MARTHA - Jyväskylän yliopisto
Transcript of MARTHA - Jyväskylän yliopisto
17.MA
RT
HA
C.
NU
SSBA
UM
Nussbaum
defendsa
versionofthe
capabilitiesapproach
tojustice.
This
approachholds
thatju
sticeis
centrallyconcerned
with
making
possiblethe
realizationof
certainhum
anfunctionings
orcapabiliiies.
She
dern
onstrateshow
thisapproach
canguide
development
policylo
ensurethat
wom
enhave
equalcapabilities
with
men.
kid
sheargues
thather
ver
sionofthe
capabilitiesapproach
canadequately
answer
them
ostserious
chargesm
adeby
relalivistsagainst
ethicaluniversalism
.
Hum
anC
apab
ilities,F
emale
Hum
anB
eings
Firstpublished
inW
omen,
Culture
andD
evelopment:
AStudy
ofH
uman
Capabilities,
ed. Martha
C.Nussbaum
andJonathan
(3/over(O
xford:O
xfordU
niversityPress,
1995),61—
104.
Hum
anbeings
arenot
bynature
kings,or
nobles,orcourtiers,or
rich.All
areborn
nakedand
poor.Allare
subjecttothe
miseries
oflife,to
frustrations,toills,to
needs,topains
ofeverykind.
Finallyall
arecondem
nedto
death.T
hatis
what
isreally
thehum
anbeing;
thatis
what
nom
ortalcan
avoid.Begin,then,by
studyingw
hatis
them
ostinseparable
fromhum
annature,thatw
hichm
ostconstitutes
humanness.
—Jean-Jacques
Rousseau,
Em
ile,B
ookIV
Wom
en,a
majority
ofthe
world’s
population,receive
onlya
small
shareof
developmental
opportunities.T
heyare
oftenexcluded
fromeducation
orfrom
thebetter
jobs,from
politicalsystem
sor
fromadequate
healthcare.
...
Inthe
countriesfor
which
relevant
II
Lv1n-L
’--I-1
1_
ri-‘_
flJO
UflU
iVI
-‘1
t
dataare
available,the
female
human
development
indexis
only60
percentthat
ofm
ales.
—H
uman
Developm
entR
eport, 1993,U
nlied
Nations
Develop
mentProgram
me
Were
ourstate
apure
democracy
therew
ouldstill
beexcluded
fromour
deliberationsw
omen,
who,
toprevent
depravationof
morals
andam
biguityofissue,should
notm
ixprom
iscuouslyin
gatheringsof m
en.
—Thom
asJefferson
Being
aw
oman
isnotyeta
way
ofbeinga
human
being.
—C
atIjarineM
acKinnon
1.FE
MIN
ISM
AN
DC
OM
MO
NH
UM
AN
ITY
Begin
with
thehum
anbeing:w
iththe
capacitiesand
needsthatjoin
allhum
ans,acrossbarriers
ofgenderand
classand
raceand
nation.’T
oa
personconcerned
with
theequality
anddignity
ofwom
en,this
adviceshould
appearin
onew
ayprom
ising.Foritinstructs
usto
focuson
what
allhuman
beingsshare
ratherthan
onthe
privilegesand
achievements
ofadom
inantgroup, andon
needsand
basicfisnctions
ratherthan
onpow
eror
status.Wom
enhave
rarelybeen
kings, ornobles,or
courtiers,or
rich.Theyhave,
onthe
otherhand,
frequentlybeen
poorand
sickand
dead.B
utthis
startingpoint
will
beregarded
with
skepticismby
many
contemporary
feminists.
Forit
isall
tooobvious
thatthroughout
thehistory
ofpolitical
thought,both
Western
andnon-W
estern,such
allegedlyunbiased
generalconcepts
haveserved
invarious
ways
tobolsterm
aleprivilege
andto
marginalize
wom
en. Hum
anbeings
arenot
bornkings,ornobles, orcourtiers.T
heyare,orso
it seems,
2born
male
andfem
ale.The
nakednesson
which
Rousseau
placessuch
emphasis
revealsa
differencethat
istaken
byR
ousseauhim
selfto
imply
profounddifferences
incapability
andsocial
role.H
isrem
arksabout
human
natureare
theprelude
tohis
accountof
Emile’s
education.Sophie,
Emile’s
female
companion,w
illbesaid
tohave
adifferent“nature”
anda
differenteducation. Whether,as
here,wom
enare
heldto
bebearers
of
a different”nature”fromunm
arked“hum
annature,”orw
hetherthey
aresim
plysaid
tobe
degenerateand
substandardexem
plarsofthe
same
“nature,”the
resultisusually
thesam
e:ajudgm
entoffem
aleinferiority,
which
canth
enbe
usedto
justify
andstabilize
op
pressio
n.
3I
shallargue
nonethelessth
atw
eshould
infact
beginw
itha
con
ceptionofthe
human
beingand
human
functioningin
thinkingabout
wom
en’sequality
indeveloping
countries.Thisnotion
canbe
abused.It
canbe
developedin
agender-biased
way
Itcan
beunjustly
andprejudicially
applied.It
canbe
developedin
ways
thatneglect
relevantdifferences
among
wom
enofdifferentnationalities,classes,and
races.But
Ishallarguethat,articulated
ina
certainw
ay(and
Ishallbe
emphatically
distinguishingm
yapproach
fromothers
thatuse
anidea
of“hum
annature”)
itis
ourbest
startingpoint
forreflection.It
isour
bestroute
tostating
correctlyw
hatis
wrong
with
thesituations
thatconfronted
SalehaB
egumand
Metha
Bai,4
thebestbasis
forclaims
ofjusticeon
theirbehalf;and
onbehalfofthe
hugenum
bersof w
omen
inthe
world
who
arecurrently
beingdeprived
oftheirfill
“human
development.”
