Participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities: limits and ... · Environment&Urbanization Vol 13 No 1...

Env ironmentampU rbanizat ion Vol 13 No 1 Apri l 2001 1 5 9

PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

Part ic ipatory budget ing inBrazil ian c it ies l imits andpossibi l i t ies in buildingdemocrat ic inst i tut ions

Celina Souza

SUMMARY This paper describes participatory budgeting in Brazil where citizenassemblies in each district of a city determine priorities for the use of a part of thecityrsquos revenues This is one of the most significant innovations in Latin America forincreasing citizen participation and local government accountability After describ-ing its antecedents as various local governments sought to increase citizen involve-ment during the 1970s and 1980s the paper reviews the experience withparticipatory budgeting in the cities of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte It describeswho took part in different (district and sectoral) citizen assemblies the resources theycould call on and the priorities established It also discusses its effectiveness regard-ing increased participation more pro-poor expenditures and greater local govern-ment accountability While noting the limitations (for instance some of the poorestgroups were not involved and in other cities it was not so successful) the paper alsohighlights how participatory budgeting allows formerly excluded groups to decideon investment priorities in their communities and to monitor government responseIt has helped reduce clientelist practices and perhaps more importantly for a societyas unequal as Brazil helped to build democratic institutions

I INTRODUCTION

THE WAVE OF redemocratization that overtook Latin America andEastern Europe in the 1980s has followed different paths and producedvarying experiences and results Although the regions share commonproblems achievements and agendas there are also different experi-ences and new problems that may distinguish the democratic experi-ment as it has taken root across and within different regions Despitetheir differences these countries share a common agenda regardingdemocracy and its institutions they are struggling to build or rebuildtheir democratic institutions with an agenda that focuses mainly onfighting corruption improving access to government and strengthen-ing governmental accountability This agenda has been tackled in differ-ent ways and with varying levels of success The democratic experimenthas varied not only across countries but also within them These expe-riences are especially diverse in countries characterized by deep-rootedpolitical social economic and regional disparities such as Brazil

In many countries redemocratization has gone hand-in-hand withpolitical and financial decentralization to sub-national governmentswhich means that the agenda mentioned above is not restricted to the

Celina Souza is a professorof Public Administration atthe Federal University ofBahia (Brazil) and iscurrently a visiting fellow atthe University of Satildeo PauloDr Souza is the author ofConstitutional Engineering inBrazil The Politics of Feder-alism and Decentralization(1997) and has written anumber of journal articles aswell as made contributionsto edited books both inEnglish and Portugueseincluding ldquoRedemocratiza-tion and decentralization inBrazil the strength of themember statesrdquo Developmentand Change Vol 27 No 3(1996)

Address Rua Quintino deCarvalho 153702 40155-280Salvador Bahia Brazil emailcelinaufbabr

This paper is part of aresearch project on urbangovernance poverty andpartnerships funded by theUK Department for Interna-tional DevelopmentrsquosESCOR programme It wascommissioned by the Inter-national DevelopmentDepartment of the School ofPublic Policy University ofBirmingham UK I am grate-ful to Richard Batley NickDevas Marcus Melo andMark Setzler for their manyand useful comments on thepaper

national institutions but applies also to sub-national ones As a result ofredemocratization and decentralization many local governments wereable to introduce policies and experiences that distanced them fromthose in place in the authoritarian past One of the primary justificationsfor these decentralization policies is that they strengthen democracy byincreasing participation especially by those social groups at the locallevel that have traditionally been excluded from the governmentrsquos deci-sion-making process and policies

Brazil is an example of both redemocratization and decentralizationIn the case of decentralization there is a consensus among scholars and prac-titioners that Brazil is a country in which political and financial decentraliza-tion has been pursued at an unparalleled pace both in the countryrsquos experienceand in comparison to other developing countries There is already a consid-erable literature analyzing Brazilian decentralization after redemocrati-zation focusing especially on the local level Some of these works adopta positive view of decentralization stressing its merits with respect toldquoreinventing the governmentrdquo bringing the government closer to thecommunity building bridges between private and public demands andotherwise improving local governance(1) Other authors are more scep-tical about the possibilities of decentralization per se in a countrymarked by high levels of social economic and regional disparities(2)

Similarly others have turned their attention to the risks of promotingsocial exclusion when the municipalities compete for investments(3)

Another line of enquiry contends that in certain circumstances central-ization may be essential to the successful implementation of socialprogrammes(4)

As for participation the 1988 constitution provided several mecha-nisms which allowed grassroots movements to take part in some deci-sions and to oversee public matters especially at the local level (5)

Brazilian local governments are carrying out several experiments inparticipation These range from the creation of community councils todecide on education health and social welfare policies to the imple-mentation of participatory budgeting (henceforth PB) The latter hasbeen praised both nationally and internationally as an example ofldquogoodrdquo government

The enthusiasm for and documented successes of PB are somewhatpuzzling Why have some Brazilian local governments embarked on apolicy which attempts to ldquoempower the poorrdquo in a country labelled asclientelist eacutelite-driven lacking a tradition of civic engagement andmoreover historically unequal(6) Why would local governments increaseparticipation and decision-making venues when they already have acongested agenda of unresolved local problems (housing educationhealth care public transport etc) Furthermore why in a time in whichindividualism and consumption are praised as signs of freedom andliberty have some politicians adopted policies encouraging cooperationand the pursuit of collective goods destined for social groups historicallyexcluded from the decision-making process Why in an era of disillu-sionment with the political systems and their politicians have peopleresponded positively to some top-down decisions to ldquoempowerrdquo themWhy in a time in which ldquoexitrdquo is more praised than ldquovoicerdquo has therebeen a proliferation of participatory policies in Brazil(7) Finally why ata time when mainstream literature on collective action argues that indi-viduals (politicians bureaucrats and voters) are guided by self-interestdo collective and individual actors have the incentive to cooperate

1 6 0 Env ironmentampU rbanizat ion Vol 13 No 1 Apri l 2001


1 Figueiredo Rubens andBolivar Lamounier (1996)As Cidades que datildeo CertoExperiecircncias Inovadoras naAdministraccedilatildeo PuacuteblicaBrasileira Brasiacutelia MHComunicaccedilatildeo

2 Souza Celina (1997)Constitutional Engineering inBrazil The Politics ofFederalism andDecentralization LondonMacmillan and New YorkSt Martinrsquos Press

3 Melo Marcus Andreacute(1996) ldquoCrise federativaguerra fiscal elsquohobbesianismo municipalrsquoefeitos perversos dadescentralizaccedilatildeordquo SatildeoPaulo em Perspectiva Vol 10No 13 pages 11-20

4 Tendler Judith (1997)Good Government in theTropics The Johns HopkinsUniversity Press Baltimore

5 These constitutionalmechanisms are describedin Souza Celina (1989)ldquoPoliacutetica urbana eparticipaccedilatildeo popularrdquoRevista de AdministraccedilatildeoPuacuteblica Vol 23 No 4 pages110-113

6 Clientelism or patronageor patron-client relations isa tricky concept In thecontext of this article I useWaterburyrsquos definition inwhich clientelism is ameans of protection bothfor the weak and for thepolitically powerful Itscrucial variable is real orperceived vulnerability SeeWaterbury John (1977) ldquoAnattempt to put patrons andclients in their placerdquo inGellner E and J Waterbury(editors) Patrons and Clientsin Mediterranean SocietiesGerald DuckworthLondon page 337

7 I use the words ldquoexitrdquoand ldquovoicerdquo followingHirschman The ldquovoicerdquooption is the way in whichcitizens communicatedemands direct to publicagencies and the ldquoexitrdquooption is when they chooseto quit or go to other placesor service suppliers SeeHirschman A O (1970)

This paper reviews the literature on PB in Brazil analyzing the twomost well-known experiences of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte tolead to a discussion of the main results and to answer these questions How does PB work in the two cities analyzed How does the literature view PB Does PB increase the capacity of excluded social groups to influence

the decision making process regarding the allocation of publicresources

Does PB increase the poorrsquos access to basic urban services Does local expenditure reflect the priorities of the poor

This paper argues that although some of the claims and results relat-ing to participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizontedeserve more careful reflection and research the experience has allowedlow-income segments of neglected areas of the cities to decide on invest-ment priorities in their communities Despite the fact that resources allo-cated through PB have been small the experience has shown that in anextremely unequal society such as Brazil PB is one of the very few alter-natives for transforming public investments from favours into rightsalbeit with a limited scope

The following sections begin with a brief review of participatory poli-cies prior to the Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte experiences and adiscussion of some previous decisions that contributed to the success ofthese two experiences PB in Porto Alegre and in Belo Horizonte is thenanalyzed based on secondary sources This is followed by a review ofthe literature on PB showing points of consensus and of divergenceregarding its results objectives and prospects This section also attemptsto answer the last three points highlighted above The last section re-evaluates the PB experience in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte in anattempt to draw some conclusions from its main results achievementsand problems

I I ANTECEDENTS TO PARTICIPATO R YB UD G ET IN G

THREE MAIN FACTORS must be analyzed in order to understand theadoption of PB in cities throughout Brazil during the last decade giventhat the practice neither appeared suddenly nor was solely the result ofthe efforts of certain politicians from the PT (Workersrsquo Party) First therewere a number of attempts at increasing participation by citizens in localbudgeting before redemocratization Second there was the increase inthe amount of local finance but more importantly the policy of adjust-ing local finance adopted by many local governments in the late 1980sThird is the growing presence of leftist parties in local governments

a Part i c ipa to ry Exper iences dur ing the Mi l i t a ryR eacute g i m e

Even while the military reacutegime was still in power a small number ofmunicipalities governed by a segment of the then MDB (BrazilianDemocratic Movement) adopted participatory policies as a way ofputting pressure on federal and state levels controlled by the militaryCastro(8) analyzes the experiences of Piracicaba a municipality in thestate of Satildeo Paulo over the period 1977-1982 (9) She suggests that the

Env ironmentampU rbanizat ion Vol 13 No 1 Apri l 2001 161


Exit Voice and LoyaltyHarvard University PressCambridge MA page 313For a broader discussionsee Dunleavy P and BOrsquoLeary (1987) Theories ofthe State The Politics ofLiberal DemocracyMacMillan Houndmillsand London

8 Castro M Helena G de(1988) ldquoEquipamentossociais e poliacutetica local nopoacutes-64 dois estudos decasordquo Espaccedilo e Debates No24 pages 67-74

9 Piracicabarsquos experiencealthough not unique wasrare because MDB mayorstended to switch parties toARENA (NationalRenovating Alliance) theofficial party of theauthoritarian regime inorder to receive federal andstate grants given thatpublic resources wereheavily centralized at thefederal level Castro (seereference 8) reports that inthe 1976 local elections outof 101 mayors elected bythe MDB 78 moved toARENA immediately afterthe election Furthermoreopposition localgovernments were onlypossible in medium andsmall cities because in thestate capitals the mayorwas appointed by the statelegislature

mayorrsquos strategy of calling for the direct participation of the populationin decision-making was a way first to show the federal and stategovernments that the resources sent to Piracicaba and earmarked forspecific use did not address the priorities of the people and second toput pressure on local councillors to approve controversial laws Startingin 1977 the municipality created several ldquocommunity centresrdquo and localgovernment offices in the cityrsquos districts to discuss district prioritieswhich were then passed on to the mayorrsquos office Citizen participationat the start of this experience was best characterized as consultationrather than an opportunity to take an active role in decision-making In1980 a number of committees were created including the CitizensrsquoBudgetary Committee in which popular organizations had both seatsand votes As in many other experiences of this kind with the electionof a new mayor Piracicabarsquos participatory experiment came to an endAlthough the newly elected mayor also belonged to the MDB hebelonged to a different faction from that of the incumbent

