Plastics in the car of the postwar transition period may very w e l l play a more-than-ornamental role. Whether whole bodies will be made from these plastics is another matter. The diversity of available construc­tion materials, including the light metals, will allow lighter, more attractive cars.

POSTWAR MOTOR GASOLINE ALBERTA H. ADAMS AND Β. Η. WEIL

Information Section, Chemistry Division, Gulf Research & Development Company, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Ι Ν CONNECTION with its program of post­war planning, the major problem con­

fronting the petroleum industry concerns the future markets for its bulk products, the big money makers of the past. Since gasoline has long been the key to profit or loss, the petroleum industry is vitally interested in the factors which will affect the postwar situation, chief of which is the relationship between the war-caused shortage of cars and tires and t he postwar demands for automotive gasoline. Even this single phase of the larger situation is multifaceted, one subfactor of great im­portance being the duration of the war. Following the war, as O'Donnell has said (51), there will be two periods to be faced, first a critical period of readjustment and then a longer period of (it is hoped) greater stability and steady expansion.

It has been considered of some impor­tance, therefore, to see what the experts are saying in regard to the related future of postwar gasolines and automobiles, and for this reason a survey has been made of the literature on these subjects.

Postwar Availability of Operable Cars

Since the oil industry expects the princi­pal postwar market for its products to be the passenger car, just as it was before the war when the nearly 30,000,000 such

vehicles on the road consumed 90 per cent of all the gasoline produced (18), the num­ber of cars that can be expected to remain in operation, as well as the number that can be put into operation quickly, is of prime importance in estimating this market. Most of those which will supply the immediate market for motor gasoline, of course, are the ones which will have survived the war in satisfactory running condition.

Many early estimates, such as those of Livingston (43), were based on the assumption that, if the war should end about mid-1944 or not too long thereafter, normal car mortality rates would result in

inventories of some 20,000,000 vehicles in running condition. From these data, different men estimated nadirs of 8,000,000 to 21,000,000 (an average of about 15,-000,000) vehicles in "good" condition at the close of the war, which most of them expected to last perhaps two years longer.

Figures just released by the ODT show that 24,500,000 passenger cars were still in service in January 1944, instead of the earlier estimate of 20,000,000; this may be attributed to the fact that the total num­ber of cars scrapped as of that date had been only 2,500,000, in contrast with the prewar rate of 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 per year. O'Donnell (51), as well as a few

Consensus αmong automotive and petoroleum experts indicates that some 2 . 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 of the nat ions prewar nearly. 30,000,000 cars will r éma in in operating condition at the wars end, maintaining,

w i t h the h e l p of some. military consamption and increased com-

mercial and farm use, a volumrtric market. gasoline of at least

75 pet cent of the prewar level A rapid recovery, to or above.

normal prewar· use is expected ta follow as now tires and cars

came into production the immediate postwar cars w i l l probably

be the 1942. models, with changes in automobile design expected

ta come slowly One hundred-octane automotive fuels are not ex­

pected to be required for some years, if ever here are the facts .

1154 C H E M I C A L A N D E N G I N E E R I N G N E W S

other experts, had predicted this drastic reduction in losses from scrapping (proba­bly "about 1,000,000 cars a year a t first and perhaps 2,000,000 later") on the basis of nonavailability of replacements alone; restrictions imposed by rationing on gaso­line consumption have had an additional effect in limiting the use of cars and there by reducing the scrapping rate. While O'Donnell's predicted average rate of 1,500,000 is a little high, according to pres­ent statistics, the increased scrapping rate expeeted as the age of the vehicles in­creases may bring it up t o or beyond this predicted average, should the we con­tinue for as much a s two years iongt one of his primary assumptions). In fact, the Ethyl Corp. even now reports a scrapping rate of 150,000 per month (12), which would result in scrapping nearly 2,000,000 cars in 1944.

In view of these data, estimates of im­mediate postwar fuel requirements for passenger cars appear not t o need much revision from an early prediction that they would approximate 75 per cent of the pre­war volume (the reduction in demand be­ing less than proportionate to the number of cars lost because many of those lost will be of the "marginal" type which normally sees comparatively little operation). I t may require a slight upward revision if the war is much shorter than was first pre­dicted or if the scrapping rate remains as low as it is at present, but these possibili­t ies seem rather unlikely.

In fact, statistics compiled by General Motors1 Chevrolet Division on the basis of a recent survey of the market (7) indicate that July 1945 will find the numbers of cars on the road the same as in July 1930— between 21,150,000 and 21,300,000. This survey (27), incidentally, states that only 23,000,000 of the 27,700,000 passenger cars registered a t the time of the Pearl Harbor attack are still on the road, in contrast with the ODT-released figure of 24,500,000 care.

Burrill's very recent estimate (22), as seen in Figure 1 and Table I, agrees very well with the Chevrolet survey figure, showing a low in 1944 of 23,000,000 cars; he bases his figures on the assumptions that the European war will be over by the end of this year; the war in the Far East ended by the dose of 1945; the reconver­sion of the automobile industry begun during 1945 (a matter for much conjecture and speculation just now, because of the recent appointment by W P B of an Auto­mobile Industry Advisory Committee); and the tire situation well under control by January 1,1945.

This latter assumption is not in line with some rather early estimates, many of which have proved to be unduly pessi­mistic. McWethy (44), for example, be­lieved that the close of the war will And "practically every car in the country * * * in need of a now set of tires", as war tires and very old casings will be worn out rapidly if and when the "victory" speed

limit is lifted. Estimating no car losses from causes other than tire failures, he be­lieved that the prewar 30,000,000 cars registered would be in the market for 150,000,000 tires almost immediately after the war. If this should prove true, the market for gasoline would be small until replacements could be made, but present indications are that a near-future abun­dance of material (synthetic rubber) and a sufficiency of labor and equipment (molds) should soon result in the satisfaction of military needs and essential civilian re­quirements, with other civilian demands to bo filled not much later.