Inote
that theconceptofthe
human
beinghas
akeadybeen
centralto
much
ofthebestfem
inistandinternationalistthinking.C
onsider,forexam
ple,J.S. Mill’s
remarks
on“hum
anim
provement”
in7he
Subjectionof
Wom
en;Aniartya
Sen’suse
ofanotion
of “human
capability”to
confrontgender-based
inequalities;the
Sen-inspireduse
ofa
notionof
“human
development”
inthe
TINR
eporttodescribe
andcriticize
gender—based
inequalities; Susanivloller
Okin’s
proposalfora“humanistjustice”in
herrecentm
ajor work
offeministpoliticaltheory;C
atharineM
acKinnon’s
graphicdescription
ofwom
en’scurrentsituation,quoted
asm
yepigraph;
and,ofcourse, therole
thatvariousaccounts
of”human
rights,”oreven
“TheR
ightsof M
an,”have
playedin
claiming
justiceforw
omen.
5M
uchthe
same
canbe
saidm
oregenerally,
Ithink,
aboutinternationalist
thought.6
To
citejustone
example,I
takem
yproposalto
bethe
feminist
analogueofthe
proposalrecentlym
adeby
Ghanaian
philosopherKw
ame
Anthony
Appiah
when
hew
rote,“We
will only
solveour
problems
ifwe
seethem
ashum
anproblem
sarising
outof
aspecial
situation,and
we
shallnotsolvethem
ifwe
seethem
asAfrican
problems,generated
byour
beingsom
ehowunlike
others.”1
]VIyproposal
isfrankly
universalistand
“essentialist.”T
hatis,
itasks
usto
focuson
what
iscom
mon
toall
ratherthan
ondifferences
(although,as
we
shallsee,
itdoes
notneglect
these),and
tosee
some
capabilitiesand
fi.inctionsas
more
central,m
oreat
thecore
ofhum
an
I498
OLQ
BA
LJVSTJC
E:SEM
iNA
LESSAYS
MA
RIH
AC.N
USbdA
UM
•4
life,thanothers.Its
primary
opponentson
thecontem
poraryscene
will
be“anti-essentialists”
ofvarious
types,thinkers
who
urgeus
tobegin
notwith
sameness
butw
ithdifference—
bothbetw
eenw
omen
andm
enand
acrossgroups
ofwom
en—.and
toseek
norms
definedrelatively
toa
local contextandlocally
heldbeliefs.8
‘Thisopposition
takesm
anyform
s,and
Ishall
beresponding
toseveral
distinctobjections
thatopponents
may
bringagainstm
yuniversalist
proposal.But
Ican
beginto
motivate
my
enterpriseby
tellingseveral
truestories
ofconversations
thathave
takenplace
atVID
ER
,inw
hichthe
relativistposition9
seemed
tohave
alarming
implications
forw
omen’s
lives.Ihave
insom
ecases
conflatedtw
oseparate
conversationsinto
one;otherw
isethings
happenedas
Idescribe
them.’°
1. Ata
conferenceon
“Value
andT
echnolo
g3”an
Am
ericanecono
mist w
hohas long
beena left-w
ingcritic
ofneoclassicaleconomics
deliversa
paper urgingthe
preservationoftraditionalw
aysoflife
ina
ruralareaofIndia,now
underthreatofcontamination
fromW
esterndevelopm
entprojects.A
sevidence
of theexcellence
ofthisruralw
ayoflife, he
pointsto
thefactthat, w
hereasw
eW
esternersexperience
asharp
splitbetween
thevalues
thatprevail
inthe
workplace
andthe
valuesthat
prevailin
thehom
e,here,
bycontrast,
thereexists
what
theeconom
istcalls
“theem
beddedw
ayoflife”;
thesam
evalues
obtainingin
bothplaces.H
isexam
ple:Justasin
thehom
ea
menstruating
wom
anis
thoughtto
pol
lutethe
kitchenand
thereforem
aynotenter
it, sotoo
inthe
workplace
am
enstruatingw
oman
istaken
topollute
theloom
andm
aynot
enterthe
roomw
hereloom
sare
kept.Am
artyaSen
objectsthatthis
example
isrepellent,rather
thanadm
irable:Surely
suchpractices
bothdegrade
thew
omen
inquestion
andinhibittheir
freedom.T
hefirsteconom
ist’scollaborator,
anelegant
Frenchanthropologist
(who
would,I
suspect,objectviolently
toa
puritycheck
atthe
seminar
roomdoor),replies
toSen.D
oesn’therealize
thatthereis,in
thesem
atters,noprivileged
placeto
stand?This, after
all,hasbeen
shown
byboth
Derrida
andFoucault.
Doesn’t
heknow
thathe
isneglecting
theotherness
ofIndianideas
bybringing
his‘W
esternessentialistvalues
intothe
picture?’2.