During the same period another participatory experiment wasimplemented by Mayor Dirceu Carneiro in Lages a municipality in thestate of Santa Catarina Like his counterpart in Piracicaba Carneiro wasalso a member of the MDB The Lages experience turned out to be aparadigm for medium and small-sized local administrations all overBrazil because of the cityrsquos focus on small initiatives that were cooper-atively implemented by the government and the community(10) Anotherfeature of the Lages experience was the abandonment of comprehen-sive planning as the primary guide for municipal actions Instead thecity moved toward a model of city management based on ldquoadminis-tration on a day-by-day basis through the discussion and the imple-mentation of projects which responded to the needs imposed byrealityrdquo(11) The goal of the administration was to govern with popularparticipation but there was no systematic organization on the part ofthe population The local government stepped in to mobilize and toorganize the community around several associations Because oflimited social mobilization the Lages experience although paradig-matic cannot be said to have been a success in participation Accordingto Ferreira(12) participation was built slowly and its instruments werenot strong enough to influence directly and decisively the municipalgovernmentrsquos priorities The most successful programme in the Lagesexperience was the cityrsquos efforts to build houses for the poor in spite ofscarce resources The key component of the programme was the build-ing of homes with the direct participation of the poor as labourersknown as mutiratildeo which was later widely adopted by several localgovernments in Brazil regardless of their ideological orientation As inPiracicaba the mayor of Lages governed with no support from eitherthe federal or the state governments Ferreirarsquos report on the Lagesexperience concludes that it was naive overestimated the power of thealliance with the poor and underestimated the power of those whoopposed it(13) It also concluded that the administration did not changethe basic power relationships within the city nor was it able to ldquofree theoppressed segments of societyrdquo in any meaningful way Its merit was tohave been able to create alternative ways to deal with peoplersquos mosturgent needs through the development of quick and cheap initiativessustained through popular organization

The experiences of participation in three cities in Minas Gerais admin-istered by the MDB between 1983 and 1988 were analyzed by Costa (14)



10 The case of Lages waswidely publicized by awell-known journalist andformer politician MaacutercioMoreira Alves See AlvesMaacutercio Moreira (1988) AForccedila do Povo DemocraciaParticipativa em LagesBrasiliense Satildeo Paulo

11 Ferreira Ana Luiza S S(1991) Lages Um Jeito deGovernar Instituto PoacutelisSatildeo Paulo page 64

12 See reference 11 page63


14 Costa Sergio (1997)ldquoMovimentos sociaisdemocratizaccedilatildeo e aconstruccedilatildeo de esferaspuacuteblicas locaisrdquo Dados -Revista Brasileira de CiecircnciasSociais Vol 12 No 35 pages112-124



He evaluates with scepticism the state-sponsored experiments in partic-ipation finding that although these programmes reduce the anguish oflocal politicians who are seeking to break away from patrimonialismand clientelism such programmes may have perverse consequencesMost critically Costa argues that rather than empowering widespreadparticipation they have tended to transform civil society leaders andinstitutions into brokers of political interests that are not based onpeoplersquos needs Costarsquos analysis points to the difficulties of early partic-ipatory programmes in generating any sort of autonomous civic mobi-lization of the type that could have been expected to generate citizenparticipation capable of challenging the interests of dominant politiciansand traditional municipal eacutelites

In addition to the individual case studies just reviewed we owe muchto the efforts of Instituto Poacutelis a Brazilian private think tank in provid-ing a comparative body of research that systematically analyzes severalparticipatory experiences but especially cases from after the politicalopening following the end of the military regime(15) One of their studiesanalyzed Fortalezarsquos experience with the first PT local government inBrazil elected in 1986 which largely failed in its efforts to expand partic-ipation because the political executive isolated itself from the officialbureaucracy and because the local government was divided by contro-versies surrounding the role of the PT and its relationship with the exec-utive and society(16) One of the positive aspects of the PT administrationwas that it clarified for the cityrsquos population the separation that existsbetween the city and the state governments The success of the PTadministration in distinguishing the role of municipal governance isimportant given that Fortaleza like most large cities in Brazil and in theNorth-East in particular had scarce local resources and therefore hadbecome almost another branch of the state government administrationduring the military years

b T he I nc re ase in Loca l Revenues

The second factor that has led to the increasingly widespread adoptionof PB across Brazilian cities is the increase in municipal revenuesbrought about by the 1988 constitution and the decision taken by moststate capitals to reform their finances From the 1970s to the 1980s allBrazilian cities especially the large ones were in financial disarraywhile in the 1990s the same crisis affected the states However with thechanges made by the 1988 constitution on inter-governmental financemany municipalities have been able to improve their financial situationin particular the state capitals It is important to note that the transfer ofresources determined by the constitution was phased in over time andwas only completed in 1993 The expansion of resources to sub-nationalgovernments although mentioned in the literature that analyzes PB hasnot been appropriately recognized for the crucial role it played in allow-ing local governments to adopt innovative policies such as PB

It was not only Porto Alegre or other cities governed by leftist partiesthat embarked on a policy of increasing local revenue but also severalmunicipalities across Brazil By providing information only on PortoAlegrersquos resources and financial reforms the literature can mislead thereader into believing that only Porto Alegre has adopted this policyJayme Jr and Marquetti for instance (17) show that although the effortsto raise revenues in Porto Alegre were great ndash between 1989 and 1994

15 Other localadministrations analyzedby Poacutelis are Santos (seeFerreira Ana Luiza S S et al(1994) Santos O Desafio deSer Governo Instituto PoacutelisSatildeo Paulo) Ronda Alta andSatildeo Joatildeo do Triunfo (seeFerreira Ana Luiza S S andRudaacute Ricci (1992) Estudosde Gestatildeo Ronda Alta e SatildeoJoatildeo do Triunfo InstitutoPoacutelis Satildeo Paulo) Sectoralprogrammes such asculture shantytownurbanization and streetchildren have also beenanalyzed by Poacutelis Anothernon-governmentalorganization that plays animportant role indisseminating participatorypolicies is IBASE It iscurrently involved intraining programmesregarding participatorybudgeting for other NGOscivic associationsparticipatory budgetingdelegates at state and locallevels and civil servants

16 Pinto Valeska P (1992)Prefeitura de FortalezaAdministraccedilatildeo Popular -198688 Instituto Poacutelis SatildeoPaulo

17 Jayme Jr Frederico andA Marquetti (1998)ldquoDescentralizaccedilatildeo tributaacuteriae performance econocircmicadas capitais brasileiras1989-1994 paper presentedat the LASA 1998 Chicago24-26 September

the city rose from 10th to 5th position in the ranking of state capitalsrsquoper capita total revenue ndash it was not unique (18) However the most strik-ing change in the ranking of revenue collection occurred in Belo Hori-zonte where it jumped from 22nd to 4th position over the same periodThese authors also show that the average annual rate of increase in percapita total revenue between 1989 and 1994 reached 2445 per cent inBelo Horizonte first in the ranking and 1354 per cent in Porto Alegresecond in the ranking(19) As for the increase in its own local revenueBelo Horizonte again registered a higher rate than Porto Alegre 2399per cent and 113 per cent respectively(20) Belo Horizontersquos performancedisplays the extent to which local taxpayers in several state capitals werebeing under-taxed It also shows that many popularly elected mayors asopposed to appointed mayors who had governed the state capitalsduring the military reacutegime have opted to raise taxes in order to fulfiltheir commitments to their electorate instead of solely relying on anincrease in federal and state transfers brought about by the constitutionThis contradicts the assumption that when sub-national governmentshave a large share in central transfers they make little effort to increasetheir own revenue It must be remembered however that Porto Alegreand Belo Horizonte have better economic and social indicators than theaverage for Brazilian cities This fact has given their local governmentsmuch more room for increasing local taxes and consequently obtainingmore revenue to set aside for distribution through participatory budg-eting schemes

c T he Inc rease in Le f t i s t Lo ca l G overnmen ts

The third factor that has contributed to the widespread adoption ofparticipatory programmes is the increasing presence of leftist partiesespecially the PT in local governments In 1988 32 mayors were electedIn 1992 there were 53 in 1996 115 and in 2000 187 Thus there has beenan increase in expanding participation in governance These participa-tory experiences are being constantly analyzed and disseminated by thepartyrsquos militants intellectuals think tanks and NGOs The repeatedvictories have provided the PT with the opportunity to debate how toput into practice their political and social commitments Moreover theinitial success and popularity of a number of participatory programmesincluding PB in PT-administered cities has served as a blueprint forsuccessive leftist administrations throughout the country

This section has shown that the origins of participation can be tracedback to before the most well-known experiences of Porto Alegre andBelo Horizonte Furthermore PB is not restricted to PT local govern-ments In fact Belo Horizonte was a latecomer with Recife and Fort-aleza beginning earlier But because the latter two were not administeredby the PT or because the results of PB seemed more modest in bothcities they are less well-known The experiments of Porto Alegre andBelo Horizonte analyzed in the following section have certainly learnedfrom the problems achievements and strengths described above Thedifference however is that they went much further than their prede-cessors in two ways First they have endured beyond single adminis-trative terms and second they concentrated their participatory effortson the budget process ie on the decision of how to allocate scarceresources therefore bringing into the open the issue of inequalitypoverty and uneven balance of power in Brazilian cities



18 Recife moved from the6th to 8th position in theranking

19 Recifersquos rate of increasereached 442 per centoccupying 16th positionamong the 26 state capitals

20 In Recife it was 99 percent

III PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING EXPERIENCE INPORTO ALEGRE AND BELO HORIZONTE(21)

PARTICIPATION IS CERTAINLY no panacea nor is it an easy task asthe cases of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte show(22) Furthermoreparticipation is far from being a clear concept even within the partymost associated with it the PT Further problems can be expected whenparticipation is a result of a state-led policy After considerable debateit seems that a pragmatic consensus on the two basic goals of a ldquopopulardemocraticrdquo administration has emerged in leftist local governmentsnamely inverting priorities and popular participation as suggested byNylen(23) The former refers to targeting popular policy to favour thepoor while taxing the people and groups most capable of paying Thelatter refers to engendering ldquoempowermentrdquo a form of politicalconsciousness that is both critical of existing inequalities and injusticesand yet at the same time aware of the promise of collective action inachieving progressive reform(24)

Although the experiences of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte are themost well known the former has achieved greater visibility in theacademic world among multilateral organizations and in the mediathan the latter

