NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
IRISK: DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATED TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT RISK
METHODOLOGY FOR CHEMICAL INSTALLATIONS
O. N. Aneziris
PRISM SEMINAR 27 May 2004 SLOVAKIA
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
I-RISKI-RISKDEVELOPMENT OF AN DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATEDINTEGRATED TECHNICAL AND TECHNICAL AND
MANAGEMENT RISK CONTROL AND MONITORINGMANAGEMENT RISK CONTROL AND MONITORINGMETHODOLOGY FOR MANAGING AND QUANTIFYING ON-SITEMETHODOLOGY FOR MANAGING AND QUANTIFYING ON-SITE
AND OFF-SITE RISKSAND OFF-SITE RISKS
EC Contract No: ENVA-CT96-0243
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW), The Netherlands (Coordinator)Four Elements Ltd, UK (Secretariat)
Health and Safety Executive, UKMinistry of Environment (VROM), The Netherlands
NCSR Demokritos, GreeceNational Institute for Health and Environment (RIVM), The Netherlands
Norsk Hydro, NorwaySafety Science Group, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands
SAVE Consulting Scientists, The Netherlands
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
OUTLINE
IntroductionTechnical modelManagement modelModification of Loss Of Containment
frequency, according to the Safety Management System
Case studies
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
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I-RISK
TECHNICAL MODEL
PARAMETERSPARAMETERS(λ, μ,T, fM, TM,QM1)
MANAGEMENT MODEL
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATIONHAZARD IDENTIFICATION
MODELLING OF ACCIDENTSMODELLING OF ACCIDENTS
ACCIDENT SEQUENCESACCIDENT SEQUENCESPLANT DAMAGE STATESPLANT DAMAGE STATES
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY ESTIMATIONESTIMATION
CONSEQUENCE CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMNETASSESSMNET
RISK INTEGRATIONRISK INTEGRATION
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TECHNICAL MODEL
MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM
EVENT TREE - FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
RISK INTEGRATION
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MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM (MLD)
MLD FORMS THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL MODEL
MLD IS NOT A FAULT TREE
MLD PROVIDES THE STARTING POINT FOR DEVELOPING PLANT-SPECIFIC MODELS
MLD IDENTIFIES INITIATING EVENTS
LOSS OF LOSS OF CONTAINMENTCONTAINMENT
STRUCTURAL STRUCTURAL FAILUREFAILURE
LOSS OF LOSS OF BOUNDARY BOUNDARY
CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT BYPASSBYPASS
ERROSION HIGH TEMPERA
TURE
UNDERPRESUNDERPRESSURESURE
VIBRATIVIBRATIONON
EXTERNAL EXTERNAL LOADINGLOADING
CORROSION OVERPRESSURE
FLOODINGFLOODINGSNOW, ICESNOW, ICE SEISMICSEISMIC HIGH HIGH WINDSWINDS
DIRECT DIRECT PRESSURE PRESSURE INCREASE INCREASE FROM GASFROM GAS
COOLING COOLING MALFUNCTMALFUNCT
IONION
EXCESS EXCESS HEATHEAT
OVRFILLINGOVRFILLING
INTERNALINTERNAL EXTERNAL
CHEMICAL CHEMICAL INCOMPATIINCOMPATI
BLE BLE MATERIALMATERIAL
RUN AWAY RUN AWAY REACTIONREACTION
COMBUSTICOMBUSTIONON
MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM FOR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT
EXCESS EXCESS TEMPERATTEMPERAT
UREURE
LOW LEVELLOW LEVEL LOW LOW TEMPERATTEMPERAT
UREURE
NATURAL NATURAL PHENOMENAPHENOMENA
SUPPORTS SUPPORTS FAILFAIL
EXTRA EXTRA LOADSLOADS
ROLL OVERROLL OVER PRESSURE PRESSURE SHOCH IN SHOCH IN
HOSEHOSE
INTERNAL INTERNAL PRESSURE PRESSURE INCREASEINCREASE
CONTAINCONTAINMENT MENT
OPENEDOPENED
CONTAINCONTAINMENT MENT OPENSOPENS
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EVENT TREE - FAULT TREE EVENTS
A) INITIATING EVENTS (fi, λ, fHi)
B) COMPONENT - BASIC EVENTS
PERIODICALLY TESTED STANDBY COMPONENT
NONTESTED
REPAIRABLE ON LINE COMPONENT
NON REPAIRABLE
C) HUMAN ACTIONS