Thesam
eFrench
anthropologistnow
deliversher
paper.She
expressesregret
thatthe
introductionof
smallpox
vaccinationto
Indiaby
theB
ritisheradicated
thecultof Sittala
Devi,the
goddessto
whom
oneused
topray
inorder
toavert
smallpox.H
ere,shesays, is
anotherexam
pleofW
esternneglectofdifference.Som
eone(itm
ighthavebeen
me)
objectsthat
itis surelybetterto
behealthy
ratherthanill,to
liverather
thanto
die.’Theansw
er comes
back: Western
essentialist medicine
con
ceivesof things
interm
sofbinary
oppositions: lifeis
opposedto
death,
healthto
disease.’1
But if w
ecast
away
thisbinary
way
of thinking,we
will
beginto
comprehend
theotherness
of Indiantraditions.
At
thispoint
Eric
Hobsbaw
m,w
hohas
beenlistening
tothe
pro
ceedingsin
increasinglyuneasy
silence,rises
todeliver
ablistering
indictmentof the
traditionalismand
relativismthat prevailin
thisgroup.
He
listshistorical
examples
of ways
inw
hichappeals
totradition
have
beenused
tosupport
oppressionand
violence.13
His
final example
isthat
of National
Socialismin
Germ
any.Inthe
confusionthat ensues, m
ostof
therelativist
socialscientists—
aboveall those
fromfar
away, w
hodo
not
knoww
hoH
obsbawm
is—dem
andthat
hebe
askedto
leavethe
room.
‘Theradical A
merican
economist, disconcerted
bythis
apparent tension
between
hisrelativism
andhis
affiliationw
iththe
left, convincesthem
,
with
difficulty,tolet
Hobsbaw
mrem
ain.3.W
eshift now
toanother conference
two
yearslater,a
philosophi
cal conferenceorganized
byA
martya
Senand
me.’4
Senm
akesit clearthat
heholds
theperhaps
unsophisticatedview
thatlife
isopposed
todeath
ina
verybinary
way
andthat
suchbinary
oppositionscan
andshould
beused
indevelopm
ent analysis. His
paper’5
containsm
uchuniversalist
talkof hum
anfunctioning
andcapability; he
beginsto
speakof freedom
of choiceas
abasic
human
good.At
thispoint
heis
interruptedby
the
radicaleconom
ist ofmy
first story, who
insiststhat contem
poraryanthro
pologyhas
shown
thatnon-W
esternpeople
arenot
especiallyattached
tofreedom
ofchoice.
His
example:
Anew
bookon
Japanhas
shown
that Japanesem
ales, when
theyget
home
fromw
ork,do
notw
ishto
choosew
hatto
eatfor
dinner, what
tow
ear,and
soon.T
heyw
ishall
thesechoices
tobe
takenout
oftheir
handsby
theirw
ives. Aheated
exchangefollow
sabout w
hatthis
example
reallyshow
s. Ileave
it toyour
imaginations
toreconstruct
it. Inthe
end,the
confidenceof
theradical
economist
isunshaken:
Senand
Iare
bothvictim
sof
baduniversalist
thinking, who
fail torespect “difference.”
16
Here
we
seethe
relativist positionw
hoseinfluence
indevelopm
ent
studiesm
otivatedthe
work
that hasled
tothe
presentvolume
[Wom
en,
Cu/litre
andD
eve/opnzentl. The
phenomenon
isan
oddone. For
we
see
herehighly
intelligentpeople, people
deeplycom
mitted
tothe
goodof
wom
enand
men
indeveloping
countries,peoplew
hothink
ofth
em
selvesas
progressiveand
feminist
andantiracist,
peoplew
hocorrectly
arguethat the
concept of development is
anevaluative
concept requiring
I500
GL
OB
AL
JUST
ICE
:SE
MIN
AL
ESSAY
Ss,rn
aL1a
.
normative
argum
ent
17
—effe
ctiv
ely
eschewing
normative
argument
and
takingup
positionsthat
converge,as
Hobsbaw
mcorrectly
saw, w
ith
thepositions
of reaction, oppression,and
sexism. U
nderthe
bannerof
theirfashionable
oppositionto
“essentialism”
march
ancientreligious
taboos,theluxury
ofthe
pampered
husband, educationaldeprivation,
unequalhealthcare,and
premature
death. (And
inm
yow
nuniversalist
Aristotelian
way, I
sayit
atthe
outset,Ido
holdthat
deathis
opposed
tolife
inthe
most
binaryw
ayim
aginable,and
freedomto
slavery,and
hungerto
adequatenutrition,
andignorance
toknow
ledge.N
ordo
I
believethat
itis
only,oreven
primarily, in
Western
thinkingthat
such
oppositionsare, and
shouldbe, im
portant.)T
herelativist
challengeto
auniversal
notionof
thehum
anbeing
andhum
anfunctioning
isnot
always
accompanied
byclear
andexplicit
philosophicalargum
ents.Thisis
especiallytrue
inthe
material
from
development
studiesto
which
Ihave
referred, where
thephilosophical
debateconcerning
relativismin
ethicsand
inscience
isnot confronted,
anduniversalism
issim
plydenounced
asthe
legacyofV
Vestern
con
ceptionsof “epistem
e’8
that arealleged
tobe
inleague
with
imperialism
andoppression)9
The
ideabehind
thisvolum
e[W
omen,
Culture
and
Developm
ent]as
aw
holew
asthat
tosort
outvarious
strandsin
the
philosophicaldebateon
thesequestions
would
beof the
first importance
inm
akingfurther
progresson
wom
en’sissues;
andthe
papersby
Alcott
[“Dem
ocracyand
Rationality:
AD
ialoguew
ithH
ilaryPutnam
,”pp.
