Yo Que Piensa Kantiano y Yo de Witt Gen Stein

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On Interpreting Kant's Thinker as Wittgenstein's 'I'Author(s): Patricia KitcherSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jul., 2000), pp. 33-63Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653402 .Accessed: 18/07/2011 15:10

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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LXI, No. 1, July 2000

On Interpreting Kant' Thinker asWittgenstein' 'I'

PATRICIA KITCHER

Columbia University

Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the "unknowability" f cogni-tive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue thatAllison's attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein andMcDowell's linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate.Against McDowell, I argue further hat the Critique's nalysis of the necessary condi-tions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic normativity that isimportantly different from McDowell's own account in terms of a 'second nature'created through 'Bildung'. inally, I argue that Kant's epistemic analyses also lead to a

model of the cognitive self that answers two contemporary questions: why should werefer to selves at all? in what dies the unity of a subject of thought consist?

I. Introduction

Over the last twenty-five years a curious interpretive practice has developedaround an issue that may roughly be described as the 'unknowability of thesubject of thought'. Both Kant and the early and later Wittgenstein supporteddoctrines that fall under this general rubric. A number of recent scholarsbelieve that Kant's and Wittgenstein's positions may be highly illuminatingfor current views about the subject of thought, even though both positionsare primia facie difficult to understand. To enhance our appreciation of Kant's'I think', several distinguished scholars, including Henry Allison (1996a,1996b), Wolfgang Becker (1984), and Dieter Sturma 1985), have appealed oWittgenstein's writings on the 'I'. Oddly, however, starting with P. M. S.Hacker (1972), several major contemporary philosophers, ncluding Jonathan

Lear (1986, 1984)' and John McDowell (1994), have appealed to Kant's

Although Lear (1986) attempts to meld Kant's and Wittgenstein's insights, he is keenlyaware that adopting the 'anthropological stance' and the 'transcendental stance'simultaneously is a lot like mixing oil and water. He also observes that the motivation fordoing so comes not just from an appreciation of the strengths (and weaknesses) ofWittgenstein's philosophy, but from the Hegelian conviction that "Kant's attempt at apurely formal philosophy was a failure" (271). Although my focus will be on theproblems raised by reading Kant on the assumption hat Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy s

ON INTERPRETING KANT'S THINKER AS WITFGENSTEIN'S 'i' 33



ing evidence that Hacker's (1972) attempt o go the other way, to use Kant toilluminate the early Wittgenstein,3 s also unlikely to be fruitful.

McDowell's use of Kant and Wittgenstein s complex. He argues that thenegative views that he takes Kant and the later Wittgenstein to hold incommon are correct, but that Kant's positive claims fall short, because helacked the idea of a 'second nature'. In arguing that the aims and methods ofthe later Wittgenstein and Kant are diametrically opposed, I will try to defendtwo strong and controversial claims: the assimilation of these two positionsthat McDowell shares with Hacker, Becker, Sturma, and Lear, as well asmany others in the British tradition of Kant interpretation hat began with P.F. Strawson and was enriched by the contributions of Gareth Evans,4 seri-ously misrepresents Kant's views; because of this misrepresentation,

McDowell does not appreciate that for Kant there was no gap between the'realm of law' and the 'space of reasons' needing to be bridged by the notionof a 'second nature'; rather, he gulf Kant did see, between causality and free-dom, was unbridgeable.

Although I will be comparing Kant and Wittgenstein, as my title and theforegoing indicate, my efforts will be devoted to showing how the assimila-tion of their views on the thinking subject distorts our current appreciation ofKant. Much of the paper will be critical, but in sharply differentiating Kant

from Wittgenstein, several key Kantian doctrines must emerge en passant. Inthe last section, I will argue that it is precisely these doctrines-the leastWittgensteinian aspects of Kant's philosophy-that are most fruitful forcurrent hinking about the self.

II. Allison: Kant's Thinker as Outside theBounds of Causality

Kant clearly believed that a noumenal self could not be described as part of a

causal nexus. Allison's position on the Kantian thinking self has nothing to

Among others, Bernard Williams (1972/81) follows Hacker in appealing totranscendental dealism to clarify the project of the early Wittgenstein.Beyond Evans (1982), Hacker, and McDowell, I would include Quassim Cassam (1997),Ralph C. S. Walker (1978, p. 82 ff.) and T. E. Wilkerson (1976, p.108 ff.) in thisinfluential radition. Although I will only be considering the assimilation of Kant's positionon the thinking subject to Wittgenstein's, I should note that the near universal acceptanceof Strawson's approach to the Kantian subject depends equally on his devastating attack

on the coherence of transcendental dealism. Strawson triedto showed the impossibility

of transcendental dealism by demonstrating he impossibility of transcendental psychol-ogy. He was surely correct in maintaining an indissoluble link between the transcendentalpsychology of the deduction and the theory of transcendental idealism. Unlike theWittgensteinians, however, I believe that the way to save what is valuable in Kant'sapproach s not to give up on the transcendental psychology, but to try to find a plausible(if perhaps partial) interpretation f transcendental dealism by considering what is reallyimplied by the account of cognition. This paper is not the place to carry out that largeproject (which I begin in [1999]); I hope to show only that the Wittgensteinian alternativetaken by Strawson and his followers is not plausibly viewed as Kantian.

ON INTERPRETING KANT'S THINKER AS WITVGENSTEIN'S I' 35



do with noumenal concerns. Rather, in "Kant's Refutation of Materialism"(1996b) and "On Naturalizing Kant's Transcendental sychology"(1996a), heargues that, if we understand Kant's insights into what a thinking self mustbe-just qua thinker or judger'-then we will see that his account of the

necessary spontaneity of the mind in achieving cognition raises a formidablechallenge to current materialist and, in particular, unctionalist accounts ofmental activity (1996b, 93).

No one doubts that a distinctive feature of Kant's position was his insis-tence on the 'spontaneity' of some mental faculties. As Allison acknowl-edges, however, it is possible to give a naturalistic account of such spontane-ity: "the understanding ... is spontaneous in the sense that ... [it synthesizes]the manifold of sensible intuition in accordance with its own inherent rules

(the pure concepts of the understanding)" 1996b, 94). His argument s thatthis merely 'relative' spontaneity-thinkers are spontaneous relative to theinputs of sense, but not outside the bounds of causality altogether-is not thesort at issue in Kant's epistemology; rather, Kantian epistemic spontaneitywas 'absolute'. What Allison means by 'absolute spontaneity' is that whenengaging in a cognitive act, paradigmatically a judgment, cognizers mustthink of themselves as not part of an ongoing causal chain of events (1996a,64). Even if this captures Kant's understanding f 'spontaneity', and even if

he had good arguments that thinkers must be spontaneous in this sense, ithardly follows that thinkers are not part of a causal nexus. Still, Allisonbelieves that the necessity of thinking of ourselves as absolutely free duringcognitive activity creates a deep tension within functionalist or materialistattempts o explain thinking as a causal process.

Allison's argument for his absolutist reading of Kantian epistemic spon-taneity is philosophical rather than textual.6 It rests on a demonstration of

5 Similarly, McDowell is careful to distance himself from Kantian concerns with religion,morality, and the noumenal realm. The insights he will glean from Kant about theinsufficiencies of 'bald naturalism' come from the latter's "thinking about experienceitself' (1994, 96).

6 In these and other writings, Allison appeals to five different texts to support his claim that.,ant invoked a notion of 'absolute spontaneity' in epistemology as well as ethics. But heseems to recognize that none is very persuasive (see, e.g., Allison, 1996c, 133). Onesource is pre-critical (Ak. XXVIII: 269, Allison, 1996c, 127) and presents a position thatKant later attacked in the Paralogisms; one is from the ethics (Ak. IV: 448, Allison,1996b, 98) and clearly restricts the absolute spontaneity of reason to the 'practical pointof view'; two texts contain defeating qualifications Ak. XX: 308, Allison, 1996b, 97, andB 420, Allison, 1996b, 92-93). Only the fifth text (A 546-47/ B 574-75, Allison, 1990, 36)provides any measure of support for the view that Kant took epistemologicalconsiderations o establish an unusual causality of reason:

Only man, who knows all of nature solely through sense, knows himself alsothrough pure apperception. He knows himself thus, through actions and innerdetermininations, which cannot be counted among impressions of sense. Heis thus to himself partly phenomenon and, in respect of the actions of certainfaculties, actions that cannot be counted as the receptivity of sensibility,

36 PATRICIA KITCHER



"the inadequacy of a merely relative spontaneity for the epistemic functionsassigned to the understanding" 1996a, 63). One function is making judg-ments. For cognizers to make judgments for which they are epistemicallyresponsible, the judgments must be based on reasons. Allison's initial formu-lation7 of the difficulty is that reasons cannot be causes "If, as materialismassumes, there are causally sufficient conditions for my belief that p, then myreasons are not necessary conditions" 1996b, 100); "[fWor ant ... the reasonsfor one's belief cannot be regarded as a set of causes producing t; at least theycannot be insofar as one takes oneself to be reasoning" (1996b, 103). AsAllison recognizes, however, the position that he ascribes to Kant isunsound, because, as Davidson argued some years ago, a causally necessary orsufficient condition might be describable n another vocabulary as a justifying

reason (Davidson, 1980, Allison, 1996b, 101).8Further, despite the attribution, Allison does not get the idea that reasons

cannot be causes from Kant. When Kant considered whether practical reason,which can be efficacious (can determine he will) could itself be determined by"higher and more remote efficient causes," (A 803/ B83 1) he did not concludethat such a possibility would make it impossible to regard practical reason assupplying justifying] reasons.