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AVERAGE UNAVAILABILITY FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMPONENTS
PERIODICALLY TESTED COMPONENTSi) Unavailability owing to hardware failure between tests:failure rate T: mean time between testsιι) Unavailability owing to repair of detected failures λ: failure rate TR: duration of the repair T: mean time between tests
U T1
12
ιιi)Unavailability owing to routine maintenance fM: frequency of maintenance TM: duration of the maintenance
U T TR2
1
2
U U f Tm m3 2
U U Q QM M4 3 1 2 ιv)Unavailability owing to maintenance QM1: prob. of commiting an error QM2: prob. of not detecting an error
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PARAMETERS OF TECHNICAL MODEL fi FREQUENCY OF INITIATING EVENTS
λs FAILURE RATE IN STANDBY MODE
T PERIOD OF TESTING
TR DURATION OF REPAIR
QM1 ERROR IN TEST AND REPAIR
QM2 FAILURE TO DETECT PREVIOUS ERROR
fM FREQUENCY OF ROUTINE MAINTENANCE
TM DURATION (MEAN) OF ROUTINE MAINTENANCE
λO FAILURE RATE OF ON-LINE COMPONENTS
μ REPAIR RATE OF ON-LINE COMPONENT
QO1 PROBABILITY OF NOT PERFORMING ACTION
QO2 PROB. OF NOT DETECTING/ RECOVERING ERROR
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FREQUENCY OF LOSS OF CONTAINMENT
ffLOCLOC=g(=g(bb))
bb=u(=u(qq))
bb: vector of basic events: vector of basic eventsqq: vector of technical parameters: vector of technical parameters
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MODIFICATION OF THE FREQUENCY OF LOC ACCORDING TO THE SMS
ln fj=ln fl + (ln fu-ln fl) mj/10
fj modified value of the jth technical parameter
fl lower value of each parameter, for the instal-
lation with the poorest SMS in the industry
fl upper value of each parameter, for the instal-
lation with the best SMS in the industry
mj modification factor of the jth technical parameter
ln fu
10
0
ln fl
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MANAGEMENT MODEL “Major hazard” safety management
systematic control and monitoring of the possible failure events (as modelled in the Technical Model) leading to Loss Of Containment of hazardous substances
Integrated management system model major hazard management is usually part of an
integrated SHE system Management system model structure
Control and Monitoring (feedback and learning) cycles 8 management subsystems: “Delivery systems”
delivering criteria and resources for control of major hazards
Primary business processes considered: Operations; Inspection, Testing and Maintenance;
Emergencies
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OVERALL STRUCTURE OF MANAGEMENT MODEL
MAJOR HAZARD RISK CONTROL & MONITORING SYSTEM (RCMS)
DESIGN & MODIFICATIONS
POLICY, ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE
DESIGN/MODIFICATION
INSPECTION/TEST, including maintenance concept MAINTENANCE
FEEDBACK & LEARNING LOOP(management
review)
FEEDBACK & LEARNING LOOPS
INSPECTION/TESTMAINTENANCE
OPERATIONS & EMERGENCY
ACTIVITIES & TASKS Outputs to Technical Model
OPERATIONS including emergency
8 Delivery Systems per primary business function
PRIMARY BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
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DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Availability of personnel Commitment and motivation to carry out the work safely Internal communication and coordination of people Competence of personnel Resolution of conflicting pressures antagonistic to safety Plant Interface Plans and procedures Delivery of correct spares for repairs
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DELIVERY SYSTEMS - Personnel
Competence: the knowledge, skills and abilities in the form of first-line and/or back-up personnel who have been selected and trained for the safe execution of the critical primary business functions and activities in the organisation. This system covers the selection and training function of the company, which delivers competent staff for
overall manpower planning.
