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IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers

Since 1998, Indonesia has been undergoing a momentous political and economic

transition.The fallof theNewOrder, theeconomiccrisis,and radicaldecentralization

havechangedthepolitical,economicandsocialcontext.Withinthisnewcontext,power

relations are in flux, identities are being renegotiated, and institutions are changing.

Changes in incentives, and in the role of formal and informal institutions at various

levels,havealteredtheways inwhich individualsandgroupsrelatetoeachotherand

the state. Understanding this new context, and the ways in which various actors

(nationalandinternational)canpromoteprogressivesocialchangeisimportant.

TheIndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapersseriesaimstofurtherdiscussiononarange

ofissuesrelatingtothecurrentsocialandpoliticalcontextinIndonesia,andtohelpin

thegenerationof ideasonhowdemocraticandpeaceful transitioncanbesupported.

The series will cover a range of issues including conflict, development, corruption,

governance,theroleofthesecuritysector,andsoon.Eachpaperpresentsresearchon

aparticulardimensionof socialdevelopmentandofferspragmaticpolicy suggestions.

Papers also attempt to assess the impact of various interventions—from local and

national actors, as well as international development institutions—on preexisting

contextsandprocessesofchange.

Thepapersintheseriesareworksinprogress.Theemphasisisongeneratingdiscussion

amongstdifferent stakeholders—including government, civil society, and international

institutions—rather than offering absolute conclusions. It is hoped that they will

stimulatefurtherdiscussionsofthequestionstheyseektoanswer,thehypothesesthey

test,andtherecommendationstheyprescribe.

PatrickBarron(serieseditor) [email protected]

UnderstandingViolentConflictin

Indonesia

AMixedMethodsApproach

PatrickBarron

SanaJaffrey

BlairPalmer

AshutoshVarshney

December2009

IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.15

Papers in the Indonesian Social Development series are not formal publications of theWorld

Bank. They are published informally and circulated to encourage discussion and comment

between those interested in Indonesian development issues. The findings, interpretations,

judgments,andconclusionsexpressedinthepaperarethoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbe

attributedto:theWorldBankandaffiliatedorganizations;membersoftheWorldBank’sBoard

ofExecutiveDirectorsorthegovernmentstheyrepresent;oranyofthefundingagencies.

ThefullrangeofpublicationsassociatedwiththebroaderstudyoflocalconflictinIndonesia(of

whichthisreportisaproduct)isavailableonlineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org.

Emailaddressesforcorrespondence:

[email protected]

[email protected]

[email protected]

[email protected]

Copiesofthispaperareavailablefrom:

PNPMSupportFacility

JalanDiponegoroNo.72

Jakarta10310Indonesia

Tel:+62(0)213148175

Fax:+62(0)2131903090

Acknowledgements

ThispaperprovidesanoutlineofthemethodologybeingusedfortheViolentConflictin

Indonesia study. The research is funded througha grant from theWorldBank’s Post‐

ConflictFund.Additional fundshavebeenprovidedbyUSAID, through the IRD‐SERASI

program.ChrisWilsonandAdrianMorelprovidedsubstantive inputs intotheresearch

design.ThankstoBrunoBoccara,SamuelClark,PaulFrancis,MarkusKostner,Stephen

Miller, Dave McRae, William Wallace, Alys Willman, Susan Wong and Matthew

Zurstrassen(WorldBank),YuhkiTajima(UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside),SidneyJones

(International Crisis Group), and Supryoga Hadi (Bappenas) for comments on earlier

draftsofthispaper.Theviews inthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsaloneandnotof

theinstitutionstowhichtheyareaffiliatedorofanyofthefundingbodies.

ThepaperispublishedsimultaneouslyasSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.117.

i

TABLEOFCONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................................................ i

TABLEOFCONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. ii

1.INTRODUCTIONANDBACKGROUND................................................................................................... 1

1.1THEVIOLENTCONFLICTININDONESIASTUDY ................................................................................................. 3

1.2RESEARCHTOPICS ..................................................................................................................................... 4

Patterns,incidentsandimpactsofviolentconflict................................................................................ 4

Routineviolence .................................................................................................................................... 4

Escalationofviolence ............................................................................................................................ 4

De‐escalationofviolence ...................................................................................................................... 5

2.ANOVERVIEWOFTHEMETHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 6

2.1UNDERSTANDINGVARIATION ...................................................................................................................... 6

2.2WHYAREWEUSINGMIXEDMETHODS? ...................................................................................................... 6

2.3HOWAREWEUSINGTHESEMETHODS?....................................................................................................... 7

Trackingtrends:establishingpatternsofvariance ............................................................................... 7

Nestedcasestudies:theorybuilding..................................................................................................... 8

Theorytesting ....................................................................................................................................... 9

2.4QUANTITATIVEDATA:THEVICISNEWSPAPERDATASET................................................................................... 9

Phasesofthenewspaperstudy ........................................................................................................... 11

3.PATTERNS,FORMSANDIMPACTSOFVIOLENTCONFLICT ................................................................. 14

3.1AIMSANDRESEARCHQUESTIONS............................................................................................................... 14

4.ROUTINEVIOLENCE .......................................................................................................................... 16


4.2RESEARCHMETHODS............................................................................................................................... 17

4.3CASESELECTIONANDFIELDWORK .............................................................................................................. 18

Provinces ............................................................................................................................................. 19

Districtsorsub‐districts ....................................................................................................................... 19

Incidents .............................................................................................................................................. 20

4.4COMPARATIVEFRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................................... 20

5.ESCALATIONOFVIOLENCE................................................................................................................ 22


5.2RESEARCHMETHODS,CASESELECTIONANDFIELDWORK................................................................................ 24

Hypothesisgeneration ........................................................................................................................ 24

Caseselectionandcomparativeframework ....................................................................................... 25

6.DE‐ESCALATIONOFVIOLENCE........................................................................................................... 28

6.1AIMSANDQUESTIONS ............................................................................................................................. 30

6.2RESEARCHMETHODS............................................................................................................................... 30

6.3CASESELECTION ..................................................................................................................................... 31

Comparingdifferentde‐escalationpatterns ....................................................................................... 31

Comparinglevelsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings.............................................................. 32

Comparingformsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings ............................................................. 33

Withincasestudyanalysis .................................................................................................................. 34

6.4FIELDWORKANDANALYSIS........................................................................................................................ 35

6.5TESTINGTHETHEORYONDIFFERENTTYPESOFCASES .................................................................................... 36

ii

7.TESTINGOURHYPOTHESES:LINKSTOOTHERQUANTITATIVEDATA ................................................. 37

Social/demographicfactors ................................................................................................................ 37

Economicfactors ................................................................................................................................. 37

Institutionalfactors ............................................................................................................................. 38

8.AUDIENCEANDOUTPUTS ................................................................................................................. 39

8.1AUDIENCES ............................................................................................................................................ 39

8.2OUTPUTS .............................................................................................................................................. 40

Policybriefingnotes ............................................................................................................................ 40

Workingpapers,journalarticlesandbook ......................................................................................... 40

Conflictdataset ................................................................................................................................... 40

Workshopsandcapacitybuilding ....................................................................................................... 41

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 42

ANNEXA:CONCEPTSANDDEFINITIONS ............................................................................................... 46

ANNEXB:PROVINCESANDESTIMATEDDISTRIBUTIONOFMEDIASOURCES......................................... 47

ANNEXC:CODINGTEMPLATE............................................................................................................... 48

ANNEXD:EXPLANATIONOFCODES...................................................................................................... 49

iii

1

1.IntroductionandBackground

ViolentconflictinIndonesiaisinneedofserioustheoreticalandpolicyattention.Anew

belief that conflict has de‐escalated in Indonesia has crept into popular and policy

circles.However,itisnotclearwhetherthemovementtowardsde‐escalationiscyclical

orpermanent.Nor is it clear thatnewer formsof conflictwill not erupt in Indonesia.

Comparative theoryandevidence indicate thatviolenceoften reappears inareas that

previously had acute conflict. Theory also suggests that unless suitable institutions or

policies are imaginatively devised and put in place, a multiethnic or multireligious

societyisvulnerabletothepossibilityoflong‐runviolentconflict.Acarefulexamination

of Indonesia’srecenthistoryofconflict,andformsandpatternspresenttoday, isvital

for ascertaining current risks. As the Indonesian government and society seek to

consolidatethedemocraticgainsofthepastdecade,understandingviolentconflictisof

upmostimportance.

Bynow,theliteratureonconflictinIndonesiaisquitesubstantialandmanyelementsof

thestoryarereasonablyclear.1ThefallofSuhartowasaccompaniedbytheoutbreakof

intense group violence in several parts of the country. As a result, and in dramatic

contrast to studies of Indonesia during the late New Order when the literature

emphasized order, stability and economic dynamism, conflict became an important

concern in scholarly and policy circles. The literature that emerged has especially

advanced our understanding of some large‐scale conflicts – in Aceh, Kalimantan,

SulawesiandtheMalukus.

Yet there are limitations to the existing research on Indonesian conflict. Four are

particularlyworthyofnote.First,theIndonesianmaterialshaveremainedbyandlarge

unincorporatedintothelargertheoreticalandmethodologicalliteratureonconflict.The

scholarshiponethnocommunalconflicthasmadeenormousadvancesoverthelastten

years,butIndonesiaplaysvirtuallynopartinthisscholarlyeffervescence.2Verylittleis

known about Indonesia’s conflict dynamics beyond a small circle of Indonesia

specialists. Indonesia needs theory and, equally, conflict theory needs Indonesian

materials. The conflict dynamics in Indonesia, among other things, are likely to have

relevance for those multiethnic and/or multireligious societies that used to have

authoritarian political orders and have of late gone through a democratic transition

accompanied by considerable group violence. Nigeria, post‐Communist Eastern and

CentralEurope,andCentralAmericaeasilycometomind,butthelistcanbeexpanded.

A creative engagement with theory and comparative experience nearly always

illuminates uncharted dimensions of a problem, inaugurating newerways of thinking

and,insomeinstances,suggestingnewpolicyandprojectinterventions.

1Although,forthemostpart,thepolicyimplicationsoftheexistingresearchareunclear.

2Foranoverview,seeVarshney(2007,2008).

2

Second, the emphasis in the literature has been virtually entirely on the colossal

episodesofcollectiveviolence,especially in theMalukus, inCentralSulawesi,and the

May1998 riots in Jakarta, aswell as thewar inAceh. This focus isunderstandable in

lightofhowhorrifictheseviolentepisodeswere.However, itresults inseveralserious

limitations. The literature has more or less ignored routine acts of violence, such as

fights over land or vigilante justice, which appear to be common in some parts of

Indonesia. These have not been systematically studied despite their potential policy

importance. If these forms of violence cumulatively have serious human security

impacts,or if theyareaprecursor to largeroutbreaksofunrest,an importantpartof

thepictureismissing.3

Third, themethodsbywhichthe large‐scalecasesofviolencehavebeenstudiedhave

led to incomplete explanations. One stream has focused on the structural conditions

that lead to, or allow for, violence. Books by Bertrand (2004), Sidel (2006) and van

Klinken(2007a)alltakemultiplecasestudiesandlookforcommonalitiestodetermine

causal factors. These scholars may well be right about the causes of violence, but

without a comparisonwith peaceful cases, they cannot, in principle, be sure that the

causesofviolencetheyhaveidentifiedareindeedtherightones.4Foracausaltheory

to be right, it is not only important to identify what is common across the many

episodes of violence, but it is also critical to demonstrate that the causal factors

associated with violence are absent in peaceful cases.5 Studies based on the

commonalityofoutcome(orunvaryingvaluesofthedependentvariable)cancertainly

allowonetobuildatheory,butasKing,KeohaneandVerba(1994)haveargued,such

studiescannotgiveusanadequatelyverifiedtheory.Forthat,weneedvariationinthe

researchdesign.6

3Therearesomeexceptions.Lynchingisperhapsthebest‐studiedoftheformsofroutineviolence.See

Welsh’s(2008)analysisoflynchinginfourprovinces;Vel’s(2001)onSumba,andHerriman’s(2007)onthe

‘witchdoctor’ killings inEast Java. TheeditedvolumebyColombijnandLindblad (2002) contains some

researchon‘everyday’formsofviolence.TheWorldBank’sConflictandDevelopmentprogramhasalso

analyzed ‘local conflict’ in Lampung (Barron andMadden2004; Tajima2004), and Flores andEast Java

(Clark2005;BarronandSharpe2005,2008).4Oneothertypeofresearch–large‐nininspiration–oughttobenoted.Barronet.al.(2009)andMancini

(2005)usesurveydatatodeterminefactorsassociatedwithconflictpropensity. Thissortofworkdoes

covervariationinthedependentvariable,butasistrueoflarge‐nworkingeneral,itisunabletoidentify

themechanismsthroughwhichtheindependentanddependentvariablesmightbeconnected.5Wesaymoreonthislater.SeealsoVarshney(2007)andAspinall(2008).

6Onthewhole,aresearchdesignbasedoncomparingsimilarepisodesisusefulintheorybuilding,notin

theorytesting. Underonecondition,however,theorytesting isalsopossiblethroughthismethod. Ifa

theoryisdeterministic,notprobabilistic,thenevenonecase,letaloneafew,whereviolencetakesplace

intheabsenceoffactorsidentifiedwithviolence,isenoughtoinvalidatethetheory.KarlPopper’sfamous

example isrelevanthere:anynumberofwhiteswansthatweobservewillnotprovethatallswansare

white, but one black swan can prove that not all swans are white (Popper 2002). The Popperian

observation,itshouldbenoted,doesnotapplytoprobabilistictheories,whichtheoriesofviolence,along

witha lotofother social sciencearguments, tend tobe. Inaprobabilistic schemeof things,oneblack

swancouldsimplybeanoutlier.

3

Finally,thereisalmostnosystematicinformationavailableatallonthepost‐2003years

of conflict – its forms, causes, and trajectories.7 Varshney et. al. (2008) have put

together a database for the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery

(UNSFIR) which records incidents of large‐scale violence for the period 1990‐2003;

BarronandSharpe(2005,2008)havecreatedadatasetonsmall‐scaleviolenceinFlores

andpartsofEastJavafor2001‐2003.Yetrelativelylittleinformationexistsonformsof

conflictsince2003.8Thesedataarecriticalforunderstandingconflictanditsimpactsin

Indonesia.Withthemassivedecentralizationinitiative,awholehostofnewinstitutions

havecomeintoexistence,alteringthesites,groupincentivesanddynamicsofconflict.It

is important, and apriority of the Indonesian government, tobuild anempirical base

thatallowsforconsiderationofconflictpatternsandtrendsinthepost‐decentralization

era.

