Recommendations for reforming the Iraqi SIV programSubmitted on behalf of practitioners and advocates 

November 1st, 2010   

 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In 2008, the Kennedy‐Lugar/Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act created a special immigrant visa 

(SIV) for Iraqis employed by the United States government (USG) or a contracting affiliate.1  

Despite this strong commitment, many problems have hampered the SIV program from the 

outset.  We propose the following reforms to help the USG make the SIV program for U.S.‐

affiliated Iraqis more effective and efficient. Our recommendations are compatible with the 

important goal of preserving American security, while streamlining and making more 

accountable the process by which our government fulfills its responsibility to these Iraqis. 

General Recommendations: A faster and simpler SIV process will better serve endangered 

Iraqis.  

Clear the Backlog: Provide temporary staff, particularly at the Chief of 

Mission (COM) approval stage, to clear the backlog of SIV applications. 

Set Benchmarks: Require agencies and contractors, especially at the COM 

approval stage, to process applications within a stated length of time. 

Provide Caseworkers: Replicate the simplicity of the Direct Access (P2) 

program by assigning a caseworker to assist the applicant in the SIV process.  

Allow Representation: Allow applicants to designate a legal representative 

to communicate with the USG on their behalves. 

Expedite Urgent Cases: Create transparent and formal expedited processing. 

Evacuate Life‐or‐Death Cases: Ensure that life‐or‐death cases are evacuated. 

Create a Point Person: Designate an individual to handle serious problems 

caused by action, inaction, or delay at all stages of the SIV process. 

Produce Required Reports: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

the Department of State (DOS) should produce statutorily required and long 

overdue reports on the SIV process. 

Update and Improve the FAQs: As procedural requirements change, the DOS FAQs should be updated promptly on both the English and Arabic sites.

Provide SIVs to Iraqis Who Worked For U.S. NGOs Pursuant to Grants: Allow Iraqis who worked for U.S. NGOs operating in Iraq pursuant to a grant, as opposed to a direct contract, from the USG to qualify for a SIV.

COM Approval: Bureaucratic delays and onerous requirements above and beyond what the law 

requires have made it difficult to obtain timely COM approval. 

                                                            1 Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, Pub. L. No. 110‐181, 122 Stat. 396, § 1244. 

 

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Keep Within the Legislation: Ensure that applicants do not face 

requirements beyond the scope of the legislation (or generally applicable 

immigration visa requirements). 

Reform or Remove Employment Contract Requirement: Do not require 

applicants to produce contracts between the USG and its contractors or its 

contractors and their subcontractors; recognize that contractors may have 

incomplete records, that the USG should be able to obtain copies of 

contracts to which it is a party, and that requesting a contract may put an 

applicant at risk. 

Create a Contractor, Subcontractor, and Employee Database: As the law 

requires, the USG should maintain a contractor, subcontractor and employee 

database.2  

Eliminate or Reform the HR Letter Requirement: This requirement provides 

essentially the same information as the supervisor recommendation, is 

onerous for applicants, produces lengthy delays, and is beyond the scope of 

the legislation. 

Allow Personal E‐mails from Recommenders: Recommenders may no longer 

have official e‐mail addresses, but their identity and affiliation with the 

applicant can be verified in other ways. 

Remove Inconsistent or Formalistic Requirements: Forms and 

recommendation letters and forms that fulfill all statutory requirements 

should be accepted.  

Assign One NVC Employee to Each Application: Having different NVC 

employees work on the same application results in duplicative and 

inconsistent requests. 

Improve Accountability for Legal Decisions: NVC employees often reach 

incorrect legal conclusions, and there is no established process to challenge 

the validity of these determinations. 

Assist with Locating Military and Other USG Supervisors: The government 

should assist applicants in locating U.S. military and government supervisors 

who have changed positions.  

Allow for Review of Denials: Like refugee applicants, SIV applicants should 

have the ability to request a review of a decision denying COM approval with 

a clear, formal review process. These reviews would reduce error and 

improve procedural consistency. 

                                                            2 The employee database, if created, must be extremely secure so as not to endanger the employees.  

 

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USCIS: USCIS adjudication of the I‐360 is a comparatively quick and efficient stage in the SIV 

process, but at least one aspect presents a needless and significant challenge to some 

applicants. 

Do Not Require Original Signatures: Sending materials by Iraqi post is 

unreliable, by overnight mail is expensive, through U.S. military mail is 

burdensome, and in all cases can place applicants in possible danger. 

NVC: Redundant or infeasible documentation requirements present challenges at the NVC 

stage for some applicants. 

Do Not Require Duplicative Documentation: Multiple requests for the same 

document and requests for different documents containing identical 

information needlessly delay the process. 

Require Police Certificates Only Where Feasible: Many countries only 

release police certificates to requestors in person, requiring additional travel 

and delays. 

Do Not Require Official Certified Translations: Finding an official, certified 

translator in Iraq can be dangerous and expensive. 

Embassy Interview, Security Clearance, & Departure: The administrative review process and 

problems with passports can create serious difficulties for applicants. 

Reform Administrative Review: Applicants receive no information regarding 

the reason for the administrative review or whom to contact about their 

application, and the review process can be quite lengthy (sometimes more 

than one year). 

Assist with Obtaining Passports: DOS should help approved applicants 

obtain necessary passports, as required under the law; DOS should waive the 

passport requirement for newborns and allow for use of refugee travel 

papers. 

Return Passports for Iraqis Outside of Iraq: Iraqis in foreign countries may 

face serious problems and require ID; DOS should not hold onto passports 

between the consular interview and visa issuance. 

Expedite Security Advisory Opinions and Other Security Checks for 

Applicants Under Serious Threat: Long (and often inexplicable) delays can 

further endanger applicants. 

Allow for Review of Denials: SIV applicants should have the ability to request 

a review of a decision denying consular approval with a clear, formal review 

 

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process. These reviews would reduce error and improve procedural 

consistency. 

 

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I. Introduction 

Section 1244 of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act authorized SIVs for Iraqis who have 

experienced an “ongoing serious threat” as a result of their employment “by or on behalf of the 

United States Government in Iraq.” In doing so, the law recognized an American interest in 

protecting Iraqis who have provided “faithful and valuable service” to the United States. 

But the process to obtain an SIV is a bureaucratic labyrinth that can take years to 

navigate, even for the small fraction of eligible Iraqis fortunate enough to have U.S. legal 

counsel. As a result, the SIV program has fallen short of its ideal. Although the law provides for 

5,000 SIVs per year for five years, as of June 30, 2010, the State Department had issued a total 

of 2,347 visas under Section 1244 to principal applicants.3  

Legal advocates for Iraqi refugees jointly propose the following pragmatic 

recommendations to address to the current SIV gridlock, emphasizing actions that are readily 

practicable and compatible with U.S. goals to safeguard national security while fulfilling its legal 

responsibility to U.S.‐affiliated Iraqi nationals. We begin with general recommendations for the 

SIV process and then address specific recommendations for different aspects of the process—

COM Approval, USCIS Processing, NVC Processing, Embassy Interview, Security Clearance, and 

Departure. 

II. General Recommendations 

In recent cases, the USG has taken well over a year to process SIVs for Iraqis living in 

grave danger. Furthermore, SIV applicants must meet high, sometimes impossible, burdens to 

demonstrate their eligibility for this visa. To improve the SIV process, the U.S. should: clear the 

backlog of current cases; set benchmarks for future cases; provide case workers; allow legal 

representation; expedite urgent cases; evacuate life or death cases; create a point person for 

the overall SIV process; produce required reports; improve FAQs for applicants; and amend 

implementing regulations to allow US‐affiliated Iraqis who worked for U.S. grantee 

organizations to be eligible for the SIV program. 

Clear the Backlog 

The SIV application process currently suffers from lengthy administrative delays during 

the initial processing stage for COM approval. As of September 2010, the NVC was telling 

                                                            3 Data as of June 30, 2010. State Department Fact Sheet available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/SQNumbers0610.pdf.  The State Department had also issued 2,341 SIVs to dependents.  This number does not count towards the 5,000 annual quota.   

 

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applicants that the processing time for COM approval of a completed application was 

approximately four months from the time that the applicant's application is “complete.” In 

practice, the time to obtain COM approval has routinely exceeded a year—applicants may face 

repeated delays of several months waiting to learn if their application is “complete,” only to 

have NVC or COM request additional documentation.4 In order to clear this backlog, the USG 

should provide temporary staff to eliminate the extended delays in the COM approval stage. 

The United States has previously employed this option when it acknowledged a “serious 

bottleneck to processing the SIV numbers . . . in 2009.”5 Temporary staff made great headway 

and were able to “all but eliminate” an existing backlog by February 2009.6 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Set Benchmarks 

As highlighted above, COM processing alone can take over a year – an unacceptable 

length of time for vulnerable Iraqis. The administration should look to overcome this inertia by 

setting a deadline for processing each case. Goal setting—even if it can seem arbitrary—both 

communicates the intention of the leadership clearly and fosters bottom‐up innovation. It has 

                                                            4 See the “COM Approval” section and case summaries below, as well as attached Appendices.  5 Memorandum from Richard A. Albright to Patricia A. Butenis (November 4, 2008), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 1 (April 26, 2010) (see appendix 2). 6 E‐mail from James Foley to Samuel M. Witten, et al. (Feb. 10, 2009), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 1 (April 26, 2010) (see appendix 2). 

FAILURE  TO  COMMUNICATE 

An Iraqi started working for a USAID contractor in October 2008. As a result, she received a 

threatening phone call stating that her son would be kidnapped if she did not leave her job. This was 

not the first time she had been targeted—she had already been shot in the chest and driven out of 

Baghdad for her work with the Iraqi and U.S. governments. She applied for COM approval in October 

2009, submitting employment verification and recommendation letters confirming that she had 

been employed for over a year. NVC sent her an email asking her to provide a detailed explanation 

as to how she avoided service in the Iraqi military. She noted that, as a woman, she was not required 

to serve in the Iraqi military. NVC then stated that she had not met the requirement for length of 

employment, so she resubmitted her letters and provided contact information for the HR 

department (which was already included in the HR verification letter). NVC asserted yet again that 

she had not met the time requirement. Out of an abundance of caution, she submitted an updated 

employment verification letter, dated March 2010, stating that she had been employed since 

October 2008. Months later, NVC emailed the woman’s supervisor to verify information for a second 

time.   The woman was not notified of the second verification request and her application was 

delayed while NVC  waited for a response. She eventually learned of this and informed NVC that the 

supervisor had recently left the company. She then had to submit a new recommendation letter. 

This individual received COM approval in September 2010, eleven months after submitting her 

application. By that time, she had already completed her IOM and DHS interviews in connection with 

her USRAP application and was just waiting for the medical test.

 

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also been applied successfully to achieve similar ends, such as reducing the significant 

citizenship application backlog.7 Moreover, an overall deadline already exists. When Congress 

passed the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, they included a requirement in Section 1248 that the 

President produce an annual report explaining the number of applications that were “pending 

for longer than six months, [and] the reasons that such visas have not been expeditiously 

processed.” Goals should be developed based on realistic estimations from COM and should be 

regularly re‐evaluated. If a deadline cannot be met in a particular case, the applicant should be 

informed of this, given an expected time frame for a decision and informed of the reason for 

the delay.  

Provide Caseworkers 

The United States should replicate the efficiencies of the U.S. Refugee Admissions 

Program (USRAP) Direct Access process in the SIV program by providing a caseworker for each 

SIV application. An applicant initiates the Direct Access process by sending a brief e‐mail to the 

International Organization for Migration (IOM) with his or her identifying information, a 

description of his or her relevant employment with the USG, and his or her supervisor’s name. 

An IOM caseworker then works with the applicant to obtain additional information or 

documents, confers with the Refugee Processing Center (RPC) in Virginia to determine 

employment eligibility, sets up an appointment to meet with the applicant, and fills out an 

applicant’s 18‐part form to register for classification as a refugee (I‐590) that is submitted to 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) before an eligibility interview.  

