Spec Pro 1

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF LAW REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS) PROF. DOROTHY UY NAVA 4C & 4D, Second Semester, SY 2009-2010 I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. Distinction between “civil action” and “special proceedings”

• RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3

Section 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.

(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, (1a, R2)

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. (n)

(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law. (n)

(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. (2a, R2)

Hagans v. Wislezenus, 42 Phil 880 (1920) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the petition are admitted by a demurrer. The only question presented is, whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act No. 190 permit him to appoint assessors in "special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in law exists for the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.

Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . . ." ISSUE:

Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is expressly authorized by said section 154 to appoint assessors. HELD: There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding. "An action is a formal demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-‐2010 PROF. DOROTHY UY NAVA

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the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction to actions, may be given: Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to perpetuate testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar, etc., etc.

From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the judge of the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135 (2001) -----------------------------------------------------------------------

FACTS:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar, and his eleven (11) children. At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop.

Respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

Oppositors (Petitioners) filed their opposition, but the Judge resolved in favor of the Respondents.

Petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-‐63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-‐judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO. Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx. Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-‐heirs xxx. Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx. Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16,

Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-‐63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-‐63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death


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of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-‐63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo. Natcher v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 385 (2001) -----------------------------------------------------------------------

FACTS:

Graciano del Rosario (decedent) had two marriages. When his first wife, Graciana, died, her estate was extrajudicially settled. Graciano received his fair share, the questioned lot included. Graciano thereafter entered into a second marriage with Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, he sold the same lot to the Natcher. This sale is being questioned by Graciano’s heirs (children by the first marriage) upon his death.

Graciano’s heirs then filed an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages to question the validity of Natcher’s title. The RTC ruled that although the sale was invalid, Natcher’s title to the property was valid because the RTC considered it as an advance of her legitime, being a compulsory heir of Graciano. Issue:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs? Held:

No. There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision11 contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance


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and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

B. Subject matter of special proceedings • RULES OF COURT, Rule 72

RULE 72 SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. — Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following cases: (a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons; (b) Escheat; (c) Guardianship and custody of children; (d) Trustees; (e) Adoption; (f) Rescission and revocation of adoption; (g) Hospitalization of insane persons; (h) Habeas corpus; (i) Change of name; (j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations; (k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children; (l) Constitution of family home; (m) Declaration of absence and death; (n) Cancellation of correction of entries in the civil registry. Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Hernaez Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 208 SCRA 449 (1992) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Petitioner Hernaez was declared the recognized natural child, entitled to P400 monthly support, of Respondent Hernaez. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or alternatively, an action for the annulment of judgment with preliminary injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court, which declared the decision of the trial court null and void for lack of summons by publication being an action in rem.

Petitioner instituted the subject Petition for Review. Petitioner contends that the requirement of publication is not necessary in an action for compulsory acknowledgment and support of an illegitimate child since said action is not one of the instances enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 72 of the Revised Rules of Court requiring publication of the petition before jurisdiction can be acquired by the Court. Under the "expressio unius est exclussio alterius" principle on statutory construction, this action should be considered a proceeding in personam. ISSUE:

Whether publication as required in Rule 105 necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over Respondent in the action for acknowledgment and support


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HELD: Publication under Rule 105 not necessary. Action for compulsory recognition and support not covered under Special Proceedings.

An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not among cases of special proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, such an action should be governed by the rules on ordinary civil actions.

Private respondents' claim that notice of an action for compulsory recognition should also be given to the wife and legitimate children of the putative parent, Teodoro Hernaez, Sr., is unmeritorious for the following reasons:

1. In a case for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself; and

2. Implicit in both Articles 283 and 285 of the Civil Code is the general rule that an action for compulsory recognition should the brought against the putative father, the exceptions being the instances when either the putative parent died during the minority of the child, or when after the death of the parent a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both of the parents recognize the child, in which cases the action is brought against the putative parent's heirs.

In fine, an action for compulsory recognition is an ordinary civil action. Thus, service of summons on the putative parent shall be as provided for under Rule 14. Said action shall be brought against the putative parent only; his heirs may be made party defendants only under the circumstances mentioned in Article 285. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 458 SCRA 200 (2005) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

RTC of Ormoc City granted the petition of petitioner-‐wife to have her husband declared presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage. The Republic, through the OSG, sought to appeal the order by filing a notice of appeal. This and a subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied on the ground that the declaration of presumptive death was a special proceeding and required a record on appeal. The Republic then filed a certiorari contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal. ISSUE:

whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. HELD: As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. As such, as a general rule, the declaration of absence and death are matters appropriately under Rule 71 Section 1 of the Rules of Court. This would require besides the notice of appeal, a record on appeal. However. for the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. Art. 238 of the Family Code provides: “Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.”


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There is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s order sufficed. II. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS

• Research on the different modes of settling an estate • Bautista, Antonio R., Judicial versus Extra-Judicial Settlement of an Intestate Estate: A

Comparative Evaluation, XIX Lawyers Review 5 (31 August 2005) A. NON-PROBATE/ADMINISTRATION MODES

• RULES OF COURT, Rules 69 and 74

RULE 69 PARTITION

Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. (1a)

Section 2. Order for partition and partition by agreement thereunder. — If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated. (2a)

A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. (n)

Section 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. — If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct. (3a)

Section 4. Oath and duties of commissioners. — Before making such partition; the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. In making the partition, the commissioners shall view and examine the real estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and examination, and shall hear the parties as to their preference in the portion of the property to be set apart to them and the comparative value thereof, and shall set apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the different parts thereof. (4a)

Section 5. Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners. — When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real state, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without prejudice to the


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interests of the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such amount as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale under such conditions and within such time as the court may determine. (5a)

Section 6. Report of commissioners; proceedings not binding until confirmed. — The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings as to the partition, or the assignment of real estate to one of the parties, or the sale of the same. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of court shall serve copies thereof on all the interested parties with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. No proceeding had before or conducted by the commissioners and rendered judgment thereon. (6a)

Section 7. Action of the court upon commissioners report. — Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section or even before the expiration of such period but after the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith the court may, upon hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith, or, for cause shown recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or accept the report in part and reject it in part; and may make such order and render such judgment as shall effectuate a fair and just partition of the real estate, or of its value, if assigned or sold as above provided, between the several owners thereof. (7)

Section 8. Accounting for rent and profits in action for partition. — In an action for partition in accordance with this Rule, a party shall recover from another his just share of rents and profits received by such other party from the real estate in question, and the judgment shall include an allowance for such rents and profits. (8a)

Section 9. Power of guardian in such proceedings. — The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the partition of real estate, which the minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in partition proceedings if he were of age or competent. (9a)

Section 10. Costs and expenses to be taxed and collected. — The court shall equitably tax and apportion between or among the parties the costs and expenses which accrue in the action, including the compensation of the commissioners, having regard to the interests of the parties, and execution may issue therefor as in other cases. (10a)

Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds. — If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him. If the whole property is assigned to one of the parties upon his paying to the others the sum or sums ordered by the court, the judgment shall state the fact of such payment and of the assignment of the real estate to the party making the payment, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in the party making the payment the whole of the real estate free from any interest


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on the part of the other parties to the action. If the property is sold and the sale confirmed by the court, the judgment shall state the name of the purchaser or purchasers and a definite description of the parcels of real estate sold to each purchaser, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real estate in the purchaser or purchasers making the payment or payments, free from the claims of any of the parties to the action. A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, and the expenses of such recording shall be taxed as part of the costs of the action. (11a)

Section 12. Neither paramount rights nor amicable partition affected by this Rule. — Nothing in this Rule contained shall be construed so as to prejudice, defeat, or destroy the right or title of any person claiming the real estate involved by title under any other person, or by title paramount to the title of the parties among whom the partition may have been made, nor so as to restrict or prevent persons holding real estate jointly or in common from making an amicable partition thereof by agreement and suitable instruments of conveyance without recourse to an action. (12a)

Section 13. Partition of personal property. — The provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of both real and personal property, in so far as the same may be applicable. (13)

RULE 74 SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the nest succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of small value. — Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the


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province, and after such other notice to interest persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity, or by their

guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office.

Section 3. Bond to be filed by distributees. — The court, before allowing a partition in accordance with the provisions of the preceding section, my require the distributees, if property other than real is to be distributed, to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by court, conditioned for the payment of any just claim which may be filed under the next succeeding section.

Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made.

Section 5. Period for claim of minor or incapacitated person. — If on the date of the expiration of the period of two (2) years prescribed in the preceding section the person authorized to file a claim is a minor or mentally incapacitated, or is in prison or outside the Philippines, he may present his claim within one (1) year after such disability is removed.

McMicking v. Sy Conbieng (21 Phil 211) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • When Margarita JOSE died, his estate was administered by PALANCA with Dy CUNYAO and

Mariano Lao SEMPCO as sureties. • When Mariano LAO SEMPCO died, his estate was administered by Doroteo VELASCO, and

Mariano VELASCO and BARRETO were the sureties.


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• When BARRETO died SY CONBIENG administered his estate. • Along the way PALANCA absconded with about 4/5 of JOSE’s estate. • The court then appointed MCMICKING who then tried to claim on the surety LAO SEMPCO. • But since LAO SEMPCO’s estate cannot pay, MCMICKING brought an action to claim against LAO

SEMPCO’s surety BARRETO (whose estate is administered by SY CONBIENG). • Trial court ruled in favor of SY CONBIENG and dismissed MCMICKING’s claim. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether MCMICKING can claim from BARRETO’s estate. HELD: No. The court based its ruling on these:

SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and their are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.

SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. But if it shall appear, at any time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been made.

We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. We base our affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be. • For the court ruled that VELASCO having performed his original obligation partitioning the estate

was from that point on free from liability; and so it follows that his sureties were also free. • And that any new claim arising within the two years necessitates the appointment of a new

administrator and new sureties. For the original sureties secured only one obligation and not two.

• The court then explained that MCMICKING seemed to argue that if the estate has any outstanding debts after partition that the partition itself is invalid. It is not so.

In answer the court explained: “as already seen, in order that it be a reason for such appointment and administration, the

claim must be presented within two years [it was presented in 5] from the date of the partition and distribution.

Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity, either by want of notice or otherwise, and the consequent failure to present a claim before partition, is, under the sections we are discussing, of no consequence whatever in so far as the validity of the partition is concerned.

We have also seen that the fact that there were debts outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took place is of no importance so far as the validity of the partition is concerned, leaving out account the question of fraud to which we have already adverted and left undecided.

We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is valid and subsistent against the estate is of no consequence whatever with respect to the right of its holder to require an administration of the estate unless such claim is discovered and presented within two years.

The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a certain period, a contingent one is of no importance. The sections under discussion make no distinction between claims.