1.1TheViolentConflictinIndonesiaStudy

The Violent Conflict in Indonesia Study (ViCIS) is a newWorld Bank project aimed at

plugginggaps in the literatureandadding topopularknowledgeonviolent conflict in

Indonesia.ThestudyaimstohelptheGovernmentofIndonesiaandotherstoformulate

programs and policies to promote peaceful development and effective violence

prevention. It seeks to bring a marriage of Indonesian conflict materials with the

comparative theories of ethnic and communal conflict; it focuses attention on the

widespread routine violence in Indonesia; it explores, within a broad comparative

framework, how small clashes are transformed into largeepisodesof violence; and it

investigates the process of de‐escalation, asking whether Indonesian conflict de‐

escalation is likely to represent a permanent decline, or if there is evidence to the

contrary. Finally, it aims to put together a comprehensive database of violence,

updating and deepening the UNSFIR dataset (Varshney et. al. 2008) to include local

conflict,violentcrimeandconflictsince2003,usingaround100newspapersassources.9

Havingstartedinmid‐2008,theprojectwilllastforroughlythreeyears.

7OneexceptionisthePotensiDesa(PODES)surveyconductedbytheGovernment’sBureauofStatistics.

The2005surveycontainedaquestionontheincidenceandimpactsofconflict,forallIndonesianvillages.

Whilethe2002PODESdatahasbeenused(Barronet.al.2009),no‐onehasyetanalyzedthe2005data.

ThoughthescaleofthePODES(itisimplementedineveryvillageinIndonesia)isimpressive,thefactthat

itcollectsdataatasinglepointintimepreventsanalysisofhowconflictevolvesovertime,andtheremay

be reliability issues, given incentives for respondents (primarilyVillageHeads) toover‐ or under‐report

conflict.Nevertheless,whereadvisable,wewillusethemostrecentPODESdatatosupplementourother

datacollectionmethods.8Acehistheoneexception.Here,theWorldBankhasbeenmonitoringconflictincidentsreportedinlocal

media since the tsunami (e.g. World Bank 2008). Some case evidence (e.g. van Klinken 2007b) and

reportsbytheInternationalCrisisGroupalsoprovideinformation.Butthesehavenotcomparedcurrent

conflict incidence and patterns with those in earlier periods, making it difficult to know how serious

violenceistodaycomparedwiththatoftheimmediatepost‐Suhartoperiod.9SeeAnnexAfordefinitionsemployedinthestudy.

4

ViCISbuildsuponandextendsprevious researchconductedby theWorldBank,other

development agencies, and scholars on conflict in Indonesia. Since 2002, the Conflict

and Development program of theWorld Bank has produced a number of studies on

localconflictinIndonesiaanditsinteractionwithdevelopmentprojectsandprocesses.10

ThisresearchledtotheformulationofaprogramofsupporttotheAcehpeaceprocess,

andhasalso influencedthedesignandrefinementoftwolargegovernmentprograms

funded in part through World Bank loans and credits: the KDP/PNPM community

development program, which operates in every village in Indonesia, and the SPADA

programwhichsupportslocalgovernanceanddevelopmentinIndonesia’spoorestand

mostdisadvantagedareas.UNSFIR,withsupportfromtheUnitedNationsDevelopment

Programme, created the conflict dataset discussed above. The new project will draw

uponevidence,theoryandmethodologicaltechniquesdevelopedinthepriorwork,as

wellasinsightsfromtheexistingliteratureonconflictinIndonesia,andwillcomplement

thiswithfreshdatacollectionandcomparativeanalysis.

1.2ResearchTopics

Theprojectwillhavefourmaincomponents:11

Patterns,incidentsandimpactsofviolentconflict

ViCISwillprovidequantitativeevidenceontheformsofviolenceprevalentinIndonesia,

their impacts,andhowthesehavevariedover time.Thiswillalsoallowus to identify

thegeographicdistributionof violent conflict, its formsand impact indifferentareas,

andwillhelpanswerquestionsabouttheextenttowhichitisconcentratedinalimited

numberofareasorisdistributedmorewidely.

Routineviolence

A major focus of the project will be on ‘routine’ forms of violent conflict, such as

lynchings,landconflicts,andlocalpoliticalviolence.ViCISwillhelpusmapwhichforms

arethemostprominentinIndonesia,whattheircollectiveimpactsare,andwherethey

are concentrated. Qualitative work will focus on establishing why levels and impacts

varybetweenareas,andonunderstandingtheprocessesbywhichsmall‐scaleconflicts

anddisputesacquireviolentforms.

Escalationofviolence

Theprojectwillprovidenewcomparativeevidenceonhowsmall‐scaleviolentconflicts

escalateintolargeroutbreaksofmassviolence,andwhysomeareashavebeenproneto

thiswhileotherhavenot.

10Thisworkhasresultedinalargenumberoflocalcasestudies,includingin“non‐conflictareas”(Barron

andMadden2004),workondevelopingconflicttypologiesandconflictmappingtechniques(Barronand

Sharpe 2005, 2008), and evaluations of the impacts of projects on local conflict (Barron, Diprose, and

Woolcock2006).Theseandotherpapersareavailableatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org11Fullerdiscussionof theresearchquestions,andmethods tobeutilized,undereachof these topics is

giveninSectionsIII‐VI.

5

De‐escalationofviolence

There has been little attention paid to forms and levels of violent conflict in the

‘postconflict’areasof Indonesia.ViCISwillprovide insights intohowformsofviolence

evolve after large‐scale conflicts formally end, andwhy some areas become peaceful

relatively quickly while in others sporadic violence continues. The analysis will help

identify the extent to which these areas remain vulnerable to further outbreaks of

violence, and the formsof intervention that canhelpensure thatpeaceful conditions

consolidate.

6

2.AnOverviewoftheMethodology

2.1UnderstandingVariation

The study will combine quantitative and qualitative approaches. The fundamental

premiseofourmethodologyisthatfiguringoutwhytherearevariationsintheoutcome

of interest – namely, violence – is the one of bestways to understand the causes of

violence.12

Suppose X represents violence and Y represents peace.With some exceptions, most

explanations of violence have so far taken the following form: if transmigration (a),

incomedifferentialsbetweentwoethnicorreligiouscommunities(b),anddemographic

imbalances in the local military or police units (c) are present in X, they have been

treatedas thecausesofviolence.Methodologicaldiscussionsof the last fifteenyears,

inspiredbyKing,KeohaneandVerba (1994),havebynowclearlyestablishedthat this

sortofcausalreasoningisfallacious.Factors(a),(b)and(c)cancauseX,ifonecanshow

that theyarenot present inY,which representspeaceful cases.Conversely, if (a), (b)

and(c)arepresentinbothXandY,butanotherfactor(d)ispresentonlyinY,notinX,

then(d)willbethecauseofwhyXisdifferentfromY.13Wecannothaveconfidencein

our theory of violence ifwe study only the violent cases. Rather, it requires studying

appropriatelychosencasesofpeaceandviolence.14Thatisoneofthekeyimplications

oftheprincipleofvariationforthestudyofconflict(Varshney2007).Weneedtoavoid

‘selectionbias’inqualitativeresearch.

2.2WhyAreWeUsingMixedMethods?

Methodological arguments in the social sciences are increasingly headed towards the

view that both quantitative and qualitative approaches have distinct utilities and

limitations,anexclusiveuseofeitherapproachcanundulyconfinethescopeofanalysis,

andideallythetwoshouldbecombined(Gerring2007).Large‐ndatasets,forexample,

typicallyallowtwokindsofanalyses:(a)identificationofbroadpatternsandtrends,and

(b)establishmentofcorrelationsbetween‘independent’and‘dependent’variables.On

the whole, if not always, large‐n datasets are unable to establish causality, whereas

12Thoughadmittedlyitisnottheonlyway.

13Assumingallelsethatmayberelevantisidentical.

14 However, we ought to note that the causal factors we consider in our study of variation must be

significant inananalytical,notmechanical,sense. Takeanexample. Suppose inastudyofmurder, (a)

standsformen,(b)forhatredbetweenthem,(c)foraknife,and(d)forhandcuffs.Furtherassumethat

(d)ispresentinY(peace)butnotinX(murder).Ifwemechanicallyfollowthelogicoutlinedabove,the

absenceofhandcuffs (factord) couldbeviewedas thecauseof violence. Rather, factor (d) shouldbe

viewed as the “cause” of violence only in the specific contextwhere (a), (b), and (c) are also present.

Thus,interventionstomitigateviolencemightneedtoaddress(a),(b),and(c),aswellas(d).

7

qualitativeresearch,bysystematicallylookingatwhicheventsledtoviolence(‘process

tracing’),allowsustoseparatecausesandeffects.15

Of course, there are conditions under which large‐n datasets can move beyond

correlations.Theycanallowustoassigncausality, ifgood ‘instrumentalvariables’can

be identified.However,evenundersuchconditions,weneedqualitativecasestudies.

Instrumentalvariablescangiveusagoodsenseofcausaleffects(whatistheeffectofX

onY?),butnotofcausalmechanisms(howdidXcause,orleadto,Y?).16

Followingthisreasoning,theobjectiveofthequantitativeapproach inthisprojectwill

be to generate a usable large‐n dataset, building on and supplementing existing

datasets,whichwillallowfor identificationof trends inconflict types, formsandtheir

impacts. Based on the empirical results of the quantitativework, targeted qualitative

studies will be carried out to determine the causes of the most frequent and high‐

impactconflicts,andofdifferingpatternsofconflictescalationandde‐escalation.17

Itshouldbenotedthatthereisanotherwaytoproceed.Sometimes,itissaidthatcase

studies are goodat theorybuilding, not for theory testing, forwhich large‐ndatasets

mayberequired(Gerring2007).Ouruseofcasestudiesaboveisnotconceptualizedin

thisvein.Asofnow,wedonotplantomovefromcasestudiestodatasets:ratherwe

will proceed from datasets to case studies. Our contention above is that our large‐n

dataset will establish patterns and case studies will establish causes underlying such

trends. For example, it is possible that largeepisodesof violence are concentrated in

cities,notvillages.Ifso,ourcasestudieswillbeaimedatsortingoutwhythisisso.18

2.3HowAreWeUsingTheseMethods?

Trackingtrends:establishingpatternsofvariance

Thelarge‐ndatabasewillenableustoobservepatternsofvarianceintheincidenceand

impactsofconflictatmultiplelevels.Identificationofsuchpatternsisnotonlynecessary

toanswertheresearchquestionsposed inthisstudybutalsohasserious implications

for policy‐makers who need to identify areas and issues most vulnerable to violent

conflict.

15Thisisparticularlytrueforresearchonviolence,wherethedirectionofcausalitycanbeimpossibleto

determine(seeBarronet.al.2009).16FordetailsseeGerring(2007,pp.43‐48).SeealsoGeorgeandBennett(2005).

17Aseconduseofourdatasetisalsopossible.Wecantestwhethersomeexistingtheoriesinthelarger

literature–forexample,theethnolinguisticfractionalization(ELF)argument–areapplicabletoIndonesia.

Thisisnotthemainthrustofourproject,butifweareabletotestsomepreexistingtheoriesthisway,we

certainlywill(seeSectionVII).18Wearesureaboutthisuseofourdataset,butweremainopentothealternativemethodologicalroute.

Our casematerialswill inevitably generate some theories of violence. If the elements or factors they

identifyascausescanbemeasuredwell,andifourdatasetalreadyhasrelevantinformation,wemayalso

subjectourtheoriestoalarge‐ntheorytesting.Beforefiguringoutwhattheorieswillemerge,itishard

tobecertainaboutwhetherwewillbeabletouseourlarge‐nknowledgefortheorytesting.

8

First, we will consider spatial variation in the incidence and impacts of conflict. The

designof thedatabasewill allow identification of patterns at the regional, provincial,

district(ruralkabupatenandurbankotamadya)andsub‐district(kecamatan)levels.We

willbeabletoascertainwhichregions,provinces,districtsandsub‐districtshavebeen

themajorsitesofviolence.

Second,temporalvariationintheincidenceofconflictwillbetracedacrosstheeleven‐

year period (1998‐2008). This will allow us to understand which regions, provinces,

districtsandsub‐districtshavemovedfrompeacetoviolence(andtowhatdegree)and

viceversa.

Third,wewillanalyzevariationinconflicttypes(religious,ethnic,resourceconflict,etc.)

andforms(demonstrations,riots,lynching,etc)acrossregionsandacrosstime.Wewill

thus know which forms and types of violence have been prevalent where, and how

formsandtypeshavechangedindifferentpartsofthecountry.

Nestedcasestudies:theorybuilding

While the dataset will be used to identify trends of conflict in Indonesia, causes or

causalmechanismswill be established by conducting targeted case studies based on

patternsdetected in thedata.19 Theprojectwill adopt twocasestudyapproaches to

determinethecausesofviolence.

Thefirst,involvesmatched‐casecomparisons.Casesexhibitingdifferentlevelsofconflict

(high, medium and low) in the dataset, or showing different patterns of conflict

escalationandde‐escalation,willbeselectedaftercontrollingforsomefactorsthatwe

will identify later to detect causes or causal pathways. Comparisons will bemade at

multiple levels (regional, provincial anddistrict level) toallow for the identificationof

causalmechanisms. It is entirely possible that different causes ormechanisms are at

workatdifferentlevelsofthepolity.Thispossibilitycannotbetheoreticallyruledout.

Thesecondentailslookingatwithin‐casevariation.Variationofviolencewithinasingle

casewillbestudiedacrosstime.20Forexample,ifadistrictexhibitsanoveralltrendof

high‐violence but is not uniformly violent across time, the case studywill be used to

establish the mechanisms through which violence occurs at specific times in that

particulardistrict.Forexample,weknowthatAmbonandPosousedtobepeacefuluntil

horrific violence rocked the two cities in 1999.Over the last three years, Ambon has

becomequitepeaceful,butPosohaswitnessedarecurringpatternofviolence,though

19FurtherdiscussionofthequalitativecomponentsofthestudyisgiveninSectionsIV‐VI.

20 For the purposes of this study, we define a case as being a geographic area. For different types of

analysis, caseswill be at different levels – provinces, districts, sub‐districts. Our choice for the unit of

analysiswilldependprimarilyon the levelatwhichvariation isobserved.Whenwediscusswithin‐case

analysis,weprimarilymeanlookingattemporalvariationswithinasinglegeographicarea.

9

notatthesamelevelasinthe1999‐2002period.Within‐caseanalysiscanhelpidentify

whyviolencelevelsmayhavechangedwithineachdistrictovertime.

Theorytesting

The main purpose of this study is to build theory in order to ascertain causal

mechanisms. Process tracing based on case studies nested in the dataset will make

possible.However,asdiscussedabove,wewillremainopentotheideathatourdataset

may allow some preexisting hypotheses to be tested on a large‐n template. Such

hypotheses may be based on Indonesia‐specific scholarship, or that emerging from

elsewhere in theworld. Depending on how good our newspaper‐based dataset turns

outtobe,theorytestinginthismannerisconceivable.21

2.4QuantitativeData:theViCISNewspaperDataset

The main quantitative data source will be a comprehensive newspaper dataset that

recordsall incidentsofconflict (violentandnon‐violent)andviolentcrimereported in

localnewspapersfortwenty‐twoprovincesovertheperiod1998‐2008.22 Thedecision

toemploythismethodologyhasbeentakenafterconsideringthelimitationsofseveral

otheroptions.Householdsurveysareweakatmeasuringconflictincidenceandimpacts,

as they tend to record perceptions of conflict and have a tendency to underreport

because (violent) conflict is a generally rare event that does not affect all in a

community. Key informant interviews, as used by the PODES survey, create perverse

incentives tounder‐orover‐reportconflictdependingon theexpectationsabouthow

thesurveyresultswillinfluencepolicydecisionsandresourceallocations(Barronet.al.

