Rabinowitz, WG

8/6/2019 Rabinowitz, WG

1/14

Platonic Piety: An Essay toward the Solution of an Enigma

Author(s): W. Gerson RabinowitzSource: Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1958), pp. 108-120Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181634 .

Accessed: 23/03/2011 14:15

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4181634?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4181634?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap


2/14

PlatonicPiet:An EssayToward he Solutionofan Enigma

W. GERSONRABINOWITZ1

THE ONE dialogue of the Platonic corpusin which the concept ofpiety is discussedas such and at any length at all is, of course, theEuthyphro,nd it is this work - or, to put it more strictly perhaps,it is the concept of piety adumbratedwithin the work - which consti-tutes the "enigma" f my title, for, unfortunately, he work itself doesnot make it unambiguously lear whatmeaning,if any, Plato wished toattachto 6o6atov. The Eithyphro,n fact, is one of the so-calledaporeticdialoguesof definition,a dialogueto be distinguishedrom the dialogueof exposition by its apparentailureto hit the truth, to answera questionsatisfactorily, o arrive at an affirmative ndpositive result. In short, it isa dialogueof searchwhich-beginsand ends with an apparentavowal ofignorance concerning the meaningof piety; and the impression withwhichnmanyave eft off itsperusal s thatof a typicallyminor, "Socratic"dialogue- dramatic, earlycomposed, tentative, andnegative.Negative and tentative as it is, it would be foolhardyto label what Ihere propose to say about its central question a solution simpliciter:onecannotclaim certaintyfor a findingwhich is to be discoveredexplicitlyformulatedas suchatno pointwithinthe dialogue,andwhich, moreover,cannot be deduced therefrom without resort to the general hypothesisthat Plato's thoughtconstitutesa unified system, the concepts of whichinterpenetrateand illuminate one another. Nevertheless, I hope to beable to suggestthat there is reason for employingsuch an hypothesis nconnection with the Euthyphro,hat this reason is to be found withinthe confines of the dialogue itself, and that, once the hypothesis isaccepted, the enigmaticqualityof the work will vanish nto clarity.It will be recalled that the work opens with a certain Euthyphromeeting Socratesat the stoa of the &pXowvat.e6hq.Each is soon to beengagedin a trial: Socrates, it develops, is to be tried for impiety, forbeinga 7ronqg Oecov,a xacvoTotiZw nz-pLTX MOC whereby,t is alleged,he corruptsthe young; Euthyphro,contrary o the wishesof his family,is going to prosecute his own fatherfor murder, a man who throughneglect has permitted a homicide, a 7csX'n of Euthyphro's,to die.His family think Euthyphro's act an impious one (v6a0tov yap stvat 'o108


3/14

Aov 7rocptppovou semL-vxc); but Euthyphro himself knows better: hehas, he claims, exact knowledge of a 0'Lta, sa a ivcxTL,and of tra' Oetin general, and he will be glad to impart this knowledge to Socrates(2A-SD).He first asserts that 6 !SaLovis what he is in fact going to do, to proceedagainst the akatx6v no matter who he may be. Such action, however, issimply an example of that To'r6o Eo, of that pta 8e'a, of that singlecharacteristic which all pious acts must possess if they are to be pious.It is an account of this characteristic, which Socrates apparently does notcomprehend, that he wishes Euthyphro to impart to him (sD -6 E).

Accordingly, a second definition is offered - piety is that action whichis pleasing to the gods; and this is soon corrected to that which ispleasing to all the gods, when Socrates points out that the gods of thetraditionalcultus GaToaCL&ouGL.. xxl 8a=povtoct M);Akot4 about whatis just and unjust, noble and base, good and evil (6E Io-9E).