Whether, however, in these actions through which it prescribes laws, reason itself is againdetermined through ulterior influences and that what in regard to sensuous stinmli is calledfree, might again be nature n respect to higher and more remote efficient causes, this does notconcern us in practice, since we only and primarily ask of reason precepts for conduct ... (A803/B 831).

partly a purely intelligible object. We call these faculties "understanding"and "reason." Especially the latter is distinguished in an entirely proper andexcellent way from all empirically conditioned powers (A546-47/ B 574-75*).

Although this passage suggests something stronger, it is compatible with the possibilitythat, in cognition, the spontaneity of reason and understanding s merely relative. In thenext paragraph, Kant noted that the causality of reason was evident in the imperatives ofmorality, suggesting that epistemological considerations were insufficient to establish anuncaused causality of reason. More importantly, however, Kant explicitly rejected anabsolute spontaneity reading of his epistemology at A 799-800/ B 827-28, when heconcluded that "these three cardinal propositions [freedom of the will, the immortality ofthe soul, and the existence of God] are not in any way necessary for knowledge."

*All references to Kant's works, other than the First Critique, will be to Kant (1902-) and

will be cited in the text by giving the volume and page numbers after "Ak." Citations tothe Critique of Pure Reason will also be in the text, with the usual "A" and "B" editions;except as noted, they will be my translations. have consulted Kemp Smith (1968), Pluhar(1996), and Guyer and Wood (1998).See note 9.Although Allison recognizes that Davidson's argument renders this move illegitimate, inhis Presidential Address, he asserts again that "to place something in this space [ofreasons] is to subject it to normative requirements of justification as opposed to causalexplanation" (1997, 42, my emphasis. See also his penultimate concluding paragraph, 7-48).

ON INTERPRETING KANT S THINKER AS WITTGENSTEIN'S I' 37



Had Kant believed that reasons could rationalize conduct or judgment) only ifthey were not also regarded as causes, then this passage should have a differ-ent message. It should point out that only the negative results of the Dialec-tic-that the truth of determinism s undecidable by human reason-preservesthe ability of reasons to justify. But the passage makes no such claim.Rather, the view is that reason can provide justifying reasons as long as itcan supply [efficacious] precepts for action; whether it is or is not itself aneffect of further auses does not affect this role.

It is at this point in the argument, n considering the possible compatibil-ity of reasons and causes, that Allison enlists the aid of the early Wittgen-stein's reflections on the self.9 The appeals to Wittgenstein are somewhatawkward. In one passage, Allison makes the analogy between Kant's views

about the subject of thought and the "Wittgensteinian-Rylean mode" of argu-ing, which accounts for the "systematic elusiveness" of the "I" in terms ofthe "'logic' of its use" (1996b, 96). In another, he compares Kant's positionto Ryle's "systematic elusiveness" of the "I" (1996a, 66). Although Allisoncites Ryle, I think he means Wittgenstein,"> ince he is trying argue that"this mysterious I of apperception" annot be explained n causal or naturalis-tic terms (1996, 66). Ryle's purpose was to demonstrate that "there isnothing mysterious or occult about ... self-consciousness" (1949, 187, 189).

Allison interprets Kant as holding that cognitive subjects must regardthemselves as not part of a causal chain and Ryle examined a phenomenonthat may seem to lend support to this view." When subjects of thought tryto reflect on their states, one part always eludes capture, viz. the thought thathas other thoughts as its object. Because of widespread discussions of atten-tion, Kant well understood that if cognitive subjects try to observe their

9 Allison offers slightly different arguments against materialism n the two papers. In "On

Naturalizing Kant's Transcendental Psychology," he notes that "reasons can function asreasons only when they are consciously recognized as such" (1996a, 63). He thenappeals to Wittgenstein (in the guise of Ryle, see below in the text) to show that areasoning subject is "not an entity capable of being cognized" (1996a, 66). In "Kant'sRefutation of Materialism," he runs basically the same argument n the early part of thepaper (1996b, 94-96), again ending with an appeal to Wittgenstein. Later, however, hereturns to the question of recognizing reasons as reasons and notes that Davidsoniancompatibilism between reasons and causes would undermine his point. To counter this"last word" of the non-reductive materialist, he returns to the themes of theineliminability and systematic elusiveness of the 'I': "the former precludes the possibility

of simply eliminating t from an analysis of thinking hat purports o do justice to its claimsof objective validity, the latter precludes the possibility of reducing it to just one moreitem in the world" (103-04). In the text, I am describing this third, most sophisticatedversion of the argument.

10 Another reason for doubting that Allison really intends to appeal to Ryle is that Allisondoes not understand self-consciousness on the model of a "second act" (1996b, 62) andRyle introduces his discussion of "systematic elusiveness" by drawing attention to ourability to perform "higher order" acts on other acts (1949, 182).Walker (1978, 132) also argued that the similarity between Kant's position on the 'Ithink' and Ryle's famous discussion of 'systematic elusiveness' was merely apparent.

38 PATRICIA KITCHER



current states, then they will alter them (see Ak. V: 471 and discussion of itbelow, p. 49, see also B 157a). Thus subjects cannot fully capture their ownthinking n any one moment. But Kant did not draw any dramatic conclusionsabout the unknowability of the thinker from this fact.'2 Neither did Ryle. Hisexplanation of the 'systematic elusiveness of 'I" was completely deflationary:

Self-commentary, self-ridicule and self-admonition are logically condemned to eternal penul-timacy. Yet nothing that is left out of anny articular commentary or admonition is privilegedthereby to escape comment or admonition or ever. On the contrary it may be the target of thevery next comment or rebuke (1949, 186, my emphasis).

By contrast, the early Wittgenstein took the subject of thought to bebeyond the bounds of explanation. Further, the Kantian texts that Allisoncites in support of an appeal to the 'Wittgensteinian-Rylean' pproach appearto have considerable affinity with the views of the Tractatus:

Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing more is represented han a transcen-dental subject of the thoughts = X. It is known only through the thoughts which are its predi-cates, and apart from them, we cannot have the least concept of it at all. We thus turn in aconstant circle about it; as we must always already use this representation n any judging what-ever about it .. (A 346/ B 404, see Allison, 1996b, note 11.).

Now it is, indeed, very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose n

order to know any object, and that the determining self (the thought) is distinguished from theself that is to be determined (the thinking subject) in the same way as knowledge is distin-guished from its object (A 402, cited in Allison, 1996a, 66).

The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself asan object of the categories. For in order to think them, its pure self-consciousness, which is tobe explained, must itself be presupposed B 422, cited in Allison 1996a, 66.)

At least at first glance, these passages seem strikingly similar to some

famous lines in the Tractatus Wittgenstein, 1922):

5.6 The limits of my language are the limits of my world....

5.61 We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot sayeither.

5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains deas....

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather t is a limit of the world.

Most importantly, it is Wittgenstein's position that provides a means forreaching Allison's intended conclusion. Recall that the argument wassupposed to move from the Kantian requirement hat judgments be based onreasons to the conclusion that judgers must think of themselves as outsidethe bounds of causation. The problem with Allison's first attempt was thateven if cognizers must think of themselves as having reasons, there is no

12 See below, p. 49.

ON INTERPRETING KANT'S THINKER AS WITTGENSTEIN'S I' 39



incompatibility between explanation by reasons and explanation by causes.Now the key argumentative move is different. It's not that reasons can't becauses, but that a reasoner or subject of thought cannot be an object ofthought. Again, judgments must be based on the subject's reasons; hence all

judging is self-reflexive (Allison, 1996b, 95). But this self or subject ofthought is merely 'formal'. Allison explains that Kant's 'I think' is'systematically elusive', because of the "'logic' of its use.... Rather thannaming or referring o a distinct individual, this I functions as a placeholderfor the subject of thought.... As such, it is not only ineliminable, but alsosystematically elusive in the sense that it is purely formal" (Allison, 1996b,96). At another point, he describes the I as "the reference point to whichthought must be directed in any act of thinking" (Allison, 1996a, 66).

Although Allison doesn't spell out the rest of the argument, it must besomething like the following. We can interpret Kant as anticipating he validWittgensteinian point that a subject of judgment s the limit of the world or aperspective on it and, hence, not a possible item in the world that is judged.Thus, judgers cannot coherently regard hemselves as part of the world to beexplained or, in Kant's terms, the phenomenal world of causal interaction.When illuminated by the early Wittgenstein, it is clear that for Kant theunknowability of the thinking self is not just a matter of general noumenal

ignorance. Rather, because thinkers make judgments on the basis of theirown reasons, the 'I' is a formal aspect of every judgment and so cannot be theobject of a judgment. Hence [on the substantial assumption of the correctnessof Kantian epistemology], there is something deeply incoherent about func-tionalist and materialist programs or naturalistic ausal accounts of thinking.