2009).Furthermore,surveymethodsrelyonthememoryofrespondentsandarehence

lessreliableforrecordingthedetailsofolderincidentsofviolence,makingitdifficultto

create time series data. A comparison of police, hospital and NGO sources with

newspaperdataalsorevealsthatthereissystematicunder‐reportingofviolentimpacts,

especiallyfatalities,aspoliceandhospitaldataonly includecasesthatarereportedto

thepoliceorvictimswhoareadmittedtohospitals.23Furthermore,theserecordsdonot

21SeethediscussioninSectionVII.

22Fordefinitionsoftheconceptsofconflict,violence,andcrime,seeAnnexA.Foralistofprovinces,see

AnnexB.Weincludeviolentcrimeinthedatabase,inadditiontoconflict(whichisourprimaryfocus),for

threereasons. First,knowingwhetherthere isahigh levelofdeathsfromviolentcrimeis important in

understandingthenethumansecurityimpactsofviolence.Studyingviolentconflictbutneglectingviolent

crimewouldgiveapartialviewofsecurityimpacts.Second,violentcrimessometimesplayanimportant

role in conflict escalation. Collecting data on violent crimeswill thus allow us to study this aspect of

escalation.Finally,thereisamethodologicalreason,inthatnewspaperreportsoftenmakeitdifficultto

determinewhetheraviolentincidentwastheresultofaconflictoracrime.Attemptingtocaptureonly

violentconflictcouldmeanexcludingtheseincidentsfromthedatabase,eventhoughitmayturnoutthat

manysuchunclear incidentswere infactconflict. Asaresult,wewishto includeallviolence(including

whatappearstobecrime).23ApilotconductedinMalukuandNorthMalukucompareddeathsreportedbynewspapers,thepolice

andhealthcareprovidersbetweenJanuaryandJune,2005.Itfoundthatnewspapersreported24deaths,

policerecordedonlytwelve,UNIncidentTrackingfound17deaths,andtheMalukuInterfaithAssociation

10

contain the level of detail that would allow for a distinction to be made between

incidentsofconflictandthoseofformsofviolentcrimesuchasassaultandarson.

Incontrast,thenewspapermonitoringmethodologyhasbeenshowntobeeffectivein

both high and low conflict regions (Barron and Sharpe 2005). UNSFIR showed that

buildinganationaldatasetrecordingconflictsreportedinnewspaperswasbothpossible

and useful. Since August 2005, the local newspaper methodology has been used to

monitortheAcehpeaceprocess.Existingdatasetshaveexpandedourunderstandingof

violenceinIndonesia.Yetgapsremain.ThenewViCISconflictdatasetwillbuildonprior

effortsinanumberofways.

First, the dataset will expand on current spatial and temporal coverage. The UNSFIR

dataset contains data on conflict in fourteen provinces for 1990‐2003. Data collected

sincethenthroughWorldBankstudiesandpilotshavedevelopedmorecomprehensive

methodologiesforrecordingconflictdatabuthavefocusedonasmallersetofregions

for shorter time periods.24 The new ViCIS dataset will expand coverage by collecting

data from 22 provinces, which cover 341 of Indonesia’s 457 districts and 86% of

Indonesia’spopulation,andbycollectingdata from1998to2008 (BPS2007a,2007b).

ThiswillenableustotracetrendssinceUNSFIRacrossandwithinmoreregions.

Second, a larger set of sources of datawill be used. The first iterationof theUNSFIR

dataset collected data from national Indonesian newspapers. UNSFIR‐II utilized

provincial papers when it became clear that smaller conflict incidents were seriously

underreportedinnationalnewspapers(Varshneyet.al.2008).Furtherstudies,primarily

basedonsub‐provinciallevelnewspapersinlowerconflictprovinces(BarronandSharpe

2005; Welsh 2008), demonstrate that provincial papers still miss certain forms of

conflict: incidentsofroutineviolence,suchaslynchingandlanddisputes,arereported

in district level newspapers, but often not in the provincial media. An emerging

conclusion about the Indonesian newspapers as sources of conflict data is that at

differentlevelsofcoverage,newspapersdifferintheirperceptionofwhichconflictsare

newsworthy.Whilelargeepisodesofviolencearereportedbythenationalnewspapers,

lynchingsarebettercoveredinthedistrictlevelnewspapers(Varshney2008).Ourstudy

buildsonthesefindingsbyusinganestimated57district‐levelnewspapers inaddition

to42provincialpapers.Thiswillprovideamoreaccuratecountofconflictincidentsand

theirviolentimpacts.25

recordedonlyfourdeaths.HospitalrecordsrecordedonlyonedeathinAmbon,comparedwiththeseven

reportedinnewspapers(forAmbon).Thelevelofunder‐reportingwasmostpronouncedoutsideofthe

provincialcapital(Sharpe2005).24TheseincludetheKDPandCommunityNegotiationdataset(forFloresandpartsofEastJava;2001‐2003

– see Barron and Sharpe 2008), a newspaper conflict monitoring pilot in Maluku and North Maluku

provinces in 2005 (Sharpe 2005), and the Aceh Conflict Monitoring Updates (2005‐ongoing – see, for

example,WorldBank2008).25Fortheestimateddistributionofnewspapersacrossprovinces,seeAnnexB.

11

Third,thenewdatasetwillimproveonprioreffortsbyexpandingtherangeofincidents

included, and by developing a more detailed coding system that allows for more

extensive disaggregation of data. UNSFIR‐II, the most ambitious project to compile

quantitativedataon conflict in Indonesia todate, focusedalmostexclusivelyon large

incidentsofcommunalviolence.Thenewdatasetwillalsoincludelocalviolentincidents

betweenindividualsandformsofviolentcrime.Thecodingsystem,developedforour

proposeddatabase,expandstheanalyticalcategoriesbyallowingdisaggregationofboth

violentandnon‐violent incidents,byconflict types (resource,administrative, religious,

ethnic andpolitical, etc.) and conflict forms (demonstrations, riots andgroup clashes,

etc.). A broader classification of actors, interventions and impacts will enable us to

capturedetailedinformationaboutconflictdynamicsinIndonesia.26

Phasesofthenewspaperstudy

Whilenewspapersappearbethebestsourceofdataformappingconflictpatternsand

trends in Indonesia, they are not without weaknesses. The study anticipates the

followingproblemsandstrategiesbybreakingthedatacompilationprocess intothree

stages.

1.Addressingbiases:mediaassessments

Before selecting specific newspapers for data collection in each province, exhaustive

media assessments will be carried out to profile existing provincial and district

newspapers.Thestaffofnewspaperswillbeinterviewedtoassessthefollowing:

• Coverage.Evenifweuseprovincialanddistrictlevelnewspapers,itislikelythatthe

reporting coverage will be uneven across districts and sub‐districts. By compiling

informationaboutareaswhereeachnewspaperhaspermanentoffices,permanent

reporting staff and free‐lance reporters,wewill be able to: (a) select newspapers

withthebestregionalcoveragefordatacollection;(b)supplantaweaker‐coverage

paperwithothersinthatregion;and(c)identifythestrongandweakersectionsof

ourdata,evenifanewspaperwithlimitedcoverageisselected.

• Accuracyofreporting.Accuratereporting,especiallyasitpertainstoassessmentof

impacts(deaths,injuriesandpropertydamage),iscrucialforthevalidityofourdata.

Itislikelythatsomenewspapersdonotemphasizeaccuratecollectionoffactsprior

topublicationofincidentreports.Gatheringinformationaboutnewspapers’sources

ofinformationandtheirpolicyonfact‐checking,willenableustoselectnewspapers

withhighstandardsofreportingandtoestablishhowaccurateourdatais likelyto

be.

26Bertrand(2008)hasarguedthatexpandingtherangeofincidentsincludedwillleadtoalackofanalytic

clarity,becausetheforcesdrivinglarge‐scaleviolencewillprobablydifferfromthoseleadingtosmaller‐

scale unrest. However, the coding categories employed mean that it will be possible to disaggregate

different types of violence (large‐scale communal, localized, violent crime, etc.). This will allow for

consideration of the different causal factors and processes that lead to different outcomes; itwill also

allowforBertrand’shypothesistobetested.

12

• Reporting biases and censorship. There iswidespread consensus that the press in

post‐Suharto Indonesia is relatively free. However, previous research shows that

self‐censorship in editorial policy due to the SARA legacy of theNewOrder or to

prevent conflict escalation,27 and ‘envelope’ journalism, where newspapers are

sponsored by certain local groups or individuals and become advocates of those

parties,stillexist(BarronandSharpe2005).Assessingtheinstitutionalandpersonal

biases in conflict reporting is vital for ascertaining the accuracy of the dataset.

Extensive interviewswithnewspaper staff,eliciting responsesaboutnotonly their

ownreportingstandardsbutaboutthereputationsofotherpapers inanarea,will

help us evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of our data and how it can be

analyzed.28

• Completionofarchives.Asidefromconducting interviewstogaugetheaccuracyof

reporting, themedia assessment processwill also obtain an accurate count of all

existingarchives ineveryprovince.Byaggregating this information from the field,

wewill be able to: (a) select newspaperwith themost complete archives for the

eleven‐yearperiodofthestudy,and(b) identifypotentialgaps inourdatatohelp

strategizehowtoovercomethem.

2.Datacollectionandcoding

Datacollectionandcodingwillbethemostcrucialpartsofthequantitativestudy.Field

teamswillcollectreportsofconflictandviolentcrimeincidentsfromlocalandprovincial

newssourcesandsendthisrawdatatoJakarta.Astandardizedcodingtemplatewillbe

completed for each reported incident and information about location, date, conflict

type,form,actorsinvolved,andviolentimpactswillbecoded.29Thecodeddatawillbe

subsequentlyenteredintoasearchabledatabase.Toensureaccuracyanduniformityof

collectionandcoding,thefollowingmeasureshavebeentaken:

• Training.Ateamofresearchershasgonethroughasix‐daytrainingprogramtolearn

theconceptsofviolentandnon‐violentconflictandviolentcrime,asdefinedinthis

study,andhowtomapandcollectdata.Aseparatetraininghasbeenconductedfor

thecodingstafftoteachthemthenuancesofthecodingsystemdevelopedforthe

ViCISdataset.

• Qualitycontrol.Giventhatthedefinitionsofconflictandcrimeusedinthisstudyare

complex, therearebound tobeerrors in the selectionof articles in the field.We

havedevelopedsystematicqualitycontrolproceduresthatwillenableustomonitor

the number of mistakes being made in the field in real time, so these can be

correctedonanongoingbasisandadditionaltrainingcanbeprovidedifnecessary.

Procedures will also allow us to identify the newspapers and articles that were

27 On ethnocommunal issues, the New Order government had a so‐called SARA policy. SARA was an

acronym for ethnic (suku), religious (agama), racial (ras), and inter‐group (antar‐golongan)differences.

Thesedifferenceswerenottobediscussedinthepublicrealm.28 Forexample, if anewspaperacts asamouthpiece for apolitician, it cannotbeused for anaccurate

countofconflictsrelatedtoelections.However,itbutmaystillbeusefulforreportsonlynching,etc.29Forthecodingtemplateandanexplanationofthecodesused,seeAnnexesCandD.

13

subjected to quality control in the field so that they can be re‐checked for the

reliability of the quality control procedures themselves. Ten percent of coding

templateswillberandomlycheckedforaccuracyanduniformity.

3.Testingtheaccuracyofcompileddata

Afterthecompilationofthedatabase,thefinalaccuracyofourdatawillbetestedby:

• Cross‐checkingthedatawiththePODESsurvey;

• ComparingcollecteddatawiththeUNSFIR‐IIdatabasefortheperiod1998‐2003;

• Checking and augmenting the newspaper data with other sources such as police

reports,courtdocuments,andNGOreports;

• Comparing the quantitative newspaper data with results of the qualitative case

studies;and

• Presentingresultstopeersforregularfeedback.

14

3.Patterns,FormsandImpactsofViolentConflict

Aprimaryfocusofthestudyistodescribetheoverallpatternsandtrendsofviolencein

Indonesia today, and over the past eleven years. Thiswill address several of the key

gaps in our understanding of violence in Indonesia. The newspaper database will

providethemostcomprehensivequantitativedescriptiontodateofpatternsofviolence

acrossregions,andtrendsinviolenceovertime.

3.1AimsandResearchQuestions

Inthiscomponentofthestudywewillseektoansweranumberofquestions:30

1. What have been the cumulative impacts of violent conflict in post‐Suharto

Indonesia?31

• Patternsoftemporalvariationinimpacts;

• Patternsofspatialvariationinimpacts(inparticular,isthereaconcentration

ofviolenceinasmallnumberofregions?)

2. Whichtypesofviolentconflicthavehadthelargestimpacts?

• Patternsoftemporalvariationinthetypesthathavebeenthemostfrequent

orhadthehighestimpacts;

• Patterns of spatial variation in the types that have been most severe (in

particular,whichtypesofviolencearesevereinwhichplaces?)

3. Whichtypesofviolencehavethelargestimpactperincident(i.e.themostfatalities

perincident)?

• Patternsoftemporalvariationinthemostdeadlytypes;

• Patterns of spatial variation in themost deadly types (in particular, which

typesofroutineviolencearedeadlyinwhichplaces?)

4. How doesurban and rural violence differ? Do they have different impacts? Are

theirformsdifferent?Aretheyequallydeadly?

5. Whichactorsaremost likelytobe involved inviolentconflicts,and inparticular in

thedeadliestones?Aretherevariationsovertimeandspace?

6. Which weapons are used most frequently in violent conflicts, and in deadliest

conflicts?Aretherevariationsovertimeandspace?

7. What are the variations innon‐violent conflict types and incidence? How is non‐

violentconflictrelatedtoviolentconflict?Forexample,ifthereismorenon‐violent

conflict,istheregenerallymoreviolentconflictalso,orisittheotherwayaround?

30 The following list is not exhaustive. Thedatabasewill alsoprovide a host of other information (see

templateandcodes,attachedinAnnexesCandD).Besidesbeingofusetothecurrentstudy,thedataset

willbeavailableforusebyotherresearchers.31Asnotedearlier,thedatabaseprovidesinformationonimmediateimpactsofviolence,suchasdeaths,

injuries,andpropertydamage,notonlonger‐termeconomicandpoliticaleffects,whichmaybestudied

throughothermeans.

