SWS Gordon Tambe 1NC v. KQ Redzic Weisberger Zong Rd C

8/10/2019 SWS Gordon Tambe 1NC v. KQ Redzic Weisberger Zong Rd C

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1NC Round 3 vs Zong Aff


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Topicality-need a planThe affirmative should defend a topical plan.

A. Explore means to travel in or through an area for the purpose oflearning about it

Oxford 14 (Oxford Dictionaries 2014http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/explore)

exploreSyllabification: explore Pronunciation: /iksplr verb [with object] 1Travel in or

through (an unfamiliar country or area) in order to learn about or familiarize

oneself with it: the best way to explore Icelands northwest figurative the project

encourages children to explore the world of photography More example

sentencesSynonyms 1.1 [no object] (explore for) Search for resources such as mineral

deposits: the company explored for oil More example sentences 1.2Inquire into or

discuss (a subject or issue) in detail: he sets out to explore fundamental questions More

example sentences 1.3Examine or evaluate (an option or possibility): you continue to

explore new ways to generate income

Ocean is the single continuous body of salt water

Science Dictionary 2 The American Heritage Science Dictionary Copyright 2002. Published by Houghton Mifflin. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ocean

ocean ('shn) Pronunciation Key The continuous body of salt water that covers 72

percent of the Earth's surface. The average salinity of ocean water is approximately threepercent. The deepest known area of the ocean, at 11,034 m (36,192 ft) is the Mariana Trench ,

located in the western Pacific Ocean. Any of the principal divisions of this body of water, including

the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans. Our Living Language : The word ocean refers toone of the Earth's four distinct, large areas of salt water, the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian, and Arctic

Oceans. The word canalso mean the entire network of water that covers almost

three quarters of our planet. It comes from the Greek Okeanos, a river believed to

circle the globe.The word sea can also mean the vast ocean covering most of the world. But itmore commonly refers to large landlocked or almost landlocked salty waters smaller than the

great oceans, such as the Mediterranean Sea or the Bering Sea. Sailors have long referred to all

the world's waters as the seven seas. Although the origin of this phrase is not known for certain,

many people believe it referred to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the

Black Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, which were the waters of

primary interest to Europeans before Columbus.

B. Violationthe affirmatives historical re-presentation of the Zong

is physically removed from the single continuous body of salt water

and is not exploration of the ocean

A stasis point is key to debatewe offer the only one rooted in the

resolution.
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/explorehttp://dictionary.reference.com/browse/oceanhttp://dictionary.reference.com/browse/oceanhttp://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/explore


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Shively,Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K [Ruth Lessl, AssistantProf Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p.

182-3)

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree thatbasic terms mustbe shared before they can be resisted and problematized.In fact, they are often very

candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need

of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as

usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that

order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell

us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some

ought to be fully supported.As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless

rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly

some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further

contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they

cannot admit to these implications, forto open the door to some agreements or reasonsas good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of

rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic,

but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Yet

difficulties remain. For and then proceed to debate without attention to further

agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities

premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two

people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any

argument,certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At

the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they

must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing

about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agreeand they do

so simply by entering into debatethat they will not use violence or threats in making

their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good

arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

The impact is decision-making skills - focused deliberation is key to

informed opponents that are adequately prepared to debate.

Steinberg, University of Miami, and Freeley, John Caroll University, 8

[Austin L. and David L., 2/13/2008, Argumentation and Debate: Critical

Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 12thedition,

http://teddykw2.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/argumentation-and-

debate.pdf,p. 43-44]
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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of

opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in

agreement on a fact or value or policy, there is no need for debate; the matter can be

settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to

debate Resolved: That two plus two equals four, because there is simply no

controversy about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate.

Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on

issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions

without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For

example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How

many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal

immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our

communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do

they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak

English?Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not

hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship?

Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do

work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as

human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law

enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their

status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its

borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national

identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite

immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to

be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration.

Participation in this debate is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not

likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and

identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy.To be discussed and

resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understandingresults in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional

distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make

progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.Someone disturbed

by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised

youths might observe, Public schools are doing a terriblejob! They are overcrowded,

and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers

can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms. That same

concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful

decision, such as We ought to do something about this or, worse, Its too complicated

a problem to deal with. Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of

public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger,disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for

their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education

without finding points of clarity or potential solutions.A gripe session would follow.

But if a precise question is posedsuch as What can be done to improve public

education?then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a

focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or morejudgments can be

phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for


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legislative assemblies. The statements Resolved: That the federal government should

implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities and Resolved: That the

state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program more clearly identify specific

ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate.

They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points

of difference.

Critiques get bogged down in theoretical jargon that distract from

efforts for true political changewe must engage in the rhetoric of

policymaking.

McClean Rutgers Philosophy Professor1

[David E., Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American

Philosophy, The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/davi

d_mcclean.htm]

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our

Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to

the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people likethose just mentioned, and

a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to

me hugely more irrelevantthan Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest

policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills

of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I wouldlike to suggest that it is time forAmerican social critics who are enamored with this

group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a

disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my

own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate

theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These

elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the

pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in

various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or

regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such

statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of

death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When

one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately

theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either

philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist

version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's

way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats

from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach tothe problems of its country.

Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as

John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that
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philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced

to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic

formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its

own implicit principle of successful action."

Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural

Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefersand prefers forgood reason.Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves

pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some

of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view

anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the

knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural

Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and

redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e.

disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes,

as I will explain.

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use

if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and

help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determinationto, indeed,

achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and

Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George

Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference

to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create

the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single

yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan

ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be

part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not

seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat

of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to

create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public

intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of

seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are

less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our

flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes

a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho

almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds

the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one

member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"

The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and tradetheory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international

markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics

of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our

arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social

institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to

dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult

and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it


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means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually

function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This

might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who

actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic

assumptionsfrom which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to

listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish

disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

Simulating government discourses allows students to synthesize

theory and fact creating useful real-world knowledge.