To assess the plausibility of Allison's early Wittgensteinian reading ofKant, I turn to P. M. S. Hacker's Insight and Illusion, which offers an exten-sive discussion of the similarities and key differences between Kant's viewsand those of the early and later Wittgenstein. Since Hacker believes that theearly Wittgenstein's puzzling comments about the correctness of solipsismcan be understood by placing them in the broader context of transcendentalidealism, he should be particularly sympathetic to Allison's assimilation ofthe two writers on the topic of the elusive self. Hacker argues that althoughWittgenstein dismissed the "thinking, representing subject" (Wittgenstein,1922, T 5.631, 5.633, Hacker, 1972, 59 and 59 ff.), he affirmed he necessityof a 'metaphysical self' for reasons of transcendental dealism": since the"transcendental elf is the source of the forms and categories of experience, itis 'a presupposition of all experience"' (1972, 64, 68).

13 Hacker attributes Kant's influence on Wittgenstein to the latter's reading ofSchopenhauer. Although Wittgenstein may have borrowed the language fromSchopenhauer, the doctrines are clearly Kant's.

40 PATRICIA KITCHER



I will leave it to others to determine how helpful it is to understand heTractatus as influenced by transcendental idealism. My concern is withWittgenstein's reasons for holding that the metaphysical subject "does notbelong to the world: rather, t is a limit of the world" (Wittgenstein, 1922, T5.632), since that is the doctrine Allison imports into the center of Kant'sphilosophy. Hacker thinks the key to understanding .632 lies in the claim at5.634 that "no part of our experience is a priori." The solution is thatlanguage can express only logical and contingent truths, but the claim "thatour experience belongs to us and could not belong to another s a priori [butnot logical]" (1972, 79, 63). Hence it is inexpressible.

Of course, Kant also believed that claims about the thinker had a peculiarstatus: they were synthetic a priori. 14 Presumably one motive for understand-

ing Kant through Wittgenstein is a tacit admission that the former was justwrong about the synthetic a priori. The idea would be to salvage Kant'sinsights, by turning his synthetic a priori claims into Wittgensteinian apho-risms that cannot be expressed, but at least 'shown'. This strategy is givenfurther mpetus by the superficial, but misleading verbal similarities betweentheir views. Wittgenstein was concerned about linguistic practices and the'logic' of the word 'I' (see below, p. 44); Kant referred to the 'I think' asmerely logical' (e.g., A 350). But Kant understood logic' in something like

the sense of the Port Royal logicians, as the 'art of thinking'.'5 So, forexample, he explained in his handwritten ogic notes that "The logical ques-tion is not: how we attain concepts, but which acts of the understanding orma concept..." (Ak. XVI: 548. Nr. 2857.). Wittgenstein would reject both ofthese questions as irrelevant to logic. Since the verbal similarity betweentheir approaches to the 'I think' is merely that, the strategy of redeemingKant's claims about the special status of the 'I think' by appealing to theearly Wittgenstein makes sense only if there are some real affinities betweenthe former's ways of thinking about the synthetic a priori and the latter's atti-tude towards he inexpressible.

Kant believed that synthetic a priori claims could be established by meansof a transcendental deduction; Wittgenstein maintained that non-contingent,non-logical claims could only be "shown" e.g., 4.121, 4.1212). Since I haveno wish to enter the interpretive ontroversy about what the latter ntended by'showing', I will look at the potential for assimilation only from the side ofKant's notion of a transcendental deduction. It has long been agreed that the

14 Kant's position on the analytic or synthetic status of the 'I think' has been a matter ofdispute, because in different passages he describes it in both terms (e.g., as "analytic" atA 350, B 135, and B 407, and as "synthetic" at A 1l17aand B l34a). I take the solution tothis textual puzzle to be given at B 133, where he explains that the "analytic unity ofapperception s possible only under the presupposition of a synthetic [unity]." I discussthis issue further n the text below, p. 5 1).

IS This tradition s explored in the aptly named collection, "Logic and the Workings of theMind," (Easton, 1997).

ON INTERPRETING KANT'S THINKER AS WITTGENSTEIN'S l' 41



goal of the deduction was to defend the legitimacy of certain a priori claimsand concepts by arguing that the concepts were necessary for the possibilityof experience. What was much less clear until Dieter Henrich's (1989) studyof 18th century egal deductions was how the deduction was supposed to work(and why Kant made the analogy with legal practice). The following isStrawson's presentation of how the methodology of the Critique should beunderstood n light of Henrich's mportant ontribution:

A deduction ... aims to justify ... [a] claim of right, by tracing it back to origins, to originswhich are such as to confer legitimacy on it. In application to the Critique this is a matter ofelucidating crucial basic facts by virtue of which our knowledge claims are justified and uponwhich our possession of knowledge depends. These basic facts relate to specific cognitivecapacities of which we have, in reflection, an implicit awareness ... The deduction is then saidto proceed ... by a variety of argumentative trategies that will systematize and render explicitthe functioning of our cognitive capacities and, in doing so, will, it is hoped, exhibit the ...validity ... of the categories ... (1989, 69).

In particular, he deduction was intended o reveal that our cognitive capacitiesmust combine incoming sensory data in certain ways and that these combin-ings give rise to various "transcendental ontents" such as spatial and causalrelations (A 79/ B 105). Thus, although the concept 'cause' does not origi-nate in the senses, but in the necessary operations of our faculties, it is notusurpatory, but legitimate.

More generally, Kant started with what might be called the 'fact of cogni-tion'.16 All but the most extreme skeptics admit that we can have knowledgeof some features of the inner or outer world. But upon analysis, it turns outthat any cognition at all has certain requirements: tems must be located in aspatial and temporal framework, and must be related as substances or acci-dents, events must be related as causes and effects, diverse causal and substan-tival beliefs must be systematically nterconnected or we would have no testof truth [A 647/ B 675]). Further, t is a fact about our capacities for receiv-ing sensory data that none of these necessary ingredients n cognition, spatio-temporal position, causal relations and relations of 'substance' as bearer of'accidents', and systematic unity, can be acquired hrough he senses. Rather,these needed cognitive elements must have their origins in our faculties.Hence, the Transcendental Aesthetic was to be a science of the "principles ofa priori sensibility" (A 21/ B 35), which sought to determine what the faculty

of sensibility did and must "supply" liefern) to perception; he Transcenden-tal Analytic involved a "dissection of the faculty of understanding tself' thatwas to reveal it as the "birthplace" f certain necessary concepts (A 65/ B 90);the Transcendental Dialectic sought to isolate reason to determine whether ittoo contained a priori principles (A 305/ B 362). To cast the point, again, in

16 On analogy with the 'fact of reason' that we are conscious of the moral law, which isbedrock for the Second Critique, e.g., Ak. V: 31.

42 PATRICIA ITCHER



terms of Kant's parade case, the synthetic a priori claim that 'all events havecauses' was to be vindicated by arguing that experience is possible forcreatures with our cognitive constitutions only because our understandingscombine the data of sense in a way that gives rise to causal contents.

These faculties are not merely necessary for cognition; by the samereasoning, they are all necessary parts of a thinking self. To avoid facultypsychology, Allison and other commentators often portray Kant's 'I think' asmerely the 'logical' subject of judgments, and so as encompassing only [thefaculty of ] understanding. But this reading badly misrepresents his teleologi-cal approach o cognitive faculties. Like many in the 18th century, he realizedthat he had no way to understand mental faculties except 'functionally', interms of their effects;"7 more specifically, he thought they could only be

understood n terms of their contributions o cognition. The faculties explainhow cognition is possible, but their complementary contributions o the goalof cognition and, hence, to the functioning of a cognitive subject are animportant part of the explanation of why such faculties exist (Cf. Ak. V:373). Although he did not explore teleology systematically until the ThirdCritique, his teleological approach was fully evident in his discussions ofmental faculties in 1781. So, for example, even though he criticized the pre-tensions of reason, he went on to explain that the ideas of reason must have a

legitimate use, because "everything which is grounded in the nature of ourpowers must be purposive [zweckmndssig] and agree with [their] rightful use"(A 642/ B 670). In the oft-quoted ntroductory aragraphs f the Transcenden-tal Analytic, he explained that cognition required a faculty for receivingimpressions and a faculty for combining impressions, because only throughtheir "joining their forces together" sich vereinigen] (A 51/ B75) can knowl-edge arise. Without a faculty of sensibility 'thoughts' would be 'empty', anda faculty of understanding would be pointless. Similarly, without the facultyof reason to "prepare he ground or the understanding," y creating conceptsorganized in a genus-species hierarchy, here would be no understanding A657/B 686). Like the principles of cognition themselves, which must betreated as belonging to a system, Kant's cognitive faculties must be under-stood "in terms of a self-subsistent unity in which each limb, as in an orga-nized body, exists for all the others and all exist for its sake" (B xxiii). AKantian 'I think' without a rich array of faculties, but only an understanding,would be an impossibility.

