14

42

12

4

12

3

5

2009()98-2410-H-009-017-MY22009.08.01-2010.7.31

2008NSC 97-2410-H-009 -059 -2008.12.1-2009.7.31

David Easton(1969)

political community

regime

authorities

media malaiseFallows, 1996; Newton 1999; Robinson 1975; 1976; 1997; 2001

virtuous circleAnsolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Luskin 2002; Neuman, Just and Crigler 1992; Norris 1999; 2000

panel study

2004813691113999887

1. 2. 3.

1

366

41.3

294

33.1

355

40.0

389

43.9

495

55.8

567

63.9

517

58.3

487

54.9

26

2.9

26

2.9

15

1.7

11

1.2

887

100.0

887

100.0

887

100.0

887

100.0

200420052006

2two-way turnover table

()

()

200

166

0

366

54.6%

45.4%

0.0%

100.0%

92

384

19

495

18.6%

77.6%

3.8%

100.0%

2

17

7

26

7.7%

65.4%

26.9%

100.0%

294

567

28

887

33.1%

63.9%

3.2%

100.0%

FisherFishers exact testp

3two-way turnover table

()

()

201

93

0

294

68.4%

31.6%

0.0%

100.0%

154

402

11

567

27.2%

70.9%

1.9%

100.0%

0

22

4

26

0.0%

84.6%

15.4%

100.0%

355

517

15

887

40.0%

58.3%

1.7%

100.0%

FisherFishers exact testp

4two-way turnover table

()

()

237

118

0

355

66.8%

33.2%

0.0%

100.0%

151

358

8

517

29.2%

69.2%

1.5%

100.0%

1

11

3

15

6.7%

73.3%

20.0%

100.0%

389

487

11

887

43.9%

54.9%

1.2%

100.0%

FisherFishers exact testp.05

Marginal homogeneity (Stuart-Maxwell)>.05

Marginal homogeneity (Bickenboller)>.05Marginal homogeneity (no diagonals)>.05

Contribution to symmetry 2_&_ =4.05p>.05_&_=1.00p>.05_&_ =0.47p>.05

200420052006

513.0%25.8%0.1%38.9%55, 6.2%49, 5.5%65, 7.3%

6Proportional-odds ModelPOM fixed effect

Coef.

SE

odds

0.35

0.14*

1.42

0.23

0.12

1.26

0.01

0.01

1.01

14

-0.15

0.28

0.86

14

-0.01

0.15

0.99

110

0.37

0.12**

1.45

1.13

0.29***

3.08

0.43

0.27

1.53

*

-0.07

0.06

0.93

*

0.04

0.02*

1.04

*

-0.06

0.04

0.94

*

0.07

0.03*

1.07

*

-0.01

0.03

0.99

*

0.03

0.03

1.03

1.34

0.51

5.91

0.53

log likelihood

-2366.494

Wald2

268.79

PseudoR2

.077

3354

* p

7Proportional-odds ModelPOM random effect

Coef.

SE

odds

0.27

0.09**

1.32

0.03

0.15

1.03

-0.28

0.12*

0.75

0.39

0.15**

1.47

0.27

0.12*

1.31

0.00

0.01

1.00

14

-0.14

0.28

0.87

14

0.00

0.16

1.00

110

0.39

0.12**

1.47

1.08

0.29***

2.94

0.37

0.27

1.45

*

-0.08

0.06

0.92

*

0.04

0.02*

1.04

*

-0.06

0.04

0.94

*

0.07

0.03*

1.07

*

-0.01

0.03

0.99

*

0.03

0.03

1.03

1.44

0.51

6.03

0.54

log likelihood

-2356.068

Wald2

279.45

PseudoR2

.081

3354

* p

8Random-intercept Proportional-odds ModelRI-POM random effect

Coef.

SE

odds

0.34

0.12**

1.41

-0.01

0.19

0.99

-0.41

0.16*

0.66

0.52

0.18**

1.68

0.35

0.15*

1.41

0.00

0.02

1.00

14

-0.26

0.33

0.77

14

0.00

0.20

1.00

110

0.42

0.13**

1.52

1.43

0.35***

4.17

0.34

0.33

1.41

*

-0.07

0.07

0.93

*

0.05

0.03

1.05

**

-0.09

0.04*

0.91

**

0.09

0.04*

1.09

**

-0.03

0.04

0.97

**

0.06

0.04

1.06

fixed partthresholds

1.49

0.58*

1.49

7.25

0.62***

7.25

random part

variances and covariance

1.92

log likelihood

-2273.784

Level1

3354

Level2

1368

* p

political predispositions

cross-sectionalpanel study

()

David Easton(1969)

political community

regime

authorities

()

()

()

()

/

(50.2%)

/(49.8%)

(0.0%)

()

(0.0%)

/

(100.0%)

(0.0%)

()

(0.0%)

/(60.7%)

/

(39.3%)

*