The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case at bar it was five years after the petition before the alleged creditor made any attempt whatsoever to "discover" or present his claim. He knew


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of the death of OCAMPO very soon after it occurred. He knew that it was among the possibilities that OCAMPO'S estate might be called upon to respond for the failure of PALANCA to perform his duty as administrator. It was his duty to see to it that he would be protected in that event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of OCAMPO to be partitioned and distributed without protest and without the presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and passive for nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very probable that the property of the estate was being consumed, incumbered, and transferred by the persons among whom it had been distributed.” Rebong v. Ibañez, 79 Phil 324 (1947) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • REBONG was the sole heir of her predecessors-‐in-‐interest. She appropriated the estate of her

parents extra-‐judicially. • REBONG petitioned the CFI to cancel the annotation on the Cert. of Title over an inherited land. • The Cet. of Title had the annotation that the land was subject to the claims of the creditors and

other heirs of the deceased parents within two years from July 9, 1947 (no further explanation, perhaps the parents died together on the said date)

• REBONG's petition was anchored on Sec. 112 of Act 496 which stated that o “Any registered owner or other person in interest may … petition to the court, upon the

ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; ... and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition … and may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may deem proper;”

• REBONG even offered to file a bond amounting to P5thou to answer for any contingent claim that may arise. The lot in question was worth P5thou.

• CFI judge, respondent IBAÑEZ, denied REBONG's petition. Hence, this case. ISSUE:

Whether REBONG's petition should be granted in light of Rule 74, Secs. 1 & 4, vis-‐a-‐vis Act 496. RULING (Majority Opinion, Feria, J.):

No, since the registered or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs of REBONG's predecessors-‐in-‐interest, established by Sec. 4 of Rule 74, has not yet terminated or ceased, or the period of two years from July 9, 1947 has not yet elapsed, respondent IBAÑEZ had no jurisdiction or power to order the cancellation of said lien or annotation as prayed by REBONG. Neither Sec. 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court, nor Sect. 112 of Act No. 496 authorizes interest of substitution of a bond for a lien or registered interest of any description, whether vested, expedient, inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated or ceased. (NB: Decision was promulgated by SC on Sept. 30 1947, clearly less than two years from July 9, 1947). Concurring Opinion (Perfecto, J.):

While no provision of law is invoked by REBONG in support of her prayer, she alleges as reasons, (a) that the rights of third persons whose claims are cancelled by the lien are merely contingent, expectant and inchoate; (b) that the dominical rights of petitioner would greatly be hampered and she cannot transact or deal with the real estate property with third persons; and (c) that the bond, in the event that there exist claims against it within a period of two years will answer for such eventuality, so much so that no right of third persons will really be prejudiced. She alleges


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that when she filed the petition on July 14, 1947 with the lower court, she alleged that she desired to cancel the annotation of the lien "in order to mortgage the property to a bank."

REBONG's reasons are unconvincing. If her intention in seeking the cancellation of the annotated lien is to have an opportunity to mortgage the property to a bank so as to obtain a loan, the purpose can be accomplished without the cancellation prayed for. If she can secure sureties willing and able to answer for the amount of P5,000, we do not see any reason why she cannot obtain from a bank a loan with the same sureties. If they can offer a good guarantee for the bond of P5,000, surely they can offer a good guarantee in favor of a bank for a loan that petitioner may apply for.

Torres v. Torres (10 SCRA 185) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • PAZ E. Siguion Torres died intestate on December 18, 1959. • ALBERTO S. Torres (petitioner), claiming to be one of the four legitimate children of Paz,

petitioned to be administrator of the properties left by the decedent (aggregate value of about P300,000.00). He also claimed he was not aware of any debt left by the decedent.

• ALBERTO’S petition was opposed by CONCHITA Torres, one of the heirs, on the ground that on January 27, 1960, the heirs of the deceased (including petitioner) had already entered into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate, pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 74.

• The extrajudicial deed of partition of the estate contains the following provisions: “1. That they (ALBERTO, ANGEL, EDUARDO and CONCHITA, all surnamed Torres) are the only legitimate children who survive the deceased Paz Siguion Vda. de Torres;

x x x x x x x x x “3. That the said decedent died without leaving any will and her only surviving heirs are the aforementioned parties who are her legitimate children;

“4. That the deceased left no debts; x x x x x x x x x

“6. That pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and in view of the difficulty of making a physical division of the above properties, the parties have agreed to settle the aforementioned estate by continuing the co-ownership on all the above properties in the following proportion: ALBERTO Torres — ¼ undivided interest ANGEL Torres — ¼ undivided interest EDUARDO Torres — ¼ undivided interest CONCHITA Torres — ¼ undivided interest” (Emphasis supplied.)

• ALBERTO, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition was signed by the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual designation of their respective shares had failed thus needing the court's intervention. He also claimed that some properties of considerable value were not included in said extrajudicial partition. In another pleading, he claimed that the decedent had an outstanding debt of P50,000.

• On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial settlement had already been entered into by the heirs, dismissed ALBERTO’S petition.

ISSUE: Whether administration or a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is necessary.

RULING: No. The claim of the decedent’s debts is unsubstantiated. ALBERTO did not specify from whom

and in what manner the said debt was contracted. The bare allegation that "the estate has an existing


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debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot be considered as concise statement to constitute a cause of action.

If other properties are not included in the deed of extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, the questions such as the titles and their partition — if proven to belong to the intestate — can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition and not in an administration proceeding.

Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected either extra-judicially or through an ordinary action for partition. If there is an actual necessity for court intervention in view of the heirs' failure to reach an agreement as to how the estate would be divided physically, the heirs still have the remedy of an ordinary action for partition under Rule 74. Jerez v. Nietes (30 SCRA 905) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

In 1960 Nicolas Jalandoni died. A special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed before the CFI of Iloilo, and his widow, Lucrecia Jerez, was appointed as administratrix. In 1966, a project of partition and final accounting was submitted, and the respondent Judge Nietes approved the same.

Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the project of partition which they would have respondent Judge reject for being contrary to law. Judge Nietes allowed intervention and reopened the proceedings to permit the movants "to present whatever evidence they may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased." The widow and legitimate children of Nicolas Jalandoni filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, which denied such petition to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge. HELD:

Judge Nietes is directed to require private respondents Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to intervene in Special Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H. Jalandoni pending before such sala.

Doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention: rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final accounting had been approved.

Although the recognition of their right to intervene appeared to be tentative and conditional, it cannot be denied that they were given a standing sufficient to set aside the project of partition. However, the verified motion on the part of private respondents (Lucilo and Victoria) did not suffice to call into play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention. There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge could be considered premature. "No one may quibble over the existence of the court's discretion on whether to admit or reject intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited."


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Ermac v. Medelo (64 SCRA 359) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a parcel of land as the only property to be

inherited by heirs • MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary settlement of the estate. • ERMAC: moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement claiming the land as belonging to

him and his wife. ISSUE: W/N the approval of the project of partition was valid despite the claim of ERMAC in a separate civil action? HELD: • The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased

persons with the least loss of time. o Small estates: summary procedure dispensing with appointment of administrator

• Not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate; properly ventilated in an independent action and probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate (subject to the results of suit). Appropriate step: proper annotation of lis pendens

Periera v. CA (174 SCRA 154) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Andres Periera died intestate, with no debts. He was survived be his wife of 10 months Victoria Periera who is a nurse in London and his sister Rita Nagac. Rita instituted as special proceeding for the issuance of letters if administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased which is said to include his death benefits from PAL, bank accounts in PNB and PCIB and a 300 sq mt land in Las Pinas. Victoria filled a motion to dismiss the petition alleging that there is no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration or that if there is an estate letters of administration be issued in her favor as surviving spouse. The trial court appointed Rita as administrator which Victoria is now questioning. ISSUE:

Whether a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent as in this case? HELD: NO RATIO: As a general rule, when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will or in case he left one should he failed to name an executor. An exemption to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for appointment of an administrator.

Section 1 of Rule 74 however does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the


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estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.

It has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age of not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.

In this case, the only two surviving heirs are the spouse and sister who are both or age. They admit that there are no debts. The estate is also not substantial. What is apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms and that Rita wants to administer the estate because she wants to take possession of the properties, this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. Avelino v. Court of Appeals, 329 SCRA 369 (2000) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Antonio Avelino Sr. died intestate. His daughter, Maria, petitioned the court to issue to her letters administration. The other heirs, (the Respondents), moved to convert Maria’s petition into an action for judicial partition. The court granted the respondent’s motion and allowed partition on the ground that it was only one heir (Maria) who was opposed to the partition. CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether partition was proper considering that one heir was opposed to the partition? HELD: Yes.

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. Since the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age it is (our) view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court1 should apply.

As to the contention that the extent of the estate has yet to be determined, this can be done in the partition proceedings.

In cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 620 (2001) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Spouses Miguel and Rosalina de Rodriguez adopted Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. Years later, Miguel died intestate. Private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of Maria Elena.

1 SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. -‐ If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.


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The RTC upheld the validity of the adoption. While the case is pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Rodriguezes entered into a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. New TCTs under the name of the respondents were subsequently issued. Maria Elena then sent her daughter to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives. Maria Elena filed a complaint to annul the partition. ISSUE:

Whether or not the action to annul the partition has prescribed. HELD:

Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. Maria Elena did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-‐year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period is 4 years from discovery since the annulment is based on fraud (for the lack of notice and consent of 1 of the heirs, Maria Elena). Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.

Also, Section 1 of Rule 74 provides that “The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.” Lastly, it cannot be argued that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the extrajudicial settlement because at that time, Maria Elena was no longer a minor. Hence, Rosalina only represented herself during the settlement.

B. PROBATE/ADMINISTRATION MODE 1. RULE 73 – VENUE AND PROCESS

• Jurisdiction/venue in probate/administration proceedings

RULE 73 VENUE AND PROCESS

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedents is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.


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Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

Section 3. Process. — In the exercise of probate jurisdiction, Courts of First Instance may issue warrants and process necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses or to carry into effect theirs orders and judgments, and all other powers granted them by law. If a person does not perform an order or judgment rendered by a court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, it may issue a warrant for the apprehension and imprisonment of such person until he performs such order or judgment, or is released.

Section 4. Presumption of death. — For purposes of settlement of his estate, a person shall be presumed dead if absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code. But if such person proves to be alive, he shall be entitled to the balance of his estate after payment of all his debts. The balance may be recovered by motion in the same proceeding.

Dinglasan v. Ang Chia, 88 Phil. 476 (1951) -----------------------------------------------------------------------


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Eusebio v. Eusebio, 100 Phil. 593 (1956) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Eugenio Eusebio file a petition with the CFI of Rizal for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres, residing, according to the petition, in the City of Quezon. Amanda, et al, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to the petition, saying that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. Because of his heart condition, he bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in said City. While transferring his belongings to this house, he suffered a stroke and subsequently died. Consequently, he never stayed in the said house in Espana extension. The CFI overruled the objection and granted the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was filed in the proper venue. HELD:

NO. It being apparent that the domicile of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, the presumption is that he retained such domicile and residence. If Andres established another domicile, it must be one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently. The first 2 requisites are present. However, the facts show that he had no intention to stay permanently in the Espana residence. The house and lot were bought because he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness". It is likely that he bought the place in order that he could be near his doctor. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." Moreover, he did not alienate the San Fernando residence. Some of his children also remained in Pampanga. In the deed of sale (of the Espana residence), he gave San Fernando, Pampanga as his residence. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile — which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of record.