In contrast, an applicant initiates the SIV process by filling out and e‐mailing an 18‐part 

form (DS‐157), obtaining signed letters from at least one supervisor and a human resources 

department, and submitting evidence of an ongoing serious threat—the DOS Foreign Affairs 

Manual recommends obtaining “statements from their employer, personal statements, or 

statements from community leaders.” If successful at the first COM approval stage, an applicant 

must then fill out an 11‐part form (I‐360) with 3 supporting documents and mail a hard copy to 

USCIS in the United States. If successful at the second stage, the applicant must then complete 

a 45‐part form (DS‐230), a 29‐part form (DS‐234) and e‐mail another 6 supporting documents 

before being considered for an in‐person interview at a U.S. embassy. Because the Direct 

Access process has been perceived as both easier and faster than the SIV process, eligible SIV 

applicants have been applying to Direct Access or applying for both simultaneously.  

To make the SIV program more accessible to eligible Iraqis, SIV applicants – like 

applicants to the USRAP Direct Access program – should be able to initiate the application 

process with an e‐mail containing basic information. Immediately thereafter, the applicant 

should be assigned a caseworker to contact the applicant by e‐mail and phone, fill out the 

                                                            7 Julia Preston, Goal Set for Reducing Backlog on Citizenship Applications, N.Y. Times (March 15, 2008). 

 

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proper forms, help applicants obtain the necessary documentation, and liaise with the other 

agencies in the SIV process. Having a single caseworker to shepherd the application through all 

of the stages would greatly improve the efficiency of the process. 

Because so many SIV applicants apply simultaneously to the Direct Access and are 

already assigned to IOM case workers, providing assistance would not require a large increase 

in personnel or resources. The caseworkers need not be in Iraq—U.S. lawyers and law students 

currently provide this type of assistance to a small number of applicants via e‐mail and phone. 

In fact, the USG has previously acknowledged that the vast majority of the SIV process can be 

done outside of Baghdad.8 

Every year, the USG provides more than 100,000 refugee applicants with case worker 

assistance. SIV applicants, who have experienced an ongoing serious threat because of their 

faithful and valuable service to the USG, deserve the same type of assistance. For the many SIV 

applicants who are in danger in Iraq, assistance from a caseworker can save lives. 

Allow Representation 

Applying for an SIV is a complex process involving multiple application forms and a 

number of different documents at different stages of the process. Legal assistance can have a 

significant impact on an applicant’s ability to meet properly the requirements set forth in 

Section 1244. Currently, however, COM and NVC do not consistently recognize or communicate 

with designated legal representatives working on behalf of SIV applicants. Allowing applicants 

to designate an accredited legal representative would not only provide accountability in all 

phases of the SIV process, but also save USG adjudicators time when reviewing applications and 

communicating requests for additional information. 

Expedite Urgent Cases  

The USG should establish transparent and formalized expedited processing procedures 

for refugee and SIV applicants that would set a timeframe in which every step of processing 

must be conducted.  Expedited processing for emergency cases should not total longer than 

two weeks. The expedited processing procedure should include a list of criteria or indicators to 

determine what types of cases will be expedited. If an applicant’s demographic profile requires 

a lengthy security check such as a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO), and PRM cannot ensure 

processing within the aforementioned time frame, the applicant should be offered the 

opportunity to be evacuated to a UNHCR Emergency Transit Center (ETC) pursuant to its 

respective processing procedures and guidelines. When none of these options is practicable, 

the Department of Homeland Security should initiate humanitarian parole into the United 

States for at‐risk SIV applicants. 

                                                            8 Albright Memorandum, supra note 3. 

 

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Evacuate Life or Death Cases 

Current SIV processing lacks a formal procedure to protect applicants who face 

imminent danger. Section 1244(e) of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act states that: 

“[t]he Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other 

relevant Federal agencies, shall make a reasonable effort to 

provide an alien described in this section who is applying for a 

special immigrant visa with protection or the immediate removal 

from Iraq, if possible, of such alien if the Secretary determines 

after consultation that such alien is in imminent danger.”  

The USG already attempts to facilitate evacuation into Jordan for SIV applicants inside 

Iraq facing danger. While this effort is admirable, it is not an adequate solution for a number of 

reasons.  In particular, the process for facilitating an individual’s entry into Jordan can be a 

lengthy one, and is often hindered by the Jordanian government’s unwillingness to admit Iraqi 

men.  Moreover, applicants are required to purchase their own plane ticket and support 

themselves indefinitely while in Jordan, making this option prohibitively expensive for some 

applicants. In accordance with the legislation, the Secretary of State must be prepared to take 

appropriate measures for individual SIV applicants who are in danger of physical harm or death 

due to their association with the United States.9  

 

Establish a Point Person 

The USG should establish a point person to handle serious case problems that may arise 

at all stages of the SIV process. An SIV applicant must interact with multiple USG units (COM, 

NVC, USCIS) and with their contractors who seem to lack any discretion in evaluating the 

                                                            9 In the past, the U.S. has taken extra ordinary measures to protect particularly at risk groups.  For example, in 1996, the United States airlifted 6,600 Kurdish Iraqis to Guam in response to Saddam Hussein’s attack on their safe haven.   

THE  NEED  FOR  SPEED 

A brother of a former Iraqi interpreter for the U.S. military qualifies for P‐2 status under Sec. 

1243(a)(3) as the sibling of an Iraqi employed by the U.S. in Iraq. While his sister successfully 

navigated the SIV process, shortly after she left Iraq he began receiving death threats by telephone, 

letter, and through neighbors, all accusing him of being a traitor like his sister. He asked the U.S. 

Embassy in Baghdad how he could join his sister in safety and was told that the SIV process could 

take over a year. When a man in his village who looked like him was murdered and it was widely 

rumored that this individual was the intended target, he knew he could not survive a year waiting in 

Baghdad and so fled to Thailand, through Iran. He continues to navigate the P‐2 process. 

 

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adequacy of the information provided. Having a single point person would help make the 

process more efficient, increase accountability, and provide a mechanism to prevent the types 

of problems that are illustrated by the case examples provided with these recommendations.  

Within USCIS, the CIS Ombudsman provides assistance for refugee case problems that involve 

significant hardships caused by action, inaction, or delay. A similar model for the SIV program 

would require minimal additional resources but would have the potential to greatly increase 

the efficiency of the SIV process. 

Produce Required Reports 

Section 1248(b) of the 2008 Act requires the President to prepare an annual report 

containing: 

(1) an assessment of the financial, security, and personnel considerations and resources necessary to carry out the provisions [of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act]; (2) the number of [Iraqis who were or are employed by the United States Government, in Iraq]; (3) the number of such aliens who have applied for special immigrant visas; (4) the date of such applications; and (5) in the case of applications pending for longer than six months, the reasons that such visas have not been expeditiously processed.  

Additionally, Section 1248(c) requires three reports by the executive branch relating to SIV 

processing, as well as a report tracking the establishment of a database of USG contracts in Iraq 

and of Iraqis employed on behalf of the U.S. mission. The reports are part of the “reasonable 

effort” required of the Secretary of State under §1244 to ensure that the SIV process is 

streamlined in recognition of the imminent danger faced by applicants. But FOIA requests 

indicate that no agency has submitted any of the required reports to Congress.10  

Update and Improve the FAQs 

   The more information provided to SIV applicants regarding the application 

requirements, the better they and their advocates can submit applications which meet the 

USG's needs. This would limit the number of incomplete applications, and allow for a more 

efficient process. To that end, the DOS FAQs should be updated frequently on both the English 

and Arabic sites as soon as any new procedural requirements take effect. DOS should also 

include information in the FAQs to help applicants avoid frequently occurring problems with 

applications. 

                                                            10 For an example of DHS’ acknowledgment of the database requirement, see E‐mail from Ruth E. Tintary to Lori Scialabba, et al. (Mar. 12, 2008), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 1 (April 26, 2010). 

 

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Clarify the Foreign Affairs Manual Implementing Regulations Regarding Contractors vs. 

Grantees 

Currently, SIVs are only issued to U.S. affiliated Iraqis who worked for an entity that had 

a direct contract or subcontract with the USG.  This has created an anomaly by which Iraqis who 

worked for one entity pursuant to a contract are eligible to receive a SIV while Iraqis who 

worked for a different entity pursuant to a grant are not eligible for a SIV even though both 

individuals performed similar or identical work for the USG and face similar threats.  A modest 

amendment to the implementing regulations that would permit Iraqi employees of U.S. grantee 

organizations to receive SIVs would go a long way towards fulfilling the promise of the Refugee 

Crisis in Iraq Act to protect Iraqis who have provided “faithful and valuable service” to the 

United States.  Such an amendment would still bar Iraqis who did not work for a U.S. entity 

from receiving a SIV, while permitting a limited class of Iraqis who worked directly for a U.S. 

NGO and who would otherwise be eligible for a SIV to receive one. 

III. COM Approval 

The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act calls for an expedited and straightforward application 

process, with the hope that the applications would quickly move from the COM to USCIS and 

the NVC, and then back to Iraq. Unfortunately, applicants today face long delays, and the 

application process, particularly at the COM stage, makes demands on the applicants far 

beyond what Congress intended or the law requires. A number of reforms could quickly reduce 

processing times without compromising security. 

Align the Process with the Legislation 

The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act laid out specific requirements that an SIV applicant must 

fulfill before his or her application is processed. These requirements balance security with 

speed, responding to the pressing need to evacuate SIV applicants from Iraq. Unfortunately, 

COM seems to treat these statutory requirements as a floor rather than a ceiling, as it has 

imposed additional onerous requirements – outlined in detail below – on the SIV applicants. As 

a result, COM excludes certain applicants that Congress sought to help, but that are not in a 

position to obtain copies of the additional required documents.  

The State Department also should clearly articulate in its SIV FAQs what requirements 

may be waived.11 Eligible Iraqis, particularly the vast majority without legal representation, may 

desist from the application process because they see that it requires documents they are 

unable to obtain.  Providing information on which document requirements are waivable, and 

                                                            11 For example, the requirement to provide a copy of the military service record has been waived upon request, when the applicant cannot obtain a copy of the record. 

 

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the criteria for being granted a waiver, would assist these individuals in accessing the SIV 

program.   

 

Reform or Remove The USG Contract Requirement 

The NVC SIV Unit – which is tasked with processing applications at the COM approval 

stage12  – sometimes require applicants to provide copies of the contracts between their 

employer and the USG. Iraqi nationals, especially those in low‐level positions and without 

outside assistance, face nearly insurmountable difficulties in acquiring these contracts. 

Moreover, the SIV Unit has refused to accept a copy of the first page of a contract that 

identifies the USG contract number and has insisted on the full contract. In many cases, a 

company will not want to provide (or may be prohibited from providing) the full contract 

because it contains confidential information. For direct contracts with the USG, the U.S. should 

already have a copy of the contract to which they can refer, especially when the contract has 

been identified. With respect to subcontracts, there may be some cases in which it is 

reasonable to request that the applicant provide the contract. However, when the Iraqi 

applicant is under threat or cannot easily obtain the contract, the USG is better placed to verify 

                                                            12 In turn, the SIV Unit employs a support contractor, Serco, Inc., to process the SIV applications at the COM approval stage.   