Esberg and Sagan, special assistant to the director at New York University's and

Professor at Stanford, Center12

(Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on.International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND Scott

Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for

International Security and Cooperation NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION:

Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy, The Nonproliferation Review,

19:1, 95-108 accessed 5-7-13,

These governmentor quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very

similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational

simulations.Government participants learn about the importance of

understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, andthe necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in

negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted

how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome

bureaucratic myopia, moving beyond theirnormal organizational roles and

thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The

skills of imaginationand the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and

reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example,

simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisisheld in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings

Institution's Saban Center and at Harvard University's Belfer Center, and involving

former US senior officials and regional expertshighlighted the dangers of

misunderstanding foreign governments preferences and misinterpreting their

subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating

team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries,

would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs,

andthe literature on simulationsin education has long emphasized how such

exercises force students to challenge their assumptionsabout how other

governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became


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more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded

on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture

format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly,

simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory,

providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10

These exercises are particularly valuablein teaching international affairs for many of

the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to

grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.11 Simulations have been

used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European

politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12

Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical

factsbut they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and

merely receiving knowledge, students actively research their government's positions

and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly;

simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.


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Animals KThe Aff is simply a pause of violence papers over the ongoing war on thenon-human animalthe end of the world they call for merely brings forththe same plane where every human subject can kill or be killed within the

circuit of anthropocentrism. The Aff ignores the fundamental reversibilityof all violence.Bell (PhD candidate in social philosophy at Binghamton) 11(Aaron, The Dialectic of Anthropocentrism in Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, pg. 173-5)

Freud noted in his well-known comments on what he termed "human megalomania"

that "curiously enough . . . [anthropocentric violence] is still 42foreign to children."

Despite our wretchedness and failings, in a "wrong life" that cannever be lived rightly, there is the hope that we can do better. Thebad facticity of our distorted and distorting relationship to otheranimals and the rest of life is exposed as such by every generationof children who must be broken and indoctrinated, whose innocence

must be sacrificed in order to continue in the logic of sacrifice. In the final aphorism ofMinima Moralia, Adorno holds that "perspectives must be fashioned thatdisplace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts andcrevices, as indigent and distorted43as it will appear one day in themessianic light." It seems that our one conso- lation is that this perspective, at least inrelation to our treatment of other animals, obstinately returns and cannot be entirelysnuffed out for as long as we continue to exist as a species.If we are finally to abandon the self-aggrandizing narrative of anthropocentrismconstructed in the West, we will have to begin by reconceptualizing the differencebetween humans and animals in a way that does not operate under a destructive

exclusionary logic. Both for human beings and for animals, anycessation of violence under the current logic is only a momentary

deferment, an armistice but never a peace. Even moments ofapparent tenderness and compassion become grotesquesymptoms of a corrupted order so long as this way of life ispermitted to stand.As Horkheimer and Adorno observe in Dia- lectic ofEnlightenment, "the fascists' pious love of animals, nature, and children is the lust of thehunter. The idle stroking of children's hair and animal pelts signifies: this hand candestroy. It tenderly fondles one victim before fell- ing the other, and its choice hasnothing to do with the victims guilt. The caress intimates that all are the same beforepower." The Nazi officers arbitrary choice of who would survive (for another day) andwho would be killed demonstrates the same terrible eitelkeit of Hegel's radical evil

individual, who reduces every decision to a choice of "this or that? The arbitrarynature of the decision is an exercise of power in its rawest form,

and an uncanny reminder of our contemporary violence towardsanimals. For the same perverse arbitrariness at the core of the SSofficers decision holds sway in a society which dooms millions ofanimals to unimaginable suffering while pampering millions ofothers as "pets."Such interludes of apparent nonviolence are merely pauses betweenatrocities: as Levinas puts it, "the peace of empires issued from war rests on war.[Peace] does not restore to the alienated beings their lost identity." War on the other,radicalized in the form of fascism, shows that "not only modern war but every war


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employs arms that turn against those who wield them. It establishes an order fromwhich no one can keep his distance." There is no safe ground for the "authentically"human individualbecause there can be no authentic anthropocentrism, just as Adornoand Horkheimer claim that "there is no authentic anti-semitism." They write: "Just as . . .

the victims are interchangeable: vagrants, Jews, Protestants, Catholics . . .each of them can replace the murderer, in the same blind lust for

killing, as soon as he feels the power of representing the

norm."The Jew in Auschwitz, the Palestinian in the West Bank, theChristian in Armenia, the enslaved African in the American South,women everywherethey all have been reduced to the status ofanimal and they all could do the same to others. We all can be reduced tothe "animal."

The Aff obscures the way the originary Human/Animal divide made civilsociety, chattel slavery and coloniality possiblePugliese (an Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, Sydney) 13(Joseph, State Violence and the Execution of Law, pg. 38-40)

In her The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery, Marjorie Spiegel asks the

provocative question: Comparing speciesism with racism? At first glance, manypeople might feel that it is insulting to compare the suffering ofnon-human animals to that of the human. In fact, in our [Western]society, comparison to an animal has come to be a slur.17 In herForeword to Spiegels book, Alice Walker notes that: It is a comparison that,even for those of us who recognize its validity, is a difficult one to face.Especially if we are the descendants of slaves. Or of slave owners .Or of both. Especially so if we are also responsible in some way forthe present treatment of animals.18 Spiegel proceeds to stage a largely

descriptive yet important articulation of the dreaded comparison by evidencing howthe domination of animals . . . was in many cases used as a prototype for the

subjugation of blacks.19 She unfolds a history of the manner in which Westernsocieties, from the sixteenth century onwards, developed systems of humanslavery that closely paralleled humans treatment of animals, including the use of shackles, auction, branding, stalls and pens ,and so on. As I remarked above, the issue of slavery, as constitutive in thedevelopment of biopolitical formations founded on racism, is almost entirely absent fromFoucaults genealogical account. Yet, in his arguing that the pressure exerted by thebiological on the historical had remained very strong for thousands of y ears, Foucaultpresents an alternative point of departure for the critical study and elaboration of hisconcept of biopolitics. In pursuing this anachronic perspective on biopolitics I am, ineffect, attempting to flesh out an occluded aspect of the historical conditions of theemergence of biopolitics. Derrida identifies in Aristotles Politics the articulation of azoo-politics that effectively opens the debate on biopolitics;20 Roberto Espositogestures to this prehistory of biopolitics when he posits the question of the relation ofmodernity with its pre, but also that of the relation with its post. 21 As a fundamentally colonial formation of power, premised on the pivotal role of racismin governing subject peoples and assigning them positions on racialized hierarchies oflife that spanned the right to genocidal extermination (of Indigenous peoples) and of

enslavement (of black Africans), biopolitics is informed by a parallelhistory of speciesism that extends back to the very establishment


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of human civil and political societyas premised on animalenslavement(domestication). Derrida traces the contours of this founding relation: The socialization of human culture goes hand in hand with . . . thedomestica- tion of the tamed beast: it is nothing other than thebecoming-livestock[devenir- btail] of the beast. The appropriation, breaking-in,and domestication of tamed livestock (das zahme Vieh) are human socialization . . .