15

8. What are the gender dimensions of violence? For example, what is the role of

womenasvictims,andasactors,inviolence?Arewomenspecialvictimsofspecific

typesofviolence?32

9. Whoarethevictimsinthemostviolentormostdeadlytypesofviolence?Howdoes

thisvaryovertimeandspace?

10.Which cleavagesmost commonly drive violent incidents – ethnic, religious, tribal,

political,orindigenous/local?

• Whichcleavagesarepresentinthedeadliestincidents?

• DoesIndonesiahavewhatmightbecalleda‘mastercleavage’liketheHindu‐

Muslim cleavage in India, the Malay‐Chinese cleavage in Malaysia, the

Sinhala‐Tamil cleavage in Sri Lanka, or the racial cleavage in the United

States?33

32Newspaperdatabasescannotgenerallyrevealmuchaboutformsofviolencesuchasrapeanddomestic

violence, due to both under‐reporting and editorial priorities. Although we can not thus expect

comprehensive or accurate data on violence against women from this database, it will provide some

informationongenderaspectsofviolence,whichmaybefollowedupthroughqualitativework.33A‘mastercleavage’isonewhich,forawholevarietyofhistoricalreasons,isaprimary,ifnottheonly,

determinantofpoliticsandviolence.

16

4.RoutineViolence

Routine violence is one of the most glaringly neglected aspects of the current

scholarship.34 We define routine violence as: “frequently occurring forms of violence

(suchas thebeatingof suspected thieves, inter‐villagebrawls, or fights over a plot of

land)which are not part of a large orwidespread conflict, andwhere the impacts of

single incidents are typically low (less than five deaths)”. Such incidents involve local

actors struggling over local issues, rather than large‐scale mobilization by identity

characteristics(suchasethnicity,religionorregion).

Routine conflict doesnothave tobe violent; it can takebothnon‐violent and violent

forms.Examplesincludedemonstrations,protests,petitionsandgroupmobilization.On

the whole, such expressions of grievance are quite healthy for a polity. Freedom of

expressioninapluralisticsocietyisinevitablyaccompaniedbysuchlegitimatemodesof

politics. These non‐violent forms should be separated from incidents of routine

violence.Bothnon‐violentandviolentroutineconflictsareimportantforunderstanding

thedynamicsofviolenceinIndonesia.

Thereareseveral important justificationsforthestudyofroutineviolence.First,small

butfrequentviolencecanexactabigtoll.Althoughfatalitiestendtobelimitedineach

incident,thetotalnumberofthosekilledthroughroutineviolencecanbelarge,ifsuch

episodes are common or frequent (Barron and Madden 2004; Barron et. al. 2009;

Barron and Sharpe 2008;Welsh 2008; Tadjoeddin andMurshed 2007). Second, such

small‐scale violence has serious systemic consequences. If some regions of a country

developatraditionoflynching–amobkillingasuspectedculpritinsteadofhandinghim

over to the police or administration – it impedes the growth of the rule of law.

Moreover,ifthefrequencyofsuchactsishigh,itdeadenspopularsensibilities,arguably

creating greater acceptance of large‐scale violence as well. Finally, sometimes small

incidents initiateaprocess that leads tohugeconflagrations.Often, ifnotalways, the

starting point of a big episode of violence is a small clash between two groups or

individuals. Ifwedevelopabetterunderstandingofwhy small actsof violenceoccur,

especially if suchviolence is frequentandwidespread,andofwhichpeopleorgroups

are in conflict in these forms of violence, we can perhaps generate a policy‐relevant

theory that can identify the institutions and strategies relevant to minimizing the

occurrenceorlimitingtheeffectsofsuchviolence.


Thiscomponentofthestudywillseektoansweranumberofquestions:

1. WhataretheoverallimpactsofroutineviolenceinIndonesia?

34Forexample,routineviolenceisnotafocusofattentioninthethreemostrecentbook‐lengthworkson

groupconflictinIndonesia(Bertrand2004;Sidel2006;vanKlinken2007a).

17

2. Whichtypesofroutineviolencehavethegreatestimpactsacrossthecountry?

3. Which types of routine conflictmost often become violent, andwhich types very

rarelybecomeviolent?

4. HowdoesroutineviolencevaryacrossIndonesia?

• Are there some provinces or districts which suffer much higher impacts than

others?35

• Are these the same regions which also suffer from large‐scale violence, or are

theseregionstypicallythoughtofas“low‐conflictregions”?

5. Howdoesviolencevarybetweenurbanandruralcontexts?36

6. Howhasroutineviolencevariedovertime?

• Aresomeformsincreasinglyprevalentnow?

• Areothersonthedecrease?

7. Whydosomeareasexperiencehighlevelsofroutineviolencewhileothersdonot?

8. Whydosomeareasexperienceparticularformsofviolencewhileothersexperience

differentforms?

9. Whydocasesofroutineconflictescalateintoviolenceinsomeplaces(andatsome

times)andwhynotinotherplacesandatothertimes?

4.2ResearchMethods

All but the last three of these questions can be answered through the newspaper

dataset. The previous section described how the ViCIS databasewill provide detailed

informationonthetypesand impactsofviolence in Indonesia,and itsgeographicand

temporal variations. However, the database cannot tell us why these patterns vary

across regions and across time periods, andwhy some types of routine conflict very

often become violent while other types rarely do.37 No understanding of routine

violenceinIndonesiawouldbecompletewithoutattemptingtounderstandvariationin

time and space, and the transition fromnon‐violent conflict to violence. Insights into

these questions will likely have significant policy implications, as Indonesia seeks to

strengthen its peaceful democratic system in ways most appropriate to each local

context.

A series of qualitative case studieswill be used to understand these ‘why’ questions.

Case studies will each focus on a particular type of routine violence, and will be

35Regionalcomparisonsofviolentimpactswillbeconductedinbothabsoluteandpercapitaterms.Each

hasitsownmeritsforanalyzingviolence.36Understandingdifferencesbetweenurbanandruralpatternsofviolence is important for theory,and

for policy – especially as Indonesia becomes more urban, and given the ease of mobilization and

escalation in urban environments, where heterogeneous communities compete over limited resources

andoftenrelyheavilyonethnicnetworks.37 Although comprehensive comparisons have not yet been carried out, several studies have indicated

thatpatternsofroutineviolencedovarybetweenregions.Forinstance,lynchingsappeartobefarmore

commonontheislandofJavathanelsewhereinIndonesia(Varshneyet.al.2008;Welsh2008).Similarly,

BarronandSharpe(2008)showhowviolentlandconflictismuchmoreprominentinEastNusaTenggara

provincethaninEastJava.

18

designedtounderstandvariation in its impactsacrossregions (and, later in thestudy,

overtimewithineachconflictcase).Casestudiesareneededforthereasonsdescribed

above:large‐nworkcaneasilyidentifycorrelationsbutnotcausalmechanisms.Process‐

tracingwithincasestudieswillthusbeusedtoidentifycausalmechanisms.Comparinga

certain type of routine violence across locations will require obtaining information

about local structural conditions (demographics, institutions, politics, and so on) that

will not be provided by our newspaper database. Finally,wewant to understand the

transitionfromnon‐violencetoviolence,butnon‐violentepisodesarenotconsistently

reported by newspapers. Qualitative work is thus needed to explore why routine

conflicttakesdifferentformsandhasdifferentimpactsindifferentplaces.

4.3CaseSelectionandFieldwork

Thefirststepistoselectwhichtypesofroutineviolencewillbestudied.Ourattention

will focus on the three types of routine violence with the highest aggregate impacts

across Indonesia. Based on the previous literature, we expect that types of routine

violencesuchaslynchings,landconflicts,andgangfightsmaybeamongthosechosen.

However,adecisiononwhichtypestostudywillbemadeafterthedatabaseproducesa

clearerpictureofviolenceimpactsandforms.

The next step is to selectwherewewill conduct case studies. For each of the three

types to be studied, nested case study comparison will be used, selecting provinces,

districts,sub‐districts,and individual incidents.Figure1 laysouttheplan.Thestrategy

allowsforcomparativeanalysisatanumberoflevelstohelpidentifycausalprocessesat

each.

Figure1:CaseSelectionPrinciplesforStudyingRoutineViolence

NOTE:VrepresentsviolentandNVnon‐violent.

DISTRICTS /

SUB-DISTRICTS

High

violence

Low

violence

High

violence

Low

violence

Low

violence

V V

V V

NV

NV

V

V

NV

High

violence

V

V

NV

PROVINCES

CASES

DISTRICTS /

SUB-DISTRICTS

High

violence

Low

violence

High

violence

Low

violence

Low

violence

V V

V V

NV

NV

V

V

NV

High

violence

V

V

NV

PROVINCES

CASES

High

violence

Low

violence

High

violence

Low

violence

Low

violence

V V

V V

NV

NV

V

V

NV

High

violence

V

V

NV

PROVINCES

CASES

19

Provinces

First, twoprovinceswill be chosen foreach typeof routineviolenceweare studying,

onewith a high level of impacts and onewith a low level.38 Effortswill bemade to

controlforotherfactorsasfollows:

• Levels of non‐violent conflict. Provinces will be chosen that have similar levels of

non‐violent conflict of the type being studied. In the case of land conflicts, for

example, thismeans thatwewould select two provinceswith similar numbers of

landconflicts,butwherethenumberofviolentlandconflictsismuchhigherinone.

Inthecaseoflynching,suchidentificationwillnotbepossiblebecauselynchingsare

by definition violent. Becauseof this,wewill use proxy indicators for factors that

tendtoleadtolynchings,suchasthepresenceoftheft,asabasisforselectingthe

control areas. (We are aware that thismay be particularly challenging, given that

newspaperstendnottoreporttheftifitdoesnothaveaviolentimpactorwhenitis

small inscale.Assuch,wewillattemptto incorporateotherdatasources,suchas

policecrimedata,andlocalknowledge,todrivecaseselection).

• Structuralfactors.Provincesselectedshouldnotdiffersubstantiallyacrossstructural

factors (economic levels,education levels,etc.).Which factorsaremost important

will be determined later,with consideration to the type of routine violence being

studiedandthelikelihoodofstructuralfactorsbeingpertinenttoit.

• Reportinglevels.Afterconductingthoroughassessmentsofmediacoverageineach

province,wewillbeable toratethecoveragewhichourdatabaseprovidesof the

news in each province (see discussion above). Itwould bemisleading to compare

rates of violence in a province with minimal coverage to rates of violence in a

province with excellent coverage. Thus in order to be confident of selecting

provinceswithdifferentlevelsoflynchingviolence,theyshouldhavesimilarlevelsof

reporting.39

Districtsorsub‐districts

Fourdistrictsorsub‐districts40willbechosenforeachtypeofroutineviolence:twoin

the ‘high violence’ province and two in the ‘low violence’ province. As with the

provincialselection,thedistricts/sub‐districtswillbechoseninsuchawaythatcontrols

for exogenous factors that might affect the (reported) incidence of routine violence.

Where possible, we plan to choose neighboring districts to control for higher level

38By impactshere,aswehavealready stated,weprimarilymeandeaths. For certain typesof routine

violence, other kinds of direct impacts (injuries or property destruction)may bemore prominent, and

hence become a basis for selection. Other indirect impacts—such as effects on the economy,

psychologicalimpacts,andsoon—willbeanalyzedinthecasestudies.However,thesecannotbeusedas

abasisforcaseselectionbecausewedonothavequantitativedataonthem.39

Mediaassessmentsconductedpriortonewspaperselectionwillenableustoidentifylevelsofdistrict

reporting.40Whetherwechoosetocomparedistrictsorsub‐districtswilldependonwhereintra‐provincialvariation

ismostmarked. Thisdecisionwillbe taken laterafterwehaveanalyzedthebasicpatternsofviolence

fromthenewspaperdataset.

20

factorsthatmaydrivevariation.Comparativeanalysisofthefourdistricts/sub‐districts

will help us tease outwhich of the factors leading to variation exist at the provincial

level,andwhichatlowerlevelsofgeographicspecification.

Incidents

Particularincidentsofviolentandnon‐violentconflict(VandNVinthefigureabove)will

be chosen in each of the districts/sub‐districts concerned.Wewill likely over‐sample

violentcases.41 Thenumberof incidents tobestudiedwillbedecided laterbasedon

resource issuesand the insightscoming fromearlycasestudies.Casehistorieswillbe

developedby theresearchteams.Within‐caseprocess tracingwillhelpusunderstand

why some became violent and others did not, and how these factors relate to the

structuralconditionspresentineachplace.

Inanalyzingeachincident,thefollowingresearchquestionswillbeuseful:

• Whydidtheconflictbecomeviolent?

• Whydidthepoliceorotheractorsnotpreventthisviolence?

• Didthepolicearresttheperpetrators?

• Howdolocalsperceivethiscaseandthewayitwashandled?

• Whatstructuralfactorsareconnectedtothiscase?

• Whoweretheactors,whowerethevictims?

4.4ComparativeFramework

The comparative framework outlined in Figure 1 above will allow for a number of

controlledcomparisonsincludingthefollowing:

• Comparison between cases with similar outcomes (high levels of violence) but

differentdistricts/sub‐districtsconditions;

• Comparison between cases with similar outcomes (high levels of violence) but

differentprovincialconditions;

• Comparisonsbetweenviolentandnon‐violentcaseswithinhighviolenceareas;

• Comparison of two districts/sub‐districts (one high violence, one lower violence)

withinhighorlowviolenceprovinces.

Selection of provinces and districts/sub‐districts will be guided by one additional

consideration. If thedatabasehas shown that anumberofprovincesordistricts/sub‐

districts contain a particular concentration of violence, then efforts will be made to

focusseveralofthecasesstudiesonthoseareas.That is, locationsformorethanone

casestudy–perhaps, lynchingsaswellas landconflicts–willbe selected fromthose

41Withinthelowviolencedistrict/sub‐districtinthelowviolenceprovince,wewillnotdoanycasestudies

ofspecificincidents(violentornon‐violent).However,fieldworkwillbeconductedtoseewhatstructural

factorsmightbedrivingthelackofviolenceinthisarea.

21

regions.Thiswillenableustofocusextraattentiononthesehigh‐violenceplaces,across

thevarioustypesofroutineviolence.

Later in thedata collectionprocess (whenearlier yearsof data are available), further

case studies may examine temporal variation in routine violence within a particular

geographicarea.

22

5.EscalationofViolence

Anextensive literaturehasemergedon large‐scaleviolence inpost‐Suharto Indonesia.

However, we still do not have a good theory for why the small sparks of localized

violence and tensions erupt into the large fires of inter‐group collective violence.

Developingsuchatheoryisimportantforunderstandingnotonlythedeadlyoutbreaks

ofcommunalviolenceinthepast,butalso(a)thepotentialforsmall‐scaleconflictand

routine violence elsewhere in the archipelago to escalate, and (b) the scope for

intervention–bythegovernmentand/orcivilsociety.If,withtheaidoftheory,wecan

understandhowtopreventsparksfrombecomingfires,perhapsonecanalsohopefor

fewerandlessdeadlyviolentconflictsinthefuture.

