp l a na t io n sof why f a m i l i a r i t y enhances performance, and why the c ont ente f f e c t i s so " e lu s ive . "

None of t h e s e t h eo r i e s i nvoke th e no t ion of a so c i a lco n t r ac t , t h e r e fo re none of them t r y t o exp la i n why so c i a lc o n t r a c t r u l e s a r e t h e only t he ma ti c r u l e s t o c o n si s t e nt l y e l i c i tr o b u s t c o n t e n t e f f e c t s . I nv ok in g t h e c on c ep t of a s o c i a lc o n t r a c t t u r n s t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p roblem on i t s head : t hephenomenon re qu ir in g exp lan at i on i s n ot t h e c on te n t e f f e c t ' se l u s i v i t y , bu t, r a t h e r, i t s p r e d i c t a b i l i t y .

3 .1 Fami l ies of explan a t ion

B ef or e d i s c u s s i n g t h e p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r i e s t h a t ha ve a l r e a d ybeen proposed, it i s use fu l t o cons ide r what k inds of exp lana t iona r e p o s s ib l e i n ~ S I I . o nce ptua lly , t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t f i v er e l a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t f a m i l i e s of e x pl an at i on :

1. There i s no l o g i c module. I n s o l v i n g t h e s e l e c t i o n t a s k ,peop le u se ru l e s of i ne r e n c e a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e domainsug ges ted by th e problem. These ru l e s of i nf er en ce may bed i f f e r e n t f o r d i f f e r e n t c o nt e nt d omains.


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a . The ru le s of in fe r ence a r e a p roduc t o f " exper i ence"s t ru c t u r ed on ly by inormation pro ces sin g mechanisms t h a ta r e inna te , bu t domain genera l .b. The r u l e s o f i n f e r e n c e a r e i n n a t e , o r e l s e t h e product of

"exper i ence" s t r uc tu re d by domain sp e c i f i c inn a tea lgor i thm s .

2 . There i s a l o g i c module, but it i s not necessary for everydayl e a r n i n g . I t i s a c t i v a t e d o n ly i n hi g h er l e v e l modelbu i l d ing , fo r example , t o answer ques t ions w i th i n th eframework of a we ll -e st ab l i sh ed the ory of what i s t r u e of aco nt en t domain. That i s why performance i s b e t t e r w i t hf a m i l i a r m a t e r i a l s .

3. There i s a l o g i c module, and it i s n e c e s s a r y f o r l e a r n i n g .The con ten t e f f ec t i s d ue t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n how w e l l t h epro pos i t i ons can be pushed through a ux i l ia ry mechanisms l i k esh or t te rm s t o re s o r imagery buf fe r s . Fam i l i a r t e rms and /o rr e l a t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e p er fo rm an ce be ca us e t h e y a r e c o n c r e t e andth e r e f o r e more e as i l y m an ipu lab le o r because they r educe" c o g n i t i v e l o a d " .

4 . There i s no l o g i c module, j u s t t h e a b i l i t y t o r e co g ni z eco nt ra di c t io n when one se es i t .a . People can bui ld menta l models of th e c i rcumstanc esdesc r ibe d i n a p roblem ; i f t hey happen t o bu i l d a m odelt h a t c o n t r a d i c ts t h e s t a t e of a f f a i r s a s s e r t e d by t h e

c o n d i t i o n a l , t h e y w i l l f a l s i f y . I t i s e a s i e r t o b u i ldm ental m odel s of f am i l i a r p ro pos i t ion s and re l a t i on s .b. A c tu a l ex p e ri e n c e w i t h e v en t s t h a t c o n t r a d i c t t h e r e l a t i o na r e s to re d i n long-term memory. A f am i l i a r them e i s morel i k e l y t o c ue co n t r a d i c t o ry a s s o c i a t i o n a l p a i r i n g f rom lo n gterm memory, because such pa i r in gs a r e more l i k e l y t o havebeen ac tua l ly exper i enced .

5 . Non-ra t ional , domain-genera l he ur is t ic s having noth ing t o dow i th fo rm al log ic , o r w i th an under s t and ing o f the r e l evanceof coun ter -examples , account fo r the p resence and v a r i a b i l i t yof t h e c o n t e n t e f f e c t .

The hypo the sis t h a t humans have Darwinian alg ori thm s fo rreason ing abou t soc ia l exchange i s a "family 1-b" ex plan at io n.Each e x p l a n a t i o n p r op os ed i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e b e l on g s t o one o ft h e s e f i v e f a m i l i e s o f e x pl a na t io n .


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3 .2 E xp la na ti on s p ro po se d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e

A number of exp lan at i ons have been put f o r t h t o ex pl ai ncon ten t e f f e c t s on th e Wason se le ct io n ta sk . Most of theminv olv e a wedding of ass oci at i oni sm and Tversky & Kahneman's(1973) " a v a i l a b i l i t y " h e u r i s t i c .

Tversky & Kahneman were i n t e r e s t e d i n how p eop le judgep ro bab i l i t y . They no ted t h a t peop le t y p i c a l ly do no t makes t a t i s t i c a l l y sound p r o b a b i l i s t i c i n f e r e n c e s , even when gi ve ni n o rm at io n s u f f i c i e n t t o do so .

Although peo ple ' s p r ob ab i l i t y judgments a r e no ts t a t i s t i c a l l y sound, t hey a r e no t random, e i t h e r . To accoun t fo rt h i s , Tversky & Kahneman po si te d th a t people use mental s ho rtc u t s -- " h e u r i s t i c s " -- i n making pr ob ab i l i t y judgments . Theyhypothes ized t h a t people judge th e prob ab i l i t y of two event s co-oc cu rr in g by t h e e as e wit h which examples come t o mind -- t h e i r" a va i l ab i l i t y " . They named t h i s method th e " av a i l a b i l i t yh e u r i s t i c . "

For example, suppose you ar e to l d th a t 80% o f c o l l e g es t u d e n t s i n Cambridge a t t e n d Harvard and 20% a t t e n d MIT. ACambr idge co l le ge s tudent was involved i n a f i gh t today . Yourt a s k i s t o g u e ss which s c h oo l t h i s s t u d e n t a t t e n d s . F i v e f i g h t sinvo lv ing MIT s t ud en ts immediate ly spr ing t o mind, bu t you havet o se arch your memory long and hard t o r e ca l l any f i g h tsinvol v ing Harvard s tu den ts : th e co-occur rence of "MIT" and" f i g h t " i s more av ai la bl e a s a response. Even though Harvardstudents outnumber MIT s t u d e n t s 4 t o 1 i n Cambridge, and eventhough you have no r e l i a b l e da t a i nd i ca t ing th a t MIT s t u d e n ts a r emore pu gn ac io us t h a n Ha rv ard s t u d e n t s , t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y h e u r i s t i c

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would l ea d you t o j udge t h a t t h e f i g h t t oday was more l i ke ly t ohave involved an MIT s tu den t than a Harvard s tu den t .

According t o Tversky & Kahneman, e as e of r e c a l l i s af u n c t i o n of a s s o c i a t i v e s t r e n gt h . A s s o c ia t i v e s t r e n g t h , t h eyargue , i s u s u a l ly d i r e c t l y p r o p o rt i o n a l t o t h e f r eq ue nc y w it hwhich two eve nts co-occur i n an in d i v i du a l ' s exper ience . Thea v a i l a b i l i t y h e u r i s t i c i s a us efu l r u le of thumb because the e asewi th which ass oc ia t i on s can be brought t o mind i s u s u a l l yc o r r e l a t e d w it h t h e i r e c o l o g i c a l f re qu en cy . I t can l e a d t o b i a s ,however , when as so c i a t iv e s t re ng th i s de termined by f ac to r s o the rt h a n e c o l o g i c a l f r e qu en c y ( l i k e s e ma n ti c d i s t a n c e o r p e r c e p t u a ls a l i e n c y ) .

F r eq u en t e v e n t s a r e f a m i l i a r e v e nt s . A b s t r a c t r u l e sr e l a t i n g l e t t e r s and numbers a r e u n f am i li a r . I t o c cu rr ed t o anumber o f r e s e a r c h e r s t h a t a v a i l a b i l i t y -- based on frequency-d e te rm i ne d a s s o c i a t i v e s t r e n g t h -- might p l ay a key r o l e i nexp la i n ing why some f am i l i a r p rob lems a r e more l i ke ly t o e l i c i tl o g i ca l per formance on th e Wason se l e c t io n t a s k t han a bs t r ac tproblems.

For Tversky & Kahneman, ec ol og ic al f req uen cy was onl y one ofmany de t e rminan t s o f av a i l a b i l i t y . Bu t because s e l ec t i on t a skt h e o r i s t s were t r y i n g t o ac co un t f o r a c o nt e nt e f f e c t t h a t t h e yassumed was caused by fa mi l i a r i t y , assoc i a t ion ism p la ys a morec e n t r a l r o l e i n t h e i r a d ap t at i on s of a v a i l a b i l i t y t h eo ry .

The " a v a i l a b i l i t y t h e o r i e s " of t h e s e l e c t i o n t a s k t h e o r i s t scome i n a var ie ty of forms , wi th some impor tan t th eo re t i ca ld i f fe re nc es . But common t o a l l i s t h e n o ti on t h a t t h e s u b j e c t ' sa c t u a l p a s t e x p e r i en c e s c r e a t e a s s o c i a t i o n a l l i n k s between t e r ms

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mentioned i n th e se l ec t i on task . The more exposures a sub je c thas had t o , f or example , th e co-occurrence of P and Q , t h es t r o ng e r t h a t a s s o c i a t i o n w i l l be and the e as ie r i t w i l l come t omind -- become "a va il ab le " a s a response. A s u b j e c t i s morel i ke ly t o have a c tua l l y e xper ie nc e d th e c o -occ ur rence of P andnot-Q f o r a f a m i l i a r r u l e , t h e r e f o r e f a m i l i a r r u l e s a r e morel i k e l y t o e l i c i t l o g i c a l l y f a l s i f y i n g r esp ons es t h an u n f am il i ar. .r u l e s . I f a l l t h e t er ms i n a t a s k a r e unfamlllar, the on lya s s o c i a t i o n al l i n k a v a i l a b l e w i l l be t h a t c re a te d between P and Qby t h e c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e i t s e l f , b ec au se no p r ev i ou s l i n k w i l le x i s t among any of th e terms . Thus ' P & Q ' w i l l be t h e mostcommon respons e f o r un fa mi li ar ru le s.

