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Transcript of PUC Rudnick
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Lecciones del terremoto de Chile 2010 y suimpacto en el suministro eléctrico
Hugh Rudnick
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Preocupación en la sociedad moderna
Suministro seguro de servicios básicos
Alta dependencia de suministro eléctrico Impactos diversos en suministro eléctrico por
Problemas de abastecimiento de combustibles
Guerras, conflictos políticos, terrorismo
Desastres naturales (huracanes, terremotos,maremotos, erupciones volcánicas, etc.)
Necesidad estar preparados para enfrentarlos
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Seguridad de abastecimiento eléctrico
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Araneda, Juan Carlos(Transelec), Rudnick,Hugh (PUC), Mocarquer,Sebastian (Systep), Miquel,Pedro (Systep), "Lessons
from the 2010 Chileanearthquake and its impacton electricity supply", 2010International Conferenceon Power System
Technology (Powercon2010), Hangzhou, China,October 24-28, 2010
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1575 Valdivia 8.5 1730 Valparaiso 8.7 1751 Concepción 8.5 1835 Concepción 8.5 1868 Arica 9.0 1906 Valparaíso 8.2 1922 Vallenar 8.5
1943 Coquimbo 8.2 1960 Valdivia 9.5 1985 Santiago 8.0 1995 Antofagasta 8.0
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Large earthquakes in Chile
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•
03:34 hrs. February 27 2010• 8.8 Richter shakes 6 regions of Chile
along 500 km (80 % of population)
• Tsunami hits the cost minutes after
• Death toll: 521; Missing: 56
• Injured: 12,000; Displaced: 800,000• Infrastructure affected:
• 370,000 houses
• 4,013 schools
• 79 hospitals
• 4,200 boats damaged
• Economic loss: 30 billion US dollars
• Acceleration of 0.65 g in Concepcion
• 10 meter average plaques displacement
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The 2010 earthquake
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Large acceleration for long time
Peak acceleration of 0.65 g for one of the horizontalrecords. Duration of strong shaking for 70 seconds
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Its effects– structural collapses
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Its effects– building collapses
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High standard of seismic requirements for its civil works. Buildingcodes in Chile are substantially the same as US codes (ACI 318, aleading concrete design reference for building codes worldwideissued by the American Concrete Institute).
High voltage electrical facilities, the national technical standardestablishes that facilities must obligatorily fulfill the ETG 1.015Chilean standard or the IEEE 693 standard in the condition of HighPerformance Level. It specifies a maximum 0.50 g acceleration and amaximum horizontal displacement of 25 cm. to be considered in the
design as the seismic intensity at the facility location. Specific electrical requirements for installation construction and
maintenance through Technical Norm of Security and Quality ofService, which defines technical and economic evaluations todetermine the reliability level on the planning and operation of the
power system.10
Norms and standards in Chile
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SIC
Immediate blackout for4,522 load (peak demandof 6,145 MW and installedcapacity of 11,023 MW)
Longitudinal transmissionsystem over 2,200 km long
Grid lines mainly at 220kV and 500 kV
Five, then two, islandscheme for grid supplyrecovery
Distribution networks
severely damaged
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Evolution of electricity supply
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Black out with loss of 3,000 MW
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Evolution of electricity demand
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Impact on operation
Severe impacts on country communicationsystems. Basic systems (mobile networks,emergency alert schemes, public order control),electricity dependant, did not operate as desired
and caused additional harm.Difficulties also arose in the communications
and telecontrol schemes of most electricityinstallations, transmission substations andgenerating plants, complicating plant andsystem recovery and operation. No alternative
backup radio systems.
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Impact on operation
System operator (CDEC-SIC) had additionaldifficulties throughout the emergency as theSCADA system in use (for over ten years), wasnot able to provide information required for
system recovery (alarms could not be trusted asthey were often incorrect).
Traditional phone calls had to be used to learnon local conditions and supervise actions forequipment and system restoration.
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4,522 MW dispatched
Immediate blackout
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Dispatched generation at event
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Damage in generation plants
Bocamina plant
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3,000 MW became unavailable immediately 693 MW (13 plants) went to major repairs
950 MW being built also
damaged
Cooling systems,
transformers,communications,lines, etc.