Rodriguez v. Borja, 17 SCRA 418 (1966) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb. 12, 1963. On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and

Adelaida Jacalan (respondents) delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testatment of Fr. Rodriguez. On March 9, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriquez (petitioners), through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. On March 11, 1963, before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn. On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the CIF of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez. On same day, (March 12), defendants filed a petition for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4.

• Petitioners contend that the intestate proceedings in the CIF of Rizal was filed at 8:00AM on March 12, while the petition for probate in the CIF of Bulacan at 11AM, so the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.


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• Defendants contend that CIF of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery of the

will, hence the case in this court has precedence over petitioners’. • CIF of Bulacan denied MD of petitioners. MR denied. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction? – CIF of Bulacan HELD: • The jurisdiction of the CIF of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of the will of the Fr.

Rodriquez on March 4 even if no petition for its allowance was filed yet because upon the will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices to what is prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: “When a will is deliver to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will xxx and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published xxx”

• where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the will was delivered to the court of Bulacan on March 4 while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in court of Rizal only on March 12, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable

• As to petitioners objection that the Bulacan court did not have jurisdiction because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal, court ruled that the power to settle the decedent;s estates is conferred by law upon all CIFs, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the court.

• Furthermore, the estate proceedings having been initiated in Bulacan court ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wron venue by express provisions of Rule 73.

• Court also held that petitioners, in commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, were in bad faith, patently done to divest the Bulacan court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules.

• Lastly, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid and operative will (Art. 960 of Civil Code).

Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360 (1973) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • DECEDENT: On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila.

o He was survived by his widow (petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco) and their 2 minor sons, who resided in QC, and by his children of the first marriage (respondents Manuel, Lourdes, Concepcion, Carmen, Consuelo and Teresita), who resided in Cebu

• INTESTATE PROCEEDING IN CEBU: On 5 March 1964, Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI of Cebu, alleging that the late senator died intestate; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. o An order issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition was not yet ready for the

consideration of the said court (no publication nor service) • PROBATE PROCEEDING IN QC: On 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition)

the widow filed a petition with the CFI of QC for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor

• OPPOSITION IN CEBU INTESTATE PROCEEDING: The widow filed in the Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator


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o The Cebu court issued an order deferring its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss

until after the QC CFI shall have acted on the petition for probate of the will of the deceased o Respondents did not make a MR or motion to set aside such order or challenge the same by

certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts. • OPPOSITION IN QC PROBATE PROCEEDING: Respondents filed in the QC court an Opposition and

Motion to Dismiss opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court. Said respondent prayed that the QC action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue. o The QC court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of

probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." The said court further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was in QC. The Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco shows that the decedent at the time

when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.

o Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's 2 MRs were denied. • HEARING IN QC PROBATE PROCEEDING: The hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent

was called 3x but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the QC court proceeded with the hearing in their absence. o The Quezon City court noted that respondents-‐oppositors had opposed probate under their

opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law; (b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit; (c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.

o The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, and of the notary public

• OUTCOME IN QC PROBATE PROCEEDING: The Quezon City court admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament and appointed petitioner-‐widow as executrix of his estate without bond.

• SCA IN CA: Respondents filed a SCA of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CA o The CA rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the

herein petitioner. A writ of prohibition was issued against the QC testate proceeding. o The CA held that:

Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. The proceeding in the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the


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factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death

Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI, it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the QC CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco. The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.

The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-‐R, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.

ISSUE: W/N the QC court had jurisdiction over the petition for probate

DOCTRINE: The QC court had jurisdiction over the petition for probate, albeit it was not the proper venue

therefor. BUT “wrong venue is a waivable procedural defect” (Uriarte case). Since the respondents did not appear in the QC hearing despite due notice and the Cebu court deferred/consented to the probate proceeding therein, the QC court had jurisdiction over the petition.

Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable.

Since respondents failed to appeal from the QC court's order admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and cannot be overturned in a special civil action of prohibition.

The residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. The Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

A fair reading of the Rule indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

Thus, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1,


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the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-‐widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition. Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189 (1976) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister of decedent) filed with the CFI of Laguna, at Calamba, a petition for letters of administration over the Estate of Amado G. Garcia. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate, which the Judge granted.

Virginia had forgotten to place in the original petition the last place of residence of the decedent. She filed a supplemental pleading which stated among other things that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna.

This was questioned by Preciosa B. Garcia (spouse of decedent) through an MTD on the ground of jurisdiction and improper venue after filing an MR to the appointment of Virginia as Special Administratrix.

During the hearing of this case Virginia presented the death certificate of the decedent showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

The CFI ruled in favor of Virginia. CA ruled in favor of Preciosa and annulled the proceedings before the CFI.

ISSUE/S: Whether the term “resides” in Sec 1 Rule 73 means domicile or actual residence? Whether

venue was improperly laid? RULING: The term “resides” means actual residence.; Yes, venue was improperly laid.

Section 1, Rule 73 specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.

But, the far-‐ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and


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should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.

In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.

In other words, "resides" means the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.

Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.

Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.

Nevertheless, the long-‐settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

Coca v. Borromeo, 81 SCRA 278 (1978) -----------------------------------------------------------------------


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Maloles II v. Phillips, 324 SCRA 172 (2000) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He claimed he had no

compulsory heirs and had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.

• On Feb. 16 1996, Makati RTC Branch-‐61 under judge Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will, the court found that the testator was of sound mind and freely executed said will.

• Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos died • Petitioner (testator’s nephew) claiming to be the only son of the deceased’s sister Alicia de

santos, filed a motion for intervention as the nearest of kin, and also as a creditor of the deceased. • Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Makati Branch 61, but then

withdrew the same. Later defendant then filed the motion in Makati RTC Branch 65. • Petitoner then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating again he was a full

blooded nephew and that a case already related to the subject matter was pending in Branch 61. • Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61. • Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in Branch 61 denied the petitioner’s motion to intervene, and denied

taking cognizance of the case forwarded by Branch 65, because the case in Branch 65 involved the Estate of Decent Arturo De Santos, while the one in Branch 61 was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when he was alive and had already been decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed the will.

• Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed it’s decision and again took cognizance of the case to expedite proceedings.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate

proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos. 2. Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of

letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent. 3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right

to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent. HELD:

Branch 65 now has jurisdiction. Petitioner’s contention that that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of Court is without merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-‐settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. This was already done in the ante-‐mortem probate of Dr. De Santos’ will during his lifetime.

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court.


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Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, §1

which states: “Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts…” The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the

estate of deceased persons. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other.

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death.

Lastly, regarding petitioner’s claim as heir and creditor the Court said that: “The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.” Thus, the Petition was denied.

Pacioles v. Chuatoco-Ching, 466 SCRA 90 (2005) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner, and their two minor children. milio Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate.

Miguelita’s mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of “paraphernal properties.”

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate. Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them “would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.” She then nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.


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The intestate court then issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular

administrators of the estate and then declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. Petitioner then submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.

Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees. Respondent opposed on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is “premature and precipitate,” considering that there is yet no determination “whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.” Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an “heir and co-‐owner.” She prayed that a hearing be scheduled.

The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed “premature.” It also ordered that a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-‐ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’”

Petitioner questrioned this order but the MR was denied. The Petition for Certiorari with the CA. This is a Petition for Certiorari to the CA. ISSUE:

Did the lower court acted with GADALEJ in ordering that a hearing be set to determine the ownership of the properties in an intestate procedding? HELD: YES May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate? RATIO:

The general rule is that the intestae court cannot hear and pass upon questions of ownership. However the intestae court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership provisionally and when merely incidentalif the purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory of he estate of the deceased. But this case does not fall under the above mentioned deviation from the general rule, thus the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering that a hearing be set for determining the ownership of the properties in question.

The facts of this case show that the inventorty is not disputed. In fact, in repondent’s Manifestation and Opposition, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner. Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties. Also, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative, did not submit his own inventory Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.

Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate given that she had Torrens title over such properties. (Miguela cannot even determine in particular the properties she is claiming.) San Luis v. San Luis, 514 SCRA 294 (2007) -----------------------------------------------------------------------


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FACTS:

The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, who was previously the governor of the Province of Laguna. During the lifetime of Felicisimo, he was married to three women. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit who predeceased Felicisimo. The second marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen, who later obtained a decree granting absolute divorce before the family court of Hawaii. The third marriage was with the respondent, Felicidad Sagalongos, who he lived with for 18 years up to the time of his death.

After the death of Felicisimo, the respondent sought for the dissolution of their conjugal assets and the settlement of the estate. A petition for administration was then filed before the RTC of Makati City.

The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) venue was improperly laid since the petition should be filed in Laguna where Felicisimo was the elected governor; (2) Respondent does not have legal capacity to sue because her marriage with Felicisimo is bigamous and the decree of absolute decree is not binding in the Philippines.

The RT C granted the motion to dismiss. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. ISSUES:

1. Whether venue was properly laid. 2. Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of

administration HELD:

1. Venue was properly laid. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate should be filed in the RTC of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death”. In the case of Garcia Fule v. CA, we laid down the rule that for determining venue, the residence of the decedent is determining. Residence for settlement of estate purposes means his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence of place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. It is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

2. The divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee Corwin, which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spouse. However, the respondent was not able to provide sufficient documentation to prove the decree of divorce obtained in Hawaii.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration as she may be considered the co-‐owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties acquired during their cohabitation. The case is therefore remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

2. RULE 75 – PRODUCTION OF WILL; ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY

RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL; ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. — No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Section 2. Custodian of will to deliver. — The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having


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jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

Section 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust. — A person named as executor in a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testate, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.

Section 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect. — A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excused satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.

Section 5. Person retaining will may be committed. — A person having custody of a will after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will.

In re Johnson, 38 Phil. 156 (1918) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden in 1877; in 1893, he emigrated to the United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois. In 1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately afterwards left for the Philippine Islands as a US Army soldier. A daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after their marriage. After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he continued to live in the Philippines. In 1902, Rosalie Johnson was granted a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. In 1903, Emil Johnson procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago, after which he visited family in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila. In Manila he had 3 children with Alejandra Ibañez: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. Emil Johnson also had 2 children with Simeona Ibañez: Eleonor and Alberto.

He died in Manila, leaving a holographic will. This will, signed by himself and 2 witnesses only, instead of the 3 required witnesses, was not executed in conformity with Philippine law. A petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here.

The hearing on said application was set, and three weeks publication of notice was ordered. In the hearing, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator of the estate.

The will gives to his brother Victor shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-‐Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother, P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, P5,000; to Alejandra Ibañez, P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children -‐ Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.

About three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will


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to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other orders in the case. HELD: 1. Whether the court had jurisdiction – YES

The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.

"The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short." (Citing In re Davis) 2. Whether the order of probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State. -‐ NO

The CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.

Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.

3. Whether the will should not have been probated because it was void – NO (will was validly probated)

The probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will.

If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the law must prevail. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general provisions here applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate." Guevara v. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249 (1956) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

On August 1931, Victorino Guevara executed a last will and testament. The will was not probated when he died in 19332. In the first case file by Rosario Guevara 4 years later, where she sought to recover a portion of a parcel of land registered under Ernesto Guevara’s name as part of 2 The case did not say why the will was not probated upon Victorino’s death.


