15(2018)

15 (2018)

1. - Dunning Porter ...................................................................................................................................7

( )

2. : ...41( )

3. PNG : ..........................................61( )

4. ...................................................................77( )

5.The Orbital Alignment Theory: The Sun Once Rose...........................................................97David Tizzard( )

6. () ?...................................109( )

7. - .....................................................................................129( )

8. ........................................................................................141( )

9.WAR ON TERROR AFTER 9/11: US INABILITY TO REACH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS.........................................................................................................................................157

Zeljana Zmire( )

10. - .............................................179( )

11. ........................................................................193( )

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27

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(EEU) (2015)

KMPA () - (2016) (2014, 2016) 70 (2015)Deloitte Russian Pharmaceutical Market Treds in 2017 (2017)DMS Group Annual Report (2013, 2015, 2016)PWC Pharma 2017 Pharma 2020 final

() - (; 2015 GPAS) - (, ; 2016) (, ; 2012)

Problems and Prospects of the Development of Import Substitution in Pharmaceutical Industry of the Russian Federation (Larisa Kiseleva, Elena Vyugova, Vadim Meshkov; 2016) Modern technologies in import substitution policy on pharmaceutical market (Yuliyana Gileta, Yevhen Krykacskyy; 2015) ( ; 2012)

Pharma2020http://fcp.economy.gov.ru/cgi-bin/cis/fcp.cgi/Fcp/ViewFcp/View/2015/350

35

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14) Ludmila M. Igolkina, Territories of Advanced Socio-economic Development: Their Importance, Establishment Particularities and Governance Methods

15) Ludmila M. Igolkina, Territories of Advanced Socio-economic Development: Their Importance, Establishment Particularities and Governance Methods"

16) KOTRA, " ", Global Strategy Report 17-002

51

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, -- , , , , , KIEP 16-01, , , KIEP , , Weekly Economic Review 17-8, , , , , (SEZ) : (ADT)

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(KHIDI), " []Ludmila M. Igolkina, Territories of Advanced Socio-economic Development: Their Importance,

Establishment Particularities and Governance MethodsTatiana A. Meshkova and Evgenii IA. Moiseichev, "Russia's experience of foresight

implementation in global value chain research"Sergey Beliakov and Anna Kapustkina, "The intermediate performance of territories of priority

socio-economic development in Russia in conditions of macroeconomic instability"World Bank, "Measuring and analyzing the impact of GVCs on economic development", Global Value Chain Development Report 2017 , XXV :

,

[]

Vesti(2016), 2017 (http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2758412)

EastRussia(2017), ? (https://www.eastrussia.ru/material/kuda-idut-inostrannye-investitsii-/)

59

EconomicReview(2017), " , " (http://www.econovill.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=314704)(2016), (http://weeklytrade.co.kr/m/content/view.html?section=1&category=3&no=22520) (2016), 160 38% "

("http://news.g-enews.com/view.php?ud=201602270809400211853_1&md=20160227084511_F)

EastRussia(2017), (https://www.eastrussia.ru/material/amurskiy-npz-ne-prikladyvaetsya/)EastRussia(2016), - 17

(https://www.eastrussia.ru/news/v-amuro-khinganskuyu-tor-budut-privlekat-17-mlrd-rubley-investitsiy-vlasti-regiona/)

(2016),

(https://dv.land/economics/investor-naveki)DVHAB(2016), , ,

(https://www.dvnovosti.ru/khab/2016/02/18/46872/) (2016), (https://minvr.ru/press-center/news/2607/?sphrase_id=58099)

[ ]WORLDBANK (http://www.worldbank.org/)UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org/) (https://minvr.ru/) (https://investvostok.ru/) (http://erdc.ru/) (http://dvtu.customs.ru/) (http://www.bukbang.go.kr/)

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95

Abstract

This research will explain the success factors of Tencents mobile offline payment

system in the Chinese fintech industry. While initially Alibaba was the monopoly

company in the mobile offline payment sector, Wechat pay from Tencent became the

pioneer in a short amount of time.