There is therefore neither socialization, political constitution, norpolitics itself without the principle of domestication of the wildanimal. . . Politics supposes livestock.22

The violence that this terse supposition enables politics supposes livestockis what Iwill discuss in some detail in my discussion of those detainees inscribed within the

biopolitical trajectories of extraordinary rendition (Chapter 4). Politics supposeslivestock precisely as it also supposes the enslavement of animalsand the constitution of a biopolitical hierarchy: for the ox, writesAristotle, is the poor mans slave; and in Aristotles zoo-politics, the enslavedanimal comes last in an ascending sequence that includes wife, house and, at the apex,

man.23 The political ramifications of this historical enslavement of animals can befurther elabo- rated: Not only did the domesticationof animals provide themodel and inspiration for human slavery and tyrannical government,Charles Patterson writes, but it laid the groundwork for westernhierarchicalthinking and European and American racial theories thatcalled for conquest and exploitation of lower races, while at the sametime vilifying them as animals so as to encourage and justify theirsubjugation.24 Jim Mason amplifies Pattersons thesis, arguing, in his interlinkingof the enslavement of animals with larger colonial formations of power, that theestablishment of agri-culture operated as a license for conquest.25The Latin etymology of the terms colony and colonial coloniaevidences themodalities of power over life that intertwine the concept of a farm and a public

settlement of Roman citizens in a hostile or newly conquered country.26 In theprehistory of biopolitical power, the expropriated space of a conquered country isinscribed with the genocidal extermination of the useless wild animals and theenslavement of those that can be put to human use; in other words, there is preciselywhat Foucault terms the biopolitical power to foster life or disallow it to the point of

death.27 This colonial move, then, is informed by a biopolitics ofspeciesism that determines who will live and who will die accordingto an anthropocentric hierarchy of lifeand its attendant values of, amongstother things, economic productivity. The non-human animal is, in this prehistoricalmoment, marked by an ineluctable fungibility that pre-dates the transference of thissame attribute to the human slave.In figuring forth her compelling thesis that it is fungibility that characterizes the life anddeath of the black slave, Saidya Hartman delineates its complex dimensions:

The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both figurativeand literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave that is, thejoy made possible by virtue of the replaceability in inter- changeability endemic to thecommodityand by the extensive capacities of property that is, the augmentation ofthe master subject through his embod- iment in external objects and persons.28In the colonial prehistory of biopolitics, non-human animals are branded as eithervermin to be exterminated so that, in Foucaults titular phrase, society can bedefended or, alternatively, as fungible objects that are infinitely replaceable andexchangeable. The anthropocentrism of the master subject augments the sense of


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embodied ownership over the enslaved animal while legitimating their right over itslife/death. The archaic development of colonial regimes of governance over the life ofanimals pivots on a series of biopolitical technologies that include capture, enclosure,harness, enforced labour, controlled breeding, castration, branding and auctioning atmarkets. All of these animal technologies are invested, in their ancient inception,29 withthe biopolitical power of regularization, and it . . . consists in making live and lettingdie.30 Moreover, all of these animal technologies will effectively be transposed toregimes of human slavery: the management of livestock, Mason notes, operated as

a model for the management of slaves.31 Biopolitical technologies of animalenslavement were effectively drawn upon in the development ofmodern slave plantations, with programs of captive breeding/rapeof black women by either the master or his overseers, confinedspaces for quartering, controlled food rations, auctioning atmarkets and the use of a range of disciplinary technologies thewhip, the branding iron, shackles and the coffle, that train of slavesor beasts driven along together;32 the use of the conjunction or testifies to asedimented history that binds animals to slaves. Europes prehistorical animal-slave practices are what will be later exported out to the colonies in

the establishment of human slave plantations. If, as Cary Wolfe contends,the practices of modern biopolitics forged themselves in the common subjection andmanagement of the factical existence of both humans and animals not in the least,in the practices and disciplines of breeding, eugenics, and high-efficiency killing33 then the co-articulation between the animal farm and the slave plantation offers anotherhistorical dimension of the biopolitical formation of power.

Reject the affirmatives speciesism Only an absolute refusal to move thelines of violence can prevent the extinctionPugliese (an Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, Sydney) 13(Joseph, State Violence and the Execution of Law, pg. 95-7)

In the pumpkin patch, the hooded detainees are compelled to embodythe strange hybrid of vegetable-animal life. They fulfill, in a grotesque fashion,Martin Heideggers euro-anthropocentric vision of the hierarchy of entities that inhabitthe world: man is not merely a part of the world but is also master and servant of theworld in the sense of having world. Man has world. The hierarchy of life, after thisimperial ground-clearing opening statement, follows: [1] the stone (material object) isworldless; [2] the animal is poor in the world; [3] man is world-forming.20 In thecontextof Guantnamos pumpkin patch, the masters of the world govern their militarizeddomain and all its entities according to the biopolitical hierarchy of life. As masters ofthe world, they are indeed world-forming, as they shape and constitute the lives, deathsand realities of their subjugated subjects. In the pumpkin patch, the detainee, thatstrange hybrid that has been reduced to animal-vegetable, is both worldless (in the

absolute denial through shackling, hooding, manacling and goggling of his world-forming sensorium) and, once dispatched to his cage, entirely poor in the world, as heis stripped naked and denied the most rudimentary of things essential to a liveable

existence. Critically, the solution to this regime of violence is not toshufflethe categories of life up or down the biopolitical hierarchy as this merelyreproduces the system while leaving intact the governing power of thebiopolitical cut and its attendant violent effects. Reflecting on the possibility ofdisrupting this biopolitical regime and its hierarchies of life, Agamben writes: in ourculture man has always been the result of a simultaneous division and articulation of