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her legitime, the SC denied Rosario’s claim but ordered the parties to present the will. Claiming to act pursuant to the decision, Rosario commenced in 1945, a special proceeding for the probate of the will. Ernesto appeared and opposed the probate claiming among others, that the petition is barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed 12 years after the testator’s death. ISSUE:

Whether the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. HELD:

NO. Rule 77 of the Rules of Court provides that any “person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed.” The application of the statute of limitations is destructive of the right to testamentary disposition and violative of the owner’s right to control his property within the legal limits. It is true that the rights of parties should not be left hanging in uncertainty for periods of time; but the obvious remedy is for the other interested parties to petition for the production of the will and for its probate, or to inflict upon the guilty party the penalties under Rule 76 or declare the unworthiness of the heir for concealing or suppressing the will; but not to dismiss the petition for probate, however belatedly submitted. Palacios v. Catimbang Palacios, 106 Phil. 739 (1959) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Juan Palacios, petitioner, filed a petition for the probate of his last will and testament wherein he instituted his natural children as his sole heirs. Maria Catimbang Palacios, defendant, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of the petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus impairing her legitime.

After the presentation of petitioner's evidence relative to the essential requisites and formalities provided by law for the validity of a will, the court on July 6, 1956 issued an order admitting the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and, after proper hearing concerning this incident, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her legitime. ISSUE: Whether it was proper for the probate court to decide on the intrinsic validity of the last will and testament. HELD:

The Court held that the opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will for issue cannot be raised in the probate court but in a separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.

In Montañano vs. Suesa, the court said: “The authentication of the will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities, which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely un-affected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated."

The trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the portion of the will


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which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an extraneous matter which should be treshed out in a separate action. Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 (1982) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will:

“It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to me. ... I have found peace and happiness with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.”

Petitioner filed a petition for probate while respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of the decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI of Pasig. The testate and intestate proceedings were consolidated by the respondent judge. Respondent Bernardo then filed a MTD the testate case on the ground that it is void because he, as the compulsory heir, was preterited. In opposition to the MTD, petitioner Soledad averred that in the probate of a will, inquiry is limited to the examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will. The lower court ordered the dismissal of the testate case. Petitioners then filed a certiorari petition alleging that the dismissal was in excess of jurisdiction. CA affirmed lower court’s decision. ISSUE:

w/n the order of dismissal to probate the will is proper HELD:

NO. The court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the testate case. Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory: “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court”. Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity.

“The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The que0stions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated ....”

Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Order of dismissal is set aside and case remanded for further proceedings. Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 105 (2003) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:


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• Petitioner Consolacion Sioson (CONSOLACION) and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-‐Gino

(REMEDIOS) are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson (CANUTO). CANUTO and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina and his brother Victoriano, were co-‐owners of a parcel of land in Navotas.

• The property, known as Lot 2 was owned by CATALINA, CANUTO, and VICTORIANO. Each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters.

• On 20 November 1951, CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots (Lot Nos. 2-‐A to 2-‐H) through Subdivision Plan which the Director of Lands approved on 30 May 1952. Lot No. 2-‐A, and Lot No. 2-‐E, were placed under CANUTO’s name. Three other individuals took the remaining lots.

• Later, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ("KASULATAN") where CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-‐A and 2-‐E. She later declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes.

• After 2 years, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit ("JOINT AFFIDAVIT") affirming the KASULATAN in favor of CONSOLACION. They also attested that the lots their father had sold to CONSOLACION were Lot Nos. 2-‐A and 2-‐E of Subdivision Plan.

• CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT with the Register of Deeds who issued to CONSOLACION TCT covering Lot Nos. 2-‐A and 2-‐E.

• REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the RTC for "Annulment or Cancellation of TCT and Damages." REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-‐A and 2-‐E because CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINA’s last will and testament ("LAST WILL") dated 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the size of CANUTO’s share in Lot 2.

• Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claimed that the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed the action within four years from the registration of CONSOLACION’s title.

• RTC denied Remedios claim and dismissed the case since her action prescribed already. They said she knew about the petitioner’s adverse title since she testified against petitioners in an ejectment suit which was filed more than 4 years before she filed her case. Furthermore, RTC ruled that REMEDIOS has no right of action against petitioners because CATALINA’s LAST WILL from which REMEDIOS claims to derive her title has not been admitted to probate. Since Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, no will passes real or personal property unless it is allowed in probate in accordance with the Rules of Court.

• The CA reversed their judgement and held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an implied trust allegedly created in her favor when CONSOLACION fraudulently registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-‐A and 2-‐E. Consequently, the prescriptive period for filing the complaint is ten years for breach of implied trust, not four. Also, the appellate court held that CATALINA’s unprobated LAST WILL does not preclude REMEDIOS from seeking reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-‐A and 2-‐E as the LAST WILL may subsequently be admitted to probate.

ISSUES: (1) whether prescription bars the action filed by REMEDIOS (2) whether REMEDIOS is a real party-‐in-‐interest.

HELD: • What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the same is already barred by

prescription. Since Prescriptive Period is 10 Years Counted From Registration of Adverse Title


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• For the 2nd issue. Respondent is Not a Real Party-‐in-‐Interest. Not only does prescription bar

REMEDIOS’ complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a real party-‐in-‐interest who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly ruled. Therefore she lacks a cause of action.

• REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-‐A and 2-‐E (or over its one-‐half portion) on the devise of these lots to her under CATALINA’s LAST WILL. However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-‐208 is still pending.

• Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." This Court has interpreted this provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder."

• REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of CATALINA’s LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has not admitted CATALINA’s LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-‐A and 2-‐E or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.

• The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency by ordering the reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-‐A and 2-‐E to REMEDIOS in her capacity as executrix of CATALINA’s LAST WILL. This is inappropriate because REMEDIOS sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the alleged owner of the disputed lots.

Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 470 SCRA 697 (2005) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

On November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition in Iloilo for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent). Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On May 2001, RTC rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.

On October 2001, Petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. They also filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, and the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-‐payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.

RTC issued and Order denying Petitioners’ motion for being unmeritorious. Petitioners sought annulment of RTC’s decision with the CA with a prayer for preliminary

injunction – denied Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought

to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new


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trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. ISSUE:

W/N Petitioners were made parties in the proceedings HELD:

Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.

Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.

The non-‐inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

3. RULE 76 – Allowance or Disallowance of Will

RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his


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possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court for the allowance of his will.

Section 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters are prayed;

(e) If the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the allowance of the will, or the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration with the will annexed.

Section 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testatorhimself.

Section 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not the petitioner; also, to any person named as coexecutor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at lest (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.

Section 5. Proof at hearing. What sufficient in absence of contest. — At the hearing compliance with the provisions of the last two preceding sections must be shown before the introduction of testimony in support of the will. All such testimony shall be taken under oath and reduced to writing. It no person appears to contest the allowance of the will, the court may grant allowance thereof on the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses only, if such witness testify that the


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will was executed as is required by law.

In the case of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. In the absence of any such competent witness, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

Section 6. Proof of lost or destroyed will. Certificate thereupon. — No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two (2) credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded.

Section 7. Proof when witnesses do not reside in province. — If it appears at the time fixed for the hearing that none of the subscribing witnesses resides in the province, but that the deposition of one or more of them can be taken elsewhere, the court may, on motion, direct it to be taken, and may authorize a photographic copy of the will to be made and to be presented to the witness on his examination, who may be asked the same questions with respect to it, and to the handwriting of the testator and others, as would be pertinent and competent if the original will were present.

Section 8. Proof when witnesses dead or insane or do not reside in the Philippines. — If the appears at the time fixed for the hearing that the subscribing witnesses are dead or insane, or that

none of them resides in the Philippines, the court may admit the testimony of other witnesses to prove the sanity of the testator, and the due execution of the will; and as evidence of the execution of the will, it may admit proof of the handwriting of the testator and of the subscribing witnesses, or of any of them.

Section 9. Grounds for disallowing will. — The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;

(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

Section 10. Contestant to file grounds of contest. — Anyone appearing to contest the will must state


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in writing his grounds for opposing its allowance, and serve a copy thereof on the petitioner and other parties interested in the estate.

Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. — If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.

If a holdgraphic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

Section 12. Proof where testator petitions for allowance of holographic will. — Where the testator himself petitions for the probate of his holographic will and no contest is filed, the fact that the affirms that the holographic will and the signature are in his own handwriting, shall be sufficient evidence of the genuineness and due execution thereof. If the holographic will is contested, the burden of disproving the genuineness and due execution thereof shall be on the contestant. The testator to rebut the evidence for the contestant.

Section 13. Certificate of allowance attached to prove will. To be recorded in the Office of Register of Deeds. — If the court is satisfied, upon proof taken and filed, that the will was duly executed, and that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence, or fraud, a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge, and attested by the seal of the court shall be attached to the will and the will and certificate filed and recorded by the clerk. Attested copies of the will devising real estate and of certificate of allowance thereof, shall be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the lands lie.

Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil 939 (1925) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of decedent, filed for an application for letters of

administration of the estate left by Villegas, who, according to the application, died intestate Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, Daria Mendieta and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary

executor, filed a motion with the court, praying for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein most of his property was given as a legacy to said Justina Mendieta, the latter's children and the legitimate wife of the deceased Francisco Villegas.

Laureana Hidalgo entered her objection to the probate of the will Subsequently, Laureana and Justina submitted to the court an agreement which stated that

Justina is withdrawing her application for probate and that said will be held not allowable to probate. Justina acknowledged that the deceased died intestate, without leaving any more heirs


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than his legitimate wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two adulterous children, Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, and that the property of the deceased be distributed in accordance with said agreement.

The court on October 25, 1924, approved said agreement and rendered judgment accordingly. On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to be first cousin of the deceased Francisco

Villegas, filed with the court a new application for the probate of the same supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas

HELD: The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, and the court acquires jurisdiction

over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them.

Through the publication ordered by the lower court of the application for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas said court acquired jurisdiction over all such persons as were interested in the supposed will, including Gelacio Malihan

All the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not satisfied with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been committed, and cannot now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for the probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error; especially when the parties interested have agreed to disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him.

Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil 632 (1935) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • The estate of Ines Basa was allowed in probate by court, and eventually adjudicated it in favor of

the administrator who was also the sole heir. • The petitioner contests the jurisdiction of the probate court alleging that there was failure to

comply with the notice requirements in Sec. 630. • “Sec. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. When a will is delivered to a court having jurisdiction

of the same, the court shall appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public notice thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or newspapers as the court directs of general circulation in the province, three weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice has been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses.”

• They allege that notice was only published for the first two weeks and the hearing conducted on the third.

ISSUE: Whether the probate court had jurisdiction over the estate. HELD: Yes, it had.

It will be noted that in the above cited case the last of the three publications was on December 18, 1919, and the hearing on the administrator’s final account was set for December 19 of that year, only 15 days after the date of the first publication.