Although i t i s r a r e l y e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d , t h es e t h e o r i s t sseem t o assume t h a t a s s o c i a t i v e l i n k s a r e c r e a t e d " t h e o ld -fas hion ed way", by domain gen er al as so ci a t iv e processes . Somer e f e r d i r e c t l y t o a ss o c i at i o n i sm ( P o l l a r d , 1 9 8 2 ) , w he re as o t h e r sr ef er more simply t o the di f f er en t amount of "experience"su bj ec ts may have had with d i f f er e nt content domains (Griggs &Cox, 1982; Manktelow & Evans, 1979; Johnso n-Lai rd, 1983; Wason,1983) . The presumpt ion th a t le a rn in g occurs v i a some s o r t of"computat ional asso cia t ioni sm" (Fodor, 1983) would account forth e i r be l i e f t ha t the c a te go r iz a t io n of c on te n t domains a long afamil ia r -unfamil ia r d imens ion i s th e cor re c t one , th e one wi thcau sal import . Associa t ionism i s a p rocess t h a t makes unfami l ia rcon ten t domains famil ia r -- re ga rd l e s s of the s p e c i f i c c on te n t ofthe domain it o pe r at es upon. Which co nt en t domains becomef a m i l i a r i s determ ined by t he amount of p er son al e xper ienc e apa r t i c u l a r ind i v idu a l ha s w i th the domains i n que s t ion . The

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s e l e c t i o n t a s k t h e o r i s t s r a r e l y e n t e r t a i n t h e no ti on t h a tr e g a r d l e s s of f a m i l i a r i t y , d i f f e r e n t c o n t en t domains a r ep roc es s e d by d i f fe re n t , domain s p e c i f i c r u l es of infer ence . Whenthey do, they seem t o presume th a t t he domain s p e c i f i c ru le s werelea rned v ia a domain genera l p rocess .

The P ca r d i s almost universally chosen on Wason selectionta s ks , r e ga rd le s s of c on ten t . A l l the o r ie s th a t have beenp ro pos ed i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e concede t h a t t h i s i s probably due t o arud imenta ry unders tand ing of l og ic (o r of con t ingency , i n aloo s e r , l i ng u i s t i c s e ns e ) . Thus, the p rima ry goa l of the s et h e o r i e s i s t o ex p l a in why f a m i l i a r r u l e s f a c i l i t a t e t h es e l e c t i o n of t h e n ot -Q c a r d and i n h i b i t t h e s e l e c t i o n of t h e Qcard , in sof ar a s t h i s happens . To be adequate , a theory must bea b le t o answer th re e que s t ion s ra i s e d by th e da ta r ev ie we d i n theprev ious chap te r :

1. Why do f a m i l i a r r u l e s e l i c i t more l o g i c a l f a l s i f i c a t i o nt h a n a b s t r a c t r u l e s ?2. Why do some fa m i l i a r ru le s r e l i a b l y e l i c i t lo g i c a lf a l s i f i c a t i o n wher eas o t h e r s d o no t ?3. Why do t he same f a m i l i a r r ul es sometimes e l i c i tlogical responses and sometimes not?

D i f f e r e n t i a l A v a il a b i l it y

In an a r t i c l e en t i t l e d "Human reason ing : Some pos s i b lee f f e c t s of a v a i l a b i l i t y " , P aul P o l l a r d p u t f o r t h what i s t o d at et h e m ost p r e c i s e l y s p e c i f i e d t h e o ry p u r p o r ti n g t o e x p l a i n c o n te n te f f e c t s on t h e Wason se le c t io n task (Po l la rd , 1982). I t i s aq u i t e l i t e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e a s s o c i a t i o n i s t paradigm s ke tc he da bove , i n which p re -e x i s t ing a s s oc i a t i ve pa i r i ngs of t e rms


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m en ti on ed i n t h e s e l e c t i o n t a s k c r e a t e a n o n -l o gi c al r es p on s eb i a s ( h i s t he or y i s a "family 5" e x p l a n a t i o n ) . Whether a subjectresponds ' P & Q ' o r ' P & not-Q' i s deter mined by th es t r e n g t h of t h e s e two a s s o c i a t i v e l i n k s . * The d om in an ta s s o c i a t i o n w in s, e ve n i f b oth a r e a v a i l a b l e . T hus , a s u b j e c tw i l l answer 'P & Q' i f more ins ta nc es o f P - Q l in k s come t o mindt h a n i n s t a n c e s o f P - n ot- Q l i n k s . For P o l l a r d , a s s o c i a t i v es t r e n g t h i s d i r e c t l y p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e number of e x po s u re s a nin d i v id u a l h a s h ad t o e a ch p a i r i n g . A c tu a l p e r s o n a l e x p er i e n c ei s t h e c e n t e r p i ec e of h i s a v a i l a b i l i t y t he or y .

For example, on a t r an sp or ta t i on problem where the r u l e i s"I f a person goes t o Boston then he take s t h e subway" and t h ecards a re "Bos ton t t (P), "Arl ington" (not-P) , "subwayt1 (Q ) , and"cab" (no t-Q ), a s ub je ct who had had more expe r ie nce s of peopl et a k i n g t h e subway t o Boston would choose "Boston" and "subway",t h a t i s , ' P & Q ' . A s u b j e c t who had had more e xp er ie nc es ofpeo ple ta ki ng a ca b t o Boston would choose "Boston" and "cab" ,t h a t i s , ' P & not-Q' , which i s , by c o in c ide n c e , t h e l o g i c a l l yf a l s i f y i n g r e s po n s e. N ote, however, t h a t t h e p r o ce d u re t h a tg e ne r at e d t h i s r es p on se i s dec ided ly non- log ica l .

P o l l a r d d i s t i n g u i s h e s between " r e a l i s t i c " c o n te n t an dc o n t e n t t h a t i s merely " thematic" . Thematic con ten t i s no t

* Po l l a r d does no t e x p l ic i t l y d i scu ss why someone migh t choose'PI a lone on th e se le c t io n tas k . However, i n d i s cus s in g o th erl o g i c a l t a s k s he n o t es t h a t a v a i l a b i l i t y might a f f e c t ac o n d i t i o n a l ' s p e r ce i ve d r e v e r s i b i l i t y ; " a l l do gs a r e a ni ma ls " i sc l e a r l y n o t t h e same a s " a l l a n im a ls a r e d og s" , w he re as " a l l d og sbark" i s n o t s o c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t fr om " a l l b a rk i ng a ni ma l s a r edogs." From he re he would have t o argue t h a t having unders toodt h a t " If P t h e n Q t t does not imply "I f Q then P" somehow preventsone f rom choosing the Q card . B u t s i n c e h i s t h e or y i s an o n l o g i c a l on e, and n o n r e v e r s i b i l i t y i s a l o g i c a l c o n si d e r a t io n ,it i s no t c l e a r what t h a t "somehow" would be.


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" r e a l i s t i c n u n le ss i t c ue s a c t u a l e xp e ri en c es . I f t h e s u b j e c thas had no re le va nt exper iences wi th th e problem domain, noma tt er how "th ema tic " i t i s , t h e dominant a s s oc i a t i on w i l l bet h a t c r e a t e d by t h e c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e i t s e l f . Hence, t h e s u b j e c tw i l l respond 'P & Q', j u s t a s i f t h e p ro bl e m' s c o n t e n t w er ea b s t r a c t . P o l l a r d i s a s t i c k l e r f o r a c t u a l e xp e ri en c e. Forexample, I can th in k of no t h a t people have moreexper i ence wi th than th a t expressed by th e food problem: ' I f Ie a t X t h e n I d r i n k Y n . Most meals in cl ud e both food and dr in k,and mos t people ea t th re e such meals a day, every day of t h e i rl ives . Moreover , i t i s q u i t e common fo r ce r t a i n foods and dr i nk st o be consumed i n conju nc t io n wi th one another : o range ju ic e wi thb r e a k f a s t f o o d s, c o f f e e w i t h d e s s e r t , wine wi t h d i n n e r e n t r e e s ,mixed d r i nks w i th ho r s d' oeuv re s.* Ye t Po l l a r d c l a im s t h a t t hef oo d pr ob lem d i d n o t e l i c i t a c o n t e nt e f f e c t b ec au se s u b j e c t sp robab ly had no t pe r so na l ly expe r i enced some o f t h e pa r t i c u l a rf ood-dr ink combinat ions used, such as , " If I e a t haddock the n Id ri n k gin". ( I n some of my exper iment s I admin i s t e r ed foodproblems us in g more us ua l conte nt , and s t i l l found no e f f e c t , s eeChapter 6. )

Because r e sponses a r e de t e rmined by t he ac tu a l , pe r so na l ,i d i o s y n c r a t i c e x p e r i en c e s o f s u b j e c t s , h i s t h e o r y c a n a c co u nt f o rt h e f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n c o nt e nt s , l i k e t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n problem,somet imes e l i c i t l og i c a l r e sponses and some times do no t:

* Note a l so t h a t fo r meals , th e most common ea t in g p l us d r in k in gexpe r i ences , it i s t h e t ype o f food ea t en t h a t de t e rmines wha td r i n k i s s e r v e d , n o t v i c e v e r s a . L i k e th e food problem, th er e l a t i o n f o r m ea ls i s " I f I e a t X, then I d r i n k Y no t " I f Id r i n k Y t h e n I e a t X) .


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... h e ex te nt of b ia s toward one mode of t r an sp or t wouldbe expec t ed t o va ry f rom s tudy t o s tudy and , t o someex t en t , f rom su b je c t t o sub j ec t , depend ing on suchf a c t o r s a s g e o g r a ph i c a l l o c a t i o n , income l e v e l o f t h esub je c t s and th e appea rance of t h e expe r imen te r h imse l f( s ub je c t s , f o r ins tan ce , may wel l have exper ience ofp r o f e s s o r s , b u t n o t of p o s t gr a d u a t e s t u d e n t s , r e p o r t i n gt r a v e l by p l a n e ) . (pp. 80-81)

U n f o r t un a t e l y , f o r t h e same r e as o n , h i s t h e o r y h a s v e r y l i t t l ep r ed i c t i ve power. For a pa r t i c u l a r sub jec t popu la t i on , one cang e n e r a t e p r e d i c t i o n s i f t h e p ro bl e m' s c o n t e n t t a p s e x pe r i e n ce st h a t t he expe r imen te r knows t o be nea r ly un ive r sa l o r e l s ecomple tely unfami l ia r . But fo r most conten t domains, th e on lyp r e d i c t i o n it can make i s t h a t r e s p o n s e s w i l l va ry unp red ic t ab ly .