Postwar Tire Production While McWethy's estimate of tire de­

mand seems rather high, consensus still is that there may be a considerable number of cars out of use because of a lack of serviceable tires. I t is of importance to the petroleum industry, therefore, t o learn how quickly tires can be made available t o put these cars back on the road.

Statistics published in the Rubber Age (16) showed that tire production in 1941 totaled 61,533,000 casings, the highest figure for any recent year. Judging from the highest quarterly production (almost

1S,300,000 casings), the rubber industry had the mold facilities even then for pro­ducing more than 73,200,000 casings, rubber being available. Normal tube production runs only slightly lower than that of tire casings, the industry being known to have had facilities for more than 70,000,000 tubes annually. Assuming that molds have not been scrapped (not an unreasonable assumption) and that rubber is available, even McWethy's anticipated requirements for old cars could be met by the tire industry in two years; if the average estimates are more accurate, and only 15,000,000 t o 17,000,000 cars will need to be re-tired immediately, then only one year will be necessary for this task. Then the new cars, which should be off the assembly lines by that time, can be equipped with tires (and tubes, if neces­sary) by the rubber industry, and ordinary replacements may be handled with no difficulty whatsoever.

Although accurate production figures have never been released for publication, estimates have been made for the war years (Table II). Recent information indicates not only that synthetic rubber supplies are adequate for all military needs and essential civilian requirements, but

Thermoior plant, Gulf Oi l refinery. Catalytic cracking units now aiding production of avia­tion gasoline and synthetic rubber will be used to improve quality of postwar motor gasoline.

V O L U M E 2 2, N O . 1 4 » » · J U L Y 2 5, 1 9 4 4 1155*

Ν U

SE)

g S ο ο ο

33.0ΟΟ 32.0ΟΟ 3Ι.ΟΟΟ

'3 0,0 00

29 ,000 2 8,000 27.0ΟΟ

2 6.0ΟΟ 25 ,000

24.0ΟΟ

23.0ΟΟ

i l ι ι f 1 1 1 1

1941 1942 19-43 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 I930

Figure 1. Estimate of passenger cars in use, 1941 to 1950 (23)

also that additional mold capacity h a s been created for the manufacture of s y n ­thetic rubber casings. Estimates for p r o ­duction in 1945 range from 30,000,000 u p ­ward, and as many as 90,000,000 tires a r e predicted for the first postwar year.

These new data indicate that a period o f ten months is about the highest reasonable-estimate for complete recovery from w a r -caused shortages; even this m a y prove t o o high should the anticipated lag betweem cessation of hostilities in Europe and t h a t in the Far East become a reality.

With the present recapping program, the release of a new-tire equivalent o f 12,000,000 passenger-car tires in 1943 , and the program for 30,000,000 n e w passenger-ear tires in 1944 (recently cut t o 22,000,000 because of increased military-demands, 42), i t seems likely that few c a r s will now be lost to service because of a lack: of usable tires, although the above e s t i ­mate of postwar needs is not invalidated by this conclusion. Adequate postwar supplies of passenger-car tires seem t o b e assured after only a short period of all-out; production to bring war-depleted stocks t o a normal level.

Postwar Automobile Design and Production

The petroleum industry naturally is vitally interested in how rapddly the a u t o ­mobile industry can furnish replacements not only for cars lost to service, but f o r cars that owners wish to re-tire and a u t o ­mobiles for new owners who will then h a v e the money t o buy them. In January 1943, a U . S. Chamber of Commerce s u r ­v e y indicated that 2,600,000 people intend to buy automobiles within S months af ter the end of the war (9). S o m e may be forced t o replace their cars earlier w i t h used or stored cars, b u t others will permit cars now running to reach a state where replacement is obligatory, indicating t h a t the estimated figure may b e revised u p ­ward considerably. Indeed, the m u c h more recent Chevrolet sunrey (27) s h o w s that some 17,000,000 (or 53 per cent) pre ­war car owners will need new cars by micd-1945 because 6,500,000 are expected t o b e

entirely earless b y that time and another 9,500,000 will be driving "junkers". In addition, 1,000,000 prewar truck owners wi l l be without trucks.

Earliest postwar replacements presum­ab ly will consist of "new" 1942-modeI automobiles manufactured with prewar tools and dies and sold at a price at least 2 0 per cent over the 1941 level because of increased costs of labor and materials.. Owners who can make their cars last a l ittle longer may prefer to wait for the new models which will constitute the true post­w a r car, if present research projects are a n y indication. A big spur .to these studies may be Henry F . Kaiser's ulti­m a t u m that if motor companies do not make new, light modern cars after the war, h e will (5). In fact, a t one time he w a s said t o be seriously considering the production of a $400 car (using magnesium a n d aluminum) t o be marketed for cash a n d without trade-ins by the gasoline s tat ions of the country ( i l ) . Kaiser's pas t performances are not such that bis remarks may be lightly passed over, al­though sales and advertising men in the automobile industry are not convinced t h a t such a car would be acceptable to the American public.

Opinions as t o the design, performance, a n d price of these projected new cars are a s varied as makes and models of cars were before the war—in fact, more has been written about the postwar car than about a l l other postwar products and appliances together.