Here are the main reasons:

First was the Chinese governments policy to restrain fintech companies. Initially the

governments support of the fintech industry allowed Alibaba to catapult into the

leader position. After a while the government started to inact policies to restrain the

company due to its fast growth. Tencent didnt miss this opportunity to jump into

the market.

The next advantage are Wechats functions. Wechat pay became very accessible

through online social platforms and that led into an increase of Wechat pay usage.

Up next is the way Tencents management style created opportunities for the

company. Strategies such as returning a small portion of a customers money through

offline events helped to engage and acquire new customers. The more customers use

Wechat pay, the better the advantages for Tencent.

Finally, Tencent merged ideology and cultural factors like combining Hongbao, which

is the money people exchange with each other during the holidays with the Wechat

app. This makes it very easy for users and keeps them using the service.

This research helps you to understand the Chinese mobile payment market through

an analysis of the success factors of Wechat pay, and points out the

political-economic structure between related fintech industry competitors and the

government.

96

(ICT (SNS,(BIGDATE)2017

97

The Orbital Alignment Theory: The Sun Once Rose An Analysis of Why the Domestic Politics of South Korea and America

May Signal a Return of the Sunshine Policy

David Tizzard

The Sunshine Policy was an idealists gamble, with a pragmatic touch, and it encountered numerous challenges.

Moon Chung In

This is a working paper and is not yet complete. It has been written specifically for this event at Hanyang University. The hope is that it will receive some feedback as to the plausibility and suitability of the topic and idea for further exploration.

IntroductionThe moon and other planetary objects exist in orbits. Because of this, analyzing them can only

be carried out at certain times. There are small windows of opportunity when one wants to observe the moon or even land machinery there. In such situations, it doesnt matter whether or not we have the right ideas or even the correct technology. What really matters is if we have the correct celestial alignment of bodies.

If we apply such an idea to the world of international relations and foreign policy for the purpose of this paper, we can claim that there are certain times when policies are applicable and certain times when they are not. The policy itself may remain the same and yet be effective at some times and disastrous at other times. Or, it may be socially acceptable at some times and unthinkable at others. What matters is not the policy itself rather the correct arrangement of both domestic and personal alignment in order to make the policy work.

The paper presented below seeks the following objective: to provide an analysis of the possibility of the Sunshine Policy, in any form, reappearing in the upcoming years as part of South Koreas North Korean foreign policy. It does so on the basis that the domestic situations in South Korea and America are now as they once were when it was first carried out.

It should be noted that this paper does not argue in favor of the Sunshine Policy, nor does it argue against it. It does not argue in favour of the progressive leadership in South Korea, nor does it look to degenerate the conservative leadership. It seeks objectivity in its analysis of the

98

political situation. Moreover, it does not make any firm predictions about it coming into place at any set date. Instead, it looks to examine the situation of the past, create a theory to describe what has happened, and then apply that theory to present and future events so that we may better understand international relations.

.The Sun Once Rose The mere words of the Sunshine Policy1)are likely to bring about a very visceral and emotive reaction to any Korean that hears them. Despite South Koreas rise to democratization and economic success over the past few decades, the domestic political scene remains as polarized as ever particularly with regard anything that involves the beleaguered state on its border, North Korea. The National Security Law of 1961 remains in place and this often makes it hard for there to be any serious discussion of the issue for fear of legal or social consequences.

In December 2017, the former Prime Minister Lee Hae Chan suggested that a South-North summit should be targeted for the first half of President Moons term2).The year 2019 was highlighted as being of particular significance for it will signal the 100th anniversary of the countrys March 1st Independent Movement. Such an occasion will provide extra impetus for those both sides of the militarized border. But, will it happen? Will President Moon meet with the North Korean leader? President Moons two liberal predecessors did in 2000 and 2007 while Kim Jong Uns father did on both of those occasions, too. President Moon has already officially stated in his election statement that he will visit Pyongyang if the correct conditions are met3).It seems that we should consider the words of the countrys leading politicians seriously.