The f a c t t h a t th e Dr inking Age Problem (DAP) and Johnson-L a i r d e t a l . ' s p o s t o f f i c e problem e l i c i t h ig h p e r ce n ta g e s o f ' P& no t- Q' r es p on s es p r e s e n t s d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r P o l l a r d ' s t h eo r y .Most su bj ec ts have had more exposures t o beer dr in ke rs who a r eover 20 ( l eg a l ) than under 20 ( i l l e g a l ) and seen more enve lopeswi th co r r ec t pos t age than w i th i n co r r ec t post age. Thus, ani m pl i ca t io n of h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l a v a i l a b i l i t y view i s t h a t mosts u b j e c t s w i l l choose 'P & Q ' fo r t he se p roblems. Po l l a r d no te st h i s d i f f i c u l t y and t r i e s t o f i ne s se it by sugges t ing t h a td i f f e r e n t i a l a v a i l a b i l i t y a r i s e s from t h e s u b j e c t ' s e x p er ie n ce oft h e c o n t e n t & of t h e problem. He sa ys :

The c o n t e xt r e l a t e s t o d r i n k e r s t h a t a r e i n v e s t i g a t e d byth e po l i c e , o r d r in ke r s who a r e b r eak ing the l aw , andt h e o nl y a v a i l a b l e i n s t a n c e s o f t h e s e , g iv e n t h ec o n t e x t , a r e u nd er ag e d r i n k e r s ( o r , i n t h e c a s e of t h eJohnson-Laird e t a l . s t udy , under s tamped l e t t e r s ). TheP - not-Q l i n k th us becomes dominant. (p - 80)

T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s problemat ic . Unless you al re ad y under s t an dt h a t " b re a ki n g t h e la w" = P + not-Q, p l a y i n g t h e r o l e of a p o l i c e


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o f f i c e r o r p o s t a l s o r t e r s e e k i ng v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e l aw w i l l no t ,i n and of i t s e l f , l i m i t your s ea rch t o i n s t ance s of not -Q(underaged beverage dr in ke rs , under s tamped l e t t e r s ) . T h i sc r i t i c i s m i s unde r l i ned by r e s u l t s on th e pos t o f f i ce prob lem fo rGelding's younger su bj ec ts and Gr iggs & Cox's American subjects .T he se s u b j e c t s d i d n o t u n d er st a nd t h a t " v i o l a t i n g t h e r u l e " =sea l ed enve lope + l e s s t h a n 20 c e n t s p os t ag e . P l a y i n g t h e r o l eof a p o s t a l s o r t e r l o o k i n g f o r v i o l a t i o n s d i d no t h e l p them onew i t , even though t h i s i s the same contex t success fu l ly used byJohnson-Lai rd e t a l . TP Jlook fPrr n v i o l a t i o n yau have LQ knowwhak countsa m a t i = . And i f you a l r e a d y know what c o u n t sa s a v io l a t i o n , t hen why not answer t he s e l e c t ion t a skacco rd ing ly? Why would th e j e l a t i v e ava i l ab i l i t y of compl i ancev e r s u s v i01 t on ep isode s c ause you t o change your answer?

One could re f rame Po l l a rd t s v iew of c ont ex t thu s : Mostsu b j ec t s have had expe r i ence w i th t he po l i ce and have no ted t h a tthe y only qu es t i on peop le under 20, and t h i s makes not-Q morea v a i l a b l e t h an Q. But i s t h i s t r u e ? P o l i c e do n o t i n v e s t i g at eg u i l t y p e o pl e o n ly -- t hey query a r ange of peop le i n s ea rch o fth e gu i l ty . I n my exper ience , bouncers ( I have never witnessedp o l i c e making s uc h i n q u i r i e s ) a sk t o s e e t h e I D S of pe op le wholo ok young -- bu t most o f t he se p rove t o be ove r t he l eg a ld r i n k i n g a g e. I su sp ec t my exp eri enc e i s n o t a t y p i c a l . So a l lpeo ple sha r i ng my experienc e of bouncers/pol ice should choose ' Q fra th er tha n 'n ot -Q t. And how many peo ple have had any a c t u a le x p er i en c e w i t h p o s t a l s o r t e r s , t o s e e what s o r t s of e nv el op est h e y pay s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o ? The p o i n t i s , s u b j e c t s te x p e r i en c e w i t h t h e b eh av io r of p o l i c e and p o s t a l s o r t e r s i s

81


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bound t o be a s i d i o s y n c r a t i c a s t h e i r e x pe r i en c e w i t h g oi ng t oBoston v i a cab or subway. Theref ore , i f we reframe Po ll ar d ' sv iew of con t ex t i n t h i s manner, re sponses t o the DAP and posto f f i c e pr ob le ms s ho ul d be v a r i a b l e , l i k e t h o s e t o t h et r an sp or ta t i on problem. They should no t e l i c i t such un iformlyh igh l e v e l s of f a l s i f i c a t i o n .

Las t , Po l la rd seems t o p ick and choose t h a t which he wishest o count a s "act ual experience ." The sub je ct , who has neverbeen, and perhaps never even met, a po st a l s o r t er , can pr oj ec th i ms el f i n t o t h i s r o l e s uc h t h a t t h i s im agined p e r s on ' s l o ng te rmmemory i s cued. Yet t h i s same sub je c t cannot make th e i n t u i t i v el e a p from haddock wi th water t o haddock with gi n. I can see nopr inc ip l ed way of main ta in ing t h a t th e t ra nsp or t a t i on problem andpos t o f f i c e prob lem c ue fa mi l i a r e xper ie nc es , bu t t ha t the foodproblem does not.

Memory-cueing/ Reasoning by ana logy

Memory cueing (Manktelow & Evans, 1979; Gr ig gs & Cox, 1982;Cox & Griggs, 1982; Griggs, 1983) i s a v a r i e t y of a v a i l a b i l i t yt h e o ry t h a t d o es n o t depend on d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e r e l a t i v ea v a i l a b i l i t y of P & Q versus P & not-Q. Although i t was f i r s tsuggested by Manktelow & Evans (1979) t o ex pl ai n why th e t hema ticc o n t e n t e f f e c t i s s o e l u s i v e , i t s primary proponents a r e RichardGriggs and James Cox (Griggs & Cox, 1982; Cox & Griggs, 1982;Griggs , 1983) . I t i s a "family 4-bn expla nat ion .

Acco rd ing t o the s e re s e a rc he r s , s ub j e c t s w i l l f a l s i f y on t h eWason s e l e c t ion t a s k i f the y ca n re c a l l pa s t e xpe rie nc e wi th:


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1. t h e con t en t of t h e pr ob lem;2. t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p ( r u l e ) ex p re s se d ; and3. a coun t er - exampl e t o t he r u l e .R e c a l l i n g p a s t e x p e ri e n c e w i th a l l t h r e e a s p e c t s of t h e prob le mal lo ws t h e c or re c t r esponse t o be "cued" f rom lon g t erm memory.

U n l i k e P o l l a r d ' s d i f f e r e n t i a l a v a i l a b i l i t y th e o ry , whichr e q u i r e s t h a t a v a i l a b l e d i s co n f i rm i ng i n s t a n c e s o utnumberav a i l a b l e conf i r ming i n s t a nc es , memory-cueing t h eo r i s t s on l yre qu i r e t h a t one counter-example become av ai l a b l e . Su bje c t s don o t * g e n e r a t e f a l s i f y i n g i n s t a n c e s by a d e d u ct i v e p r o c es s , b u t i fa counter -example happens t o be gene ra ted by some oth er means,t h e y c a n r e c o g n i z e it a s v i o l a t i n g t h e r ul e . T h i s h i g h l i g h t s ani m po r ta n t co n c e p tu a l d i f f e r e n c e between d i f f e r e n t i a l a v a i l a b i l i t yt heo r y and memory-cueing. D i f f e r en t i a l a va i l ab i l i t y i s ane n t i r e l y non logi ca l theor y , whereas memory-cueing re qu i r esm in im al l o g i c a l c omp ete nc e: t h e a b i l i t y t o r e co g n i z ec o n t r a d i c t i o n , t h e most f u n da m en ta l l o g i c a l p r o p e r t y .

The exper imen ts rep or te d by Griggs & Cox, 1 98 2, was ve ryi mpor t an t i n e s t a b l i s h i ng memory-cueing a s a t heo r y . Thet r a n s p o r t a t i o n an d p o s t o f f i c e pro ble ms f a i l e d t o e l i c i t morel o g i c a l r e s p o n se s fr om t h e i r American s u b j e c t s t h a n a b s t r a c tproble ms did . However, 72% and 74% of su b je c ts from t h e samep o p u l at i o n p ro du ce d f a l s i f y i n g r e s po n se s i n two d i f f e r e n tr e p l i c a t i o n s of t h e Dm. Griggs & Cox s u b s t a n t i a t e d t h e i r c l a imt h a t members o f t h e i r s ub j ec t poo l had pa s t expe r i ence w i t h t hea bo ve t h r e e a s p e c t s of t h e Dm, b u t n ot wi th t h e p o s t o f f i c ep robl em. Th i r t y - t h r ee ad d i t i on a l s u b j ec t s f rom t h e samep o p u l at i o n c o mp le te d a q u e s t i o n n a i r e d e s i gn e d t o t a p t h e i r

* a nd c a n no t , w i th o u t e x p l i c i t a c ad em ic t r a i n i n g i n f or ma l l o g i c .83


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f a mi l i a r i t y w i t h t he se t wo r u l e s and coun t er -examples t o them.The q u e s t i o n n a i r e a s k ed :1. whet he r r eg u l a t i on s e x i s t conce r n i ng beer and be i ng o f ac e r t a i n a g e , and s e a l i n g a n e n ve l op e an d h a v in g a c e r t a i n

amount of po st ag e on it; i f s o , t he n w r i t e t h e r e g u l a t i o n ,2 . whe ther t hey t hemse lves had eve r v i o l a t e d t h e r egu l a t i on ,3. whether the y c ould >qemember s p e c i f i c in st an ce s of someoneo t h e r t h a n t he m s e lv e s v i o l a t i n g t h e r e g u l a t i o n .Only 12% w ro te a r u l e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t 't h e p o s t o f f i c e problem,b u t 88B' w r o te a r u l e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e DAP. Only one subjectr e c a l l e d h av in g p e r s o n a l ly v i o l a t e d t h e p o s t a l r u l e ( i n t e r e s t i n g ,a s no su ch r u l e e x i s t s i n t h e U.S.1). I n c o n t r a s t , 76% ofs u b j e c t s r e p o r t e d h a v in g pe r s o n a l l y v i o l a t e d t h e d r i n k i n g a g er u l e , a nd 97% c o u l d r e c a l l s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s o f s omeone e l s ev i o l a t i n g it.