Geschelin has presented some typical designers' views (86, 87). H e mentions t h e use of light metal alloys and plastics in simplified designs; civilian versions of the famous Army jeep; revisions of 1942 car styles which might be put into production without too drastic retooling; and low-priced, rear-engined cars. Eventually, according to Geschelin, low-cost motor oars are expected to meet the demands of consumers too heavily burdened with postwar taxes; designs intended to keep operating costs low are anticipated for the same reason. Geschelin concludes that the automobile industry is moving toward

the production of "motor cars of less over­all length than our current low-priced, high production cars but with more leg room and more seating capacity * * * equipped with power-plants of about the same output as those we now have * * * (with) performance of about the same order, but power plants that are lighter and of smaller displacement, and fuel mileage that far exceeds today's best" (36). If and when this last factor should be real­ized, gasoline consumption per vehicle will drop unless mileage per vehicle rises enough to make up for the difference.

Many engineers in the automotive in­dustry have reacted violently toward these low-priced marvels and designers' dream cars. D e Smet shows a typical engineer's reaction when he speaks of the latter type ÎIS a "cross between an oversized beetle and a traveling showcase" (29) and quotes a newspaper description of the most fan­tastic type of postwar dream car (which article admits, however, that these dreams will take at least one year to come true). De Smet's speech, delivered at the January 1944 meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers, strongly emphasizes the cost factor, and he attacks the whole problem from the angle of those proposed changes which he can demonstrate will not be economically feasible (principally because of engineering difficulties) in the immediate postwar era. Among these he includes aluminum, plywood, or plastic bodies, and curved windshields of glass or transparent plastics.

Petroleum technologists are prone to be equally impatient with rash predictions. Holland, for example, has described the designers' dream as an "automobile that looks like a peripatetic solarium. It is made of plastic, magnesium, or just spun air, preferably hot. In the lower price ranges the postwar cars will burn 100-octane gasoline, but the super de luxe models will require something much bet­ter—150-octane is mentioned as a possi­bility. Presumably exhaust gases, if there are any, will smell like Chanel No. 5" (40).

In a serious vein, however, Holland re­ports that refinery technologists and others are expecting an A.S.T.M. octane range of 85 to 88 for postwar premium gasolines, in order to provide an all-purpose gasoline for small planes, helicopters (for which Andrew Higgins, the shipbuilder, is al­ready said to be taking orders on a basis of postwar delivery), and automobiles. Since even some commercial planes used 87-octane gasoline before the war, i t might be expected that small planes, helicopters, and automobiles could be designed to take full advantage of such gasolines.

The Ethyl Corp. has been carrying on research connected with the development and design of automobile engines which can use these higher-octane fuels. Motor studies are also directed toward achieving a balance of somewhat greater power with increased economy, the former being ac-

1156 C H E M I C A L A N D E N G I N E E R I N G N E W S

Tabic I. Estimate of Passenger Cars in Use and Gasoline Consumption by Passenger Cars (22, p. 34) I

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950

IN U S E JAM. 1 25.910.492 27.669,057 25.069.000 23.669.000 23.169.000

24.069,000 26,069,000 29,069,000 30,569.000 31.569.000

NEW REGIS­TRATIONS

3,731,166 400.000 300.000

1,000,000* ( 1,700,000« \ 1,000.000 4,000,000 6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000.000 3,000,000

TOTAL· REGIS­TRATIONS

29,641.658 28.069.057 25.369.000 24.669.000 25,869,000

28,069,000 32,069.000 34,069.000 34,569,000 34,569,000

Sc&APPEP

1,972,601 3,000.057e

1.700.0006 1.500.000 1,800.000

2.000.000 3,000,000 3,500,000 3.000.000 2.500,000

a Estimated 2,000,000 laid up and 1,000.000 scrapped. t> Estimated 700,000 laid up and 1.000.000 scrapped. c Brought out of dead storage.

GASOLINE CONSUMPTION BARRELS 4 2 ' S

Per car Total 16.6 12.5 9.9

10.5 13.5

16.0 18.5 18.5 18.0 18.0

445,000.000 330.000.000 242.000.000 246.000.000 319.000.000

402.000.000 510.000.000 552,000.000 559.000,000 572,000,000

complished chiefly by supercharging. However, some writers (1, 57) believe that greater power for the motor car is not only unnecessary but even acutely undesirable, since the present "victory speed" has proved so satisfactory both in accident re­duction and in economical performance. While realizing the difficulties confronting the automotive engineer in making drastic changes, Edgar (82) has pointed out some facts which, at the time of writing, made certain radical revisions plausible—possible wartime scrapping of tools and dies, avail­ability of light metals (aluminum and magnesium) in enormous quantity and at reduced price, and development of new and better plastics.

O'Donnell (49) takes a much more con­servative view of possible changes than do many automobile men (19, 55, 57, 58). He mentions many of the same possible changes but considers a number of them improbable, believing only that the true postwar car will probably be lighter, cheaper, and more economical. Like the majority of technical men of both indus­tries, he also expects the first postwar pro­duction to be of the 1942 model (because of availability of dies) in order to meet immediate demands. It is generally agreed (if newspaper reports of estimates of 1 hour to 1 month after armistice are discounted) that these models can be put into production after only 6 to 9 months of rearranging and retooling and that some 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 will be pro­duced in the 12 months then following, compared with a prewar peak in 1941 of 4,500,000 cars. After 12 to 18 months' production of 1942 models, the true post­war car may be tried out in production. This new car will probably not be per­fected, however, in less than another full year, after which a truly more economical car may be made available in quantity.

Ford's Charles E. Sorenson, however, says that Ford may be able to get into car production within 2 or 3 months of the armistice (5), while Packard's George E. Christopher states that Packard can have its own tools set up and in operation 2 months after the Government gets its machinery out of the Packard plants, but that this will mean an absolute minimum of 4 months before production can possibly begin after the war's end, and a probable 6 to 8 months' delay. He estimates a minimum of 12 months and probably 24 months for new car design (59).