EXTRALEGAL  REQUIREMENTS 

An Iraqi worked for a USAID contractor from June to September 2005. Three weeks into his 

employment, an Al‐Qaeda‐associated terrorist group attempted to kill him. His family had to flee 

their neighborhood as a car carrying three gunmen chased after them. In January 2006, the Iraqi’s 

wife was kidnapped as a result of his work for the USG. She was released only after considerable 

negotiation and a ransom. The Iraqi found her lying on the side of the road, unconscious and 

severely beaten. Only in October 2008 did he return to work for the USG. His application for COM 

approval in November 2009 included employment verification from both employers, a letter of 

recommendation from his supervisor, and a statement of the threats he had received as a result of 

his work for the USG. NVC confirmed that his application was complete in February 2010. However, 

eight months later, the U.S. Embassy said that the information regarding the threats against him was 

insufficient because the threat statement submitted did not refer to the same time period as the 

employment verification letter or letter of recommendation. Under Section 1244(b)(1)(D) of the 

Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, an alien is eligible for an SIV if, among other things, the alien “has 

experienced or is experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of the alien’s 

employment by the United States Government.” There is no requirement under the statute that the 

threat must have occurred during the alien’s employment with the USG or within the time period 

described by the letter of recommendation. This individual and his family were clearly targeted 

because of his work with the USG. 

 

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the contract through its direct contractors.13 Congress recognized this reality when they 

mandated the creation of a database of contracts in the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act. In fact, the 

USG has previously admitted that to require employer contracts “might be setting the bar far 

higher than many employees can realistically reach,” and indicated its intention to obtain such 

contracts directly.14 

 

Create a Contractor, Subcontractor and Employee Database 

Copies of contracts are not required under the statute. If these contracts nevertheless 

are deemed necessary, the USG should collect these documents itself. As a party to these 

contracts, the USG is in a better position to locate and provide copies than the individual SIV 

applicants. For subcontractors, the USG is better placed than individual applicants to keep track 

of where its money is being spent and can require that its contractors provide information with 

respect to all subcontractors being used, including a copy of the contracts with these 

companies or individuals. The reporting requirements in Section 1248, supra, clearly indicate 

that Congress intended the USG to bear this responsibility. Moreover, Congress intended the 

                                                            13 In any event, the applicant should not be required to provide more than the first page of any contract, since the first page is generally sufficient to show the contract number and the duration of the contract.   14 E‐mail from Tressa Finerty to Elizabeth Harris (May 5, 2008); E‐mail from Tressa Finerty to Jennifer Rumbach, et al. (July 16, 2008); Memorandum to William P. Marriott, Request for Assistance in Verifying Employment of Iraqis (undated). All were contained in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 2 (May 3, 2010) (see appendix 2).  

CONTRACT  DELAYS 

An IRAP client once worked for a major U.S. contractor in Iraq but came under serious threat. He 

applied for COM approval in October 2009. Soon after, the NVC, operating on behalf of COM, 

contacted this client and requested a copy of the “contract(s) which you or your employer was 

awarded by or on behalf of the United States Government (USG).” This individual immediately sent 

copies of the contracts between himself and the major U.S. contractor, which was operating in Iraq 

on behalf of the USG. Several months later NVC contacted his supervisors and confirmed his faithful 

and valuable service. Thereafter, however, NVC continued requesting a copy of a contract, at which 

point it became clear that they wanted this individual, who remained under threat in Iraq, to 

provide a copy of the contract between the USG and the contractor. After seeking out his 

supervisors—to whom NVC had already spoken—he fortunately was able to obtain a copy of the 

first page of the contract with the USG, which contained the USG contract number. After six months, 

during which time IRAP and the individual were in continual contact with NVC, the NVC informed the 

individual that it could not proceed without obtaining full text of the entire USG contract. IRAP is 

working with the supervisor to obtain the full text of the contract. Meanwhile, IRAP has assisted him 

with applying to USRAP Direct Access in Iraq, and he has already been scheduled for a second 

interview with an IOM caseworker. 

 

15  

database not only to cover contracts, but also to list the employees of direct contractors 

themselves. This would particularly help resolve the complex question of whether an 

organization received funding from the USG during an applicant's time of employment.15 Such a 

database would make the COM approval process more efficient and more accurate while also 

bringing the process into compliance with existing law.  

 

Eliminate or Reform the HR Letter Requirement 

Under Section 1244, SIV applicants must submit a letter of recommendation to COM 

from a U.S. citizen supervisor or co‐signed by a higher‐ranking U.S. citizen responsible for the 

contract. This requirement, while perhaps understandable, is particularly onerous for low‐level 

employees who do not work directly with U.S. citizens. Yet on top of this already exceptional 

burden, COM has requested letters from the HR departments of the direct USG contractors 

with which the applicants are employed.16  Some contractors do not have HR departments, 

making it difficult to fulfill the requirement. In fact, in 2008 U.S. officials recognized that this 

type of “double verification” was “not realistic.”17 

                                                            15 E‐mail from Tressa Finerty to Elizabeth Harris, et al. (May 5, 2008), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 2 (May 3, 2010) (see appendix 2). 16 Specifically, Section 1244(b)(4) states that “Chief of Mission . . . . shall conduct a risk assessment of the alien and an independent review of records maintained by the USG or hiring organization or entity to confirm  employment. . .“ If a letter from a company’s HR department is deemed necessary in order to conduct a risk assessment, the statute clearly places the burden of obtaining HR documents on the government and the company, not the applicant.  17 Email from Tressa Finerty to Sumitra Siram (June 3, 2008), in Department of State FOIA Records, Tranche 2 (May 3, 2010) (see Appendix 2). 

THE  NECESSITY  OF  A  GOVERNMENT  DATABASE 

For over a year and a half, an Iraqi provided uninterrupted services to the U.S. military 

pursuant to numerous overlapping short‐ and long‐term service contracts. The military allowed him 

to maintain an office workshop at Baghdad International Airport to facilitate the provision of these 

repair, maintenance, construction, and engineering services. As a result of his work, terrorists 

kidnapped and murdered both his brother‐in‐law – who worked for him – and this individual’s son‐

in‐law. He received numerous death threats and was forced to flee to Jordan. His application for 

COM approval was denied because the evidence that he had worked for the USG for at least a year 

was supposedly inadequate. He provided copies of thirteen different contracts spanning a period of 

more than one year. However, none of the contracts contained end dates, and the USG would not 

independently verify the contracts or their duration. Even after the Iraqi provided additional 

evidence regarding the duration of his work for the U.S. military, the embassy determined that the 

information was insufficient to overturn the denial. A government database could have more 

efficiently provided the embassy with the contract information it desired.

 

16  

Nevertheless, the NVC SIV Unit has refused to accept anything but an HR department 

letter, and went so far as to reject an employment verification that was submitted from a 

company’s Chief Administrative Officer. On at least one occasion, the SIV Unit refused to accept 

an HR verification letter from the same person who provided the letter of recommendation.  

Additionally, in at least one case, a major U.S. contractor (L3/Titan) has had a policy of refusing 

to issue such letters. While a practitioner working with SIVs recently stated that L3 is “finally” 

being more cooperative due to changes in HR personnel, Iraqis should not need to depend on 

individual, chance staffing practices of these contractors to obtain employment verification. 

The recommendation letters signed by U.S. citizens are already required to attest to an 

applicant’s length of service, duties, and faithful service. The USG should either take action to 

encourage its contractors to issue letters or should stop requesting additional letters 

altogether.  When it is impossible to obtain an employment verification from the HR 

department, the USG should be willing to accept the testimony of its service‐members as 

accurate. 

 

Allow Personal E‐mail Addresses for Letters of Recommendation 

A supervisor must use an official e‐mail address when submitting a letter of 

recommendation. This requirement is particularly problematic for contractors, who may no 

longer be affiliated with their original organization. Many contractors will only be in Iraq on 

one‐off contracts for limited periods of time. By the time an applicant applies for an SIV many 

years later, oftentimes their previous supervisors no longer work for the companies that 

employed them, and thus no longer have official e‐mail addresses. Especially for military 

recommenders, whose identities can be easily verified, a personal e‐mail address should be 

acceptable. In addition, all U.S. citizen recommenders could provide a unit number or other 

CONFLICTS  WITH  CONTRACTORS  AND  HUMAN  RESOURCES 

Two Iraqis were employed by the U.S. as military interpreters and were gravely endangered by 

recordkeeping mistakes made by Global Linguist Solutions (GLS), the HR agency for military 

interpreters. In one case, an individual’s supervisors attested he worked for more than a year, but 

GLS incorrectly insisted that he had not. COM refused to accept the supervisors’ statements. 

Eventually, a GLS representative in Baghdad was able to find documents proving the individual had 

been employed three months longer than GLS originally acknowledged and GLS admitted its records 

were inaccurate. In another case, the individual worked as an interpreter in both Diyala and 

Baghdad but GLS had no record of him working in Baghdad and so insisted he had worked for less 

than a year. Fortunately, the Iraqi still had his identification badge and a letter of recommendation 

from his Baghdad employment and GLS finally acquiesced to writing a new employment verification 

letter. In both cases, GLS’s mistakes delayed these individuals’ SIV applications, extending the length 

of time they were in danger. 

 

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identifying information that does not change when they leave their job. The use of a personal 

email address does not make the recommendation letter less valuable if the identity can be 

verified in other ways. Such a requirement can result in weeks or even months of delay—time 

many SIV applicants simply do not have.18 

 

Do Not Apply Inconsistent or Overly Formalistic Requirements  

In many cases, the NVC SIV Unit has employed an overly rigid application of the format 

for DS‐157s and the letters of recommendation. For example, applicants have had DS‐157s 

returned simply because the COM application reviewer preferred the blank spaces in the form 

to be filled with “None,” “N/A,” or just left blank. There is no standard request; various 

reviewers have requested differing responses.  

At other times, SIV Unit has rejected letters that contain all the necessary information 

simply because they did not exactly parrot some preferred language not previously required.  In 

one case, a supervisor from USAID/Tatweer (the national capacity development program) 

submitted a letter of recommendation stating that the Iraqi had “worked under my supervision 

and I can attest that he is an employee in good standing.”  The NVC’s SIV Unit said the letter 

was deficient because the author did not indicate that he “had met and/or personally knew” 

                                                            18 For an example of the delays this can cause, see E‐mail from Judith Wing to Iraq SIV Application (October 15, 2010) (see appendix 2). 

PROBLEMS  WITH  PERSONAL  E‐MAIL  ADDRESSES 

An Iraqi worked for over two years as an employee of several technology corporations, the 

Projects and Contracting Office, and the United States Army Corp of Engineers Gulf Region Division.  

As a result of his faithful service to the USG, he received numerous death threats and had to live in 

hiding.  An NGO assisted him with his SIV application and over the course of many months 

exchanged emails with NVC, his former supervisors, and a human resources director.  This was a 

protracted process through no fault of the client – as could be expected, several of his supervisors as 

well as the HR director were no longer employed by the same companies. The NGO had difficulty 

tracking down his former HR director who was unemployed due to a disability. When they were 

finally able to do so, NVC refused to accept communications from the HR director’s personal email 

address, and instead insisted she correspond via a non‐existent company email address.  

Frustratingly, the NGO also received emails from NVC employees who were unaware of previous 

correspondence and documents.  While the client ultimately satisfied all of the requirements and 

received COM approval, he was in danger throughout this prolonged period.  Without the assistance 

of counsel, it is difficult to imagine how an applicant could have dealt with the questions and issues 

presented, particularly in the face of grave danger.     

 

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the applicant.  This same format has been used by USAID/Tatweer on many other occasions 

without incident.  

Additionally, NVC has arbitrarily changed or applied its policy regarding letters of 

recommendation from non‐US citizen supervisors. In some instances, NVC has required a joint 

letter from the non‐US citizen supervisor and the US citizen responsible for the contract; in 

others they have accepted separate letters.  

 

In light of these examples, COM should take a full‐picture view of the evidence 

presented, rather than adhering to a narrow interpretation of the required format for the forms 

and letters of recommendations. Delays that result from the idiosyncrasies and whims of 

individual reviewers could be alleviated easily by accepting responses that fulfill the substantive 

statutory requirements, especially in light of the serious ongoing threats facing SIV applicants.  

In addition, the extent that COM has a preferred or required format for forms and/or letters of 

recommendation, it should delineate and post those requirements, and then be consistent.   

