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170 PRIMAL CONSTITUTION
presuppositionless philosophy is, perhaps, to test continually all presuppo-
sitions against the evidence available in a reflection upon intentionalexperience and the grasp of the a priori, essential structures thereof. See
also ESSENTIAL INSIGHT; TRANSCENDENTAL REDUCTION.
PRIMAL CONSTITUTION. Primal or primordial constitution takes place
within the primal impression. Husserl often uses this expression to refer
to the consti tution assoc iated with the apprehension by primal
impression ofhyletic data.
PRIMAL IMPRESSION. Primal impression is the moment within themomentary phase of consciousness that intends the now-phase of
experience in subjective orphenomenal time and, by virtue of that, the
presently intended object. See also INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS;
LIVING PRESENT; PRESENCE.
PRIMORDIAL. Husserl equivocates with the term primordial, although
the equivocation is necessary and essential. In particular, the term is used
to refer to the most original forms ofconstitution either within a phase of
experience or within a concrete experience. Hence, the term is used to
refer both to primal constitution within the living present or to the
constitution achieved by a perceptual objectifying act. See also PERCEP-
TION (Perzeption); PERCEPTION (Wahrnehmung).
PRINCIPLE OF PRINCIPLES. The principle of principles is the central
epistemological principle governing Husserls philosophy. The principle
states that intuition is what legitimizes cognition, that everything
intuitively presented is to be accepted as true as it presents itself and onlyso far as and in the manner in which it presents itself. This principle
underlies Husserls notion ofevidence and his conception ofreason as the
striving for evidence.
PROPOSITION. The proposition is the noematic sense(noematische Sinn)
of a judging act. The judging act is directed in the first place to the object
about which we judge and its determinations and relations. To be directed
to the object and its determinations and relations is, in general, to be
directed to a categorially formed complex, that is, a state of affairs. Thecategorial form is not available to simple perception but becomes
available in continued inspections of the object and the thoughtful
articulation and judging activity based thereon.
In judging, ones attention remains turned to the identical, objective
state of affairs rather than any logical reality called the judgmental content