Taking the majority opinion, it seems probable that there will be an excessive demand for automobiles in the immediate postwar period, and that 1942 models will be put in production in not less than 6 months to meet that demand. Subse­quently, passenger cars of new design will be manufactured as soon as the indus­try can satisfy pressing demands (18 months to 2 years) and prepare these new models for manufacture. Changes in the postwar car probably will be instituted gradually rather than suddenly, with early

changes taking some advantage of light but strong materials only recently in quantity production at a low price (such as aluminum, magnesium, and plastics) and of aerodynamic designs that aviation has proved advantageous. The only engine changes upon which most authori­ties seem to be agreed are those which permit the development of more energy from the fuel used, thereby making the car more economical of fuel. This will mean a lower gasoline consumption for the miles covered, but may mean no eventual reduc­tion in market to the petroleum industry, because of anticipated increases in mile­ages per vehicle and the actual number of vehicles on the road, factors which may more than counterbalance this reduction after the immediate postwar period is over (Table I).

Types of Postwar Fuels Opinions as to the type of fuel these

postwar cars will require are just as varied as those on general design, ranging from widespread use of aviation's "super-fuels" (55) to use of substitute fuels from soybean oil and kerosene (/).

Gary, formerly refining director for the Office of Petroleum Coordinator, pre­dicts that specially designed postwar motor cars will be using at least 100-octane gasoline and that "we are looking to­ward fuels better than 100-octane" (So), in order to make limited petroleum supplies last as long as possible by cutting fuel consumption. Sloan (57) expects a

car ' * with an aviation motor energized by 100-octane". Walker (86) believes all new models of postwar cars will use 100-octane fuels, but Egloff warns that 100-octane capacity "will fall short of meeting the needs of the country's transportation system" if complete conversion to its use should occur, despite the probability of continued production increases. Boyd (19) expects "sensational strides in fuels" within the next 30 years, but does not ex­pect these to be made immediately after the war. He thinks that, by 1972, the 100-octane and slightly better fuels now used for aviation will be far inferior to those in common use, with costs per gal­lon higher than those for standard fuels at present but not nearly so high as those for aviation fuels, because of reductions in manufacturing costs.

Edgar makes the following statement on postwar gasoline (32) :

I believe it to be conservative to say that the petroleum industry will be in a position to produce motor gasoline of much higher effective antiknock value than that which was produced in 1941. One might guess that gasoline approxi­mately equivalent to the premium grade of 1941 (say, 80-octane number) could be produced as a house-brand gasoline, and that premium gasoline having an effec­tive antiknock value of between 90- and 100-octane number could be produced.

Jardine (40 also thinks regular fuel will be 80-octane and premium fuel 100-octane, with increased mileage per gallon

This "dream car" is not the vision oi automotive engineers, who find many recent desisns impractical, and expect postwar cars to be modifications of 1942 models

V O L U M E 2 2, N O . 1 4 · » » J U L Y 2 5, 1 9 4 4 1157

Table II. Production of Passenger-Car-Sire Tire Casings"

59,186.000 61.533.000

1.000.0006 5,000.000*

22.000.0006

1935 1936 1937 1938 1939

49.363.000 56.040.000 53.310.000 37.848.000 57.613.000

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

° Statistics from Rubber A g*. * Estimated.

making up for higher cost, caused largely by increased taxes. Russell (56) expects "80 motor octane or 90-93 research gaso­line to result from the use of new process­ing units*'; Bcccroft (IS) predicts that "octane rating will continue to rise, and the 73 rating of today will approach 90 in pre­mium motor fuels in the next decade and perhaps 80 for regular brands".

O'Donnell (48) expects that "automo­bile manufacturers will produce cars that will fit the better fuels that will then be available", but points out that past ex­perience with the automobile industry would indicate that changes will be very gradual and that it will be a matter of 10 or more years before 95- and 100-octane fuels will see wide use. He also notes that the base stocks used in the present highly leaded 100-octane gasolines are not so far above the present (or at least pre­war) 80-octane premium gasolines as the numerical difference would indicate. Even some of today's premium fuels could be stepped up to ratings of 89 to 91 by the addition of lead or benzol.

Most recent opinion seems to be that 100-octane fuels are definitely out of the picture for the immediate postwar years, because of engineering difficulties in de­veloping engines to make profitable use of them and because of their high cost of manufacture. The end of the war will find a huge capacity for materials used in 100-octane blends without an aviation market. The withholding of exact pro­duction figures as well as the uncertain future of the aviation industry makes it impossible to estimate just how large this surplus will be, but the high cost of some components (such as cumene) makes it likely that at the close of the war some plants will be scrapped or converted to the production of other materials, as has been done already with some surplus toluene production. The general consensus is that the remaining production will raise the A.S.T.M. octane numbers of motor and premium gasolines some 3 to 5 points over their prewar levels.

Risk's comparison of postwar with pre­war gasolines for both types of octane ratings (A.S.T.M. and C.F.R.), as well as for percentages of each grade produced, is shown in Table III (58,54) · Brown and Barnard's estimates (21) for postwar oc­tane numbers and ColwelPs for both octane numbers and production percent­ages (££) are closely in agreement with these in most cases, although the latter predicts a somewhat lower (75 to 77)

A.S.T.M. octane routing for regular-grade gasoline and a slightly higher (10SW pro­duction of aviation gasoline. Other fig­ures are at least in thé «anae range a s Risk's. Piggott 452) thinks premium gasolines of 82 to S 3 A.S.T.M. octane num­ber are sufficient for present automobile engines, and Foster QS4) predicts 80-octane for the first postwar years.