225—34], B
enhabib[“C
ultural Com
plexity,Moral Interdependence,and
theG
lobalDialogical C
omm
unity,”pp.235—58], G
lover[“The
Research
Programm
eofD
evelopment
Ethics,”
pp.116—
39], andH
ilaryPutnam
[“Pragmatism
andM
oralO
bjectivity,”pp.
199—224]
carryout
various
aspectsof
thisantirelativist
project.Here,
then,Ishall
simply
setout
ratherschematically
andbriefly,for
thepurposes
of my
own
argument,
severalobjections
tothe
useof a
universalnotion
of human
functioning
indevelopm
entanalysisto
which
Ishall
laterrespond.
2. TH
EA
SSAU
LT
ON
UN
IVE
RS
AL
ISM
Many
criticsofuniversalism
inethics
arereally
criticsof m
etaphysical
realismw
hoassum
ethat
realismis
anecessary
basisfor
universalism.
Ishallargue
that thisassum
ptionis
false.By
metaphysical realism
Im
ean
theview
(comm
onlyheld
inboth
Western
andnon-W
esternphilosophi
caltraditions)
thatthere
issom
edeterm
inatew
aythe
world
is, apart
fromthe
interpretivew
orkingsof the
cognitivefaculties
oflivingbeings.
Farfromrequiring
technical metaphysics
forits
articulation,thisis
avery
natural way
toview
things, andis
infacta very
comm
ondaily-life
view, in
bothW
esternand
non-Western
traditions.We
didnot m
akethe
stars, the
earth, thetrees:T
heyare
whatthey
arethere
outsideof us, w
aitingto
be
known.A
ndour
activitiesof know
ingdo
notchange
what
theyare.
On
sucha view
,thew
aythe
human
beingessentially
anduniversally
isw
ill bepart ofthe
independent furnitureof the
universe, something
that canin
principlebe
seenand
studiedindependently
of anyexperi
enceof hum
anlife
andhum
anhistory. Frequently
it isheld
thatagod
orgods
havethis
sortof know
ledge,and
perhapssom
ew
isehum
ans
also.This
knowledge
isusually
understoodto
havenorm
ativeforce.T
he
heavenlyaccount
of who
we
areconstrains
whatw
em
aylegitim
ately
seekto
be.
2°It
isthis
conceptionof
inquiryinto
thenature
ofthe
human
thatthe
Marglins
areattacking
intheir
critiqueofw
hatthey
call Western
episteine.They
clearlybelieve
itto
bea
necessaryprop
to
anyethical
universalism.
Thecom
mon
objectionto
thissortof realism
is that suchextra-histori
cal andextra-experiential
metaphysical
truthsare
notin
fact available.
Sometim
esthis
is put skeptically:The
independent structurem
aystill be
there, but we
cannot reliablygrasp
it. Pvloreoften, today, doubtis
cast on
thecoherence
of thew
holerealist idea
that thereis
some
onedeterm
inate
structureto
thew
aythings
are, independent of allhuman
interpretation.
Thisis the
objectionthat nonphiosophers
tendto
associatew
ithJacques
Derrida’s
assaultonthe
“metaphysics
of presence,”2’
which
hetakes
tohave
dominated
theentirety
of theW
esternphilosophical tradition, and
with
Richard
Rorty’sclosely
relatedassaulton
theidea
that theknow
ingm
indis,
at itsbest,a “m
irror of nature.”22
But
it actuallyhas
afar longer
andm
ore
complicated
history, evenw
ithinW
esternphilosophy, beginning
atleast
asearly
asK
ant’sassault
ontranscendent m
etaphysics, andperhaps
far
earlier, insom
eofA
ristotle’scriticism
sofPlatonism
YA
similar debate
was
longfam
iliarin
classical Indianphilosophy, and
nodoubt
it hasfigured
inother philosophical traditions
as well.
24
Contem
poraryargum
entsabout
realismare
many
andcom
plex, involving, frequently, technical issuesin
the
philosophyof
scienceand
thephilosophy
of language.
Thedebate
aboutrealism
appearsto
befar
fromover.The
central
issuescontinue
tobe
debatedw
ithvigor
andsubtlety, and
aw
iderange
ofviews
iscurrently
onthe
table.On
theother hand,the
attackon
real
ismhas
beensufficiently
deepand
sufficientlysustained
thatit w
ould
I‘Z
lbJ1
aflJU
3O
4flAIN
tUL
OIiX
MA
RT
HA
C. N
US
SB
AU
M•
503
appearstrategically
wise
foran
ethicaland
politicalview
thatseeks
broadsupport notto
relyon
thetruth
ofmetaphysical realism
,ifitcan
defenditself in
some
otherw
ay.If,then,alluniversalist
andhum
anistconceptions
inethics
arerequired
toregard
theuniversal
conceptionof the
human
beingas
partofthe
independentfurniture
ofthew
orld,unm
ediatedby
human
self-interpretationand
human
history,such
conceptionsdo
appearto
bein
some
difficulty,andthere
may
well
begood
reasonsto
tryto
dow
ithoutthem
.B
utuniversalism
doesnot
requiresuch
support.