Both experiences started with the victory of PT in mayoral electionsIn Porto Alegre it started in 1989 one year after the local governmentrsquosinauguration and in Belo Horizonte in 1993 the year of the localgovernmentrsquos inauguration Both experiences have continued to thepresent In Porto Alegre the PT has won the last four mayoral electionsand has governed the city without extensive collaboration with otherparties In Belo Horizonte the PT was the leading party of a leftist coali-tion in the 1992 election however in the 1996 election the PT lost itsleadership to the PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party) Nevertheless it quicklybecame the dominant faction of the governing coalition and has kept itsleadership in PB Porto Alegre is a city of 13 million people in the Southof Brazil Belo Horizonte has 21 million inhabitants and is located in theSouth-East The South and the South-East have high levels of humandevelopment and are Brazilrsquos most developed regions in economicterms

The PB took a while to take off in Porto Alegre According to the liter-ature analyzed the main reasons were an initial lack of financialresources a government structure in disarray and a lack of mobiliza-tion of the poor In this last point if civic organizations already existedthey either had a history of protest and confrontation with the govern-ment or they were dominated by clientelistic practices This was dealtwith in Porto Alegre by the strong role played by local government incontracting community organizers to positions within the administra-tion PB representatives would visit unmobilized neighbourhoodsseeking out new leaders and disseminating information on PB In BeloHorizonte the literature reports almost no problems in the initial stagesof PB implementation but the issue of mobilizing the unorganized wastackled through a strategy allowing the participation of individualmembers and of existing associations even if they were seen as clien-telists

The following sub-sections present the main features of PB in PortoAlegre and Belo Horizonte as well as its impact on other collectivespheres and institutions



21 This section presentsinformation and dataextracted from selectedliterature Because there arefew works comparing thetwo experiences it was notalways possible to find thesame information for bothcities One exception isJacobi and Teixeirarsquos articlecomparing both cities (seeJacobi Pedro and MarcoAntocircnio C Teixeira (1996)ldquoOrccedilamento participativoco responsabilidade nagestatildeo das cidadesrdquo SatildeoPaulo em Perspectiva Vol 10No 13 pages 119-128Furthermore carrying outcomparative studies onlocal practices that gobeyond description is adifficult task As shown byFrey local managementexperiences in Santos andCuritiba variedsubstantially because ofeconomic cultural andsocial differences (see FreyKlaus (1996) ldquoCrise doestado e estilos de gestatildeomunicipalrdquo Lua Nova No37 pages 105-138

22 For the dilemmas ofparticipation at the locallevel see Jacobi Pedro(1990) ldquoDescentralizaccedilatildeomunicipal e participaccedilatildeodos cidadatildeosapontamentos para odebaterdquo Lua Nova No 20pages121-143

23 Nylen William (2000a)ldquorsquoThe making of loyalopposition the WorkersrsquoParty (PT) and theconsolidation of democracyin Brazilrdquo in Kingstone Pand T J Power (editors)Democratic Brazil ActorsInstitutions and ProcessesUniversity of PittsburghPress Pittsburgh page 132

24 See reference 23

a The Ma in Fea tu res of PB

i Funct ioning The main features of PB in Porto Alegre are described by variousauthors (25) The central features of the programme are the district andthematic plenary assemblies that gather in different areas of the city toparticipate in the budget-writing process There are two rounds of plenaryassemblies in each of the 16 districts and on each of the five thematicareas(26) Between the two rounds there are additional preparatory meet-ings in the micro districts of the city and on the thematic areas without theparticipation of the municipal government In the first round of assem-blies local government officials present the audience with general infor-mation about the city budget After closure of the first assembliesmeetings are held in each neighbourhood where residents draw up theirlist of priorities for investment in infrastructure In the second round ofassemblies each district elects two members and two alternates to thecity-wide municipal budget council In the months following the districtassemblies the delegates of the district budget fora negotiate amongthemselves to come up with district-wide ldquopriority listsrdquo of infrastructureprojects in each investment category The municipal budget council deter-mines how to distribute funds for each priority among districts Finallyeach districtrsquos quota is applied following the priority list of the districtThe municipal budget council and the district budget fora also monitorspending year-round and engage in regular discussions with local govern-ment personnel on issues relating to service provision more generally Thebudget council is responsible for overseeing the plans of each city agency

The Belo Horizonte experience in PB has been analyzed by variousauthors(27) PB in Belo Horizonte now starts with two rounds of assembliesin each of the cityrsquos nine administrative sub-districts instead of the origi-nal three rounds(28) As in Porto Alegre at the first meeting officials fromthe municipal governmentrsquos district offices and from its secretariats forplanning and finance explain the revenue and expenditure situation andthe amount left for PB The following two meetings are used to agree onpriorities to put together the demands of each sub-district and to choosethe delegates for the district forum known as district PB After the districtdelegates have been elected ldquopriorities caravansrdquo are organized Theseconsist of delegates making bus tours to check in loco the problems indi-cated as priorities by the sub-district meetings The aim is to give the dele-gates an overview of each district stimulating a broader perspective ofother districtsrsquo problems It also aims to counteract the tendency of districtdelegates to choose demands that are either too specific or too frag-mented The district forum is the deliberative phase of PB and is where thelist of priorities is drawn up It is at this forum that the members of thecommittee in charge of following up and overseeing the works to beimplemented are chosen The last phase is the municipal forum in whichPB is formally presented In 1994 Belo Horizonte also introduced thematicfora which worked together with the district assemblies with the aim ofbroadening the issues discussed in PB(29) These fora unlike in PortoAlegre were of a more consultative type and because of this the thematicfora were replaced by only one for housing This change came as a resultof pressure from the Homeless Movement A new participatory forumwas then created which became known as housing PB(30) In 1999 anotherforum was created the city PB with the inclusion of local officials It aimsto introduce planning criteria and to discuss sectoral policies Changes



25 Abers Rebecca (1998)ldquoFrom clientelism tocooperation localgovernment participatorypolicy and civic organizingin Porto Alegre BrazilrdquoPolitics and Society Vol 26No 4 pages 511-523 seealso Abers Rebecca (2000)ldquoOvercoming the dilemmasof participatory democracythe participatory budgetpolicy in Porto AlegrerdquoBrazil paper presented atthe LASA 2000 Miami 16-18 March and reference 21Jacobi and Teixeira (1996)Laranjeira Socircnia (1996)ldquoGestatildeo puacuteblica eparticipaccedilatildeo a experiecircnciado orccedilamento participativoem Porto Alegrerdquo Satildeo Pauloem Perspectiva Vol 10 No 13pages 129-137 MatthaeusHorst (1995) ldquoUrbanmanagement participationand the poor in PortoAlegre Brazilrdquounpublished PhDdissertation University ofBirmingham NavarroZander (1997) ldquoAffirmativedemocracy andredistributive developmentthe case of participatorybudgeting in Porto AlegreBrazil (1989-1997)rdquounpublished SantosBoaventura de S (1998)ldquoParticipatory budgeting inPorto Alegre toward aredistributive democracyrdquoPolitics and Society Vol 26No 4 pages 461-510 andWampler Brian (2000)ldquoParticipatory publics andthe executive participatorybudgeting programmes inRecife and Porto Alegrerdquopaper presented at theLASA 2000 Miami 16-18March

26 The thematic areas aretransport and trafficcirculation educationleisure and culture healthand social welfareeconomic development andtaxation city organizationand urban development

27 Azevedo Seacutergio de(1997) ldquoPoliacuteticas puacuteblicas egovernanccedila em BeloHorizonterdquo CadernosIPPUR XI Vol 1 No 2pages 63-74 also AzevedoSeacutergio and L Avritzer(1994) ldquoA poliacutetica do

have also been made in the frequency of these PBs in even years the foradiscuss infrastructure and housing projects and in odd years they discusssocial and urban policies

i i Investment Pr ior i t iesPriorities vary according to the needs of each community In Porto Alegrethe preferences for resources allocated through PB are mainly for streetpaving sewerage housing and community equipment whereas in BeloHorizonte the preferences are for housing sewerage street paving shan-tytown urbanization health and education

Both cities have established distribution criteria to assure a progressivedistribution of resources so that poorer areas receive more funding thanthe well-off ones regardless of what the fora want Therefore eachdistrictrsquos share of total investment is weighted by district level measuresof its poverty and infrastructure needs to guarantee a progressive distri-bution of investments

There are also technical criteria to determine priorities In Porto Alegrethey are if community demands are found to be technically non-viable by the

municipality they are rejected preference is given to works-in-progress the rainwater drainage network is not installed in unpaved streets(31)

In Porto Alegre elected priorities are given grades according to theirranking First priorities are grade five and fifth priorities are grade one Onthe basis of these priorities adding up the grades of the different priori-ties in all the districts the executive establishes the first three priorities ofthe budget in preparation In Belo Horizonte the priorities are listed bythe participants in a questionnaire

i i i Resources and Expendi ture For the PBrsquos significance to be understood we need to know that it is notthe whole budget that is affected by the decisions of PB participants butmostly decisions on infrastructure investment We need to know also thatbudgeting in Brazil is only an authorization of expenditure on prioritieswhich can or cannot be fulfilled by the executive

Navarro reports that in the case of Porto Alegre resources for PBincreased steadily from 1992 achieving a peak in 1994 (US$ 82 million)(32)

But as argued by Santos(33) it is possible that municipal investment hasnow reached its maximum limit especially if Brazil continues with itsnational policy of tight fiscal control This policy has produced amongother things several attempts by the federal government to reduce sub-national resources

The percentage of total investments included in the Porto Alegre municipalbudget vis-agrave-vis other items of expenditure (consumption debt payroll etc)varies between 17 per cent in 1992 98 per cent in 1993(34) and 21 per cent in1999 Payroll expenditure is the main item of the budget representing 652 percent in 1999 The figures for PB investments vary greatly from one year toanother but the literature and the website do not provide a clear explanation forthe variation As for expenditure on projects selected for PB in Porto Alegre70 per cent of the resources negotiated by the participants within PB wereactually spent between 1996 and 1998(35) PB has revealed that the peoplersquospriorities differ from those imagined by local government Matthaeusreports that in the first year of PB in Porto Alegre the administrationthought that poor peoplersquos priority was public transport but what they

Env ironmentampU rbanizat ion Vol 13 No 1 Apri l 2001 1 67


lsquoorccedilamento participativorsquoformas de relacionamentoentre estado e sociedaderdquopaper presented at theANPOCS 1994 Caxambu23-27 November seereference 23 NylenWilliam (2000b) ldquoTestingthe empowerment thesisthe participatory budget inBelo Horizonte and BetimBrazilrdquo paper presented atthe LASA 2000 Miami 16-18 March Pereira M deLourdes D et al (1996)ldquoExperiecircncias de orccedilamentoparticipativo nademocratizaccedilatildeo da gestatildeourbana a dimensatildeopoliacutetico-eleitoralrdquo paperpresented at the ANPOCS1996 Caxambu 20-22October Pereira M deLourdes D (1999)ldquoNegociaccedilatildeo e parcerias agestatildeo urbana democraacutetico-participativardquo unpublishedPhD dissertationUniversidade de Satildeo Pauloand Somarriba Mercecircs andOtavio Dulci (1997) ldquoAdemocratizaccedilatildeo do poderlocal e seus dilemas adinacircmica atual daparticipaccedilatildeo popular emBelo Horizonterdquo in Diniz Eand S Azevedo (editors)Reforma do Estado eDemocracia no Brasil EditoraUnB Brasiacutelia pages 391-425