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the animal and the human, in which one of the two terms of the operation was what was

at stake in it. To render inoperative the machine that governs ourconception of man will therefore mean no longer to seek newmoreeffective or authenticarticulations, but rather to show the centralemptiness, the hiatus thatwithin manseparates man and animal, andto risk ourselves in this emptiness: the suspension of the suspension.21 Precisely

because everything is always already at stake in the continued mobilization of

biopolitical caesurae, the seeking of new articulations of life that will bevalorized as more authentic will merely reproduce the machine withouthaving eliminated its capacity for violence as ensured by the re-articulation of the biopolitical cut. Looking back at the biopolitical infrastructureof the Nazi state, one can clearly see the imbrication of ecology, the regime of animalrights, and the racio- speciesist branding of Jews as collectively exemplifying thedangers of seeking more authentic articulations of animals and humans that arepredicated on the biopolitical division and its capacity for inversions and recalibrationswhile leaving the violent order of the biopolitical regime intact. The Nazis effectivelycalled for a more authentic relation to nature (blood and soil) that was buttressed byanimal rights (Reich Animal Protection laws) and the rights of nature (Reich Law on the

Protection of Nature).22 Animals and nature were thereby recalibrated up the speciesistscale at the expense of Jews. Deploying the violence of racio- speciesism, the Nazisanimalized Jews as rats, vermin and other low life forms, situated them at the bottomof the biopolitical hierarchy, and then proceeded to enact the very cruelty andexterminatory violence (cattle car transport, herding in camps replicating stockyardsand the industrialized killing procedures of animal slaughterhouses) that they hadoutlawed against animals. The Nazi state also exemplifies the manner in which theregime of (animal) rights can be perfectly accommodated within the most genocidalforms of state violence. This is so, precisely because the prior concept of human rightsis always-already founded on the human/animal biopolitical caesura and its asymmetryof powerotherwise the very categories of human and animal rights would fail toachieve cultural intelligibility. The paternal distribution of rights to non-human animalsstill pivots on this asymmetrical a priori. Even as it extends its seemingly benevolentregime of rights and protections to animals, rights discourse, by disavowing this violent

a priori, merely reproduces the species war by other means. In order to short-circuitthis machine, a deconstructive move is needed, a move that refuses toparticipate in the mere overturning of the binarized hierarchy, for example: animal >human, and that effectively displaces the hierarchy by disclosing the conceptual aporias

that drive it. The challenge is to proceed to inhabit the hiatus, to run the riskof living the emptinessof an atopical locus that is neither animal norhuman. This non-foundational locus is the space that Agambendesignates as the open, marked by the reciprocal suspension of thetwo terms [human/animal], something for which we perhaps have noname and which is neither animal nor [hu]man [and that] settles inbetween nature and humanity. Critically, the reciprocal suspension articulates

the play between the two terms, their immediate constellation in a non-coincidence.23In naming their constellation in a non-coincidence, Agamben enunciates the possibilityof a Levinasian ethics that refuses the anthropocentric assimilation of theOther/animal/nature into the imperialism of the Same/human. The urgent necessity ofinstigating the move to render inoperative this anthropocentric regime is not incidentalto the violent biopolitical operations of the state. On the contrary, state violence is viru-lently animated by the logic of the biopolitical caesura and its anthropological machinewhich produce[s] the human through the suspension and capture of the inhuman.24

The anthropocentrism that drives this biopolitical regime ensures that


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whatever is designated as non-human-animal life continues to bebranded not only as expendable and as legitimately enslaveable but asthe quintessential unsavable figure of life.25 The aporetic force that drives thisregime is exposed with perverse irony in one of the entries of the al-Qahtaniinterrogation log, which documents an interrogator reading to the detainee in the courseof his torture session two quotes from the book What Makes a Terrorist and Why?: The

second quote pointed out that the terrorist must dehumanize their victims and avoidthinking in terms of guilt or innocence. In the context of the post-9/11 USgulags, this biopolitical regime of state terror is what guarantees theproduction of captive life that can be tortured with impunity and that,moreover, enables its categoriza- tion as unsavable.Once captive life isthus designated, it can be liquidated without compunction without havingto think in terms of guilt or innocence.


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Mourning KMourning is a paradox - The 1ACs call to endless re-presentation of

the Zongs events further entrenches the destructive violence they

isolate through a kind of psychic plagiarism that seeks to assimilate

the other into the narcissistic self

Kirkby, 06 (Joan, Department of Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University,Remembrance of the Future: Derrida on Mourning, Social Semiotics Vol. 16, No. 3,

September 2006, http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=df402c47-

70d2-4356-80fc-d0a1d8f6c5dd%40sessionmgr4002&vid=2&hid=4206, AW)

Derrida also recalls de Mans insistence on the performative structure of the text in

general as promise (1986, 93), and goes on to argue that the essence of speech isthe promise, that there is no speaking that does not promise, which at the same time

means a commitment toward the future through . . . a speech act and a commitment to

keep the memory of the said act, to keep the acts of this act (1986, 97). He also reflects

upon the significance of the wordaporiain de Mans last texts, in which an absence ofpath gives or promises the thinking of the path and provokes the thinking of

what still remains unthinkableor unthought(Derrida 1986, 132). The aporia

provokes a leap of memory and a displacement of thinking which leads toward a

new thinking. Aporicity promises an other thinking, an other text, the future of

another promise. All at once the impasse . . . becomes the most trustworthy, reliable

place or moment for reopening a question . . . which remains difficult to think.

