(PDF) Yury Chemerkin I-society 2013

8/13/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin I-society 2013

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Limitations of Security Standards against

YU

International Conference on Information Society (


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Experienced in :

Reverse Engineering & AVSoftware Programming & DocumentationMobile Security and MDM

Cyber Security & Cloud Security

Compliance & Transparencyand Security Writing

Hakin9 Magazine, PenTest Magazine, eForensics Magazine,

Groteck Business MediaParticipation at conferences

InfoSecurityRussia, NullCon, AthCon, CONFidence, PHDAYS

CYBERCRIME FORUM, Cyber Intelligence Europe/Intelligence-SecICITST, CyberTimes, ITA

[ Yury Chemerkin ]

www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkin

http://sto

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strategy.com yury.chemerk
http://www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkinhttp://sto-strategy.com/http://sto-strategy.com/http://sto-strategy.com/mailto:[email protected]://sto-strategy.com/mailto:[email protected]://www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkinhttp://eforensicsmag.com/http://pentestmag.com/http://hakin9.org/mailto:[email protected]://sto-strategy.com/http://www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkin


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ThreatsPrivacyComplianceLegal

Vendor lock-inOpen source / Open standardsSecurityAbuseIT governanceAmbiguity of terminology

Customization and best practiceCrypto anarchismCSA, ISO, PCI, SAS 70Typically US Location

Platform, Data, Tools Lock-InTop clouds are not open-sourcePhysical clouds more secured thBotnets and Malware InfectionsDepends on organization needsReference to wide services, solu

Cloud Issues

Known Issues Known Solutio


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Common Security Recommendations

Object What to doData Ownership Full rights and access to data

Data Segmentation An isolation data from other customers dataData Encryption A data encryption in transit/memory/storage, at rest

Backup/Recovery An availability for recoveryData Destruction An Ability to securely destroy when no longer neede

Access Control Who has access to data?Log Management A data access that logged and monitored regularlyIncident Response Are there processes and notifications in place for incide

(including breaches) that affect data?

Security Controls An appropriate security and configuration control to protection

Patch Management Patching for the latest vulnerabilities and exploits?


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Top clouds are not OpenSource

OpenStack is APIs compatible with Amazon EC2and Amazon S3 and thus client applications writtenfor AWS can be used with OpenStack with minimalporting effort, while Azure is not

Platform lock-in

Beside of OpenStack, there are Import/Export toolsto migrate from/to VMware, while Azure is not

Data Lock-in

Native AWS solutions linked with Cisco routers toupload, download and tunneling as well as 3 rd partystorage like SMEStorage (AWS, Azure, Dropbox,Google, etc.) , while Azure is not

Tools Lock-in

Longing for an inter-cloud manaindustrial and built with complian

APIs Lock-In

Longing for inter-cloud APIs, howknown inter-OS APIs for PC, MD

No TransparencyWeak compliance and transparencand NDA relationships between clthird party auditors and experts

Abuse

Abusing is not a new issue and is eAWS Vulnerability Bulletins as a kresponse and stay tuned

What is about Public Clouds

Some known facts about AWS & Azure in order to issues menti


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[Intel] :: The Essential Intelligent Client

Applied are known for VMware

Ability to control clouds due the IntelAMT commands or else is applied for

VMwareThere were not known successfulimplementations for AWS, Azure, GAE orother clouds.

[Elcomsoft] :: Cracking PassworBreaking PGP on EC2 with EDPR

Serious performance probleof where the trusted/untrustagents are

Overloading the virtual OSCPU commands and system

Overloading is multiplied bthe best of all demonstratedGPU (Elcomsoft, GPU Cra

Clouds: Public against Private

Longing for managing CPU, Memory and other closed resourc


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[AWS] :: Xen Security Advisories

There are known XEN attacks (Blue Pills, etc.)No one XEN vulnerability was not applied to theAWS servicesVery customized clouds

[CSA] :: CSA The Notorious Nine Cloud Computing TopThreats in 2013

Replaced a document published in 2009Such best practices provides a least securityNo significant changes since 2009, even examples

Top Threats Examples

1.0. Threat: Data Breaches // Cross-VM SideChannels and Their Use to Extract private Keys,

7.0. Threat: Abuse of Cloud SeSide Channels and Their Use to Keys

4.0. Threat: Insecurity InterfacBesides of Reality of CSA Threats

1.0 & 7.0 cases highlight how th

e.g. AWS EC2 are vulnerable1.0 & 7.0 cases are totally focusecloud case (VMware and XEN), known way to adopt it to AWS.4.0 case presents issues raised bynot related to public clouds (exceSkyDrive) and addressed to inse

Clouds: Public against Private

It is generally known, that private clouds are most secure There is no a POC to prove a statemen


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The Goal is bringing a transparency of cloud controls andfeatures, especially security controls and featuresSuch documents have a claim to be up-to-date withexpert-level understanding of significant threats andvulnerabilitiesUnifying recommendations for all clouds

Up to now, it is a third revisionAll recommendations are linked with other standards

PCI DSSISONISTCOBITFEDRAMP

Top known cloud vendors announcecompliance with itSome of reports are getting old by nowCustomers have to control their environeedsCustomers want to know whether it is i

especially local regulations and how farCustomers want to know whether it matransparency to let to build an appropriate

Compliance: from CSAs viewpo

On CSA side On vendors and custom


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CAIQ/CCM provides equivalent of recommendations overseveral standards, CAIQ provides more details on securityand privacy but NIST more specific

CSA recommendations are pure with technical details

It helps vendors to pass a compliance easier

It helps not to have their solutions worked out indetails and/or badly documentedIt helps to makes a lot of references on 3 rd partyreviewers under NDA (SOC 1 or SAS 70)