This paper is still very much in its infancy and makes no claims about completion or of having a definitive answer to the situation. Instead, it merely serves as an introduction to a question that has arisen. The question this paper wishes to raise is this: Is there any feasibility of the Sunshine Policy being resurrected now that the domestic and international situations have once again changed? I have tried to construct a theory based on two factors to demonstrate that it might happen again. The first factor is the correct alignment of ROK-US domestic politics. The second factor is the personal attitudes of the countries respective leaders. I call this theory the Orbital Alignment Theory. I will use the hypotheses located inside the theory to see if it confirms the results of the past. If successful in doing so, it may help us understand the future of the Korean Peninsula.

There are a few limits that should be immediately countered. The first is regarding the domestic reaction to such an idea most notably because of the name. The very name of the Sunshine Policy is so politically loaded that any use of the name will be destined to fail. The failure will be the result of both sides of the political divide. Thus, if anything does happen it 1) 2) 3)

The Orbital Alignment Theory: The Sun Once Rose 99

will do so under a different name just as each President has named their own foreign policy towards North Korea. Even President Roh, who continued in a similar manner to President Kim did not use the term Sunshine Policy. So, we should avoid focusing on mere resurrection of the specific name.

From the point of view of the liberal parties, the idea will forever be associated with the political life of its creator and champion ex-President Kim Dae Jung. Thus, there will be a great expectation of a complete revisiting of the previous strategies and methods, both in theory and in practice. Such expectations will of course likely be disappointed and therefore there will be frustration that things are not as they once were.

From the conservative point of view, the name will be one that endangered national security, gave domestic resources to an enemy, and funded the development of nuclear weapons4).The payments made to the North to secure the talks are a source of great controversy for such actions were taken without transparency or national consensus.

Some of these problems and historical incidents are huge in both scope and depth. The goal is not to cover them in great detail here. Rather the aim is to set the limits of this brief explanation. The limits are concerned with the theory of the policy, the domestic situations in both South Korea and the United States and the attitudes of the leaders

.Purpose and Justification: Cheong Wa DaeFrom the outset, it must be understood that the paper does not seek to resurrect the name of

the Sunshine Policy to do so would to be defeated by both sides before even beginning. The paper instead seeks to see whether the theory and principles of the policy can be applied once more.

There should be some justification for why the paper is particularly relevant now. Why approximately 20 years since Kim Dae Jung took office is the policy worth revisiting? We can point to the recent news regarding North Koreas nuclear developments. Although it will never likely be recognized by the United States, it would appear that North Korea now has some nuclear capabilities, or at least is becoming much closer to obtaining them as every day passes. Moreover, peace on the peninsula and a better life for all remains a goal of not only the president but those in the field of international relations and the millions of people that live here. This was confirmed in a recent statement by Cheong Wa Dae:

President Moon explained to the U.S. President that the Korean Government took very seriously North Koreas statement the day before that it had reached the completion of the development of an ICBM and that it had realized the consummation of a nuclear arsenal.5)

The seriousness is highlighted and confirmed by President Moons understanding of North Koreas current capabilities regarding nuclear and military attacks. It is now understood that North Korea has possibly achieved the capabilities to strike mainland America. To many, the 4) 5)

100

Rubicon has been crossed.The paper is further justified by another statement released by Cheong Wa Dae. Despite the

recent provocations and threatening behavior of North Korea, the current South Korean regime seems intent to pursue a path of engagement rather than avoidance; to look for talks rather than neglect. This attitude which seems in line with some of the principles of the Sunshine Policy was confirmed in the following way by Cheong Wa Dae.