Griggs & Cox t a k e t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n o f p e r s o n a l e x p e ri e n ce i nt h e i r s u b j e c t p o p ul at io n w it h s u c c e ss on t h e s e l e c t i o n t a s k a sevi den ce f o r memory-cueing th eo ry. They a l s o c i t e Golding( 1 9 8 1 ) , i n w hic h o l d e r s u b j e c t s who w ere f a m i l i a r w i t h B r i t a i n ' sp re -1 96 8 p o s t o f f i c e r u l e d i d w e l l o n t h e p o s t o f f i c e p ro bl em ,wher eas younger su b j e c t s d i d no t .

They e x p l a i n t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y of t h e r e s u l t s f o r o t h e rt h e m a t i c p ro bl em s ( f oo d , s c h o o l s , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) a s ca u s e d byt h e v a r i a b l e , i d i o s y n c r a t i c , e x p e ri e n ce of s u b j e c t s w i th t h e s eco nt en ts . They su gge st , f o r example, t h a t Wason & S h a p i r o ' s( 19 71 ) t r a n s p o r t a t i o n problem e l i c i t e d hi gh e r l e v e l s o f l o g i c a lf a l s i f i c a t i o n t h a n t h o s e o f M anktelow & Evans (1979) and P ol la rd(1981), because Wason & S h a p i r o ' s s u b j e c t s fro m U n i v e r s i t yC o l le g e London l i v e c l o s e r t o t h e c i t i e s named i n t h e s e l e c t i o nt a s k t h a n d o t h e o t h e r r e s e a r c h e r s ' Plymouth P o l y t e c h n i c

84


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su b j ec t s . There f o re , Wason & S h a p i r o l s s u b j e c t s we re more l i k e l yt o h a ve made a t r i p t h a t h ap pe ne d t o be a c ou nt er -e xa mp le t o t h er u l e . *

Note t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t G ri gg s & Cox h a z a r d t h i s e x p l a n a t i o nf o r t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p ro bl em means t h a t t h e y on ly r e q u i r e t h a t

t lt h e s u b j e c t h av e e x p e r ie n t e w i t h t h e relation express ed by th er u l e . S u b j e c t s n e e d n ' t h av e e x p e ri e n c ed t h e r u l e gua r u l e --t h a t i s , a s an e x p l i c i t , l i n g u i s t i c a l l y e xp re ss ed s e t ofp r o p o s i t i o n s , s uc h a s t h e DAP and t h e B r i t i s h p o s t a l o f f i c e r u l e .

I f memory-cueing i s t h e f u l l s t o r y , one wo nd er s whyperformance on fo od problems i s so unifo rmly low. Althoughm em ory-cueing r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e s u b j e c t h av e h ad e x p e r i e n c e w i tha counter-example, i t d oe s n ot r e q u i r e t h a t t h e s u b j e c t h av e h ade x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e e m ounter-exampl e s ugg est ed by t heuncovered not-Q ca rd . On t h e DAP, fo r e xa mp le , t h e s u b j e c t ca ns t i l l be e x p e c t e d t o ch oo se a n ot -Q c a r d t h a t s a y s " 16 y e a r s o ld "e ve n i f h er s p e c i f i c e x pe r i e nc e was of an 1 8 y e ar o l d i l l e g a l l yd r in k in g b e e r . The fo o d p ro bl em s t u d i e s do n o t r e p o r t w ha t f o o da nd d r i n k p a i r s t h e y a c tu a l l y u s e d , b u t some a u t h o r s ( e. g.Po l l a r d , 1981) have made of t he f a c t th a t Mank te low & Evans'i n s t ru c t i o n s u s e d some r a t h e r odd c o m b in at io n s , s u c h a s , " I f Ie a t ha dd oc k, t h e n I d r i n k g i n n . But t h e od de r t h e c o m bin at ion ,t h e h ig h e r t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a s u b j e c t would h av e e xp e r i e nc e d

* T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n would h a ve d i f f i c u l t y a c c o u n t in g f o r B r a ce w el l& Hi d i , 1974: Even though both t ra ns po r t a t io n p rob lems were g ivent o the u b i e c t p o ~ u l a t i o n ,one l i n g u i s t i c f o rm at e l i c i t e d ac o n te n t e f f e c t , b u t t h e o th e r d i d n o t . However, G r ig g s (1 98 3)c o n s i d e r s B r a c e w e l l & H i d i 1 s i n s t r u c t i o n s r e g a rd i n g non-r e v e r s i b i l i t y to o s e r i o us a conound t o m e r i t a n e x p l a n a t i o n oft h i s i n co n si s te n cy .


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a counter-example -- i t may be tr u e t h a t not many peopl e dr in kg i n wi th t h e i r haddock , bu t I ' l l wager a g r e a t many have washedi t down wit h wat er, The average 20 year o ld su bj ec t who e a t sth re e mea ls a day w i l l have experienced a lmost 22,000 ea t i ng pl usdr in ki ng even ts. Whatever t he r ul es ac t ua l l y were, one wouldexpec t t h a t 22,000 sepa, r;ate exper iences would be s uf f i c i en t t otrigger a good number of counter-examp1,es -- espec ia l ly i f many.,a'of t he r u l es express ed odd combinations. Shouldn ' t t he memory-c ue in g t h e o r i s t e xp ec t a r e l a t i v e l y c o n s i s t e n t c on t en t e f f e c t f o rthe food problem?

How does memory-cueing th eo ry ha nd le D ' Andrade' s S e a r sproblem? A s Griggs (1983) no t es , chances a r e th a t ve ry fewsu bj ec ts have been as s i s t an t s t o Sear s ' managers, o r even workedi n a s t o r e t h a t r e q u i r e d managers t o a u t h o r i z e r e c e i p t s . Tohandle such cases, Griggs and Cox couple "reasoning by analogyuwit h memory-cueing theory . Griggs (1983) po in ts ou t t h a tJ ohns on-L ai rd e t a l . ' s B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s d i d j u s t a s w e l l on thepost o f f i c e p roblem when the s tamps were I t a l i a n ra the r thanB r i t i s h . H e a rg ue s t h a t t h i s i s b ec au se t h e f a m i l i a r r u l e u s i ngpence i s t o t h e u n f am i li ar r u l e us in g l i r e . H ee x p l a i n s D ' Andrade by s ayi ng th a t most su bj ec ts have probably hade x p e r ie n c e w i th a n alo go us s i t u a t i o n s , suc h a s s to re ma na ge rsau th or iz in g t h e su bj ec t ' s own check, 'What seems t o be e s s e n t i a li s t h a t t h e p roblem c ue t h e s u b j e c t s t o r e c a l l t h e i r e xp er i en cew i t h t h e s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n an al ogo us s i t u a t i o n s n ( Gr ig gs ,1983, p.26).

Cox & Griggs (1982) a rgue th a t t hey have found fu r th e rsuppor t f o r reason ing by ana logy i n some exper iments on t ra ns fe r .


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They c r e a t e d an "Ap pare l Color Problem" (ACP) which i s i d e n t i c a lt o t h e DAP , e xc ep t t h a t t h e r u l e f o r t h e " po l ic e o f f i c e r n t oe n f o r c e i s : " I f a person i s wearing blue , then t he person must beover 19 ." Obvious ly , no su b j ec t has ever exper ienced such aru l e . They gave each su b j ec t th re e p roblems t o so lve : ana b s t r a c t p r o b l e m ( A P ) , , t h e ACP, and t h e DAP. Cox & G r ig g sdemons t ra ted t h a t s ig n i f i ca n t ly more su b j ec t s s o l ve the ACP when

"ait comes a f t e r th e DAP than when i t comes be o r e t h e DAP (75% v.25 %) . Thei r exp lan at i on was th a t when th e ACP fol lowed t h e DAP ,s u b j e c t s r e a s o n ed by a n a log y t o t h e DAP.

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e ACP e l i c i t e d a s m al l b u t s i g n i f i c a n tt h e m a t i c c o n t e n t e f f e c t e v e n w h e n i t pre ceded th e DAP (ACP: 25% ,AP: 4% ). Griggs (1983) a s s e r t s th a t a l though t he ACP does notr e l a t e d i r e c t l y t o s u b j e c t s ' e x p e ri e n ce , t h ey would ha ve been i nmany n a tu r a l s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e i r a ge c o n s t r a in e d what t h e ycoul d do: dr in ki ng a lc oho l , d r i v i ng , vot i ng. Thus, th e ACP couldhave cued one of th es e ru l e s f o r some of th e su bj ec ts , who couldthen "reason by analogy. "*

Unfo rtun ate l y , g r a f t i n g reas onin g by analogy onto memory-c u e i n g t h e o r y t r a n s f o r m s it f ro m a m o de r at e ly s p e c i f i e d t h e o r yin to a n u n s p e c i f i e d t h e o r y . What d im en sion s of a s i t u a t i o n a r ep s y c h o lo g i c a l l y r e a l f o r s u b j e c t s ? w hich a r e most im p o rt a n t i njudg ing s im i l a r i ty ? How many ch ar a c t e r i s t i c s mus t be sharedb e f o r e a s u b j e c t d e c i d e s t h a t two p ro bl em s o r s i t u a t i o n s a r e

* Cox & G r i gg s p r e s e n t o t h e r d a t a which t h e y a l s o i n t e r p r e t a sin s t an ce s of reas onin g by analogy, us in g perm utat ions of t he DAP,l i k e " I f a p e r so n i s over 1 9 then he must be dr in ki ng beer" and" I f a pe rson i s under 19 then he m u s t be dr in ki ng coke n. However,t h e s e e x p e rim e n ts a r e s o f r a u g h t w i th demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o ft h e k i nd d e s c r i b e d f o r deformed s o c i a l c o n t r a c t s i n Ch ap te r 2t h a t t he y a r e d i f f i c u l t t o i n t e rp r e t .