25
Foruniversal
ideasof
thehum
ando
arisew
ithinhistory
andfrom
human
experience,and
theycan
groundthem
selvesin
experience.Indeed,
if, asthe
criticsof realism
allege,we
arealw
aysdealing
with
ourow
ninterpre
tationsanyhow
,theym
ustacknow
ledgethat
universalconceptions
ofthe
human
areprom
inentand
pervasiveam
ongsuch
interpretations,hardly
tobe
relegatedto
thedustbin
ofm
etaphysicalhistory
alongw
ithrare
andrecondite
philosophicalentities
suchas
thePlatonic
forms. A
sA
ristotleso
simply
putsit,“O
nem
ayobserve
inone’s
travels
todistant
countriesthe
feelingsof recognition
andaffiliation
thatlink
everyhum
anbeing
toevery
otherhum
anb
eing
.”26
Or,as
Kw
ame
Anthony
Appiah
eloquentlytells
thestory
of hisbiculturalchildhood,
achild
who
visitsone
setof
grandparentsin
Ghana
andanother
inrural
England, w
hohas
aL
ebaneseuncle
andw
holater,
asan
adult,has
niecesand
nephews
fromm
orethan
sevendifferent nations, com
esto
noticenot
unbridgeablealien
“otherness,”buta
greatdealof human
comm
onality,and
comes
tosee
thew
orldas
a“netw
orkof
pointsof
affinity.”2
7Pursuing
thoseaffinities,one
may
accept theconclusions
ofthe
criticsof
realismw
hilestill
believingthat
auniversal
conceptionofthe
human
beingis
bothavailable
toethics
anda
valuablestarting
point. Ishallbe
proposinga
versionof such
anaccount,attem
ptingto
identil5’a
groupof
especiallycentral
andbasic
human
functionsthat
groundthese
affinities.B
utsuchan
experientialandhistorical universalism
25
isstillvulner
ableto
some,
ifnot
all,of
theobjections
standardlybrought
againstuniversalism
.I
thereforeneed
tointroduce
thoseobjections, and
laterto
testm
yaccount
againstthem
.
Theopposition
chargesthat
anyattem
ptto
pickout
some
elements
ofhuman
lifeas
more
fundamental
thanothers, even
without
appealto
atranshistorical
reality,is
boundto
beinsufficiently
respectfulof
actualhistorical
andcultural
differences.People,
itis
claimed,
understandhum
anlife
andhum
annessin
widely
different ways:
andany
attempt
toproduce
alist
ofthe
most
fundamental
propertiesand
functionsofhum
anbeings
isbound
toenshrine
certainu
nd
erstandings
ofthe
human
andto
demote
others. Usually,the
objectorcontinues,
thistakes
theform
ofenshrining
theunderstanding
ofa
dominant group
attheexpense
of minority
understandings.This
typeof
objectionis
frequentlym
adeby
feminists
andcan
claimsupport
fromm
anyhistorical
examples, in
which
thehum
anhas
indeedbeen
definedby
focusingon
thecharacteristics
ofm
ales, asm
anifestedin
thedefiner’s
culture.It
isfar
fromclearw
hatthis
objectionshow
s.Inparticular
it isfar
fromclear
thatit
supportsthe
ideathat
we
oughtto
baseour
ethicalnorm
s, instead, onthe
current preferencesand
theself—
conceptionsof
peoplew
hoare
livingw
hatthe
objectorherself
claims
tobe
livesof
deprivationand
oppression.29
But
itdoesshow
at least thatthe
projectof choosing
onepicture
of thehum
anover another
isfraught w
ithdif
ficult
politicalas
well
asphilosophical.
2.2
.N
EG
LE
CT
OF
Au
To
No
J’w
Adifferent
objectionis
presentedby
liberalopponents
ofuniver—
salism;
my
relativistopponents,
theM
arglins,endorse
itas
well.
(Many
suchobjectors,
thoughnot,
Ibelieve,
theM
arglins,are
themselves
willing
togive
auniversal
accountof
thehum
anin
atleast
some
ways,
holdingfreedom
ofchoice
tobe
everywhere
ofcentral
importance.)
The
objectionis
thatby
determining
inadvance
what
elements
ofhum
anlife
havem
ostim
portance,the
universalistproject
failsto
respectthe
rightof
peopleto
choosea
planof
lifeaccording
totheir
own
lights,determ
iningw
hatis
centraland
what
isno
t.30
This
way
ofproceeding
is“im
perialistic.”Such
evaluativechoices
must be
leftto
eachcitizen. For
thisreason,
politicsm
ustrefuse
itselfa
determinate
theoryofthe
human
beingand
thehum
angood.
2.1.N
EG
LE
CT
OF
HIS
TO
RIC
AL
AN
DC
UL
TU
RA
LD
IFF
ER
EN
CE
S
2.3.P
IwjlJm
cIM.i.A
PP
LIC
AT
ION
5U4
(JLO
BA
LJIJS
TJC
E:
SE
MIN
AL
ESSA
YS
IVLEt$.1
tiltL...IN
LO
aDnU
a,A.IU
J
Ifwe
operatew
itha
determinate
conceptionofthe
human
beingthatis
meant to
havesom
enorm
ativem
oraland
politicalforce,we
mustalso,
inapplying
it, askw
hichbeings
we
shalltake
tofall under
theconcept.