(Derrida 1986, 132/133) The aporia engenders, stimulates, makes one write,

provokes thought. . .. There is in it the incalculable order of a wholly other: the

coming or the call of the other(Derrida 1986, 137). The aporia of de Mans death

has provoked Derridas re-reading of de Man and a re-casting of the process of

mourning. These ideas from de Man are then segued into the psychoanalytic model ofmourning to produce what I would argue is a new, intellectually and emotionally nuanced

model of mourning,a model wherein healthy psychic functioning depends neither

on a refusal to mourn or abandoning the dead. The Derridean model offers a respect

for the (dead) Other as Other; it allows agency to the mourner in the possibility of

an ongoing creative encounter with the Other in an externalising, productive,

future-oriented memory; it emphasises the importance of acting out the entrusted

responsibility, which is their legacy to us; it upholds the idea of community and

reminds us of our interconnectedness with our dead. And in a sort of irreligious

religiosity, it enables us to conceive of a bond greater than ourselves, the far

away within us. To summarise then. First, with regard to mourning,Derrida

privileges the process of incorporation, which classical psychoanalysis has beenseen as the pathological response to loss. He does this essentially because

incorporation acknowledges the other as other, while theso-called normal process

of mourning (introjection) merely assimilates the other into the self in a kind of

psychic plagiarism. Second, however, it is not an unreconstructed incorporation

that he recommends; he makes two important theoretical moves. In the distinction

between memory as interiorisation (erinnerung) and memory as a giving over to thinking

and inscription (gedachtnis), he appropriates gedachtnis to integrate with incorporation.
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So that what we internalise upon the death of the other is their dynamic

engagements with the other*/their modus vivendi, their animating principle, their

dialogue with the world. We do not have to give them up*/we do not murder them

and find a substitute for the dead are irreplaceable . Third, the other important thing

about gedachtnis is that it is an externalising memory; it is linked with technical or

mechanical inscription, with writing and rhetoric. It is productive; it leads to external

engagement in an ongoing dialogue with the other. It is, as he says, a

remembrance of the future(Derrida 1986, 29). In conclusion, Derrida asks What is

love, friendship, memory?

The Alternative is to deconstruct the 1AC with an unconditional ethic

to the Other in the form of an aporiathis is the only way to embrace

the paradox of mourning and prevent total-interiorization and

introjection that lead to violence towards the Other

Derrida, 86 (Jacques, Professor of the Humanities at the University of CaliforniaIrvine, Mnemosyne, in Memoires for Paul de Man, translated by Cecile Lindsay, 1986,

its a book, AW)

Everything remains in me or in us,between us, upon the death of the other.

Everything is entrusted to me; everything is bequeathed or given to us, and first of all to

what I call memory-to the memory, the place of this strange dative. All we seem to have

left is memory since nothing appears able to come to us any longer, nothing is coming or

to come, form the other to the present. This is probably true, but is this truth true, or true

enough? The preceding sentences seem to suppose a certain clarity in respect to what

we mean by in me, in us, death of the other, memory, present, to come, and so

on. But still more light (plus de lumiere is needed. The me or the usof which we

speak then aris and are delimited in the way that they are only through this

experience of the other, and of the other as other who can die, leaving in me or in

us this memory of the other. This terrible solitudewhich is mine or ours at the deathfo the other is what constitutes that relationship to self which we call me, us,

between us, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, memory. The possibility of

death happens, so to speak, before these different instances, and makes them

possible.Or, more precisely, the possibility of the death of the other as mine or ours in-

forms any relations to the other and the finitude of memory. We weep precisely over

what happens to us when everything is entrusted to the sole memory that is in me or

in us. But we must also recall, in another turn of memory, that the within me and

the within us do notarise or appear before this terrible experience.Or at least

not before its possibility, actually felt and inscribed in us, signed. The within me and

the within us acquire their sense and their bearing only by carrying within

themselves the death and the memory of the other; of an other who is greater thanthem,greater than what they or we can bear, carry, or comprehend, since we then

lament being no more than memory, in memory.Which is another way of

remaining inconsolable before the finitude of memory. We know, we knew, we

rememberbefore the death of the loved one-that being-in-me or being-in-us is

constituted out of the possibility of mourning. We are only ourselves from the

perspective of this knowledge that is older than ourselves; and this is why I say

that we being by recalling this to ourselves: we come to ourselves through this


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memory of possible mourning. In other words this is precisely the allegory, this

memory of impossible mourning. Paul de man would perhaps say: of the

unreadability of mourning. The possibility of the impossible commands here the

whole rhetoric of mourning, and describes the essence of memory. Upon the

death of the other we are given to memory, and thus to interiorization, since the

other, outside us, is now nothing. And with the dark light of this nothing, we learn that

the other resists the closure of our interiorizing memory.With the noting of this

irrevocable memory. With the nothing of this irrevocable absence, the other appears as

other, and as other for us, upon his death or at least in the anticipated possibility of

a death, since death constitutes and makes manifest the limits of a me or an us who are

obliged to harbor something that is greater and other then them; something outside of

within them. Memory and interiorization: since Freud this is how the normal work of

mourning is often described. It entails a movement in which an interiorizing

idealization takes in itself or upon itself the body and voice of the other, the

others visage and person, ideally and quasi-literally devouring them. This

mimetic interiorization is not fictive; it is the origin of fiction, of apocryphal

figuration. It takes place in a body. Or rather, it makes a place for a body, a voice,

and a soul which, although ours, did not exist and had no meaning before this

possibility that one must always begin by remembering, and whose trace must be

followed. II faut, one must: it is the law, that law of the (necessary) relation of Being to

law. We can only live this experience in the form of an aporia: the aporia of

mourning and of prosopopeia, where the possible remains impossible. Where

success fails. And where faithful interiorization bears the other and constitutes

him in me(in us), at once living and dead. It makes the other no longer quite

seems to be the other, because we grieve for him and bear him in us , like an

unborn child, like a future. And inversely, the failure succeeds: an aborted

interiorization is at the same time a respect for the other as other, a sort of tender

rejection, a movement of renunciation which leaves the other alone, outside, over

there, in his death, outside of us.