The two Presidents (Moon and Trump) shared a common understanding that the two sides had to maintain their basic stance of putting strong sanctions and pressure on North Korea until it voluntarily gave up its nuclear and missile development and came forward to the negotiation table.6)

Thus it appears that President Moon takes the technological developments of North Korea very seriously. And, moreover, it would appear from the above official statements that the way forward is not of a military nature but instead one of engagement and voluntary change from North Korea. This method seems very much in-line with actions and strategies carried out by Moons predecessors in the progressive sphere of South Korean domestic politics.

President Moon attended the 2007 meeting in Pyongyang as ex-President Rohs Chief Presidential Secretary. In fact, he was the Chairperson of the Promotion of the 2nd North-South Korea Summit. There is an undeniable continuity in both individuals, policy, and international situation at the current time. Moons position as leader of the South Korean politic, as well as his strong attachment to Roh Moo Hyun, both personally and politically, indicate that even if a clear revival of the old policies is not on the cards, the possibility of such a thing happening is worth exploring.

.Theoretical Relevance: The Orbital Alignment TheoryInternational Relations scholar Kenneth Waltz highlighted 3 levels of analysis for us to consider

when contemplating foreign policy and global issues7).By understanding these 3 image levels, we are able to create theories and then through these, better understand global politics and, ultimately, reduce the potential and danger of war.

In this section, the paper will examine the Sunshine Policy and its current potential applicability from the perspective of these aforementioned levels. The goal is to see whether any of the levels of analysis seem likely to bear fruit in terms of revisiting and rethinking the Sunshine Policy. Previously, there was not any chance of such a revisiting because the various levels of analysis did not allow such a thing. This was dominated by the conservative government being in power in Seoul from 2008 to 2017. However, it will also seek to explain how the democratic rule of Barack Obama did not provide any opportunities for the policy to be reborn.

6) 7)

The Orbital Alignment Theory: The Sun Once Rose 101

For the past ten years, there was no possibility of the Sunshine Policy being enacted. The theoretical levels of analysis simply were not compatible with any use of something akin to the Sunshine Policy. It was not so much that the idea has suddenly changed, instead it is that the time has changed. This change in time has led to an aligning of the necessary three images so as to make the Moon Doctrine now suitable for discussion and reassessment. The Orbital Alignment Theory (OAT) indicates that the theory is now once more applicable because of the temporal changes.

The first level is that of the individual. This is often tied in to ideas such as the Great Man of History theory the concept of powerful individuals being capable of moving the international system according to their will. The validity of such an argument is still debated as to whether such things occur in real life. However, we only need to look at people such as Napoleon, Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill or a host of many others to understand that the argument deserves some consideration.

The second level is that of the nation. Nations exist in the world be they big or small, democratic or otherwise. The national level of analysis is incredibly important when considering international relations because these are considered the primary actors upon the global stage. From Thucydides, to Hobbes, to Bentham and beyond, nation states remain the primary actors on the global stage. The way in which these national actors carry out their lines affects the very drama of this global play.

The third level of analysis, the systemic level, is very difficult to accurately calculate. It is generally perceived in terms of the balance of power in which states choose to either balance against or bandwagon with other nations so as to ensure their own survival. They also work, depending on their position in the hierarchy to maintain the status quo or change the status quo.

For the current purpose of demonstrating the validity of the Orbital Alignment Theory, and due to time restraints, the hypothesis will seek only to initially focus on the first two images of international relations.

.National Alignment: Factor OneAs nation states are the primary actors in the international system, we will start with an

analysis of these factors first. The purpose is to demonstrate whether or not the time is now appropriate for a resurrection of the previous policies towards the North. Thus, we apply the Orbital Alignment Theory to the second image analysis first.