Availability: allocating the necessary time (or numbers) of competent people to the safety-critical primary business tasks, which have to be carried out. This factor emphasises time-criticality, i.e. people available at the moment (or within the time frame) when the tasks should be carried out. This delivery system singles out the manpower planning aspects, which can include the planning of work of contractors during major shutdowns and the availability of staff for repair work on critical equipment outside normal work hours, including coverage for absence and holidays.
Commitment: the incentives and motivation, which personnel have to carry out their tasks and activities, with suitable care and alertness, and according to the appropriate safety criteria and procedures specified for the activities by the organisation. This delivery system is fairly closely related to the conflict resolution system, in that it deals with the incentives of individuals carrying out the primary business activities not to choose other criteria above safety, such as ease of working, time saving, social approval, etc. Organisational aspects of conflicts are dealt with there and, more personal aspects, such as violation of procedures here.
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DELIVERY SYSTEMS - Hardware
Interface: The ergonomics of all aspects of the plant, which are used/operated by operations, inspection or maintenance. This covers design and layout of control rooms and manually operated equipment, location and design of inspection and test facilities, the maintenance-friendliness of equipment and the ergonomics of the tools used to maintain it. This delivery system covers both the appropriateness of the interface for the activity and the user-friendliness needed to carry out the activities.
Spares: These are the equipment and spares, which are installed during maintenance. This delivery system covers both the correctness of the spares for their use (like with like), and the availability of spares when and where needed to carry out the activities.
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
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DELIVERY SYSTEMS - OrganizationalInternal communication and coordination: Internal communications are communications which occur implicitly, or explicitly within any primary business activity, i.e. within one task or activity linking to a parameter of the technical model, in order to ensure that the tasks are coordinated and carried out according to the relevant criteria. Conflict resolution: The mechanisms (such as supervision, monitoring, procedures, learning, group discussion) by which potential and actual conflicts between safety and other criteria (such as productivity) in the allocation and use of personnel, hardware and other resources are recognised, avoided or resolved if they occur. This delivery system is closely related to the one concerned with commitment, which covers the issues of violations within tasks at an individual level. The conflict resolution system covers the organisational mechanisms for resolving conflicts across tasks, between people at operational level and at management level.Procedures, Output goals and Plans: Rules and procedures are specific performance criteria which specify in detail, usually in written form, a formalised “normative” behaviour or method for carrying out an activity (checklist, task list, action steps, plan, instruction manual, fault-finding heuristic, form to be completed, etc.). Output goals are performance measures for an activity which specify what the result of the activity should be, but not how the results should be achieved. They are objectives, goals or outputs (e.g. accident/incident targets or trends, exposure of risk levels, ALARA, “safe”, numbers of activities carried out, etc.). It is also convenient to regard definitions and criteria for choosing one course of action over another as output criteria. Plans refer to explicit planning of activities in time, either how frequently tasks should be done, or when and by whom they will be done within a particular time period (month, shutdown period, etc.). They include the maintenance regime, maintenance scheduling (including shutdown planning) and testing and inspection activities, which need to link to the parameters of maintenance frequency, test interval and time for maintenance and repair.
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
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MANAGEMENT TASKS
Deliver the appropriate control or resource to the appropriate primary business activity at the appropriate time
Learn and improve on that delivery process over time
These tasks are modelled as processes (boxes) linked by inputs, outputs and influences (arrows) in loops
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LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
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Management tasksa) Overall management & Organization (1)b) Company Risk Control & Monitoring System (2)
(RCMS)c) Evaluate and Propose Chances in RCMS (12)d) Company System for managing and Monitoring
System (3)e) Control System (Use Delivery System to control
tasks) (4)f) Evaluate and propose changing delivery system (10)g) Record and analyze performance of delivery system
(9)h) Evaluate and propose changing use of the delivery
system (11)i) Correct on-line performance (8)
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
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1Overall management
& organisation policy/system + adapt
to system climate 12Evaluate & propose changing overall management &/or RCS system/policy
INTEGRATED (PROBABLY) MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, COMMON TO ALL LOOPS
7Weighted delivery system
x parameters matrix
Modified value of task performance per base event per
parameter
Company Risk Control and Monitoring System
2
SYSTEM CLIMATE WITHIN WHICH THE SITE OPERATES
6Calibration models
for converting performance score to
failure data
Modified values of
base event parameters
Technical model
parameters from Base
Events table
INTERFACE & TECHNICAL MODEL
Analyse risks + design the control and monitoring
system + adapt to system climate
Control 4
system
Use delivery system to control tasks
9Record and analyse
performance, deviations, incidents
etc.