By contrast, given Wittgenstein's acceptance of Fregean anti-psycholo-gism and the "Pure Theory Logic," (Hacker, 1972, 45), the Tractatus couldcontain no references to faculties that might be necessary for cognition.

17 So Charles Bonnet began his Essai de Psychologie (1755/1978, 1) with the observationthat "We know the soul only through ts faculties; we know these faculties only by theireffects."




Indeed, the early Wittgenstein was blunt about the mistakes of his prede-cessors in flirting with psychological explanations and about his own effortsto avoid repeating hese mistakes:

4.1121. Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than anyother natural cience.

Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.Does not my study of sign-language correspond o the study of thought-

processes, which philosophers used to consider so essential to the philosophyof logic? Only in most cases they got entangled in inessential psychologicalinvestigations, and with my method too there is an analogous risk(Wittgenstein, 1922, 49, my emphasis).

One of Hacker's central theses is that the later Wittgenstein's pointed crit-

icisms of philosophers' use of such cognitive psychological idioms as'understand' (see below, p. 48) were partially directed at his younger self(1972, 45-70). But even he would resist any suggestion that the earlyWittgenstein tried to account for capacities such as understanding by appeal-ing to faculties; no commentator would entertain the hypothesis thatWittgenstein's views about the status of non-logical a priori claims werebased on his understanding f the origins of certain aspects of representationsin indispensable cognitive faculties. He had no reason to pursue such consid-

erations, for as Hacker notes, "Wittgenstein, when writing the Tractatus, hadno concern with epistemological issues of how we come to know what weknow or what patterns of justification legitimize our cognitive claims"(1972, 52). The contrast could hardly be greater. Kant's pursued hisjustificatory project in the theory of knowledge, by trying to understand hethought-processes required for cognition, and it was this project pursued bythis method that led to his doctrine of the thinking self.

Even if the early Wittgenstein did not reject the metaphysical self asnonsensical, he relegated it to the unspeakable. In that case, however, inter-preting Kant's thinker n terms of Wittgenstein's metaphysical subject meansthat absolutely fundamental Kantian claims, including the doctrines that athinking subject must possess faculties of sensibility, understanding, aproductive imagination, and reason, must be not just muted, but mute.Allison's Wittgensteinian reconstruction of Kant's doctrine of the unknowa-bility of the subject of thought would enable "Kant's view" to "constitute aformidable challenge to contemporary materialism" (Allison, 1996b, 93),only by sacrificing he central enets of transcendental pistemology.

If we take a closer look at the passages that seem Tractarian, it is clearthat Kant's objectives have nothing to do with Wittgenstein's inexpressibil-ity doctrine. One of Kant's antagonists in the Paralogisms was Descartes,who erred n maintaining hat in the very act of thinking, cogito, each thinkerwas somehow aware of the identity and simplicity of his own thinking self,sumi qua res cogitans. After observing at A 346/ B 404 that any attempt to

44 PATRICIA KITCHER



grasp the nature of the thinking self or to have any concept of it beyond thethoughts that are its predicates leads us to "turn n a constant circle," Kantcontinued: "this awkwardness is unavoidable, because consciousness itself isnot so much a representation, which differentiates a particular object, but aform of representation in general. " The problem with any attempt to compre-hend the nature of the thinking self is not that the necessary conditions forthought are inexpressible-Kant spent most of the First Critique describingthem-but that, in thinking, subjects do not intuit a self ( A 107). Hence,any thoughts about a subject must revolve in a circle, because they encounterno resistance from intuition. Consciousness itself is not a representation dif-ferentiating an object. Instead, all we know about the self are the generalcharacteristics of a subject capable of thought-the 'formal conditions' for

any representations-and from these we can make no inferences about theself's constitution (A 398). That is the fundamental message of the Paralo-gisms.

Similarly, Kant went on to explain at A 402 that the error involved inbelieving that we can know the determining self was the "surreption of ahypostatized consciousness," n which we mistake "the unity in the synthesisof thoughts as a perceived unity of the subject of thought" (my emphasis).The last, seemingly Tractarian passage Allison cites, which claims that the

"subject .. cannot by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as anobject of the categories" B 422), is again concerned with the lack of intuitionof a self. Kant's point was not merely about the self. No object can beknown simply by thinking he categories: (the categories) are "mere unctions[ways in which representational lements must be combined for knowledge]which do not give thought an object to be known, and accordingly do notgive even myself as object" (B 407). Like any knowledge, self-knowledgerequired hat "I be conscious of an intuition of myself' (B 406).

Kant's position on the unknowability of the subject of thought is thuscompletely comprehensible n its natural historical setting. It was a criticismof Descartes' and other Rationalist Psychologists' efforts to extract excitingconclusions about the soul from analyzing the necessary conditions ofthought, and a warning not to apply similar moves to his own richer analysesof those necessary conditions; it was also an echo of Hume's famous objec-tion to the Cartesian move, transposed into the Critical epistemologicalvocabulary: knowledge requires ntuitions, we have no intuition of the self ininner sense, hence the self's identity, simplicity, and permanence are notobjects of our knowledge." In trying to portray Kant as offering an exciting

x What is less obvious is why Kant regarded us as inevitably prone to illusions of self-knowlbihge. Again, this can have nothing to do with the inexpressibility of the epistemiccconditions' (in Allison's useful phrase) that the Critique was written to express. Oneobvious hypothesis is that he regarded this illusion as unusually compelling, because hehad been taken in by it himself. This seems confirmed by two texts. In Dreamis of a Spirit-

ON INTERPRETING KANT'S THINKER AS WITTGENSTEIN'S ' 45



alternative to contemporary views on the mind-body problem, Allison'sWittgensteinian interpretation replaces that natural context with an utterlyalien one, in which epistemological justification s given up and reference tocapacities required or knowledge disallowed. From a Wittgensteinian erspec-tive, such rough treatment of the Kantian thinker may seem necessary; mycomplaint is with Kantians who hope to defend the importance of transcen-dental idealism by inviting Wittgenstein into the tent. If the early Wittgen-stein did recognize the necessity of a metaphysical subject, then it is far morenatural o read his inexpressibility doctrine as an implicit criticism of Kant'streatment of the same issue than as an elucidation of it.

III. McDowell: Kant's Thinker as the Subject of'Criterionless' Self-ascription

McDowell offers a very different picture of Kant's targets and insights in theParalogisms from the one just sketched. In an account indebted to Strawsonand Evans, he explains that Kant's critique of Descartes should be understoodas follows:

Kant's point in the Paralogisms is that the flow of what Locke calls "consciousness" does notinvolve applying, or otherwise ensuring conformity with, a criterion of identity.... Continuity of"consciousness" involves ... no keeping track of the persisting self that nevertheless seems to

figure in its content (1994, 100).

In a note, he elaborates hat subjects' use of the 'I' is not simply "immune oerror hrough misidentification," but involves a complete "identification-free-dom," so that it doesn't require even a practical "keeping track," as, forexample, might be the case with the demonstrative 'this'(McDowell, 1994,100-101, n. 20). He concludes:

The notion of persistence applies itself effortlessly; there is nothing to it except the flow of"consciousness" tself. This looks like a recipe for arriving at the conception ... of the referentof "I" that figures in Descartes.

That is essentially Kant's account of how the Cartesian conception of the ego arises. And itcan easily seem that we had better draw Kant's conclusion: the idea of persistence that figuresin the flow of "consciousness" had better be only formal (1994, 101).

Given this understanding f how the Paralogisms' diagnosis of Descartes'error works, McDowell sees a natural affinity with the reflections of the later

Wittgenstein on the philosophical-perplexity-inducing peculiarities of theusage of the term 'I' (1994, 178). He cites a passage from the Blue Book,

Seer (1766), Kant characterized the Paralogisms' conclusion that the soul is a "simplesubstance' as "established" n the writings of philosophers by "very sound and reliableproofs" (Ak. II: 322). And in the A edition of the Paralogisms, he indulged in a rareautobiographical aside: "In this way, my insight that we can make judgments about thenature of the thinking being and can do so from mere concepts, an insight that wasinitially so plausible, becomes suspicious..." (A 399).

46 PATRICIA KITCHER



"'the use [of 'I'] as subject' does not refer" (McDowell 1994, 178, Wittgen-stein 1958, 67); other relevant passages can be found in the Blue Book andthe Philosophical Investigations:

We feel then that in the cases in which 'I' is used as subject, we don't use it because we

recognize a particular person by his bodily characteristics; and this creates the illusion that weuse this word to refer to something bodiless, which however, has its seat in our body. In factthis seem to be the real ego, the one of which it was said, "Cogito ergo sum" (Wittgenstein,1958, B. B. 69).

410. 'I' is not the name of a person, nor 'here' of a place, and 'this' is not a name.(Wittgenstein, 1953, P. 1. 410).

