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Tanada vs. Tuvera
146 s 446Category: Civil Law Jurisprudence Facts:Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had notbeen published as required by Law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwiseprovided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in
affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court
ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublishedPresidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners
suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of generalapplicability and those which are not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a
comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion
was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And onthe clause unless otherwiseprovided in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that thepublication required therein was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
Issues:(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official
gazette.(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in
full.
Held:(1) The court held that all statute including those of local
application shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed bythe legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose isto inform the public of the content of the laws.
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Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of
Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines
(CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked
with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of
PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project
(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares,
PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This
caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such
lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations
in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
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may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens,
subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make
such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are
the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the publicdomain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
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KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia Case Digest
KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia (239 SCRA 386)
Facts: On June 26,1990, Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos issued memorandumcircular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB, Chairman Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing
provincial buses operators to charge passengers within a range of 15% above and 15%below, the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. On December 5, 1990 privaterespondent PBOAP filed an application for fare rate increase to P0.085 and again it wasreduced to P0.065 per kilometer rate. The application was opposed by the PhilippineConsumer Foundation Inc. that the proposed rate were exorbitant and unreasonable andthat the application contained no allegation on the rate o return on December 14, 1990.Public respondent LTFRB granted the fare rate increase on March 16, 1994. PetitionerKMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, itwas dismissed for lack of merit, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Bus Operators has the power to reduce andincrease fare rated based on the circular order issued by the LTFRB?
Held: Supreme Court held that the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial busoperators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal andinvalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority, Potestasdelegata non delegari protest what has been delegated further delegation of suchpower would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed inthe delegate inandated to discharged it directly. Furthermore rate fixing or making is adelicate and sensitive government function that requires dexterity of judgment and sounddiscretion with the settle goal at arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to bothpublic utility and the public.
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IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
The President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shallhave improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issues:(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the
PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character
of the PNP
Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke
such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
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sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers
and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers
highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that
the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is
no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no
justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of
the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized
in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment
of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes
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permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real
authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian
institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.
Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility
patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
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Executive Secretary vs. The Court of Appeals
[GR 131719, 25 May 2004]
Second Division, Callejo Sr. (J): 3 concur, 1 on official leave
Facts: Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995, took effect on 15 July 1995. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the 7 April
1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian
Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on 17 July 1995, a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l)
and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining The
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, OWWA Administrator, and POEA Administrator from enforcing
the assailed provisions of the law. In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil. alleged that RA
8042 was self-executory and that no implementing rules were needed. It prayed that the court
issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m)
on illegal recruitment, Section 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and Section 9 on venue of
criminal actions for illegal recruitments. On 1 August 1995, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order effective for a period of only 20 days therefrom. After the Executive Secretary,
et al. filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the
amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof 11 other corporations which it
alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary
restraining order enjoining the Executive Secretary, et al. from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i),
Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1
and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of RA 8042. Arco-Phil averred that the provisions of RA 8042
violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution (i.e. discrimination against unskilled workers,
discrimination against licensed and registered recruiters, among others) In their answer to the
petition, the Executive Secretary, et al. alleged, inter alia, that (a) Acro-Phil has no cause of
action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing RA 8042
not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the
Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of
the State. After the respective counsels of the parties were heard on oral arguments, the trial court
issued on 21 August 1995, an order granting Acro-Phils plea for a writ of preliminary injunction
upon a bond of P50,000. Acro-Phil posted the requisite bond and on 24 August 1995, the trial
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of Section 2, subsections
(g) and (i, 2nd par.); Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16; Section 7, subsections
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(a) & (b); Section 8; Section 9; Section 10; pars. 1 & 2; Section 11; and Section 40 of RA 8042,
pending the termination of the proceedings. The Executive Secretary, et al. filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court. They asserted that Acro-Phil is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner
in the trial court, as it was inconceivable how a non-stock and non-profit corporation, couldsustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law. They argued that if, at all, any
damage would result in the implementation of the law, it is the licensed and registered
recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant workers discriminated against who
would sustain the said injury or damage, not Acro-Phil. On 5 December 1997, the appellate court
came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the
Executive Secretary, et al.s motion for reconsideration ofthe said decision. They thus filed a
petition for review on certiorari.