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"analogous "? These a r e key ques t ions , ye t t hey a r e neveraddr esse d by advocat es of reas onin g by analogy. Without answerst o que s t i ons l i k e thes e , memory-cueing/reasoning by analogyexpl anat ions ar e ad-hoc. I n th e absence of a theory of analogy,rea so nin g by analogy g u ts memory-cueing th eo ry of i t s p r e d i c t i v eva lue .

Thi s can be seen 'by cons id er in g some po ss ib le t he or ie s ofanalogy.. For example, a r e t h e DAP and ACP a r e anal ogo us becausethey sh are the same consequent te rm? Apparent ly t h i s i s n o t anecessary con di t ion , because Johnson-Lai rd e t a l . ' s p os t o f f i c eproblems used d i f ferent te rms: 50 l i r e s ta mp s ve r s us 5 pencestamps.

But perhaps problems ar e analogous when t h e i r consequen tsbe long t o t h e same c l a s s of e n t i t i e s * -- a f t e r a l l , 50 l i r estamps and 5 pence stamps are s t i l l st amp s. I f t h i s i s t h e c a s e ,then why i s performance so poor on food problems? There a r en a t u r a l s i t u a t i o n s i nv o lv i ng e x p l i c i t f oo d r u l e s ( " I f I e a t r edmeat , then I d r i n k r e d w i n ew ; " I f I e a t f i s h , then I d r i n k w h i t ew ine" ) , and many invo lv ing im pl i c i t r u l e s and r e l a t i on s ( " I f Ie a t b r e a k f a s t c e r e a l , t h en I dr in k o range ju i c e" , " I f I e a t h otc h i l i p ep pe rs , t he n I dr ink w a te r " , " I f I e a t c a v i a r , t h en Idr in k champagne", "I f I e a t C h inese food , then I d r i nk t e a " ) .These ru le s d i f f e r f rom th e ones sub j ec t s w ere g iven on ly i n thep a r t i c u l a r f oo ds and d r i n k s m en ti on ed , j u s t a s t h e p o s t a l r u l e sr r d i f f e r e d on ly i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r t y p es of s ta mp s.

* Of course t h i s begs th e ques t ion . One s t i l l would need t o knowwhat d im en si on s a r e s a l i e n t f o r d e c i d i n g w he th er two e n t i t i e sbelong t o the same ca tegory . Thi s formula t ion merely pushest h e problem back one s te p.


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The memory-cueing th eo r i s t cannot expl a in t h i s d i f f er en ceaway by poin t in g out t h a t th e U U . & h p o s t a l r u l e was e x p l i c i t l ym en ti on ed i n t h e t a s k , f o r two r e as o ns . F i r s t , t h i s was n o ta lw ays t rue -- some s u b j e c t s e n c ou n te r ed t h e l i r e r u l e b e f o r e t h epence ru le , and d i d very wel l , nonethele ss . Second, Gr iggs(1983) a t t r i b u t e s suc cess on t he Sea rs problem t o "memory-cueingof aeneral exper i encen (p . 25 ) . I f such gene ra l exper i ence canbe cued! .for check au th or iz a t io n , then sure ly i t can be cued forth e food problem. The same goes f o r t h e t ra ns po rt at io n problem.I s n ' t it l i k e l y t h a t most s u b j e c t s h av e f a v o r i t e -- evene x c l u s i v e -- ways of t r av e l in g t o ce r t a i n p laces? They walk t oc l a s s e s , t h e y fly home a t C hri s tm as, t hey see the i r pa re n t s d r i vet o work ev er y day. Why c a n ' t th ey use th e s e commonplaceexpe r ien ces t o " reason by analogyn on the t ra ns po r t a t io n problem?A s mentioned above, Grig gs & Cox re qu ir e experi ence only with th er e l a t i o n , n o t w it h an m i c i t , ru le . Unfor tunate ly , Gr iggs andCox never conf ront t he se ques t i ons .

I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e , even l i k e l y , t h a t p e o p l e r e as o n byanalogy. I t i s even p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s t ec h ni q ue i s onlye f f e c t i v e when combined wit h memory-cueing. My po in t i s , u n t i lp s y c h o l o g is t s s t a r t d ev el op in g t h e o r i e s of a na lo gy , t h i s v a r i a n tof memory-cueing the ory la ck s any empir ica l cont ent .

Mental Models

The ment al models approach was developed by P h i l i p Johnson-La ir d (Johnson-Laird, 1982; Johnson-Laird, 1983). Expla in ingcon ten t e f f e c t s on the Wason se l e c t io n t a sk w as no t h i s p r im arym o t iv a t i on i n d e ve l op i ng t h i s t h e or y . I n s o f a r a s i t does account


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f o r c o nt e nt e f f e c t s , it r e l i e s on a form of a v a i l a b i l i t y . Ii n c l u d e i t because i t re p r e s e n t s a qu i t e d i f fe re n t v iew o f howhumans reason tha n do th e t he or ie s previou sly descri bed. Mentalmodels i s a "family 4-an explanation.

According t o Johnson-Laird, t he human mind ha s noc ompu ta t ional p roc edu res t ha t c o r re spond t o ru le s o f in fe re n c e( l i k e modus ponens or modus t o l l e n s ) . In s te ad,1. re a s one rs in te rp re t pre mise s by c ons t ruc t ing an in te g ra t e d,m en ta l model of them i n worki ng memory, and2. rea sone rs have one pie ce of semantic infor mation : A conc lus ion

i s t r u e i f t h e p re mi se s a r e t r u e a nd t h e r e i s no way ofi n t e r p r e t i n g them s o a s t o r e nd er i t f a l s e .These two f ac t o r s can le ad t o lo g i ca l reasoning. For example ,g iven th e premises , "Some of the s c i e n t i s t s a r e pa re n ts" and "Al lt h e p a r en t s a r e d r i v e r s n , t h e s u b j e c t w i l l f i r s t c on st r uc t ame nta l model o f the re la t i on e xp res s e d by th e f i r s t p remis e,perhaps l i k e t h i s :s c i e n t i s ts c i e n t i s t = pa re n ts c i e n t i s t = pa re n tpa re n tThe f i r s t p e rs on i s a s c i e n t i s t who i s not a pa ren t , th e secondand t h i r d a r e s c i e n t i s t s who a r e pa r e n ts , t h e f o u r t h i s a pa re n twho i s n o t a s c i e n t i s t . A l l f ou r p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e c o n s is t e n twi th the p remise "Some of th e s c i e n t i s t s a r e pa ren ts . " Next, th es u b j e c t w i l l t r y t o i n t e g r a t e t h e i n fo rm at i on i n t h e secondp re mis e i n t o the model o f the f i r s t p re mise :s c i e n t i s ts c i e n t i s t = pa re n t = d r i v e rs c i e n t i s t = pa re n t = d r i v e rpa re n t = d r i v e rThi s in te gr a t ed menta l model i s c o n s i s t e n t w i th two t e n t a t i v ec onclu s ions : "Some of the s c i e n t i s t s a r e d r i ve r s " ( a va l i d


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i n e r ence ) and "Some of t he s c i e n t i s t s a r e no t d r iv e r s " ( anin va l i d i n f e r e nce ) . But which one w i l l t he sub jec t choose? Th i si s where t he s econd f a c t o r en t e r s t h e p i c tu re . According t oJohnson-Laird, peop le know t h a t a conclus ion i s t r u e when t hep re mi se s a r e t r u e an8 LhAe is na Pf i n t e r p r e t i n gDremises as LQ x e n d e ~U false. There f o r e , t he sub jec t w i l ls e a rc h f o r a l t e r n a t i v e me nt al m odels T h a t a r e a l s o c o n s i s t e n tw i th t h e p re mi se s, t o s e e i f any v i o l a t e a t e n t a t i v e c o nc l us i onth ey have drawn. For example, t he follo win g two models a r e a l s ocon s i s t en t w i th t he p remise s :s c i e n t i s t = d r i v e r s c i e n t i s t = pa ren t = d r i v e rs c i e n t i s t = pa ren t = d r i v e r and s c i e n t i s t = pa ren t = d r i v e rs c i e n t i s t = p a r e n t = d r i v e r pa ren t = d r i v e rp a r e n t = d r i v e rHowever, bo th render f a l s e the conc lus ion "Some of th e s c i e n t i s t sa r e n o t d r i v e r s . " I n c o n t r a s t , b ot h models a r e c o n s i s t e n t wi t ht h e c o n cl u s io n "Some of t h e s c i e n t i s t s a r e d r i v e r s . "

Thus, mental modeling the ory i s very d i f f e r e n t f rom memory-cuei ng the ory . According t o memory cueing theor y, peop le canrecogn ize a counter -example a s such i f t hey happen t o r e c a l l one ,bu t t hey do no t ac t i ve ly s ea rch fo r counter -examples. A l so , i nmemory cueing theory people do not model the premises -- t h ep r em i se s f u n c t i o n p r i m a r i l y a s r e c a l l c ue s.

J oh ns on -L ai rd ( 19 83 ) i n t e g r a t e s c on t e nt e f f e c t s i n t o h i st h e o r y t h u s :

I f su b j ec t s a l r ea dy posses s a men ta l model of t h er e l a t i o n e x p r e s se d i n t h e g e n e r a l r u l e , o r a model t h a tc an be r e a d i l y r e l a t e d t o t h e r u l e , t h e y a r e much morel i k e l y t o h av e an i n s i g h t i n t o t h e t a s k . ( p. 33)H e bel ieves tha t memory i s i mp or ta nt i n t h a t "no e f f e c t o fcon ten t can be exp la ined wi thou t appea l t o p r ev ious expe r i ence . "


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Prev ious exper ien ce g ives one a l i b r a r y o f menta l mode ls .Rea l is t ic con ten t makes menta l mode ls ava i lab le , no t merea s s o c i a t i o n s .

Johnson-Laird makes no attemp t t o pr ed i ct what kinds ofc on te n t w i l l enhance performance beyond s ay ing t h a t fa mi l i a r i t ywith the r u l e helps . However, th e su bj ec t need not havee xpe rie nc ed an e xp l i c i t r u l e ( l ik e the DAP); he c i t e s Wason &Sha p i ro ' s o r ig in a l t r a n s po r t a t i on p roblem, D 'Andradel s Se a rsprob lem, and h i s own l i r e ve rs ion of th e pos t o f f i ce prob lem asexamples. However, he pr ovi des no ex pl an at io ns re ga rd in g why t h efood problem never enhances performance, why r e s u l t s wit h t het r a ns po r ta t io n and s c hool prob lems a r e s o s po t ty , o r why r e s u l t swith what I have c a l l e d " s oc ia l c on t ra c t p roblems" a r e s oc o n s i s t e n t .