UNNECESSARY  DELAYS  AND  FORMALITIES 

An Iraqi spent eighteen months working in various capacities for two different companies with 

construction contracts with the USG. This individual received repeated phone calls from Islamic 

militants threatening to hurt her family, rape her, and kill her because she worked with the 

Americans. When her colleague’s son was kidnapped because his father worked with Americans, she 

fled for the United Arab Emirates. This Iraqi’s UAE work visa will expire shortly and she risks 

deportation. She filed her application in April 2009 and despite the urgency of her situation and 

repeated contacts with the State Department and UNHCR to speed her case, it remained unclear 

why the case was not moving forward. We finally discovered that her application was delayed 

simply because her supervisors wrote two separate letters rather than having one co‐signed letter. 

 

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Assign One NVC Employee to an Application 

The NVC SIV Unit often fails to give clear requests or timely responses to applicants, and 

the failure to have a single employee at the SIV Unit working on the case exacerbates the 

situation. Applicants often receive repeated requests for documents that have already been 

submitted, and they cannot tell whether those administering the case have overlooked the 

submissions or whether what has been submitted is deficient in some way.  Requests to clarify 

such requests for information are never addressed, or addressed by a different employee and 

in an exceedingly vague manner, often using rote language that a certain document is required 

to complete the application. Because both the government and the client suffer from the delays 

caused by the failure to clearly communicate issues with an application, implementing this 

reform would result in a more efficient system with little additional resources. 

FAILING  TO  LOOK  AT  ALL  AVAILABLE  EVIDENCE 

An Iraqi was hired to serve as a civil engineer and project manager for the U.S. Army. In 

retaliation, insurgents murdered his father, forcing the individual to flee with his family. He applied 

for COM approval in August 2009. The application included a letter from a U.S. Army Captain 

verifying that this individual had been employed for 27 months. He also provided a letter of 

recommendation from a lieutenant colonel, along with six supplementary letters from U.S. Army 

personnel with whom he had worked. In September 2009, NVC requested a copy of the contract 

covering his 27‐month period of employment. The individual did not have a copy and could not 

obtain one. He had submitted a contract covering a 12‐month period, but NVC said it was 

unacceptable. As a result, he decided to drop his SIV application in favor of his USRAP application, 

which would get him out of Iraq faster. 

 

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Improve Accountability For Legal Decisions Reached By NVC Employees 

Caseworkers at the NVC SIV Unit appear to have little immigration or legal expertise.  

This has led to situations where decisions are being made that require knowledge of the law, 

and in particular immigration law, by individuals without that necessary expertise. For example, 

in one case the SIV Unit repeatedly asked for a copy of an Iraqi’s US visa, even though his 

attorneys explained on numerous occasions that he did not have a visa because he had entered 

the country through the Significant Public Benefit Parole program.19 Moreover, the current e‐

mail option for legal advice at the State Department, LegalNet, routinely fails to respond in a 

timely fashion or at all.  A single and responsive contact person willing and able to provide 

immigration and legal expertise to SIV Unit caseworkers, and to respond to inquiries from 

applicant’s legal representatives, would improve the overall accuracy and efficiency of the 

process. 

Create a System to Locate Military and Other USG Supervisors 

Often it is difficult to locate an applicant’s supervisor, in particular if the applicant 

worked for the military and his or her supervisor has been deployed elsewhere or has left the 

military. At a minimum, the USG should assist in finding military supervisors serving in a new 

location. DOD has taken the initiative to try to create a system to track down military 

                                                            19 E‐mail from Iraq SIV Application to Shannon A. Graving (May 3, 2010) (see Appendix 2). 

INCONSISTENT  MESSAGES 

As a consequence of his work as a translator for the U.S. military and several contractors, an 

individual received multiple death threats and was shot at by insurgents. He applied for COM 

approval in October 2009. He complied with an initial request for employment verification from an 

NVC support contractor. Weeks later, a different NVC support contractor emailed the Iraqi, 

questioning whether he met the twelve‐month time requirement. Weeks after his response, yet 

another NVC support contractor requested proof that he had worked as a translator for over a year. 

Over the next seven months, the Iraqi corresponded with three additional NVC support contractors. 

These individuals requested a letter from a U.S. contractor’s HR department, confirmed that the 

Iraqi’s file was complete and would be sent to the U.S. Embassy, subsequently asked for information 

with more precise dates, confirmed that the file was complete yet again, and then requested an 

additional letter of recommendation. As of October 2010, a year after the initial application, this 

individual still has not received COM approval. If there had been a single person assigned to the case 

who knew exactly what materials were required and what had been submitted, the Iraqi would have 

received less conflicting information and fewer duplicative requests. The entire process could have 

been shortened dramatically. 

 

21  

supervisors, and this initiative should be applauded.  It is unclear, however, when this system 

will be available to assist SIV applicants. Such a system should be implemented as soon as is 

feasible. 

Create A Review Process for Denied Applications 

At present, an applicant who has been denied COM approval or a visa after his or her 

consular interview has no way to request a review of that decision.  The letters denying COM 

approval or the visa do not contain sufficient information to understand the underlying basis 

for the decision, which gives cover to denials based on simple processing errors, individual 

misunderstanding, or an abuse of discretion by DOS. Applicants for SIVs have rendered faithful 

service to the USG and are entitled to more than a summary dismissal without explanation.  

One simple fix would be to ensure, regardless of where the denial took place, that every 

applicant is provided with a concise letter, in Arabic, laying out the reasons for the decision. 

Individuals whose refugee applications are denied by the US government already have the 

ability to request review of their file where new information becomes available or a material 

error has occurred. DOS and DHS should institute a similar review procedure whereby SIV 

applicants can reopen their files by providing additional information or clarifying existing 

information. This is an administrative policy within the discretion of either department.  Finally, 

when appropriate, applicants should be given an opportunity to explain unfavorable 

information through an interview process before their request for COM approval is denied.   

 

THE  NEED  FOR  APPEALS 

As a result of one Iraqi’s more than three years of service as an interpreter with the U.S. Marines, he 

has a $20,000 bounty on his head, has been shot at, has had his family members shot and wounded, 

and has had to live in hiding, unable to see his family, in both Baghdad and Kurdistan. This individual 

submitted an SIV application in January 2009 with eight letters of recommendation from military 

supervisors, having passed background checks with both Multi‐National Forces and Global Linguistic 

Solutions. In June 2009, COM denied his application, refusing to explain why or offer a means of 

appeal, but merely indicating in a very brief denial letter that there was “derogatory information.” 

Since COM has not responded to any of the repeated inquiries made by this individual, an NGO, and 

his military supervisor, he does not know what allegedly derogatory information exists and thus 

cannot dispute or explain the information.  DOS, DHS, USCIS, and the CIS Ombudsman’s office have 

indicated that COM has sole discretion and COM is unwilling to respond to these requests. Further, a 

FOIA request was denied due to consular immunity. This individual’s situation is particularly dire 

because he can remain in the safe facility only temporarily. 

 

22  

IV. USCIS 

Obtaining I‐360 approval is currently quicker and more efficient than the other stages of 

the SIV process. However, there is at least one serious, ongoing issue affecting some applicants:  

Do Not Require Original Signatures on the I‐360 Form 

The requirement of original signatures on the I‐360, the petition for a Special Immigrant 

Visa sent to the US Service Center in Nebraska, is particularly onerous for SIV applicants. It is 

difficult, expensive and dangerous for Iraqis to send mail out of their country, particularly with 

significantly reduced access to military mail as we close down U.S. bases in Iraq. Regulations 

allow for the possibility of electronic submissions, and obtaining an electronic signature is not 

nearly as difficult as an international mailing.  Original documents could always be provided in‐

hand at a later stage of the application process, if necessary, such as at the Embassy interview. 

At times, USCIS has dismissed complaints about original signatures by stating that the delivery 

time in the mail is only several weeks at most. But this misses the point; it can be dangerous 

and time‐consuming for an applicant who is under a serious threat simply to mail a document 

internationally and several weeks is too long a delay for a person in imminent danger in any 

event.  

 

V. NVC 

Once USCIS approval is obtained, the application is then forwarded to NVC for further 

processing.  At this NVC stage, difficult documentary requirements lead to significant delays for 

many Iraqis. Simple changes to these requirements could help expedite processing at this stage. 

Do Not Require Duplicative Documentation 

At the NVC stage, the applicant must submit his or her family book, a birth certificate for 

each applicant, a jensia (the Iraqi national ID card) for each applicant, a marriage certificate, any 

DANGEROUS  MAILINGS 

Many NGO clients have had problems mailing documents. One individual is a civil engineer who was 

working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He went into hiding after his team was shot at 

because of their connection to the U.S. His SIV application took approximately one year to process, 

with several months passing between each of the steps. Since he was in hiding, it was particularly 

difficult for him to mail an original signature, as required, without jeopardizing his safety. He 

ultimately had to sneak to the north of the country, with a friend’s help, to mail the document 

safely. Other Iraqis have had problems with mailing documents in Syria. One such client expressed 

grave concern about mailing the form back to us. She eventually agreed, mailed the form, and the 

NGO received it after it had already clearly been opened and sifted through, presumably by the 

Syrian government or someone affiliated with the postal service. 

 

23  

other civil documents, a passport (G or A series), and a jensia certificate.  These documents are 

used to show nationality and relationship, but nationality and relationship can all be shown 

through the jensia or in some cases the passport.  Obtaining the family book and birth 

certificates can be very difficult; these documents can also be expensive due to the cost of 

mailing through couriers and the unfortunate need to use bribes in order to obtain the 

documents, among other obstacles. Unless there are other reasons for requiring such 

documents, one piece of evidence confirming nationality and relationship should be sufficient. 

Require Police Certificates Only Where Feasible 

Until recently, a police certificate was required if the applicant lived in a country other 

than Iraq for more than 6 months and was over 16 years of age at the time. For some countries, 

the only way to get a police certificate is to physically go to that country (Jordan, UAE), and for 

others (Lebanon), the U.S. Department of State website notes that while the documents can be 

requested through an embassy, “applicants may experience extremely long waiting periods 

before they receive the document, or may not receive them at all.” The implementation of this 

requirement is also extremely inconsistent. In some cases, the police certificate requirement 

has been waived, but many applicants would not be aware that waiver is an option. 

Recently, applicants have been forced to provide police certificates for all individuals 

over the age of 14, from not only those foreign countries in which they previously lived, but 

also from Iraq. Obtaining a police certificate in Iraq is onerous and dangerous.  In addition, it is 

not clear what the basis is for this new, expanded requirement. 

The NVC should automatically waive the police certificate requirement for those 

countries that refuse to facilitate obtaining a certificate through their embassies, for those 

where long delays may result, or those where seeking a police certificate would endanger the 

applicant.   In addition, the NVC should revert to the previous standard and not ask applicants 

to put themselves in greater danger. 

Do Not Require Official Certified Translations 

It is now required that all documents in Arabic be accompanied by an official certified 

translation, completed by a certified translator.  Previously, the NVC accepted a translation that 

contained a certification that the translator was qualified to do the translation.  It can be 

dangerous for individuals in Iraq to use a certified translator, who can easily figure out the 

purpose for the translations and who can then inform on the applicant.  As a consequence, NVC 

should eliminate the requirement that only a certified translator may perform the necessary 

document translations. If NVC is concerned about the quality of translations, they might hire 

Arabic speakers to audit translations.    

 

24  

VI. Embassy Interview and Departure 

Finally, there are occasional delays as a result of the Embassy interview and departure 

process. For Iraqis who have waited significant amounts of time to depart to the United States, 

it is imperative that these bottlenecks be reduced. 

Reform Administrative Review 

When an applicant is put into administrative review following the Embassy interview, a 

final decision on the SIV application can take over a year.  No information is provided regarding 

the  reason  for  the  administrative  review  and  there  is no point of  contact  for  inquiries or  to 

request  status updates.   The State Department  should ensure  that  the administrative  review 

process  is completed within a reasonable time frame, taking  into account the ongoing serious 

threats  that  applicants  face. Additionally,  the process  should be made more  transparent,  so 

that  applicants  understand  the  reason  for  the  administrative  review  and  can  provide 

information to help resolve any issues.  