And
herethe
objectornotes
that,alltooeasily—
evenifthe
conceptionitself
isequitably
andcom
prehensivelydesigned—
thepow
erlesscan
beexcluded.A
ristotlehim
self;it
ispointed
out,heldthatw
omen
andslaves
were
nothill-fledged
human
beings;and
sincehis
politicsw
erebased
onhis
viewof hum
anfunctioning,the
failureofthese
beings(in
hisview
)to
exhibitthedesired
mode
offunctioningcontributed
totheir
politicalexclusionand
oppression.It
is,onceagain,hard
toknow
what
thisobjection
issupposed
toshow
.In
particular,it
ishard
toknow
how,if
atall,
itis
supposedto
showthatw
ew
ouldbe
betteroffw
ithoutsuch
determinate
universalconcepts.For
itcouldbe
plausiblyargued
thatitw
ouldhave
beeneven
easierto
excludew
omen
andslaves
ona
whim
ifonedid
nothavesuch
aconcept
tocontend
with.Indeed,this
isw
hatIshallbe
arguing.31
On
theother
hand,itdoes
showthatw
eneed
tothink
notonlyaboutg
etting
theconceptrightbutalso
aboutgettingthe
rightbeingsadm
ittedunder
theconcept.
Each
of theseobjections
hassom
em
erit.Many
universalconcep
tionsof
thehum
anbeing
havebeen
insularin
anarrogant
way,
andneglectfulofdifferences
among
culturesand
ways
of life.Some
havebeen
neglectfulofchoice
andautonom
y.And
many
havebeen
prejudiciallyapplied.
But
noneof
thisshow
sthat
allsuch
conceptionsm
ustfallin
oneorm
oreofthese
ways.B
utatthispointI
needto
advancea
definiteexam
pleof such
aconception,in
orderbothto
displayits
merits
andto
arguethat
it canin
factanswer
thesecharges.
3.AC
ON
CE
PT
ION
OF
TH
EH
UM
AN
BE
ING
:TH
EC
EN
TR
AL
HU
MA
J’JC
AP
AB
ILIT
IES
Here,then,is
asketch
foran
accountofthem
ostimportantfunctions
andcapabilities
ofthe
human
being,interm
sofw
hichhum
anlife
isdefined.The
basicidea
isthatw
eask
ourselves,“What
arethe
characteristic
activities32
of thehum
anbeing?
What
doesthe
human
beingdo,
characteristically,assuch—m
dnot,say, as
am
emberofaparticulargroup,
ora
particularlocal
comm
unity?”To
putit
anotherw
ay,what
arethe
forms
ofactivity,ofdoingand
being,thatconstitutethe
human
formof
lifeand
distinguishit from
otheractual or im
aginableform
sof life, such
asthe
livesof anim
alsand
plants, or,onthe
other hand, of imm
ortal gods
as imagined
inm
ythsand
legends(w
hichfrequently
haveprecisely
the
functionof delim
itingthe
human)?
33
We
canget at
thisquestion
betterif w
eapproach
itviatw
osom
e
what
more
concretequestions
that we
oftenreally
askourselves.
First
isa
questionabout
personalcontinuity
We
askourselves
what
changes
or transitionsare
compatible
with
thecontinued
existenceof that being
asa
mem
berof
thehum
ankind,
andw
hatare
not.(Since
continued
speciesidentity
seems
tobe
atleast
necessaryfor
continuedpersonal
identity, thisis
alsoa
questionabout
thenecessary
conditionsfor co
n
tinuingas
oneand
thesam
eindividual.)
Some
functionscan
failtobe
present without threatening
our sensethat w
estill have
ahum
anbeing
onour
hands; theabsence
of othersseem
sto
signaltheend
of ahum
an
life.Thisquestion
isasked
regularly,when
we
attempt to
make
medical
definitionsof
deathin
asituation
inw
hichsom
eof
thefunctions
of
lifepersist,
orto
decide, forothers
or(thinking
ahead)for
ourselves,
whether
acertain
level of illnessor im
pairment m
eansthe
endof the
life
of thebeing
inquestion?’
Theother question
isa question
about kindinclusion. W
erecognize
otherhum
ansas
human
acrossm
anydifferences
of time
andplace, of
customand
appearance.K
wam
eA
nthonyA
ppiahw
ritesabout
the
experienceof
seeinghis
heterogeneousnieces
andnephew
splaying
together, andthe
term“the
human
fiiture”nanirallyoccursto
him
.35
IVIuch
thoughw
em
aylove
our dogsand
cats, we
recognizesuch
scenesas crucially
different fromscenes
of achild
playingw
itha
dogor cat. O
nw
hat dow
e
basethese
recognitions?‘N
eoften
tell ourselvesstories,on
theother hand,
aboutanthropomorphic
creatures who
donotget classified
ashum
an,on
account of some
featureof their
formof life
andfunctioning.O
nw
hat
dow
ebase
theseexclusions?