Frames and Schemas

A t pres en t , exp lana t ions of con ten t e f f ec t s on the Wasonse l ec t i on tas k i n te rms of f rames or schemas a r e p romis ing , bu tmeta-theoretical. Wason & Sh api ro (19 71) , Wason (19 83) r andRumelhart & Norman (1981) have argue d t h a t re aso ni ng on th e Wasons e l e c t i o n t a s k i s guided by frames or schemas -- domain spec i f icin fe re nc e procedures and/or mental models. These develop cont enta r e a by c o n t en t a r e a , a c co r di n g t o t h e s u b j e c t ' s p e r s on a lexpe rie nce. The more expe rie nce a person has had wit h a givenc on te n t a re a , the more l i ke ly i t i s t ha t s he ha s a c qu i re d a f ra megovern ing in f e ren ce i n t h a t a rea . The presumpt ion seems t o bet ha t t he p roc e s s e s under ly ing the a c qu i s i t i on of f r ames a r edomain ge ne ra l, making t h i s a "family 1-a" expl anat ion . However,

92


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t h i s view would no t be compromised i f most frames were b u i l t bydomain sp ec i f i c algor i thms .

Although t h i s view i s a k in t o J ohnson -La ird ' s me nta lmodeling theory, i t i s more in cl us iv e. Schemas or frames cane nhance per fo rmance by v i r tu e of t he i r a b i l i t y to un i t e the t e rmsof t h e s e l e c t i o n t a s k i n t o one, u n i f i e d me nt al r e p r e s e n t a t i o nt h a t can be ea s i ly manipu la ted v i a t he f rame 's p rocedures (Wason& Green (1984) pr ese nt some evidence f o r t h i s view usin g a verys imple " reduced a r r ay s e l ec t i on ta sk" , o r RAST) .* A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,performance can be enhanced vi a t he domain sp e c i f i c in fe re nceprocedures tha t the schemas or frames embody.

The in e rence p rocedures t h a t deve lop i n a g iven con t en tdomain need no t be log ic a l i n charac te r . In Johnson-Laird ' stheory , th e sub je c t ' s knowledge th a t counter-examples a r er e le v an t t o t h e l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y of a conc lus ion i s an importantf a c t o r i n r e j e c t i n g t e n t a t i v e co nc lu si on s. I n f ram e t h eo r y, t h esu bj ec t could be judging t he soundness of a conclus ion us ing"p ieces of semant ic in format ionn t h a t have no th ing t o do wi thl og i ca l va l i d i ty . For example , th e su b j ec t ' s knowledge of th es o c i a l f a c t o r s gove rning c omme rcial t r a n s a c t i ons migh t gu ide he rresponse t o D'Andrad e's Se ar s problem. Th i s knowledge can bee i th e r d ec la ra t i ve o r p rocedura l . Because each con ten t a re a may

* The RAST i s a s e l ec t i on tas k which uses on ly Q and not-Q cards,and us ua ll y many in st an ce s of each. Given t h e r u l e " A l lt r i a n g l e s a r e w hi t e" , t h e s u b j e c t i s t o determine whether it i st r u e by a s k i ng t o i n s p e c t -- one a t a t ime -- t h e minimum numberof black shape s or whi te shapes. The be st answer i s t o c hoos ea l l and on ly th e b lack shapes ; however , one can t e s t va ry ingd e g r ee s of i n s i g h t i n t o d i f f e r e n t r u l e s by se e i n g i f s u b j e c t schoose more conf i rming whi te shapes fo r one r u l e than fo ranother. The RAST i s d i f f e r e n t enough from t h e f u l l s e l e c t i o nt a s k t h a t r e s u l t s on it a r e no t d i re c t ly c ompa ra ble.


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h av e d i f f e r e n t r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e a s s o c i a t e d w i th i t , a frameneed n o t l e a d t o a l o g i c a l l y c o r r e c t a nsw er.

The f rame th e o r i s t s have no t ye t a dd re s se d que s t io ns l ik e :Are some con ten t a r ea s more l i k e l y than o t he rs t o have f ramesa s s o c i a t e d wi th them? How many exp er ie nc es wi th a domain mustone have t o develop a fgame? Must th os e exp er ie nce s be of apa r t i cu l ar k ind? How 'does t he mind par se th e world i n t o se pa ra tedomains ..for t h e purpose of b ui ld in g frames? To what ex te nt dod i f f e r e n t ind iv i dua l s s ha re the same f rames ?

Wi thou t an swers t o que s t ions l i k e the s e , the f ra me sexplana t ion cannot be eva lua ted by appea ls t o empir ica l ev idence .I n p r i nc i p l e , any c on te n t e f f e c t o r non-eff e c t i s compat ib le wi thit. I f a p a r t i c u l a r c o nt e nt e l i c i t s an e f f e c t , t h a t i s post-hocev idence f o r the ex is t ence of a f rame f or t h a t con ten t domain.I f it doe s no t , th a t i s pos t-hoc ev idence f o r the l ack of a f ramef o r t h a t cont ent domain. The Wason se l ec t i on ta s k may indeedt u r n ou t t o be a us ef ul t o o l f o r g F s c o v w what s o r t of framespe ople ha ve , e s pe c ia l l y i f per fo rmance i n c e r t a in domains i sc o n s i s t e n t a c r o s s s u b j e c t s , b ut v i o l a t e s l o g i c a l pr i n c i p l e s .However, a t pre sen t t he frame view does not a l low one t o pre di c ti n advance which co n ten t a r ea s w i l l enhance performance. I f onepresumes th a t f rames a r e bu i l t by domain gene ra l co gni t i veprocesses , then , a t mos t , f rame theory pr ed i c t s th a t performancewith the same content domain w i l l v ar y, r e f l e c t i n g t h eid io s ync ra t i c e xpe rie nc es of the s ub j e c t s t e s t e d . But be fo reframe theory can be considered a thoroughgoing explanation ofc on te n t e f f e c t s on the Wason s e le c t ion t a s k , the que s t ion of howframes a r e b u i l t must be addressed .


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Auxiliary Mechanisms

I n t h e e a r l y 1 9 70 s, s e v e r a l r e s e a r c h e r s c o n s i de r e d t h ep o s s i b i l i t y t h a t p e o pl e a r e l o g i c a l l y c omp eten t, b u t t h a ta b s t r a c t t e rm s o r r e l a t i o n s c r e a t e pe rfo rm an ce l i m i t a t i o n s ( a"family 3" ex pl an at io n) . Wason & Shapi ro (1971) , Bracewel l &Hidi (1974) , and Gilhoollf & Falconer (1974) , s u g g e s t e d t h a tt hemat i c t e r ms o r r e l a t i on s may be mote eas i ly manipula ted bya ux i l i a ry mechani sms ( l i k e working memory) than a b s t r a c t t e rm s orr e l a t i o n s . The c o n c r e t e t e r m s u se d i n t h e m a t i c p ro b le m s m ig htenhance per formance because they a r e more memorable th an a b s t r a c tsymbols. A t hemat i c r e l a t i o n mi gh t impose a s ma l l e r " co gn i t i velo a d " on working memory i f i t s c o n t e n t a c t i v a t e s k nowledge t h a tc u es t h e s u b j e c t t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n i s n o n -r e ve r si b le : * t h e f a c tt h a t t h e c o n d i t i o na l i s n o t r e v e r s i b l e n ee d n o t b e a c t i v a t e d a s as ep a r a t e and ad d i t i on a l p i e ce of i n o r ma t ion i n work ing memory.

R e se ar ch i n t o t h i s vie w was v i r t u a l l y a ba nd one d a s l a t e rr e s u l t s c a l l e d i n t o q u e s ti o n t h e v er y e x i s t e n c e of a t h e m at icc o n t e n t e f f e c t . The s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e s u p e r i o r m e m or a bi l it y o fc o n c r e t e te r m s e x p l a i n s t h e c o n t e n t e f f e c t ca n be r u l e d o u t . Thef oo d p ro ble m h a s n ev er e l i c i t e d a c o nt e n t e f f e c t , t h e p o s t o f f i c ep ro bl em d o e s n o t when s u b j e c t s a r e u n f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n ,t h e s choo l and t r an s p or t a t i o n p rob lems us ua l l y do no t p r oducec o nt e nt e f f e c t s -- y e t a l l u s e c o n c re t e te rm s.

The h y p o t h e s i s t h a t c e r t a i n t he m a t ic r e l a t i o n s r e du c ec o g n i t i v e l o a d i s u n l i k e l y g iv en t h e s p o t t y r e p l i c a t i o n r e c o rd

* I t i s obv i ous t h a t "A l l ho r s es a r e an i ma ls " does no t i mp ly t h a t" A l l a n im a ls a r e h o r s e s w ; i t i s no t s o obv ious t h a t "A l l ca r dswi t h an A on one s id e have a 3 on t he o t he r s i d e" does no t i mpl yt h a t " A l l ca rds wi th a 3 on one s i d e have an A on t h e o t h e r s i d e . "


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f o r t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p roblem. The t r a n s po r ta t ion problem i sone of t h e o nl y t h e m at i c r e l a t i o n s t e s t e d t h a t c l e a r l y d o es no timply i t s conver se. "Every tim e I go t o Boston I t r a v e l by c a r"i s a ra t he r o rd ina ry c la im about a ha b i tu a l way of ge t t in g t o ap a r t i c u l a r d e s t i n a t i o n , b u t " Every ti me I t r a v e l by c a r I go t oBoston" sounds l i k e t h e c a r h a s a mind of i t s own. Thet r a n s p o r t a t i o n r e s u l t s f rom t h e l a t e 1 9 70 s and e a r l y 1 98 0s h av ec a s t doubt upon t he c la im t ha t a the ma tic r e l a t io n e nha nc esl o g i c a l p er form ance a t a l l -- a f a c t t h a t must be e s t a b l i s h e dbefore en te r t a i n i ng hypotheses regard ing how it d o e s t h i s .