Assist With Obtaining Passports and Do Not Require Passports for Newborns 

Currently, Iraqis can only travel to the United States with either A‐Series or G‐Series 

passports. This requirement presents an additional obstacle to many SIV applicants, though it is 

one the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act anticipated. Section 1244(d) requires the Secretary of State to 

“make a reasonable effort to ensure that [Iraqis] who are issued special immigrant visas are 

provided with the appropriate series Iraqi passport necessary to enter the United States.” 

Creating procedures that ensure that SIV applicants can obtain an acceptable passport will 

bring the State Department into compliance with this provision of the statute.  

Though refugees can enter the United States without a passport as long as they have 

refugee papers prepared by the USG, the SIV program requires all newborns to have passports, 

or to be added to their mother’s passport.  There is no ability to add a child to an A‐series 

passport, however, and currently there are extreme delays in issuing new passports.  This 

means that, depending on when a child is born, some applicants cannot travel for many 

months, or longer, after their visas have  been issued.   In many cases this means the visas will 

expire before travel is possible, creating even further delays because the application must 

undergo additional administrative processing when the visas are reissued.  We understand that 

pursuant to a January 13, 2010 Department of State memo, passports for newborns born after 

the US Embassy interview are not required.  Instead, they should be issued a travel letter and A‐

number at the port of entry.  The State Department should ensure this mandate is 

implemented for these newborns,  and extend the mandate for newborns born prior to the US 

Embassy interview where requiring a passport will entail significant delay in the applicant’s 

ability to travel (for example, where the baby cannot be added to the mother’s passport).   

 

25  

Return Passports 

When an applicant goes for a consular interview, the Embassy keeps the passport until 

the visa is issued.  This can create problems for an applicant who is in a foreign country, placing 

him or her in potential danger or in trouble with local authorities who require proof of identity. 

The Embassy should  return  the passport of all  Iraqis  interviewing outside of  Iraq pending SIV 

approval. 

Conduct Security Checks, Including Security Advisory Opinions, Without Unnecessary Delays   

The multi‐agency security clearance process can cause long delays for many applicants. 

For those applicants who are facing serious threat in Iraq or elsewhere, those delays place them 

in  significant danger.  The USG  should  take  steps  to ensure  that  at‐risk  applicants have  their 

checks  expedited.  The  government  should  also  conduct  security  clearance  processing  for  all 

Iraqi  refugee  and  SIV  applicants without  unnecessary  delays.    The National  Security  Council 

should  continue  its  review  of  the  inter‐agency  security  clearance  procedure  required  for 

refugees and immigrants, and implement improvements promptly. Each agency involved in the 

process should be provided the staffing  it requires to complete checks accurately and without 

unnecessary delays within a set period.  In addition, a point person should be charged with the 

authority to ensure that each case moves through the system in a timely manner. 

CONCLUSION 

Our experience suggests that Iraqi SIV applicants are vulnerable and frequently in grave 

danger. Making improvements to the SIV process like those suggested above will enable us to 

demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Iraqi people who have made sacrifices to support 

the USG in Iraq. 

 

 

        

Appendix 1: pending cases in need of consideration 

 

 

Internal  Reference  Number  

Assisting  Organization/Case  Status  

Case  Description  

1   IRAP  Yale,  Pending  COM  approval  

Contract  Delays  See  Above,  Page  13      

2   IRAP  U.  Penn,  Pending  P-­‐2  Visa  approval    

The  Need  for  Speed  See  Above,  Page  9  

3   The  List  Project  (TLP)/Mayer  Brown,  COM  Approval  Received,  pending    

Failure  to  Communicate    See  Above,  Page  6    

4   TLP/Holland  &  Knight,  pending  COM  Approval  

Inconsistent  Messages    See  Above,  Page  18  

5   IRAP,  Berkeley,  pending  COM  approval  

Unnecessary  Delays  and  Formalities  See  Above,  Page  17  

6   IRAP  Berkeley,  pending  COM  action  and  approval.  

The  Need  for  Appeals  See  Above,  Page  20  

7   TLP/Holland  &  Knight,  Pending  

Holland  &  Knight’s  (H  &  K)  client  worked  for  L3  Communications,  on  assignments  with  the  United  States  Department  of  State,  Baghdad  Provincial  Reconstruction  Team  and  the  United  States  Department  of  Defense.    As  a  result  of  his  work,  the  Jaish  Al  Madi  attacked  him  and  his  colleague,  killing  his  colleague  instantly.    The  client  managed  to  escape,  despite  being  shot  at  three  times,  but  he  and  his  family  continued  to  receive  threats  even  after  they  were  transferred.    One  time,  a  car  followed  them  and  opened  fire  on  their  vehicle,  destroying  the  car  and  injuring  the  client's  17  year-­‐old  and  14  year-­‐old  sisters,  who  were  hospitalized  for  several  days  after  the  attack.    As  a  result  of  his  incredible  work  on  behalf  of  the  US,  several  members  of  the  military  sponsored  him  for  Significant  Public  Benefit  Parole  (SPBP)  and  he  lives  with  one  of  his  supervisors  in  the  US.    H  &  K  applied  for  COM  for  him  in  March  2010,  explaining  that  he  was  in  the  US  on  SPBP  rather  than  a  visa.    A  month  later  H  &  K  received  an  email  requesting  his  visa,  to  which  H  &  K  again  explained  that  he  did  not  have  a  visa  and  provided  his  SPBP  and  travel  documents.    The  client  continued  to  receive  emails  requesting  his  visa.    The  

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client’s  file  was  finally  transferred  to  the  US  Embassy  in  Iraq  in  May  2010.    By  mid-­‐September,  despite  an  urgent  plea  from  H  &  K  to  the  Embassy,  he  still  had  not  received  COM  approval  and  was  informed  processing  would  take  approximately  four  or  more  months  rather  than  the  weeks  he  was  originally  told.    Thankfully,  the  client  met  someone  in  late  September  through  his  sponsor  who  had  a  connection  with  the  US  Embassy  in  Iraq  and  he  received  COM  approval  a  few  days  later,  over  five  months  since  H  &  K  sent  the  first  SPBP  reply  email.    

8   TLP/Holland  &  Knight  case,  pending  

Problems  with  Personal  Email  Addresses  See  Above,  Page  16  

9   TLP/Holland  &  Knight,  pending  

This  client  worked  as  a  linguist  (translator)  for  L3  Communications  (previously  Titan  Corp,  and  subsequently  GLS),  doing  work  for  the  US  Army,  2nd  Battalion,  22nd  Infantry  Forward  Operating  Base  in  Kirkuk  for  more  than  3  years.    Several  of  his  colleagues  were  assassinated  by  the  insurgents  due  to  their  work  with  US  Army  and  he  received  numerous  threats.    Fearing  for  their  lives,  he  and  his  wife  fled  to  Turkey.    His  former  supervisor  was  contacted  to  verify  certain  information  and  replied  by  using  his  AOL  account.    NVC  replied  telling  him  he  must  provide  the  same  information  from  a  work  or  military  email  address,  which  fortunately  he  was  able  to  do.  

10   TLP/Holland  &  Knight,  pending  

Another  client  worked  with  the  Titan/GLS  starting  from  Sept  2008.    He  is  eligible  for  the  SIV  program  but  does  not   have   a   second   reference   letter   from   his   former  supervisor.     We   have   tried   to   reach   out   one   of   his  former  supervisors  and  after  one  month  of  research  we  found  him,  but  he  referred  us  to  another  person.    This  other  person  was  overseas  and  although  she  was  very  supportive   and   willing   to   provide   the   letter,   after  dozens   of   emails   we   still   did   not   receive   it.    Then  we  tried   to   reach   out   a   third   supervisor.    This   last   one   is  cooperative   too  but   due   to   his   deployment   in   remote  locations   has   been   unable   to   provide   the   letter.    The  security  situation  is  so  bad  and  our  client  could  not  just  wait  for  something  bad  to  happen  to  him  or  his  family  thus  he  decided  to  apply  for  USRAP  and  has  finished  his  DHS  interview.        

11   IRAP  Berkeley,  pending  at  COM  

IRAP-­‐Berkeley   has   been   working   with   a   client   who,  because  of  his  service  as  a  military  interpreter,  received  a  written  death  threat  from  the  Al-­‐Sadr  Militia  in  2007.    Since  then,  the  client  has  lived  as  a  prisoner  in  his  own  

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home:  He  is  afraid  that,  if  he  is  recognized  in  town,  he  will  be  killed   like  many  of   the   interpreters  with  whom  he   has   worked.   We   included   a   copy   of   his   written  threat   in   the   client’s   COM   application,   which   we  submitted   in  May  2010.    We   received  a   reply  on   June  18,  2010  that  his  application  was  complete  and  would  be  processed.    The  email  did  not  mention  a  timeline  for  processing.     We   followed   up   on   September   12   and  received  a  reply  stating  that  the  client’s  application  was  complete   and   that   processing   time  would   be   about   4  months.     Then,  on  Oct.  4,  when   the  client  had  waited  nearly  4  months,  we  received  a  new  email  stating  that  his  statement  of  threats  had  to  be  written,  signed,  and  dated   by   him.   (The   client’s   previous   statement   had  been  written   in   the   third  person,  not   the   first  person,  and   the   client  had  not   signed  or  dated   it,   as  we  were  not  aware  of  that  requirement.)    We  complied  with  this  new  request  within  72  hours.    On  Oct.  15,  we  received  a   new  email   again   stating   that   the   client’s   application  was   complete   and   that   he   could   expect   a   4-­‐month  waiting  time.    We  are  concerned  that,  even  though  the  applicant   has   already  waited  more   than   4  months   for  processing,  his  application  has  been  pushed  to  the  back  of   the   pile   because   of   a   new   requirement   that   had  never   before   been   published.     It   had   also   never   been  raised   in   any   of   the   unit’s   previous   emails,   which  assured   us   that   the   client’s   application   was   complete  and  would  be  processed  in  due  course.  

12   IRAP  Berkeley,  pending  

IRAP  Berkeley  has  been  working  with  a  client  who  lives  in  Damascus.  After  submitting  her  application  for  COM  approval,  they  worked  with  the  client  to  prepare  the  I-­‐360.  They  asked  her  if  she  could  mail  the  form  to  the  US  with  the  original  signature,  but  she  expressed  serious  reservations.  She  told  us  she  was  worried  because  she  believed  that  all  mail  in  Syria  was  opened,  and  she  did  not  feel  comfortable  mailing  immigration  forms  to  the  United  States.  (She  had  been  quite  cautious  throughout  the  representation  with  sharing  information  in  English  over  the  phone,  as  she  was  nervous  about  the  safety  of  her  and  her  family.)  IRAP  then  asked  a  number  of  trusted  sources  who  lived  in  or  are  familiar  with  daily  Syrian  life.  They  suggested  the  best  approach  would  be  to  use  either  FedEx  or  DHL,  both  of  which  have  offices  in  Damascus.  Our  client  agreed  to  use  FedEx,  and  mailed  out  the  form  accordingly.  IRAP  received  the  package  opened.  IRAP  Berkeley  assumed  that  this  is  Syrian  practice  for  outgoing  mail,  and  were  concerned  about  the  

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possibility  of  security  threats  to  our  client.      13   TLP/Mayer  

Brown,  Currently  in  the  U.S.  through  USRAP  

Failing  to  Look  at  all  Available  Evidence  

See  Above  Page  17  

14   TLP/Mayer  Brown,  Denied  COM  Approval  

The  Necessity  of  a  Government  Database  See  Above  Page  14  

15   TLP/Mayer  Brown,  pending  COM  approval  

Mayer  Brown’s  client  worked  for  the  U.S.  military  over  the  course  of  three  years,  through  a  series  of  contracts.  As  a  result  of  his  work,  our  client  and  his  father  were  kidnapped  and  the  family  fled  to  Jordan  in  2006,  where  they  currently  reside.    Our  client  applied  for  Chief  of  Mission  approval  on  October  22,  2009,  and  his  application  has  been  stalled  since  March  2010  because  he  cannot  provide  the  full  copies  of  his  contracts  with  the  U.S.  military  –  which  he  did  not  take  with  him  when  he  fled  Iraq.    He  has  provided  the  first  page  of  several  contracts  which  show  that  he  was  employed  by  the  U.S.  military  for  more  than  one  year.    We  have  been  unable  to  obtain  copies  of  the  full  contracts,  or  copies  of  those  contracts  he  does  not  have.    Nevertheless,  we  have  provided  other  documentation,  including  letters  of  recommendation,  which  show  that  our  client  was  employed  by  the  U.S.  military  for  more  than  one  year.  