The original Sunshine Policy, the 2000 summit in Pyongyang, the 2007 summit in Pyongyang and the five rounds of six party talks all mainly took place during a specific South Korean and American domestic alignment. When these were underway, there was a liberal party in power in Korea (Kim Dae Jung 1998 2003 and Roh Moo Hyun 2003 2008) and, for a large majority of the time, a republican party in power in the United States (George W. Bush 2001 2009).

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Figure 1: American and South Korea Political Alignment since 2000

This specific alignment, it can be argued was necessary for the Sunshine Policy to take place. It relied on two important factors: 1) A progressive party in power in South Korea that saw engagement with the North as a necessary role for the government in trying to achieve a confederation between the two Koreas and ultimate peace and 2) A republican party in power in America that was willing to take action when it saw necessary regarding states around the world, particularly those that it disagreed with such as North Korea. This was often seen as American unilateralism by some. The two attitudes of peaceful exchange and military enforcement were in stark contrast to each other. And yet, for the North Korean situation, it seemed to provide fruitful results. The good cop/bad cop theory. Or perhaps through more eastern glasses, a Yin and Yang arrangement.

This specific alignment is necessary for anything resembling the Sunshine Policy. It was necessary for the enactment of it in the first place. Such a theory can be proved by the following decade. After this ten year period, the dichotomy was reversed. Instead of a progressive party in Korea and a republican party in America, there was a conservative party in Korea and a democratic party in America.

Such an alignment is not conducive to anything approaching the Sunshine Policy or Moon Doctrine. This is because the Korean conservative parties are not willing to engage or recognize the North Korean regime and instead see their role as securing wider international alliances and agreements. Moreover, the democrats in America, specifically under the watch of Barack Obama and his doctrine of strategic patience were seemingly not willing to engage with states it felt unsavory possibly for fear of disrupting its domestic reputation as being liberal and forward.

The image describes the appropriate alignment for the possibility of successful engagement of North Korea through policies akin to the Sunshine Policy or Moon Doctrine. What can be learnt from this is that the ideal situation is for there to be a republican party in power in America and a liberal party in South Korea. This has been the case for the last 17 years since the Sunshine Policy was first introduced. Of course there are currently limits to the theory because since the Sunshine Policy and engagement with the North was first seriously undertaken, we have

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yet to see a two other images in action to test the underlying hypotheses of the Orbital Alignment Theory.

Following the somewhat recent elections of republican President Donald Trump and liberal President Moon Jae In, the domestic situations are once more aligned for the possibility of engagement with the North. Whilst it may seem somewhat counter-intuitive for it to require a republican government in America to produce the correct alignment for engagement with the North, the history seems to confirm that this is the case.

This somewhat counter-intuitive requirement can be better understood by explaining the situation from the first image, the personal level. It will there be illustrated that the republican attitude towards taking action towards North Korea is a personal one and, despite the hostility, compatible with the South Korean liberal desire for engagement.

Individual Desire: Factor TwoWhilst it has been demonstrated that the necessary party alignment was required in both South

Korea and America for the Sunshine Policy to take place, there were also personal factors. These are demonstrated by the first level image of international relations. The individual desire, attitude, and character of the leaders of the two countries also affected the possibility of such engagement.

The desires of both the sequential progressive and conservative leaders in South Korea need little highlighting for a domestic audience, however a brief overview will seek to demonstrate and prove the second important factor in the Orbital Alignment Theory. That the personal attitudes of the countries respective leaders towards the North matter a great deal.