Inshort, w
hat dow
ebelieve
mustbe
there,if
we
aregoing
toacknow
ledgethat a
givenlife
ishum
an?36
Thisinquiry
proceedsby
examining
aw
idevariety
of self-interpreta
tionsof hum
anbeings
inm
anytim
esand
places. Especiallyvaluable
are
myths
andstories
thatsituate
thehum
anbeing
insom
ew
ayin
the
universe, between
the“beasts”
onthe
onehand
andthe
“gods”on
the
other;stories
thatask
what
it isto
liveas
abeing
with
certainabilities
thatset
itapart
fromthe
restof the
world
ofnature
andw
ith, onthe
otherhand, certain
limits
that derivefrom
mem
bershipin
thew
orldof
nature.The
ideais
that peoplein
man)’ different societies
sharea
general
506G
LO
BA
LJtJS
TIC
E:
SE
MIN
AL
ES
SA
YS
LWJU
%L
Flit
b.nL
NJII3
13flU
fl•
JUl
outlineofsuch
aconception.T
hisisnotsurprising,since
theydo
recognizeone
anotheras
mem
bersof
thesam
especies,37
marry
oneanother,have
childrentogether,
andso
forth—and
indeeddo
tellone
anothersuch
stories,without
much
difficultyof
translation.This
convergencegives
ussom
ereason
foroptim
ism,that
ifwe
proceedin
thisw
ay,usingour
imaginations,
we
will
havein
theend
atheory
thatis
notthe
mere
projectionoflocalpreferences,butis
fullyinternational
anda
basisfor
cross-culturalattunem
ent.Severalim
portantmethodologicalpoints
mustnow
beem
phasized:
1.T
heprocedure
throughw
hichthis
accountof
thehum
anis
derivedis
neitherahistoricalnora
priori.Itisan
attemptto
setdown
averygeneralrecord
ofbroadlyshared
experiencesof
human
beingsw
ithinhistory.
Arelated
pointcan
bem
adeabout
theresults
ofthe
inquiry:they
donot
claimto
beahistorical
ora
prioritruth,
but,rather,
anespecially
deepand
continuoussortofexperiential
andhistorical
truth.
2.O
nthe
otherhand,
theguiding
questionsof
theinquiry
directitto
crossnationaland
temporalb
ound
aries,looking
forfeatures
thatground
recognitionsof
humanness
acrossthese
boundaries.T
husw
ecan
expectthat
itsresults
willem
bodyw
hatis
continuousrather
thanrapidly
changing,internationalratherthanlocal.
3.T
heaccount is
neithera
biologicalaccountnoram
etaphysicalaccount.(Forthese
reasonsIhave
avoidedusing
theterm
“human
nature,”w
hichis
usuallyassociated
with
attempts
todescribe
thehum
anbeing
eitherfromthe
pointofview
ofanallegedly
value-freescience
orfrom
thepointofview
ofnormative,often
theological,m
etaphysics.)Theinquiry
paysattention
tobio
log
butas
itfigures
inand
shapeshum
anexperience.
Itis
anevaluative
and,ina
broadsense,ethicalinquiry.It
asksus
toevaluate
components
oflives,askingw
hichones
areso
important
thatw
ew
ouldnot
calla
lifehum
anw
ithoutthem.T
heresultofthis
inquiryis,then,notalist
ofvalue-neutralfacts,buta
normative
conception.3
8
4.T
heaccount
ism
eantto
beboth
tentativeand
open-ended. W
eallow
explicitlyfor
thepossibility
thatw
ew
illlearn
fromour
encountersw
ithother
human
societiesto
recognizethings
aboutourselves
thatw
ehad
not seenbefore,or
evento
changein
certainw
ays,according
more
importance
tosom
ethingw
ehad
thoughtm
oreperipheral.
(We
may
alsoshift
toreach
apolitical
consensus.)
5.‘The
accountis
notintended
todeny
thatthe
items
it
enumerates
areto
some
extent differentlyconstructed
bydifferent societies. It
claims
onlythatin
theseareas
thereis
considerablecontinuity
andoverlap, sufficient
toground
aw
orkingpolitical
consensus.3
9
6.A
lthoughthe
account appealsto
consensusin
thisw
ay,it should
beunderstood
thattheconsensus
isacceptable
onlyif
itisreached
byreasonable
procedures, where
thenotion
of reasonablenesshas
normative
conten
t.4°
Inthis
way
itisdifferentfrom
consensusas
mere
overlap.41
7.The
listis heterogeneous: forit containsboth
limits
againstw
hichw
epress
andcapabilities
throughw
hichw
easpire.
‘Thisis
not surprising, sincew
ebegan
fromthe
intuitiveidea
ofacreature
who
isbothcapable
andneedy.
8.The
concept “human
being,” asthis
viewunderstands
it,
isin
onew
aylike
theconcept “person”as used
elsewhere
inm
oralphilosophy:
thatis,
itis
anorm
ativeethical
concept.O
nthe
otherhand,
becauseof
itslink
with
anem
piricalstudy
ofa
species-specificform
oflife,
andw
ithw
hatis
most
centralin
sucha
formof
life,it
may
provem
oredifficult
tow
ithholdfrom
certainbeings
inan
arbitraryw
ay(see
Section7
below).T
hism
aycom
mend
itto
feminists:
forthe
label“person”
hasfrequently
beenw
ithheldfrom
wom
en,w
ithoutsubstantial
argum
ent.