Although he admires their negative insights, McDowell believes that

Wittgenstein's abjuring of positive theses and Kant's 'formalism' are toonegative. In the latter case, he suggests that Kant could not see his way to amore positive view, because he would not go "outside the flow of conscious-ness" (1994, 102). As a result, Kant shrunk the 'I think' to a 'mere point ofview'. What Kant needed, he argues, was the notion of a 'second' nature, anature enhanced, if not enchanted, by capacities that are developed through'Bildung' [roughly, education and civilization]. Had he considered the optionof a second nature, then Kant might have seen beyond mere 'formalism' to

the possibility that subjects' use of the term 'I' was a reflection of their in-troduction o the conceptual realm through heir language community, and sorecognized that although self-ascription s 'criterionless', it is still embeddedin a form of life in which 'I think' is merely "an abstraction rom the ordi-nary substantival persistence of a living subject of experience" 1994, 103).

The idea that the puzzle of 'criterionless elf-ascription' ies at the heart ofthe Paralogism's message about the unknowability of the 'I think' is com-mon to many readings. Dieter Sturma suggests that Kant's understanding ofthe "unmstandlose dentifizierung criterionless dentification]" f the structureof self-consciousness is carried forward n the analytic tradition by Wittgen-stein's analysis of the "logic of 'I-sentences'," (although he notes that thelatter position involves some questionable premises [1985, 145]); similarly,Wolfgang Becker believes that Kant's attempts o understand he phenomenonof self-consciousness can be clarified by juxtaposing them with thereflections of analytic philosophy on "kriterienlose Selbstzuschreiblung[criterionless elf-ascription]" 1984, 143); Hacker s even more direct:

The crucial question to be answered, as both Kant and [the later] Wittgenstein realized, iswhat are the necessary conditions of criterionless or original (underived) self-ascription ofexperience? (cited in Becker, 1984, 144).

If McDowell's and others' interpretation f the Paralogisms s sound, thenKant's and the later Wittgenstein's teachings about the confusions surround-ing self-knowledge show a remarkable onvergence. What I will argue, how-

ON INTERPRETING KANT'S THINKER AS WITFGENSTEIN'S I' 47



ever, is that the apparent agreement between these positions is an artifact ofhis (and others) having already interpreted Kant through the lens of theirunderstanding f Wittgenstein. I will argue further hat McDowell's inabilityto appreciate Kant's positive views about the self (including the latter'ssolution to questions of normativity hat McDowell proposes to address viathe notion of a 'second nature') derives from the same source. Since severaldistinct points will be involved, I will number hem for ease in reference.

1. Kant's thinker was not shrunken, but, from Wittgenstein's perspective,hopelessly bloated with dubious faculties. As we have seen, if we are to makeany sense of Kant's epistemology, then "this I, he or it (the thing) thatthinks" (A 346/B 404) must possess faculties of sensibility, understanding,productive imagination, and reason that operate in various ways in thecombination of representations. The later Wittgenstein would have none ofthis. He was deeply suspicious of the justificatory projects of his predeces-sors, especially when couched in a psychological vocabulary. n particular, hethought it was a serious mistake to regard recognizing or understanding orseeing as a definite kind of state or process that helped to explain variousbehavioral manifestations (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1953, P. I. 149).19 Rather thanjustification, Wittgenstein thought the proper role of philosophy was to

enable readers "to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something thatis patent nonsense" (Wittgenstein, 1953, P. I. 464). So, for example,although it can seem that recognizing is a cognitive process (cf. Kant'ssection on "Recognition n a Concept"), we can be led to see the folly of thisby asking "Did you recognize your desk when you entered your room thismorning?" (Wittgenstein, 1953, P. I. 602). As Fromm argued some yearsago (1979), with its constant appeal to processes like perceiving, imagining,conceiving, and judging, Kant's epistemology must have been a prime target

of the later Wittgenstein's attack on the confusions of previous philosophies.McDowell and others (e.g., Strawson, 1966, 104, Cassam, 1997, 16) viewKant as having a shrunken notion of an 'I think' only because their Wittgen-steinian scruples lead them to ignore central features of Kant's position. So,for example, McDowell reads Kant as unwilling to go outside the 'flow ofconsciousness', because he cannot take seriously Kant's efforts to engage intranscendental eflection on the sources of the necessary aspects of representa-tions. Given Wittgenstein's disdain for both the goal (justification) and themeans (the appeal to 'faculties' that 'process' sensory data) of the transcenden-tal deduction, however, a late Wittgensteinian eading of Kant seems to me tohave all the advantages of a Rylean reading of Descartes.

2. The issue of criterionless self-ascription has its natural home in the prob-lem of 'other minds', a problem that did not and could not arise within the

19 1 borrow this way of putting matters rom Goldfarb 1989, 635.

48 PATRICIA KITCHER



Kantian epistemological framework."' The problem of other minds becomespressing through a consideration of the asymmetry between first and thirdperson ascriptions of mental states: in the case of 'other minds', we mustmake a dubious inference to assert than anyone else even has a mind,whereas, in our own case, the ascription of mental states is 'immune toerror', or at least 'immune to error through misidentification'. The readingthat McDowell relies on does not attribute a problem about other minds toKant; rather it credits him with the insight to see through the problem andthe related puzzle about error-proof elf-ascription.

But Kant saw no philosophically interesting asymmetry between first andthird person ascriptions of mental states. A look at some relevant textsreveals that he was oblivious to the kinds of worries that generate philosoph-

ical anxiety about other minds. In the Second Paralogism, Kant explained:"This is obvious: if someone wants to represent a thinking being, then hemust substitute his own subject for the being he wants to consider..." (A353). That is, we understand he minds of others through our understanding four own minds-not even on analogy with our own minds-but just as wemight understand an unobserved inden tree through hose we have observed.In the passages that follow the citation, no concern surfaces that this naturalmethod of thinking about other thinkers might involve questionable

inferences.In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant argued that

empirical psychology could never be more than an "historical, naturaldoctrine of inner sense," because we cannot "separate nd divide [for purposesof experimentation] he multiplicity of our own [representations]," nd "stillless, however, does another thinking subject submit to our investigations ina way that is useful to our purposes; also observation itself alters anddisguises the observed object" (Ak. IV: 471). There is no hint of a differencein kind here; the minds of others are even less-noch weniger-good subjectsof experimental observation than our own. Further, t is clear from discus-sions in the Anthropology why others are less good subjects of observation:people do not care to be observed, so they dissimulate (Ak. VII: 121). If theworry is that the targets in our quest for knowledge of other minds dissimu-late, however, then the possibility that they might be mindless robots is notbeing seriously entertained. Kant also raised the problem of dissimulation forself-observation in the same Anthropology passage. To avoid dissimulationin our own case, we can study ourselves in a state of emotional agitation.Unfortunately, n such a state, where normally we cannot dissimulate, we arealso unable to observe (Ak. VII: 121). Finally, in another passage from theAnthropology, Kant questioned the reliability of introspection: "For without

2() Walker (1978, 131) observes that Kant said almost nothing about 'other minds'.




noticing, the object of our supposed discovery here [through ntrospection] swhat we ourselves have introduced" Ak. VII: 133).

Kant stressed the mediacy of self-knowledge in principle as well as prac-tice. Central tenets of transcendental dealism implied that subjects had nodirect or privileged access to their own mental states. Probably n response tothe accusation of Berkeleyan idealism, Kant took some pains to explain inthe second edition that his position was that, since we can have knowledge ofour inner states only through he form of inner sense and the categories of theunderstanding, we know "also even our own selves, only as we appear" B152-53, see also B 409). Because Kant denied-for reasons of principle-anyspecial knowledge of our own selves and our states, the asymmetry betweenself-knowledge and knowledge of 'other minds' that s essential for taking the

problems of 'error-proof' elf-ascription and other minds seriously is absentfrom his philosophy. I do not see how he can be credited with the insightthat, although self-ascription of mental states is immune to error throughmisidentification, that does not imply any special knowledge of a specialsubject of thought, when his own position was that our knowledge of ourown selves, as appearances, is on a par with our knowledge of all else,including the minds of others.21

McDowell might reply that for all Kant's recognition of the fallibility of

empirical self-knowledge, he clearly understood that the central doctrine oftranscendental dealism, the 'I think' must accompany all my representations,was a necessary truth. Although this is correct, it introduces no asymmetrybetween my thinking self and all others. Kant's reasons for holding that itmust be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations (B132) rested on his analyses of the necessary conditions for cognition. As wehave seen, any cognizer must have a sensibility that receives sensory impres-sions (and supplies spatio-temporal ontents), an understanding hat combinesthe sensory data (and supplies causal and substantival ontents), and a facultyof reason that renders causal and substantival beliefs systematic (according oprinciples of homogeneity, specificity, and continuity.) But it is clear fromKant's further analyses that the mere presence of these organically nterrelatedfaculties would still not suffice for cognition. To take his well-knownexample, subjects can judge that a ship has moved only if (1) they havesynthesized enough actual sensory data to have the relevant concepts (whichmust belong to a genus-species hierarchy of concepts), and (2) they havecombined enough of these concepts in particular beliefs about the causal and

21 It would still be possible to view Kant's epistemology as a preemptive solution to theproblem of other minds, because it blocked the claim that we have the privileged accessto our own minds that is necessary to set up the problem. In that case, however, his'solution' to the problem would have nothing to do with 'criterionless self-ascription' andeverything to do with special features of his epistemology that are largely absent inMcDowell's treatment, he forms of intuitions and the categories of the understanding.