I ssue: Whether ACRO-Phil has locus standi.
Held:PARTLY YES. ACRO-Phil has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in
representation of the 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in the amended
petition. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its
members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An
association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members
are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,
the Court held that standing jus tertii would be recognized only if it can be shown that the partysuing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the right of the third party would be
diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional claims.
Herein, ACRO-Phil filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
for and in behalf of its 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies which are its members,
and which approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing ACRO-Phil to file the said suit for
and in their behalf. The Court note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, ACRO-Phil was
organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of
the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating
and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership;enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as
the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the
manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish
the purposes embodied therein. ACRO-Phil is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its
members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. ACRO-Phil asserts
that the assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights of its members and the officers and
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employees thereof. ACRO-Phil is but the medium through which its individual members seek to
make more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. However,
ACROPHIL has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. The
Court notes that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in
failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies itclaimed to represent, ACRO-Phil failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which
ACRO-Phil filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is deemed
amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.
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KilosBayan v Guingona G.R. No. 113375. May 5, 1994.07/08/2010
0 Comments
Facts:On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it hadgiven the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country's on-line
lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be
submitted not later than 8 November 1993 "for final clearance and approval by
the Chief Executive."
1.5 The Lessor is expected to submit a comprehensive nationwide lottery
development plan ('Development Plan') which will include the game, the
marketing of the games, and the logistics to introduce the games to all the cities
and municipalities of the country within five (5) years.
1.7 The Lessor shall be selected based on its technical expertise, hardware
and software capability, maintenance support, and financial resources. The
Development Plan shall have a substantial bearing on the choice of the Lessor.
The Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least sixty percent (60%) of
its shares owned by Filipino shareholders. . .
1.8 Upon expiration of the lease, the Facilities shall be owned by PCSO
without any additional consideration. 3
The petitioners raise the following points of law to wit:
a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited
from holding and conducting Lotteries 'in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity';
b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional
franchise is required before any person may be allowed to establish and operate
said telecommunications system;
c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60%
Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified
from operating a public service, like the said telecommunications system; andd) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the
Foreign Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate the on-
line Lotto and telecommunications systems."
Considering the above citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the
Berjaya Group "undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%," by
http://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/kilosbayan-v-guingona-gr-no-113375-may-5-1994.htmlhttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/kilosbayan-v-guingona-gr-no-113375-may-5-1994.htmlhttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/kilosbayan-v-guingona-gr-no-113375-may-5-1994.html#commentshttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/kilosbayan-v-guingona-gr-no-113375-may-5-1994.html#commentshttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/kilosbayan-v-guingona-gr-no-113375-may-5-1994.html#commentshttp://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/kilosbayan-v-guingona-gr-no-113375-may-5-1994.html -
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selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.
Issue:In the deliberation on this case on 26 April 1994, the issues are
regarding:
(a) the locus standi of the petitioners, and
(b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1
of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign."
Held:Requirement of standing was waived by the Court. (a)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged
Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and
invalid.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 11 April 1994 is hereby MADE
PERMANENT.
Ratio:A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which itmay, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the
issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed
aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (a)
The actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is
its franchise to hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC
which operates and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight
years.
As may be expected, it will induce in PGMC an active interest and
participation in the success of PCSO that is not expected of an ordinary
detached lessor who gets to be paid his rental feewhether the lessee's
business prospers or not. PGMC's share in the operation depends on its own
performance and the effectiveness of its collaboration with PCSO. Although
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the contract pretends otherwise, PGMC is a co-investor with PCSO in what is
practically, if not in a strictly legal sense, a joint venture.