Before anyone r ea l i ze d how "el us iv e" conte nt e f f e c t on t heWason se l ec t i o n ta sk would prove t o be, two sets of re s e a rc he rs-- Bracewell & Hidi (1974) and Gilho oly & Falconer (1974) --t r i e d t o a s s e s s t h e r e l a t i v e c o n t r ib u t i on of c o nc r et e te rm sv e r s us c o n c r e te r e l a t i o n s t o s u cc e ss on t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o nproblem. The ir r es u l t s were con t rad i c to ry .

Both sets of rese a rch ers inve s t iga ted four types of p rob lem:Abstract Terms - Abs t ra c t Re la t ion (AT -AR) : " I f t h e r e i s a J onone s i d e t h en t h e r e i s a 2 on the o the r s ide "Abstract Terms - Concrete Rela t ion (AT-CR): " I f I go t o J then It r av e l by 2. "Concrete Terms - Abs t ra c t Re la t ion (CT-AR): "If Manchester i s onone s id e then ca r i s on the o the r s ide . "Concrete Terms - Concrete Rela t ion (CT-CR) : " I f I go t oManchester then I t r av e l by ca r . "*

A s mentioned i n Chapter 2 , Bracewell & H id i a l s o t e s t e d twod i f f e r e n t l i n g u i s t i c fo rm at s: "Every ti m e P, Q" and "Q every t ime P. "

A l l to ld , Bracewel l & Hidi had e igh t groups ( two l i ng u i s t i c

* The CT-CR and AT-AR ru le s correspond t o Wason & S h a p i r o ' s(1971) themat i c and ab s t r ac t ru les . These a r e the g roupsde s c r ibe d i n Chap te r 2.


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f o r m a t s f o r e ac h of t h e a bo ve f o u r g r o u p s ) , w i th 1 2 s u b j e c t s p e rg ro up . T h e i r r e s u l t s a r e p i c t u r e d i n T a b le 3.1 b elow :

Table 3 .1 Res u l t s o f Bracewel l & Hidi , 1974CT-CR AT-CR CT-AR AT-AR T o t a l sEvery time P, Q: 9 4 1 1 I 1 5Q every t i m e P: 2 3 0 1 I................................................... 6

T o t a l s : 11 7 1 2Number of s u b j e c t s who answer ed ' P & not -Q' ; n=12 per ce l l .

Bracewel l & H id i f ou nd a main e f f e c t f o r t h e l i n g u i s t i c f or ma tfa c to r ( "Every t ime . . . d o e s b e t t e r ) , a main e f f e c t f o r t h er e l a t i o n f a c t o r ( t h e c o nc r et e r e l a t i o n does b e t t e r ) , b ut noe f f e c t f o r t h e te rm f a c t o r . However, a f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s o f t h e i rd a t a t h ro ws do ub t on w he th er a r e l a t i o n f a c t o r e x i s t s a t a l l .Although Bracewell & H i d i ' s d a t a a r e c o n s i s t e n t w it h t h eh y p ot h e si s t h a t t h e r e i s a r e l a t i o n f a c t o r , two a l t e r n a t i v eh y p o th e s e s a r e more s t r o n g l y s u p p o r te d by t h e i r d a t a :1. There i s no r e l a t i o n f a c to r . P er fo rm an ce i s enhanced only fort h e CT-CR problem, and on ly i n t h e "Every ti me n for ma t ( se ec o n t r a s t s L 1 be low) ,2. A c o n cr e t e r e l a t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t t o en ha nc e p er fo rm an ce , b u tonly i n an "Every t imen format (se e L2) .Bracewel l & H i d i ' s h y p o t h es i s t h a t b ot h t h e r e l a t i o n a nd t h el i n g u i s t i c f or ma t f a c t o r a r e i m po rt an t i s r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e s e tof c o n t r a s t s L3.

The sum of s qu ar es f o r L3, Bracewe ll & H i d i ' s h y p o t h e s i s ,a c c o u n t s f o r 62% of t h e v a r i a n c e du e t o main e f f e c t s an d


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i n t e r a c t i o n s ( i . e . , of SS - SS i F = 22.79, p


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Table 3.2 R e s u l t s f o r G i l h oo l y & Falconer, 1974

...............C T : 11 : 10 : 2 1...............A T : 6 : 3 : 9

Number of s u b j e c t s who answered 'P and not-Q ' .n=50 per c e l l .

r ev e r s ib l e" may have s im ply focused sub jec t s ' a t t e n t io n on ther e l a t i o n f a c t o r ( s e e Ch ap te r 2 ) .

I n s h o r t , B ra ce we ll & Hidi and Gilhooly & Falconer provideno c l e a r e v i d en c e f o r t h e c l a i m t h a t a t h e m a t ic r e l a t i o n e n ha nc esl o g i c a l pe rf or ma nce a t a l l , t h u s r u l i n g o u t t h e h y p ot h e si s t h a ti t does t h i s by r educ ing "cogn i t i ve loadn . *

I n l i g h t o f t h e e v i de n ce p re s e n t e d i n Ch ap te r 1 i n d i c a t i n gt h a t p e o pl e d o n o t u se t h e b a s i c i n f e r e n c e s of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a lc a l c u l u s , e x p l a n a t i o n s i n t er m s of p er fo rm an ce f a c t o r s d o n o tappear very promising. The da ta reviewed i n Chapter 2 c a s t ap a l l on such an en t e rp r i s e . Any fu tu re "pe rformance l i m i t a t io n"exp lana t ions w i l l h av e t o e x p l a i n 1) why some f a m i l i a r , c on cr et econt ent can be pushed through "a ux i l ia ry mechanisms" be t t er thano t h e r f a m i l i a r c o n c r e t e c o n t e n t , and 2) why the same f a m i l i a r ,c o n c r e t e c o n t e n t i s sometimes processed easi ly, and sometimeso nl y w it h g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y .* One could ar gue t h a t because an AT-CR r u l e u s es a b s t r a c t t e rm s,i t c a nn o t c ue n o n - r e v e r s i b i l i t y ; t h a t i t i s n o t so c l e a r t h a t"Every time I g o t o J I t r a v e l by 2" does not imply "Every time It r a v e l by 2 I g o t o J". I f t h i s were s o, t h en t h e r e l ev a n t c e l l sf o r t e s t i n g th e r e l a t i o n f a ct o r a r e CT-CR versus CT-AR. Again,t h e r e s u l t s would be c on t r a d i c t o ry : t h e s e c e l l s d i f f e r f o rBracewell & H id i , bu t no t fo r G i lhoo ly & Falconer .


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Family 2 e x p l a n a t i o n sThe on ly f a m il y of e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t h a s no r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n

t h e l i t e r a t u r e i s "fami ly 2": Humans have a l o g i c module, bu t i ti s o n l y a c t i v a t e d i n a n sw e ri ng q u e s t i o n s w i t h i n t h e fram ework o fa w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h e o r y o f w hat i s t r ue of a co nt en t domain.On t h i s vi ew , peop l e may us e i n duc t i o n t o gene r a t e hypo t hes es i nunf am i l i a r domains , but once they develop some in du ct iv ec o n f i d e n ce a b o u t t h e i r h y po th e se s , t h e y t e s t t hem d e d u c ti v e l y .

T h i s e x p la n a t i o n c an no t a cc ou nt f o r t h e c o n t e n t e f f e c t sr ev i ewed i n Chap te r 2. Assuming t h a t f a m i l i a r i t y i s some measureo f a pe r s on ' s unde r s t and i ng of a domain , t he l o g i c modu le s hou l ds wi t ch on f o r f am i l i a r domai ns . How, t hen , cou l d t h i s t heo r ya cc ou nt f o r t h e f a c t t h a t some f a m i l i a r d omains e l i c i t c o n t en te f f e c t s b u t o t h e r s do no t (e. g., DAP v. food) , and the samefa m i l i a r domain sometimes produces an ef fe c t , and sometimes not( e. g. , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , s c h o o l ) ?

O th er f o r m u l a t i o n s a r e p o s s i b l e , b u t I can think of nonet h a t c an h an d l e t h e r e s u l t s o f C h ap te r 2 . For example, perhapsf a m i l i a r i t y w it h t h e e le me nt s an d r e l a t i o n s i n a domain i s n o tenough; perhaps th e l o g ic module i s ac t i va t e d on l y when t h edomain i s f a m i l i a r t h e s u b j e ct a l s o h a s p e rs on a l b e l i e f sr e g a r d in g t h e v e r a c i t y o f t h e r e l a t i o n e x p re s se d by a r u l e . *T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n c a n a l s o b e r u l e d o u t .

One imp l ic a t io n of t h i s v iew i s t h a t peop l e s hou l d bee s p e c i a l l y a d e p t a t e v a l u a t i n g t h e v a l i d i t y of c o n cl u si o n s when

* Even i f t h i s w ere t r u e , i t c ou ld n o t e x p l a i n t h e r e s u l t s o fChapter 2 . For example, th e most robu s t and re pl i c ab le cont ente f f e c t was f o r s o c i a l c o n t r a c t p ro ble ms. Y et th e y h av e no t r u t hv a l u e ; t h e y a r e r u l e s t o be f ol lo w ed .


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t h ey ha ve p e r s o n al b e l i e f s r e g a r d in g t h e i r t r u t h v a lu e . VanDuyne (1976) , was in te re s t ed i n whether people reason morel o g i c a l l y w it h s e n t en c es t h a t e x p re s s n ec es s ar y t r u t h s o rc o n t i n g e n t t r u t h s . H e a s ke d 22 s u b j e c t s t o g e n e r a t e c o n d i t i o n a l st h a t t hey though t w ere "always t ru e" (ne ces s i t y cond i t ion) and"sometimes t r u e n (cont ingency con di t i on ) . Each su bj ec t so lvedtwo se le c t io n t a s ks t h a t had been c rea t ed from ru le s he h imse l f

.'.?

had gen era ted (one necessary , one cont i nge nt ) .I f a lo g i c module i s a c t i v a t e d i n a ns we ri ng q u e s t i o n s w i t h i n

a w e l l - e s t ab l i s hed theory of what i s t r u e , t h e n 1) Van Duyne'sparad igm should p roduce a su bs ta n t i a l amount of f a l s i f i c a t i on ( a tl e a s t o v e r 50%), and 2) performance should be be t t e r fo r "alwayst r u e " c o n d i t i o n a l s t h a n f o r "sometimes t r u e " c o n d i t i o n a l s . *N e i t h e r p r e d i c t i o n i s borne ou t by th e da ta . Levels off a l s i f i c a t i o n wer e low: o nl y 6 of t h e 22 s u b j e c t s ( 27 %) f a l s i f i e df o r t h e " n ec e s sa r y t r u t h " , and 8 o u t o f 22 ( 36 %) f a l s i f i e d f o rt h e "c o nt i n ge n t t r u t h . " Th es e p e rc e n ta g e s a r e n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l yd i f f e r e n t , and even i f t hey w ere, t h e ineq ua l i ty runs coun te r t op r e d i c t i o n . I n f a c t , i f one r e q u i r e s t h a t s u b j e c t s n o t o nl y g i v et h e c o r r e c t a ns we r, b u t g i v e i t fxx& correcrt; reasons ( a sa s s e s s e d by v e r b a l e x p l a n a t i o n s ) , s u b j e c t s d i s p l a y e d f a r m o r ei n s i g h t i n t o c o n d i t i o n a l s t h a t wer e " sometimes t r u e " t h a n o ne st h a t were "always t ru e" .

