1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Transcript of 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

Page 1: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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由 2009諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談起

Chi, Tze-wen

Retired Assoc. Prof.

Dec. 29, 2009

Page 2: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Outline

Common-Pool Resources (Common Go

ods)

Elinor Ostrom’s Work

Kuznets Environmental Curves

Basic Legal Documents

A Broad Brush Model

Pause for Thought

Page 3: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Goods/services Classification

Excludable Non-excludable

Rivalrous Private goods

food, clothing, toys, furniture, cars

Common goods(Common-pool resources)

fish, hunting game, water

Non-rivalrous

Club goods

satellite television

Public goods

national defense, free-to-air television, air

Page 4: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Elinor Ostrom’s Work

Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons Prisoners’ Dilemma Ostrom’s Institutional Design

Page 5: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Ostrom’s Institutional Design Clearly defined boundaries Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and lo

cal conditions Collective-choice arrangements allowing for the participation o

f most of the appropriators in the decision making process Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountabl

e to the appropriators Graduated sanctions for appropriators who do not respect com

munity rules Conflict-resolution mechanisms which are cheap and easy of a

ccess Minimal recognition of rights to organize (e.g., by the governm

ent) In case of larger CPRs: Organisation in the form of multiple lay

ers of nested enterprises, with small, local CPRs at their bases

Page 6: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Nobel Laureates Whose Works Relating to Environment

1) Economics 1991, R. Coase,: Property right & transaction cost.

2) Chemistry 1995, P. Crutzen, M. Molina, S. Rowland: Ozone destruction by NOx & Cl.

3) Peace 2007, Al. Gore: Global climate changes.

4) Economics 2009, E. Ostrom, O. Williamson: Governance of commons, transaction cost, and firm’s boundaries.

Page 7: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Chinese Nobel Laureates

1) Physics 1957, Chen-ning Yang, Tsung-dao Lee

2) Physics 1976, C .C. Ting.

3) Chemistry 1986, Y. T. Lee

4) Physics 1997, Steven Chu

5) Physics 1998, Chee Tsui

6) Literature 2000, Xingjian Kao.

7) Chemistry 2008, Roger Y Tsien

8) Physics 2009, Charles Kao

Page 8: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Kuznets Environmental CurvesPopu without safe water Urban popu without

adequate sanitation

Urban PM concentration

Urban SO2 concentration

Municipal wastes per capita

CO2 emissions per capita

World Bank Report(1992)

Page 9: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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中華民國憲法增修條文 / 民國 94年

第 十 條 第二項 :

   經濟及科學技術發展,應與環境及生態保護兼籌並顧。

Page 10: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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環境基本法

第  三  條   基於國家長期利益,經濟、科技及社會發展均應兼顧環境保護。但經濟、科技及社會發展對環境有嚴重不良影響或有危害之虞者 (p),應環境保護優先 (q) 。

Proposition: If p, then q

Page 11: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Declaration of Independence

It is an argument (Syllogism): If p, then q P Therefore q

http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/index.htm

Page 12: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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A Broad Brush Model (Consider a Cylindrical Cow, by John

Harte)

Economic Output

Y

Economic Activity

X

Ecosystem Services

Z

Human

Welfare

W

Page 13: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Assumptions for functional relationship:

W (human welfare) = aYZ

Y (economic output) = bXZ

Z (environmental condition) = Zo – cX

where a,b,c are parameters, Zo stands

for pristine or initial environmental

condition.

Page 14: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Problem 1: Maximize economic output (GNP)

Max. Y = bXZ S.t. Z = Zo – cX

Or Max. Y = bX(Zo – cX).

Setup N.C. for solution (with subscript 1): X1* = Zo/2c

Z1* = Zo/2

Y1* = b(Zo)2/4c

W1* = ab(Zo)3/8c

Page 15: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Problem 2: Maximize human welfare

Max. W = aYZ

S.t. Y = bXZ, Z = Zo – cX

Setup N.C. for optimal solution (with subscript 2): X2* = Zo/3c

Z2* = 2Zo/3

Y2* = 2b(Zo)2/9c

W2* = 4ab(Zo)3/27c

Page 16: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Comparison

Human welfare W1*/ W2* = 27/32

Economic output Y1*/ Y2* = 9/8

Economic activity X1*/ X2* = 3/2

Environmental condition Z1*/ Z2* = ¾

Refer to www.gapminder.org

Page 17: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Discussion:

Shadow price of Zo: d(W2*)/d(Zo) (Zo)2

Functional forms

Parameter values

More linkages

Dynamics

Page 18: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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Thank for your attention ~

Page 19: 1 由 2009 諾貝爾獎經濟學得主談 起 Chi, Tze-wen Retired Assoc. Prof. Dec. 29, 2009.

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For your brains ( and mine)

Economic development is a N.C. for human welfare enhancement.

Is subsidy for scooters a N.C. or S.C. for air quality improvement?

What are N.C. (S.C.) for ambient O3 reduction? Is halting over-drafting of ground water a N.C.

or S.C. for land subsidence prevention? For Prevention, control N.C., whereas

implement S.C. for Promotion