In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in Sec. 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full


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weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing. Santos v. Castillo, 64 Phil 211 (1937) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian of the minor acknowledge natural children of the deceased, filed a petition for probate of the will of Nicolas Azores. She also filed a motion for the appointment of a special administrator. At the hearing, respondents Jose, Sinfrosa and Antonio Azores, legitimate children of the deceased filed their opposition, on the ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case—petitioner’s allegations being insufficient to confer jurisdiction because she did not allege that she had the custody of the will, and therefore, was not entitled to present it for probate; and furtherance because the will that should be probated is the original and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the petitioner. Petitioner filed an amended petition praying that respondents be required to present the copies of the will and the codicil in their possession.

Court issued an order denying the petition for the appointment of a special administrator by petitioner and ordered Jose Azores, who has custody of the last will and testament and all other documents in relation thereto, to deliver said papers to the court within 10 days from notice. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion praying that her amended petition be admitted. However, before this motion was decided, respondents, 16 days after their father’s death, presented the original of the will and codicil, and petitioned that they be admitted for probate.

The court issued an order dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner. ISSUE: [1] Who is entitled to apply for probate? [2] W/N Court has acquired jurisdiction HELD: [1] Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no will shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed. For this purpose, section 626 provides that the person who has the custody of he will shall, within 30 days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will. Sections 628 and 629 proscribed coercive means to compel a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the court having jurisdiction. Petitioner alleged that the deceased designated nobody as custodian of his will but that he directed his nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, to keep one in his (Manuel’s) possession, and to turn over the other two copies to his son Jose Azores, with instructions to the effect that if petitioner or his son failed to present said will for probate, Manuel should take charge of presenting it to the court. Taking everything into account therefore, it is of the Court’s view that Jose Azores, the son of the deceased, had the custody of the will because the original thereof was turned over to him. For the sake of argument, however, admitting that the testator had designated nobody as custodian of the will, it cannot be denied that his act of subsequently making a codicil and entrusting the custody thereof to his legitimate children, clearly modified his last will. In this sense, the custody of both is entrusted to his legitimate children and not to Manuel Azores or to petitioner.

Hence, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custody of the originals of the will and of the codicil, they alone could, had the right and where bound by law to apply for the probate of their father's last will.

[2] In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and for the administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege, in addition to the residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that the


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applicant is the executor in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated. The original of said document must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the non-‐representation of said original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as these requisites had not been complied with in the application filed by the petitioner, the respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in dismissing the application in question. Salazar v. CFI, 64 Phil 785 (1937) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • Petitioner instituted spec proceedings for the probate of his mother’s will dated May 13 1924. • Respondent filed an “Opposition-‐ Counter petition” and submitted another will dated May 11

1930 allegedly made by the same person. • The Court ruled that the respondent should initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the

second will. • On MR, the court set aside its previous ruling and ordered the two probate proceedings

consolidated. ISSUE : WON the court acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counter-‐petition for the probate of the second will, or to set the same for hearing of said will to be held in the same proceeding jointly with the first will, on the ground that the respondent had not previously filed her pleading nor paid the fees of the clerk of court fixed by section 788 of the Code of Civil Procedure. HELD: • The Court has Jurisdiction • A Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is shown by evidence

before it: (1) That a person has died leaving a will; (2) in the case of a resident of this country, that he died in the province where the court exercises territorial jurisdiction; (3) in the case of a nonresident, that he has left a estate in the province where the court is situated, and (4) that the testament or last will of the deceased has been delivered to the court and is in the possession thereof.

• According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that the court has acquired jurisdiction to probate the second will, in view of the presence of all the jurisdictional facts above-‐stated. The respondent's counter-‐petition should, in this case, be considered as a petition for the probate of the second will, the original of which was filed by her on July 20, 1937

• The payment of the fees of the clerk of court for all services to be rendered by him in connection with the probate of the second will and for the successive proceedings to be conducted and others to be issued, in accordance with section 788, as amended, is not jurisdiction in the sense that its omission does not deprive the court of its authority to proceed with the probate of a will, as expressly provided for by section 630. It is the inevitable duty of the court, when a will is presented to it, to appoint hearing for its allowance and to cause notice thereof to be given by publication. The duty imposed by said section is imperative and noncompliance therewith would be a mockery at the law and at last will of the testator. Section 785 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended recently by Act No. 3250, permits the remission or postponement of the payment of the clerk's fees in cases of poverty, at the discretion of the court, and if this were done in one case and the payment of the fees for filing the application were jurisdictional, is claimed, then the court, in admitting the will to probate and in allowing it, would have acted entirely without jurisdiction. Finally, it should be taken into consideration that the court, in this case, did not exempt the respondents from paying the fees in question but merely failed to make provision therefore


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• When the court ordered that the second will be set for hearing that publication be made thereof

and that said will be heard in the same proceeding jointly with the first will, it merely ordered the consolidation of the two applications and the two hearing on the probate of both wills, instead of conducting separate hearing, undoubtedly because it understood that the form so chosen was the most convenient for the parties and their attorneys.

• There are three ways of consolidation action or special proceedings where the questions at issue and the parties in interest are the same. The first consists in recasting the cases already instituted, conducting only one hearing and rendering only one decision; the second takes place when the existing cases are consolidated, only one hearing held and only one decision rendered; and the third takes place when, without recasting or consolidating the cases, the principal one is heard, the hearing on the others being suspended until judgment has been rendered in the first case. The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may adopt any of these three forms of consolidation whenever in its opinion the proceeding is beneficial to and convenient for the parties. The power so exercised is discretionary. In the case under consideration, the court acquired jurisdiction from the moment the counter-‐petition was presented and the second will came to its possession and under its control and, consequently, it likewise had full discretion to order, as it did, the probate thereof in the proceeding already instituted for the purpose of rendering later only one decision. It should furthermore be taken into consideration that the consolidation so ordered was the form most convenient for and beneficial to the parties as well as to the court because if the first will were opposed on the ground that it was revoked by the second will, the best evidence of the revocation would be said second will and once the publications are made, if the second will was executed with the formalities prescribed by law, the court could order the probate thereof, without the necessity of multiplying the proceedings.

Perez v. Perez, 105 Phil 1132 (1959) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

This case involves an appeal with respect to the summary settlement of the estate Carida Perez. In their appeal the oppositors-‐appellants insist the lower court did not "acquire jurisdiction to receive the evidence for the allowance of the alleged will" because two heirs (Melanio Perez, Jr. and Milagros Perez) had not been notified in advance of such will. In reply, the petitioner-‐appellee says the persons mentioned were not entitled to notice, since they were not forced heirs — grandnephew and niece — and had not been mentioned as legatees or devisees in the will of the deceased (Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil., 448). And as to Milagros Perez, petitioner asserts that notice had been addressed to her last known residence in this country. ISSUE and HELD:

1. Whether or not the appeal was proper: NO It does the summary settlement of a testate estate worth P6,000.00 according to petitioner,

or P10,000 according to oppositors, it should not have been brought directly to this Court from the Iloilo Court of First Instance, inasmuch as several questions of fact are raised in relation with testimonial evidence: for example, the soundness of the mind of the testatrix and her freedom from constraint in signing the will. The jurisdictional question directly appealable to this Court refers to jurisdiction over the subject matter, not mere jurisdiction over the persons, (Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil., 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil., 676; Sy Oa vs. Co Ho, 74 Phil., 239.)

2. Whether or not the Court acquire jurisdiction: YES The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested in the estate through the publication

of the petition in the newspapers (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 159; Joson vs. Nable, supra) — which in this case admittedly took place. Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees


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is a matter of procedural convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. (Joson vs. Nable, supra) So much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not adviced — the decree allowing the will does not ipso facto become void for want of jurisdiction. (Nicholson vs. Leathan, 153 Pacific Reports, 965; Moran, Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., Vol. II, p. 355; see also In re Estate of Johnson, supra, and Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil., 938.)

Wherefore, this record will be referred to the Court of Appeals for disposition in accordance with law. Abut v. Abut, 45 SCRA 326 (1972) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: 1) Generoso Abut (petitioner), child of deceased Cipriano from 2nd marriage, executor in deceased’s alleged will, filed a petition for approval of will and letters testamentary. Court set hearing. 2) Opposition was filed by Felipe Abut (oppositors) and other children from 1st marriage . Generoso Abut died before Court could start formal hearing so Gavina Abut (sister) asked Court to substitute her. 3) Court dismissed Generoso’s petition w/o prejudice to filing another pursuant to Rules of Court. ISSUE: W/N the probate court correctly dismissed the petition simply because the original petitioner (executor Generoso) died before the petition could be heard and/or terminated (did death of Generoso divest the court of jurisdiction on the theory that amended petition of substitute sister required new publication)? HELD: NO, probate court incorrect in dismissing petition. 1) When court vested w/ jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of the original petition and upon compliance with Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of Rules of Court 2) Jurisdiction of the court continues until termination of the case and remains unaffected by subsequent events. Parties who could have come in and opposed the original petition as what Felipe, et. al. did, could still come in and oppose, having already been notified of the pendency of proceeding by the publication of the notice. 3) Jurisdiction over persons interested, how acquired: A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. All that sec. 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs (additional heirs names in the amended petition but not included in the original petition) be notified of the hearing for the probate of the will, either mail or personally. 4) Effect of absence of notice to individual heirs: Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of procedural convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. So much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not advised -‐-‐ the decree allowing the will does not ipso facto become void for want of jurisdiction De Aranz v. Galing, 161 SCRA 628 (1988) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Joaquin R-‐Infante filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for probate and allowance of the last will and testament of Monserrat R-‐Infante y G-‐Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses of the petitioners as lagatees and devisees. The probate court then issued an order setting the petition for hearing. This order was published in “Nueva Era” a newspaper of general circulation


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once a week for three consecutive weeks. Joaquin was then allowed to present evidence ex-‐parte and was appointed executor.

The petitioners filed an MR alleging that as named legatees no notices were sent to them as

required by Section 4 of Rule 76 and they prayed that they be given time to file their opposition. This was denied. ISSUE:

Whether or not the requirement under Section 4, Rule 76 is mandatory and the omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion? HELD: YES RATIO:

It is clear for the Rule that notice in time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated, or other known heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such place of residence be known.

In this case, there is no question that the places of residence of the petitioners are known to the probate court. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.

4. RULE 77 -‐ Allowance of Will Proved Outside of Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder • CIVIL CODE, Articles 815 to 817

Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. (n)

Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (n)

Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n)

Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil 610 (1930) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from the denial of probate of the last will and testament of the deceased. The will was alleged to be executed in and under the laws of West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction. ISSUE:

Whether or not the will should be allowed probate in the Philippines despite the absence of proof showing compliance with the laws of West Virginia for the execution of wills? HELD: NO.


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The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. Such laws must be

proved as facts. There was no was printed or published copy under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as required by the law. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. There was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine, it would then be the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means. Leon v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., 90 Phil 459 (1951) -----------------------------------------------------------------------


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Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon, 490 SCRA 140 (2006) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who

have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will bequeathing properties to Richard, and was assigned as the executor. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.

• In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey Daygon (respondent), with whom he had 2 children.

• In Oct. 1982, Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties (1) real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.

• On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.