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Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 159139, 13 January 2004]
En Banc, Panganiban (J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 concurs in result, 2 filed
separate opinions, 1 also filed a separate opinion to which 1 joined, 1 dissents in separate opinion
to which 1 joined
Facts: On 7 June 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to
conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body
to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). On 22 December 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 authorizing
Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the poll
body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and
materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. Initially intending to
implement the automation during the 11 May 1998 presidential elections, Comelec -- in its
Resolution 2985 dated 9 February 1998 -- eventually decided against full national implementation
and limited the automation to the ARMM. However, due to the failure of the machines to read
correctly some automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for
the entire Province of Sulu. In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for
both national and local positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been
acquired for that electoral exercise allegedly because of time constraints. On 29 October 2002,
Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. Itresolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely,
Phase I - Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II - Automated Counting and
Canvassing System; and Phase III - Electronic Transmission. On 24 January 2003, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to
fund the AES for the 10 May 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the
release of an additional P500 million. On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation
to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid." On 11 February 2003, Comelec issued Resolution 5929
clarifying certain eligibility criteria for bidders and the schedule of activities for the project
bidding. Out of the 57 bidders, the Bidding and Awards Committee (BAC) found the Mega
Pacific Consortium (MPC) and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible.
For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BACs Technical Working Group (TWG) and
the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). In its Report on the Evaluation of the
Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of
failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on 15
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April 2003, promulgated Resolution 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission
publicized this Resolution and the award of the project to MPC on 16 May 2003. On 29 May
2003, five individuals and entities (including the Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a
letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to
MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been
conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural
requirements, they sought a re-bidding. In a letter-reply dated 6 June 2003, the Comelec chairman
-- speaking through Atty. Jaime Paz, his head executive assistant -- rejected the protest and
declared that the award "would stand up to the strictest scrutiny." Hence, the present petition for
certiorari.
I ssue: Whether ITF, et. al. have the locus standi to file the case questioning the validity of the
election computerization bidding.
Held:The issues central to the case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest."
As alleged, Comelecs flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified
entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Any taint on the
sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith
in the democratic system of government. Further, the award of any contract for automation
involves disbursement of public funds are in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest
requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly. Truly, our nations
political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004
elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of the case is "a matter of
public concern and imbued with public interest"; in other words, it is of "paramount public
interest" and "transcendental importance." This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal
standing, following the liberal policy of the Court whenever a case involves "an issue of
overarching significance to our society." ITF, et. al.s legal standing should therefore be
recognized and upheld. Moreover, the Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when
there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to
any improper purpose"; or when petitioner(s) seek to restrain respondent(s) from "wasting publicfunds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." Herein, Ma. Corazon M.
Akol, Miguel Uy, Eduardo H. Lopez, Augusto C. Lagman, Rex C. Drilon, Miguel Hilado, Ley
Salcedo, and Manuel Alcuaz Jr., suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was
defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law
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and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain the Commission On Elections; Comelec
Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr.; Comelec Bidding And Award Committee Chairman Eduardo D.
Mejos And Members Gideon De Guzman, Jose F. Balbuena, Lamberto P. Llamas, And
Bartolome Sinocruz Jr.; Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.; And Mega Pacific Consortium from
implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any unwarranted expenditure of public
funds pursuant thereto. Thus, the Court hold that ITF, et. al. possess locus standi.
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Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 148334, 21 January 2004]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion to which 3 join
Facts:
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator
Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001. Following
Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution
84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution 84 called on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously
with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term
each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution 84 further provided that the
Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on
30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results
from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution 01-
005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution 01-
005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6)
years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)
years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. Ralph
Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12th and 13th,respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On 20 June 2001, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo
Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for prohibition, impleading only
COMELEC as respondent. Tolentino and Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest
number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term
seat. Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the nullification of Resolution 01-
005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend
that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed
to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate
in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or
regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates
seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly
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required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that
because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were
no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for
thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a
temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing
any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the
petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's standing to bring the instant
petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally
disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the
issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.
Issue: Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.
Held:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest ina case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act. The requirement of standing, which necessarily
sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to the constitutional mandate that this
Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be
allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Applied strictly, the doctrine of
standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in their
capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino and
Mojica assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized
grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all
the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have Tolentino and Mojica alleged, in
their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition
because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses
of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELECor that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose. On the other hand,
the Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to
give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. The Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of
legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has
adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is
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able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure. The Court accords the same treatment to Tolentino and
Mojica in the present case in their capacity as voters since they raise important
issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in the
petition is likely to arise again.
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BLAS F. OPLE
v.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITOHABITO,ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to
prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis
considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by
civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No.
308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
on two important constitutional grounds,
viz
:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the
rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation
on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the
instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the
heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On
April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling:
YES
Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues
relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case atbar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to
uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power.