Intercommunal ethnic or religious violence in West and Central Kalimantan, the

MalukusandCentralSulawesi, separatist conflicts inAcehandPapua,and the Jakarta

riotsofMay1998havereceivedthegreatestattentionofIndonesiaexperts.42Initially

most analyses focused on individual cases with few attempts at cross‐case analysis.

More recently, three scholars (Bertrand 2004; Sidel 2006; van Klinken 2007a) have

written books on the broader issue of violence in Indonesia, examining multiple

conflicts.Cross‐caseanalysishasbeenusedtodevelopframeworkstounderstandwhy

different forms of conflict arose in different places at different times, concentrating

largelyonsimilaritiesinstructuralconditionsthatpredatedtheoutbreakofwidespread

violence.

This newwork has undoubtedly enhanced our understanding of the specific conflicts

andhaspointed to general systemic factors, all largely a product of Indonesia’s post‐

Suharto transition. Yet thebooks also have a numberofweaknesses that need to be

remedied.

Thegreatestproblem ismethodological.Noneof theseworks isbasedon the ideaof

variationinresearchdesign.Allhaveconcentratedonlyonepisodesofviolence,mostly

on large‐scale episodes, and none systematically compares why violence occurred in

someplaces, not others. Bertrand (2004) studies violence in East Timor, theMalukus

andKalimantan;Sidel(2006)focusesontheburningofChurchesinJavaintheearlyto

mid‐1990s, the violence in Jakarta, and intercommunal conflict in the Malukus and

Sulawesi;andvanKlinken(2007a)concentratesonriotsinKalimantan,theMalukusand

42See,forexample:vanKlinken(2001)andWilson(2008)onMalukuandNorthMaluku;Acciaioli(2001),

Aragon (2001) andMcRae (2008)onCentral Sulawesi;McGibbon (2004)onPapua; vanKlinken (2000),

Davidson(2008)andSmith(2005)onWestorCentralKalimantan;Aspinall (2006, forthcoming),Schulze

(2004), Sukma (2004), Barron, Clark and Daud (2005), Reid (2006) on Aceh; and Siegel (1998), Purdey

(2006) and Mietzner (2008) on the Jakarta riots. The reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG),

availableatwww.crisisweb.org,havealsoilluminatedmanyoftheconflicts.Anumberofeditedvolumes

havebrought togetherpiecesof conflicts,oftendrawingparallelswithhistoricalpatternsofviolence in

Indonesia:see,Tornquist(2000),Anderson(2001);WesselandWimhofer(2001);ColombijnandLindblad

(2002);HuskenandJonge(2002);Anwar,Bouvier,SmithandTol(2005)andCoppell(2006).

23

Sulawesi. Methodologically, the choice of areas in all three books are examples of

‘selectionbias’.Agoodtheoryrequiresshowingthatthefactors identifiedascausal in

makingviolencepossibleweremissinginplacesthatdidnotexperienceviolence.43As

discussed earlier, if we do not study peace and violence together, we cannot

conclusivelyshowwhichfactorswerereallycausalinproducingeither.44

Threemoreshortfallsareworthnoting.TheseproblemsmarkBertrand(2004)andSidel

(2006), but not van Klinken (2007a).45 First, the comparative work has not fully

considered the processes of escalation, which turned existent social tensions into

smaller‐scale acts of conflict to large‐scale episodes of violence. Second, the

explanations have largely been structural, and hence often rather deterministic,

focusing on demographic shifts, economic balance, and changing access to political

power, andhaveunderplayed the importanceof theprocesses ofmobilization. Third,

there has been an overriding emphasis on macro explanations for the outbreak of

violenceincertainlocalities.Bertrand(2004),forexample,concentratesondifferential

groupaccesstopowerinJakarta,andtheirroleintheIndonesiannationandpolity,to

explainwhy theDayaks,ChristiansandMuslims roseupatcertainpoints.This sortof

approach can explain why violence gets clustered around certain periods (temporal

variation), but it cannot help us understand why violence has geographically specific

locations(spatialvariation).46

For understanding the latter, we need to pay attention to micro or local factors in

explainingviolence (Aspinall2008;Varshney2002,2008).Toooften in the Indonesian

literature,local‐levelconclusionshavebeendrawnfromnational‐levelcrises.Unlessthe

local‐national linksareclearlyestablished,suchcausal reasoning is flawed.Anational‐

level crisis is, by definition, a constant for all localities, both violent and peaceful. It

cannotexplainbothpeaceandviolence.Logically,aconstantcannotexplainvariation.

43 Van Klinken (2007a) does develop a ‘vulnerability index’ in order to compare the provinces of high

violencetootherprovinceswherelarge‐scaleviolencedidnotbreakout.Heidentifiesfactorsofrapidde‐

agrarianization and high dependence of the local economyon the state as important in differentiating

high‐violence and low‐violence provinces. However, the focus of the book is not on establishing how

these factors led to violence through a comparison of dynamics in high‐violence and low‐violence

provinces,butrathertracingtheevolutionofviolenceinthehighviolenceprovinces.44Foramoredetaileddiscussion,seeVarshney(2008).

45VanKlinken(2007a)doesconcentrateonescalation,processesandlocaldynamics,thethreepointswe

makebelow.However,hisprimaryfocuswasnottoisolatecausalfactorsinordertodeveloppoliciesfor

conflict mitigation, whereas this project does aim to do so. Van Klinken discussed one aspect of

escalationforeachoffivebigconflicts:WesternKalimantan,CentralKalimantan,Maluku,NorthMaluku

andCentral Sulawesi. As a result,we learnhow Indonesian violence supports Tilly andhis colleagues’

conceptual categorization of the dynamics of contentious politics (McAdam et. al. 2001), and how

elementsofthattheorycanshedlightonunderstandingviolenceindifferentprovinces.Butthelackofa

comparative framework (even within high violence locations) mitigates against generating a broader

understandingofwhyescalationoccursinsomeplacesandnotinothers.46Bertrand(2008)agreeswiththispoint.

24


The second component of the study aims to develop and empirically test causal

explanations as to why small‐scale conflicts and tensions escalate into large‐scale

violence in some cases and not in others. This can be used to increase our

understandingof (a)why the largeoutbreaksof violence inKalimantan, Sulawesi and

theMalukusoccurred47;(b)howtheyescalated;(c)whatexplainstheirtiming,location,

and the form they took; (d) thepotential risk for escalationof local conflicts inother

parts of Indonesia; and (e) potential areas for fruitful intervention by government,

developmentagencies,civilsocietyandtheprivatesectortopreventfutureescalation

of conflicts. Answers to these questions may also have applicability in conflict‐prone

areasinothercountries.

Theresearchquestionsareasfollows:

1. Givenlarge,systemicandsuddenshocks(suchasthefalloftheNewOrderandthe

financialcrisis),howandwhydolocalconflictsescalateintolargeconflictsinsome

places,andnotinothers?48

2. In the absenceof large shocks, howandwhydo local conflicts escalate into large

conflicts?49

3. How,andbywhom,aregroupsmobilized?

4. Inbothcontexts,whatexplainsvariationinincidence,timingandform?

5. What potential exists for the escalation of routine violence across Indonesia into

largeconflicts,andwhichareasareparticularlyvulnerable?

6. Whatpoliciesandprojectscanhelppreventfutureescalation?

5.2ResearchMethods,CaseSelectionandFieldwork

Hypothesisgeneration

Given thatmore has been written on large‐scale violence in Indonesia than on local

conflicts, a first stepwill be to commission a literature reviewof theexisting studies.

The studies of particular conflicts and someof the cross‐case treatments cited above

provide in‐depth chronologies, including of the actors involved, violence triggers and

47 Van Klinken (2007a) has studied all three of these conflicts. However, as discussed above, he has

focusedoncommonalityofoutcomes(large‐scaleviolence),notoutcomevariation(violenceandpeace),

asawaytobuildhisargument.Asaconsequence,wecannottesthisargumentwithhismaterialsalone,

eveniftheargumentisright.48Weareinterestedinfourdifferenttypesofescalationhere:(a)escalationfromindividualtogroup

contention;(b)escalationfromnon‐violenttoviolentconflict;(c)escalationinimpacts;and(d)escalation

ofconflictformsandtypes,wherelessseriouskindsofconflictchangeintomoredeadlyones(e.g.landto

religiousconflict).49ThisisparticularlyimportanttounderstandgivenwhereIndonesiaisnow.Economically,Indonesiahas

nowfully recovered fromthe financialcrisis (asmeasured inGDPpercapita terms)andenjoyspolitical

stabilitynotseensincetheSuhartoera.Therecentglobalfinancialcrisiscouldbeanewshock,although

currentpredictionsarethatIndonesiawillcontinuetogrowandpovertylevelswillcontinuetofall.

25

hypothesizescauses.Fromthese,alongwithotherstudiesof large‐scaleviolence,and

especially riots, fromaround theworld,wewill distill hypothesesonpotential factors

andcausalmechanismsthatmaybeassociatedwithconflictescalation.

Caseselectionandcomparativeframework

Qualitative fieldwork will then be employed. The hypotheses will be developed and

testedinanumberofways.

First,weplan toconduct structured, controlledand in‐depthcasecomparisonsof the

sitesof large‐scalerioting(suchasAmbon,Poso,Ternate,Sampit)withthosethathad

very little violence (such asManado, Palu and Yogyakarta). Controls will be specified

later.Comparingthetwowillhelpelicitinformationonwhyviolenceescalatedinsome

areasandnotinothers.

Second, structured, controlled and in‐depth comparisonswill bemade of the sites of

high violence (e.g. Ambon, Poso)with those that hadmedium levels of violence (i.e.,

locationswhereviolencerosebutdidnotescalatebeyondapoint,suchasMedan,Solo,

Kupang,Lombok).Again,controlswillbespecifiedlater.

Figure2showsthetypesofcomparisonsthatwillbemade.Therearethreehypothetical

cases,consistingoflarge‐scalerioting(suchasinAmbon),medium‐scalerioting(suchas

in Solo), and low violence (such as inManado). The first kind of comparison involves

comparing cases of large‐scale rioting (the top line) with cases of low violence (the

bottom line) for the first threemonths on the graph. The second kindof comparison

involves the next twomonths of the graph (frommonth 3 to 5), where the top line

keepsrising,whilethemiddlelinebeginsdeclining.

Figure2:Threedifferenttrajectoriesofviolence:

large‐scaleriotingvs.medium‐scaleriotingvs.lowviolence

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The analyses above will help identify the structural differences between areas that

experience large‐level conflict escalation and those that do not (or those experience

escalation,butofalesserextent).However,suchanalyseswillnotinandoffthemselves

identifythetriggersthatledtoconflicttoescalateatagivenpointintime.Athirdform

of analysis will thus examine varying conflict patterns within a case. This can help

identifytheturningpointsinconflicttrajectories.Forthis,thenewspaperdatasetwillbe

used tomappatternsof conflictover timewithina givengeographicarea. From this,

pointsofheightenedescalationcanbeidentified(seethearrowsinFigure3).Fieldwork

willfocusonthesepointstoseewhatwashappening.

Figure3:Within‐caseanalysisofconflicttrajectories

Cross‐areacomparisonofsuch‘turningpoints’canthenhelpustoascertaintheextent

towhichtherearecommonalitiesinthefactorsleadingtoheightenedescalation.

Finally, some of some hypotheses derived from the literature and fieldwork can be

testedstatistically.Theconflictdatasetweconstructwillcontaininformationonconflict

outcomes (over time). It can also be used to understand how different incidents oi

conflictrelatetoeachother–forexample,ifconflictsofacertaintype(e.g.alynching)

atagivenpointoftimetendtobeassociatedwithconflictsofadifferenttype(e.g.an

inter‐groupbrawl)ata laterpoint intime–50andwillcontain informationonprocess

variables (how escalation began, how it did, or did not, rise beyond a point; which

institutionsororganizationsintervenedtostopescalation,etc.).

Other causal explanations may be more structural in nature, focusing on the

social/demographic,economicor institutionalconditionsthattendtopredictdifferent

50 Doing such ‘process analysis’ is exceptionally difficult within quantitative datasets, even where

informationiscollectedcontinuouslyratherthanatseparatedpointsintime.However,wethinkwewill

beabletodosomesuchanalysis.Separateconflictincidentswithinthedatabasewillbe‘linked’toother

conflict incidents through the generationof a ‘Conflict ID’. This should allow for someprocess tracing

analysis.

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patternsofconflictescalation.Thisdatawillnotbecapturedfromnewspapersbutwill

be taken fromsurveysconductedby the IndonesianBureauofStatistics (BPS) suchas

PODES,SUSENAS,andvariouscensuses.SectionVIIprovidesmoreinformationonhow

suchstatisticaltestingcanbeconducted.

28

6.De‐EscalationofViolence

In Indonesia and beyond, there has been little consideration of processes of de‐

escalationafterepisodesof large‐scaleviolencehavetakenplace,oroftheconditions

underwhichremainingtensionscanre‐escalateintonewoutbreaksofsevereviolence.

Thefourthcomponentofthestudywillseektodeveloptheoryexplainingvariationsin

thesuccessofpeacestabilizationinareasthatexperiencedmassiveunrest,thefactors

thatexplainthere‐emergenceofviolentconflict insomeareasandnot inothers,and

why ‘postconflict’ violence takes different forms in different areas. This will have

implications for thedesignof postconflict programs and approaches in Indonesia and

beyond.

Areas that have experienced large‐scale outbreaks of violence are prone to the

resurgenceofviolence.Collieretal.(2003)havedemonstratedthatthereisasignificant

chance of violent conflict re‐emerging in areaswhere civilwars have formally ended,

withinfiveyearsofwartermination.Thereareanumberofreasonsforthis:signinga

peace settlementdoesnot necessarymean that conflicting parties,whomay still see

advantages in a future re‐escalation of conflict, have fully ‘bought in’ to peace;

expectationsoverthebenefitsofpeacemaynotbemet;poorprogramsandpoliciesin

postconflictsettingscancreateincentivesforpreviouslywarringpartiestopickuparms

again.51 Conflicts also play a role in hardening identities and group cleavages,

reconfiguringnormsregardingtheacceptabilityofviolenceinwaysthattakedecadesto

overcome.Suchfactors,andothers,canleadtotheresumptionofwarinareaswhere

peaceagreementshavebeensigned(Stedman,RothchildandCousens2002).

‘Postconflict’ areas can also experience new forms of violence (e.g. Rogers 2007;

ChauderyandSuhrke2008;Fortna2008).Insomecases,thehumansecurityimpactsof

such violence can be as great as those experienced during the initial period of war

(Muggah2009). InElSalvador,GuatemalaandNicaragua, forexample,homiciderates

arenowhigherthantheywereduringtheconflictperiod(Waiselfisz2008).InIndonesia

too, such ‘postconflict’ forms of violence are also present. In Aceh, for example, the

Helsinkipeaceagreementofficiallybroughttoanendathree‐decadeconflictbetween

theIndonesiangovernmentandGAM,arebelgroup.Yetwhilethepeaceprocesshasby

andlargegonewell,therehavebeenrisinglevelsoflocalizedroutineviolencesincethe

signingofthepeaceagreement(Figure4).

