Péter MartonScholarship fellowHungarian Institute of International Affairspmarton@gmail.com

„The challenge of coalition burden-sharing among members of a security community”

Missziós feladatok védelemgazdasági nézőpontból (a fókuszban Afganisztán)„Missziós feladat – többletköltség vagy beruházás a jövőbe?”Budapest, 2008. május 29-30. 

Rendezők:• Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság• Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi

Egyetem• Univerzita Obrany• Gesellschaft für Militärökonomie

On approaching the conceptual box I.

On approaching the conceptual box II.

Critical remarks incorporated:

Delimitation of the defense economy vs. networked, multisectoral homeland security (blurring boundaries)

Level of analysis issue: Costs/benefits analysis for the country or for the defence economy? Or for an entire security community?

„Save Darfur” (or Eastern Chad etc.) – issue of returns supposedly irrelevant (a humanitarian/human security perspective)

If the resources committed are insufficient – again, returns issue irrelevant: e.g. see investments in northern Afghanistan…

Politics of scale shouldn’t be ignored: Visegrád-level cooperation or else – e.g. demining S-NGO

Security costs and benefits and short-term/long-term approaches when translating to Forints/Euros… Impacts back on defence economy, too

The aim of the presentation

Shedding light on what should work, why – and why it’s difficult – in the case of the Afghan mission. (Security goals; strategy disaggregation; a reflection on challenges.)

Using International Relations and Security Studies discourse – their existing conceptual repertoire…

+ three case studies, to show:

We’re not there - i.e.: no trans-Atlantic security community case-specifically, in the Afghan case…

Title:

The challenge of coalition burden-sharing among members of a security community

„Security community”

Adler, Emmanuel – Barnett, Michael (1998): Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press(in Karl Deutsch’s footsteps)

- Amalgamated SC (political union)

- Tightly coupled SC („common system of rule”) - [ ≈ European Union ]- Relatively tightly coupled SC („mutual aid,” „collective arrangements”) [ ≈ Transatlantic alliance ]- Loosely coupled SC („dependable expectations of peaceful change/no bellicose action”) - [ ≈ on a global scale ]

Two alternatives1. Empire: core – gap; zone of peace – zone of

instability; North – South etc.A core security communityInterventionism on security grounds (Cooper, Fukuyama, Mallaby, Fearon and Laitin etc.)

2. „World society” – A first-order social level security community

Fukuyama, Francis (2004): State-building – Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Cooper, Robert (2002): The Post-Modern State. In: Leonard, Mark (ed.): Re-Ordering the World, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 11-20.

Fearon, James D. – Laitin, David D. (2004): Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States. International Security, Vol. 28.: No.4., 5-43.

Mallaby, Sebastian (2002): The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire, Foreign Affairs, March-April, 2002, Vol. 81.: No. 2.

Security interdependence

An abstract model (unlimited interdependence) Supposedly valid rationale for a global security community

•unit weakness a threat;•negative spill-over effects;•proximity irrelevant;•unilateral defence a non-option

Empirically more or less observable instead: security complexes (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde)

Approach adapted from Buzan et al.

A) Demarcation of security complexes geographicallyB) Sector-specific view of security complexes -

disaggregationAdaptation:1. Geographically demarcated and issue-specifically

disaggregated analysis2. Sectors ignored (non-applicable re: the threats

considered3. Do issue-specific security communities emerge in

the case of Afghanistan?

Buzan, Barry – Wæver, Ole – de Wilde, Jaap (1998): Security: A New Framework For Analysis. Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner.

Several more points re: issue-specific security complexes

1. Any meaningful difference between issue-specific security complexes and security communities?► Incomplete cooperation dysfunctional?

► Cooperation = normality? (Equitable burden-sharing?)

2. Security vs. securitisation complexes(mixed epistemology)3. Empirical data availability issue: problematic demarcation (e.g. refugees from traditional population movements; drugs trade: assessment of production, routes, consumption, harm…)

Before the case studiesTwo critical points with regards to the Afghan

„source”

- Partly non-synchronous spill-over effects (separability for analysis - seemingly).largest „refugee” movements: 1980s; terrorism externality: 1989-2001; drugs production upsurge after 2001

- Spill-overs both ways (demand for drugs, precursors, arms, terrorism etc.)

- Refugees and the drugs trade by nature not suited to ground one’s Afghan policy on and thus not suited to inspire equitable burden-sharing themselves; terrorism taken care of to a degree, via internal AT – no agreement over CT, though

Illustration: Opium production

Gradual increase over 1990s, drop in 2000-2001 possibly overestimated by UNODC

(„foot in the door”)

The refugee flow security complex

An often-heard point about securitisation, but it doesn’t really work in practice like that:

Number of people from Afghanistan claiming refugee status in Hungary:

2001, first ten months: 3409 (exceptional)

Overall number of people getting refugee status, Hungary, 2006: 99; 2007, first three quarters: 90

Oa. no. of people getting „supplementary protection,” Hungary, 2006: 99; 2007, first three quarters: 62