The predicted percentage increase in production of premium gasolines, inci­dentally, as shorn* in Table Π Ι , i s gener-

Table il l . Estimated Proportionate Produc­tion of Postwar Gamsolines by Grades ind Octane Numbers, Compared with Prewar

Production (54) (National average)

P B * R CB2SBT OP TOTAL PKODUC- OCTANE 2*ÎOMBB» GRADE TIOÏC Motor Research Postwar Oasoline Aviation Premium Regular

Third

Aviation Premium Regular Third

6-8 10-20 eo-rs fi-15

I0O 86-S8 78-80 08-TO 70-7*

93-9S

Prewar Gasoline 2

10 78 10

91-Ï0O 8 0 7 5 6 4

80 80 05

ally conceded to b « the result of tfae num­bers of old cars still on the road which may need gasolines of higher octane rat­ings in order to maintain proper perform­ance. Moreover, ' the public's habit (developed in this wartime period when octane numbers htavc been much, lower) of buying premiucm gasoline; is bound t o carry over to sorrte extent into tfae early postwar years; softer that, engineering developments may have new cars, requiring the higher-octane fuels, on the; road.

Chayne (β4) has graphed his forecast of the rate of octane: rise in the postwar era (Figure 2). He ctoes not attempt to pre­dict the first postwar year because, like most other authorities, ho expects wild fluctuations during this period, csuiscd .by unsettled conditions in all parts of the country and by exceedingly large varia­tions resulting fr-om difforintg local pro­duction and transportation conditions. Chayne's figures on premiuna gasoline in the immediate postwar period agree more closely with Piggott's than do the others, with rises in both types of gasolines shown as cars are developed that can. maJke use of them. He half-jokingly includes a line for "advertised" octane ratings, expecting sales and advertising departments to exert pressure for the production of gaso­lines of octane numbers much* higher than can be used economically. There is a more or less general feeling tlrat gasolines actually marketed in the poetwaa· period may have octane ratings as xvell as other qualities that are- dictated by advertising and competitive considerations rather than by actual -requirements, a.nd that this may lead to the marketing of gaso-

lines with unnecessarily high octane rat­ings, at least in some localities.

Conservative opinion would seem to indicate that engine designs will not change materially over those prevalent during the immediate prewar period and that, consequently, octane requirements should not increase much during the im­mediate postwar period. New automobile engines having high knock rating require­ments and improved economy are ex­pected later, but not for some years, since the only engine designs available for re­sumption of production will be those in existence at the cessation of commercial production, the dies, jigs, and other fix­tures having been reserved against the time when production may be resumed.

A 1940 survey of actual octane number requirements of passenger automobiles as determined by the C.F.R. Committee is of definite interest (89). Figures shown are for "trace knock" as determined by ex­perienced test engineers, and the octane number requirements thus measured are considerably more severe than those which would be determined by the sort of easily audible knock found objectionable by the average driver.

PERCENTAGE OF ALL CARS

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20

OCTANE REQUIREMENT AT 25 M.P.H.

82 79 77 76 74 73 72 68

In this survey, all makes of cars were included in the average proportionate to their number on the road. Since the oc­tane requirements of old cars always are higher than those of new ones, this table seems to indicate a definite need for a postwar "regular" gasoline of perhaps 80-octane number, which is higher tlian anticipated by most experts.

Authorities are thus not in complete accord. It seems probable that the majority who claim that the immediate postwar period will see the need for house brand and premium fuels that are not very much higher in octane ratings than those of the immediate prewar period are some­what justified in their beliefs, since no im­mediate production of drastically changed motor cars is possible. As to gasolines in the second phase of the postwar period, there is certainly cause for doubt, because of the wide spread of the numerous guesses, both as to octane ratings and to automobile engine designs. The "middle road" of the gradual development of engines using progressively higher-octane, gasolines appears to be the conservative* guess, with marketing of higher quality fuels possibly preceding the improved engines.

1158 C H E M I C A L A N D E N G I N E E R I N G N E W S

Postwar Automotive Gasoline Demands

Production figures published in 1942 indicate that about 45 per cent of the 1,400,000,000 barrels of crude oil refined in 1041 yielded approximately 90,000,000 tons of gasoline (690,000,000 barrels), selling at $16 per ton (5 cents per gallon, δβ). Production of 100-octane gasoline was about 2,500,000 tons for that year; this sold at about S50 per ton at the fac­tory gate (56). Judging from experience, the petroleum industry after the war will continue to increase both the quantity and quality of gasoline produced as it did in prewar days. By the end of the war, catalytic-cracking units charging almost 1,000,000 barrels per day of crude oils should be in operation, capable of produc­ing extremely high-octane gasolines; this figure compares with a charging capacity of about 2,200,000 barrels per day for "old style" thermal cracking plants in 1940 (21). It is a question whether or not the probably increased postwar pro­duction of both types of fuels will find a sufficiently increased postwar market. If not, the prewar trend toward decreasing value of gasoline (49) may be resumed, at least for a few years; this would be a disturbing thought, in view of probable higher costs of producing crudes in the postwar period.

O'Donnell takes an optimistic view of the situation because of the fantastic rises in national income which may come to a peak in the postwar period (Figure 3). Concerning gasoline consumption he states (49) :

AVhile the foregoing indicates that it will be at least 1.5 years (and longer if the war extends beyond the middle of 1944) before the oil industry's major market re­turns to a volumetric normal, this does not mean that demand for gasoline will lag correspondingly. There is also some­what of a parallel between gasoline con­sumption per passenger vehicle and na­tional income. This indicates that if national income in the first postwar year is of the order of $135,000,000,000 (as compared with an 18-year average prior to 1942 of $70,000,000.000) consumption per vehicle will likely be of the order of 780 gallons, some 12 per cent higher than it was in 1941.