• Richard’s will was admitted to probate on July 1986 in RTC Makati. • Petitioner filed for a project for partition of Audrey’s estate, ¾ of Makati property to Richard and

¼ to Kyle. The motion wa granted, hence , the issuance of title in favor of the two. • Meanwhile the Ancilliary administrator also filed a project of partition as regards Richard’s share

on the Makati property, 2/5 to the wife and 3/5 to the children. This was opposed by the respondent on ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

• RTC ruled in favor of the respondent (1988). In Oct. 1993, Respondent filed an amended complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty by the ancilliary administrator for failure to consider the laws of the State of Maryland.

• Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.

ISSUE: W/N the ancilliary administrator acted in good faith

HELD: No In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC

Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of


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good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will, and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to partition and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-‐year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-‐888 were all done in 1991. Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-‐888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.

While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.

5. Rule 78 - Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and To Whom Issued

RULE 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION, WHEN AND TO WHOM ISSUED

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. — No person in competent


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to serve as executor or administrator who:

(a) Is a minor;

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

Section 2. Executor of executor not to administer estate. — The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator.

Section 3. Married women may serve. — A married woman may serve as executrix or administratrix, and the marriage of a single woman shall not affect her authority so to serve under a previous appointment.

Section 4. Letters testamentary issued when will allowed. — When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust, and gives bond as required by these rules.

Section 5. Where some coexecutors disqualified others may act. — When all of the executors named in a will can not act because of incompetency, refusal to accept the trust, or failure to give bond, on the part of one or more of them, letters testamentary may issue to such of them as are competent, accept and give bond, and they may perform the duties and discharge the trust required by the will.

Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Matute v. CA, 26 SCRA 768 (1969) -----------------------------------------------------------------------


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Note: The decision involves 3 separate petitions for certiorari which have intertwined issues, but this is the part related to Rule 78. FACTS:

Carlos S. Matute, filed in the settlement of the Matute estate a petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-‐administrator and his (Carlos') appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that Matias neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his administration, and that he is incompetent and negligent in the administration of the estate because of a murder case filed against him which is occupying most of his time.

Matias filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence with the express reservation of his right to produce his own evidence should the court deny his motion, but the probate court issued an order removing Matias as co-‐administrator and appointing Petitioner as the new administrator. Matias now questions the legality of the lower court’s order. ISSUE:

Whether or not Jose has the right to co-‐administer the entire estate HELD: YES

The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court. In the case at bar, we are constrained, however to nullify the disputed order of removal because it is indubitable that the probate judge ousted the respondent from his trust without affording him the full benefit of a day in court, thus denying him his cardinal right to due process. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the controverted order removing the respondent as co-‐administrator without giving him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. Even without the respondent's reservation, it was the duty of the probate judge to schedule the presentation and reception of the respondent's evidence before disposing of the case on the merits because only the movants at that time had presented their evidence.

Even granting arguendo that the removal of Matias is free from infirmity, this Court is not prepared to sustain the validity of the appointment of the petitioner in place of the former. To start with, the record does not disclose that any hearing was conducted, much less that notices were sent to the other heirs and interested parties. The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all known heirs and other interested parties as to the date thereof is essential to the validity of the proceeding for the appointment of an administrator in order that no person may be deprived of his right or property without due process of law. Moreover, a hearing is necessary in order to fully determine the suitability of the applicant to the trust, by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors, if any, to contest the said application.

The provision of Rule 83 that if "there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person," cannot be used to justify the institution of Petitioner even without a hearing, because such institution has no factual basis considering that there was a general administrator who remained in charge of the affairs of the Matute estate after the removal of Matias. The abovecited provision evidently envisions a situation when after the removal of the incumbent administrator no one is left to administer the estate, thus empowering the probate court, as a matter of necessity, to name a temporary administrator (or caretaker), pending the


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appointment of a new administrator after due hearing. Such circumstance does not obtain in the case at bar.

We hold that the controverted order removing Matias as co-‐administrator and appointing Jose as new administrator is a nullity and must therefore be set aside in its entirety. NB: With regard to the jurisdictional issue, the SC held that “the scope of a co-‐administrator's trust encompasses the entire estate and is co-‐extensive in effect with those of the other administrators; consequently, the value of the entire estate should be the proper basis of the jurisdictional amount irrespective of the value of the particular property or assets of the estate which are the objects of a separate administration pending the settlement proceedings.” Since the value of the entire estate is not within the jurisdiction of the CA, then the CA cannot issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by the Petitioner. Medina v. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 206 (1973) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: Judge Augusto M. Amores in an order dated March 6, 1970, wherein it approved and confirmed the deed of sale executed on May 8, 1969 by then special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina covering the sale of its property known as "Bitukang Manok" for P24,000.00 to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, a daughter-‐heir of the decedent. The petitioners in this case now challenges the lower court's orders appointing private respondent Beda Gonzales as special administrator of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina, the Court excludes the said special administrator from interfering in the possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as "Bitukang Manok" by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen to whom the said property had been sold, and full payment therefor received, by the estate through Gonzales' predecessor (Demetrio Encarnacion). The petitioners are questioning the appointment of Gonzales as special administrator of the estate. Hence, the court then in lieu of Gonzales appointed its clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de Castro, Jr. as "special administrator and to qualify immediately as such. ISSUES:

1. W/ON Gonzales should be disqualified as Special Administrator 2. W/ON the Clerk of Court is a proper Administrator

HELD: The established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed

where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts with such right and duly.

Also the Court does not look with favor on such practice of clerks of court or other court employees being appointed as administrators of estates of decedents pending settlement before the probate court. The objectivity and impartiality of such clerks of court or other employees so appointed as administrators in discharging their regular functions may be easily compromised by extraneous considerations. Furthermore, because of the administrator's fees and compensation payable to them, it is not inconceivable that self-‐interest intrudes and consciously or unconsciously, obstacles are placed against the prompt settlement and termination of the proceedings in derogation of the primordial purpose of the law to strive to have the estate settled expeditiously and promptly so that the benefits that may flow there from may be immediately enjoyed by the decedent's heirs


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and beneficiaries. Probate courts are therefore enjoined to desist from such practice of appointing their clerks of court or other court employees as administrators or receivers of estates or the like.

On this consideration (the replacement of the clerk of court) and on the further consideration of the specific and limited powers of special administrators and that their appointment merely temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is duly appointed, the Court has resolved to allow the appointment of respondent Gonzales as special administrator to stand, insofar as taking care of the other properties of the estate are concerned, to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property already sold by the estate to petitioner Rosalia del Carmen.

Baluyut v. Paño 71 SCRA 86 (1976) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • Issues regarding the estate of Sotero Baluyot are in dispute. • His nephew Alfredo filed with the CFI a petition for letters of administration. He alleges that the

widow of Sotero is mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the estate. • The widow Encarnacion opposed. • Alfredo alleges the existence of a will, although none was yet presented in court. Encarnacion

denies the existence of a will. • Alfredo and Jose Espino (an acknowledged natural child of decedent) are appointed special

administrator. • Encarnacion filed an urgent motion to be declared administratrix. • Alfredo alleges that a court of competent jurisdiction declared Encarnacion ‘an incompetent’ in

proceedings for guardianship over Encarnacion Baluyot. • During the hearing on Encarnacion’s motion, no oral or documentary evidence was presented to

prove her capacity. Encarnacion was merely examined by the CFI by asking questions. • Encarnacion also alleges that Alfredo has no legal standing to in the estate proceedings of Sotero,

being a mere nephew and therefore excluded by the acknowledged natural child Jose Espino. • The CFI appointed Encarnacion as administratrix, reasoning that Alfredo has no interest in the

proceedings because the Rules of Court provides that the surviving spouse enjoys preference in the administration of the estate.

• Alfredo files for certiorari. ISSUE:

Whether Encarnacion is a qualified to be an administratrix despite the allegations of incompetency. HELD: The CFI erred in appointing Encarnacion without a hearing as to her competency.

Jurisprudence provides that the suitability of the potential administrator requires a hearing where he will prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest. This was not present in this case. Alfredo was not given a chance to contest Encarnacions competency despite the issue being squarely raised. Whether Sotero died intestate or otherwise, Encarnacion’s fitness to act as executrix or administratrix should be determined in a hearing.

A will was indeed found; the intestate proceedings should be converted to probate proceedings. Encarnacion was designated executrix and Alfredo was instituted as an heir. Alfredo, therefore, has legal standing to file the case.

Gabriel v. CA, 212 SCRA 413 (1992)


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----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: 9 months after Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, Roberto Dindo Gabriel (RDG) filed with the RTC Manila, a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. RDG mentioned 8 of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the decedent.

The court thereafter issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on which date all persons interested may show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The court further directed the publication of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order appointing RDG as administrator of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of the decedent was published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of RDG, filed a "Motion to File Claim of the Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that the decision in a civil case between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate.

On December 1988, RDG filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and Appraisal". On February 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued to RDG and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein petitioners.

On September 1989, the probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners on the ground that they had not shown any circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the person who was appointed administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable under these circumstances. MR Denied. Certiorari was filed, and likewise denied. ISSUE:

W/N the appointment of RDG as administrator of the estate runs contrary to the order of preference set forth in Sec 6 Rule 78 of the ROC.—not really. (SC modified its decision and appointed RDG and the widow of the deceased as co-‐administrators) HELD:

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.

This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. On this ground


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alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-‐Gabrie (FJB), the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.

RDG however, argues that FJB may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules. It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for 30 days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration.

In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-‐Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-‐day period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors."

On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.

In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of RDG. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time.

On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice.

"Also, co-‐administration herein will constitute recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may further be expected from RDG for the same estate.

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-‐administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-‐Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-‐administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court. Silverio v. CA, 304 SCRA 541 (1999) -----------------------------------------------------------------------


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(Doctrines: the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances; the probate court, in the exercise of its dis-‐cretion may disregard the order of preference to the administration set forth in the Rules of Court; the probate court is not vested with the power to order the special ad-‐ministrator to sell real properties of the estate pending determination of the validity of the regular administrator’s appointment.) FACTS: • Beatriz Silverio (deceased) died intestate survived by:

a.) Ricardo Silverio (husband) – also the petitioner b.) Edmundo Silverio (son) c.) Edgardo Silverio (son) – also the private respondent d.) Ricardo Silverio, Jr. (son) e.) Nelia Silverio (daughter) f.) Ligaya S. dela Merced (daughter)

• After three (3) years, the p. respondent filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the RTC of Makati.

• After a couple of days (16), he also filed an Urgent Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator.

• The Judge (also a respondent) issued the Order appointing p. respondent as a Special Administrator.

• Petitioner interposed his opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration. (take note that Petitioner did not interpose an opposition to the urgent petition for appointment of special administrator.)

• The Petitioner however did not appear on the date of his reception of evidence. • The respondent Judge declared that the failure of petitioner to appear and adduce evidence on

his behalf amounted to a waiver of his right to present evidence. • Following this, the respondent judge also appointed the p. respondent as the regular

administrator. • The petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the

annulment of the orders appointing p. respondent as special and regular administrator. • The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. • Hence this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: • Whether or not Section 6, Rule 78 of the revised rules of court provides that the surviving spouse

takes precedence exclusive of and over all other heirs of the deceased in the appointment of the administrator.

