U.S. v. Rama (DOJ Sentencing Memo)

8/20/2019 U.S. v. Rama (DOJ Sentencing Memo)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )) Case No. 1:15-CR-143

v. )) Honorable Gerald Bruce Lee

JAMES M. RAMA, )) Sentencing: October 9, 2015

Defendant. )

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO SENTENCING

The United States hereby submits its position on the sentencing of the Defendant, James

Rama, in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 6A1.2 and the policy of this Court. As explained below,

and in view of the additional reasons set forth in the government’s under seal filing, a sentence of

twelve months and one day imprisonment is appropriate in this case.

I. Factual Background

This sentencing arises from Defendant’s admitted participation in a multi-year conspiracy

to pay bribes to senior officials in a Kuwaiti ministry in order to secure a lucrative security

contract for the benefit of Defendant’s employer IAP Worldwide Services, Inc. (“IAP”). IAP

was a defense contractor headquartered in Florida, and it also had a large office in Arlington,

Virginia. During the Iraq War, IAP, like many defense contractors, had a significant presence in

the Middle East, and the Defendant, who was the company’s Vice President of Special Projects,

spent significant stretches of time in Kuwait. Even before joining IAP, Defendant was in Kuwait

running another defense contractor’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (“LOGCAP”)

contract for the U.S. Army in support of Iraqi operations. Defendant joined IAP in mid-2005 in

a senior business development role.

Case 1:15-cr-00143-GBL Document 17 Filed 10/02/15 Page 1 of 11 PageID# 86


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which could require huge outlays by the Kuwaiti government on equipment and installation.

Because the recommendations of Phase I would guide the Phase II order and process, IAP first

sought to become the Kuwaiti government’s consultant in Phase I. This would enable IAP to

steer the requirements for Phase II, in essence tailoring the Phase II contract to IAP’s strengths.

This was not Defendant’s idea alone—it was widely understood and endorsed by colleagues and

senior management at IAP. It was simply Defendant’s responsibility to carry out the plan in

Kuwait and to serve as IAP’s local operator.

Because the consultant on Phase I would be responsible for advising the Kuwaiti

government on Phase II, and a potential conflict would exist if IAP was using its consultancy

primarily to steer Phase II business to itself, Defendant and several senior IAP colleagues

(apparently with knowledge of certain Kuwaiti officials) set up a new company called Ramaco

International Consulting, LLC (“Ramaco”). Defendant was the company’s namesake, owner,

and only employee, but Ramaco was little more than a front for IAP; indeed, IAP and Ramaco

signed a master services agreement under which IAP and its UK subsidiary would perform the

Phase I work.

The Phase I contract was awarded outside of normal tendering processes in Kuwait, and,

to Defendant’s understanding, the involvement of Kuwaiti Consultant was key in allowing this to

occur. Defendant agreed with several co-conspirators that approximately one-half of the

payment IAP would receive to allow it perform Phase I would be diverted to Kuwaiti Consultant.

Defendant knew that this was done so Kuwaiti Consultant would bribe Kuwaiti government

officials to ensure that IAP won the Phase I contract. That something was untoward about the

payments was evident from the structure IAP set up to pay Kuwaiti Consultant; rather than

transfer money to Kuwaiti Consultant directly (as would be expected for someone performing a



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real service), Defendant, with the assistance of others, set up a mechanism to send the money

through an intermediate company in Kuwait (referred to as “Kuwaiti Company”). Kuwaiti

Company would first inflate its invoices to IAP by charging IAP for the total amount of both the

legitimate services that Kuwaiti Company was providing and the payments that Kuwaiti

Company was funneling to Kuwaiti Consultant without listing or otherwise disclosing the

funneled payments to Kuwaiti Consultant. After the MOI paid Ramaco for work it (i.e. IAP)

was performing on the Phase I contract, Ramaco would transfer funds to a bank account of IAP,

and IAP would then transfer funds to Kuwaiti Company. Kuwaiti Company would then pay

Kuwaiti Consultant through a middleman, and Kuwaiti Consultant in turn paid Kuwaiti

government officials.

The Criminal Information and Statement of Facts filed with Defendant’s plea agreement

contain an example of one such payment to Kuwaiti Consultant. On September 13, 2006, a co-

conspirator emailed Defendant and others saying he would approve IAP’s payment of $420,000

to Kuwaiti Consultant based on an invoice issued by Kuwaiti Company. Emails from the time

evidence Defendant’s and others’ understanding the purpose of paying Kuwaiti Company was

simply to get Kuwaiti Consultant his money quickly. IAP then wired Kuwaiti Company

$420,000, which the company immediately paid to Kuwaiti Consultant. At the same time, due to

delays in IAP paying Kuwaiti Consultant, Rama had sought a loan on behalf of Ramaco so that

he could also pay Kuwaiti Consultant immediately. As the conspiracy progressed, at the end of

2007 and in early 2008, Kuwaiti Consultant began receiving cash payments from Defendant’s

co-conspirators.