This emended definition, according to which -r6 6aLov is o' OroypXe4,is then subjected to a critical examination in which, perhaps for thefirst time in the history of western thought, the distinction betweenessential nature and accidental property is drawn. In brief, Socratesshows that the piety of an act remains unaffected by the love which itspiety inspires in the gods. Its being pleasing to the gods and its pietyare, in fact, distinct characteristics which stand to one another inthe relation of =tOos to o6a[a, the act's piety entailing the love itreceives from the gods, but not vice-versa (9 E- i I B).With the rejection of this definition, an impasse is reached and aninterlude in the search for the content of TO- 6aLov ensues, in whichEuthyphro complains that he does not know now how to express whathe means: their definitions refuse to remain stable and slip away fromthem. Socrates banteringly suggests that this instability of definition isthe result of Euthyphro's Daedalean skill. To which Euthyphro retortsthat it is really Socrates who, like a Daedalus, has been impartingmotion to the definitions so that they refuse to stay put. "Inthat case, "replies Socrates, "I am probably a greater artist than Daedalus to thisextent: he only made his own creations move, whereas I move those ofother people as well." Yet, he continues, he would rather not: e3ouX6unlvy&p &Mvot ro6q X6youq V?'VCLVOL aXLVYG)4( lap5iaOML [LRX)XoV 7 -Cp nAcaXou aopLoc -sC& Tav'&Xou Xp yev'aO. He would give thewisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus on top of that, for asolid definition (i i B- E ).

The interlude having ended with these words, Socrates asserts thatlO9


4/14

he will now try to help Euthyphro o see how he (Euthyphro)shouldinstruct him (Socrates) 7rptro5 'aou.. He begins by explaining thedistinction between genus and species, and easily gains Euthyphro'sconsent to the propositionthat the genus of piety is justice, that pietyis a kind of justice. What particularkind of justice piety is, however,remainsto be answered: the specific differentia must be stated if therequirementsof formal definitionare to be met. Euthyphrothereforeanswers that piety seems to him to be that kind of justice which isOepoutneLo the gods. Socrates commendshim warmly for this answer,but is not clear about the meaning of Oepnxsta. In the first place everytrue OCpO7E'L implies an art or science. Secondly every OepmnetLXeither improvesthe object of its concern or helps, in an ancillaryway,the object of its concern to produce some effect, to achieve somegpyov. Piety cannot be the sort of art that improvesthe gods, for godscannot be improved by men. It must therefore be an ancillary art, anu7nqpe?rTj-ntq,an art that helps the gods to achieve some act. But whatis this act, this 7r&yxomov'pyov, this utterly wonderful and noble act,which the gods are helped to achieve through the instrumentalityofman s piety? Ecat , X 01pta-e.T nE Oeoz? U1tYpVTLX1 L TLYO4 pyou&7repyMa[OCv 't=plCTX? XV&V ; iXOTVy& 6'n olaOX, Z'=taip T& yeOC?Z XAXLG'n 9X; el&VOC &vOpvrnV... ?CI 87 7tpO6 AL6 t C7rO 'cOTVexe7LVo6 7CaXyXOV E'pyOV 8 OL OSO'LOb?pyok0VTCL 7 'LM)PeOC xp@"COL;( iIE-I 3EI i).This questionEuthyphroails to answer.He shirksthe issue by replyingthat the works of the godsare 7roXX&odOLXa. But Socratespresseshim.The activities of generalsand of farmersare 7to?&xocl ctX?aoo; yetthey each havesome principal ask to achieve,so x cy'aXatov pyov.What is so xs%aCocLovf the ?pyopao of the gods? Again Euthyphroevades the point. It would be a work of great magnitude, he says, tolearn &xptPc6q6V'rocoJ3ocM '?Xs. But he will say this: that pietyconsists in knowinghow to speakand act in a mannergratifying o thegods, in prayerand sacrifice.This is the knowledge and such are theacts which preserve the welfare of the state. Again, however, Socratespersistsin keepingin the foreground he definition of piety as an art orscience that is ancillary o the gods' achievementof some principalact.He refers to his questionaboutthe natureof this act asthe chief questionhe has asked('orXS oto0VJv Np6T9), and he chidesEuthyphrofor havingturned aside at the very point at which he was face to face at1 The iterationof 6 XZCP&XCxLovere (r4B9) and the shift to a denotationdifferent romthat which the term bears at i4A Io seem significant.See p. I I9, note 3, infra.I 10


5/14

last with an adequate definition. Still, as asker, he must follow where thereplies of his interlocutor lead him: if piety consists in knowing howto sacrifice and how to pray to the gods, then it ought to be a science ofputting requests and giving returns to them. "A really first-rate compre-hension of my meaning!" Euthyphro exclaims at this. "Yes", repliesSocrates, "and the reason why I understand you so well is that I am an