Even more damning t o t h i s expl ana t io n i s t h e c o n s i d er a b l ebody of l i t e r a t u r e on "be l i e f b i a s n ( r ev iew ed by Po l l a rd , 1982) ,which in di ca te s t h a t people do not reason more log ic a l ly when

* Insofa r a s one ' s t heory of w hat i s t r u e i n a domain i s b e t t e re s t a b l i s h e d f o r r u l e s which a r e " a lw ay s t r u e " t h a n f o r t h o s etha t a re " som et im es t rue . "


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t h e y ha ve p e r s o n al b e l i e f s r e g a r d i n g t h e t r u t h v a l u e of t h ec o n c l u si o n ( s e e s e c t i o n 2 .3 ) . I n s uc h c a s e s , s u b j e c t s 'pe rfo rm ance appea r s t o be guided, i n pa r t , by a des i r e o rtendency t o confi rm t h e i r person al be l ie fs . When t h e conte nt ofa conc lus ion agrees w ith a pe r sona l b e l i e f , t hey judge th eargument v a l i d , and when it dis agr ees , they judge t h e argumenti n v a l i d . P o l l a r d & Evans , 1981, have demonstra ted t h i s on th e

" tse le c t io n tas k . Using a paradigm l i k e Van Duyne's (1976),P o l l a r d & Evans found t h a t s ub je ct s were much more l i k e l y t ochoose the not -Q ca r d fo r con d i t iona l s t h a t t hey though t were" u s u a l l y w o r " al wa ys " f a l s e , t h a n f o r c o n d i t i o n a l s t h a t t h eythought were "usual ly" or "a lways" t rue .

These were cond i t io na l s t h a t sub jec t s ' had genera tedthemselves. Hence, they were fa mi l i ar & s u b j e c t s ' h ad o p i n i o nsr eg ar d in g t h e i r v e r a c i t y -- o pt i ma l c on d i t i on s f o r t h e a c t i v a t i o nof a lo g ic module , accord ing t o the r e fo rmula ted f am i ly 2exp lana t ion . I f a lo g i c module i s a c t i v a t e d under t h e s econd i t i ons , we shou ld se e a sub s t an t i a l amount of f a l s i f i c a t i oni n t h i s ex pe riment .

Although Pollard & Evans r e p o r t s e l e c t i o n f r e q u e n c i e s f o rind iv i dua l ca rds r a th e r than fo r combina t ions of c a rds , t h eper cen tag e of su bj ec ts who answered 'P & not-Q' can be es t i mat edfrom the p ercentage of Q c a r d s e l e c t i o n s . * Bt most, 8.5% ofs u b j e c t s f a l s i f i e d f o r " t ru e " c o n d i t i o n a l s and 21% f a l s i f i e d f o r" f a l s e " c o n d i t i o n a l s -- hardly auspic ious per formance for ana c t i v a t e d l o g i c module. T h i s r e s u l t i s f a t a l t o t h e " f am i l i ar i typ l u s v e r a c i t y " f o r m u l a t i on of t h e f a m i ly 2 exp lana t ion .* because no one who chose Q could have answered 'P & not-Q' .

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3.3 Summary of explanationsThe t h e o r i e s t h a t h a ve been p ro po se d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e

r e p r e s e n t f o u r of t h e f i v e " f a m i l i e s w of e x pl a na t io n l i s t e d a tt h e b e g i nn i ng of t h i s ch a p t er :

Frame theory i s a family 1-a explanation: Humans have nol o g i c module; i n s t e a d t h e y us e r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e t h a t a r eapp rop r ia te t o th e domain sugges ted by the problem. Current

" I

fo rm ula t ions p resume t h a t f r am es a r e b u i l t by domain gene ra linformation processing mechanisms.

Auxiliary mechanisms i s a fami ly 3 explanation: Humans havea l o g i c module, but a ux i l ia ry mechanisms fo r manipula t in gin fo rm at ion c re a t e pe rformance l im i t a t io ns .

Mental models and memory-cueing a r e famil y 4 exp la na ti on s:Humans have no lo g i c module , ju s t th e ab i l i t y t o recognizeco nt ra di c t io n when they see i t . M en ta l m od el s t h e o r y f a l l s i n t oca teg ory 4-a, a s i t p r o p o s e s t h a t p e o p l e a c t i v e l y c o n s t r u c tm odel s o f th e p remises i n sea rch o f ones th a t w i l l r e f u t e at e n t a t i v e conclus ion. Memory-cueing f a l l s i n t o ca tegory 4-b, a si t proposes th a t a counter-example can become av ai la b le only i f ap e rs o n h a s a c t u a l l y experienced one -- p e o p le d o n o t a c t i v e l yc o n s t r u c t m e n ta l mo de ls i n s e a r c h of r e f u t a t i o n .

D i f f e re n t i a l a v a i l a b i l i t y i s a fami ly 5 explanation: Humanshave no l o g i c module; ra th er , t h e i r performance i s guided by non-i n f e r e n t i a l , g e n e r a l p ur po se h e u r i s t i c s .

None of th es e th e or i es i s sa t i s f ac to ry . Some a re toou n s p e c i f i e d t o e v a l u a t e a g a i n s t e m p i r i c a l e v id e nc e ( fr am es ,m en ta l m od el s) . O t he r s a r e b e t t e r s p e c i f i e d ( d i f f e r e n t i a la v a i l a b i l i t y , memory-cueing, a u x i l i a r y mechanisms) , but cannot


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account f o r i mpor t an t p i ec es o f ev idence . To t r y t o account f o rt h i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y d a t a , some of t h e t h e o r i e s add c o d i c i l s t h a ta r e e i t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l l y unsound ( d i f f e r e n t i a l a v a i l a b i l i t y ) ,h av e c on se qu en ce s t h a t a r e r e f u t e d by e x i s t i n g d a t a ( d i f f e r e n t i a la v a i l a b i l i t y, memory-cueing/reasoning by an alo gy ) , o r must bei n t e r p r e t e d s o l o o s e l y a s t o r e nd er t h e t h e o r y co mp le te lyu n t e s t a b l e (memory-cueing/reasoning by analogy) .

None of t h e t h e o r i e s e x p l a i n why s o c i a l c o n t r a c t r u l e s a r et h e o n ly t h e m at ic c on t en t t o c o n s i st e n t l y e l i c i t l a r g e c on t en te f f e c t s .

* * *

The many r e s u l t s c i t e d i n Chap t e r s 1 -3 demons t ra t e t h a tpeop l e do no t have t h e s o r t o f l o g i c modu le neces s a ry f o rPopp er ian - s ty le everyday l earn ing . The Wason se le c t i on t a sk i sp a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g b ec au se it i s a t e s t of o ur a b i l i t y t ot o t e s t hypo thes es deduc t i ve l y . A lt hough some o f t he t he o r i e spre sen ted i n Chapter 3 provide a ccount s of how people can t e s thypo t hes es i n t h e abs ence of a l o g i c modu le ( men ta l model s,m em ory -c ue in g), t h e s e t h e o r i e s r e q u i r e t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l b r i n ga va s t s t o r e o f world -knowledge t o t he t a s k .

Th i s br i ng s us back t o th e c e n t r a l problem: How do peopleac qu i r e t h i s wor ld-knowledge? I s t h i s knowledge a ccur a t e?I n d u c t i o n i s usu al l y conceived a s a pr oces s by which th e wor ldi m p r i n t s e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s o n o ur min ds -- t h a t i s , t h e k i n d s o fhypotheses it c an b e e x p e c te d t o g e n e r a t e describe r e l a t i o n sbetween e x i s t i n g p r o p e r t i e s o r e le me nt s.

G iven t h a t t he r e a r e an i n f i n i t e number of ways of ca r v i ngt h e w or ld i n t o p r o p e r t i e s , and t h e r e f o r e a n i n f i n i t e n umber of

104


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re la t i on s between pr ope r t ie s t o se rv e a s hypotheses , we mustgen er at e an enormous number of i nc or re ct in du cti ons . Yet re su l tson th e Wason se le c t io n tas k show th a t we a r e ve ry bad a t t e s t i ngd e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s -- the ve ry s o r t o f hypothes es t ha t induc t ionpr ov id es . How, th en , do w e weed o u t a l l t h e s e i n c o r r e c tinduc t ions ?

More puzz lin g: I f t he evo lu ti ona ry purpose of human le ar ni ngi s t o p ro v id e v a l i d g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s ab ou t t h e wo rl d, t h en s u r e l yt h e n eed t o d e t e c t v i o l a t i o n s i s g r e a t e s t f o r d e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s.Why, then , a r e we so bad a t de te c t ing v i o l a t io ns of de sc r i p t iv er u l e s , b u t s o good a t d e t e c t i n g v i o l a t i o n s of s o c i a l c o n t r a c tru le s ? Soc i a l c on t ra c t ru l e s do no t de s c r ibe the way th ings a re ;the y do not even de sc ri be the way ex i st i n g peop le behave. Theypr es cr i be : They communicate th e way some pe opl e want o th er peo pl et o behave. They a r e ru le s t o be fol lowed. One cannot as s i gn at r u t h valu e t o them. Why, then, do we appear t o reason l o gi ca l l yi n re sp on se t o s o c i a l c o n t r a c t r u l e s , b ut n ot i n r e sp on se t od e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s ?

The se a r e t he que s t ions t h a t mo t iva te t he remain ing c ha p te r s .

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