51SeeMuggah(2009)foradiscussion.

29

Figure4:ViolentconflictsinAceh:January2005‐January200952

Source:Barron(2009)

In Indonesiaandelsewhere, relatively little isknownabout the formsofviolence that

emergeafterpeacesettlements.Thishasnegatedfromanunderstandingofthefactors

that lead to violence re‐escalation. Most of the cross‐country quantitative analyses,

which aim to give causal explanations resumption of war, have implicitly treated

violenceasabinaryvariable:thelackofthereemergenceoffull‐scalecivilwarisseenas

asuccess.Patternsofpostconflictviolenceare inherently importantforunderstanding

the potential for war or large‐scale violence to restart. Yet, they have not been

adequatelyincorporatedintotheoriesforwhywarresumesinsomeplacesanddoesnot

in others; Tilly’s (1995) argument that understanding the ‘causes’ of war and its

reoccurrenceare less important thandevelopingdeeperunderstandingsof thenature

ofpostwarviolencehas,toalargeextent,notbeentakenupbyresearchers.

Further,therehasbeenrelativelylittlestudyofhowandwhyviolenceformsmorphin

postconflict settings, andhow thisnegatively impactsonhuman security and stability

(evenwithout re‐escalation towar or large‐scale violence). Variations in the levels or

forms of postconflict violence that have not escalated to full‐scale civil war are not

considered. In Indonesia, thetreatmentsof thehighconflictareaswhereviolencehas

seemingly subsided (theMalukus, Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and now Aceh) have

focused on initial actions taken to end the conflicts such as the Helsinki agreement

(Aceh)andtheMalinoaccords(PosoandMaluku).No‐onetoourknowledgehassought

tosystematicallycomparelevelsandformsofnewviolenceand/ortensionssincethese

conflicts peaked. Little data (quantitative or qualitative) has been collected to permit

52NotethattheHelsinkiMoUwassignedinAugust2005.

30

suchcomparisons.This lackofpostconflictdatamakes ithard toanalyzehowconflict

subsides,takesnewforms,and(potentially)re‐escalates.

6.1AimsandQuestions

Thefourthpartofthestudywilllookatissuesrelatingtothede‐escalationofconflictin

areas that have been affected by large outbreaks of intercommunal violence in

Indonesia.Thisinvolvesmappingoutlevelsofviolenceand/ortensionsforanumberof

years after the larger conflict has ended and carrying out more in‐depth work to

understandhowthesedifferentpatternsemerged.Theresultswillhaveimplicationsfor

understandingpreemptive and responsive conflict resolution strategies in postconflict

settings, allowing for the generation of policy recommendations applicable in both

conflictandpostconflictsettings.

Thefollowingquestionswillbeaddressed:

1. What patterns of conflict emerge after large‐scale episodes of violence end, and

howdothesechangeovertime?

2. Whatexplainsvariationintheincidenceandformsofpostconflictviolence?53

3. Howdopastpatternsofviolenceshapethepotentialforconflictre‐escalationdown

theline?

4. What is the relationship between patterns of postconflict routine violence and

patternsofde‐escalation?

5. Has the de‐escalation of conflict in Indonesia acquired the properties of a

permanent decline (a sustainable peace), or there is a real possibility of the

reemergenceofviolenceinsomeareas?

6. What policies and strategies can consolidate peace in both the short‐run (the

immediate period after agreements are signed or when conflict significantly de‐

escalates)andinthelonger‐runpostconflictperiod?

7. To what extent are patterns of de‐escalation similar in areas affected by

intercommunalandseparatistviolence?

6.2ResearchMethods

Quantitative and qualitative evidence will be used to answer these questions. The

formerwillbeusedtoidentifypatterns.Thiscanthenbeusedtoselectcasesformore

in‐depthfieldwork.

53Thiswillincludeconsiderationofthedifferentaidinterventions,whichmayhavecontributedtoconflict

de‐escalation(orwhichmayhavehelpedleadtonewviolence).This isparticularly importantwithinthe

WorldBankgiventheemphasisondocumentinglessonslearnedondifferenttoolsforpostconflictareas

(e.g.KostnerandJohnsonforthcoming).OtherworkunderthePCFgrantinvolvesevaluationstotestthe

efficacyofreintegrationprogramsinPosoandAceh,conflictresolutiontraining,psycho‐socialprograms

for traumatized conflict victims, and public information peace‐building programs. Insights from these

studieswillhelpinformouranalysis.

31

The quantitative datasetwill be used tomap violence by incidence, impact and form

acrossthoseprovincesthatexperiencedhighlevelsofcommunalviolentconflictinthe

post‐Suhartoperiod:Maluku,NorthMaluku,WestKalimantan,CentralKalimantan,and

CentralSulawesi.54Thekeyperiodsofconcernaretheyearsofhighlevelviolenceand

subsequent years. Importantly, both routine violence and large‐scale violencewill be

included(althoughtheywillbedisaggregated).55

Such mappings will help us select areas for comparative study. However, in‐depth

fieldwork will be needed to understand causal factors that explain variation. For the

escalation component of the study, many studies already exist, meaning that less

fieldwork is necessary. In contrast, very little work on de‐escalation has been done

whichfocusesonrecentyearsandthepresentday.Thus,itislikelythatteamswillneed

tospendasubstantialamountoftimeinthefield.

6.3CaseSelection

Caseswillbeselectedtoallowforanumberofdifferentcomparisonstobemade:

• Variationsinlevelsandtemporalpatternsofde‐escalation

• Variationsintheextenttowhichnewformsofviolencearelinkedtooldconflict‐era

forms

• Variationsinthetypesofpostconflictviolencethatemerge

Comparingdifferentde‐escalationpatterns

First,withinthesampleoffivepostconflictprovinces,wewilllookforvariationinlevels

ofde‐escalation. Suchvariationmightbe inaggregate levels (e.g. toa certain levelof

violence) or in patterns of de‐escalation (e.g. in the speed at which violence has de‐

escalated).Figures5aand5billustrate.InFigure5a,districtAhasseenade‐escalation

of violence as has district B. However, the scale of such de‐escalation differs, being

greaterindistrictB.InFigure5b,incontrast,bothdistrictAanddistrictBendupwitha

similarlevelofviolence.However,thespeedofde‐escalationdiffersbetweenthetwo,

asdoestheextenttowhichitislinear,beingfasterandmorelinearindistrictB.

54 Aceh will be excluded from the initial analysis because of the different nature of conflict there.

Likewise,ourfocuswillnotbeonotherareasthatexperiencedonlyshort‐runviolence,suchasJakarta.55 Inpractice,distinguishingbetweenlarge‐scale(“big”)violenceandroutineorsmallscaleviolencewill

notbesimple.Inmanypostconflictcontexts,newformsofviolencethatemergeareoftenlinked(directly

orindirectly)totheinitialconflict.However,ourdatasetcontainsanumberofvariablesthatshouldallow

ustoseparateroutineandlarge‐scaleviolence,includingconflicttypes,actorsinvolved,andtheconflict

cleavage.

32

Figure5aDifferentscaleofde‐escalationintwodistrictsFigure5bDifferentspeedofde‐escalationintwodistricts

Comparingsuchcases—throughin‐depthfieldworkand,totheextentpossible,areview

of the case literature—can help in the development of causal theories for why de‐

escalationpatternsdiffer.

Comparinglevelsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings

We are also interested in the relationship between routine violence and forms of

violencethatwereprevalentintheconflictperiod.Evenwhereaggregatelevelsofde‐

escalationare similar acrossareas, varying formsof violencemayemerge indifferent

places.Someof thesemayhavedirect links to the formsofviolenceprevalentduring

theconflictperiod,whileothersmaybenew.

The fourhypothetical scenarios laidout in Figures6a‐d illustrate. Ineach, the shaded

space represents the trajectory of the original, large‐scale, violence, and the red line

represents routine,small‐scale,violence.All four figuresshowsteadilydeclining large‐

scale violence, but four different trajectories in the evolution of routine violence. In

Figure6a,routineviolencecontinues,unaffectedbythedeclineinlarge‐scaleviolence.

InFigure6b,bothlarge‐scaleandroutineviolencedecline,atasimilarrate.InFigure6c,

thetworatesofdeclinearedifferent,withroutineviolencetakinglongertodecline.In

Figure6d, large‐scaleviolencedeclinesover time,but routineviolence increases in its

stead.

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Figure6:Differentlevelsofroutinepostconflictviolence

Figure6a Figure6b

Figure6c Figure6d

Comparingformsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings

Variationintheformsofpostconflictviolencepresentwillalsobeconsidered.Figures7a

and 7b break down further the different forms of postconflict violence observable in

two areas. In each, levels of violence remain similar but violence has taken different

forms. Figure 7a shows a rise in vigilantism, while Figure 7b shows a rise in land

conflicts.

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101520253035

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Figure7a:Riseinvigilantisminpost‐conflictperiodFigure7b:Riseinlandconflictsinpost‐conflictperiod

Withincasestudyanalysis

Much canalsobe learnedby looking at variationswithin cases in levels and formsof

violence. The quantitative dataset will allow us to look for sharp rises and falls in

violence over the postconflict period. In the qualitative cases, time will be spent

identifyingreasonswhysuchrapidchangesoccurred.

Our within case analysis will focus on comparing periods of conflict escalation with

thosewhereconflicthasre‐escalated(afterinitialdropsinviolence).Figure8showsthe

pattern of violence over time in a hypothetical district. Comparative analysis of two

periods(markedwitharrows)withinthesameconflictcanhelpindeterminingwhether

arecentperiodofviolencere‐escalation isaprecursortoa futureperiodofextended

violence or whether the characteristics are different, with re‐escalation a temporary

blip.Withincaseanalysiswillalsobeconductedforperiodsofconflictde‐escalation.

Figure8:Within‐caseanalysisofde‐escalation

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Finally, within case analysis will compare conditions after conflict de‐escalation with

thosebeforetheoriginalperiodofviolence.Arethefactorswhich(wehypothesize)led

to the initial violence missing or do they remain. (These will be identified in the

component of the project on escalation). If these underlying factors remain, we can

positthatviolencemayre‐emergeagaininthefuture?

6.4FieldworkandAnalysis

Variation along these dimensions will be used to select a number of cases (to be

decided) forcomparativeanalysis.The levelatwhichcasecomparisonswill takeplace

(province,districtorsub‐district)willbedecidedafterweobtaininformationindicating

thelevelatwhichvariationismostmarked(whichwillcomefromthedatabase).Ideally,

wewillmatchcasesatmultiplelevels(provincial,district,sub‐district)tohelpteaseout

thefactorsateachlevelthatcontributedtodifferentialtrajectories.

Qualitative fieldworkwill then be needed. Aswith thework on routine violence and

escalation,structuredcomparisonswillbeemployed.Aftercasesareselected,in‐depth

fieldworkwillthencarriedouttotrytoteaseoutthesourcesofthedifferentformsof

variation.Whenthere,theywillfocusonanumberofissueswhichmayinclude:56

• Whatareinformants’(villagers,leaders,conflictactors,government,etc.)viewson

whyviolencehasdeclined(ornot)?

• Howhave conflict actors reorganized themselves? Are their formernetworks still

strong?Towhatextentaretheiridentifies,andtheirpositionsincommunities,still

definedbytheroletheyplayedintheconflict?

• Whatrolehavegovernmentpoliciesandactionsplayed?Howdidlocalandnational

governmentrespondtotheconflict,eitherdirectlyorinprovidingbelligerentswith

positionsofpowerorresources?

• Whatrolehaveaidandpeacebuildingeffortsplayed?Howhavetheycontributedto

limiting/triggeringrenewedviolence?

• What preexisting social networks exist? What cross‐cutting relationships and

institutionsexistedbeforetheperiodof large‐scaleviolentconflict,howwerethey

affectedbytheviolence,andhowhavetheybeenreconstituted(ornot)?

56 Other focus areas will be identified once the quantitative data is in. This will allow us to develop

hypothesesthatcanbetestedduringthefieldwork.Relevantliteraturesthatmayalsohelpinhypothesis

formulationincludethatonsocialmovements(e.g.Tarrow1994),sourcesofrevolution(Wolf1969;Scott

1976; Skopkal 1994); the security dilemma (Posen 1993); the organization of violence and rebel

movements(Kalyvas2006;Weinstein2007);institutionalorganization(e.g.North1990;Fukuyama2004);

andbroaderworkon thepoliticaleconomyofdemocratic transitions (e.g.HaggardandKaufman1995;

Bates2001).

36

6.5TestingtheTheoryonDifferentTypesofCases

Theanalysisabovewillhelpgeneratetheoryonwhyviolencede‐escalates indifferent

waysandwhatconditionsmakeforsustainablepeaceinpostconflictareas.Oursampled

provinceswereall sitesof large‐scale intercommunal violence.Towhatextentdo the

same factors and dynamics that lead to de‐escalation and sustainable peace in these

areas leadtosimilaroutcomes inareasthathaveexperiencedother typesofextreme

violence?

Thisquestionhasparticulartheoreticalrelevance.Inmuchoftheliteratureitisassumed

thatresumptionofintercommunalviolencehasverydifferentcausestothosethatlead

torenewedviolenceagainstthestate.57Thissoundsplausible,butisittrue?Weplan

toapplysomeofthehypothesesgeneratedfromtheanalysisabovetothecaseofAceh,

whereconflictbetweenasecessionistmovementandtheIndonesianstate ledtoover

15,000 deaths. The method and analytical steps will be similar to those above. The

quantitativedatasetwill identifypatternsofpostconflictviolencebyareawithinAceh.

We will then look for variation in current violence levels, and in patterns of de‐

escalation.Fieldworkcanhelptestwhetherthesamefactorsledtode‐escalationhere

asinthesitesofintercommunalviolence.

57Onthedifferencebetweenethnicwarsandotherviolentconflicts,seeHorowitz(1985),Fearon(2004),

andDoyleandSambani(2006).

37

7.TestingourHypotheses:LinkstoOtherQuantitativeData

Aswehavesaidabove,wealsoremainopentotheideathattheViCISstudydatacanbe

used for econometric testing of hypotheses about what causes violent conflict in

countriesandwhataccountsforvariationsinviolentconflictlevels.Anewliteratureon

themicro‐dynamicsandfoundationsofcivilwarandlocalconflicthasemergedinrecent

years. These studies look at the impacts of local social, economic and institutional

factorsinshapingviolencepropensity.58Oneweaknessofmanyexistingstudiesisthat

thedependentvariable(incidenceorimpactsofviolentconflict) ispoorlymeasuredor

collected at only onepoint in time. This is an artifact of theuseof household or key

informantsurveys.