XLOUp qg . . . aq qao CXp LcnpOaeXy tov voiv auq,Tc'- OU xcqtcd7r6ZZLr 0Tt &VZn ( 13 E l 2 -I4 D 6).In using these words at I4D4- 6, Socrates seems to be saying that he isquick to grasp Euthyphro's meaning because of his earnest desire tomaster Euthyphro's science of theology, because of the close attentionhe pays to it. The result of this close attention to Euthyphro's words, heseems to be saying, is this: that nothing said by Euthyphro will be lostupon him. Nevertheless, there is a puzzle in this sentence which has notheretofore been noticed. The result clause, (COT? oV xoa.[al neazarL

ocv ? , means literally "so that whatever you say will not fallto the ground", i.e., will not be rendered invalid. All commentators, sofar as I know, have taken this clause to mean "so that nothing which you(Euthyphro) say will be lost or thrown away upon me (Socrates)", butthere is no warrant in the Greek for the words "upon me". Their gra-tuitous addition becomes understandable only when one realizes thatsense seems to vanish without them, that sense seems to vanish if Platohere makes Socrates say that, as a result of his close attention toEuthyphro's words and wisdom, whatever Euthyphro says will berendered valid. The puzzle, in short, is generated by the collocation ofthe result clause with the idiomaticsenseof -rpoaexcoTOv voUv,, for therecan be no causal relation, it would seem, between Socrates' mereattention to them and the validity of Euthyphro's definitions. I shall haveoccasion later to return to this point and to other ambiguities within thepassage.

To finish the resume - if that service of men to the gods that is pietyis to put requests and to give return to them, then right requests oughtto concern what men need from the gods, and right return what thegods need from men. But, while there is no good for men which theydo not derive from the gods, what good or benefit do the gods receivefrom men? "Gratification", says Euthyphro, "what pleases them", withthis reply completing the circle to the full and returning to the positionwhich Socrates has already refuted. We are thus no closer, apparently,to a knowledge of what piety is at the close of the dialogue than we wereat its outset. The result of the investigation is negative; but Socrates, at

I I I


6/14

least, is not content with having proved Euthyphro an ignoramus in thevery sphere in which he claimed competence. "We must begin again,then, he says in the epilogue, "andask, what is piety? For syciO7tplv&vaLciOCVV ?tQt.9X7tQtLXLXa&. a BX?C [LE &x?0 & 7V lTp07r(d irpoaxcow 'r6vv0o5V 6Ot [c,CXLar0C UV et7t 'MV oexv - "Someother time," is Euthyphro's final rejoinder. "I've got in engage-ment, and I really must be off." - "What a thing to do, my friend," saysSocrates. "You've dashed my hopes, you know. I was so hoping thatI'd learn from you the nature of piety and impiety and thus clear myselfof Meletus' indictment. I'd have told him that you had enlightened me(ao?po... yTyovx) as to the meaning of ra&Oeo and that, in conse-quence, I was no longer going to make ad hocjudgments about them outof ignorance or make innovations regarding them, and that the rest ofmy life would be better as a result. " (I4D6-i6A).

So the dialogue ends, negatively, on the face of it, and yet a workrelatively rich in motive. There can be little doubt, as Shorey hassuggested, that the purposes of the Euthyphro, ike those of every otherPlatonic dialogue, are complex, are, in fact, "its entire content: thefavorable contrast of Socrates with Euthyphro, the satire on popularreligion, the lesson in elementary logic, the hint, perhaps, of the theoryof ideas, the deeper problem of the relations of religion and morality,the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, for finite minds of definingwithout contradictions our relations and service to the infinite that weapprehend as God." 1 There is an additional motive as well, however,which is not listed in such a catalogue. This is precisely the persistentattempt to come to grips with the nature of piety, which runs throughthe entire length of the dialogue, giving it its unity and structure. To allappearance, this is the major motive. On the face of it, Plato is strivingto make clear a concept of piety; and, on the face of it, he fails. But doeshe really fail?

This question, which must have been debated at least as early as thefirst century A.D., when Thrasyllus of Alexandria, in dividing Plato'sworks into tetralogies and in classifying each, in part, by philosophicalmethod and purpose, must have put it to himself in order to reach theconclusion that the Euthyphrowas a peirastic dialogue of search, wasraised anew in modern times by Schleiermacher, in the introduction tohis translation of the dialogue. There he observed that "man kann imEuthyphron weder eine fortschreitende Berichtigung der allgemeinstenethischen Ideen nachweisen, noch auch, wenn man bei dem einzelnen1 P. Shorey, WhatPlatoSaid (Chicago, X933), 78-79.I I 2