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Case1. Past-oriented approaches towards whiteness neglect the way

future discourse affects the presentfuturity is key to full awareness

Baldwin, 11(Andrew, Co-Director of the Institute of Hazard at the University of

Durhams Department of Geography, Whiteness and futurity: Towards a researchagenda, Progress in Human Geography 2012, originally published August 3, 2011,

http://phg.sagepub.com/content/36/2/172, AW)

My argument is that a past-oriented approach to accounting for geographies of

whiteness often neglects to consider how various forms of whiteness are shaped

by discourses of futurity. This is not to argue that a historicist approach to

conceptualizing white geographies is wrongheaded; the past continues to be a crucial

time-space through which to understand whiteness. It is, however, to argue that such a

past-focused orientation obscures the way the category of the future is invoked in

the articulation of whiteness. As such, any analysis that seeks to understand how

whitenesses of all kinds shape contemporary (and indeed past) racisms operates withonly a partial understanding of the time-spaces of whiteness. My argument is that we

can learn much about whitenesses and their corresponding forms of racism by

paying special attention to the ways in which such whitenesses are constituted by

futurity. I have offered some preliminary remarks on how we might conceptualize

geographies of whiteness qua futurity, but these should only be taken as starting points.

Much more pragmatically, what seems to be required is a fulsome investigation into the

way the future shapes white geographies. What might such a project entail? For one,

geographers would do well to identify whether and how the practice of governing

through the future inaugurates new and repeats old forms of whiteness. It would

also be worth comparing and contrasting how the future is made present in various

dialectical accounts of whiteness.For instance, what becomes of whiteness when

understood through the binary actual-possible as opposed to an actual-virtual

binary, which has been my main concern? Alternatively, what becomes of the

category of whiteness if it is shown to be constituted by a future that has no

ontology except as a virtual presence?And, perhaps more pressing, how might

whiteness be newly politicized? Futurity provides a productive vocabulary for

thinking about and challenging whiteness.It does not offer a means of overcoming

white supremacy, nor does it provide white people with a normative prescription for living

with their whiteness guilt- or worry-free. Futurity is, however, a lacuna in the study of

whiteness both in geography and outside the discipline, and thisalone suggests

the need to take it seriously. But equally, and perhaps more urgently, there is the

need to study whiteness and futurity given how central the future is to

contemporary governance and politics. Indeed, at a moment when the futurefeatures prominently in both political rhetoricin his inaugural speech, Obama

implores America to carry forth that great gift of freedom and [deliver] it safely to future

generations and everyday life, how people orient themselves towards the future

is indelibly political. The future impels action. For Mann (2007), it is central to

interest. For Thrift (2008), value increasingly arises not from what is but from what

is not yet but can potentially become, that is fromthe pull of the future. Attention to

whiteness and futuritymay at minimum enable us to see more clearly the extent to
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which the pull of whiteness into the future reconfigures what is to be valued in the

decades ahead.

2. The affs attempt at continued re-presentation of the Zong is a futile

attempt of remembering that will only eclipse over the place of the

deadHartman, 02 (Saidiya, professor of African American literature and history atColumbia University, The Time of Slavery, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 101, 4, Fall

2002, Duke University Press, EBSCO Publishing, AW)

At the portal that symbolized the finality of departure and the impossibility of reversion, the tensions that reside in

mourning the dead are most intensely experienced. Mourning is both an expression of loss that

tethers us to the dead and severs that connection or overcomes loss by assuming

the place of the dead. The excesses of empathy lead us to mistake our return with

the captives'. To the degree that the bereaved attempt to understand this space of death by placing themselves in

the position of the captive, loss is attenuated rather than addressed, and the phantom

presence of thedeparted and the dead eclipsed by our simulated captivity."You are back!"

We are encouraged to see ou rselves as Lhe vessels for the captive's return; we stand in the ancestor's shoes. Weimaginatively wi t ness the crimes of the past and cry for those victimized -the enslaved, the ravaged, and the

slaughtered . And the obliterative assimilation of empathy enables us to cry for ou rselves, too. As we remember those

ancestors held in Lhe dungeons, we can't bul think of our own dishonored and devalued l ives and t he unrealized

aspirations and the broken promises of abolition, reconstruction, and the civil rights movemen t. The i n transigence of our

seemi ngly eternal secondclass status propels us Lo make recou rse to stories of origi n, unshakable explanatory

narratives, and sites of inju ry-the land where our blood has been spilt -asif some essen liaJ ingredien t of ourselves can

be recovered at the castles and forts tha t dot the western coast of Africa, as if the location of the wound

was itself the cure, or as if the weight of dead generations could alone ensure our

progress. lronica ll}1 the decla ration "You are back!" undermines the very violence that these memorial s assiduouslywork to present by claimi ng that the tourist'sexcursion is theancestor'sreturn.Given this, what does the journey back bode

for the present? What is surprisi ng is Lhat despite the emphasis placed on remembrance and

return,these ceremonies are actually unable to articulate in any decisive fashion , other than the

reclamatio n or a true identity, what remembering yields.While the journey back is the vehicle of remedy,recovery, and sel f-reckoni ng. the question begged is what exactly is the redressive work

actualized by remembrance.Is not the spectacular abjection of slavery reproduced

in facile representations of the horrors of the slave trade? What ends are served

by such representations, beyond remedying the failures of memory through the dramatic reenactment ofcaptivity and the incorporation of the dead? The most disturbing aspect of these reenactments is the suggestion that the

rupture of the Middle Passage is neither irreparable nor irrevocable but bridged by the tourist who acts as the vessel for

the ancestor. Inshort, the captive finds his redemption in the tourist.

3. The affs focus on telling the history of the Zong failsat

transforming the present and fully representing the full atrocity of

slavery with just simulation

Hartman, 02 (Saidiya, professor of African American literature and history atColumbia University, The Time of Slavery, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 101, 4, Fall

2002, Duke University Press, EBSCO Publishing, AW)

The point here is not to condemn tourism. but Lo rigorously examine the politics of memory

and question whether "working through" is even an appropriate mod el for our

relationship with history. In Representing the Holocaust, Dominick LaCapraopts for working th rough askind of middle road between redemptive totaJiza tion and the im possibility of representa tion and suggests that a degree

of recovery is possible i n the con text or a responsible working throu gh of the past. He asserts thati n coming


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to terms with trauma, there is the possibility of retrieving desirable aspects of the

past that might be used in rebuilding a new life.23 While LaCapra's argu men ts are persuasive,