Thenewspaperconflictdatasetwillprovideaseriesofdependentvariables(presenceof

violentconflict, levelsofviolentconflict,presenceofparticular formsofviolence,etc)

that can be used for econometric analysis. The dataset will have limited data on

independentvariables.However, thesecanbe integrated fromotherexistingdatasets

suchasSUSENAS,PODESandtheGovernanceandDecentralizationSurvey.

As such, we expect that a final stage of the projectwill be tomerge the newspaper

conflictdatasetwithotherssurveydatasets.Thiswillallowforformaltestingofsomeof

thehypothesesdevelopedfromthecasestudywork.

At thispointwecannotdeterminewhathypotheseswewould like to test,andhence

whatvariableswewouldwanttomergeintothedataset.However,areasofhypotheses

are likely to relate to three areas: (a) social/demographic causes of violence; (b)

economic causes of violence; and (c) institutions and violence. Independent variables

mayincludethefollowing:

Social/demographicfactors

• Percentageofunmarriedmen

• Youthbulge:highorincreasingproportionofyouth(especiallyyoungmen)

• Ethnicheterogeneity–ELF,withtemporalaspect(changesinELF)

• In‐migration

• Seasonandtemperature

Economicfactors

• Economicshocks:nationalandlocal

• Changesinwages

• Unemployment,changesinemploymentlevels(especiallyforyoungmen)

• Changesininflation

• Changesincommodityprices

58SeeKalyvas(2007)forasummaryandcritique.

38

Institutionalfactors

• Perceptionsofgovernance

• Proximitytoreligiousinstitutions

• Representativeness of government institutions (for example percentage of civil

servantsbyethnicity)

• Districtsplitting(pemekaran)

• Changesingovernmentafterlocalelections

• Remotenessfromurbancenters

39

8.AudienceandOutputs

8.1Audiences

The project aims to speak to a number of distinct audiences. First, ViCISwill provide

dataandinsightsofusetopolicymakersinIndonesia.ThesewillfeedintoBappenas’s

(the National Planning Agency) strategy for developing of conflict‐affected

disadvantagedareas.Thestudywillbefinanced,inpart,fromfundsfromajointWorld

Bank‐BappenasgrantfromthePost‐ConflictFund(PCF),whichaimstobuildknowledge

of conflict in Indonesia, and to build the capacity of the state and non‐government

organizations to respond to it in effectiveways. Counterparts from Bappenaswill be

involvedinpeerreviewingmaterialsthroughoutthestudytohelpensurethatthestudy

contributes information useful to the government’sMedium TermDevelopment Plan

2010‐2014.Bappenaswill be responsible fordisseminating results and ideas from the

studytootherGovernmentministries.

Results will be fed into the drafting of the law on conflict management, which is

scheduledtogotoparliament in2009or2010.Withsupport fromBappenas,outputs

from this studywill be streamlinedwith the timeline of the drafting of legislation to

informlawmakersaboutconflictdynamicsineveryprovinceandenablethemtodevise

effectiveconflictmanagementstrategies.

Resultswillalsobedisseminatedwidelytolocalgovernmentstostrengthentheirrolein

conflict management and prevention. These are increasingly important to promote

conflict sensitivity in participatory planning process within the policy context of

Bappenas’ support of the Musrenbang process. It is envisioned that funds for pilot

projectresponsesbasedonfindingswillbefoundfromothertrustfunds,otherdonors,

andgovernmentbudget.59

Second, ViCIS will provide key information for development practitioners from aid

agencies and national and international NGOs. The study will help these groups

prioritizeareastoworkin,typesofprogramstofinanceandimplement,andwillgivea

broadsenseoftheextenttowhich“conflictprogramming”shouldremainapriorityas

Indonesiamaturesasademocracy.Findingswillfeedintotheongoingimplementation

of large‐scale Bank‐financed projects such as PNPM/KDP and SPADA that operate in

many conflict‐affected areas in Indonesia. Materials may be of use in building the

capacity of facilitators and other project staff to understand, analyze and manage

conflictintheirareas.

59Somedonors,especiallyUSAID,haveexpressedinterest,ashasBappenas.

40

Third, the projectwill provide fresh insights to Indonesian and Indonesianist scholars

and to the broader global community working, and writing, on conflict issues. The

analyticapproachesshouldhelptocontributetoanswerstosomeofthekeyquestion

on conflict in Indonesia today (as discussed earlier). ViCIS will provide key data and

frameworksthatwillhaveapplicabilitytounderstandingconflict,andhowtodealwith

it, inothercountries. Inaddition,ourconflictdatamaybeusedbyothers toperform

their own analyses. Materials will be published through international fora, and

workshops will be held in Washington and elsewhere to disseminate findings. The

project aims to help in the process of incorporating Indonesian materials into

internationaldebatesandworkonviolentconflict.

Finally, the study also aims to build the capacity of local research organizations to

conduct empirical policy‐focused research. Large portions of the fieldwork will be

implemented by partners. Local research instituteswill assist in the quantitative data

collection,whilemuchofthequalitativedatacollectionwillbecontractedtoIndonesian

social scientists (political scientists, historians, anthropologists), selected from local

universitiesinsiteschosenforcasestudieswhereverpossible.Thiswillalsohelpensure

capacity‐buildingactivitiestargetorganizationsoutsideofJava.

8.2Outputs

Given the diverse audiences for the project, outputs will take a number of different

forms.

Policybriefingnotes

Regular briefing notes will be produced summarizing data and analysis. Key target

audience is the government. Briefing noteswill also beproduced for an international

audience and will be disseminated through the World Bank’s Crime, Conflict and

ViolenceteaminWashington.

Workingpapers,journalarticlesandbook

Workingpaperswillbeproducedforeachofthefourresearchtopics.Therewillbean

emphasisongettingdataandearlyanalysisoutquicklytohelpmaximizeusefulnessfor

government and practitioners in Indonesia. At a later point, more conceptual and

theoretical papers will be produced aimed at a wider audience. A book will bring

togetherthefindingsfromthestudy.

Conflictdataset

TheprojectwillproduceacomprehensivedatasetonviolenceinIndonesia.Thiswillbe

on‐line and freely available for conflict researchers, government, NGOs, etc. It is

planned that the dataset will bemaintained in partnership with Bappenas to ensure

dataiskeptup‐to‐datewhentheprojectends.

41

Workshopsandcapacitybuilding

Theprojectaimsnotonlytoproducegooddataandtheory,buttobuildthecapacityof

local groups in Indonesia. Regularworkshopswill be held to disseminate and discuss

data.Overtime,itishopedthatfundswillbeavailablefortargetedcapacitybuildingof

localgovernmentandcivilsocietygroupstointerpretthedataandfindings,andtoplan

responses.

42

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AnnexA:ConceptsandDefinitionsConflict “Astruggleovervaluesandclaimstosecurestatus,power,andresources,a

struggleinwhichthemainaimsofopponentsaretoneutralize,injure,or

eliminaterivals”(Coser1956).

ViolentConflict Includesallformsofconflictbetweenindividualsandgroupsthatinvolveany

formofphysicalactionthathasconcreteconsequencessuchasdeaths,injuries

anddestructionofproperty,orwhichhasaviolentform.

Non‐Violent

Conflict

Includesallincidentsthatinvolve:(1)theformationandmobilizationofagroup

and(2)wherethegrouptravelstoalocationanddeliversademandforactionor

response.

ViolentCrime Includesallviolentcriminalincidentsthathavenotbeencodedasconflict.These

includethoseillegalactivitiesthatinvolveanyformofphysicalactionthathas

concreteimpactssuchasdeaths,injuriesanddestructionofpropertyorthat

haveaviolentform.Crimediffersfromconflictinthatthereisnoissueover

whichthepartiesareindispute.

Escalation Thefollowingwillbeconsideredinthestudyofescalation:

Changefromnon‐violentconflicttoviolentconflict.

Increaseinscale,i.e.numberofparticipants,impacts,numberofincidents.

Escalationwithinincidentsaswellasacrossincidents.

Escalationintolargehighprofileconflicts.

Escalationonamuchsmallerscale:fromademonstrationtoafewsmallriots

withnodeaths.

De‐escalation Thefollowingwillbeconsideredinthestudyofescalation:

Changefromviolenttonon‐violentform.

Decreaseinscale,i.e.numberofparticipants,impacts,numberofincidents.

Mutualresolutionofunderlyingissuesbetweenparties.

Routine

Violence

Frequentlyoccurringformsofviolence,whichhavelowper‐incidentimpacts

(maximumfivedeaths)andwhicharenotpartofalargeorwidespreadconflict.

Suchincidentsinvolvelocalactorsstrugglingoverlocalissues,ratherthanlarge‐

scalemobilizationbyidentitycharacteristics(suchasethnicity,religion,or

region).

47

AnnexB:ProvincesandEstimatedDistributionofMediaSourcesProvince NoofDistricts ProvincialPapers Sub‐ProvincialPapers

Aceh 23 2 2

Papua 20 2 2

WestPapua 9 2 2

CentralSulawesi 10 2 2

Maluku 8 2 2

NorthMaluku 8 2 1

Jakarta 6 ‐ 3

CentralJava 35 2 4

Lampung 10 2 3

EastNusaTenggara 19 2 3

EastJava 38 2 4

NorthSumatra 26 2 4

WestKalimantan 13 2 3

WestNusaTenggara 9 2 3

NorthSulawesi 13 2 2

Yogyakarta 5 2 2

CentralKalimantan 14 2 2

WestJava 26 2 4

SouthSulawesi 23 2 2

Riau 11 2 3

Bengkulu 9 2 2

Banten 6 2 2

Total 341 42 57

48

AnnexC:CodingTemplate

49

AnnexD:ExplanationofCodes

SECTION1

Coderinitials Enteryourinitialsinthisfield.

IncidentID AssigneachincidentbundleauniqueincidentIDfromthelistofIDsprovidedbythe

ProjectManager.

FortwoormoreeventstobeconsideredasingleIncidentandhavethesameIncident

IDtheymustbedrivenbythesameissue,involvethesameactorsandoccuronthe

samedate.

Sourceinfo Entertheinitialsofnewspapers(fromtheprovidedlist)anddateofeveryarticle

attachedtoincidentbundle.

SECTION2

Actors • Enterminimumoneactorpersideandmaximumtwoactorsperside.

• Ifmore than 2 actors involved on a side, or if three sides are involved in one

incident,writethisinthe‘CodingIssues’Section.

• If there isaclearpelakuandaclearkorban,enter thepelaku inSide1andthe

korbaninSide2.

• Each set of actors, or ‘sides’, should be coded for General, Type, Total and

Women.

General • At‘General’,enterthecodeforthebestdescriptionoftheformofparticipantto

theincident:

1. Individual

2. Group

3. Institution

Type • At‘Type’,enterthecodeforthebestdescriptionofwhotheactorsareaffiliated

with,oractingonbehalfof:

1. Individual,groupofindividualswithnoclearaffiliation

2. Group(warga,massa)withnoclearaffiliation

3. Militias(ethnic,religious,martialarts)

4. IDPs

5. Government – elected or bureaucracy (civil servant or government body, e.g.

courts,DepartmentofHeath)

6. Foreignaidorganization/NGO(includingemployees)

7. IndonesianNGO(includingemployees)

8. Privatecompany,contractor,shop

9. Politicalparty

10. Ormas–secularsocietalgroupsuchasyouthorganization,PP

11. Religious leader or group (Church, Islamic group, santri group,NU, JI). Includes

preman‐likegroupswhichclaimtobereligiousgroupssuchasFPI.

12. TNI(Indonesianarmedforces)

13. Brimob(Policespecialforces)

14. Police

15. Separatistgroup(GAMbeforeMoU,RMS,OPM)

16. Tradeunion/workersgroup(formalorinformal)

17. Electoralinstitution(iePanwas,KPUD,KPU)

18. Students

88AUNCLEAR

99AOTHER(Explain)

50

Total • Enter the total number of actors involved for every actor. Follow the following

guidelines:

o IFrangesarementioned,estimatenumbersusingthefollowingrules:

Beberapa‐2

Belasan‐11

Puluhan‐20

Ratusan‐100

Ribuan‐1000

Range(e.g2‐4)‐lowernumber.

o IF multiple sources report different totals, use the LOWEST estimate

(UNLESSthelowestiszero).

o IF revised numbers are published by newer sources, use the revised

numbers.

? • IFyouhaveestimatedatotalfromarange,ORifthedifferencebetweentotals

reportedbymultiplesourcesismorethan5,tickthe?boxnexttothatTotal.

Women? • Tickthisboxifwomenwereprominentinthissetofactors.

Cleavage? • Tickthisboxifyoufeeltheremaybeacleavageassociatedwiththisconflict.(See

definitionofcleavages).

Ifyoutickthisbox,thenentercodesforGenericandLocalCleavages.

Genericcleavage • Thereisspaceformaximum2genericcleavages.Ifyoudetectmorethan2,write

thisintheCodingIssuessection.

• Enterthecodeforthegenericcleavageyouthinkispresentbetweenthetwosides

ofactors:

1. Ethnic

2. Inter‐Religious (Choose between several options,MuslimChristian,Muslim

Hindu,HinduChristianandOther).

3. Intra‐Religious

4. Migrant‐Local

5. Separatist

99AOTHER(Explain)

Localcleavage • Eachregionmaydevelopasetoflocallyrelevantcleavagecodes.Thesemightbe

furtherspecificationofthegenericcodes(i.e.whichethnicitiesareinconflict,or

whichgeographicregions),ortheymaybedifferentcleavagestothoseinthe

genericlist(inwhichcase‘other’wouldbeselectedasthegenericcleavage).

Localcleavagecodeswillvaryfromregiontoregion.Listoflocalcleavagesfrom

yourprovinceareattachedattheendofyourcodingkey.

Intervention • If some parties came to the scene of the conflict and attempted to stop the

eventsinthisincident,thisinterventionmustbenoted.

• Thereisspaceforenteringupto3interventions.Ifyoudetectmorethan3,write


Foreachintervention,youmustidentify,theintervener,theresultofthe

intervention,theconflictform(1or2)inwhichtheinterventionhappenedandifthe

intervenerswerealsotheactors.

Intervener • Foreveryinterventionenterthecodefortheintervenersfromthefollowinglist:




4. IDPs

51

5. Government ‐ official, formal or informal (includes Village Heads, Camat,

memberofparliament)

6. Government – bureaucracy (civil servant or government body, e.g. courts,

DepartmentofHeath)




10. Politicalparty

11. Individualpoliticalfigure

12. Supportersofpoliticalcandidate(s)orindividualpoliticalleader.


14. Religious leader or group (Church, Islamic group, santri group, NU, JI).

Includespreman‐likegroupswhichclaimtobereligiousgroupssuchasFPI.