50 PATRICIA KITCHER



substantival tructure of the world, beliefs such as 'currents ause untethered,buoyant objects to move' and 'rivers have currents', o recognize that the shiphas changed its location.22 From these analyses, Kant concluded thatconcepts, judgments, and intuitions (that can play their proper role in produc-ing cognition) are possible only if they are connected to other representationsby operations of synthesis performed by needed faculties. That is why allrepresentations, intuitions and concepts, must participate in a "necessarysynthesis of representations" hat is entitled the "original synthetic unity ofapperception" B 135).

Once we have understood hat synthesis across representations s necessaryfor knowledge, then the 'synthetic unity' of the subject of thought will bepart of our concept of a thinker and "thought n it" (A 6-7/ B 10-11). This

case would be no different from any other example of theoretical vocabulary,where the definitions, and so the analytic claims, come after and depend onthe substantive, synthetic truths. Hence Kant observes at B 133 that the"analytic unity of apperception s possible only under the presupposition of asynthetic [unity]." For Kant, the claim that 'all my representations mustbelong to a single I think' is both necessary and analytic, but this specialstatus has nothing to do with the alleged infallibility introspection or withthe peculiarities of the linguistic practice of self-ascription. Rather, t depends

on philosophical reflection on the necessary conditions of cognition. And thatanalysis applies equally to my thoughts and to everyone else's.23

3. The second assumption n McDowell's hypothesis that Kant had a thin orshrunken notion of the subject, because he lacked a sufficiently rich notion ofBildung to generate a conception of a 'second nature', also seems implausi-ble. McDowell recognizes that Kant had the concept of Bildung (1994, 96),but does not think that it figured very seriously in his thinking.24 Bildung

was a central concern of Kant's anthropology ectures, which he gave annu-

22 In this discussion, I rely on Guyer's argument (1987, Ch. 10, passim) that Kant believethat distinguishing events from non-events required not just a general causal principle butknowledge of particular causal laws.

23 Kant did note one asymmetry between first and third person knowledge of the'permanence' of the soul in the Third Paralogism. 'Permanence' refers to existence at alltimes. In the wake of Descartes' claim that the essential attribute of the mind wasthought, there was considerable debate about whether the soul always thinks. Kant had a

means of explaining why both sides were right. Since on his view time was the formof

inner sense, then I am permanent o myself, because the only times that exist for me arethose times at which I think: "it is one and the same thing whether I say: this whole time isin me as individual unity, or: I am to be found with numerical dentity in all this time" (A362). From another person's point of view, however, I am not permanent, ince there willbe times when he is thinking and I am not. But this asymmetry s a reflection of a featureof Kant's general position (the ideality of time) that has no echoes in the analytictradition.

24 Allison (1997, 45) also objects that McDowell underestimates the role of Bildung inKant's philosophy.




ally for a period of nearly twenty five years (1772 to 1795). He believed thatanthropology was important as a practical discipline. In his prefatory remarksto the Anthropology, he argued or its advantages over then current heoreticalattempts o acquire knowledge of man'.

Whoever speculates on the natural causes on which the faculty of memory, for example, rests,can expostulate off and on (as Descartes did) about traces of impressions remaining in thebrain.... But since we do not know the cerebral nerves and fibers nor understand the use ofthem in their design ... this is a sheer waste of time. When, however, we use our observationsabout what has been found to hinder or aid memory in order to increase its scope and agility,this is part of anthropology or pragmatic purposes ... (Ak. VII: 119).

More generally, Kant believed that it was important to study men, theirtemperaments, haracters, and motivations to enable one to 'know one's wayabout in the world', which he sharply differentiated from possession oftheoretical knowledge of the world.25 n a rather odd work, The Idea for aUniversal History with a Cosmnopolitan Purpose, Kant suggested thatphilosophers might approach history to trace the will's manifestations n theworld of phenomena, "where human actions are determined n accordance withnatural laws, as is every other event" (Ak. VIII: 17).26 He offered severalprinciples for writing such a history, including the following:

All the natural capacities of a creature aire destined sooner or later to be developed completelyand in. cotontrility' with their end.

In mnan .. those natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason are suchthat their could be fully developed only in the species [through generations, with each passing"its enlightenment to the next"], but not in the individual (Ak. VIII: 42-43, interpolation from43).

In light of these two texts, Kant's position on the importance of Bildung in

understanding ow people progress hrough he 'space of reasons' seems quiteclose to McDowell's own: people reach their full potential only throughBildung and the only way to understand people and so become civilized is tostudy civilization.

But there is also a fundamental difference between Kant's views about therole of Bildung and McDowell's. For McDowell, Bildung creates a 'secondnature' in which meaning, rationality, and normativity irst become possible;for Kant, it merely enhances the performance of cognitive faculties-faculties

that are themselves 'the sources of intelligibility and normativity'.27 AsMichael Friedman argues in some detail (1996), the 'gap' that McDowellenvisions between the 'space of reasons' and the 'realm of law' does not exist

25 My appreciation of Kant's goals in the Anthropology lectures has been influenced bymany helpful conversations with Thomas Sturm.

26 My attention was drawn to this text by Barbara Herman's paper (ms.).27 To adapt Christine Korsgaard's 1996) useful phrase.

52 PATRICIA KITCHER



in Kant's system. Rather, Kant attempted o preserve the 'intelligibility' ofthe world, by explaining how we could understand t in terms of mathemati-cally precise laws. On my reading of Kant and, I believe, on Friedman's,McDowell is simply wrong in claiming that "[flor Kant, nature is the realmof law and therefore devoid of meaning" 1994, 97).

Because McDowell refuses to take transcendental pistemology seriously,he does not recognize that, although Kant saw an important place forBildung, he had his own, very different view of the sources of normativity.As noted, he assumed the 'fact of cognition'. He argued that distinguishingbetween events and non-events (such as real and apparent motion) requiredappeal to causal and substantival principles. From the arguments of theEmpiricists, he realized that such principles could never be extracted from

experience. So he inferred that our minds were so constituted to combinesensory impressions in a way that gave rise to causal and substantivalrelations. But he also realized that causal and substantival beliefs could them-selves be tested only through their place in a system of causal and substanti-val principles. And again he realized that principles of systematicity could notbe extracted from the variety of actual sensory experience (e.g., A 649/ B676, see also Kitcher, 1991). So he inferred urther hat principles of homo-geneity, specificity and continuity were also supplied by the mind

(specifically by the faculty of reason). On Kant's view, normative cognitionwas possible-we can determine how things are as opposed to the way theymerely seem (Strawson, 1966, 100-10)-precisely because sensibilitysupplies elements that place all objects and events in determinate spatio-temporal relations, understanding nterprets sensory data in terms of causaland substantival elations, and reason enjoins us to accept putative causal andsubstantival principles as laws only when they belong to a system of laws.

Contrary o McDowell's assertion that, with its embrace of the ScientificRevolution, modern philosophy opened up a gap between laws and norms, onKant's account, it is precisely the same factors that enable us to understandnature as a system of laws that makes us "responsive o ... rational demandsbesides those of ethics" (McDowell, 1994, 84). We have epistemic norms,and consequently can do natural science, because of the principles that areimplicit in our faculties' ways of interpreting ensory data. Of course, this isan explanation of how cognition is possible, viz. because our facultiesoperate in certain ways; it is not an account of why our epistemic norms arevalid. Kant well understood that we had no way to judge the soundness ofthese principles except by using our own faculties. As he remarked in hishandwritten ogic notes, it seems paradoxical hat "I try to have knowledge ofthe [proper] rules of the understanding hrough [use] of the understandingwhich requires he rules" (Ak. XVCI: 28, Nr. 1592). Nonetheless, he thoughtit was possible to determine the rules of good thinking, by evaluating andsystematizing the rules of 'natural logic', the ways our understandings

ON INTERPRETING KANT'S THINKER AS WITTGENSTEIN'S 'I' 53



normally function.28 Similarly, it follows from Kant's theories that we mustuse our understanding nd reason, with their inherent principles of causal andsubstantival and systematic reasoning, o determine how beliefs are [properly]justified. But again, he clearly believed that it was possible to achieve cogni-

tion of the necessary conditions for cognition.2No mystery, no "spookiness" (McDowell, 1994, e.g., 82) surroundsKant's explanation of how normative cognition is possible. As he observedin the Dialectic, theories of cognitive faculties are governed by exactly thesame principles of causality and systematicity as any other theory (A 649-49/B 676-77). We infer the necessity of contributions rom the faculties fromthe fact of cognition, an analysis of the requirements of cognition, and thepoverty of sensory data; "at the beginning almost as many powers must be

assumed as effects ..." (A 648/ B 676-77); later this apparent variety can bereduced by discovering hidden unity in the effects. McDowell believes Kantneeded a notion of a 'second nature', because his Wittgensteinian convictionthat claims about psychological faculties must be irrelevant o philosophicalquestions leads him utterly to ignore Kant's own, alternative explanation ofepistemic normativity.