I wonder to what degree the backward glance can provide us with the vision to

build a new life? To what extent need we rely on the past in transforming the

presentor, as Marx warned , can we on ly draw ou r poetry from the fu ture and not the past? 2 Here I amnot

advanci ng the impossi bil ity of representa tion or declaring theend of history. but wondering aloud whether

the image of enslaved ancestors can transform the present. I ask this question in order to

discoveragain the political and ethical relevance of the past. If the goa l is something more than

assimilating the terror of the past into our storehouse of memory, the pressing question is, Why need we

remember? Does the emphasis on remembering and working through the past expose our insatiable

desires for curatives, healing, and anything else that proffers the restoration of

some prelapsarian intactness? Or is recollection an avenue for undoing history? Can rememberingpotentially enable an escape from the regularity of terror and the routine of violence constitutive of black life in the United

States? Or is it that remembering has become the only conceivable or viable form of political agency? Usually the

injunction to remember insists that memory can prevent atrocity, redeem the

dead, and cultivate an understanding of ourselves as both individuals and

collective subjects. Yet, too often, the injunction to remember assumes the ease of

grappling with terror, representing slavery's crime,and ably standing in theother's shoes. I am not proscribing representations of the Middle Passage, particularly since it is the absence of apublic history of slavery rather than the saturation of representa tion that engenders these com pulsive performances, but

instead poin ting lo the danger of facile invocations of captivity, sound bites about the

millions lost, and simulations of the past that substitute for critical engagement.

4. Haunting metaphors reassert colonial powerperpetuate a

dancing around the wound effect that trades off with mobilization for

change and strip the victims of agency and dignity

Cameron, 08 (Emilie, Department of Geography at Queens University, Indigenousspectrality and the politics of postcolonial ghost stories, Cultural Geographies, July 11,

2008, http://cgj.sagepub.com/content/15/3/383,AW)

What does it mean, then, to be haunted in a decolonizing settler colonylike BritishColumbia? Who is haunted in these stories, and who or what is doing the haunting? What kind of future might these

hauntings demand? Do they signal, as Derrida intended, a recognition of the always unfinished

and unfinishablein our relation to the present and past and, by extension, a sense of generosity and hospitality

towards ghosts? Or do they, as Sarah Ahmed55 has argued in relation to white guilt in postcolonial Australia,

constitute yet another self-referential engagement with the colonial past, in which

the experiences and desires of the settler occlude consideration of other desires

and possibilities? This is the reason formy wariness in the face of haunting tropes,

for I fear that postcolonial ghost stories risk perpetuating a kind of endless dancing

around a wound56 that Daniel David Moses identifies among liberal, left-leaning Canadians, anxiously

replaying their complicity in an ugly colonial past while neglecting to mobilizeeffectively for change in the present. The ghostsof the Stein do not seem to me to

representthe Nlakapamux with very much dignity or agency, and surely any postcolonial trope we

might mobilize ought at the very least to figure Indigenous peoples with dignity. In

Haraways terms, it seems to me that haunting has the potential to function as a particularly

deadly trope, one that requires the death and immaterialityof Indigenous peoples to makean e/affective claim on non-Indigenous British Columbians. It is a trope within which todays living descendents of the

generalized spirits haunting the Stein, people like Chiefs Leonard Andrew and Ruby Dunstan, seem to have no place: As

the direct descendents of those aboriginal peoples who have inhabited, shared, sustained, and been sustained by the
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Stein Valley for tens of thousands of years down to the present, our authority in this watershed is inescapable Under the

cooperative authority of our two bands we will maintain the Stein Valley as a wilderness in perpetuity for the enjoyment

and enlightenment of all peoples.57 And so, at a time when (primarily non-Aboriginal) geographers, among others, seem

to have taken an interest in ghostly matters, it seems critical to acknowledge that ghostliness is

a politicized state of being. Many scholarshave interpreted these politics as a function of visibility

that is, they suggest that the uncovering and exposure of the ghosts of the past is an

emancipatory act. In many cases this may be true, butI would suggest that there is also apolitics of vision involved in these hauntologies. Those who see and imagine

ghosts are as deserving of interrogation as the ghosts themselves, and the ghosts

of the Steinare profoundly self-referential. And so while the spectral does seem to offer a

means of conceptualizing that which we cannot easily see , even of giving some voice to

colonial traumas, confining the Indigenous to the ghostly also has the potential to re-

inscribe the interests of the powerful upon the meanings and memories of place.

5. The 1ACs focus on the events of transatlantic slavery prevents

change and uses suffering narratives to distract from emancipation

Hartman, 02 (Saidiya, professor of African American literature and history at

Columbia University, The Time of Slavery, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 101, 4, Fall2002, Duke University Press, EBSCO Publishing, AW)

History that hurts. The dungeon provides no redemption. Reckoning with our

responsibility to the dead cannot save them. The victor has already won . It is not

possible to undo the past.So, to what end do we conjure up the ghost?Of what

use is an itinerary of terror? Does it provide little more than evidence of what we

cannot change, or quell the uncertainty and doubt regarding millions Jost and u

nknown? The debate still rages as lo how many were transported to the Americas, killed

in the raids and wars Lhat supplied the trade, perished on the long journey to the coast,

committed suicide, died of dehydration during the Middle Passage. or were beaten or

worked to death-22 million. 30 million, 60 million, or more? 21 Isn't it enough to know

that for each captive who survived the ordea l of captivity and season ing, at least one

did not? At best, the backdrop of this defeat makes visible the diffuse violence and the

everyday routines of domination, which continue to characterize black life but are

obscured by their everydayness. The normative character of ter ror insures i ts i

nvisibility; i t defies detection behind rational categories l ike crime,povert y, and

pathology. ln other words, the necessity to underscore the centrality of the event.

defined here in terms of captivity, deportation , and social death, is a symptom of

the difficulty of representing "terror as usual."The oscillation between then and now

distills the past four hundred years into one definitive moment.And, at the same

time, the still-unfolding narrative of captivity and dispossession exceeds the

discrete parameters of the event. In itemizing the long list of violations, are we any

closer to freedom, or do such litanies only confirm what is feared-history is aninjury that has yet to cease happening? Given the irreparable nature of this event,

which Jamaica Ki ncaid describes as a wrongthat can be assuaged only by the

impossible, that is, by undoing the past. is acting out the past the best approximation of

work ing through available to us? By suffering the past are we better able to grasp

hold of an elusive freedom and make it substantial? Is pain the guarantee of

compensation?Beyond con templating injury or apportioning blam e, how can this

encounter with the past fuel emancipatory efforts?Is it enough that these acts of


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commemoration rescue the u n named and unaccounted for from obscurity and obl ivion

, counter the disavowals constitutive or the U.S. nalionaJ community, and unveil the

complicitou s discretion of the scholar shi p of the trade?