8Correct on line performance of
tasks
10Evaluate and
propose changing the way the delivery
system is used
11Evaluate & propose changing delivery
system
MANAGEMENTSUB-SYSTEMS
Monitoring system
3
3Company system for managing and
monitoring delivery system + adapt to
system climate
Performance (8 delivery systems x number of common mode management subsystems)
Quality of management evaluated by
AUDIT
MANAGEMENTMANAGEMENT
TASKS MODELTASKS MODEL
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Data collected from equipment, tasks, and other sources
Output from one box becomes input for processing by the next
Influences from one box which can change the processing quality of the other
KEY
1Overall
management & organisation
policy/system + adapt
to system climate
12Evaluate & propose
changing overall management
&/or RCM system
INTEGRATED (PROBABLY) MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, COMMON TO ALL DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Company Risk Control Company Risk Control and Monitoring Systemand Monitoring System
Analyse risks + design the control and
monitoringsystem + adapt to
system climate
2
MANAGEMENT MODELMANAGEMENT MODEL
INFLUENCES from one Process can
change the quality of another. This
change takes time:TIME MODEL
An INPUT to a Process is the OUTPUT of a previous one. The quality on 0-10
scale: result of CALCULATION MODEL
application
OUTPUT from Process 12
becomes INPUT for Process 1
The current QUALITY of each MANAGEMENT
PROCESS is assessed in an AUDIT on a 0-10 scale
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
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Control SystemControl System44
Use delivery system to control
tasks
99Record and analyse
performance, deviations,
incidents etc.
88Corrections to on
line performance of tasks at the
workface
1010Evaluate and
propose changing the
way the delivery system is used
1111Evaluate &
propose changing delivery system
MANAGEMENTMANAGEMENTSUB-SYSTEMSSUB-SYSTEMSfor eachfor eachDELIVERY SYSTEMDELIVERY SYSTEM Monitoring Monitoring
systemsystem
3
33Company system for
managing and monitoring delivery system + adapt to
system climate
AUDIT the ‘BOXES’ Assessprocess
quality for each of the 8 DeliverySystems
7Weighted Delivery
System x Parameters Matrix
Quality on 0-10 scale of 8 Delivery System outputs
determined fromCALCULATION MODEL
Quality of “Procedures” is function of
•audited quality of 8 (AUDIT)•calculated quality of input from 4•weightings of their relative effects on output quality
Data collected from equipment, tasks, and other sources (not delivery specific)
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
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1Overall management
& organisation policy/system + adapt
to system climate 12Evaluate & propose changing overall management &/or RCS system/policy
Control 4
system
Use delivery system to control tasks
9Record and analyse
performance, deviations, incidents
etc.