4. McDowell's hope that Kant's insights about freedom, reason, spontaneity,

and the self can be made more coherent by "equipping" im with the "idea ofa second nature" 1994, 99) appears o be groundless. As we have seen, Kanthad a non-spooky account of the thinking self, which included an account ofhow human cognitive behavior conformed to norms; he also saw an impor-tant role for Bildung in fulfilling human potential. In the cases of non-ethicalnorms, the idea of a second nature would be superfluous; but when we turn toethics, the problem is different. The notions of a 'second nature' and'Bilduing' provide no relief for Kant's difficulties with freedom.

On a standard compatibilist view, human freedom is possible because weare able to act on something like our own internal principles, principles thatwe have acquired and/or developed, principles that can counter instincts orother impulses of the moment. Such principles can be refined by rationaldeliberation, ncluding reflection on a wide range of different cases. Early inhis early career, Kant was also a compatibilist. To get some sense of why hecould not remain one, consider a question that he would have encountered n abook he frequently consulted, J. N. Tetens' Philosophische Versuche:

28 For further discussion of Kant's views of the relation between 'natural' and 'school'logic, see Kitcher 1997, section IV.

29 The one text I know that runs counter to this claim is B 145-46. Like other interpreters,am baffled as to why Kant suddenly claims that we can have no real explanation of whythe unity of apperception is produced by the twelve categories, or why space and timeare the only forms of intuition. The obvious problem s that he spends most of the Analytictrying to explain the former claim and much of the Aesthetic trying to explain the latter.

54 PATRICIA KITCHER



To what degree do the activities of the thinking power necessarily ensue if the act of feelingmentioned and the power of representation are present? upon those can the former neverthe-less be held back and altered? (Tetens, 1777, 1979, vol. I, 475)

Kant's position on this issue was unequivocal. At the beginning of his logic

lectures, he explained that: "Everything n nature, equally in the inorganic andorganic realms, happens according to law...; The exercise of our powers alsohappens according o rules..." (Ak. IX: 11).

Given this understanding f faculties, Kant could not maintain an explana-tion of ethical norms that paralleled his account of epistemic norms. Ethicalnorms could not be embodied in the operation of a [normal] aculty of practi-cal reason, because for moral responsibility to be possible, it must be possi-ble for the agent to do otherwise at the moment of action. Morality cannot be

saved by an appeal to rational, psychological causation, because there is nomoral law without transcendental reedom, and the latter is completely ruledout "[even] when the determining grounds [of an action] are without excep-tion internal, and even if they do not have mechanical causality but a psycho-logical causality through conceptions..." (Ak. V: 96-97).

No notion of 'second nature' or 'Bildung' can rescue Kant from hisincompatibilist predicament, because, for him, the fact that actions might bebased on conceptions acquired through socialization did not matter. Heregarded he conceptual and the rational as lawful in the realm of phenomena,and so as precluding he ability to do otherwise at the moment of action. Theproblem is that Kant divided things up differently from McDowell: concepts,reason, civilization, and so a rational, civilized thinker all fell on the side oflaw-governed phenomena, whereas free actions did not.3'( McDowell's pictureof rational ethics grounded on the development of capacities through educa-tion and civilization may be more attractive han Kant's incompatibilism, butit cannot plausibly be regarded as an extrapolation of the latter's deeply heldviews about freedom.

IV: Kant's Thinker in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

By stressing how different Kant's actual views about the cognitive subjectwere from the Wittgensteinian urrogates hat have appeared n recent discus-sions, I may make his philosophy seem uninteresting. Presumably, Kant'sthinker morphed into Wittgenstein's linguistic 'I', because the Critique

30 In his recent Woodbridge Lectures, McDowell again suggests that "What corresponds nKant to this image of the space of reasons is the image of the realm of freedom" (1998,433-34). He also maintains that according to the "Kantian conception" "freedom" in"judgment" "is essentially a matter of responsiveness to reasons" (1998, 434). The lattercharacterization seems accurate, but only if the "freedom" nvolved is not the absolutefreedom required or moral responsibility. In his handwritten ogic notes, Kant made veryclear that he did not believe that judging was voluntary: "The will has not direct influenceon [what] we hold fro true; this would be absurd [sehr Ungereiint] (Ak. XVI: 398, Nr.2508).




contained what appeared o be unfounded and irrelevant laims about he facul-ties required for cognition. In this final section, I will argue for the oppositeconclusion: when understood n his own Erkenntnistheoretische [cognitivetheoretical] erms, Kant's epistemology offers a useful perspective for currentthinking about the self, a perspective that has been lost on the austere andimplausible Wittgensteinian eadings.

Kant was concerned with cognitive capacities and processes, but contem-porary psychology has returned o the mentalism that characterized he 17th,18th, and 19th centuries, and much current work is devoted to determining heprocesses that combine (synthesize) nformation rom different representationsinto more sophisticated representations. Armchair speculation still gets norespect, but recent efforts to make sense of mental life help to cast Kant's

pioneering inquiries in a different light. As he maintained, he was not in thebusiness of offering hypothetical causes for given effects (A xvii). His facultyterminology was not intended to refer to actual psychological mechanisms,but to characterize he types of processes that must operate on sensory inputs(given what was known about those inputs) to produce representations uit-able for knowledge claims. In current erminology, Kant was a 'teleologicalfunctionalist',"1 who tried to describe psychological faculties abstractly, interms of their necessary contributions o the goal of cognition.

Although this way of understanding Kant's epistemological endeavorsgives them contemporary respectability, it is the differences between histeleological functionalism and some current varieties that may make his workuseful for contemporary discussions. Current eleology is inspired by Darwinand, often, by a particular way of understanding natural selection. For post-Darwinians the teloi are survival and reproduction. Further, here is substan-tial agreement hat natural election works towards survival and reproductionnot by creating elegant organs for various tasks, but by "tinkering."32 vensuch frequent and vociferous opponents as Daniel Dennett and Stephen JayGould agree that the organic world is cobbled together, more a messy "jury-rig"33 han a marvel of efficient design.34 There is, however, an obvious prob-lem with any consensus that natural election is always, or almost always, orshould, in the absence of compelling contrary evidence, be taken to be atinkerer: t conveniently ignores cases such as the eye and the ear. In a way,this is hardly surprising. These were the sorts of elegant organs that were

31 Among others Lycan (1987, 44) argues for the virtues of 'teleological functionalism'.32 Natural selection as a "tinkerer" s a central theme of Gould (1980).33 The term comes from Dennett, 1987, 50.34 Gould and Dennett disagree over the weight to be given to selection pressures versus

pleiotropy, developmental constraints, available genetic variations, and the like. For theclassic statement of the view that evolution does not proceed just by adaptation, seeGould and Lewontin 1979.

56 PATRICIA KITCHER



taken as evidence of divine design. Nevertheless, it is not good practice tothrow out the explananda with the bogus explanans.

Kant was not a Darwinian. His teleology was rooted in his faith in aDivine Designer-in particular, a Designer who subscribed fully to theEnlightenment project of liberating human beings through the acquisition ofknowledge. Although Kant regarded human beings as having other, evenmore important eloi, in the First Critique, the telos is cognition. In particu-lar, he wanted to explain how it was possible for human beings to havemathematical and scientific knowledge of the world.35 n his own terminol-ogy, he wanted to explain how synthetic a priori claims, that is, necessaryand universal claims about the world, could be true.

Kant's different conception of the purpose o be served by cognitive facul-

ties led him to undertake a project rarely ventured n contemporary ognitivescience. As the psychologist George Mandler has noted,36 ognitive scientistsalmost never focus on cognition or knowledge, dealing instead with percep-tion, the acquisition of beliefs, concepts, and so forth. Hence they rarelyconsider the normative requirements of cognition. By contrast, since Kantwanted to understand how creatures with our basic cognitive constitutionscould have something appropriately alled 'cognition', he undertook a noima-tive investigation that turned out to have important psychological implica-

tions. Reduced to barest essentials, his inquiry had four results: (1) knowledgeis possible only if cognizers can distinguish between appearance and reality;(2) such a distinction is possible only against the background of an internal,if inchoate, understanding of the causal and substantival structure of theworld; (3) causal and substantival beliefs are possible only against a back-ground of a systematic unity of such beliefs; (4) sensory data cannot them-selves supply standards or distinguishing among sensory data; in particular,sensory data alone cannot supply the needed causal and substantival contentsor the principles of systematicity for determining causal and substantivalstandards; herefore, our faculties must operate n ways that produce systemat-ically interconnected ausal and substantival beliefs.