28 As in Porto Alegreldquoassociativismrdquo andparticipation in themeetings are highly unevenin the sub-districts asmentioned by Pereira (1996)(see reference 27) andNavarro (1997) (seereference 25) Navarrohowever does not stress thenumber of participants asan important variablebecause first there aremany intermediatemeetings during the entireprocess and secondparticipatory budgeting inPorto Alegre is no longerinterested in high numbersof participants but ratherin the quality of therepresentation

29 The thematic fora inBelo Horizonte wereeducation healthenvironment socialdevelopment and

voted for in PB was water supply and sewerage (36)

In the first year of PB in Belo Horizonte half of the local resources forinvestment were allocated according to the decisions taken by PB (aroundUS$ 15 million in 1994 US$ 20 million in 1995 US$ 365 million in 1996US$ 27 million in 1997 US$ 30 million in 1998 and US$ 64 million in 1999)In the first year however PB resources represented only 5 per cent of thetotal budget(37)

i v The Part ic ipants Data show that the inhabitants of Porto Alegre have a high rate of associ-ational activity political awareness and communal trust when comparedto the inhabitants of most Brazilian cities Calculations by Setzler showthat 384 per cent of the people in Porto Alegre belong to a civic associa-tion while in Belo Horizonte the figure is 277 per cent(38) As an indicatorof political awareness 922 per cent of the people in Porto Alegre and 889per cent in Belo Horizonte said that they follow current events and 757per cent in Porto Alegre and 704 per cent in Belo Horizonte said they seekvoting information As an indicator of communal trust 407 per cent ofthe people in Porto Alegre and 373 per cent in Belo Horizonte said theybelieve civic associations of some type defend peoplersquos interests althoughscepticism in both communities was greater than trust 457 per cent inPorto Alegre and 533 per cent of citizens in Belo Horizonte said theybelieved neither associations nor politicians defended their interests

As for those who directly participate in PB in Porto Alegre Abersmentions that in 1989 60 per cent of participants in the district assemblieslived in six districts that had some history of protest-based neighbour-hood activism while 40 per cent came from 10 districts that had littlehistory of activism(39) By 1995 62 per cent came from the latter 10 districtsAbers also found that 76 per cent of the interviewees in a survey partici-pated in some kind of organization mostly neighbourhood associations(40) At the thematic plenary 759 per cent stated that they belonged to someentity or association and 505 per cent that they belonged to neighbour-hood associations ie of those belonging to associations 66 per centbelonged to neighbourhood associations(41) The number of participantscurrently taking part in the PB process in Porto Alegre is estimated at16000 belonging to 300 grassroots movements Navarro mentions thatthe number of participants in official meetings rose from 3694 in 1991 to10735 in 1993 to 14267 in 1996 and to 16016 in 1997(42) Santos mentionsthat if the number of people attending all meetings is taken into accounttotal participation would come close to 100000 people(43)

In Belo Horizonte it has been reported that in 1994 15716 peopleparticipated in 1994 there were 28263 and in 1995 52900 representing800 grassroots movements The municipalityrsquos website states that around200000 people have already participated in PB(44)

The social and educational background of the participants A surveyconducted by Abers in two selected districts of Porto Alegre found that40 per cent of the interviewees had a monthly household income of up toaround US$ 228 and that 18 per cent earned between US$ 228 and US$380 per month (45) Around 42 per cent of the interviewees had notcompleted basic education and only 12 per cent had gone on to highereducation Abersrsquo survey confirms the findings of a larger one coveringall the districts In the latter it was found that the majority of the partici-pants had a household income of around US$ 76 to US$ 228 per month andhad completed basic education In comparison with a similar survey done



administration the latterincluding human resourcesand payroll expenditure

30 Resources invested inhousing projects amountedto R$ 34 million reaching3342 families Sevencouncil estates were builtand one is underconstruction reaching 775families

31 See reference 25 Santos(1998)

32 See reference 25Navarro (1997)



35 In Recife it was 29 percent see reference 25Wampler (2000)

36 See reference 25Matthaeus (1995) page 266

37 See reference 27Azevedo (1997)

38 Setzler Mark (2000)ldquoDemocratizing urbanBrazil institutional legaciesand determinants ofaccountability in localelections and legislaturesrdquopaper presented at theLASA 2000 Miami 16-18March

39 See reference 25 Abers(1998)





44 These figures aredifficult to compare as theauthors do not mention themethod they used to arriveat them


in 1993 an increase in income and education was detected A significantnumber of the people surveyed were self-employed retired and at-homeworkers As for gender and age the participants were a balanced groupof men and women with an average age of 41 However the number ofwomen participating decreased as the scale of decision making rose(46)

In Belo Horizonte Somarriba and Dulcirsquos survey found that thebalance between genders is similar to Porto Alegre 448 per cent of thedelegates were women(47) With respect to age the majority of delegateswere aged between 31 and 40 (34 per cent) followed by those between 41and 50 (236 per cent) Most participants worked in commerce or serv-ices (276 per cent) With respect to schooling the picture is similar toPorto Alegre 303 per cent of the delegates had not completed basiceducation followed by those who had competed secondary school (171per cent) The survey does not present information on income levelHowever it states that although the vast majority of the participantscame from the ldquopoorest sectors of society there was also a significantnumber coming from societyrsquos middle sectorsrdquo More than half the dele-gates (507 per cent) belonged to community associations followed bythose who belonged to religious groups (131 per cent) However wecannot infer from these figures that the number of people in Belo Hori-zonte who were encouraged to join social movements has increased as aresult of PB As shown by Nylen the lack of a before-and-after compar-ison in the survey obscures an important aspect of the PB experience andof its well-publicised results namely the empowerment thesis(48) Nylenrsquossurvey showed that both prior to their PB experience and at the time ofhis survey Belo Horizonte delegates participated in neighbourhoodorganizations (522 per cent before PB and 645 per cent after PB) and inreligious groups (40 per cent before PB and 401 per cent after PB) Thefigures for those who had never participated in organized movementsstood at 197 per cent prior to delegatesrsquo PB involvement and 122 percent at the time of the survey(49) Nylen concludes by suggesting thatproponents of participatory democratic processes should refocus theirargument by emphasizing the issue of sustaining non-eacutelite politicalactivism rather than empowering disengaged or alienated citizens Thegreat majority of PB delegates in Belo Horizonte declared they had noparty affiliation (789 per cent) followed by 139 per cent who had PTmembership

v De lega tes In Porto Alegre delegates are chosen from the participants attending PBrsquossecond general assembly This strategy of choosing delegates from thoseattending PB meetings and not from existing community associations wasadopted because as reported by Abers these associations have beendominated traditionally by clientelism and by the PDT (DemocraticLabour Party) the PTrsquos main opponent both in Porto Alegre and in thestate of Rio Grande do Sul(50) As mentioned above in Porto Alegre thegovernment stepped in to mobilize participants by hiring communityorganizers

The criteria used to determine the number of delegates to the districtand thematic fora have changed over time Initially one delegate for everyfive people attending the initial PB community forum was agreedgrowing to ten and reaching 20 by 1996 Currently the criteria are morecomplex as reported by Santos(51) and comprise different ratios accord-ing to the level of attendance There is one delegate for every ten people




47 See reference 27Somarriba and Dulci (1997)

48 See reference 27 Nylen(2000b)

49 Similar figures were alsofound by Nylen (2000b)(see reference 27) in Betimanother municipality inMinas Gerais that hasparticipatory budgeting



up to 100 people attending from 101 to 250 people attending one delegatefor every 20 from 851 to 1000 one for every 70 and for more than 1000one for every 80 The delegates are elected for a one-year mandate andcan only be re-elected once Problems on how to select the delegates andtheir relationship with those they represent are mentioned by Abers andSantos(52) Abers believes that while there are some problems the commu-nity is reacting against delegates who try to operate in a clientelist ormanipulative way Santos states that this relationship is not as smooth asit appears Problems of autonomy accountability and transparency doexist but they have been debated inside and outside PB He believeshowever that the popular sectors in Porto Alegre are actively engaged inpreventing PB from falling into the trappings of the ldquoold clientelistauthoritarian systemrdquo

In Belo Horizonte PB delegates are elected from among participants atneighbourhood or micro-district meetings One delegate is elected forevery ten participants(53) Unlike in Porto Alegre individuals who aremembers of any community association can be elected as delegates (54)

v i Inst i tu t ional Arrangements and the BureaucracyThe institutional arrangements to deal with PB have changed in PortoAlegre during its implementation The Secretariat of Planning was maderesponsible for PB but it was soon obvious that its bureaucracy was resist-ant either because of its technocratic training or because it was too clien-telist To overcome this GAPLAN was created in 1990 directly linked tothe mayor rsquos office Currently there are no complaints regarding thebureaucracyrsquos commitment to PB and high-level administrative staffregularly appear at meetings as reported by Abers(55) The mayor alsoattends some meetings Some critics of PB interpret this change as an inap-propriate political use of the programme

In Belo Horizonte the main resistance came from the SUDECAP anagency in charge of the cityrsquos public works Being a powerful agency ithad strong links with the equally powerful building industry Unlike inPorto Alegre the mayor did not make any formal change in the institu-tional structure but rather changed the agencyrsquos board Boschi inter-preted this strategy as bringing new politico-administrative practices thatpositively altered the entire functioning of the government(56)

vii Visib il i ty and Satis factionIn Porto Alegre PB is well-known by the local population Matthaeusreports that a survey in 1994 showed that 463 per cent of the populationknew about it and that 83 per cent had participated in one form oranother in PB discussions(57) With regard to satisfaction among delegatesa 1995 survey showed that 565 per cent of participants in district andthematic assemblies claimed to have benefited from the works and serv-ices of PB This percentage increases with the number of years of partici-pation(58)

In Belo Horizonte Somarriba and Dulcirsquos survey found that 851 percent of the delegates approved of PB because they claimed it allowed thepeople to decide on how to invest the ldquogovernmentrsquos moneyrdquo(59) As forproblems with PB 507 per cent of the respondents said that the mainproblem was the limited resources A 1994 opinion poll with a sample ofBelo Horizontersquos inhabitants found that PB had the approval of 673 percent of the population and that it received the greatest approval of all localgovernment policies(60)

170 Env i ro nmentamp Ur baniza t ion Vol 13 No 1 Apri l 2001


52 See reference 25 Abers(1998) and Santos (1998)


54 In Satildeo Paulo during thePTrsquos term in office onlysocial movements that hadties with the party werecalled to participate Thecity was divided into 20sub-districts each of whichhad around 1 millioninhabitants (see Singer Paul(1994) ldquoPoder puacuteblico eorganizaccedilotildees populares nocombate agrave pobreza aexperiecircncia do governoLuiza Erundina em SatildeoPaulo 1989-1992rdquo paperpresented at the conferenceGovernabilidade e PobrezaRio de Janeiro 29-30 June