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But most remain available
MW (thermal plants) unavailable
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Damages in lines
Transelec has 8,239 km.of lines, 50 substations,10,486 MWtransformation capacity
Hualpen-Bocamina line (3 towers)
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Capacitor bank
without damage
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But most remain available
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Circuit breakerswith sufficientdamping
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But most remain available
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Transmission assesment
Damages concentrated in one transmission line3 towers 154 kV line (1.6 km)
Substation damage (12 out of 46 substations,
26%). Mainly focused at:500 kV bushings (high failure rate, particularly in
transmission bushings)
500 kV pantograph disconnector switches
220 kV circuit breakers (live tank type)
154 kV circuit breakers (air compressed type)
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Transmission interconnection recovery
Recovery process of the interconnected system
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Worse extended damage in distribution
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Worse extended damage in distribution
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Worse extended damage in distribution
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But most remains standing
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Distribution damage
4.5 million people were initially affected by theextended blackout that took place because of theearthquake and it took days, and even weeks insome areas, to recover full electricity supply.
Most affected areas supplied by CGE, Emelectricand Emelat. Chilectra also affected in Santiago.
80% of clients were without supply the day after
the earthquake and this reduced to 0.4% twoweeks after (related mainly to Concepcion andTalcahuano, next to the earthquake epicenter).
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Distribution damage
Some distribution networks were destroyed bythe effects of the earthquake, as houses fell overstreet lines or simply were washed away by thetsunamis (for example 40,000 houses were
destroyed out of 1.5 million supplied by CGE).Besides those distribution installations directly
damaged, there was little damage elsewhere.Distribution poles in Chile are mainlycompressed pre-stressed concrete poles, whichare well founded, and support importantmechanical stresses. Exceptions in overloaded
city poles.
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Heavily loaded poles in main cities
Worse extended damage in distribution
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Small percentage damage
760,000 poles in CGEand 300,000 in
Chilectra
50,000 transformers inCGE and 20,000 in
Chilectra.
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Challenges in supply recovery
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Damage in distribution
Distribution aerial transformers are often placed between two poles and a steel support, thus they alsowithstand well an earthquake.
Main difficulties in restoring supply to houses took placeat the connection point between the low voltage linesand the buildings.
Companies have equipment and human resources torepair normal failures within one or two days. But whenseveral hundred thousand of those connections fail, as in
an earthquake, the problem is quite different.Communication problems, difficult physical access tolocations, no resources to manage the huge number ofneeded repairs. Companies involved human resources
brought from other regions.
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Damage in distribution
Mobile generating sets brought to support recovery ofsupply, particularly in more isolated areas.
Challenges for distribution companies lasted monthsafter the earthquake (many latent faults, caused by thequake, that could not be detected when repairs were
been made days after the event, or if detected, weresecondary to the objective of supplying consumers asfast as possible).
Arrival of winter, with rain and wind, started ignitingthese faults in a a massive way, demanding thecompanies to comply.
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Araneda, Juan Carlos(Transelec), Rudnick,Hugh (PUC), Mocarquer,Sebastian (Systep), Miquel,Pedro (Systep), "Lessons
from the 2010 Chileanearthquake and its impacton electricity supply", 2010International Conferenceon Power SystemTechnology (Powercon2010), Hangzhou, China,October 24-28, 2010
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Balance y conclusiones
Experiencia internacional indica mayores dañosen transmisión y distribución
Altos estándares y códigos constructivos civilesy en equipos eléctricos de generación
Imposible evitar impactos de desastre natural deesa magnitud en instalaciones eléctricas
Necesidad aprovechar experiencia y producirnecesarios cambios en métodos de prevención yde recuperación
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Balance y conclusiones
Balance negativo de capacidad de respuesta delpaís y su institucionalidad de emergencia.
Inaceptables niveles de fallas de infraestructurade comunicación
Balance positivo del nivel sísmico de lainfraestructura eléctrica (particularmente en
generación/transmisión)Claras oportunidades de mejoras,
particularmente a nivel de CDEC y de redes dedistribución
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Balance y conclusiones
Cuidado con reacciones excesivas a evento de baja frecuencia de ocurrencia
Necesidad evaluar económicamente accionespreventivas versus correctivas.
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Agradecimientos
Transelec
CGE Distribución
CGE Transmisión
CDEC-SIC
Chilectra
American Society of Civil Engineers’ Post-
Disaster Assessment Teams (Dr. Anshel Schiff,Stanford University)