INTEGRATED (PROBABLY) MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, COMMON TO ALL LOOPS
8Correct on line performance of
tasks
10Evaluate and
propose changing the way the delivery
system is used
11Evaluate & propose changing delivery
system
MANAGEMENTSUB-SYSTEMS
Monitoring system
Company Risk Control and Monitoring System
Analyse risks + design the control and monitoring
system + adapt to system climate
2
3
3Company system for managing and
monitoring delivery system + adapt to
system climate
Performance (8 delivery systems x number of common mode management subsystems)
SYSTEM CLIMATE WITHIN WHICH THE SITE OPERATES
Technical model
parameters from Base
Events table
7Weighted delivery system
x parameters matrix
Modified value of task performance per base event per
parameter
INTERFACE & TECHNICAL MODEL
6Calibration models
for converting performance score to
failure data
Modified values of
base event parameters
MANAGEMENTMANAGEMENT
TASKS MODELTASKS MODEL
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Audit ObjectivesAudit Objectives
Integrated assessmentIntegrated assessmentMajor hazards as focus for Major hazards as focus for
articulation of management systemarticulation of management systemModification at technical parameterModification at technical parameterSensitivity analysis for significantSensitivity analysis for significant
corrosion factors in management corrosion factors in management systemsystem
Use a microcosm to study the wholeUse a microcosm to study the wholemajor hazard management systemmajor hazard management system
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Audit Procedure
Preparation:Preparation: Construct technical model: completeness of scenarios Group basic & initiating events into clusters with same
management Link initiating events to management system: expert judgement Map company SMS onto I RISK model: who to interview / tailoring
Conduct: Auditor expertise: process + management + benchmarking of
industry Focus on scenarios Prompt lists and recording forms Verification across interviews and with checks in practice
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Audit EvaluationAudit Evaluation
Assessment per box:Assessment per box:
Scale of 1-10 compared to industry averageScale of 1-10 compared to industry average: : anchoring, baselineanchoring, baseline
Interrater reliability:Interrater reliability: refinery, av.refinery, av. 0.74, range 0.1-0.80.74, range 0.1-0.8 ammonia, av 0.73,range 0.49-0.96ammonia, av 0.73,range 0.49-0.96
Discussion or blind re-ratingDiscussion or blind re-rating: : av. 0.85av. 0.85
Relative weighting of delivery systems Relative weighting of delivery systems per task/parameter per task/parameter
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MODELING OF THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
yi =fi(xi,y1,…,yj,…yI)
yi output of box i
fi function of box i
xi state of box i
yj (j i) input of box i
yi =kiixi+(1-kii)Σcijyj y=Kx+(I-K)Cy
y=[I-(I-K)C]-1Kx
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Management –Technical Interface Model
11 12 13
1415 16
ManagementProcesses forcommon mode
A
BaseEvents:
EventParameters:
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8
mj=Σy8iwij
i =1
mj modification factor of the jth technical parameter
y8i output of the ith delivery system (box 8)
wij weighting factor assessing the relative importance of the ith management delivery system on the influence of the jth technical parameter
j index running over the basic events of the kth group
MODIFICATION OF THE FREQUENCY OF LOC ACCORDING TO THE SMS
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Qo1 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.18 0
Qo2 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.21 0.21 0.2 0.14 0
QM1 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.14
QM2 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.04
fi 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.4 0
λ 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.28
Τ 0.05 0.24 0.14 0 0.28 0.05 0.19 0.05
fm 0.05 0.21 0.16 0 0.32 0.05 0.16 0.05
TR 0.12 0.07 0.21 0.09 0.1 0.19 0.1 0.2
TM 0.12 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.08 0.14
WEIGHTING FACTORS
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DYNAMIC MODELING
=Ax+By (1)
A=[aij] influence of state of box j on rate of change of state of box i