7/14

Begriff stehen bleiben will, der den unmittelbaren Gegenstand derUntersuchung ausmacht, finden sich hier solche indirekte Andeutungen,welche den aufmerksamen Leser hinreichend mit der Ansicht des Ver-fassers bekannt machen; sondern sowol die Beschranktheit des Zwekksals die bloss skeptische Behandlung des gegenstandes liegt hier ganzdeutlich zu Tage." 1 Yet, only i6 years later Socher was to find in thework just th-ose "indirekte Andeutungen", pointing to positive doctrine,whose existence Schleiermacher had denied ;2 and with the publicationin Bonitz's PlatonischeStudien of a lecture on the interpretation of theEuthyphrowhich had been delivered before the Berlin Academy ofScience in I 872, a position was taken which all proponents of a positiveinterpretation have utilized since, with but minor degrees of alteration.3In this lecture Bonitz maintained and reinforced Socher's view that thekey to the dialogue and the solution to the problem of Platonic pietylay in the one question, put by Socrates at I3E I 0- I I and again ati4A9-io, which Euthyphro fails to answer.

Since Bonitz's day, no scholar who has attempted to understand theEuthyphro as been able to avoid taking the one stand or the other. Whileneither view has prevailed at the expense of the other 4, I shall herecontend that the more plausible position is that of those who assume aI F. Schleiermacher, Platons Werkc, Ersten Theiles, Zweiter Band, Dritte Auflage(Berlin, i8S5), 37. The first edition of the work was published in I8o4.2 J. Socher, Ucber Platons Schrften (Munich, 1820), 62: "'Gott dienen ist Religion:giebt es einen Zweck der Gottheit, ein erhabenes Werk, zu dessen Vollfiihrung sie dieMenschen als Mitarbeiter aufruft? Welches ist dieses?' Hier liegt der Schiussel!" cf.Ibid., 6i: "Gew6hnlich, sagt Schleiermacher bei einer. andern Gelegenheit, legt er[i.e., Plato] den negativen Resultaten den Schliissel zur positiven Kenntniss bei: ergreifeihn, und schliess dir selbst auf! "3 H. Bonitz, Platonische tudien, Dritte Auflage (Berlin, i 886), 2 2 7-242. Fot those who hadanticipated Bonitz in finding positive results in the dialogue - notably, Stallbaum andSusemihl himself - see F. Susemihl, Dic GenetischeEntivickelung er PlatonischenPhilosophic,ErsterTheil (Leipzig, I8SS), I 17-I I9.4 Among the positivists are to be found, for example: J. Adam (Platonis Euthyphro[Cambridge, 1890], xii-xvii); W. A. Heidel ("On Plato's Euthyphro,"TAPA 31 [1900],163-I8 I); T. Gomperz (GrcekThinkersEnglish transl. London, I905], vol. II, 3?8-367);H. Raeder (Platons PhilosophischeEntwickelungLeipzig, 1905], 127-130); H. von Arnim(Platos Jugenddialoge [Leipzig-Berlin, 1914], 141-I54); Wilamowitz (Platon [Berlin,19I9], vol. II, 76-8I); and P. Friedlander Platon [Berlin, 1971, vol. 11,7?-84). Thenegativists include: B. Jowett (The Dialogues of Plato Translated nto English, II, 67-73);M. Croiset (Platon. Oeuvres Completes[Paris, Societe d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres,"1946], 1,4 I81-I83); L. Robin (Platon [Paris, 19351, 4I and 254.-255); J. Burnet(Plato's Euthyphro,Apologyof Socrates,and Crito [Oxford, 1924], S7); and P. Shorey (op.cit., 78-80). cf. E. Zeller, Die Philosophieder Griechen,II. i,5 193, note i and479.

I 13


8/14

positive concept of piety in the work, a concept to which Plato washimself committed and which was consciously meant by him to berecognizedas at least distinct from all conventionalnotions of the day,even if it were not understood n full. On the issueof the content of thisnotion, however, I must part companywith these scholars.Here, andhere alone, I may claim to be advancing omethingnew.

