PVRAVI 02 Presentation

19
8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 1/19 1 The views expressed in this paper/presentation are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), or its Board of Governors, or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.

Transcript of PVRAVI 02 Presentation

Page 1: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 1/19

1

The views expressed in this paper/presentation are the views of the author anddo not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank(ADB), or its Board of Governors, or the governments they represent. ADB does

not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts noresponsibility for any consequence of their use. Terminology used may notnecessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.

Page 2: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 2/19

APPROACHES FOR PPPRISK SHARING ANDRISK MANAGEMENT:INDIA

P.V RaviSr Director, PPPI: Infrastructure DevelopmentFinance Company Ltd (IDFC)

&MD & CEO: Infrastructure Development

Corporation (Karnataka) Ltd (iDeCK)

Page 3: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 3/19

3

Present a t ion St ruc t ure

• Risk allocation

• Risk management approach

• Financial incentives as risk management

tools

Page 4: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 4/19

Risk A l loc a t ion

Page 5: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 5/19

5

St andard Guidel ines

• There are no explicit risk allocation policies and

guidelines – Though the standard "model" concession agreements for

various sectors prepared by the Planning Commission,

have a wealth of detail on how risks are allocated• However, these documents cover certain sectors only. No

allocation policies/ guidelines are available for other sectors

• At the State level, there are generally no guidelines

 – Generally, a ‘negotiated’ approach

Page 6: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 6/19

6

Risk A l loc at ion Pr inc ip le

• Clichéd, but:

 – Each risk is allocated to the party best positioned tomanage it

• Land, R&R, environmental ‘consent to establish’,clearance from key departments such as railways& defense – Government Agency

• Design, Finance, Build, Operate, Maintain andobtain all other clearances & approvals – Private

sector

Page 7: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 7/19

7

Risk Measurem ent

• Risk matrices and risk registers are rarely used

• Quantification methods are generally: – Sensitivity analysis based on point estimates of key

variables (basically costs and revenues)

• Most common, by far – Probabilistic methods based on base-high-low

assignments for key variables• Rare

 – Probabilistic simulation methods• Not used at all

• Also unclear that all the real options available in a contract can

be modeled, anyway

Page 8: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 8/19

8

Al loc at ion vs. Measurem ent

• The focus of most agreements is on allocation ofrisk, rather than measurement

• Even the private sector spends more time andeffort on the allocation and not on quantification – Rudimentary ‘sensitivity’ methods are normally used:

• However, the model documents have somecovenants that place an indirect value on somevariables:

 – For instance, if the traffic on a road reduces below theanticipated design traffic, there is an increase in theconcession period (and vice-versa too)

• But a large part of the risks are not modeled…

Page 9: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 9/19

9

Dem and Risk : Var ia t ions

• Demand risk is normally allocated to the

private sector – However, there are some constructs where

demand risk is taken over by the GovernmentAgency, either in whole or in part:

• Annuity/ Deferred Performance-based Payment

Scheme• Take-or-pay

 – Though there is some debate whether PPP still remains PPPwith the demand risk removed!

Page 10: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 10/19

10

(Pr ivat e Sec t or) Sponsor Risk

• Since projects are structured on a non-

recourse basis, sponsor risk is important toaddress – The members of the consortium are ‘locked into’

the SPV equity, at a certain percentage, for acertain period

 – Performance Securities (about 5% of projectcost)

• Financially this is not a severe penalty, but then the‘good name’ of the consortium members is also at

risk…

Page 11: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 11/19

11

Financ ing, Ref inanc ing Risk , &

Windfal l• Financing is at the risk of the private sector

• Refinancing is not addressed in the agreements atall – Loan agreements have covenants about refinancing,

including prepayment penalties• Windfall clauses are not built in

 – Except the provisions in the model agreements that have

mechanisms for adjustment of concession period in theevent of traffic changes• The absence of these provisions is causing disputes in many

projects

Page 12: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 12/19

Risk

ManagementApproach

Page 13: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 13/19

13

Condi t ions Prec edent

• While the agreement is signed on a certain date, itbecomes ‘effective’ only when ConditionsPrecedent described in the agreement are satisfied

• The CPs ensure that some of the key risks areaddressed prior to the agreement becoming

effective, and neither party loses significantly ifthese are not fulfilled – Government

• Land clear of encumbrances• Clearances from key agencies

 – Private sector• Obtaining certain key clearances

• Financial closure

Page 14: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 14/19

14

Ot her Measures for Risk

Management• Change of Scope is explicitly addressed

• Termination is explicitly addressed• Model concession agreements have some clauses thataddress risk management

• For instance, increase in concession period if traffic volumes drop

 – However, for the most part, management of risks is not directlyaddressed, except very indirectly through certain dispute resolutionmechanisms

• In most State agreements, management is by allocation ofrisks through a negotiation process with potential bidderswhen the project is under bid – Such as an annuity structure if there are issues in demand or

collection

Page 15: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 15/19

15

Disput e Resolut ion &

Termina t ion• Dispute resolution

 – Intermediation of Independent Engineer – Amicable Settlement – Arbitration under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996

• Termination – Normally no ‘buy out’ or ‘terminate at will’ clauses – The principles of early termination are as follows:

• Termination due to concessionaire event of default: the equity

investment is forfeited by the concessionaire;• Termination due to Government default: the Government pays apremium (of upto 50%) on equity investment.

• Lenders are protected by ensuring payments of debt due: (90-100%, depending on reason and agreement)

Page 16: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 16/19

Financia l

Inc ent ives as RiskManagem ent Too ls

Page 17: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 17/19

17

Inc ent ives & Pena lt ies

• Performance Security

• Some agreements have incentives for earlycompletion

 – Most have liquidated damages for delayed completion

• Plus, of course, the revenue streams will also be correspondinglydelayed

• Lenders covenants in loan agreements

 – However, the State may not be aware of what thecovenants are, and these can also be changed…

• Penalties for not maintaining service levels

Page 18: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 18/19

18

Inc ent ives & Penal t ies… (2)

• Force Majeure provisions that handle direct

and indirect political events – Equity and debt are protected

• Severe penalties on default – Essentially, the entire equity is forfeited

Page 19: PVRAVI 02 Presentation

8/6/2019 PVRAVI 02 Presentation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pvravi-02-presentation 19/19

Thank You!