B=[bij] influence of output of box j on rate of change of state of box i
y=[I-(I-K)C]-1Kx (2)
(1),(2) =[A+B[I-(I-K)C] -1K]x
x
x
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DYNAMIC MODELING
i=[Σaijxj+Σbijyj]fi(xi)
fi(xi): state specific resistance
=F(x)[A+B[I-(I-K)C] -1K]xx
x
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CASE STUDY: AMMONIA STORAGE TANK
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EVENT TREE
LOSS OF REFRIGERATION
(STORAGE)FLARE
SAFETY VALVES
(1)
(2)
(3) 8 EVENT TREES 17 FAULT TREES128 BASIC EVENTS
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GENERIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS QUALITY
1. OVERALL MANAGEMENT 5.0
2. COMPANY RCMS 6.0
3. EVALUATE RCMS 2.13
AVAILABILITY
4. COMPANY SYSTEM 5.33
5. CONTROL SYSTEM 4.6
6. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE 4.75
7. RECORD &ANALYSE ON LINE PERFORMANCE
2.75
8. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE CHANGING THE WAY IT IS USED
3.67
9. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE CHANGING 3.33
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TECHNICAL PARAMETER
MODIFICATION FACTOR
Qo1 3.6
Qo2 3.76
QM1 3.93
QM2 3.86
fi 3.66
λ 3.97
Τ 3.46
fm 3.97
TR 3.65
TM 3.70
MODIFICATION FACTORS
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Lower and upper values of technical parameters
EQUIPMENT PARAMETER Lower Upper
1 Safety valves, remote control valves Tr, Tm (hr) 24 8760
2 All equipment T Plant data x 0.9 Plant data x 1003 Safety valves, remote control valves λ 1.71x10-6 3.15 x10-5
4 All equipment Qm1 1.00 x10-4 0.5
5 All equipment Qm2 5.00x10-2 1
6 Safety valves fail in open position λ 8.50 x10-7 3.40 x10-5
7 Manual valves λ 2.74 x10-7 5.04 x10-6
8 Manual valves Tr, Tm, T (hr) Plant data x 0.9 Plant data x 100
9 Flow instruments λ 8.30 x10-7 5.59 x10-6
10 Flow instruments Tr, Tm (hr) 24 336
11 Instruments where equipment has to be taken apart for repair
Tr, Tm (hr) 24 8760
12 Level instrument λ 2.50 x10-6 1.10 x10-5
13 Pressure instrument λ 2.50 x10-7 2.94 x10-614 Temperature instrument λ 3.00 x10-8 2.97 x10-5
15 Process pump λ 4.50 x10-5 2.28 x10-4
16 Process pump Tr, Tm (hr) 24 8760
17 Human Error Qo11.00 x10-4 5.00 x10-1
18 Human Error Qo25.00 x10-2 1.00
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
CURRENT, BEST AND WORST CASE FREQUENCIES
OVERPRESSURE STORAGE
OVERPRESSURE LOADING
UNDERPRESSURE
PIPEBREAK
CURRENT STATE
1.1 10-5 2.2 10-6 1.2 10-6 1.4 10-4
WORST CASE
6.1 10-3 8.7 10-2 5.5 10-4 5.0 10-2
BEST CASE 2.9 10-10 4.3 10-10 1.9 10-10 5.5 10-6
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
IMPORTANCE ANALYSIS
fLOC=g(b)
b=u(q)
q=w(q*)
q*=My8=MHx
IMPORTANCE MEASURE :
fLOC : frequency of Loss of Containment
b : vector of basic events
q : vector of technical parameters
x : vector of state of manegerial tasks
ix
fLOC
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
GENERIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS QUALITY IMPORTANCE
1. OVERALL MANAGEMENT 5.0 0
2. COMPANY RCMS 6.0 0
3. EVALUATE RCMS 2.13 0
AVAILABILITY
4. COMPANY SYSTEM 5.33 0
5. CONTROL SYSTEM 4.6 5.29 x 10-7
6. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE
4.75 13.21 x 10-7
7. RECORD &ANALYSE ON LINE PERFORMANCE
2.75 2.11x10-7
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
MOST IMPORTANT TASKS QUALITY IMPORTANCE
48. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMAN- CE OF SPARES
5.0 29.34 x10-7
42. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMAN-CE OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES
3.2 27.80 x10-7
12. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMAN-CE OF COMMITMENT
3.00 24.36 x10-7
30. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMAN-CE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
4.0 22.70 x10-7
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
QUALITY OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS VERSUS TIME
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 5 10 15 20
TIME
RE
LA
TIV
E Q
UA
LIT
Y
AVAILABILITY
COMMITMENT
COMMUNICATION
COMPETENCE
CONFLICTRESOLUTIONINTERFACE
PROCEDURES
SPARES & TOOLS
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
PERFORMANCE SCORE VERSUS TIME
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 5 10 15 20
TIME
RE
LA
TIV
E Q
UA
LIT
Y
Qo1
λ
T
Tr