Starting points based in the past create the linearity they critique and

preclude changea future-oriented approach is key

Baldwin, 11(Andrew, Co-Director of the Institute of Hazard at the University ofDurhams Department of Geography, Whiteness and futurity: Towards a research

agenda, Progress in Human Geography 2012, originally published August 3, 2011,

http://phg.sagepub.com/content/36/2/172, AW)

What, then, aregeographies of whiteness? For my purposes here, they refer to geographies

spaces, places, landscapes, natures, mobilities, bodies, etc.that are assumed to be

white orare in some waystructured, though often implicitly, by some notion of whiteness(Bonnett,1997; McCarthy and Hague, 2004; Vanderbeck, 2006). The argument put forward in this paper is that research ongeographies of whiteness is almost invariably past-oriented (Bonnett, 1997, 2000; Hoelscher, 2003; Pulido, 2000). By

past-oriented I mean that whiteness, whether understood as a past or present phenomenon, tends to be

explained, accounted for and examined as an expression of social relations that took shape

in the past(Satzewich, 2007). In the paper, I aim to show how this work is dominated by an orientation that looks tothe past as the temporal horizon through which research and learning about past or present white racial identity occurs.

By and large, this work assumes that in order to challenge or reconfigure whitenesses and their corresponding racisms

whiteness must be diagnosed using some form of past-oriented analysis (Bonnett, 1997). The racist past is, thus,

used to explain the racist present. A brief example makes the point. In an essay that many (Baldwin,2009a; Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Jackson, 1998; McCarthy and Hague, 2004) suggest is a main point of reference for

debate about whiteness in geography, Alastair Bonnett (1997) argues that whiteness ought to be understood as a function

of historical geography.2 As such, Bonnett privilegesa methodological approach that reaches into

the past for answers about contemporary race and racism. Elsewhere, Audrey Kobayashi andLinda Peake (2000) make a similar claim that whiteness is a historically constructed position: to understand whiteness

requires understanding its multiple genealogies. Ido wonder, though, whether a past-oriented

approach to the study of white geographies reproduces the teleological

assumption that white racism can be modernized away. Such an assumption

privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the

present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before. Consequently,efforts to understand racism are thought to proceed from, or be enhanced by, some correct historical analysis of

whiteness.According to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which

white racism will get resolved. It cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future

discrete ontological form. Yet, in so doing, this kind of temporality disregards the ways

in which the future is very often already present in the present not as a discrete

ontological time-space, but as an absent or virtual presence that constitutes thevery meaning of the present(Anderson, 2010a; Massumi, 2007). This is a rather significant oversight when

attempting to account for geographies of whiteness because it means that such geographies are not

simply a function of the past but of the future as well. So, then, what about the future? To whatextent are geographies of whiteness a function not just of the past but of the future? How are white geographies

maintained in relation to the future? In what ways is the future already present in various forms of whiteness? It seems

that the geographic literature on whiteness is silent on these questions. In pointing this out, I do not mean to indict or

discredit the historicist approach that has come to dominate understandings of whiteness. Again, past-oriented analyses

of various kinds have been and continue to be critical for understanding whitenesses and the various racisms to which

they give rise. I simply wish to acknowledge that by foregrounding the past in the present the
http://phg.sagepub.com/content/36/2/172http://phg.sagepub.com/content/36/2/172


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geographic study of whiteness risks overlooking how whitenesses are made and

maintained in relation to futures both distant and immanent.Here, the task for a

futureoriented geographic research on whiteness might be to understand how

both contemporary and past forms of whiteness relate to the future(Anderson, 2010a), orhow specific geographic expressions of whiteness are contingent on the future. For instance, the task might be to

understand how discourses of futurity shape various forms of white supremacy from right-wing xenophobias to left-

nationalisms to practices of liberal humanitarianism, and how these shape, for instance, geographies of place, nature,space, mobility, bodies and so on. A worthwhile starting point for this work might be to

analyse how discourses of white crisis, such as those found in Great Britain in the early 1900s(Bonnett, 2004) or throughout the West during processes of post-Second World War decolonization (Thobani, 2007),

relate to and are shaped by notions of futurity. They do relate to the future. The question is: how

and to what effect? Acknowledging how the future is made present in white

geographies is important for at least three reasons. First, as many now argue (Grusin, 2010;

Massumi, 2007), the future is an important site through which individuals and societies

are governed(Anderson, 2010a). A focus on whiteness and futurity provides scope for thinking

about the way in which governing through the future might inaugurate new or

reconfigure old forms of whiteness. Eugenic science is a useful example here. Eugenics wasunderwritten by an imagined future eradicated of human imperfections. Thus we might seek to understand how white

geographies are reproduced through new future-oriented technologies, like genetic screening and nanotechnology (Rose,2007). Second, understanding how white geographies articulate with discourses of

futurity opens up new terrains for conceptualizing and challenging racism. If white

supremacy is, in part, reproduced throughshared practices of futurity, what then are

these practices? What kinds of futures do such practices seek to expunge or produce, and how can they beresisted? The case of genetic medicine is again illustrative. For instance, individual genemapping allows genetic citizens

to witness their future health by assessing their genetic predisposition for disease (Rose, 2007). Genetic citizenship is, in

turn, shaped by new practices of bodily purification aimed at foreclosing certain unhealthy futures. We might ask whether

and how these practices are white. Third, a focus on whiteness and futurity points to the idea

that affect shapes white racial formation(Hook, 2005). For the future can never exist

except as a form of virtual present, and affect can be understood, in part, as a

generalized attitude towards the presencing of particular futures. (Important, however, isthat affect can also be understood as a generalized attitude towards presencings of the past. Think, for example, affects

of nostalgia and loss.) Thus, we might ask: what futures infuse the affective logics of whiteness? How does this future

presencing occur? And how, if at all, are these futures constitutive of specific white spatio-temporalities? These reasons

together provide a rationale for a research agenda concerned with understanding how the future works as a resource in

the geographic expression of whitenesses.

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