11Thereare severalreasonswhy one is justified n seekingpositivedoctrinein the dialogue.The Euthyphroallsnaturally nto two sectionsseparatedfrom one anotherby an interlude. It has long been recognized that thisdevice of interlude is Plato'sway of warningthe readerthat everythingthat has preceded is prefatory and that, if positive doctrine is to befound, it is to be soughtin the secondpart. This is the case, for example,with the Phaceowhose major interlude, followingthe objections leveledby Simmiasand Cebesagainst he immortalityof the soul, sets the scenefor the introduction of the theory of ideas as ultimate causes of allcharacteristicswhich come to focus in phenomenain space-time; theelaborateinterlude of the Protagoras,n which Plato not only parodiesthe sophists Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, but even involvesSocratesin a long and fantastic nterpretationof a piece of Simonideanverse that is itself a parodyof contemporarypractice in literary criti-cism, similarlysets the stage for the proof of the homogeneity of thevirtues in intelligence and knowledge; andthe case is similaragairn iththe Phaedrus nd the Theaetetus,ach of which has a long interlude thatfunctions in just this sort of way. Now, up to the interlude, everyattempt to define piety in the Euthyphronds in negation, every defi-nition seems to slipaway ike one of Daedalus'moving statues.We note,moreover, that these definitionsare the ones which havebeen advancedby Euthyphro, that Socrates up to this point has confined himselfchieflyto criticizingwhat Euthyphrovolunteers as his own ideas. In theinterlude, however, Euthyphro s reduced to a confession of incompe-tence; and, from this point on, Socrates,after stating his earnest desireto detain the definitions, that is, to reach one that is adequate,plays adifferent role. He is no longer chiefly critical, but now leads Euthyphrostep by step to the notion of piety as Oepxciv'Cmo the gods. We notethat he warmly congratulatesEuthyphro or havingreached this insight,and, what seems to me to be of extreme significance,he himselfneverabandons his way of looking at piety even though Euthyphro s quiteincapableof elaboratingon it and at the dialogue's end returns to theI 14


9/14

original position. These devices of artistry would seem to give everyindication not only that Plato intended to put positive content into thework, but also meant his readers to look for it in the section thatsucceeds the interlude. If such is not the significance of the devices, theyare left without function; and it is noteworthy that every negativist,while implicitly denying the significance here accorded them, hastacitly omitted to deal with them and to rem-ove them as possibleobstacles to his theory.

In any event, there are additional indications which, together withthose just mentioned, make it highly probable that the Ozpv.ta-concept is to be regarded as being at the heart of the Platonic concept.When piety is at last defined as the art ancillary to the performance of thegods' chief function, we are presented with the one definition in theentire dialogue that gets off scot free at Socrates' hands, that is not sub-jected to the devastating elenchus. Instead, Socrates presses Euthyphroto say what that function is, persists in keeping the definition before himwhen he tries to alter it, refers to his own question about the nature ofthe gods' function as the most important question he has asked, andfinally even rebukes Euthyphro for having turned aside just when theyhad come in sight of an adequate definition. It is inconceivable to methat Plato would have made Socrates speak and act so, had he not intendedhis readers to understand that the vital point in the dialogue had beenreached.

To reach that vital point, however, is to stumble upon an enigma: for,granted that Plato intends one to understand that piety is, in somesense, an 7rnpseTxnToZq Ocoiqdc TOV XCCPO?XOupyou &i7rpyxaLCv,what is that sense? What particular art does he have in mind? What doeshe mean by OeoL?And what is the gpyov of whatever he means byOsoL? t is scarcely surprising, in view of the ambiguity of these terms,that practically all who believe positive doctrine to be latent in thedefinition have given varying accounts of its content. What does surpriseone, apart from the fact that, in their concentration upon the meaningof Epyovor Oco'or both together, all have ignored one element of thedefinition altogether - that piety is an art or science, an U7prLXJt4 1 - is to find that they all manage, in one way or another, to import

1 Bonitz (op. cit., 234), for example, assertsthat Platonicpiety is "nichtsanderes...als die vollendete Sittlichkeit, nur unter der Form, dasssich der Mensch bewusst ist,hierdurchdas dienende Organfuirdas g6ttliche Wirken zu sein;" but precisely whatepistemonic form that "Sittlichkeit"would assumein Platonic terms he does not say.And Heidel (op. cit., 174), interpreting he definition o mean"thedevotedserviceof the