56 Boschi Renato (1999)ldquoGovernanccedila participaccedilatildeoe eficiecircncia das poliacuteticaspuacuteblicas exame deexperiecircncias municipais noBrasilrdquo in Marcus AndreacuteMelo (editor) Reforma doEstado e MudanccedilaInstitucional no BrasilFundaccedilatildeo Joaquim NabucoEd Massangana Recifepage 268




60 See reference 27 Pereira(1996)

b The Ind irect Ef fects of PB

PB has an impact beyond the budgeting process itself affecting othergovernmental and societal practices and institutions

i Transparency in Dec is ion -m akingSome authors argue that the impact of PB on increasing governmentaltransparency is as significant as increasing participation The reasons forthis are two-fold First budgetary matters have always been surroundedby too specific and coded a language and dominated only by a fewbureaucrats making it difficult for most people including politicians tounderstand let alone ordinary citizens Because this budgetary expertisehas always been the work of a few bureaucrats and politicians it hasallowed the negotiation of vested interests sometimes leading to corrup-tion However as a result of one of Brazilrsquos major political scandals involv-ing members of the federal budgetary committee in 1993 society and themedia became aware of the dangers of the lack of transparency in budg-etary matters The importance of PB as a way of tackling this tradition ofsecrecy has probably increased as a result of this awareness Secondbecause the governments implementing PB have to legitimate the expe-rience public resources and expenditures are disclosed to PB participantsand to the media therefore discouraging negotiations based on vestedinterests such as those facilitating clientelism andor corruption Bybringing into the open not only the choices about how to spend part ofthe budget but also the bulk of resources and expenditures decision-making becomes more transparent

There is little doubt that PB is one way of increasing transparency ingovernment decision-making however Brazil in general is experiencinga wave of social revolt against corruption and vested interests regardingpublic resources The work of several parliamentary inquiries and publicprosecutors in particular at the national and local levels coupled withthe role of the media in following these inquiries and even disclosingcorruption cases has never been greater Therefore one of the positiveresults of redemocratization in Brazil has been an enormous increase ingovernmental transparency at local and national levels as opposed tostate level although the gap and the timing between the disclosure ofwrong-doings relating to public resources and their punishment remainshigh

i i Local Government Accountabi l i tyIn Porto Alegre the government distributes pamphlets and publishes abooklet with a list of all the approved works described in detail as wellas a list of the names and addresses of every delegate in order to offeraccountability In a 1995 survey when asked about the degree of satisfac-tion concerning the accountability of the executive 476 per cent of therespondents said it was satisfactory and 236 per cent that it was satisfac-tory in part(61) Both cities have websites with information regarding PBresults and procedures (wwwbelohorizontemggovbr andwwwportoalegrersgovbr) as well as information on the local executiveCommunication between the executive and the citizens is seen by Jacobiand Teixeira as one of the reasons for the success of PB in Porto Alegre(62)

In Belo Horizonte the cultural markets (feiras culturais) are the instru-ment for accountability These go into various areas of the city promot-ing PB In Somarriba and Dulcirsquos survey the delegates said they had been




62 See reference 21 Jacobiand Teixeira (1996)

informed about PB through their neighbourhood associations (376 percent) through district offices (185 per cent) and pamphlets (114 percent)(63)

i i i Relationship with the Local Legis lature In Porto Alegre the role of local councillors (vereadores) in the municipallegislature is troubled by the fact that the PT has never been able to win amajority in the legislature although the number of PT councillors hasincreased steadily since the 1988 elections There is a consensus in the liter-ature analyzed that the relationship between the councillors and PB dele-gates is tense and dominated by open conflict The councillors feel thatthey have no say in the budget negotiations for two reasons First theyare formally excluded from participating in the meetings as local coun-cillors although this does not mean that they cannot participate as citi-zens Second popular pressure not to change the budget proposalsubmitted to the legislature by the executive is so intense that councillorsfeel that they have to approve it without any amendments preventingthem from taking part in what they see as one of their major roles as legis-lators They also argue that the number of people who participate in thedecision-making is smaller and less representative of the population thanthe number of voters many councillors represent According to Wamplerthe number of amendments to the budget presented by local councillorsin Porto Alegre between 1994 and 1998 was 117 and 53 (45 per cent) ofthem were approved(64)

The existence of amendments to the budget cannot always be taken asan indicator of clientelism whereby amendments are used to providematerial benefits to the electoral bases of councillors Qualitative researchby Seltzer indicates that in Porto Alegre councillors on the left the centreand the right of the political spectrum legislate along ideological ratherthan patrimonial lines(65) His analysis of five years of recent budgetaryamendments carried out by councillors reveals that essentially no neigh-bourhood-targeted legislation had been introduced by councillors as partof the budget negotiation process Instead budgetary amendments hadbeen almost exclusively limited to attempts to reduce executive auton-omy (eg cutting down the governmentrsquos expenditure on publicity andreducing its freedom to spend unexpected revenues without additionallegislative approval)

In Belo Horizonte Jacobi and Teixeira and Somarriba and Dulcidescribe the reaction of local councillors to PB as less tense and problem-atic than in Porto Alegre(66) First because PB is seen as a result of themunicipalityrsquos organic law (a type of local constitution) it is not viewedas a PT or mayoral imposition given that the councillors were the oneswho passed the law Unlike in Porto Alegre where mayors have openlysuggested that PB is a viable alternative for city councillors in Belo Hori-zonte the process has not threatened the political basis of councillors asargued by Seltzer(67) Second many councillors see PB as a way of freeingthem from clientelist demands that are essentially impossible to satisfygiven the limited role that councillors can legally play in the distributionof city resources Third in the second year of PB the government formallyinvited the councillors to participate in the meetings The delegates alsosee the councillorsrsquo participation as positive with 60 per cent approvalrate Fourth in 1995 the municipal government recognized that one ofthe reasons for councillor resistance to PB was that they now had to sharepower in PB decisions on the allocation of resources to the cityrsquos districts




64 See reference 25Wampler (2000) Wamplerrsquosfigures for Recife are 559amendments presented and290 (51 per cent) approvedin the same period

65 See reference 38

66 See reference 21 Jacobiand Teixeira (1996) alsoreference 27 Somarriba andDulci (1997)

67 See reference 38

Pragmatically the local government decided that part of the resourceswould be left for the councillors to allocate freely a strategy which waswidely criticized by the PT In Belo Horizonte city councillors continue tosubmit many budget amendments that seek to deliver public works proj-ects to their electoral bases while knowing that such amendments arerarely if ever actually acted upon by the mayor As Setzler argues thereis little evidence to suggest that Belo Horizontersquos clientelist councillorseither have or will put an end to their well-entrenched politics of personalassistance (68)

i v Par t i c ipat ion beyond PB In both cities PB has triggered other participatory processes aiming atinvolving other social groups and classes besides low-income groups InPorto Alegre the main experience is the Cidade Constituinte (ConstituentCity) project aimed at discussing the future of the city in a broader andlonger-term perspective than that of PB In Belo Horizonte the main expe-rience is the Forum da Cidade (City Forum) to discuss the cityrsquos master planIn both cities these broader participatory processes were a response toaccusations that PB was excluding other social classes and was too centredon short-term demands(69)

The following section analyzes the experiences of Porto Alegre andBelo Horizonte in the light of selected literature searching for answers tothe questions listed above

IV W H AT DOES THE LITERATURE ARGUE ABOUTPARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

MANY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS began the 1980s with the creation ofmechanisms that allowed the local community to participate in the deci-sion-making process There is an increasing consensus that participatorypolicies are a desirable goal for ldquoThird Worldrdquo countries especially thoserecently redemocratized The consensus is so strong that it covers a widerange of the political spectrum from conservative to leftist parties frommultilateral organizations committed to income distribution to those thatare keen on ldquobest practicesrdquo Participation has become a ldquohotrdquo issue anda buzzword in the planning of local programmes as well as in their financ-ing

There is a wide range of literature analyzing participatory experiencesMoreover it is literature that focuses on issues that transcend academicdisciplines and areas decentralization democracy social capital account-ability development governance (good government) empowerment ofexcluded groups civic education social justice sustainable developmentnew forms of urban management etc In the case of Brazil this literaturederives from academic sources think tanks works sponsored by multi-lateral organizations such as the World Bank and by a host of Brazilianfunding bodies(70)

There is a consensus in the literature analyzed that although there areproblems constraints tensions and unexpected results deriving from PBit is certainly an important step with implications regarding the statersquosrole in facilitating citizen participation in policy making What are thegrounds for such an evaluation The theoretical and empirical literatureon participation has generally been pessimistic about the statersquos role inimproving democracy and in building up democratic institutions As



68 See reference 38

69 See reference 25Laranjeira (1996)

70 A comprehensiveanalysis of the literature onparticipatory budgeting isdifficult because it isscattered throughouthundreds of MScdissertations andconference papers Theselection made here hasfocused on works derivedfrom PhD theses includingsome still in progressjournal articles and thinktanks

Abers argues this literature points to three central ldquoproblems of partici-pationrdquo(71) First these programmes face the ldquoimplementation problemrdquowhich has to do with the fact that even when governments genuinelyseek to implement participatory decision-making mechanisms that wouldgive greater decision-making control to the less powerful the morepowerful are often able to resist such changes successfully Second theldquoinequality problemrdquo that has to do with the fact that even if open fora arecreated in which all participants formally have an equal right to influencedecision-making socio-economic inequalities tend to inhibit the effectiveparticipation of certain groups of people Third these programmes facethe ldquocooptation problemrdquo in that even if such open fora are genuinelyrepresentative inequalities between governments and participants withrespect to control over information and resources tend to lead to themanipulation of participatory venues by government officials

Despite these views the empirical literature on Brazilrsquos experience ofbudgetary participation especially in the cases of Porto Alegre and BeloHorizonte evaluates these programmes as having been quite successfulHowever the reasons provided by the literature for such positive evalu-ations vary as much as the label each work gives to PB This is becauseparticipation implies different things to different people To some it is ameans of improving efficiency to others it is limited to enhancements insocial justice meaning the improved access of people and social groupshistorically excluded from the decision making process To others partic-ipation is nothing more than rhetoric As Abers(72) puts it for some thebenefits of participation are limited to ldquoinstrumentalrdquo ones improvingpolicy effectiveness promoting consensus on state actions and gainingaccess to detailed information about policy context and the real needs ofordinary citizens But for many proponents of PB the principal goal ofparticipation is the ldquoempowermentrdquo of the social groups that have typi-cally been ignored by social and economic development policies Themeaning of participation is the first great divide both in the literatureanalyzed and in the issue of participation itself

a Part ic ipat ion as Vo i ce o r Em p o we rm en t

For the majority of multilateral organizations participation means voicein the process and not autonomy in decision-making With participationmultilateral organizations seek transparency accountability and voice(73)