17. Police


19. Tradeunion/workersgroup


21. Students

77ANONE

88AUNCLEAR

99AOTHER(Explain)

Result • Foreveryintervention,enterthecodefortheresultoftheattemptedintervention:

1. Werecontactedbutdidnotcome

2. Werecontactedbutcamelate

3. Cametothescenebutdidnotintervene

4. Cametothescene,triedtointervenebutwereunsuccessful

5. Came,intervenedsuccessfullytostoptheviolence,madenoarrests

6. Came,intervenedsuccessfullyandarrestedpartiestotheconflict

7. Cameandtookintocustodythevictimofviolence

8. Cameandaggravatedtheviolence

88AUNCLEAR

99AOTHER(Explain)

Conflictform1

or2?

• If twoconflict formswerepresent in this incident,enter thenumberofconflict

forminwhichthisinterventiontookplace.(1or2?)

Intervener

affiliatedwith

anactor?

• Tickthisbox iftheaffiliationofthe intervener isthesameasoneoftheactors.

(e.g., if theconflict isbetweenFPIandAhmediyyaandthereligious leaderwho

triestointerveneisalsoamemberoftheAhmediyyabutwasnotpresentatthe

scenebefore).

Violentimpacts • Beforewritinganynumbersintheimpactsboxes,readallsourcesthatreportthis

incident and all follow‐up articles (attached) to ensure there isn’t any more

specificinformation.

• InViolentImpacts,youshouldwriteinformationaboutbothhumanandbuilding

impacts.

Totals(Deaths,

Injuries,

Kidnappings,

SexualAssaults

andBuilding

Impacts)

• For every type of impact, enter the total number following the following

guidelines:

o IfitisclearthattherewereNOimpacts,write77A(NONE)inthosefields.

o IFno impactsarementioned inanyof thesourcesbutyouthink there

mayhavebeensomewrite88A(UNCLEAR)inthosefields.

52

o IF impacts are mentioned in ranges estimate numbers using the

followingrules:

Beberapa‐2

Belasan‐11

Puluhan‐20

Ratusan‐100

Ribuan‐1000

Range(e.g.,2‐4)‐lowernumber.

o IF multiple sources report different totals, use the LOWEST estimate

(UNLESSthelowestiszero).

o IFrevisednumbersarepublishedbynewersources,usethemostrecent

numbers.

? • IFyouhaveestimatedatotal fromarange,OR if thedifferencebetweentotals

reportedbymultiplesourcesismorethan5,tickthe(?)boxnexttotheTotalof

thatimpact.

FemaleVictims • If it is not clear how many victims were male or female write 88A in

correspondingfields.

• Ifyouknowforafactthattherewerenomale/femalevictims,write77Ainthose

fields.

• Ifyouknowthebreakdownofthemale‐femaleimpacts,enterthemhere.

• Ifyouestimatedthebreakdownfromarangeorifthedifferenceinbreakdowns

reportedbymultiplesourceswasmorethan5, tickthe?boxnexttothemale‐

femalebreakdown.

Breakdown

(damaged‐

destroyed

buildings)

• If it is not clear howmany buildingswere damaged or destroyedwrite 88A in

correspondingfields.

• Ifyouknowforafactthattherewerenodamagedbuildings(onlydestroyed)or

that there were no destroyed buildings (only damaged) , write 77A in those

fields.

• If you know the breakdown of the damaged‐destroyed buildings, enter them

here.

• Ifyouestimatedthebreakdownfromarangeorifthedifferenceinbreakdowns

reportedbymultiplesourceswasmorethan5, tickthe?boxnexttothemale‐

femalebreakdown.

BuildingType • Tickallthebuildingstypesthathavebeendamagedordestroyedinthisincident.

OtherImpacts • Usethisspacetodescribeanyotherviolentimpactsthatyoucouldnotrecordin

theotherfields(e.gburningofcarsetc)

Weapons • Thereisspaceforuptotwoweapons.Ifyoufoundthatmorethantwoweapons

wereused,writethisintheCodingIssuessection.

• Enterthecodeofweaponsusedfromthefollowinglist:

1. Club/rock

2. Knife/Spear/othersharp,cuttingweapon

3. SmallFirearm.

4. LargeFirearm.

5. Firearm(butsizenotclear)

6. Molotov/grenade/bomb

7. Homemadeweapon.

8. Fire

77ANONE

88AUNCLEAR

99AOTHER(Explain)

53

SECTION3

Conflict

incident?

• TickthisboxiftheincidentisConflict(violentORnon‐violent)

Conflicttypes • ForeveryincidentclassifiedasconflictyouwillenterminimumoneConflictType

andmaximumtwo.

• If you thinkmore than two conflict types are present,write this in the Coding

Issuessection.

• To assign a Conflict Type, enter the number of the Type and the letter of the

correspondingConflictsub‐type(e.g.aResourceIssueovercommonLandwillbe

codedas‘1A’,ResourceissueoverprivateNaturalResourceswillbecoded‘1D’

• Ifasubtypeisnotlistedinourcodes,choosethe‘OTHER’sub‐typeandexplainit

inthespaceprovided.(Writecode199A,299A…etc)

• IftheConflictTypedoesnotfitinanyofourtypes,enter99A.

• IftheConflictTypeisentirelyunclear,Enter88A.

1.Resourceissues:ownership,access,anduse

A) Land(common):ownedcommunallyordesignatedpublicusebythestateor

ownedbyindividuals/families,privatecompaniesorthestate.

B) Naturalresources.

C) Man‐maderesources.

D) Markets,routes,customers,etc.

E) Accesstojobs,markets,routesandservices.

F) CommodityPrices

G) Pollution,environmentaldamage,noise

99A)Other(explain)

2.Administrativeissues

A) Tenderrelatedissues.

B) Corruptionormisuseofgovernmentfundsnotrelatedwithtenderissues.

C) Public services (quality of a public service, e.g. a education, healthcare

utilities, this includes services provided by government and private

institutions)

D) Other program implementation issues for government funds, including

funding priorities and complaints about implementation or unaddressed

needs,includingsubsidies.

E) Corruption or misuse of funds for non‐government aid and development

programs

F) Non‐government aid or development projects that are not related to

corruptionoffunds.

G) Labor‐related(industrialaction,complaintsoverpay,conditions)

H) Splittingofregions(pemekaranwilayah)orgeographicborder

I) Arrestorotherlawenforcementissueorlegalprocedure.

99A)Other(explain)

3.Politicalissuesandcontestsoverposition,influenceandpower

A) Government position a national level (e.g. National elections, calls for

resignationofnationalMPs,PresidentorVicePresident)

B) Government position at provincial level (e.g. Provincial elections, calls for

resignationofelectedofficials)

C) Governmentpositionatdistrictlevel(Pilkadaandlegislativeelectionsetc)

D) Government position at sub‐district level (e.g. dispute over Camat

appointment)

E) Governmentpositionatvillagelevel(e.g.Pilkades,BPDelections)

F) Position/influence/powerwithinapoliticalparty

G) Position/influence/power of appointed government workers outside A‐E

54

above,includingcivil‐serviceandbureaucraticappointments

H) Struggleforindependence/separationfromNKRI,orspecialautonomywhich

govern the province’s relationship with the central government (eg

Aceh/Papua).

I) Internationalissue.

99A)Other(explain)

4.Identityissues

A) Ethnic issues (eg disputes over cultural attributes of migrants, name of

district,monumentetc)

B) Religious issues (ie attacks on Church for holding service or on gambling

parlour,JIattacksieBalibomb)

C) Intra‐religious(egattacksonAhmadiyah,enforcementofshariah)

D) Migration‐related

E) Migration and Ethnicity‐related (use if the issue involves BOTH Migration

ANDEthnicity)

F) Geographic(ieinter‐villagefight)

G) Genderrelated

99A)Other(explain)

5.MoralIssues

A) Humiliation/lossofface/offense

B) Accident

C) Debt

D) Theft

E) Damagetoproperty

F) Sexualindiscretion

G) Murder/Assault

H) Gambling/Alcohol/Narcotics

I) Witchcraft

99A)Other(explain)

Conflictforms • Forevery incident classifiedas conflict, enterminimumoneandmaximumtwo

conflictforms.

• Ifyouthinkmorethantwoconflictformswerepresentinthisincidentthanwrite


• Enterthecodefortheconflictformspresentfromthefollowinglist:

Non‐violent

1. Demonstration

2. FormalDelegation(delegasi)

3. Formal complaint or protest (formally aired through media, or by submitting

complainttorelevantauthority)

4. Dispute(squabblebetweenparties)

5. (non‐violent)Threat

6. Blockade

7. Strike(stopwork)

8. Courtcase(grouptakesachallengetocourt)

Violent

9. Riot:Groupattackinganddamagingproperty

10. Riot:Group(over10,massa)attackingpeople

11. Groupclash(over10oruseofIndonesianterms–kelompok,massa)

12. Fight(smallgroupsorindividuals–beberapaorang)

13. SmallerGroupAttack(manyagainstoneortwoieVigilantism,beatingofpolitical

55

opponents)

14. Terror‐style attacks, where an individual or small group attacks people or

buildings (i.e.attackswhichare intendedtocausefear,suchasabombthrown

intoacrowd,ortheAcehgrenadeattacks)

15. Vandalism,arson

16. Assault/sexualassault(one‐sided)

17. Sweeping/Forcibleentry

18. Kidnapping

88AUNCLEAR

99AOTHER(Explain)

Violence? • TickthisboxifyourecordedviolentimpactsforthisconflictincidentAND/ORyou

choseatleastoneviolentConflictForm

Organizationin

riots?

• In case of Riots (Conflict Form 9 or 10) tick this box if there was any sign of

organization, such as coordination, funding, leadingby any individuals and / or

organizations.

• Enterthecodeofactorresponsiblefororganizingtheriotfromthefollowinglist:




4. IDPs

5. Government ‐ official, formal or informal (includes Village Heads, camat,

memberofparliament)

6. Government – bureaucracy (civil servant or government body, e.g. courts,

DepartmentofHeath)




10. Politicalparty

11. Individualpoliticalfigure

12. Supportersofpoliticalcandidate(s)orindividualpoliticalleader.


14. Religious leader or group (Church, Islamic group, santri group, NU, JI).

Includespreman‐likegroupswhichclaimtobereligiousgroupssuchasFPI.



17. Police


19. Tradeunion/workersgroup


21. Students

88AUNCLEAR

99AOTHER

• Specify which form of organization occurred in the notes section. In field

provided,indicatethetypeofactorinvolvedinorganizingtheincident.

Election

conflicts?

• Ticktheboxprovidediftheconflictconcernedanelection.Tospecifythelevelof

election,choosetheappropriateConflictType3.

Relatedto

crime?

• Tickthisboxiftheconflictincidentyouarecodingisrelatedtoacrime

committedpreviously.

Individualissue? • Tickthisboxiftheincidentwasapurelyindividualdisputeandnotconcerninga

groupissue.Tickthisboxif“thedisputeconcernsthe‘status,powerand

56

resources’ofacentralindividualactororsmallnumberofindividualsandnot

thoseofthewidercommunity”.

Changefrom

individualto

groupissue?

• Tickthisboxiftheissuechangedfromindividualtoagroupissuewithinthesame

incident.

Relatedtoother

conflict?

• Tickthisboxiftheconflictisrelatedtoanotherconflictinthesameprovince.

ConflictID • TOBECOMPLETEDBYTHECODINGTEAMLEADERafterthetemplatehasbeen

coded.

SECTION4

Purecrime? • TickthisboxiftheincidentisaPureCrime(makesureyouhaven’tenteredany

informationinSection3)

Crimeform • For every incident classified as pure crime, enterminimum one andmaximum

twocrimeforms.

• If you think more than two crime forms are present, write this in the Coding

Issuessection.

• Enterthecodeforthecrimeformfromthefollowinglist:

1. Murder/Manslaughter

2. Assault

3. Rape,SexualAssault

4. Robbery

5. Deprivationofliberty(iekidnapping)

6. Domesticviolence

88AUNCLEAR

99AOTHER

SECTION5

Incident

summary

Write a brief summary, 2‐3 sentences, so that the reviewer can understand what

happened without needing to look at the article. Try not to repeat too much

informationwhichisalreadycodedonthetemplatebutdothefollowing:

• Identifyspecificactors

• Distinguishbetweensides

• Explainsequenceofevents

• Otherimportantdetails

Codingissues • Noteanyproblemsyouhadchoosingappropriatecodes,orcodingissueswhich

arose,sothattheycanbereviewed.

IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers

No. Title Authors(s) Date

1 TheDynamicsofDistrictGovernance:Forums,BudgetProcessesand

Transparency

LuthfiAshari May04

DynamikaPemerintahanKabupaten:Forum,PerencanaanAnggaran

danTransparenci

2 ViolenceandConflictResolutioninNon‐ConflictRegions:TheCaseof

Lampung,Indonesia

PatrickBarron

DavidMadden

Aug04

3 MobilizingforViolence:TheEscalationandLimitationofIdentity

Conflicts

YuhkiTajima Aug04

4 MoreThanJustOwnership:TenLandandNaturalResourceConflict

CaseStudiesfromEastJavaandFlores

SamuelClark(ed.) Dec04

BukanSekedarPersoalanKepemilikan:SepuluhStudiKasusKonflik

TanahdanSunberDayaAlamdariJawaTimurdanFlores

5 Crisis,SocialTies,andHouseholdWelfare:TestingSocialCapital

TheorywithEvidenceFromIndonesia

AnnaWetterberg Apr05

6 VillageCorruptioninIndonesia:FightingCorruptioninIndonesia's

KecamatanDevelopmentProgram

AndreaWoodhouse Apr05

7 CountingConflicts:UsingNewspaperReportstoUnderstandViolence

inIndonesia

PatrickBarron

JoanneSharpe

May05

8 Aceh:ReconstructioninaConflictEnvironment AdamBurke

Afnan

Oct05

9 MediaMapping:UnderstandingCommunicationsEnvironmentsin

Aceh

JoanneSharpe

ImogenWall

Apr07

10 ConflictandCommunityDevelopmentinIndonesia:Assessingthe

ImpactoftheKecamatanDevelopmentProgram

PatrickBarron

RachaelDiprose

MichaelWoolcock

Jul06

11 PeacefulPilkada,DubiousDemocracy:UnderstandingAceh’sPost‐

ConflictElections

SamuelClark

BlairPalmer

Aug08

12 Community‐BasedReintegrationinAceh:AssessingtheImpactsof

BRA‐KDP

PatrickBarron

MacartanHumphreys

LauraPaler

JeremyWeinstein

Dec09

13 DeliveringAssistancetoConflict‐AffectedCommunities:TheBRA‐KDP

PrograminAceh

AdrianMorel

MakikoWatanabe

RobWrobel

Dec09

14 DDRandLocalizedViolentConflict:EvaluatingCombatant

ReintegrationProgramsinPoso,Indonesia

DaveMcRae Dec09

15 UnderstandingViolentConflictinIndonesia:AMixedMethods

Approach

PatrickBarron

SanaJaffrey

BlairPalmer

AshutoshVarshney

Dec09

Papersareavailableon‐lineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org

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