As noted, Defendant spent much of 2006 and 2007 in Kuwait, working on the Phase I

contract and preparing IAP for Phase II. Due to financial troubles that apparently resulted from



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diverting so much of the Phase I budget to Kuwaiti Consultant, the consultancy phase was

plagued with operational problems, missed deadlines, and internal strife at IAP. Although

Defendant formally left IAP in mid-2007, apparently due to the chaos that surrounded Phase I

and to pursue other ventures in Kuwait, he remained involved in Phase I by becoming a

consultant to IAP. Others within IAP believed that Defendant had the closest connections to

officials in the Kuwaiti MOI, and his continued presence was necessary to maintain relationships

with the Kuwaiti MOI and Kuwaiti Consultant. Defendant now admits that he continued to

participate in the scheme despite understanding that bribe payments were being made to officials

in order to secure (1) Ramaco’s continued participation in the KSP Phase I project, and (2) IAP’s

and Kuwaiti Consultant’s ability to participate in the Phase II project.

In total, $1,783,688 was diverted to Kuwaiti Consultant. Notably, IAP did not profit on

the Phase I contract because so much of the Phase I money was diverted to pay bribes, and due to

this investigation, IAP never pursued Phase II where the real profits were expected. Defendant

himself did not personally profit from the bribery conspiracy (other than through receiving his

normal IAP salary and bonuses).

II. Procedural History

On June 16, 2015, the Defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty before U.S.

District Judge James C. Cacheris to a one-count criminal information charging him with

conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 371; 15 U.S.C. §

78dd-2. Under the plea agreement, the government and Defendant reached certain agreements

with respect to the facts and sentencing recommendations they would submit to the Court. First,

the parties agreed that the base offense level for a conspiracy to violate the FCPA would be a 12

pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2X1.1(a), 2C1.1(a)(2). “For bribery offenses, the Sentencing Guidelines



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provide that the sentence shall be enhanced by the greatest of (1) the value of the bribery

payment, (2) the ‘benefit received or to be received’ as a result of the bribery payment, or (3) the

loss to the government.” United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation

omitted). Here, the value of the bribe payment, approximately $1.78 million, is the appropriate

factor. This results in a 16-level increase under §§ 2C1.1(b)(2) and 2B1.1(b)(1)(I). The

Defendant qualifies for a three-level reduction in his offense level under § 3E1.1.

If the Court accepts the parties’ recommendation, Defendant’s total offense level will be

25. With a criminal history category of I, the appropriate sentencing range is 57 to 60 months

(the latter being the statutory maximum). This was also the calculation of the Probation Office.

No objections were filed in response to the Pre-Sentence Report.

III. Sentencing Argument

Although the Supreme Court rendered the federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory in

United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), “a sentencing court is still required to ‘consult

[the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.’” United States v. Clark , 434 F.3d

684, 685 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Booker , 543 U.S. at 264). The Supreme Court has directed

district courts to “begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable

Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). The sentencing court,

however, “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.” Nelson v. United States,

555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009). The “Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial

benchmark,” but the sentencing court must also “consider all of the § 3553(a) factors” in

determining the appropriate sentence. Id.; see also Clark , 434 F.3d at 685. Ultimately, the

sentence imposed must meet a standard of reasonableness. See Booker , 543 U.S. at 260-61.



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A. Guidelines Range

The government submits that the Guidelines calculation set forth in the Plea Agreement

(and outlined above) is correct. Each recommendation follows from the known, provable facts

of this bribery scheme. The final offense level should be calculated as 25, and the Court should

find a 57 to 60 month advisory range initially applies here.

B. Section 3553(a) Factors

Nature and Circumstances of the Offense, History and Characteristics of the Defendant

In imposing an appropriate sentence, the Court must consider “the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(1). The sentence imposed needs: “(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to

promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2). In its assessment, a sentencing court is not “[r]equir[ed] . . . to address each factor

on the record,” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006), such that “the record

shows that the § 3553(a) factors were ‘adequately and properly considered.’” Id. (quoting

United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 632 (4th Cir. 2006)). As explained below, the relevant

§ 3553 factors, in combination with the factors set forth in the government’s under seal filing,

counsel in favor a modest period of incarceration for this offense.