For them ldquovoice of local people particularly the poor can be increasedby policy reforms at the national level that allow greater freedom to joinnon-governmental organizations trade unions and other bodies to under-stand better and influence decisions that affect themrdquo(74) Therefore for agreat part of the multilateral community participation is a way of trans-forming unorganized people into members of a civil society that can influ-ence (but not decide) issues that directly affect them This view alsostresses short-term ldquoresultsrdquo both in scope and time rather than long-term changes It is cautious in respecting the boundaries between the roleof popular participation and that of elected officials in a representativedemocracy This instrumental and cautious view of participation is notthe one that is being pursued by PB in Porto Alegre and Belo HorizonteAs mentioned above for the PT participation means empowering thepoor to become aware of inequalities and injustices (political conscious-ness-raising) and to reform the political and social systems throughcollective action





73 World Bank (1994)Governance The WorldBankrsquos Experience WorldBank Washington DC


As a result of these competing views a question arises is it possible toadopt PB in all Brazilian cities Even in the less ambitious view of themultilateral community the answer to this question is not straightfor-ward as the positive results from the limited number of cities that haveimplemented the procedure might suggest There are empirical and theo-retical constraints that may limit the adoption of PB elsewhere The mainones are Why would elected representatives be willing to share their power even

in a consultative way Why would rational people be will ing to participate in new

programmes given the disillusionment with politics that survey datareport from across Brazil

How can these programmes overcome problems of free-riding Do Brazilian municipalities have enough resources for large-scale

investments capable of stimulating citizens to invest their time indiscussion(75)

How can these programmes avoid manipulation corruption and clien-telism in cities where people are poorly educated not accustomed toplaying an active role in holding government to account and wheremost citizens are so poor that all their efforts and time are alreadycommitted to ensuring their daily survival

How can these programmes persuade people to devote themselves tocollective concerns over immediate needs when many other participa-tory policies were abolished after a different political group won theelections(76)

The large number of community councils that now exist in Brazil arenot an answer to these issues Stimulated either by national policies or byforeign grants that require the creation of community councils in returnfor funds for local governmentrsquos basic responsibilities (health care basiceducation social welfare etc) almost all local governments in Brazil havecreated community councils This has generated a merely formal repro-duction of what the rules say therefore threatening participationrsquos funda-mental assumptions of credibility trust transparency accountabilityempowerment etc Although there is still no body of research analyzingthese community councils in depth and in comparative terms there havebeen several accusations in the media about the control mayors exert overthem together with suspicions of corruption in the use of resources foreducation and health

What is the scope for the replication of PTrsquos view of participation as away of empowering the poor Some see PB as only possible in PortoAlegre(77) because of a combination of three factors First PB became apolitical strategy to gain support to govern becoming the municipalgovernmentrsquos hallmark It was also used to dismantle the old electoralbases of the cityrsquos populist left led by the PDT (Democratic Labour Party)Second state actors were able to change the cost-benefit calculation ofcollective action for poor less organized people by lowering the costs ofjoining in through the role of community organizers Third they were ableto increase expectations of benefits by targeting basic infrastructure forthe poor Abersrsquo thesis however is contradicted by the Belo Horizontecase although some of the reasons for the success as indicated by her arealso found in Belo Horizonte The idea that PB has produced a generalizedempowerment of the unorganized and of the poor has been challengedby Nylenrsquos findings as mentioned above and by the level of income ofthose who participate(78) Their income although low on average does not



75 Several works show thatthe great majority ofBrazilian cities especiallythose in districts wheremost needy people livecannot increase theirrevenue given the lack ofeconomic activities or thepoverty of their populationSee Bremaeker Franccedilois(1994) ldquoMitos e verdadessobre as financcedilas dosmuniciacutepios brasileirosrdquoIBAM unpublished alsoreference 2 Souza (1997)among others

76 The most recentexample occurred inBrasiacutelia The formergovernor CristoacutevamBuarque from the PTimplemented a highlypraised programme to givefamilies a minimum wageconditional on keepingtheir children at school ndashthe bolsa-escola programmeIt was the administrationrsquoshallmark The programmewas well evaluated byopinion polls and themedia Buarque was not re-elected and the programmewas immediately abolishedby his successor JoaquimRoriz a conservativepolitician well-known forhis clientelist practices Twolessons can be learned fromthe Brasiacutelia experienceFirst despite the outcryagainst closing theprogramme Roriz did soshowing that conservativepoliticians are notinterested in breaking theirclientelistic ties with thecommunity Second underBuarque the bolsa-escolawas presented to people asa right just as participatorybudgeting is Why wouldpoor rational voters notseek to combine rights withfavours



fully support the claimMatthaeus answers the issue of replication by stating that a policy like

PB is likely to be adopted only by leftist parties(79) For Santos PB worksin Porto Alegre because it is a city of ample democratic traditions and ahighly organized civil society(80) Data analyzed by Setzler as mentionedabove demonstrate that Porto Alegre indeed has higher levels of associ-ational activity political awareness and communal trust than other largeBrazilian cities(81) But Porto Alegrersquos associational activity has not always beengrounded in democratic values as the strategy of hiring community organizersshows The Belo Horizonte experience although combining differentstrategies (participation with forms of clientelism) has also been evalu-ated as successful despite the cityrsquos relatively lower levels of association-alism

Navarro also addresses the question of whether PB can be replicatedin other cities and in different conditions(82) While listing several neces-sary pre-conditions (political will to cede power to associations politicalposture to avoid clientelism financial control and resources to beinvested) he concludes that PB could become generalized in municipaladministration

The divide discussed above poses a final question is participation inthe sense of empowerment only possible in experiences similar to PBSome argue that cost-recovery policies directed at the people withoutgovernment mediation are more important for achieving ldquourban manage-ment by the peoplerdquo whereas PB is ldquourban management with thepeoplerdquo(83) This alternative option is condemned by Abers(84) Whateverthe view there is a consensus in the literature analyzed that in the case ofPorto Alegre empowerment (at least of the direct participants) was madepossible because of the conditions mentioned by Abers(85) In Belo Hori-zonte however Boschi seems to give the credit for PBrsquos success mainly toprevious experiences on decentralization(86)

b PB as a Means of Inver t ing Pr ior i t ies to Favour thePo o r

As to whether PB has been able to reflect the priorities of the poor mostauthors agree that this has been the case (87) Delegates who haveresponded to surveys in both Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte also seemto agree However it is less clear as to whether PB has been able to reflectthe needs of non-participants in particular the very poor This is impor-tant because even though support for the PB in Porto Alegre and BeloHorizonte has been high the great majority of poor citizens do notactively participate in the programmes The results of a 1991 survey in 150municipalities across Brazil analyzed by Desposato show that the poorestand less-educated voters mentioned economic survival concerns (cost ofliving low salaries and job opportunities) as their top priority and notinfrastructure which is PBrsquos main focus of investment(88) As income risesabove the minimum wage (around US$ 76 a month) votersrsquo concerns shiftto the provision of public goods and services Although the survey wasundertaken almost ten years ago it might indicate that PB is not meetingthe demands of the very poor but rather those of a part of the popula-tion who although not totally poor feel that PB is worth the effort andtime because it compensates for the neglect of low-income areas by previ-ous local administrations

Other questions arise as a result of the issue discussed above Is there



79 See reference 25Matthaeus (1995)


81 See reference 38


83 See reference 25Mattheaus (1995)



86 See reference 55

87 See reference 25 Santos(1998) also reference 27Somarriba and Dulci (1997)reference 27 Pereira (1996)reference 25 Abers (1998)and reference 23

88 Desposato Scott W(2000) ldquoInstitutionaltheories and social realitiesand parties a comparisonof legislative politics in fiveBrazilian statesrdquo paperpresented at the LASA2000 Miami 16-18 March

evidence that PB first does increase the capacity of excluded social groupsto influence decisions on the allocation of public resources And seconddoes it increase the access to basic urban services for the poor Figuresstatements and analyses provide sufficient grounds for arguing that PBdoes increase the capacity of excluded groups to influence investmentdecisions and that it does increase their access to basic urban servicesespecially infrastructure As Navarro summarizes

ldquo even if several claimed changes are not visible ndash for example the realmeaning of ldquolocal democratization of state powerrdquo or of supposed changes in themanifold relationships established between the local government and the popula-tion ndash it is undeniable however that other changes and concrete results are easilyfound in many corners of Porto Alegre These are results linked to the very oper-ation of public services which improved substantially in the last nine years afterPB Greater general administrative rationality and efficiency are among its resultsbut also more social justice when allocating public resourcesrdquo(89)

The recognition that with PB excluded segments of the population dogain influence over policy and do gain better access to basic urban serv-ices is also sustained by the responses of the electorate to the coalitionsthat introduced PB The electorate have re-elected the same governingcoalition four times in Porto Alegre and three times in Belo Horizonte Anassociation between these electoral results and PB is not unrealistic giventhat PB is the best known policy of these governments

Does this mean that PB is also an instrument for increasing democracyAbers offers a positive response for Porto Alegre and Somarriba andDulci for Belo Horizonte(90) In the case of Porto Alegre Navarro qualifiesPB as a kind of ldquoaffirmative democracyrdquo because of its achievement inensuring redistributive effects in the face of Brazilrsquos traditional powerasymmetry(91) One less optimistic view of PBrsquos potential for increasingdemocracy is that of Nylen but the reasons he gives are all based onbroad national indicators(92) Perhaps a more realistic assumption is thatPB does have an effect on improving local democracy by bringing into thedecision-making arena representatives of social groups from low-incomeareas who have seldom had a chance to make decisions regarding theirliving conditions

c What is PB Then

Another great divide relates to the way in which literature views andinterprets PB The views are so diverse that they are difficult to synthe-size As an attempt to simplify all the answers (and even several answerswithin the same work) I have divided them into four main fieldsmanagement education politics and social change

In the management realm there is the view that PB is urban management with the poor(93)

a sustained mechanism of joint management of public resourcesthrough shared decisions on the allocation of budgetary funds(94)

a model of urban management more than a policy(95) and a process of social fiscal management(96)

In the realm of education most literature considers PB an educativeprocess that involves all the key local actors ndash the mayor the bureaucracycouncillors delegates grassroots movements and the PT ndash as well as theinstitutions in which they operate

In the political realm the views are extremely diverse PB is a policy that empowers disadvantaged groups from above(97)

Envi ronmentampU rbanizat ion Vol 13 No 1 Apri l 2001 177


89 See reference 25Navarro (1997) page 5

90 See reference 25 Abers(2000) also reference 27Somarriba and Dulci (1997)


92 See reference 23



95 See reference 56



a way to radicalize democracy and the result of a firm political will toenable the construction of a political culture to raise consciousnessregarding citizenship and to bring about improvement of the popula-tionrsquos living conditions(98)

one of todayrsquos forms of counter-hegemonic globalization(99)

a way to combine representative democracy with participation(100) and a means of overcoming the limits of representative democracy through

mechanisms that increase civil society mobilization beyond corporatismand mere consultation(101)

Also apparent in most of the literature are views that PB increasestransparency accountability and credibility PB is constantly mentionedas a way of breaking down (or challenging) clientelism authoritarianismand patrimonialism Thus while highly divergent the literature comesround to the same conclusion that PB is changing the political life of PortoAlegre and Belo Horizonte