Going beyond O'Donnell's graph, Bur-rill (22) in Figure 4 has drawn a picture of war and postwar years. His figures reflect not only the wartime production decrease but also the sharp consumption drop under rationing, with the bulk of the product (at least 30 to 40 per cent) moving into military channels (where 50 gallons per man per week are reported to be neces­sary). They further show Burrill's as­sumption that rationing will be eased in mid-1945 and lifted by the end of that year, but a return to 1941 levels is ex­pected to be delayed by an inability to get cars back on the road in prewar numbers before the end of 1946, as may be seen from Figure 1.

V O L U M E 2 2, N O . 1 4 » »

Table I shows these gasoline consump­tion figures along with the data on cars in running condition, allowing for compari­son of the two sets of figures (as shown in Figure 4), and the predicted per-car con­sumption of gasoline. The reasons for the decreasing consumption in the period 1941-3 are so obvious as to require no comment; the upped consumption per car in the 1944-47 period will depend on a number of factors (22): the abundance of gasoline and other consumer-type prod­ucts in contrast with a paucity or absence of permanent-type goods, coupled with a widely reported condition of high incomes and large savings in the hands of the pub­lic; a predicted high degree of travel by duration workers returning "home" from war jobs and pleasure travel stimulated by the projected construction of super­highways as projects to ease immediate (though temporary) unemployment caused by postwar reconversion; and a limited amount of driving caused entirely by the psychological feeling of release occasioned by the sudden lifting of restrictions.

Depressing factors will also be in opera­tion, however; repair parts (45) and skilled mechanics in all probability will both be scarce during the first postwar year, so that cars may not be in fit condi­tion for extended travel. Unsettled con­ditions accompanied by high taxes, high prices, etc., may cause many to be cau­tious in spending accumulated savings. These factors, however, are expected to be outweighed by the other influences. The slight drop predicted by Burrill for the 1949-50 period may be interpreted as a reflection of the more economical perform­ance of the truly new cars expected to be on the roads by that time.

I 0 O

Expert opinion, then, expects demand in the immediate postwar period to be at least 75 per cent of recent prewar require­ments, largely because of the decrease in number of serviceable cars which will be available to consumers. Most authorities expect demand to rise to a new high in the second phase of the postwar period.

Subsidiary Automotive Markets Other vehicles besides passenger cars

should be considered briefly in connection with the postwar market for gasoline. Because of aviation, military, commercial, and farm use, as well as export of gasoline, actual consumption of gasoline is remain­ing nearly at a level (23), despite de­creasing use by passenger cars. The question of export in the postwar period is far less a technical or even economic question than a political one, and no pre­diction seems warranted. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that military con­sumption will drop, possibly fairly sharply at first, and then perhaps more gradually level off. Farm consumption probably will continue to rise slowly, at least for the anticipated postwar era of prosperity; Burrill, however, predicts a steady, though higher than prewar level (Figure 5). Commercial consumption seems likely to rise sharply to (or nearly to) its prewar level; in the second postwar period it may rise more sharply (Figure 4).

Farm equipment has, in the past, pro­vided a substantial market for gasoline, since most farmers have trucks and trac­tors as well as passenger cars, and many have other gasoline-powered equipment as well. Farm expenditures in 1940 for bulk petroleum products were some $323,200,-

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Fi sure S. Octane numbers in postwar era (24)

» J U L Y 2 5, 1 9 4 4 1159

Table IV. Gallons of Motor Fuel Consumed on Farms (17) Year ly Averapre for D e s i g n a t e d P e r i o d s , for 1940 , a n d for 1943

P E R I O D OR Y E A R

1910 14 1920-24 1930-34 1940 1 9 4 3*

F A R M A U T O M O B I L E S

2G.0OO.000 6 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 0

1,242,000,000 1 ,558 ,000 ,000 1.406.981.300

F A R M MOTOR TRCCKH Ι,ΟΟΟ.ΟΟΟ

82,000.001» 3 2 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 341.000,000 4 6 7 , 0 8 2 , 0 0 0

F A R M T R A C T O R S

42,000.000 330,000.000 742.000.000

1,390,000,000 1,069.181,000

T O T A L F U E L C O N S U M E D o x F A R M S »

110 ,000 ,000 1 ,084 ,000 ,000 2 . 3 7 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 3 . 3 5 7 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 3 , 0 6 3 , 7 2 1 . 1 7 5

a Include» m o t o r fuel c o n s u m e d by s t a t i o n a r y e n g i n e s o n f a r m s . S o u r c e : B u r e a u of Agr icu l tura l E c o n o m i c s . IT. S. D e p a r t m e n t of Acr icu l ture .

f> Es t imatec i bv U . S. D e p a r t m e n t of Agr icu l ture , Xatl. Petroleum Xeus, 3 5 , 9 ( M a y 2 6 , 1943)

000 (£), representing about 3,357,000,000 gallons of fuel ( / / ) . Farm-tractor con­sumption alone has risen from a yearly average of 42,000,000 gallons in 1910-1914 to 1,390,000,000 gallons in 1940. Other farm-equipment consumption has risen proportionately (Table IV). Diesel power may not become much more important in agricultural machinery, because low first cost and reduction of fuel cost for equiva­lent power output for the individual farmer may come from replacing "distil­late fuel" with regular-grade gasoline.