First, the bribery scheme here was a serious offense, which involved elements of

deception that show Defendant executed the crime knowing full well of its illegal object. He and

his co-conspirators authorized the payment of more than $1 million in bribes to government



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officials. As the Court is aware, bribery of government officials, whether in the United States or

abroad, is about inducing and corrupting such officials to forsake fair-handed decision-making in

favor of personal greed and surreptitious favoritism. See United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d

332, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2012). The victims are the recipients of government services, citizens and

residents under the jurisdiction of the corrupt officials, and the competitors to those businesses—

including U.S. companies—who chose to conduct business honestly. IAP had competitors, and

the defendant knew other businesses would seek the KSP opportunity. Defendant interfered with

the market, and it can never be known what honest dealing would have produced. Defendant

stepped well over one of the clear lines about doing business with government officials. He

further sent the mistaken message abroad that American businesses do not play by the rules and

will resort to illegal conduct.

The conduct here included Defendant assisting in setting up a shell company to mask

IAP’s role as consultant and eventual bidder; he agreed to contract terms that he knew were

bloated with the kickback payments; and he failed to properly carry out the Phase I survey so

IAP would have sufficient funds to pay the bribes. Defendant did not work alone, but his day-to-

day involvement in Kuwait was such that this scheme would not have succeeded without him.

Although this is Defendant’s first criminal conviction, there is no basis to conclude that

this crime, which spanned several years, was a momentary lapse in judgment or something for

which Defendant could not (or did not) fully contemplate the potential consequences. The

evidence here was that Defendant and his co-conspirators repeatedly made payments under the

pre-planned scheme to funnel money to Kuwaiti Consultant, while using a method set up for no

other reason than to provide distance and cover to IAP and its employees. Defendant was also

familiar with Kuwait, having worked there with this previous employer as well as with IAP, and



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thus familiar with both the opportunities and risks presented by doing business there.

Nevertheless, Defendant did not personally profit from the bribe payments nor was he a rogue

who deceived IAP or his co-workers about what was actually occurring.

Specific and General Deterrence

The government submits that there is little need for specific deterrence in the Court’s

sentence. Defendant is now essentially retired and all indications are that he will never again

hold a position where he would be in a place to make corrupt payments. Defendant also lacks

the means to re-offend, and, more importantly, given his admissions and candor to date appears

to have little appetite for such behavior.

A sentence of incarceration would be consistent with the statutory directive calling for

general deterrence. White collar cases, and in particular crimes of corruption and foreign

bribery, receive significant attention. The government respectfully submits that the message

from a sentencing court in such circumstances must therefore be unequivocal that regardless of a

defendant’s background, business success, or means, felonies warrant a period of incarceration.

See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because economic and

fraud-based crime are ‘more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or

opportunity,’ these crimes are ‘prime candidate[s] for general deterrence.’”) (citation omitted).

Moreover, corruption cases, particularly those involving foreign bribery—where witnesses,

evidence, and facts must be located thousands of miles from the U.S.—are often difficult to

detect, investigate, and prosecute. Deterrence plays a greater role in such matters than simply

punishment—a bribe payor who has been caught and prosecuted will rarely find himself in a

position to re-offend.



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Defendant’s Family and Personal Circumstances

The government recognizes that a below-Guidelines sentence may also be appropriate

here in view of several circumstances unique to this Defendant. The PSR notes that Defendant

provides certain assistance to his wife, who has a significant medical condition, see PSR §§ 57,

61, 77. This is, additionally, Defendant’s first encounter with the criminal justice system, at 69

years of age, and thus a custodial sentence in line with the governments’ recommendation of 12

months and one day is likely to be significant in severity to Defendant.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, and in light of the additional reasons set forth in the

government’s under seal filing, the government respectfully submits that a final sentence of 12

months and one day of imprisonment would be appropriate for the Defendant and this crime.

Respectfully submitted,

Andrew Weissmann Dana J. BoenteChief, Fraud Section United States Attorney

By: /s/ . By: /s/ . Tarek Helou Paul J. NathansonAssistant Chief, Fraud Section Assistant United States AttorneyJames P. McDonald Eastern District of VirginiaTrial Attorney, Fraud Section Counsel for the United States of AmericaUnited States Dept. of Justice United States Attorney’s Office1400 New York Avenue 2100 Jamieson AvenueWashington, DC 20005 Alexandria, VA 22314Tel: (202) 598-2441 Tel.: (703) 299-3700Fax: (202) 616-3511 Fax: (703) 299-3981Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]: [email protected]



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of October, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing

Position of the United States With Respect to Sentencing with the Clerk of Court using the

CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following:

Joseph Alexander MaloufLaw Offices of Joseph A. Malouf244 Main Street, 3rd FloorGaithersburg, MD 20878Tel: 301-587-8484Fax: 301-947-8997Email: [email protected]

A copy has also been sent via email to:

Karen Moran RiffleSenior U.S. Probation [email protected]

/s/ . Paul J. NathansonAssistant United States Attorney


U.S. v. Rama (DOJ Sentencing Memo)

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