HELD: • No. The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant

facts and circumstances. • In the case of Esler vs. Tad-Y, 46 Phil. 854, the court answered in the affirmative the query

whether the probate court, in the exercise of its discretion, may disregard the order of preference to the administration set forth in the Rules of Court. The trial court has the discretion to issue the letters of administrator to any of the persons mentioned in said section and unless there has been an abuse of discretion, such appointment shall not be revoked.

Angeles v. Maglaya, 469 SCRA 364 (2005) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:


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On March 25, 1998, respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her

appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles. Petitioner opposed the petition and prayed that she be made the administratrix of Francisco's estate. Petitioner alleged having married Francisco on August 7, 1948, and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco's legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, records of marriages of the Civil Registrar where the alleged 1938 Francisco-‐Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. Respondent presented her birth certificate and four witnesses. After presentation of evidence, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. RTC granted the motion. It was reversed by the CA and made the respondent the administratix. ISSUE:

Whether the respondent was a legitimate child of the decedent? Is she entitled to be an administratix? HELD: No.

A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-‐emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefore, i.e., that the child's parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract, doubtless the best evidence of Francisco's and Genoveva's marriage, if one had been solemnized, was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco's daughter.

Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion ' as well as the appellate court's conclusion -‐ that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. Respondent declared that Genoveva died in 1988, then if there was a legitimate marriage between Francisco and Genenova in 1938, the 1948 wedding between Francisco and petitioner would be void and the petitioner would not be considered an heir of the deceased. However, it was still declared by the respondent’s petition that the only surviving heirs of the deceased was the respondent herself as the daughter and the petitioner as the surviving spouse of the deceased, thus negating her own stand.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of 'next of kin', the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.


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Delgado v. Rustia, 480 SCRA 334 (2006) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado and Lucio Campo, both of whom were never married. Five other children were born to the couple who are full-‐blood siblings of Josefa and natural children of Felisa. Felisa also had another son with another man (Ramon Osorio) named Luis Delgado. Josefa Delgado died on September 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives.

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. Petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as an unmarried woman. They never had any children but took into their home Guillermina and Nanie. They were never legally adopted but was known in the local dialect as ampun-‐ampunan. Guillermina was alleged to be the illegitimate child of Guillermo with another woman.

Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not mean that no marriage transpired and that Guillermina was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child and such right had prescribed upon the death of Guillermo. They maintain that Guillermo and Josefa were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, they presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity dated December 1, 1944 issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia; 2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947; 3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself swore to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado. Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila. This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-‐ampunan Guillermina Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-‐blood relative Josefa Delgado. Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors, the motion was granted.

The RTC ruled that petitioner and her co-‐claimants are entitled to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado and declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado. Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto. As the estates of both decedents have not as yet been settled, a single administrator was appointed in the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa. LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION were issued to CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of P500,000.00.

Upon appeal in the CA said court reversed the decision. ISSUES:


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1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado; 2. who

the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are; 3. who should be issued letters of administration. HELD: First issue: The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed

between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses." These arguments are very persuasive.

Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage. Second Issue: The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

Since Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-‐blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.

The SC ruled that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-‐blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-‐blood relation. The court ruled that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them.

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia Intervenor Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be

entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or


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mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family; On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a

statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition

through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing. There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any judicial action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. Therefore the right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia. Third Issue: Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the

estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-‐administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

The SC found it fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court. Uy v. Court of Appeals, 484 SCRA 699 (2006) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: Lilia Hofilena was appointed the special administrator of the estate of the deceased Jose Uy. Wilson Uy, petitioner-‐son of the deceased, opposed this appointment. He moved for the revocation of


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the appointment with the prayer that he be appointed the administrator of the estate. The court revoked the appointment of Lilia Hofilena and issued letter of administration to the petitioner. Johnny Uy, brother of the deceased, filed a motion to intervene. While at first he was denied by the court to do so, he was later appointment co-‐administrator of the estate together with the petitioner. Petitioner then moved that private respondent bring into the estate properties belonging to the deceased, which motion was granted by the trial court. Not satisfied with the compliance of private respondent, petitioner reiterated his motion for removal of the former as co-‐administrator, but the same was denied. The Court of Appeals similarly denied his petition on the ground that: “appointment of private respondent was justified; that the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators; that the institution of a case for annulment of title and reconveyance against respondent does not justify private respondent’s removal as co-administrator.” ISSUE: whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent as co-‐administrator to the estate of the deceased HELD:

There is no question that petitioner was appointed as regular administrator of the estate of the deceased Jose K. C. Uy. However, private respondent in his motion to intervene sought to be appointed as administrator as he is not only the brother of the decedent but also a creditor who knows the extent of the latter’s properties. Thus, the trial court, while retaining petitioner as administrator, appointed private respondent as co-‐administrator of the estate.

The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. In the case at bar, the trial court granted letters of administration to petitioner and thereafter to private respondent as co-‐administrator. The preference to whom letters of administration may be granted are stated in Section 6 of Rule 78. However, the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In Sioca v. Garcia, this Court set aside the order of preference, to wit:

It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error. x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. x x x.12 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court. Instead of

removing petitioner, it appointed private respondent, a creditor, as co-‐administrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report regarding the estate under his administration.

A co-‐administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. The practice of appointing co-‐administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited.

6. Rule 79 - Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary, Petition and Contest for Letters of Administration


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RULE 79 OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTER TESTAMENTARY, PETITION AND CONTEST FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION

Section 1. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. — Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Section 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

Section 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. — When a petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

Section 4. Opposition to petition for administration. — Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency of the person for whom letters are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or person named in the opposition.

Section 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. — At the hearing of the petition, it must first be shown that notice has been given as hereinabove required, and thereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left no will, or that there is no competent and willing executor, it shall order the issuance of letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto.

Section 6. When letters of administration granted to any applicant. — Letters of administration may be granted to any qualified applicant, though it appears that there are other competent persons having better right to the administration, if such persons fail to appear when notified and claim the issuance of letters to themselves.


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Trillana v. Crisostomo, 89 Phil 710 (1951) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Crisostomo and others appealed the denial of their petition for relief of judgment of the probate of the will of the deceased. They alleged that the judgment allowing the probate of the later will was procured by fraud, that the court erred when it didn't set a date for proving the probate of the August 1948 will and the failure to prove was due to the court's own fault and negligence. HELD:

The petitioners-‐ appellants having failed to show that the judgment of the lower court of January 5, 1948, probating the will of testatrix of October 19, was obtained through fraud, the lower court did not commit any error in denying the appellant's petition for relief under sec. 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and therefore it is not necessary for us to discuss and pass upon the other propositions of the appellant.

Besides, even assuming without deciding, that under sec. 3 of Rule 77, the court shall set aside a date for proving a will even without petition when it is delivered to the, court having jurisdiction, as contended by the appellants, the lower court was right in not setting a date for proving the will of August 16, 1948, because this will was expressly and absolutely revoked by the will of October 19, 1948, executed by the same executrix or deceased, which was filed for allowance on November 1, 1948, with the same court. According to the attorneys for the appellant, the will dated August 16, 1948, was sent together with a writing called "Manifestation" by registered mail on October 30, 1948, from Manila to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, by Attorney Mr. Tomas V. Barnes, and said will must have been received by the Clerk of Said Court on or after November 1, 1948, the date when the subsequent will of October 19, was filed for probate. It stands to reason that if two wills are presented for allowance but one of them revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the latter subsequent will, because it would be a waste of time to allow the revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is allowed. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed. Gutierrez v. Villegas, 5 SCRA 313 (1962) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

Irene Santos died and was survived by her husband and two nieces, daughters of her deceased brother. Her husband filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, naming himself and the two nieces as the surviving heirs of the decedent. He was later named by the court as administrator. Thereafter, an unverified manifestation was filed by Adela Gutierrez, one of the nieces, in court, attesting to a deed of assignment conveying all her interest in participating in the proceedings to her sister. On a later date however, another manifestation was filed by Adela, alleging that the deed of assignment mentioned in the earlier filed manifestation was procured by the administrator by fraud and that she signed the same by mistake. She alleged that she was misled by the husband in signing said manifestation in exchange for money loaned to her by her sister, and that she continuously seeks to participate in the intestate proceedings of her aunt. She then filed a motion to transfer the special proceedings in the same branch where a case for the nullity of deed of assignment was filed. This motion was denied. Adela then sought that the administrator be ordered to furnish her all records of the proceedings. The administrator opposed this on the ground of the earlier filed manifestation. The court ordered in favor of the administrator. HELD:


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It cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the

proceedings in question. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate, it was established at the time of death of Irene Santos. While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pending. Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-‐heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No serious argument can be offered to deny the co-‐heirship of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution of the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance. The motion in question is not one of intervention, but solely a plea to enforce a right and that is to receive pleadings and orders related to the case. Evidently, the use of the word "intervention" in the manifestation and pleadings presented by Adela was resorted to for want of another appropriate word. In effect, all she wanted to convey was that she should participate or continue taking part in the case for being an original party therein. It was her belief that in filing the manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings (but which she later informed the court to have been secured thru fraud), her standing might have been affected. Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings. The aforementioned circumstances do not fit Adela as she was not a third party to the proceedings but rather, an original party therein. Duran v. Duran, 20 SCRA 379 (1967) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: Pio Duran died intestate. His alleged heirs are Josefina Duran (surviving spouse) and brothers

and sisters, nephews and nieces. Cipriano Duran, Pio's brother, executed a Deed of Assignment renouncing his hereditary rights to

Pio's estate in favor of Josefina. He filed a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. He also filed an ex parte motion to be appointed special administrator.

Josefina opposed, saying Cipriano is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation; she asked to be appointed administratrix. In response, Cipriano alleged that Josefina Duran was not the decedent's wife and that the deed of assignment was procured thru fraud. Another brother, Miguel Duran, filed a petition to be joined as co-‐petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina moved to strike as an improper attempt to intervene in the case.

CFI: dismissed the petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest in the estate, based on the deed of transfer executed by Cipriano. The court declared itself without power to examine in said proceedings, collaterally, the alleged fraud, inadequacy of price & lesion that would render it rescissible/voidable. Miguel's petition was also dismissed. Cipriano & Miguel appealed to the SC.

HELD: SC affirmed the dismissal order.


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The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and settlement of an estate

must be filed by an "interested person" (See. 2, Rule 79). Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-‐participating heirs only. Should it be contended that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is left without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for settlement proceedings. Also, since there was really no settlement proceedings in the first place, the petition to intervene must be denied.

Difference with Santos doctrine: Santos case held that the assigning heir remains an interested person. That case involved an assignment between co-‐heirs pendente lite, during the course of settlement proceedings. Given that the settlement court had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate, any assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court. And since the approval the court is not deemed final until the estate is closed the assigning heir remains an interested person in proceedings even after said approval, which can be vacated is given. In the instant case, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings was pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court.