Moreover, lightweight tractors using the same fuels and lubricants as passenger cars are becoming more and more popular among th<; farmers. These new-type tractors are largely responsible for recent increases in the number of tractors in use on farms, and sales were still increasing when the war started. In 1939, 8,500,000 barrels of the farm consumption of 95,-500,000 barrels of regular-grade gasoline or better were used for these tractors (10). This is of importance in studying the post­war gasoline market not only because some of these tractors will still be in operation, but also because some may be replaced by adaptations of the present military vehicle, the jeep (β). Jeeps have already been tested for plowing and other jobs normally performed by light tractors in a "jeep farming test" conducted in Alabama by

the Army, the U. S. Bureau of Agricul­tural Chemistry and Engineering, the Alabama Polytechnic Institute, and the Country Gentleman (SO). The^e tests showed that jeeps can be used successfully for almost all types of farm work; thus they may provide an appreciable market for gasoline in the immediate postwar era. Some civilians have already expressed a desire to own and drive jeeps, and it is possible that after the war these "will be sought after by hunters, fishermen, and stunt drivers" (8). Recent reports (6), however, indicate that many believe the jeep to be too unsatisfactory for continued production and that only second-hand Army jeeps may find a market at very low prices.

As for aviation, of the 1941 domestic gasoline consumption of 658,474,000 bar­rels, only 16,621,000 barrels (or 1.6 per cent) were for aviation use (49)\ in 1940, only 12,451,000 barrels of the 616,359,000-barrel consumption (or 1.33 per cent) were for aviation use (16). All authorities are convinced, however, that this demand will increase greatly, because of increased use in both commercial and civilian planes. BurrilPs estimate of this increase is shown in Figure 5.

The demand for fuel oil will also proba­bly increase, possibly necessitating de­creasing production of motor gasoline,

1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 «936 1938 1940 1942

Figure 3. Efiect of national income on car sales and sasoline consumption (57, page 23)

although opinion in the p>etrole um indus­try seems opposed to aaay suw?h action. O'Donncll (49) also poinds out the trend toward decreasing exportas and increasing imports of oil as a factor in postwar sup­plies; increasing percentage yields of gasoline, however, may «aire* even de­creased supplies of crude» to r e mit in no decrease of available sgasolinac. Thee figures indicate that adequate supplio-s, at least, may be anticipated.

Conclusion %

In planning for the postwrar period, therefore, the petroleum industry must be cognizant of the many factors influencing the volume of probable postwar markets for its bulk product*, especially gasoline.

Probably mo4 important is t h e number of cars still unwrapped ajid operating on at least four usable tires stt the? end of the war. Naturally, the duration of the war is certain to have a larpçe effect on this number, and estimates are a s varied as those on the date of the war's termination. A conservative guess noight place this number at approximately 20,000,000, or about 70 per cent of those opeirating when the war began.

The next factor of imporla.nce is the determination of how soon mowrc cars can and will be put in operation after the war. Easiest and quickest to put on t h e road are those needing only rceonditîoning and new tires. If the rubber is available, as it now appears almost certain to flbe, molding capacity should be sufficient to put all operable cars back on the? road in less than a year, assuming that there \\Ό1 be skilled labor available to operate the machinery.

The problem of getting* "new" cars on the road is more serious. It is believed that the first postwar cans will IDC the same models as the last prewsu* car-s, and that less than half a normal year's; production can come off the assembly line in the first postwar year! This means that it will take perhaps two years t*o furcush replace­ments for cars lost to service? during the war years and that production* of the true "postwar" car of a new «design* cannot be­gin much before that time. NCost authori­ties predict that changers in t h e postwar cars will be gradual, as they htave been in the past. Of particulaar intesrest to the petroleum industry are· the widespread beliefs that postwar cars wull be more economical in their use o><f fuels', because of some application of lighter-weight metals, greater use of automatic transmissions, and the probable use of s&soKnaes 0f some­what higher octane rations.

It seems possible that 100-octane fuels may eventually find use, at least a** the premium-grade fuel, abfchougtfci this may not be very soon after the armistice. Hou*e-brand gasolines luare not. expected to be higher than 80-octan& inthie immediate postwar period, and either one or two grades of premium fuels will iprobably be put on the market, with oci&anc ratings perhaps somewhere betv -een S o and 90.

1160 C H E M I C A L A N D Ε Ν G I Ν Ε ΕΙ* I N O N E W S

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Figure 4. Estimated U. S. gasoline demand by passenger cars, trucks, and busses (23, page 36)

Auxiliary automotive markets will also affect the market outlook, inasmuch as military consumption should drop and commercial, farm, and civilian aviation consumption rise. These trends are likely to be sharp during the immediate postwar period and more gradual thereafter, except for aviation, which may rise sharply for some time.

In general, prospects for gasoline mar­kets are not particularly dark, even in the immediate postwar period; in the subse­quent period of anticipated prosperity, the outlook seems to be good indeed. In the former period there seems to be little chance for a widespread demand for 100-octane gasoline other than for aviation use, although lessened demands for the latter purpose probably will make a large volume of high-octane stocks available (60). In the latter period, however, it may eventu­ally find an automotive market.

Bibliography Some of the references below were used in pre­

paring this article but are only a part of state· mente giving general opinion. Such articles are not referred to by number in the text. A few references deal with postwar planning in general.

(1) Allen, A. H. t Steel, 110, 63 (May 11. 1942) ; Natl. Petroleum News, 34, 20 (May 20, 1942).

(2) Anon., Automotive and Amotion Inds., 86, 75 (March 15, 1942).