16   TLP/Mayer  Brown,  pending  COM  Approval  

Extralegal  Requirements  See  Above  Page  12      

17   IRAP  UPenn,  pending  USCIS  approval  

Our  client,  an  Iraqi  refugee  living  in  Amman,  was  employed  by  the  United  States  Air  Force  Office  of  Special  Investigations  (AFOSI)  from  mid-­‐2003  through  January  2005  and  from  July  2005  to  July  2007.  A  June  2005  letter  of  appreciation  from  an  AFOSI  Commander  commends  Mr.  Ali’s  continuous  service  “since  December  2003,”and  a  badge  issued  5  June  2007  notes  2005-­‐2007  service.  A  2004  letter  of  praise  from  an  AFOSI  Security  Advisor  states  Mr.  Ali  “endured  great  personal  risk  in  providing…assistance,”  and  “demonstrated  that  he  placed  the  interests  of  the  U.S.  Coalition  Forces…before  himself.”    In  2005,  the  client  fled  Baghdadi  militias  on  advice  from  AFOSI  superiors,  and  in  2006  the  Jaysh  al’Mahdi  killed  his  partner.    The  militias  that  identified  Mr.  Ali  continue  to  operate  in  Iraq  and  pose  a  very  serious  threat  should  he  be  forced  to  return.    The  Client,  his  wife  and  young  daughter  first  applied  to  the  International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM)  for  refugee  and  SIV  status  on  30  July  2007.    

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However,  he  continues  to  be  deferred  for  “further  review”  without  explanation.    The  last  deferral  is  dated  18  August  2010,  and  Mr.  Ali  claims  his  last  interviewer  told  him  delay  resulted  because  the  “president  in  the  White  House”  had  to  approve  his  file.    USCIS  continues  to  defer  his  application  without  demonstrated  cause.        

18   IRAP  Berkeley,  pending  

IRAP-­‐Berkeley  has  been  working  with  a  client  who  served  as  a  military  interpreter  for  19  months  and  who  is  now  in  serious  danger:  Insurgents  have  shot  at  him  and  thrown  a  live  grenade  in  his  family  compound.    We  submitted  the  client’s  COM  application  on  Aug.  13,  2010  and  received  a  return  email  from  the  SIV  unit  on  Aug.  25,  2010.    The  email  detailed  a  number  of  new  requirements  for  the  applicant.    First,  it  required  him  to  sign  and  date  his  statement  of  threats.    Second,  it  said  that  the  client’s  letter  of  recommendation  was  unsatisfactory.    The  email  required  that  the  letter  be  written  by  the  applicant’s  “direct  supervisor”  and  that  the  recommender  describe  himself  as  such  in  the  letter.    The  SIV  Unit  cited  Defense  Authorization  Act  Sec.  1244  for  this  requirement.    We  had  never  heard  of  this  requirement,  and  when  we  checked  the  act,  it  did  not  require  an  LOR  from  a  “direct  supervisor.”    Instead,  it  requires  a  letter  from  a  “senior”  supervisor.    We  feel  that  our  applicant’s  letter  meets  this  requirement:  It  was  written  by  the  captain  of  the  military  police  unit  with  which  the  client  worked.    We  also  feel  that  the  SIV  Unit  response  was  unfortunate  because,  in  addition  to  the  letter  referenced  above,  we  included  a  second  LOR  that  met  these  requirements.    Third,  the  SIV  unit  returned  the  client’s  DS-­‐157  as  unsatisfactory.    Question  12  of  the  form  asks  for  the  applicant’s  last  two  employers.    Our  client  has  only  had  one  job,  which  we  listed  and  which  directly  followed  his  graduation  from  college,  also  listed  on  the  form.    The  reply  email  relayed  (contradictory)  instructions  that  stated  we  could  not  use  the  words  “not  applicable”  instead  of  the  word  “none”  in  certain  spaces  in  the  form.    We  have  revised  the  DS-­‐157  to  meet  these  requirements,  but  we  also  believe  this  kind  of  nitpicking  stymies  legitimate  applicants.    No  published  information  states  that  an  applicant  must  sign  his  statement  of  threats,  that  only  a  “direct  supervisor”  can  write  a  letter  of  recommendation,  or  that  the  word  “none”  is  not  a  legitimate  substitute  for  “not  applicable”  on  the  DS-­‐157.      

19   TLP/Mayer  Brown,  COM  

Mayer  Brown’s   client  was  employed  by  KBR   from   July  14,   2003   through   April   4,   2005,   as   a   purchasing  

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Approval  Denied;    Request  for  Review  pending  with  Office  of  Refugee  and  IDP  Affairs,  U.S.  Embassy  

consultant   pursuant   to   a   contract   and   five  subcontracts.       As   a   result   of   his   work   with   KBR,   our  client  was   attacked   in   his   parents’   home  by  men  who  threatened   to   kill   him.     He  moved   to   another   part   of  Baghdad,   but   was   again   threatened   with   death.     He  fled   the   country   in   2006   and   returned   to   Baghdad   in  2009,  moving   into   the  house  of  his   in-­‐laws   in   another  part   of   town   in   order   to   ensure   his   safety.     Recently,  however,   neighbors   of   his   parents   have  warned   them  that   unknown   men   have   been   asking   for   our   client’s  whereabouts.  Our  client  filed  an  application  for  Chief  of  Mission  approval   in   January  2010.   In   conjunction  with  that  application,  he  provided  the  full  signed  copy  of  his  consulting  agreement  with  KBR,  and  all  five  signed  (and  complete)   copies   of   the   subcontract   change   orders.    The   original   contract  was   for   the   time   period   July   14,  2003   through   January   14,   2004.     Subcontract   Change  Order   1   extended   that   time   period   to  May   28,   2004.    Subcontract   Change   Order   4   further   extended   the  period   of   performance   “from   the   effective   date   of  14Jul03   to   the   expiration   date   of   28May04   to   the  effective   date   of   14Jul03   to   the   expiration   date   of  28May05.”   We   also   submitted   an   employment  verification  letter  from  KBR  which  stated  that  our  client  had  been  employed  from  July  14,  2003  to  April  4,  2005,  and  which  provided  the  contract  number  under  which  he  had  been  employed.  On  October  5,  2010,  our  client  received   a   letter   denying   his   application   for   Chief   of  Mission   approval   because   he   had   “not   provided  evidence   to   demonstrate   that   [he   had]   met   the  program   requirement   of   having   worked   for   the   U.S.  Government   in   Iraq   for   not   less   than   one   year   after  March   20,   2003.”       We   requested   clarification   of   the  decision   and   were   told   the   documentation   submitted  did  not  prove  one  year  of  work  for  the  US  Government.    In  particular,  we  were   told   that   “[t]he   contracts  often  changed   monetary   amounts   but   in   adding   up   all   the  time   covered,   it   was   not   more   than   365   days.”     We  asked   for   a   review   of   that   decision,   in   particular  pointing   to   Subcontract   Change  Order   4.   In   response,  we  were  told  that  an  in-­‐depth  review  had  been  done  of  the  evidence  our  client  submitted  and  “it  still  does  not  appear  that  he  is  qualified  for  the  program.”    We  have  requested   further   review   and   clarification,   which   has  been  forwarded  to  the  Office  of  Refugee  &  IDP  Affairs  at  the  US  Embassy  in  Baghdad.  

20   TLP/Mayer   Mayer  Brown’s  client  was  employed  by  US  Government  

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Brown,  Currently  in  Sweden;  Likely  to  be  deported  because  of  lack  of  COM  approval  

L-­‐3  Communications  and  the  Saudi  Arabian  Trading  and  Construction   Company   (SATCO),   as   a   translator   from  September  2003  through  August  2007.    In  August  2007,  he   was   kidnapped   and   tortured   by   individuals  identifying   themselves   as   members   of   the   Al   Mahdi  armyHe   was   eventually   released,   and   then   fled   the  country,   ending  up   in   SwedenHis   application   for   Chief  of  Mission  approval  was  denied  because  he   could  not  provide  a  recommendation  letter  with  an  official  email  address.    His  U.S.   citizen   supervisor   from  SATCO,  who  provided   the   recommendation   letter   that   was  submitted   as   part   of   his   application,   was   already  retired  and  did  not  have  a  company  email  address.    He  explained  in  the  recommendation  letter,  however,  that  his   “mindspring”  email   address  had  been  his   “official”  email   address   during   this   time   of   employment   with  SATCO   –   they   had   all   used   their   personal   email  addresses  –  and  was  still   valid.    Our  client  was  unable  to   locate   any   of   his   U.S.   military   supervisors.     He   is  currently  facing  deportation  back  to  Iraq.      

21   TLP/Mayer  Brown,  pending  Administrative  Review  Process  

Mayer  Brown’s  client  served  as  a  translator  for  the  U.S.  Army.     As   a   result,   he   received   threats   and   was  targeted  for  attack  by   insurgents.    He  fled  the  country  in   2005,   and   is   currently   a   refugee   in   Syria.     Mayer  Brown  applied  for  Chief  of  Mission  approval  on  behalf  of   our   client   in   December   2008,   and   he   was   granted  COM   approval   in   February   2009.   In   August   2009   –  following   his   visa   interview   at   the   U.S.   Embassy   in  Damascus   –  we  were   informed   that   his   case   required  further  administrative  processing  and  that,  as  a  result,  his  visa  application  had  been  denied  under  INA  221(g).    To   date,   more   than   a   year   later,   the   administrative  review  process  has  not  been  completed.        

22   TLP/Mayer  Brown,  SIV  Approved;  Awaiting  Newborn’s  Passport  for  Travel  

Mayer   Brown’s   client   received   his   Special   Immigrant  Visa  on  April  8,  2010,  but  IOM  would  not  arrange  travel  for   his   wife   because   of   her   pregnancy.     He   was  informed   that   when   the   child   was   born   –   which  happened   occurred   on   June   15,   2010   –   they   would  need   to   obtain   a   passport   for   the   child   in   order   to  travel   to   the  United   States.     The  U.S.   Embassy   agreed  to   reissue   the   visas   once,   given   his   circumstances.    However,   they   advised   that   this   would   not   be  immediate,   as   he   would   need   to   undergo   additional  administrative  processing  due  to   the  reissuance.      Our  client  has  been  given  a  date  in  February  2011  to  appear  at   the   Iraqi   passport   agency   to   provide   all   the  

Appendix 1 Page 7

 

 

necessary   information   for  his  newborn  son’s  passport.    After  that,  it  will  likely  take  a  few  more  months  for  the  passport   to   be   issued,   and   then   his   case  will   need   to  undergo   further   administrative   processing.    Accordingly,   it  will   be  well   over   a   year   from  when   he  received  the  visas  until  he  and  his   family  can  travel   to  the   United   States.     We   asked   that   the   passport  requirement  be  waived,  and  we  were  told  that  the  U.S.  Embassy   was   not   able   to   issue   any   travel   documents  for  the  baby  unless  he  has  a  valid  passport.      