7. Rule 80 - Special Administrator • See also Section 8, Rule 86

RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

Section 1. Appointment of special administrator. — When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

Section 3. When powers of special administrator cease. Transfer of effects. Pending suits. — When letters testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate of the deceased, the powers of the special administrator shall cease, and he shall forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator the goods, chattels, money, and estate of the deceased in his hands. The executor or administrator may prosecute to final judgment suits commenced by such special administrator.

RULE 86 CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE Section 8. Claim of executor or administrator against an estate. — If the executor or administrator


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has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator, who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such claim.

De Guzman v. Guadiz, 96 SCRA 938 (1980) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS:

De Guzman filed a petition for the probate of a will. Villegas filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition contending that the properties are now owned by them. The respondent judge Guadiz, resolved to defer resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall have presented their evidence;

A motion for the appointment of a special administrator was filed by De Guzman alleging that the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor; that the decedent's estate consists of 80 hectares of agricultural rice land with P50,000.00 worth of rice harvested twice a year; that somebody representing the estate should collect and receive the palay harvests pending the probate of the will;

Hon. Guadiz denied the motion for appointment of a special administrator on the ground that appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the necessity of enabling somebody to take care of the properties where there is a considerable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator. In the present case, since the properties covered by the will are in the possession of the Villegas who claim to be the owners thereof, the Court sees no necessity of appointing a special administrator.

De Guzman filed a motion for certiorari on the ground that Hon. Guadiz acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying De Guzman’s motion for the appointment of a special administrator ISSUE:

Whether the facts warrant the appointment of a special administrator of the estate pending resolution of motion to dismiss and/or opposition? HELD:

Yes, a special administrator should be appointed. Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides -‐ When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.

The basis for appointing a special administrator is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.

The reason for appointing a special administrator rests in the fact that estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim. Principal


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object of appointment of special administrator is to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.

It appears that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an immediate need for a special administrator to protect the interests of the estate as regards the products. The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the appointment of a special administrator in this case because the respondents are already in possession of the properties covered by the will. The respondent judge has failed to distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants from that of the neutral possession of the special administrator under the Rules of Court. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. Heirs of Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, 474 SCRA 747 (2005) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • One Crisanta Gabriel died leaving a sizable estate • A little over a month after Crisanta's death, her mother, Crisanta Santiago Vda. de Yanga,

commenced an intestate proceeding alleging, among others, that to her knowledge, her daughter died intestate leaving an estate with an estimated net value of P1,500,000.00 and that such estate was being managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-‐in-‐law, Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent persons.

• She prayed that letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the brother of the deceased, and that she be awarded her share of the estate of her daughter after due hearing; However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator

• Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-‐Gabriel and Lorenzo Almoradie was declared void for being bigamous; The RTC then removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his stead

• On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor, alleging that he discovered his mother's will on October 25, 1989 in which he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and designated as alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter sometime in 1985 or 1986

• On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died; the heirs of Belinda filed a Motion praying that they be substituted as party-‐litigants in lieu of their late mother Belinda, who died in 1990.

• The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated; On May 15, 1991, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the intestate proceedings

• On July 8, 1991, the probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of his mother's estate

• On April 16, 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a 'Manifestation and Motion where she informed the probate court of her husband's death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well. She alleged that she had a bachelor's degree in law and had worked for several years in a law office.

• the heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores' manifestation and motion, averring that Dolores was not Crisanta Gabriel's next of kin, let alone the lawful wife of the late Roberto, which Dolores refuted

• In a Resolution dated December 5, 2001, the lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix upon a bond of P200,000.00. The probate court merely noted the motion for


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substitution filed by the heirs of Belinda, stating that they were 'mere strangers to the case and that their cause could better be ventilated in a separate proceeding

ISSUE: W/N it was proper for the Court to appoint Dolores as the special adiministrator of Crisanta’s

estate HELD: Yes RATIO: • The petitioners argue that since the respondent does not have any right to inherit from their

grandmother, either by her own right or by the right of representation, she is not qualified to be appointed as administratrix of the estate; in contrast, they are Crisanta Gabriel's only compulsory heirs.

• They insist that the respondent's late husband, Roberto, was just a nephew of the decedent and not a legally adopted son as he claimed to be.

• Even assuming this claim was true, the fact that the respondent is not naturally related to the decedent by blood in the direct descending line makes it unfair to appoint her as the special administratrix.

• Citing jurisprudence, the petitioners explain that the principal consideration in the appointment of administrator of a deceased person's estate is the applicant's interest therein.

• This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of such administrators.

• The underlying assumption behind this rule, the petitioners insist, is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.

• In ruling against the petitioners and dismissing their petition, the CA ratiocinated as follows: The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the discretion of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. In the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court determines who is entitled to the administration of the estate of the decedent. On this point, We hold that the preference of private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient reason.

• The facts of this case show that Roberto Gabriel ' the legally adopted son of Crisanta Yanga Gabriel ' survived Crisanta's death. When Crisanta died on January 25, 1989, her estate passed on to her surviving adopted son Roberto. When Roberto himself later died on April 16, 2001, pursuant to the law on succession, his own estate which he inherited from Crisanta passed on to his surviving widow, private respondent.

• While it is true, as petitioners submit, that private respondent is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir of Crisanta Yanga-‐Gabriel and is considered a third person to the estate of Crisanta, nonetheless, private respondent is undeniably entitled to the administration of the said estate because she is an heir of her husband Roberto, whose estate is the former estate of his adopting mother Crisanta.

• The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court.

• A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed.

• When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court.


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• As such officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is expected

to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement.

• The principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.

• In many instances, the appointment of administrators for the estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great waste and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed.

• The occasion for such an appointment, likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is delayed.

• The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court

• Under the above rule (Rule 80 Sec.1), the probate court may appoint a special administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.

• The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.

• It is obvious that the phrase 'by any cause includes those incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator.

• As enunciated above, the probate court has ample jurisdiction to appoint respondent as special administratrix.

• The deceased Crisanta Yanga-‐Gabriel left a document purporting to be her will where her adopted son, Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her properties.

• However, pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow, the respondent herein, as his sole heir.

• Thus, the respondent has much stake in Crisanta's estate in case the latter's will is allowed probate.

• It needs to be emphasized that in the appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the shares in the decedent's estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to administer the estate.

• The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution.


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• Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice,

equity or legal principle. • The petitioners' strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. The

rule refers to the appointment of regular administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to the appointment of a special administrator. It has long been settled that the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators.

8. Rule 81 - Bonds of Executor and Administrators

RULE 81 BONDS OF EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATORS

Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters. Amount. Conditions. — Before an executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows:

(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him;

(b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to the will of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his possession or to the possession of any other person for him, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed by the court;

(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within one (1) years, and at any other time when required by the court;

(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.

Section 2. Bond of executor where directed in will. When further bond required. — If the testator in his will directs that the executors serve without bond, or with only his individual bond, he may be allowed by the court to give bond in such sum and with such surety as the court approves conditioned only to pay the debts of the testator; but the court may require of the executor a further bond in case of a change in his circumstance, or for other sufficient case, with the conditions named in the last preceding section.

Section 3. Bonds of joint executors and administrators. — When two or more persons are appointed executors or administrators the court may take a separate bond from each, or a joint bond from all.

Section 4. Bond of special administrator. — A special administrator before entering upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account for such as are received by him when required by the court, and will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them.


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Mendoza v. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 134 (1937) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- FACTS: • Manuel SORIANO was former administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme. • He filed a bond for P5,000, with Januario PACHECO and Raymundo CORDERO as sureties. • SORIANO'S account, upon approval, showed him indebted to the estate in the sum of P23,603.21. • Unable to turn said amount over to the estate upon demand of the new administratix ROSARIO

Cosme, the CFI ordered the execution of SORIANO’s bond after notice was served upon the sureties.

• Sometime later, the CFI approved a settlement had between ROSARIO and SORIANO, whereby SORIANO ceded certain real properties to the estate, thereby reducing his indebtedness to the estate from P23,603.21 to P5,000.

• Subsequently, ROSARIO had the public sale thereof to collect this amount of P5,000. • Separate motions to be discharged from the bond were filed by PACHECO and CORDERO. • Both motions were denied, as well as an MR therefor. • This dismissal was appealed to the Supreme Court, but the SC dismissed (according to the SC, the

order for executing the bond was made in 1932 and the motion for discharge was filed in 1933: LATE!)

• Upon resumption of the case in the lower court, PACHECHO and CORDERO filed a motion challenging, for the first time, the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order for executing the bond.

• CFI denied. Thus, the instant case. ISSUE:

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order the execution of SORIANO’s bond, given that the trial court was only sitting as probate court. RULING: Yes, the CFI has jurisdiction.

It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so many words that such court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal term.

It is thus clear that a CFI, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-‐embracing power over the administrator's bond and over administration proceedings, a CFI in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed.

It should be observed that section 683 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of the account of an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person liable as surety in respect to such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a party to such accounting, and may have the right to appeal as hereinafter provided." There is here afforded to a person who may be held liable as surety in respect to an administrator's account the right, upon application, to be admitted as a party to their accounting, from which we may not unreasonably infer that a surety, like the appellants in the case before us, may be charged with liability upon the bond during the process of accounting, that is, within the recognized confines of probate proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct from such proceedings.

We take the view that the execution of an administrator's bond clearly stands upon a different footing and is as necessary a part and incident of the administration proceeding as the filing of such bond or the fixing of its amount. Particularly is this true in the present case where Soriano's indebtedness to the sate in the amount of P23,603.21, subsequently reduced to P5,000, is conceded


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on all sides, and all that the trial court had to do was to see that said amount was turned over to the estate. Justice Villareal’s Dissent

Chapter XXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is headed "Wills and the allowance thereof, and duties of executors", contains no provision concerning the enforcement of the liability of an executor or administrator on his bond and of that of his sureties. According to Art. 1853 of the Civil Code, "the guarantor may set up against the creditor all the defenses available to the principal debtor and which may be inherent in the debt; . . . ." In an administration bond the executor or administrator stands in the place of the principal debtor; his sureties may, therefore, set up all the defenses to which he may be entitled, and which are inherent in the obligation. The procedure by which such defenses may be set up is the ordinary one established by the said Code of Civil Procedure by means of an action in court wherein may contain general or special denial, a special defense or a counterclaim. The said Code has not established any special procedure by which an executor or administrator with a mere notice to his sureties does not afford them an adequate opportunity to set up the defenses which the law guarantees to them. To enforce the liability of an administrators and require them to file an adequate bond — is not only ultra vires but a violation of the constitutional inhibition that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty and property without due process of law. "The usual method of enforcing the liability on an administration bond is by an action brought on the bond in a court of law, although in some jurisdictions other forms of remedy are provided by statute, . . . ."

The only procedure by which the liability of an executor or administrator and his sureties be enforced on their bond is, therefore, by an ordinary action in court.

The failure of the sureties to appeal from the order of summary execution issued by the court below on their bond after a mere service of notice did not legalize said summary procedure and the order of summary execution issued by the lower court, which were otherwise illegal and ultra vires. The order appealed from ordering the summary execution of the bond filed by the sureties-‐appellants, together with the former administrator Ramon Soriano, was issued not only in excess of jurisdiction but without it, because it was not authorized by law.

Spec Pro 1

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