Finally in the sociological realm authors conclude that the PB allows a fairer distribution of scarce resources in an extremely unequal

society(102)

an innovative instrument for the reconstruction of public life(103)

a new form of relationship between local public power popular organ-izations and the rest of society to address the demands of the poorestsegments of the population(104)

the enhancement of urban ldquoassociativismrdquo and a strengthening of therelationship between community associations and district dwellers(105)

an equitable means of deciding on resource allocation(106)

d The Issue of Pol i t ical Represen tat ion

Perhaps the most sensitive issue regarding PB is the potential effect ofcommunity participation threatening to replace the role of bureaucratsthe local executive and elected councillors This is particularly relevantwith respect to the relationship between PB delegates and elected coun-cillors The issue is important given that final approval of the budget is aconstitutional prerogative of the councillors Where to draw the linebetween these two means of interest representation is far from clear As forthe bureaucrats most literature points to their initial resistance to PB butbelieves that there are ways of overcoming this Santos argues that thebureaucrats are also submitted to a learning process concerning commu-nication and argumentation with the lay population but as he sees it theroad from ldquotechnobureaucracyrdquo to ldquotechnodemocracyrdquo is a bumpy one(107)

However as we are reminded by Navarro technical expertise is an essen-tial requirement of PB practice(108) As for the relationship with the execu-tive there is a consensus that local government does play a decisive rolewithin PB even when the participants contest it

However the ldquopolitical contractrdquo to use Santosrsquo words between theexecutive and the communities thus far has not been extended to the legis-lature(109) Although Somarriba and Dulci(110) do not see this relationshipas a problem it does exist and the pragmatic formula found in Belo Hori-zonte to accommodate councillorsrsquo demands to continue amending thebudget to favour their constituencies shows that adherence to PB legisla-ture is far from secure(111) As such there are doubts about its prospects ifor when leftist parties are thrown out of office However this should notnecessarily lead to a pessimistic view of PBrsquos future If PB has reallyworked the way the literature describes then one result could be that the



98 Villas Boas Renata(1994) ldquoOs canaisinstitucionais departicipaccedilatildeo popularrdquo inVilas Boas Renata (editor)Participaccedilatildeo Popular nosGovernos Locais Poacutelis SatildeoPaulo






104 See reference 27Pereira (1996)







111 Clientelist practices inBelo Horizonte are reportedby Azevedo and Avritzer(1994) (see reference 27)and Pereira (1996) (seereference 27)

organization of social movements and the acceptance of PB by societymay convince other political groups to keep it in these cities

While risking an oversimplification of the issues debated in this sectionTable 1 presents a summary of the main strengths and weaknesses foundin the literature regarding PB experiences in Porto Alegre and Belo Hori-zonte

V D EBATING SOME RESULTS AND CLAIMS

THE LITERATURE ON political science and public administration doesnot yet provide clear answers as to why some politico-institutional expe-riences and practices are adopted and what the reasons are for theirsuccess or failure The lack of a coherent analytical framework able toguide evaluations of politico-administrative practices leads to extremelydivergent evaluative criteria and conclusions on the results and prospectsof participatory programmes Furthermore in countries such as Brazilwhich are characterized by enormous social economic political culturaland regional disparities making conclusive generalizations based on theresults of the small number of PB programmes adopted is certainly atemptation to be avoided Evaluations and generalizations of the Brazil-ian experience of PB for instance can easily fall into the trap of believingthat PB is only possible in the ldquomodernrdquo and ldquodevelopedrdquo South andSouth-East and impossible in the ldquobackwardrdquo or more ldquoclientelistrdquo North-East Furthermore in assessing the main results of PB it is important toremember Santosrsquos warning the search for only one logic in the realm ofcollective action is fruitless given that in such environments a multiplic-ity of factors are likely to be responsible for particular policy outcomes ina given place(112) Acknowledgement of these limitations should guide theresearcher in the challenge of debating and evaluating PBrsquos main resultsand claims

The lack of an analytical framework as mentioned above allows exces-



S t r e n g t h s Makes representative democracy open to more active

participation of segments of civil society Reduces clientelism populism patrimonialism

authoritarianism therefore changing political cultureand increasing transparency

Stimulates associativism Facilitates a learning process that leads to better and

more active citizenship Inverts priorities away from the best off to benefit the

majority of the population (the poor) together withattempts to open participatory channels to othersocial classes

Provides a means of balancing ideological concernsfor promoting citizen empowerment with pragmaticresponses to citizensrsquo demands

Provides a structure that can carry over beyond agovernmental term

Encourages programme participants to move awayfrom individualistic views towards solidarity and to seecity problems in universal rather than personal terms

Table 1 S u mm a ry o f P B rsquos ma in st r en gt hs an d w ea kn e ss es ac c ord in g tos elected l i tera ture

W e a k n e s s e s Interaction with government puts community movementsrsquo

independence at risk Forms of clientelism still survive Civil society is still developing Financial limitations and resources for participatory

budgeting are still scarce limiting the scope of theprogrammes

Communities tend to stop participating once theirdemands are met

Difficulties persist in broadening participation the verypoor young people and the middle-classes are under-represented

Programmes disappoint participants because of the slowpace of public works

Cleavages between the PT and the executive Participatory budgeting risks reification of the popular

movement making it difficult to maintain a clear separa-tion between its role and that of government

Fragmented decisions and short-term demands mayjeopardize urban planning and long-term projects

112 Santos Wanderley Gdos (1993) Razotildees daDesordem Rocco Rio deJaneiro

sive space for evaluating PB according to observersrsquo ideology interests orpersonal agendas Beyond the literature reviewed here evaluations fallinginto this category vary considerably Some critics see PB as an opportu-nity for leftist parties to engage in the same ldquoold clientelismrdquo ndash albeitwithout the mediation of local councillors ndash of past local administrationsOther critics contend that PB is a type of leftist naive altruism Others cyni-cally argue that PB is a way of making the poor decide so that they canblame themselves if they do not get proper resources instead of blamingthe government The difficulty with these essentially normative criticismsas is also the case with advocates who embrace PB solely because theysupport the types of governments most likely to implement the policy isthat neither provide evaluative criteria on which to evaluate the workachieved

PB is a state-sponsored experience which is well accepted in the citiesanalyzed Such approval is probably one of the reasons for the re-electionof the governing coalitions which implemented it The constant changesin its rules procedures and functioning show that PB has been a learningprocess for all those who have taken part in it The cases reviewed herealso demonstrate that the problems and early frustrations (in the case ofPorto Alegre) did not make those involved give up on the experience Thismight indicate that PB is overcoming Brazilrsquos tradition of changing publicpolicies every time a new government comes into office Dramaticchanges in public policies often occur even when those newly electedbelong to the same party as the incumbent(113) Therefore PB is addressingone of the main problems identified by the scarce literature on Brazilianpublic policies ndash the lack of persistence within policies in the sense of apolicy that remains in force until the problem for which it was developedhas been tackled Despite changes in the factions that won local electionsin both Porto Alegre and in Belo Horizonte PB continues to this dayPopular acceptance manifested through organized social movements andopinion polls might also play a role in PBrsquos survival

The previous sections have shown that some of the claims related tothe aims and results of PB are probably confirmed given that they holdacross different case studies Other claims however deserve more carefulattention and further research These are discussed in the following sub-sections

a The Em power ing o f the Poor Cla im

Data and analyses show that with PB low-income groups but not thevery poor have gained influence on decision-making in the allocation ofa percentage of public resources Although this percentage is smallcompared to the total budget it is certainly an important step in bringinginfrastructure to communities that dramatically lack them However theissue of limits on the financial resources available for these programmesis more crucial than it may seem at first glance This is because althoughmunicipal governments with PB may want to reverse priorities and trans-form spending on the citiesrsquo poorer areas into rights and not favours theystill cannot meet even a small fraction of either the needs of poor commu-nities or the most compelling problems in their cities In this sense whatis most valuable about PB is not necessarily the material gains that suchprogrammes may create for Brazilian low-income segments rather it isthe extension of participation and decision-making power to the formerlyexcluded groups Having noted the financial limitations a more serious



113 There has been amarked history of this inBrazil even during themilitary reacutegime assuggested by Batley (seeBatley Richard (1991)ldquoUrban management inBrazil Part I ndash commoncharacteristicsrdquoDevelopmentAdministration GroupInstitute of LocalGovernment StudiesUniversity of Birminghamunpublished) Howeverldquobest practicesrdquo literatureargues that programmesthat are recognized assuccessful are maintainedacross governments despitetheir ideological differences

issue of resource allocation remains What the experiences of the citiesreviewed here suggests is that in extremely unequal societies such asBrazil low-income groups are spending a considerable amount of timeand effort debating the allocation of public resources As I suggest abovethis is in fact empowering It is worth stressing however that the infra-structure which low-income groups spend time fighting for the middleand upper-classes have already gained without a struggle

The claim that PB empowers the poor is also challenged by the partic-ipantsrsquo income level Although PB is not reaching the very poor it iscertainly achieving another important target namely redirectingresources to neighbourhoods that have historically been excluded fromany governmental action Previously the only way these neighbourhoodswould receive any public investment was by building close ties with localcouncillors or the executive in electoral years Furthermore investmentin these districts was offered to dwellers as a political favour and not astheir right These neighbourhoods which certainly make up a largeportion of Brazilian cities were either left to their own destiny or weretaken over by gangs and Mafia-type organizations as is now happeningparticularly in Rio de Janeiro and Satildeo Paulo In providing an incentive forself-organization in these communities PB provides a possibility for low-income inhabitants to see themselves as citizens who are no longercondemned to survive at the margins of the state or under a gangrsquosldquoprotectionrdquo The claim of empowerment of the poor could then be refo-cused to see PB as a way of compensating for the historical neglect byBrazilian local administrations of low-income areas

b The Blow against C l ientel ism Cla im

The literature claims that one of the reasons for the success of PB rests onthe programmesrsquo attainment of participationrsquos core values credibilitytrust transparency accountability empowerment of ordinary citizenssolidarity etc Most of the literature adds to this list a claim that PBreduces what many see as one of Brazilrsquos main problems namely a polit-ical culture based on clientelism and patrimonialism Discussing theseissues and the reasons for them is beyond the scope of this paperHowever it is important to mention that in the case of clientelism theliterature also seems to recognize that the practice is still alive in cities thathave adopted PB Belo Horizonte in particular Setting aside a part of theresources for local councillor allocation was the way to reduce resistanceto the programme in Belo Horizonte On the other hand all the efforts toimprove rule-setting that have taken place as PB took root in Porto Alegreand in Belo Horizonte may indicate that it is possible to insulate PB fromclientelism We can conclude that although Porto Alegre was the first cityin which PB became a continuous local government policy other citiesthat are adopting PB are adjusting it to their local circumstances This canbe interpreted as a sign of maturity and pragmatism However it mayalso suggest that the claim that PB is a way of changing ldquoold clientelistrdquopractices may not be upheld in every political setting Therefore oneshould not expect from PB more than it can deliver

c The Empowerment o f the D iso rganized C la im

The claim that PB has empowered the disorganized also requires furtherdebate and analysis As shown by Nylen(114) a significant number of PB