At this point, it is important o resist the temptation o say that Kant waswrong, because science has shown that the teloi of human cognitive facultiesare survival and reproduction and not cognition. For all we know, our cogni-tive faculties might be more an elegant contrivance and less an awkward con-traption, more like the eye and less like the Panda's thumb. Their teloi couldbe both cognition and survival. As far as I know, evolutionary biology hasno settled opinions one way or another; further, biologists who are suspi-

35 Kant did not always believe that mathematics 'applied' to the physical world. In an earlypaper, the "True Estimation of Living Forces," he concluded that although mathematicswas not deceitful, "things are not actually as it has them" (Ak. 1: 139).

36 I believe Mandler made this remark n a discussion of a colloquium paper, but it mighthave been in conversation.

ON INTERPRETING KANT'S THINKER AS WiTHGENSTEIN'S I' 57



cious of Panglossian adaptationism will point out that it is far too easy totell just-so stories supporting either side.37 Kant's teleological functionalismmay be useful precisely because he tried to illuminate the road not usuallytaken in contemporary cognitive science, the 'task domain' of [normative]

cognitionof the world around us.

Of course, every step of Kant's argument s controversial, starting withhis assumption that we have knowledge. Many regard scientific theories asinstruments of prediction, mathematics as a game, and true universal general-izations as impossible. (An important part of Wittgenstein's legacy is thedeep suspicion that there are no universal generalizations n philosophy, butonly 'family resemblances' across cases of logic, proof, justification, and soforth.) Further, contemporary epistemologists might well contest claim (2)

above that an is/seems distinction requires backing by causal and substantivalknowledge; anti-unificationists will deny (3) above, that systematic connec-tion to other beliefs is an important test of truth; some recent work inconnectionist branches of cognitive science is intended to refute somethinglike claim (4) above, by showing how subjects can form judgments aboutobjects and causal connections just on the basis of sensory data.38 So mysuggestion is not that contemporary cognitive science assume that Kant'sanalyses of the requirements of cognition were correct. I claim only that he

offered a plausible and relatively determinate proposal for investigating theoption that human cognitive faculties are not a mishmash, but a relativelyelegant contrivance for producing knowledge: To gain any insight into howpeople make sense of the enormous variety of the natural and social worldsaround them, we need to understand he psychological mechanisms that pro-duce beliefs about causal relations and about relations between objects andproperties, and the mechanisms that permit the integration of diverse beliefsin a unified picture of the causal and substantival structure of the world.39However difficult research on these apparently ophisticated and highly devel-oped psychological processes might be, if Kant is right about the actuality ofcognition and about its 'task demands', then these processes hold the key toan adequate understanding f human understanding.

37 Beyond Gould and Lewontin (1979), see Dupr6 (1987) for extensive discussion. I'mgrateful to Philip Kitcher for discussions of this issue.

38I'm grateful to Mark Collier for numerous discussion of these projects. For an interestingattempt to explain the production of object representations from gappy data, seeMunkata, McClelland, et al. (1994).

39 I don't mean to suggest that there is no psychological research on causal beliefs orreasoning; there is a great deal. (Although this may be due to the crudeness of searchstrategies, either mine or the search engines themselves, a check of current contentssuggests that there are many fewer studies of object and property relations than of causalrelations.) Rather my point is that Kantian epistemology offers a framework forunderstanding the significance of results in these topics, and for suggesting usefulquestions to investigate.

58 PATRICIA KITCHER



Beyond the return to mentalism, contemporary philosophers, psycholo-gists, and even neuroscientists seem to have recognized that any plausible'cognitive science' must say something about the subject of thought, or atleast about the 'self construct'.40 What, if anything, is the source of mental

unity? What,if

anything, ustifies reference to 'selves', (beyond the hopes ofmoralists to preserve some serviceable residue of the 'soul')? Kantian episte-mology provides rationales or three interconnected orts of unity of a cogni-tive self, a unity of faculties, a unity across different states, and a unity ofprinciples.

Against the Empiricists, Kant argued that sensory inputs were not self-organizing and could lead to cognitively significant representations nly whencombined in distinctive ways by needed faculties. If human knowledge is not

a mirror of nature, but a mirror of nature and faculties, however, then we needto refer to faculties. Since Kant took cognition to be an elegant contrivance,he conceived of faculties as playing complementary oles in the production ofknowledge. A Kantian aculty of understanding hat synthesized sensory datawould make no sense if it were not part of a mind that also contained afaculty of intuition for supplying data; as he noted explicitly in the Dialectic,a faculty for applying concepts (understanding, A 19/ B33) would make nosense in the absence of a faculty for forming concepts (reason, A 651/ B 680,

A 654/ B 682). Given Kant's anti-Empiricist arguments and his teleologicalapproach o faculties, it follows that cognition can be produced only by a setof faculties that "join forces together" A 51/ B 75) or "operate ogether" (A353) in such a way that the faculties must be understood as "limbs" of a"separate self-subsistent unity" (B xxiii), an 'organically unified' cognitiveself.

As I have argued elsewhere (Kitcher 1982 and briefly above p. 51.), Kant'sepistemology also implies that different cognitive states, intuitions andjudgments, must be united by relations of synthesis. Pace Hume, judgmentsthat were not synthesized from intuitions would have no content and beimpossible as judgments; intuitions that could not be synthesized in judg-ments would not be intuitions, because they would have no role in cognition(A 116). Kant's baroque and unfamiliar characterization of the unity of thethinking self as 'synthetic' was precisely correct. On his theory, the states ofa cognizer must be linked together by processes of synthesis or combination;disconnected, Humean 'heaps' of cognitive states were impossible.

Finally, Kant's theory of cognition implies that a cognitive self musthave a certain unity of principles. As we have seen, cognition requires morethan a full complement of faculties. In the paradigm case of judging that aship has moved, for example, it is not enough for subjects to have faculties

40 See, e.g., Neisser (1988), and some of the essays in Ciccheti and Beeghly (1990), Parker,Michell and Boccia (1994), and Bermidez, Marcel, and Eilan (1995).

ON INTERPRETING KANT'S THINKER AS WiTTGENSTEIN'S 'I' 59



or even to use general causal and substantival principles; rather they mustappeal to some specific beliefs, such as 'currents cause untethered objects tomove' and 'rivers have currents'. By the arguments of the Dialectic, thosebeliefs will belong to hierarchies. So, for example, the claim that rivers havecurrents might be subsumed by more general principles of downhill motion;in turn, it might subsume particular principles of navigation.

Two interesting results follow. As Kant notes, the principles of system-aticity permit a variety of unificatory strategies, so some individuals mighthave a tendency to form hierarchies with more specific claims; others mightprefer to push in the direction of ever greater generality. Further, he particu-lar causal and substantival beliefs in these hierarchies will be a function ofdifferent streams of sensory experience. It follows that different cognitive

selves will have somewhat idiosyncratic epistemic standards. will accept orreject sensory data as evidence of real events depending on my causal andsubstantival understanding f the world; you may weigh virtually the 'same'sensory data differently, depending on your causal and substantival Weltan-schauung. In this sense, a Kantian cognitive self has a unique way of under-standing the world, but this rich interpretive viewpoint is no shrunken pointof view'. The second result is that at least the causal and substantival beliefsof a cognitive self must have some unity: they must, because such unity is

the selection criterion for their becoming epistemic standards. That does notmean that an individual's causal and substantival beliefs form anything ike aperfect hierarchy or even that they are consistent. Kant always presented thesystematizing tendencies of reason as means of striving towards an unreach-able goal. Still, on the substantial assumption that Kant's epistemology iscorrect, there should be considerably more unity among the causal andsubstantival beliefs of a single individual than across the beliefs of randomlychosen different ndividuals.

These brief reflections on the clues that Kant's work on the self offers tocurrent research may seem to run counter to my original topic, his viewsabout the unknowability of the subject of thought. And, in a sense, they do.Kant had important claims to make about the systematic errors of his prede-cessors in trying to extract comforting doctrines about the substantiality,simplicity, and permanence of the soul from epistemological investigationsinto the necessary conditions for cognition. The Paralogisms is, however,one chapter n a long book. Much of the rest of the Critique of Pure Reasonis devoted to arguments and analyses that are intended to reveal the positivecharacteristics hat must be possessed by any subject of thought as such. As Ihave argued, it is only in the context of these positive claims that theunknowability hesis of the Paralogisms can properly be understood: ackingany sensory evidence about the thinking self, we can glean its properties only

60 PATRICIA KITCHER



by considering the necessary faculties for thought, but these tell us nothingabout its constitution. Beyond providing an essential context for understand-ing his negative doctrine, Kant's positive claims offer a different approach orthinking about the subject of thought, as an organically unified cluster offaculties for producing epistemic

standards,in

particular, for creating arelatively unified causal and substantival vision of the world, against whichsensory data can be evaluated as real or illusory. This approach can giveneeded direction o contemporary ognitive science's search for the self in theforest of states, processes and capacities of the mind-brain. Hence, the timeseems right to welcome Kant's cognitive theoretical analyses back into thefold of respectable philosophical theses-even while they remain, forWittgenstein and his followers, emblems of a failed philosophical radition.

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