I IS


10/14

the Republic'sidea of good into it, some seeing this concept in the7yyxcXo0v gpyov of the gods, others equating it with the gods them-selves, others, again, making the gods and their 'epyov he subjective-objective content of the idea of good. For such impletion of the defi-nition blinks not nmerely the fact that no definite sign or clue can befound within the dialogue to indicate that Plato intends Oeo' or epyovtco'v O6v to be identified with the idea of good, but, what is moreimportant, the fact that no evidence exists within the entire Platoniccorpusto suggest that Oeos ever denoted the idea of good or the causalagent thereof. As Professor Cherniss has demonstrated1, it is voiithat constitutes deity or the essential characteristic of deity for Plato- the voiJg that rules "necessity" through persuasion in the ordering ofthe universe in the Timaeus 48A), that is Pcxeug oPJOCvoi3 xoc. ynqin the Philebus (28C), and and that is CyxpQCr4gOCa-pcOve xOLOacov

,Xcov s there are in the universe, of which it is the &LoxexoacpJXW,in the Laws (966E). Moreover, "deity, as vo5q, is not causally inde-pendent and so cannot be the 'ultimate reality'. It must, in fact, sinceit is vok, exist in soul, and consequently must be intermediate betweenthe ideas and phenomena... The Republic shows both that voi3 iscausally dependent upon the ideas and why Plato insists that it can existonly in soul. As there is vision in the eyes as soon as they are turnedupon objects lighted by the sun, so is there vo5q in the soul as soon asit rests upon the intelligibles illuminated by the truth and realityIdeal [Goodj, consciously conceived as God," is equally silent about the epistemoniccontent of that service. The same is true of Gomperz (op. cit., 361-362: "The work ofthe gods is the good, and to be pious is to be the organ of their will, as thus directed"),Raeder (op. cit., 130: "Der Dialog schliesst... ohne dass eine geniugende Definitionder Fr6mmigkeit erreicht wird; doch zeigt es sich hier wie bei friiheren Definitions-versuchen, dass eine richtige Definition nur unter der Bedingung zustande kommenkann, dass das Gute als Zweck erfasst wird"), and Friedlander (op. cit., 82: "Und wennSokrates fragt, welches denn das Hauptstiick dieses vielen Sch6nen sei, das die Gotterwirken, und keine Antwort erhalt, so ahnen wir, dass der platonische Sokrates daraufdie Antwort hatte: 'das Gute'; wir wissen aber auch, wie hoch ihm dieses Gute steht,und dass es vor Euthyphron nicht ausgesprochen werden konnte, ohne missverstandenoder enttweiht zu werden"). von Arnim would appear to be an exception, for he says(Op. cit., 149) that Plato "sie [i.e., piety] als eine ELt-fl.LV) u7np?j;rLz' Ozot; et4 -rreXd0cu 7rOLe!V lcxX TOV MVOpO7tcov4uy& auffasste." The sentence which immediatelyfollows this, however, shows that he too did not hold the definition to entail the conceptof a distinct science: "So ware sie auch nur eine Anwendung italics mine.- WGR] derit7rLaV on &o5 yOoA3."1 H. Cherniss, Aristotle'sCriticismof Plato and the Academy Baltimore, 1944), AppendixXi, 603-6io.I I6


11/14

emanating fromn he idea of good as light does from the sun (go8 B-D).Similarly in the Timaeus, although at the beginning it is said that thedemiurge constructed voi5 within soul (30B), it is later explained thatvoi5 is the result in the soul of the soul's 'contact' with the ideas(37A-C). For Plato, then, voi54 is not an 'entity' but is just the soul'sability (cf. Republic So8 E) to 'see' the ideas or the state in thesoul (i.e., v6&jaLq,Republic riiD, Timaeus52A) producedby sight ofthem. "1

It is the knowledge of this equation between deity and voi3c, vouchedfor as it is by the evidence of the dialogues, which alone enables one toanswer without resort to conjecture the question shirked by Euthyphro;for if the function of vo05in the first of its two senses must be, and canonly be, the realization of itself in the second - if it is the function ofvo05 to become vo67aL4, - then the "work" of the gods, a atyxoaXovepyov indeed, can only be the apprehension of the Platonic ideas.Moreover, it is only on the condition that Plato had already conceivedof this equation at the time of composition of the Euthyphrohat one cancomplete the definition of piety by allowing to it its full epistemoniccontent; for if the gods are vo5qand their function is the apprehensionof ideas, then it follows that the only art capable of aiding them toperform this function must be that Platonic art of philosophical dialecticwhich enables vo5 - TOptL '4 6 6'pymvov 4 xcTLav0acvtexcroq - to twist around and away from phenomenal process to theend that it may confront the ideas (Republic 518 C-D). Thus, if theequation between deity and vo54is accepted as a relation which is validfor the Euthyphro, very term in its enigmatic definition will be immedi-ately accounted for by a precise denotation for which evidence exists inthe Platonic dialogues; the alternative to acceptance of this equation, onthe otlher hand, for those who would find positive doctrine in the work,has in fact been, and can only continue to be, a conjectural reconstructionof that doctrine which in every case must fail to account for its epi-stemonic content.