Bad idea to let vendors fills such documents

They provide fewer public detailsThey take it to NDA reports

Vendors general explanations multiplstandards recommendations are extremelytransparencyClouds call for specific levels of audreporting, security controlling and data reten

It is often not a part of SLA offere

It is outside recommendationsAWS often falls in details with their architecAWS solutions are very well to be in costandards and specific local regulations such

It additionally need to use CLI, APthird party solutions and implemenIt offers a PenTest opportunity

Compliance: fromCloud Vendors view

Compliance, Transparency, Elabo

Description DIFF (AWS vs AZURE)


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Description DIFF (AWS vs. AZURE)Third Party Audits As opposed to AWS, Azure does not have a clearly defined statement whether their customers able to p

vulnerability test

Information System RegulatoryMapping

AWS falls in details to comply it that results of differences between CAIQ and CMM

Handling / Labeling / Security Policy AWS falls in details what customers are allowed to do and how exactly while Azure does not

Retention Policy AWS points to the customers responsibility to manage data, exclude moving between Availability Zonesensures on validation and processing with it, and indicate about data historical auto-backup

Secure Disposal No serious, AWS relies on DoD 5220.22 additionally while Azure does NIST 800-88 only

Information Leakage AWS relies on AMI and EBS services, while Azure does on Integrity data

Policy, User Access, MFA No both haveBaseline Requirements AWS provides more high detailed how-to docs than Azure, allows to import trusted VM from VMware, AzureEncryption, Encryption KeyManagement

AWS offers encryption features for VM, storage, DB, networks while Azure does for XStore (Azure Storage)

Vulnerability / Patch Management AWS provides their customers to ask for their own pentest while Azure does not

Nondisclosure Agreements, ThirdParty Agreements

AWS highlights that they does not leverage any 3 rd party cloud providers to deliver AWS services to thethe procedures, NDA undergone with ISO

User ID Credentials Besides the AD (Active Directory) AWS IAM solution are alignment with both CAIQ, CMM requirements whthe AD to perform these actions

(Non)Production environments,Network Security

AWS provides more details how-to documentsto having a compliance

Segmentation Besides vendor features, AWS provides quite similar mechanism in alignment CAIQ & CMM, while Azure poininfrastructureon a vendor side

Mobile Code AWS points their clients to be responsible to meet such requirements, while Azure points to build solutions trac

w/o CE w CE


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NAME w/o CE w CE

AWS Azure AWS AzureAccess Control Policy and Procedures Y Y None NoneAccount Management Y Yexc. g Y: 1, 4, 6, 7; prebuilt: 2, 5a-b; poss.3,5c,5d Y: 1-4, 5a, 6

Access Enforcement Y Y Y: 1,2;prebuilt: 3-6 Y exc. 3

Information Flow Enforcement Y Y prebuilt:1-8,10-17;N/A:9 Y exc. N/ALeast Privilege Y Y Y Y

Security Attributes prebuilt prebuilt exc.N/A:5 None None

Use of External Information Systems Y Y Y YAuditable Events Y Y None NoneAudit Review, Analysis, and Reporting Y Y p.internal t.internal

Protection of Audit Information Y Y poss. poss.Security Function Isolation t.internal t.internal t.internal t.internal

Denial of Service Protectionp.internal p.internal p.internal p.internal

Boundary Protection

prebuilt prebuiltprebuilt:1-6,11 exc. poss. 4c; prebuilt:7,8,9,12,15,16; prebuilt:10 exc. N/A: iii,t.internal:v;p.internal:13,14,17

prebuiltN/A: 3-4poss. 7,p.interna

Architecture & Provisioning forName/Address Resolution Service

prebuilt t.internal prebuilt t.internal

Honeypots poss. poss. None NoneOS Inde pendent Applications poss. poss. None NoneProtecti on of data at Rest poss. poss. None None


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Out of paper example (MDM) : Efficiency o

16,67 19,05

60,00

5,88 14,29 5,5616,67

66,67

11,76

66,67

25,0050,00

25,00 25,00

50,0

16,673,45

12,50

5,08

14,29

3,37 6,25

8,704,26

66,67

9,09

66,67

5,262,17

88

0,00

50,00

100,00

150,00

200,00

250,00

% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm


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Out of paper example (MDM) : Efficiency o

BlackBerry Old iOS BlackBerry QNX Quantity of Groups 55 16 7 Average perm per group 20 5 7 Efficiency 80,00 38,46 31,82 Totall permissions 1100 80 49

55

16

7 20 5 7

80,00

38,46 31,82

1100

80

49

0

10

20

30

40

50

6070

80

90

100

Quantity of Groups Average perm per group Efficiency Totall permissions


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The best Security & Permissions ruled by AWS among other clouds

Most cases are not clear in according to the roles and responsibilities of cloud vendors and their custo

Some of such cases are not clear on background type: technical or non-technical

Swapping responsibilities and shifting the vendor job on to customer shoulders

Referring to independent audits reports under NDA as many times as they can

All recommendations should be enhanced by independent analysis expert in certain areas

CSA put the cross references to other standards that impact on complexity & lack of clarity like NIST

NIST is more details and well documented with cross references and AWS matches to the NIST more

CONCLUSION

THEVENDOR SECURITYVISION HAS NOTHING WITH REALITY AGGRAVA


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Q&A THA
https://plus.google.com/108216608239392698703mailto:[email protected]://twitter.com/sto_bloghttps://twitter.com/yury.chemerkinhttp://scribd.com/ychemerkinhttps://www.facebook.com/yury.chemerkinhttp://www.slideshare.net/YuryChemerkin/http://www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkinhttp://sto-strategy.com/http://eforensicsmag.com/http://pentestmag.com/http://hakin9.org/

(PDF) Yury Chemerkin I-society 2013

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