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4
As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the
misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the
Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308
have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid
per se
and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves
have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As
early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID)
card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat
representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the
national identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents show theirunswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe formality of
the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters
insistence that wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its
result would be to throttle an importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental
right.
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People vs. Vera
[GR 45685, 16 November 1937]
First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result
Facts:
The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai BankingCorporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The
People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal case 42649)
of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court.
Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the
aforesaid criminal case. The information in the said criminal case was filed with the
CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a
protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the
length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the
bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of
conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and
2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and
with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court,
on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5
years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of
prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed amotion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were
denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18
December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the
petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November
1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the
case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial
court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu
Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he
was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good
conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the
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application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial
of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose
O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the
Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu
Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging,
among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section
2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection
(1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because
section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said
law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April
19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an unduedelegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1,
Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private
prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a
resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime
of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the
latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an
exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a
motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial
was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional
motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were
set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of
counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici
curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6
August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for
the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and
forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for
intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the
last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his
motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene
as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the
postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing
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of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the
motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the
circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was
signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at
this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary
legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in
the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng
for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him,
exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the
judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was
accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the
Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.
Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and
Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.
Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and
the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if
Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose
name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside.
Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds
is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity
of its own laws.
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ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts:Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectivelyfashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from theconstitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said lawthat it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimesalready punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates thefundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses.Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, thepetitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity ofthe law using the facial challenge.
Ruling:On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute
vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficientnotice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vaguenessdoctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only beinvoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, whereinclarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may notinvoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vaguenessdoctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld,not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose maynot be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade thearea of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is
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allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possiblechilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the lawcannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative actsis the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establishthat no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developedfor facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the
established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not beheard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applyingto other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. Onits face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground thatthey might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionallyprotected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imaginedthan real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in theCongress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusionperpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition isdismissed for lacking merit.
ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN
Issues:
1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that wouldinform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties,its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the languageof law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c thepetitioner is alleged to have committed.We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense.Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition ofthe terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overtor criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Lawunconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right tobe informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of hisfundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms areused herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standardsthat men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in itsapplication. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the partiestargeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridleddiscretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of theGovernment muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which isoverbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possibleharm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighedby the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived
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grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimesof plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crimeof plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by theaccused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overtor criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused alwayshas in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, andunless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt thatculpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm ofconstitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accusedagainst conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crimechargedthe element of the offense.
Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is hissubmission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and thatSec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element ofthe crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder
We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements ofplunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for theprosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4
does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but onlyoperated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engenderthat moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accusedbeyond reasonable doubt.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether itis within the power of Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely becausethe constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in aprosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guiltyknowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminatesthe requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void,petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation onS.B. No.733Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the schemeor conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
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criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the actsconstituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must beproved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised PenalCode to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea isan element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent.Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemedto have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include itamong the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their verynature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like ananimal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or hergrowth as a human being.There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance andimplications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political andeconomic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and providefor its poor and underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies thatit is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherentlywrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in aspecial law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly malain se.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as thePlunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, thepetition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit
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UMALI VS. GUINGONA [305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed RegionalDirector of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V.Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. OnAugust 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential
memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of
internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during hisincumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the followingmalfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the
said confidential memorandum, former President authorized the
issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of thepetitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against thelatter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft andCorruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly
informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to
send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, andLiabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet.Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the
PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required
answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGCissued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a primafacie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) chargesagainst petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the
recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from theservice, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under thelaw.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to
Security of Tenure.
(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law
(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/umali-vs-guingona-305-scra-533-gr-no.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/umali-vs-guingona-305-scra-533-gr-no.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/umali-vs-guingona-305-scra-533-gr-no.html -
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government agency and whether the petitioner can raise theissue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion forreconsideration of the trial courts decision.