The consciousness of the need to be clear about the meaning of anyterm Plato might use, which the Euthyphrobespeaks not only in itsinsistence throughout upon clear comprehension of the denotation oftr 6aLovbut also in its suggestion at 3E IO-14C3 that the definitionas it stands will remain deficient so long as the denotation of the epyov1 Cherniss, op. cit., 606-607. The last statement is not an exclusive disjunction. It isclear from the passages cited by Cherniss that Plato conceived of voi3q both as 8U"Va1LLqandas Nvipyem.

I 17


12/14

of the gods is not made explicit ', it bespeaks in particular for Oso'inits epilogue. There, afterevery effort at definitionhas ended in failure,Socrates s madefinallyandironicallyto lamentthe fact that Euthyphrohas not enlightenedhim, not as to the meaningof T6 0aLov,be it noted,but as to the meaningof t& Oet? - a strangelamentationto make, and apoint of striking significancefor the interpretationof the dialogue,when one recalls that not once in the entire conversationhas eitherparty to it addressedhimself to the particularquestion, rt e'trLT6 O?ZoV.The condition for the answer to this question, no less than that for theanswer to the question concerning the teachability of virtue in theMeno, s that a prior question be answered; and, for the Euthyphro,tis this prior question, -L Eatv 6 GO4, and its answer, vo5i, which(rather than the question concerningthe spyovof the gods) constitutethe key to the solution of the enigma.It may be objected, of course, that to accept for the Etuthyphronequation that is demonstrablyvalid only for the Republic,Philebus,Timaeus, nd Laws s quite unnecessary,and even anachronistic.So toobject, however, is to overlook the fact that, long before the time ofcomposition of the Euthyphro, naxagorasof Clazomenaehad alreadyconceived of, and had published, his view of vok as 6o&otxoruzW-VCxod. lt&vTcv 'rLo;s2, if not as the identical of Oeo', as the doxo-graphical tradition asserts.3 Moreover, to object so is to overlookevidence provided by the Euthyphrotself. It will be recalled that, whenat i4D4-6 Socrates ironically assuresEuthyphro hat he will save thevalidity of all the definitions by applyingvo5qthereto, we noted apuzzle in the sentencegeneratedby the collocationof the result clause1 To be noted, too, is what Plato makes Socrates say at 9E, after Euthyphro has defined-r 6a8Lovas 6 csv 7rcv-rcot Oeol (pLt)aLv. So defined, r 6&atovs tro Oro9LXc.Socrates' critique of this definition is based upon his clarjfication of the meaning of thisterm: it is an adjective which, in the last analysis, denotes merely a =aOo4 f Tr66tov,and as such it cannot be equated with the oUatLoof the latter. What I wish to emphasizehere is not the demonstration of the inadequacy of the definition as such, but rather thedemonstration of Plato's consciotisnesshat the denotation of a term must be understood ifthe validity or lack of validity of the definition in which the term appears is to beascertained. Ovxo5v kmaxo6,tAev oZ TO-ro, cX EUOIcppav, - says Socrates, - et xc&5@sXkye-rL, i IpCv xot oTrw, v -re aluTrv & xo8rey[eOm xxat -rv &Xhw &a?6Vov c -rcq L gxe" oura, >YXC(pOUVVTECXLV; j aX)(T7rov -rt ?kyct 6 hey&w;(9E4-7) The same consciousness of the necessity of clarifying a definition's terms is tobe seen at 3 A-D, where OrpTretoc -rv OEv is refined to its immediate denotation,upenxi -rot Oeog. N.B. x 3A I^2: :v y&p OepOMEL'V iS7ro JUVJ.L 'VLVOw oVOFL&4M.2 Phaedo97 B-C. cf. Laws966 E-967 B.8 H. Diels, DoxographiGraeci (Berlin, 1929), 30 2b I - 1 2.I 8