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
FREQUENCY OF FAILURE OF LOC VERSUS TIME
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
0 5 10 15 20
TIME
FR
EQ
UE
NC
Y (
/hr)
TankOverpressurestorageTankOverpressureloadingTankunderpressure
pipebreak
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
T6655
T6656
T6654
LPG
LPG
MEA
MEA
NAOH
NAOH
H2O
H2O
CASE STUDY: LPG SCRUBBER
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
DIRECT CAUSES OF LOC
TOWER FAILURE FROM OVERPRESSURE CAUSED BY
HEAT FLUX FROM EXTERNAL SOURCE
TOWER FAILURE FROM OVERPRESSURE, OWING TO
OVERFILLING
TOWER FAILURE OWING TO AGING
TOWER FAILURE OWING TO FREEZING
EXTRA LOADS OWING TO A ROAD ACCIDENT
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
INITIATING EVENTS
EXTERNAL FIRE
HIGH INLET OF MEA OWING TO VALVE FAILURE
NO OUTLET OF MEA
HIGH INLET OF CAUSTIC
NO OUTLET OF CAUSTIC
HIGH INLET OF WATER OWING TO VALVE FAILURE
NO OUTLET OF WATER
HIGH INLET OF LPG
NO OUTLET OF LPG
OPERATING CONDITIONS OFF SPECIFICATIONS
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
SAFETY SYSTEMS
PRESSURE DETECTION SYSTEM
FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
PRESSURE SAFETY VALVES
LOW LEVEL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN TOWERS T6654, T6655, T6656
HIGH LEVEL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN TOWER T6654, T6655, T6656
TOWER INTEGRITY
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
EVENT TREE
HIGH INLET OF MEA
OUTLET FULLY OPEN
PSV
(1)
(2)
(3)10 EVENT TREES 9 FAULT TREES
41 BASIC EVENTS
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
GENERIC DELIVERY SYSTEMSQUALITY
1. OVERALL MANAGEMENT 9.3
2. COMPANY RCMS 9.0
3. EVALUATE RCMS 7.0
AVAILABILITY4. COMPANY SYSTEM 8.9
5. CONTROL SYSTEM 9.8
6. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE 9.9
7. RECORD &ANALYSE ON LINEPERFORMANCE
8
8. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE CHANGINGTHE WAY IT IS USED
8.9
9. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE CHANGING 7
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
TECHNICALPARAMETER
MODIFICATION FACTOR
Qo1 9.1
Qo2 9.0
QM1 9.3
QM2 9.0
fi 9.5
λ 9.3
Τ 9.4
fm 9.3
TR 9.1
TM 9.2
MODIFICATION FACTORS
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
FAILURE FREQUENCY CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF TOWER T6654
PLANT AS ASSESSED 4.7 x 10-10/hr
BEST POSSIBLE CASE 1.1 x 10-10/hr
WORST POSSIBLE CASE 1.2 x 10-4/hr
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
EXTREME PHENOMENA FOLLOWING PLANT DAMAGE STATES
CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF TOWER T6654 (2700 Kg LPG)
1. BLEVE
2. FLASH FIRE
3. EXPLOSION
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
RISK INTEGRATION
1.0E-08
1.0E-07
1.0E-06
1.0E-05
1.0E-04
1.0E-03
1.0E-02
1.0E-01
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
AREA (Km2) WHERE INDIVIDUAL RISK IS ABOVE CERTAIN LEVELS (10-1 - 10-8 /yr)
Specificcase
Worst case
Best case
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
FREQUENCY OF FAILURE VERSUS TIME
0.00E+00
5.00E-10
1.00E-09
1.50E-09
2.00E-09
2.50E-09
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
"TOWER T6655" "TOWER T6654" "TOWER T6656"
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
GENERIC DELIVERY SYSTEMSQUALITY IMPORTANCE
1. OVERALL MANAGEMENT 9.3 0
2. COMPANY RCMS 9.0 0
3. EVALUATE RCMS 7.0 0
AVAILABILITY4. COMPANY SYSTEM 8.9 0
5. CONTROL SYSTEM 9.8 1.8 x 10-11
6. CORRECT ON LINEPERFORMANCE
9.9 4.4 x 10-11
7. RECORD &ANALYSE ON LINEPERFORMANCE
8 7.1x10-12
8. EVALUATE AND PROPOSECHANGING THE WAY IT IS USED
8.9 4.7x10-12
9. EVALUATE AND PROPOSECHANGING
7 0
NATIONAL CENTERFOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH“DEMOKRITOS”
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITYAND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH. RADIATION PROTECTION
MOST IMPORTANT TASKS
QUALITY IMPORTANCE
48. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMAN-CE OF SPARES
9.6 9.6x10-10
12. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMAN-CE OF COMMITMENT
9.8 1.4x10-10
30. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMAN-CE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
9.1 1.4x10-10
42. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMAN-CE OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES
9.8 1.3x10-10
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