Kim Dae Jungs approach to foreign policy was influenced primarily by the theory of liberalism.8) He favored institutions to breed harmony and coexistence. Despite such attitudes, however, he was not adverse to the concept of military defense and the use of deterrence. He understood that old adage, to seek peace is to prepare for war. There were four underlying principles of Kims doctrine towards North Korea. Of course, it changed over the course of his political career indeed, some of his first utterances of such a plan were given in speeches in the 1970s. However, four elements were a fundamental part of the overall policy that resulted in the meeting in Pyongyang in 2000: 1) Easy tasks before difficult tasks; 2) economy before politics; 3) unofficial moves before official moves; and 4) give before taking.9)

Roh Moo Hyun, Kim Dae Jungs progressive successor, also visited Pyongyang and sought to engage the North so as to create a path towards peace. In one of the decades more memorable images, Roh drove to Pyongyang, stepping out of the car with his wife and crossing the DMZ on foot. There was a change in name to proceedings it was now called the Peace and Prosperity Policy and the discussions in October 2007 centered more on economic activities of exchange to help the two countries grow. Such hopes, however, were short-lived because three

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months after the summit, a conservative government was back in power in Seoul.The Lee Myoung Bak government was neither favorable towards North Korea in its attitude

nor open to any real engagement. The Lee Doctrine was the De-Nuke, Open 3000 which proposed to raise the per capita income of North Korea to $3000 within ten years if it denuclearized. Such proposals were unfeasible for all sides and seen merely as an attempt to destabilize or undermine the Norths regime. Indeed, it can be argued that President Lees government did not truly have a North Korean policy. They had one regarding the nuclear situation, but not one that dealt with the country as a whole. Instead of working towards the North, or at least engagement, President Lee instead favored the strengthening of the bilateral alliance with the United States. Such a move was seen as more economical and politically beneficial.

President Lee was followed by another conservative leader: Park Guen Hye. Park laid out her own North Korean policy in an article written in Foreign Affairs. Here she stated what would be known as Trustpolitik. She referred to improved relations with the North as a possible jackpot or bonanza and seemed to position herself between Rohs attitude of engagement and Lees latter anything but Roh approach. Whatever would have truly become of Parks policy we are yet to find out as she remains on trial. Whether or not the constitutional court can find a case against which she is undeniably guilty remains to be seen and the clock is ticking.

The political divide in South Korea concerning attitudes towards the North are well-known and dont require much more elaboration. The overall image presented is that progressive governments since 2000 are more likely to seek to engage the North in an attempt to promote peace and unification under a confederation whereas the conservatives are more likely to withdraw communication channels and heavily reduce economic and social engagement.

From the American perspective, we can see that the Republican presidents take a more personal approach to the situation than their democratic counterparts. This is not to say that they are supportive of the North Korean regime rather the opposite, in fact. Their passionate distaste for what they see as an unallowable entity to exist pushes them to take proactive steps towards a solution.

George W. Bushs doctrine was heavily based on offensive realism and its various components. This included the idea of pre-emptive action, use of nuclear weapons, and rejections of Westphalian sovereignty10). Bushs unilateralism and determination to take the fight to states that he saw opposing the American way of life was combined with what Washington Political analyst Bob Woodward described as a loathing and a visceral reaction towards Kim Jong Il. It wasnt merely foreign policy or international relations. For George W. Bush, the situation was much more than that it was personal.

Despite his clear and stated animosity towards the regime, a stance given most credence by his placing of North Korea in the axis of evil, there were more engagements with the state during

10)

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his reign than the 8 years of Obamas democratic term. In March 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that there were plans to engage with North Korea and continue some of the work done by the previous Clinton administration11). A lot of dangerous rhetoric and actions, as well as offers and demands, went back and forth between the two countries. However, in late August 2003, the first round of six-party talks took place in Beijing. These were followed by a second round in February 2004 and a third in June 2004. While progress was slow, if not non-existent, there was dialogue and engagement. 2005 saw the third round of six-party talks and, more notably, a number of US and North Korean bilateral dialogues. In early November that year, the fifth round took place, still without much progress but engagement was nonetheless frequent. These were ultimately undermined by the Banco Delta Asia fund investigation into North Korean money laundering.