participants were engaged in community activism prior to PB so it is nottotally accurate to say that PB motivated these people to engage in poli-tics for the first time The claim therefore should be refocused to interpretPB as helping to sustain non-eacutelite political activism to use Nylenrsquos wordsChanging the focus of the claim does not imply reducing the importanceof PBrsquos achievements especially in an eacutelite-driven country like Brazil

d The Pol it ical Will Cla im

The claim that the adoption of PB is a result of a strong political will char-acteristic of leftist governments also deserves deeper thought Explana-tions based on voluntaristic approaches are problematic First theyassume that it is possible to change reality through the action of a fewgroups Second they do not take into account the web of circumstancestraditions and conditions that are involved in any kind of political actionThird they do not explain why certain PT governments have given prior-ity to other experiences such as Brasiacuteliarsquos bolsa-escola(115) in trying to inte-grate excluded groups into citizenry It also fails to explain why PB wasnot successful in Brasiacutelia Satildeo Paulo and Santos for instance despite theattempts of their executives The issue of political will should be rede-fined some administrations have chosen PB as their hallmark because theprogramme provided an opportunity to broaden governing coalitionsThe pay-off of this option has been the successive electoral victories ofadministrations that have given priority to PB

e The Impact of Increased Local Revenues C la im

Another claim that calls for caution is the one linking the success of PB tothe fiscal reforms implemented by PT administrations First the positiveimpact on local finances brought about by the 1988 constitution is notgiven enough credit in the literature It fails to take into account that thetransfer of resources to the municipalities was phased in and was onlycompleted in 1993 Second by not presenting data from other state capi-tals readers are misled into believing that only PT administrations werecommitted to raising their own revenue and to reforming their financewhereas these two policies have been pursued by many large Braziliancities It also does not explain why in Satildeo Paulo the electorate reacted sofuriously against the raising of local taxes while it was accepted in BeloHorizonte and Porto Alegre

Another problem with the claim that links PB to the improvement oflocal finances relates to the pattern of investment in Brazilian citiesAlthough Brazil is a federal country legislation is quite uniform nation-wide Sub-national governments have little room to adopt their own legis-lation on various matters compared to other federal countries Howeverthe pattern of expenditure varies greatly among Brazilian local govern-ments especially social expenditure This point is important becausealthough the constitution states that local governments are the main levelresponsible for basic education other levels of government can alsoprovide it In the case of Brazil several state governments have tradi-tionally shouldered a large share of the provision of basic educationthereby leaving more resources available for introducing innovative policies suchas PB This may indicate that one prerequisite for a successful PB couldbe paradoxically a reduced role of local government in education there-fore leaving more resources for improving the conditions of neglected



115 This is a scheme whichpays modest sums to low-income households if theirchildren continue at schoolin order to encourage suchhouseholds not to take theirchildren out of school early

low-income areas the main achievement of PB However after 1998 thefederal government created a fund for education FUNDEF which penal-izes municipalities that do not increase the enrolment rate in schoolsadministered by them Considering that expenditure on education hadincreased by the end of the 1990s it is therefore possible that investmentthrough PB could have reached its maximum limit not only because ofthe national policy of tight fiscal control but also because of the greaterrole municipalities now have to play in basic education This becomesmore tricky in large municipalities in particular in those that tradition-ally had invested little in education as was the case of Porto Alegre andBelo Horizonte

f The Increase in Pol i t ical Representation Cla im

One final issue deserves special thought the debate regarding the role ofPB vis-agrave vis that of local councillors The issue is at the heart of the currentconundrum regarding the functioning of a representative system in ademocratic heterogeneous and participatory environment Legislatureshave a dual role to legislate and to oversee the governmentrsquos function-ing It would be naive to interpret the former role as one that is not sharedwith other political actors and institutions especially with the executiveSince World War II and the transformations brought about by theincreased role of government in economic and social affairs the separa-tion of power between executive and legislative functions has become lessclear Therefore social and economic variables have forced legislatures toshare their legislative powers with executives In the case of participatorypolicies councillors are required to share this prerogative yet further withorganized movements Furthermore it means that local councillors andthe local eacutelite they represent lose their monopoly in the representation oflocal interests and their role as one of the main actors in decisions regard-ing the allocation of public resources

The issue of what representation is about does not affect local council-lors alone The literature analyzed also refers to problems of accountabil-ity and transparency between community representatives and those theyrepresent However it does not pay enough attention to an issue thatseems to require careful reflection It remains unclear from the studieswhether participatory systems are destined to reproduce the same prob-lems arising in a formal representative system This still remains verymuch an open question in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte

VI A CONCLUDING NOTE

THIS PAPER HAS summarized and debated the main strengths andweaknesses of PB in two Brazilian cities in an attempt to analyze its limi-tations and possibilities in building democratic institutions Whatever themerits and constraints of the experience it is important to note that thereis no single ldquomodelrdquo of PB but rather a collection of experiences that haveacquired different features Maybe the greatest risk posed by PB both inBrazil and in other countries experimenting with it is the adoption of aldquocopy and pasterdquo formula The risk of it becoming just another band-wagon is foreseeable The main strength of the PB in Porto Alegre andBelo Horizonte seems to be the insertion of marginalized people andcommunities albeit only a minority of them into the political process for



the first time But allowing these citizens the right to decide (and not onlyto be heard) may well have a long-term impact on Brazilrsquos unequalbalance of power

It can be concluded that the experience of PB in highly unequal soci-eties such as Brazil should be valued more for its provision of citizenry toformerly excluded groups in society rather than for the material gains itmay bring In this sense the experience of PB both in Porto Alegre and inBelo Horizonte can be seen as an important step towards building demo-cratic institutions a crucial aspect of the agenda of recently re-democra-tized countries



national institutions but applies also to sub-national ones As a result ofredemocratization and decentralization many local governments wereable to introduce policies and experiences that distanced them fromthose in place in the authoritarian past One of the primary justificationsfor these decentralization policies is that they strengthen democracy byincreasing participation especially by those social groups at the locallevel that have traditionally been excluded from the governmentrsquos deci-sion-making process and policies

Brazil is an example of both redemocratization and decentralizationIn the case of decentralization there is a consensus among scholars and prac-titioners that Brazil is a country in which political and financial decentraliza-tion has been pursued at an unparalleled pace both in the countryrsquos experienceand in comparison to other developing countries There is already a consid-erable literature analyzing Brazilian decentralization after redemocrati-zation focusing especially on the local level Some of these works adopta positive view of decentralization stressing its merits with respect toldquoreinventing the governmentrdquo bringing the government closer to thecommunity building bridges between private and public demands andotherwise improving local governance(1) Other authors are more scep-tical about the possibilities of decentralization per se in a countrymarked by high levels of social economic and regional disparities(2)

Similarly others have turned their attention to the risks of promotingsocial exclusion when the municipalities compete for investments(3)

Another line of enquiry contends that in certain circumstances central-ization may be essential to the successful implementation of socialprogrammes(4)

As for participation the 1988 constitution provided several mecha-nisms which allowed grassroots movements to take part in some deci-sions and to oversee public matters especially at the local level (5)

Brazilian local governments are carrying out several experiments inparticipation These range from the creation of community councils todecide on education health and social welfare policies to the imple-mentation of participatory budgeting (henceforth PB) The latter hasbeen praised both nationally and internationally as an example ofldquogoodrdquo government

The enthusiasm for and documented successes of PB are somewhatpuzzling Why have some Brazilian local governments embarked on apolicy which attempts to ldquoempower the poorrdquo in a country labelled asclientelist eacutelite-driven lacking a tradition of civic engagement andmoreover historically unequal(6) Why would local governments increaseparticipation and decision-making venues when they already have acongested agenda of unresolved local problems (housing educationhealth care public transport etc) Furthermore why in a time in whichindividualism and consumption are praised as signs of freedom andliberty have some politicians adopted policies encouraging cooperationand the pursuit of collective goods destined for social groups historicallyexcluded from the decision-making process Why in an era of disillu-sionment with the political systems and their politicians have peopleresponded positively to some top-down decisions to ldquoempowerrdquo themWhy in a time in which ldquoexitrdquo is more praised than ldquovoicerdquo has therebeen a proliferation of participatory policies in Brazil(7) Finally why ata time when mainstream literature on collective action argues that indi-viduals (politicians bureaucrats and voters) are guided by self-interestdo collective and individual actors have the incentive to cooperate



1 Figueiredo Rubens andBolivar Lamounier (1996)As Cidades que datildeo CertoExperiecircncias Inovadoras naAdministraccedilatildeo PuacuteblicaBrasileira Brasiacutelia MHComunicaccedilatildeo

2 Souza Celina (1997)Constitutional Engineering inBrazil The Politics ofFederalism andDecentralization LondonMacmillan and New YorkSt Martinrsquos Press

3 Melo Marcus Andreacute(1996) ldquoCrise federativaguerra fiscal elsquohobbesianismo municipalrsquoefeitos perversos dadescentralizaccedilatildeordquo SatildeoPaulo em Perspectiva Vol 10No 13 pages 11-20

4 Tendler Judith (1997)Good Government in theTropics The Johns HopkinsUniversity Press Baltimore

5 These constitutionalmechanisms are describedin Souza Celina (1989)ldquoPoliacutetica urbana eparticipaccedilatildeo popularrdquoRevista de AdministraccedilatildeoPuacuteblica Vol 23 No 4 pages110-113

6 Clientelism or patronageor patron-client relations isa tricky concept In thecontext of this article I useWaterburyrsquos definition inwhich clientelism is ameans of protection bothfor the weak and for thepolitically powerful Itscrucial variable is real orperceived vulnerability SeeWaterbury John (1977) ldquoAnattempt to put patrons andclients in their placerdquo inGellner E and J Waterbury(editors) Patrons and Clientsin Mediterranean SocietiesGerald DuckworthLondon page 337

7 I use the words ldquoexitrdquoand ldquovoicerdquo followingHirschman The ldquovoicerdquooption is the way in whichcitizens communicatedemands direct to publicagencies and the ldquoexitrdquooption is when they chooseto quit or go to other placesor service suppliers SeeHirschman A O (1970)























































24 See reference 23
































































































65 See reference 38


67 See reference 38










68 See reference 38








































81 See reference 38





86 See reference 55







c What is PB Then












92 See reference 23



95 See reference 56









society(102)
















































































































































24 See reference 23
































































































65 See reference 38


67 See reference 38










68 See reference 38








































81 See reference 38





86 See reference 55







c What is PB Then












92 See reference 23



95 See reference 56









society(102)

























































































































































































65 See reference 38


67 See reference 38










68 See reference 38








































81 See reference 38





86 See reference 55







c What is PB Then












92 See reference 23



95 See reference 56









society(102)



































































































68 See reference 38








































81 See reference 38





86 See reference 55







c What is PB Then












92 See reference 23



95 See reference 56









society(102)































































































































81 See reference 38





86 See reference 55







c What is PB Then












92 See reference 23



95 See reference 56









society(102)






























































































c What is PB Then












92 See reference 23



95 See reference 56









society(102)
































































































society(102)


























































































Participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities: limits and ... · Environment&Urbanization Vol 13 No 1...

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