13/14

with 7tpoaco trv vo5v taken in its idiomatic and normal sense. It ismeaningless, we noted, for Plato thus to have implied a causal relationholding between Socrates' mere attention to them and the validity ofEuthyphro's definitions. It may now be pointed out, however, that itwould have been no less meaningless for Plato to have implied a causalrelation holding between the application of vo54 to the definitions andtheir validity, unless he had already identified voi5 with the one termcommon to them all.' The puzzle at i 4D 4-6 is therefore evidence forPlato's conscious equation of vo-u and O6o. And what Plato makesSocrates say at i g C I I -D 2, just before Euthyphro breaks off the conver-sation altogether, buttresses this evidence. In this final appeal, Socratesambiguously describes himself as one who will not voluntarily give upthe process of search until he gain haOntL - in effect, as voi4 strivingto become v6TJaL4 and enjoins Euthyphro not to devalue him sodescribed.2 The alternative to such devaluation is for Euthyphro tospeak the truth about so 6atov.. And how is he to attain this truth? Byapplying voiu3, at last, to every turn of definition.3

One question, perhaps, remains to be considered. If it is true that,when he wrote the Euthyphro,Plato had already "developed" the conceptof deity which was to "reappear" in the Timaeus, Republic, Phaedrus,Philebus,and Laws, why did he not make it crystal-clear in the earlierwork? The reason, I venture to say, is an obvious one: had he wished todeclare that god is voi5 and genuine piety philosophy, in his sense ofthe term, he would have been forced to write not a Euthyphro,but aRepublic and a Timaeus to support his views; nXt?Lovo4pyoi Ea-tvMxpLP5; i&Vrx TaI3To 64 x? iL,OeZv, replies Euthyphro, quitei For a similardouble entendregiven to 7rpoakXeLv6v vo5v by Plato, see Philebus 32 E:... et=p 6v-C(Oq 0'Lt T6 hy6tkeVOV, 8LM&,pOeLpo0VaVLaV 'U-r6V &?Yn8)V, cVM(,?O tACOVW

8 0ov, V flu)-rat eetpoll?vo)v ftLre &VMa O.LkVWV1VVOqaG)VeV 7tppt, 'rtvc so-r0 Ctv8et r6-re kv 1x&arotL ClvaL rot,; C6Olt, O'rav ot'urcotaxn; ac6apa 8& 7poo)cav 'rbvvoVv Eiiu. The fi; here asked about is revealed as vo54in 33B-C 3.2 The irony here is the same as thatof Phaedoi i 5B- I6A X cf. Alcibiades1 x32 B-I3 3 C.3 A similarambiguity uggesting he consciousequationof vok3and Oe6qs to be seenat x4B8-9: hadEuthyphroonly wishedto do so, he would have answeredthe xcpdaXtovof the questionsSocrates had asked; or, he would have stated the xeci&Xotov f thoseaboutwhom ocrates had asked. The ambiguity of ebTc5 iv so' xe(P&'atov&v 7pC"3r(vpermits either of these interpretations. In the second, xEp&oXatov can mean either"principal haracteristicof" or, takenliterally, "thatbelongingto the head, the upperpart of the body, of." The first of these senses is an obvious description of Wo%3,heessentialcharacteristicof deity. The second is seeminglywithout sense, anddoes in factremain so, until one recalls that, for Plato, xcpaXris the habitation of votig, ' 'roOetoa'-rouxcdt[epc'r&'rou tx-rjtg (Timaeus4sA).

i19


14/14

truthfully, to the question, T'L so6 xeyp.Xov ra'=L Tr 4yoa[['c,v Oe7v]. Moreover, if Plato was to put his treatment of piety intothe synthetic, ironic, pseudo-historical form of Socrates' quest for itfrom the lips of an unaffectedly orthodox and typically unreflectingreligionist - from the very sort of man, in short, whose narrow ortho-doxy was responsible for his master's death, - he had to suppress dis-cussion of the essential characteristic of deity which for him guaranteedthat true piety, like all other virtuous and intelligent activity, was in thelast analysis philosophy and the result of philosophy.

The monstrousness of the Athenians' treatment of Socrates, for Plato,lay in this: that they had condemned and put to death for impiety aman who, as Plato saw it, had practiced the true piety of dialectic allhis life. And the hints of the Euthyphroecord this judgment for posterity- for all, that is, capable of applying vouG hereto.University of California.

120

Rabinowitz, WG

Documents

Transcript of Rabinowitz, WG