The six-party talks resumed again in February 2007 and March 2007. In return for heavy-fuel oil, North Korea agreed to halt operations at the Yongbyon facility. Frozen assets and the removal from state-terrorist lists were also discussed. These talks continued throughout the year until Roh Moo Hyun visited Pyongyang in October. Thus we learn that, despite George W. Bushs distaste for both Kim and the regime, the engagement between the states was frequent. This helps demonstrate the second factor in the Orbital Alignment Theory.

At the end of his second term, despite the animosity, President George W. Bush even found time to write a personal letter to Kim Jong Il12). In this, he continued the proposal of normalized relations if North Korea were to dismantle its nuclear program.

Obamas 8 year approach to North Korea was that of strategic patience. Things started with a nuclear test in 2009 and this resulted in the U.N. Security Council immediately moving to put sanctions in place against them. Following in his predecessors footsteps, Obama also sent a letter to Kim Jong Il asking for disarmament talks but this received a frosty reception.13)

Further progress was made in 2012 when the Norths new leader, Kim Jong Un, accepted food aid in return for stopping the countrys nuclear tests. The agreement was not carried out in practice, however, as the North continued its nuclear program and we find ourselves in the situation we are today. Obama lost any faith in the regime and adopted a principle of what he described as not rewarding bad behavior. He refused to placate the regime and refused any aid, engagement, or other actions while the North continued to adopt its hostile position.

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Obamas term did not just revolve around exclusion, however. He also favored the use of economic and political sanctions as a way of trying to break the North Korean regime. Just before he left office, he encouraged the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions that would cut the Norths largest export good, coal, by up to 60% thus severely affecting the economy of the country.

The second factor in the Orbital Alignment Theory is demonstrated in the attached figure. It seeks to prove how attitudes at the first image level towards North Korea bring different levels of possible engagement.

We can see that both Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun had a somewhat positive, sympathetic, or understanding attitude towards North Korea. This is completely understandable because of the national, racial, and ethnic elements they have in common. This attitude was combined with them both seeking engagement towards the North. On the other hand, George W. Bush was out-spoken in his distrust and distaste of the North Korean regime. And yet the level of engagement was high. This can be seen through the eyes of offensive-realism and a desire to impose ones will in the form of American exceptionalism or unilateralism on the worlds stage. President Trump seems to be following in such footsteps in both regards.

Conversely, President Obama and President Lee Myoung Bak both demonstrated incredibly low levels of engagement with the North.

While there was a more liberal attitude towards the state and general international political field demonstrated by President Obama, influenced no doubt by his democratic position, he didnt really pursue any forms of engagement and, in fact, seemed to actually move away from them. Of course, no strategy in such a complicated game can ever be predicted as perfect, and President Obama himself freely admitted this. However, it would seem that the many years of non-engagement has left the world with an even bigger problem today. A problem that requires solutions and the new actors to navigate. The new actors now share similar characteristics to those from the past when engagement was an active principle, so it seems reasonable to explore the possibility of it happening again.

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.ConclusionIt bears repeating that this paper is not offering solutions to the North Korean problem. It

makes no claims about the success or failure of any ideas. Moreover, it does not necessarily champion the Sunshine Policy as a way forward or, conversely, degenerate the policy of strategic patience as something untenable.

What it does do is to highlight the possibility that engagement between the South and North (and by dint of association, the U.S.) may soon occur again. It will occur because of the current alignment of the respective individual and national images of South Korea and America matches that what it was when engagement previously occurred on a frequent scale. It uses the Orbital Alignment Theory created for this paper to suggest such possibilities.

South Korea has a progressive leader in power who has vast experience with the concept of engagement and understanding with the North. Not only did he attend the 2007 in Pyongyang with President Roh, his father was also a North Korean refugee. President Moons statements both pre and post-election have all seen a dramatic shift away from the attitude of the two previous conservative governments.

But that alone would not have sufficed. For the most part, when previous engagement was underway, President George W. Bush was in the White House. Despite his neo-realist approach to world politics and distaste for North Korea and its leader, the very personal nature of his presidency made him more inclined to