 

 

 

Appendix 1 Page 8

        

Appendix 2: example emails 

Appendix 2  

Document  Pages Memorandum from Richard A. Albright to Patricia A. Butenis (November 4, 2008)  1‐6 E‐mails from James Foley to Samuel M. Witten, et al. (February 10, 2009)  7‐8 Emails from Jennifer Rikoski to J. Wally Bird and LegalNet (September 1, 2009)  9‐11 E‐mail from Ruth E. Tintary to Lori Scialabba, et al. (March 12, 2008)  12‐13 E‐mails between Tressa Finerty and Elizabeth Harris (May 5, 2008)  14‐15 E‐mail from Tressa Finerty to Jennifer Rumbach, et al. (July 16, 2008)  16 Memorandum to William P. Marriott, Request for Assistance in Verifying Employment of Iraqis (undated) 

17‐18 

E‐mails between Tressa Finerty and Sumitra Siram (June 3, 2008)  19‐20 E‐mails between Rachel S. Allport and Iraq SIV Application (August 9, 2010)  21‐26 E‐mails between Shannon A. Graving and Iraq SIV Application (May 3, 2010)  27‐29 

 

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STATE-0057

Subject:

UNCLASSIFIED

Siram, Sumi!,a 11Z 5';;'Fr;;':om::':.. =';=::'::"--F-,-J--B--------RE...L...E""A..S....E....D"""I PART

aey. amesSent: Tuesday, February 10, 2009 5:00 PM B5To: Witten, Samuel M; Rusch. Tcny L; Bartlett, La'M'ence 1::; Heinlein. Simone G; Siram, Sumilta;

Sarkisova, Elina V; Pollack, Margaret JBaghdad SIVs and the refugee backlog

I had a good conversation with Tressa today on the SIV stale of play.

The good news is that the TOYers have made great headway and have alf but eliminated the backlog of SIV applications.They should be fully cutTent by next week. Meantime another backlog has fonned at the next stage: signature of theCOM letters, of which there are about 200 pending. Tressa will work through these herself over the next couple weeks.794 COM leners have been signed 10 dale.

As for off·shoring employment verification. a memorandum has now been signed with NVC and they are working out thekinks in the data base. April 1 is the transition date to NVC.

The six TOVers will remain at post through June and will focus on the retail effort to move applicants from the refugee tothe SIV queue. Moreover, post has decided to continue funding two TOVers indefinitely in support of SIVs, which isoutstanding news and w~1 enable this labor-intensive effort to continue.

As a practical matter, Tressa noted that there remains only a 3-4 month window to affect FY09 results. In other words.application packets with approved COM letters prepared after June would likely end up as FV20 10 arrivals.

Overall, SlY applications have remained steady at about 100 per week. In principle that would equate to the 5,000 annuallimit. but the reality is much different. These initial applications tend 10 be preliminary in nature, and are often not foHowedup. Tressa said that at least 30% ~disappear" (self-eliminate) and another percentage may be deemed ineligible for onereason or another. She estimated that perhaps half of the caseload would actually go forward and receive a COM letter­maybe in the neighborhood of 2500 cases per year (a very rough estimate). But not all of these applicants would choose10 forward the packet with COM letter 10 NVC immediately, again for various reasons.

The bottom line is that current demand for SIVs is well short of capacity - likely under 50% of the 5,000 limit (to saynothing of the FY08 canyover. which brings the ceiling close to 10,000). [n other words, there is an enormous need tofocus our minds on finding ways to move applicants 'rom the refugee to the SIV queue.

As mentioned, the TOY staff will soon be devoting time 10 examining refugee cases to identify the potential for switches.(Already there is an effort underway to persuade people to drop out of the refugee Queue once they have received asigned COM letter, which itself now contains such an exhortation.) This project is or will be hampered by the tact that therefugee and SIV data bases are not compatible (they can't be run together). Nonetheless Tressa felt it has real potential.

In fact, she and Richard believe there are relatively significant numbers of refugee applicants who would switch to the SIVr~ ,e war. 'bev .Ho",'. '0 do so i eu those emo'oyed bv USAID under gcants or coopera"ve agreements. \ IB5

Finally, I queried Tressa about the potential for processing more of Baghdad's refugee ap~icants in Amman. While ablanket communication to applicants to this effect would not be advisable, she thought there might be potential if theycould figure out a way how to pilCh this option on a case·by-case basis. However, the fact that applicants currently mustremain in Amman for both the OPE pre-screening and DHS interviews Is a big impediment. I offered to take this up withDHS.

UNITED S"J',\TE;S DErART~IJo:NT OF STATEREVIEW ,\UTIIORJTY: AI>OLPIIIl EISNERDATE/CASE 11): 27 APR 2010 200901707 UNCLASSIFIED

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Foley, James BThursday, February 12, 2009 2:55 PMDonahue, David TWillen, Samuel MSIV eligIbility for Iraqis

'>Fviey, James B

From:Sent:To:Cc:Subject:

UNCLASSIFIED

ReU~J\S~1)~?,;~TB5

PAGES MISSINGDavId,

I've been In discussIOn thIS week with Baghdad to assess how the SIV program is domg and where it is heading. Thegood news is that, thanks 10 the current deployment of TOY personnel and the upcoming transfer oflhe employmentverification function to NVC, the backlog of applications has been all but eliminated and there is every reason to believepost will be able to process SIVs in a timely and efficient manner from here on oul. Thanks to CA for the outstandingsupportr

The bad news, as it were, is that SIV demand is falling far short of capacity. Currently Bagb.gad is averaging about 100applications per week. However, many oflhese (approx. 30%) self-eliminate"§Jld a certain number are deemed inehgible.When all is said and done, it would seem Baghdad is on a course that would produce somewhat less than hair of the 5.000$IV cases per year authorized under the Kennedy legislation.

ThIs is not going 10 look good to Congress, when it finds out. In facl. it's going to look even worse given that (a) the actualFY09 SIV arrival numbers will be even lower given the stow slart, and (b) the FY09 ceiling In reality is almost 10,000, giventhe carryover of unused FY08 numbers. ~

Of course, one might say to Congress that it is not our fault If demand is relatively low. But there's a problem vllth thisargumenl demand is 100 h1sh - way too high for refugee processing in Baghdad. PRM has Just approved anolherexpansion oTOur Overseas recessing Entity (OPE) in Baghdad, but even with this increased capacity the backk>g ofapplications will continue 10 grow, There are simply fiOite limits to how much refugee processing we can do in-counlryunder prevailing Green Zone conditions.

Given that the pool of applicants for P·2 refugee and SIV programs is largely the same, our challenge is to try to persuadefolks 10 !QQ-'!'..~.ft.QmJhe..locg1efugeeline to the undersubscribed $IV queue_ It appears that refugee status IS preferred"bymost applicants because the case composition (family sIze) is larger than under SIVs. However, the long wait currentlyfacing refugee applicants ought to be an incentive for some to switch over to SIVs. Post is gOing to work on (his - It wIlllook closely at the refugee applicalJOn files and identify cases With the most SIV potential. This will be a labor-intensIveand tlme-consuming effort,

There is one thing we can do thaI would help move perhaps significant numbers off the refugee rolls and into the SIV,~~~~;,~,Jij<;~'v~~;billHliitviJilo;J;in~clu~d~ejl~ra;o;is;';;w~h~o~wo~r~k~ed~fo~r~u~sLu~n~d~e~r:;;;mra~n~l~s~a~n~d~c~o~o;o,e~ra~t~iv~ei:iao[rr~c~e~m;e~n~li5.]"-="""---'85

UNCLASSIFIED

Another factor to keep in mmd is that Congress likely will acl if we do nol. They look upon the two programs (refugees andSIVs) as helping 10 rescue an undifferentiated pool of IraqIS endangered because of their vaned and various associationswith Ihe USG. Once Congress learns of the imbalance belween demand for the two programs, they will want to make thIS

""S' ,,::.-p.-. ..... , .::..,..~-" .. '~",UNlTlm STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATEIlEVIEW AUTIIORITY: AOOLI'IIII EISNERDATE/CASE II); 27 API~ 2010 200')01707

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STATE-0242

Siram, Sumitra

From:Sent:To:Cc:SUbject:

Follow Up Flag:Flag Status:

UNCLASSIFIED

~2BEHarris, Elizabeth J RELEASED IN PARTMonday, May 05.2008 6:14 PMFinerty, Tressa R(Baghdad) B6Thayer, Yvonne F; Siram. Sumltra; Bartlett, Lawrence ERE: Thorny EV Question RE USG grant/cooperative agreement organizations

Follow upFlagged

I guess J am not thinking about needing this for big companies-or e'l.'en ddving too much into thedetails. If someone worked for KBR or L3 Titan, just move forward. (Since 1,3 Titan lost the DODcontract, any "new'" hires would be unde'r the new company anyway, so anyone who says theyworked for 13 Titan as an interpreter in Iraq is fine since 1,3 Titan wouldn't be able to hire anyonenew now that they have lost the contract.)

For the case in question, since your Embassy contact said that the company no longer receives usafunding, we have to look into it. But I am not suggesting adding this to your line of questioningunless we cannot find evidence of the USG funding.

Liz

From: Rnerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)sent: Monday, May 05,2008 9:17 AMTo: HarTis, Elizabeth JCc: Thayer, Yvonne F; Siram, Sumitra; Bartlett, Lawrence ESubject: RE: Thorny EV Question RE USG grant/cooperative agreement organizations

Liz: Maybe we can dlat aboul this laler tonight. 111 try you sometime between 8-10pm BGO lime.

Verifying that an employee worked during the lime lhe entity was receiving USG funding is realty, realty complex. Thisessentially means we'd have 10 get copies of grants/cooperative agreements for each company -- not 10 mention copies ofgrant extensions, etc. We might be setting the bar far higher than many employees can realisticalty reach, as it is verydoubtful that big companies (i.e., KBR or L3) are going to give employees copies of company contraclsfgrants whichmight be seen as proprietary corporate information.

let's chal.·r

Tressa Rae FinerryRcfugoe CCOITiinarorU.S. Embassy BaghdadPreskJenrial Pal&<;e 5-212

OSN. 239.8902Met: 914 360.5360

'n"""1---------B6

from:sent:To:CcSubject

Tressa,

HarTis, Blzabeth JMonday, May 05, 2008 3:31 PMFinerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)Thayer, Yvonne F; 'Kathleen Thompson'; 'Paula zakarian'; Siram, Surnltra; Bartlett, lawrence ERE: Thorny EV QuestIon RE USG granVcooperativeagf~ organizations

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STATE-0243

UNCLASSIFIEDIt seems to me that if we can confirm that the FA worked for an organization that received USGfunding, and that he was an employee during this time, I don't think it matteTs if the organizationno longer receives funding. This would be similar to L3/Titan-they have lost the DOD interpretercontract but anyone who worked for them when they did have the DOD interpreter contract wouldstill be eligible. But I do think the key is to confIrm that he was employed at the time the entity wasreceiving USG funding.

Liz

From: Rnerty, Tressa R{Baghdad)sent: Monday, May OS, 2008 7:01 AMTo: HarriS, Elizabeth JCc: Thayer, Yvonne Fj 'Kathleen Thompson'; 'Paula Zakarian'; Sirarn, SumitlU; Bartlett, Lawrence ESUbject: Thorny f:II Question RE USG grant/cooperative agreement organizations

Liz: Per the email below, Iraq Media Network, had received USG money in some form or fashion in the past, but at themoment may not receive any USG money (PA is confirming this information).

So, this begs the complicated question - if an OI"ganization, such as Iraq Media Network. received USG media for year200X-200Y, but does not currently receive USG funding, does the P-2 applicant (1) not qualify since organization does nolreceive USG money at time of refugee application, (2) only qualify if they worked at the organization during the time USGfunds were received, or (3) qualify at any titl',le? (Maybe there are additional iterations, but you get the point.)