(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the
charges against the petitioner is still basis for the petitioner'sdismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152
Held:Petitioner maintains that as a career executive serviceofficer, he can only be removed for cause and under the
Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of
the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, hisdismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his
right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful
study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court ofAppeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure,
petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the
PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer andother pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal
revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings
before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that hisprotestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any
factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was aviolation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure.According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of
Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of
tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemicof evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that
he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce
sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. Asregards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was onlyposed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise
for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to lastissue, It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration,the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to
the institution of the criminal case. The charges included inAdministrative Order No. 152 were based on the results ofinvestigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal
charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is
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dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by thepetitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning thefinding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.
However, taking into account the antecedent facts and
circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of itsequity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of thecharges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct
and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of theBureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested
in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the SolicitorGeneral, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No.152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot
be overlooked.
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Arceta vs. Mangrobang [GR 152895, 15 June 2004]
Resolution En Banc, Quisumbing (J): 12 concur, 1 on official leave
Facts: The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with
violating Batas Pambansa 22 in an Information (Criminal Case 1599-CR), alleging inan Information that on or about 16 September 1998, Arceta issued a Regional Bank
check worth P740,000 (postdated 21 December 1998) to Oscar R. Castro payable in
CASH, well-knowing that at the time of issue she did have sufficient funds or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment, and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, Arceta failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to
make arrangement for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after receiving
notice. Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the
Information quashed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned
out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be an exercise in
futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus
go against prevailing jurisprudence. On 21 October 2002, Arceta was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment
should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she
would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed
the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporary
restraining order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP
22). On the other hand, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a chargesheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (MeTC of
Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183), alleging in the Information that on or about
the month of January 2000, Dy issued Prudential Bank Check 0000329230 in the
amount of P2,500,000.00 dated 19 January 2000 in favor of Anita Chua well
knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which
check was subsequently dishonored for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and with
intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount of
P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check has
been dishonored and had not been paid. Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss
the charges against her on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise
believed that any move on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the
charges on said ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a
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petition with the Supreme Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the
said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.
Issue: Whether the Court should render BP22 unconstitutional due to the present
economic and financial crisis, else due to the undue burden made upon the MeTC bybouncing checks cases.
Held: When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the
established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and
controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the
case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdictionover a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due
regard to counsels spirited advocacy in both cases, the Court was unable to agree
that the said requisites have been adequately met. Nor does the Court find the
constitutional question raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy
below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The Court examined the
contentions of Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade us that BP 22
by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even
the thesis of Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to
declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant
consideration. As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there
exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial
system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency
substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial
communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened
immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the allegedinvalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower
courts lies elsewhere.
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LAMBERTO MACIAS, Lorenzo Teves, Fausto Dugenio, Rogaciano Mercado, Mariano
Perdices VS THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and Vicente Gella in his capacity as
National Treasurer
PONENTE: BENGZON(Jose), J
FACTS: (1) Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented fromimplementing Republic Act 3040 that apportions representative districts in this
country. It is unconstitutional and void, they allege, because: (a) it was passed by the
House of Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been
furnished the Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was
approved more than three years after the return of the last census of our
population; and (c) it apportioned districts without regard to the number of
inhabitants of the several provinces. (2) after hearing both parties, court declared
the said RA void.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of RA 3040
HELD: REITERATES resolution declaring that RA 3040 ingfringed the
provision of the Constitution and is therefore VOID.
ANALYSIS: Petitioners as voters and congressman and governor of the aggrieved
provinces have PERSONALITY to SUE. Constitution DIRECTS apportionment of
members of the House of Representatives be according to the member of their
respective inhabitants in their city/province. COURTS MAY declare an
unconstitutional apportionment law VOID.
Republic Act 3040 - AN ACT TO APPORTION REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTSIN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE SECTION ONE
HUNDRED SIXTEEN AND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-THREE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, AS AMENDED.
o Republic Act 3040 manifests that (a) it gave Cebu seven members,while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it
gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population
got three only; (c) Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila
and Cotabato got more than both five members having been assigned
to it; (d) Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while
Davao with 903,224 got three only; (e) Bulacan vs. with 557,691 got
two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and
(f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while
Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two.
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TAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local
Government Code
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of
Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and
the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.
Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite
for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and
contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the
Local Government Code because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living
within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in
the plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only
be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the
governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the
Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial
alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in
the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new
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province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of
the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundarieswould be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of
those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed
province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or
compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is
applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the
people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at
bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.