(3) Ibid., 86, 76 (March 15, 1942). (4) Anon.. Barron's, 22, 5 (Sept. 28, 1942). (5) Anon., Business Week, No. 698, 17

(Jan. 16, 1943). (6) Ibid., No. 762, 24 (April 8, 1944). (7) Ibid., No. 755, 34 (Feb. 19, 1944). (8) Anon., Life, 13, 70 (July 20, 1942). (9) Anon., Mag. Wall Street, 71, 642 (March

20, 1943). (10) Anon., NaU. Petroleum News, 32, 25

(July 31, 1940).

(11) Ibid., 34, 30 (June 17, 1942). (12) Ibid., 36, 1 (Jan. 19, 1944). (13) Anon., Pah. Press, 60, 15 (May 19,

1943). (14) Ibid., 60,6 (June 27,1943). (15) Anon., Rubber Age, 51, 420 (Aug.

1942). (16) Ibid., 51,442 (Aug. 1942). (17) Barnard, D . P., and Marschner, R. F.,

Petroleum Refiner, 23, 122 (Feb. 1944).

(18) Beecroft, D. , S.A.B. Journal, 47, Sup. 35 (July 1940).

(19) Boyd, Τ. Α., Ibid., 50, 402 (Sept. 1942).

(20) Brackeen, L. O., Life, 13, 8 (June 8, 1942).

(21) Brown, Β. Κ., and Barnard, D. P., Natl. Petroleum News, 35, 19 (Dec. 8, 1943).

(22) Burrill, C. L.. Ibid., 36, 33 (March 8, 1944).

(23) Burrill, C. L., Ibid., 34, 16 (April 22, 1942) ; Oil & Gas J., 40, 34 (April 23, 1942).

(24) Chayne, C. Α., Natl. Petroleum News, * 35, 17 (Dec. 15. 1943).

(25) Chevalier, W., Business Week, No. 700, 91 (Jan. 30, 1943).

(26) Col well, A. T., "Effect of Wartime Fuel Developments upon Postwar Auto­mobiles", S.A.E. preprint, meeting of Nov. 10, 1943.

(27) Cummings, G. H., Wall Street J., 123, 1 (Feb. 21, 1944).

(28) Custer, J. R., Automotive and Aviation Inds., 87, 17 (Aug. 1, 1942).

(29) De Smet, E. C , "Practical Postwar Car*', S.A.E. preprint, meeting of Jan. 10-14, 1944.

(30) Dezendorf, F. B., Barron's, 24. 3 (March 6, 1944).

(31) Dickson, J., Commercial Car J., 66, 49 (Feb. 1944). *

(32) Edgar, Graham, "Gasoline—Past, Pres­ent, and Future", A.S.T.M. Edgar Marburg Lecture, 1942; Proc. A.S.T.M., 42 (1942).

(33) Foster, A. L., Oil & Gas J., 42, 27 (Dec. 9,1943).

(34) Ibid., 42, 34 (Dec. 9, 1943). (35) Gary, W. W., Natl. Petroleum News, 34,

20 (Feb. 18, 1942). (36) Geschelin, Joseph, Automotive and Avia­

tion Inds., 87, 26 (Sept. 1, 1942). (37) Ibid., 87, 42 (Sept. 15, 1942). (38) Hirsch, J., Barron's, 24, 3 (Feb. 21,

1944). (39) Holaday. W. M., and Happel. J., Petro­

leum Eng., 14, No. 10, 251 (Ref. An­nual, 1943).

(40) Holland, J. B., Ethyl News, 1944, 14, (March 1944).

(41) Jardine, F., S.A.E. Journal, 50, 299 (July 1942); Science, 96, Sup. 11 (July 10. 1942).

(42) Joffers, W. M., Natl. Petroleum News. 35, 18 (May 19, 1943); Dewey, B.. Ibid., 35, 37 (Nov. 24, 1943); India Rubber World, 110, 64 (April 1944).

(43) Livingston. S. M., "Markets after the War", U. S. Dept. Commerce Bull. (March 1943).

(44) McWethy, J. Α., Barron's, 23, 7 (March 8. 1943).

(45) Ibid., 24, 3 (Jan. 10, 1944). (46) Middleton.P.H.,"Transportation—Pre­

war and Postwar", Chicago, Railway Business Association, 1943.

(47) Newton, R. H., CHEM. ENG. NEWS. 22, 248 (1944).

(48) O'Donnell, J. P., Oil & Gas J., 40, 15 (Nov. 13, 1941).

(49) Ibid., 41, 17 (July 23, 1942). (50) Ibid., 41, 60 (Nov. 12, 1942). (51) Ibid., 41, 22 (March 4, 1943). (52) Piggott, R. J. S., Commercial Car J., 66,

48 (Feb. 1944). (53) Risk, T. H., Ethyl News, 1944. 15

(Feb., 1944). (54) Risk, T. H., Nat. Petroleum News. 36,

R-132 (March 1, 1944). (55) Rose, Η. Ε., Wall Street J., 121, 1

(Jan. 23,1943). (56) Russell. R. P., Chem. Met. Eng.. 49, 1

(1942). (57) Sloan, G. Α., Mech. Eng., 65, 163

(1943). (58) Stout, W. B„ Petroleum World, 40, 60

(Jan., 1943). (59) Von Tresckow, W., Barron's, 23, 9

(June 14, 1943). (60) Weil, B. H., Oil & Gas J., 41, 40 (Aug.

19, 1943). PRESENTED before the Division of Petroleum Chemistry at the 107th Meeting of the AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY, Cleveland, Ohio.

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MISC. AND LOSSES • • • • 4 · · · + · *

AGRICULTURE

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Figure 5. Estimated U. S. gasoline demand

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950

ior agriculture and aviation (22, page 42)

V O L U M E 22, N O . 1 4 » » » J U L Y 2 5, 1 9 4 4 1161