As of Jan., 2007:Pakistan: 3.5 million Afghan refugeesIran: 900,000 Afghan refugees(registered and non-registered together)

Refugee flow security complex

A potential security community: the security complex minus the failed source state

Security complex reordered post-2001; Western in-takers starting repatriations (e.g. Australia) – Direct and indirect in-takers

Partly reversed flow now from Pakistan (10,000 refugees from Kurram)

Iran using repatriation as a foreign policy tool in the spring of 2007 (generated crisis in domestic Afghan politics; sent a message to ISAF; stirred up some armed activity locally, in Shindand district, Herat province)

Jihadist terrorism SCx: The threat to Hungary

Past data:Some inicidents with Hungarian casualties,

that can be connected to SCx looked at here:

August 12, 2000: Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir – two wounded (tourists)

July 7, 2005: London – one wounded in the Tube bombings (migrant worker)

April 24, 2006: Dahab, Sinai – one killed, one wounded (tourists)

January 17, 2007: Baghdad, Yarmouk district – one killed (PS employee)

v. the baseball rule…

Jihadist Terrorism Security ComplexTriangle within Middle East + West = autocracies – democracies – weak(ened) states…Migration: 4GW + ideology + deflectionDeflection:significance post-2001 = hardening democracies, crushed states.A key aspect of security community provided.„Afghan mission = risk management”?

Security complex wormholes:Air travel, money transfers, ideology, images etc.;- images via the media:„Normative difference” Merom, Gil (2003): How Democracies Lose Small Wars - State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

An emboldenment effect? Iyengar, Radha – Monten, Jonathan (2008): Is There an “Emboldenment” Effect? Evidence from the Insurgency in Iraq. Paper published on-line by the authors, February 2008. URL: http://people.rwj.harvard.edu/~riyengar/insurgency.pdf, retrieved: April 10, 2008.

The illicit opiate trade SCx

Anchored SC (by demand)Anchor may shift, too (cocaine trade: North America ►Europe)Data reliability issue – problematic demarcation – e.g. routes?Securitisation of drugs in general varying: examples of Russia (ignorance?), China (sources’/routes’ issue), Iran (overly?), U.S. v. Netherlands, Afghanistan (cannabis)

The illicit opiate trade SCx

Wormholes: money laundering – developed banking systems: profit for the national economy?Arms and precursors the opposite wayDifferences on distance-to-source function:Armed smuggling v. concealment, corruption or stealth smugglingHealth effects: direct/indirect (Iran: opium v. heroin)Large scale corruption: state captureCrime: market-related v. acquisitive

The illicit opiate trade SCx:Health effects in Europe I.

Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2007

The illicit opiate trade SCx: Health effects in Europe II.

Continued (next p.)

The illicit opiate trade SCx: The illicit opiate trade SCx: Health effects in Europe II. (c’d)

Remark:

Firm, but non-full rank correlation (ρ=0.742) between rankings in terms of population abuse rate and rate of those treated for opiate-related problems; cases of spectacular discrepancy

Drugs trade: non-suitable policy basis

Reviewing balance of threat theory (sufficient basis without regression analysis):

• Functioning predictive factor: UK, Italy, Estonia/Iceland cases

• Weak predictive capability: Luxembourg, Iran (2.8% abuse rate) cases

3. Questionable prospects for elimination4. Long-term, holistic effort needed as opposed to

short-term, eradication-focused counternarcotics (see contrast: US CN strategy v. AFG National Drug Control Strategy)

5. Conversion issue (synthetic and other substances)6. Migration (geographically – e.g. back to the Golden

Triangle)Narcotics part of a bigger picture which nevertheless is

there to be seen…

ConclusionsReview of the approach followed so

far:Issue-specific/regional disaggregation of security complexes only mildly relevant to

policy-making;Scarcely visible direct implications for

most countries (other than potential) – no securitisation in the sense of licensing

extraordinary measures;Other, less visible factors at play: a more pure impact of coalition burden-sharing

dynamics: NATO Summits as force generation conferences…undermining the

security community?

Conclusions

Keohane and Nye: interdependence in and of itself doesn’t provide a basis for harmony

Keohane, Robert O. - Nye, Joseph S. (2001): Power and Interdependence. New York: Longman.

Game theory (Fang and Ramsay) – lead nations pay moreComplex theory (balance of threat, relative size, alliance dependence, domestic factors)

Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold - Danny Unger (2004): Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War. International Organization, 48:1, 39-75.

ConclusionsAlliance dependence a key driving factor in Hungary’s case – hard to quantify

Alternative (normative remark): „alliance importance” (more fitting for a security

community as opposed to a temporary alliance, arguably)

The military’s organisational interests – ISAF case studies:Canada (Afghan mission showcasing the military’s importance) v. Netherlands (Afghan mission costs v. the rest of the pie)Hungary, Germany: decreasing defence budgets

Conclusions

What to do?

Anticipate, adapt, advocate

(Open-source) strategy conferences – internal and external feedback at the same time – a learning organisation – a learning society, incl elite?

Run it home that the military is not a social welfare program as some claim.