·Tressa

From:Sent:To:Subject:

Smith, Brian K(Baghdad)Monday, May as, 2008 12:41 PMRnerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)RE: Media COmpany Contacts - Employment Verification for Refugee ApplICants

Tressa.Still awaiting a response from people who would know for certain ... latest word is that we do not fund them at all right now.Regards,

Brian K. SmithMedia Analysis OfficerU.S. Embassy, BaghdadMel cell: 1-914-360-4558lraqna cell: +964-0790-232-7343English site: httD:Jlbaghdad.usembassy.govlArabic site: htlp:llbaghdad.usembassy.govlirag/arl

From: Rnerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)sent: Sunday, May 04, 2008 1:36 PMTo: Smith, Brian K (Baghdad)S.ubject: RE: Media Company Contacts -- Employment Verification for Refugee Applicants

The way the refugee legislation was written an Iraqi employed by an organization or entity closely association with the USMission in Iraq that has received USG funding through an official and documented contract, award, grant or cooperativeagreement would qualify to apply for the refugee program. So, can you confirm that the Iraq Media Network did getfunding via one of the listed mechanisms? If so, yes, please send contact info for the organization. Many thanks.

Tresso Rae FinertyRcfvgoc CootrfinarOl"U.s. Embassy BoghdadPresidential Palace 5-212

DSN: 239.8902Mel: 914.360.5360

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UNCLASSIFIED

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STATE-0236

UNCLASSIFIED

Siram, Sumitra

From:Sent:To:Cc:

Subject:

Finerty, Tressa R(Baghdad) RELEASED IN PARTWednesday, July 16, 2008 3:40 AM'RUMBACH Jennifer'; MURPHY Craig B6Albright, Richard A(Baghdad); Bartlett, Lawrence E; Sarkisova, Elina V; Siram, Sumifra;Harris, Elizabeth J; JOHN DavidMinor change to IZ application guidance

Craig/Jennifer: We need to make one more minor change to the lZ application guidance. Under #5 employmentverification, please add the text below (highlighted in red only for the purpose of this email):

The principal applicant must forward an email or PDF letter from their U.S. supervisor or company official or otheravailable employment documentation verifying their employment.

-This additional language allows those applicants who can not receive employment verification letlersJemails from theircompany to submit other documentation, such as their employment contract, etc. We still do need "good" EV information,including a supervisor name and emaiVphone number. as we don't currently have the staffing sufficient to do individual EVresearch. So, I'll ask that Baghdad Info Center continue to push applicants for detailed points of contact altheir employer;however, we n.eed to balance this knowing that there may be a few companies that will not provide actualletters/emaiJs ofemplo~entverification.

Thanks,~ Tressa

General Refugee General RefugeeProgram Il1Quir... Program Inqulr...

TrEssa Rae FinctryRefugee Ccordimlioru.s. EmbillJsy B<lgfnledProsl':1t'f!liifl Pafar;() S-2IOC

DSN: 239.8002 (from U.S. 703-343.8902)MCI: 914 J!iQ 53$0/!af:lllS;

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UNITED STA"n:s DEPARTMENTOF STATEREVIEW AUTHORITY: ADOLPH II EISNERCLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIEDDATE/CASE: 10: 27 APR 2010 200901707

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UNCLASSIFIED

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STATE-0204

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULLUnited States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 10520

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. MARRIOTIEXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Request for Assistance in Verifying Employment ofiraqis

The Department of State requests assistance from the Department ofDefense in establishing a procedure for verifying the employment of Iraqi nationalswho seek admission to the United States as refugees. The Bureau of Population,Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is designing a procedure whereby Iraqis whoclaim persecution based on association with the U.S. because of their dircct orcontract employment by the USG or U.S. contractors will be able to requestconsideration for admission to the United States as refugees. It wiJl be necessaryto verify this claimed employment before any decision can be made regardingfurther action to bc taken, including possible submission of cases to theDepanment of Homeland Security for refugee claim adjudication.

The Department of State (PRM) is prepared to contact U.S. contractorsdirectly to obtain this verification. The Department ofDefense is requested tosupport this exercise by:

• Providing a DOD point of contact (POC) for policy dccisions on all mattersrclating to the resettlement of Iraqi refugees;

• Providing a DOD POC for verifying the current or former employment by DODof any Iraqi citizens in Iraq;

• Providing a list of all U-S. contractors supporting DOD operations in Iraq whohave employed Iraqis since 2003, with a POC for each contractor;

• Informing those contractors that they should cooperate with the Department ofState by establishing POCs for the expeditious verification of their employmentof any Iraqis in Iraq;

• Providing an estimate of the number ofcurrent and former Iraqi employeesengaged directly by DOD and by each contractor supporting DOD operations inIraq; and

UNITED STATES IJEF'ARTl\1 ENT OF STATEREVIEW AUTHORITY: AOOI.I'IIII EISNERDATE/CASE 11): 03 MA y 2010 200901707

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• Providing the Deparnnent of State (PRM) and/or Department ofHomelandSccurity with access to any database of biometric data compiled on employees.

The Department of State appreciatcs your assistance. Point of Contact in PRM willbe Ms. Terry L. Rusch at 202-663-1047.

Harry K. Thomas, Jr.Executi ve Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

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STATE-0239

UNCLASSIFIED

Siram, Sumitra

From:Sent:To:Subject:

Finerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)Wednesday, June 04, 2008 1:17 AMSiram, SumitraRE: EV • double \IS single verification

RELEASED IN PART86

Sure. my schedule is open next week. 9.30am (EDT) is my favorite time 10 do calls, bul it can be later if that works best.Pick the time/dale that works best for you and RPC...

Cheers,Tressa

TrGs.<;a R"f) FiflQrtyRcfu')C(J Coord;ntJloru.s. Em/:Y.Jssy Bag!l(iadp(£w}(Jrl/;al PJ/s!;c 8-212

DSN; 2JiI.8902 ((wm U.S, 703.343.8902)MCI: 914 36Jl53WImqrrajL- _ 86

from:5<"0To:Subject:

Siram, SumitraTuesday, June 03, 2008 10:14 PMAnerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)RE: EV - double vs sing~e verilication

I agree - I think the RPCs standards should be the same as well. I am still working w~h the RPC in figuring out what istheir role. my role and OPE's role. t think over the last couple of days we have been successful at conveying to RPC thatthey were trying to do too much and that we really need to shift a lot of the burden that RPC has taken on back to theOPE and the applicant themselves.

If you don't mind, I would like 10 propose to the RPC folks having that conference call between RPC and you and me.Maybe we could have it next week? .

from:Sent:To:Subject

Rnerty, Tressa R(Baghdac:l)Tuesday, JUIle 0], 2008 1: II PMSiram, SumitraRE: EV - double V5 single verification

It might be ·over the hill ft now... looks like the SIV program has realized that "double verification" not realistic.

Do know that for IZ refugee EV I'm only doing "single verification". I think it is important that RPC's standards are thesame.

-T

Tm:;sa Rao FlnfJr1yRDfufjcC Coordi:J<lforU.S. Embassy BfiglJdadPresidenll8l PalncG S·212

DSN: 239.8!i02 {(tom U S 703.343.80(2)Mel; 914.360 5360

IIOGnfJ·1 _ B6

UNITED STAn:s IlEPARTi\"lENTOF STATE:REVIEW AlJrI-lORITY: AIlOLPIl II EISNERDATE/CASE 10: 27 APR 2010 200901707

From: Siram, Somitra

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sent:To:....- TuesClay, June 03, 2006 7:41 PM

Anerty, Tressa R(Baghdad)EV - doOOIe VS single verification

UNCLASSIFIED

I just realized that I don'l think anyone on. this end ever weighed in on the issue of verifying with the supervisor \IS.verifying with the supervisor and HR.

I wiU try to find out what I can from larry.

Sumitra SiramBureau of Population, Refugees, and MigrationU.S. Department of State202-663·1057

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Graving. Shannon A (WAS - X72584)

From:Sent:To:Cc:Subject:

Dear

Iraq, SIVApplication [lraqSIVApplication@state.gov]Mnnnqv Mav 03.20102:23 PM

Graving, Shannon A (WAS - X72584)NVCSIV2010084004

We have received your email with attachments.

However, according to your DS157 , you are currently residing in the United States. Pleasesend a scanned copy of your visa and a brief explanation of how you entered the UnitedStates.

Please submit scanned copies of the missing documents to IraqSIVapplication@state.gov. Uponour receipt of all of the items listed above, we can continue processing your' application.

Sincerely,VioletSIV UnitNational Visa CenterSerco IncSupport ContractorEmail: IraqSIVApplication@state.govWeb: http://iraq.usembassy.gov/special_immigrant_visas.html

This email is Sensitive but Unclassified based on the definitions provided in 12 FAM 540.Any information in this transmission pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas orpermits to enter the United States shall be considered confidential under Section 222(j) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) [8 US C. Section 1202]. Access to and use of suchinformation must be solely for the formulation, amendment, administration, or' enforcement ofthe immigration, nationality, and other laws of the United states under INA 222(j) and asspecified in FAM guidance. If you have received such information in error, do not review,retransmit, disclose, disseminate, use, or take any action in reliance upon this information,and contact the sender as soon as possible.

Appendix 2 Page 28

x .. -

From:Sent:To:Cc:Subject:Attachments:

Dear Ma'am,

-,.. _...

Monday, May 03,20108:15 PMIraqSIVapplication@state.govGravinn Shannon A (WAS - X72584)Fw.

Thank you very much for your email. I wish you are doing well.

Regarding to my case I would like to inform you that I entered the United States as a Significant Public BenefitParolee. Attached are two documents evidencing my grant of Significant Public Benefit Parole and my approvalto travel to the US.

I have alternative office in DC represented by Miss Shanon who is helping me at the process. That alternativesent to SIV office in Baghdad full explanations about my situation.We got emails of Mr. Walter who asked us the same question and we sent to him the documents with briefing.

However,! forwarded to you the emails I got before from Mr. Walter and the alternative's answers.

I am really appreciate your helping and please be free to ask for any thing you need.

Sincerely

From: Graving, Shannon A (WAS - X72584)Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2010 11:28 AMTo: 'Iraq, SIVApplication'Subject: RE: NVCSIV2010084004

Dear Walter,I hope this email finds you well. _ _ entered the UnitedStates as a Significant Public Benefit Parolee. Attached are two documents evidencing his grant of SignificantPublic Benefit Parole and his approval to travel to the US. Please let me know if you have any otherquestions.

Thank you for all of your assistance. We greatly appreciate it.

Best regards,Shannon

Shannon A. Graving I Holland & KnightSenior Counsel I The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies

2099 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 100 I Washington DC 20006

1

Appendix 2 Page 29

Phone 202.419.2584 I Fax 202.955.5564

shannon.graving@hklaw.com I www.hklaw.com

Add to address book! View professional biography

From: Iraq, SIVApplication [mailto:IraqSIVApplication@state.gov]Sent: Friday, April 09, 2010 8:07 AMTo: Graving, Shannon A (WAS - X72584)Subject: RE: NVCSIV2010084004

Dear Shannon:

Th<mk you f()r your interest in the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program.

According to your emaiL is currently residing in the United States. Please send a scanned copy ofvisa and a brief explanation of how you entered the United States.

Please submit scanned copies of the missing documents to IraqSIVapplication((i~state.gov. Upon ()lIr receipt ofall of the items listed above. we can continue processing your application.

Sincerely,

Walter

SIV Unit

National Visa Center

Serco IncSuppo11 Contractor

Email: IraqSIVApplication@state.gov

Web: http://iraq.usembassy.gov/special_immigrant_visas.html

This email is Sensitive but Unclassified based on the definitionsprovided in 12 FAM 540.Any information in this transmission pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United States shall be considered confidentialunder Section 222(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) f8 US C. Section 1202]. Access to and use of such information must be solely for theformulation, amendment, administration, or enforcement of the immigration, natiC'na/ity, and other laws of the United States under INA 222(j) and asspecified in FAM guidance. If you have received such information in error, do not review, retransmit, disclose, disseminate, us~~, or take any action inreliance upon this information, and contact the sender as soon as possible.

2

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