42
Here
then,asa
first approximation, is
astory
about what
seems
to
bepart
of anylife
we
will
countas
ahum
anlife:
L’.JaJnI
MA
I{1i-IA
C.
£N
UbbA
UM
•SU
9
3.1.L
EV
EL
ON
EO
FT
HE
CO
NcE
PT
ION
OF
TH
EH
uiw
cB
EIN
G:
TH
ESH
APE
OF
TH
EH
uiswc
FoiuwO
FL
IFE
3.1.1.Mortality
All
human
beingsface
deathand,
aftera
certainage,know
thatthey
faceit.’This
factshapesm
oreor
lessevery
otherelem
entofhum
anlife.
Moreover,allhum
anbeings
havean
aversionto
death.Although
inm
anycircum
stancesdeath
will
bepreferred
tothe
availablealternatives,
thedeath
ofaloved
one,orthe
prospectofone’s
own
death,isan
occasionfor
griefandlorfear.Ifw
eencountered
anim
mortal
anthropomorphic
being,ora
mortalbeing
who
showed
noaversion
todeath
andno
tendency
atalltoavoid
death,we
would
judge,inboth
ofthesecases,that
theform
oflifew
asso
differentfromour
own
thatthe
beingcould
notbe
acknowledged
ashum
an.
3.1.2.The
Hum
anB
ody
We
liveall
ourlives
inbodies
ofacertain
sort,whose
possibilitiesand
vulnerabilitiesdo
notas
suchbelong
toone
human
societyrather
thananother.T
hesebodies,sim
ilarfar
more
thandissim
ilar(given
theenorm
ousrange
ofpossibilities)
areour
homes,
soto
speak,opening
certainoptions
anddenying
others,giving
uscertain
needsand
alsocertain
possibilitiesfor
excellence.Thethct
thatany
givenhum
anbeing
might
havelived
anywhere
andbelonged
toany
cultureis
agreatpart
ofwhat
groundsour
mutual
recognitions;this
fact,inturn,has
agreat
dealto
dow
iththe
generalhumanness
ofthebody,its
greatdistinctnessfrom
otherbodies.The
experienceofthe
bodyis
culturallyshaped,to
besure;
theim
portancew
eascribe
toits
variousfunctions
isalso
culturallyshaped.B
utthebody
itself,notculturally
variantin
itsnutritional
andother
relatedrequirem
ents,setslim
itson
whatcan
beexperienced
andvalued,ensuring
agreat
dealofoverlap.
There
ism
uchdisagreem
ent,ofcourse,abouthowm
uchofhum
anexperience
isrootedin
thebody.H
erereligion
andm
etaphysicsenterthe
picturein
anontrivialw
ay.Therefore,inkeeping
with
thenonm
etaphysical
characterofthe
list,Ishall
includeat
thispoint
onlythose
featuresthatw
ouldbe
agreedto
bebodily
evenby
determined
dualists.The
more
controversialfeatures,suchas
thinking,perceiving,andem
otion,Ishall
discussseparately,taking
nostand
onthe
questionofdualism
.
1.H
ungerand
thirst:the
needforfoodand
drink.A
llhum
anbeings
needfood
anddrink
inorder
tolive;allhave
comparable,though
varying,
nutritionalrequirem
ents.B
eingin
oneculture
ratherthan
anotherdoes
notm
akeone
metabolize
fooddifferently.Furtherm
ore,allhuman
beingshave
appetitesthatare
indicesofneed.A
ppetitiveexperience
isto
some
extentculturallyshaped;butw
eare
notsurprisedto
discoverm
uchsim
ilarityand
overlap.Moreover,hum
anbeings
ingeneraldo
notwish
tobe
hungryorthirsty
(thoughofcourse
theym
ightchooseto
fastforsome
reason). Ifwe
discoveredsom
eonew
horeally
didnotexperience
hungerand
thirstat all,or,experiencing
them,really
didnot
careabouteating
anddrinking,w
ew
ouldjudge
thatthiscreature
was
(inA
ristotle’swords)
“farfrombeing
ahum
anbeing.”
2.N
eedforshelter.A
recurrentthem
ein
myths
ofhum
annessis
thenakedness
ofthehum
anbeing,its
relativeunprotectedness
inthe
animalw
orld, itssusceptibility
toheat,cold,and
theravages
oftheele
ments. Stories
thatexplorethe
differencebetw
eenour
needsand
thoseof
flurryor
scalyor
othenviseprotected
creaturesrem
indus
howfar
ourlife
isconstituted
bythe
needto
findprotection
throughclothing
andhousing.3. Sexualdesire.T
houghlessurgentas
aneed
thanthe
needsforfood,
drink,and
shelter(in
thesense
thatone
canlive
without
itssatisfac
tion),sexual
needand
desireare
featuresof
more
orless
everyhum
anlife,at
leastbeyond
acertain
age.Itis,and
hasall
alongbeen,
am
ostim
portantbasis
forthe
recognitionof
othersdifferent
fromourselves
ashum
anbeings.
4.Mobility.
Hum
anbeings
are,asthe
olddefinition
goes,featherless
bipeds—that
is,creaturesw
hoseform
oflifeis
inpart
constitutedby
theability
tom
ovefrom
placeto
placein
acertain
characteristicw
ay,not
onlythrough
theaid
oftools
thatthey
havem
ade,but
with
theirvery
own
bodies.H
uman
beingslike
moving
aboutand
dislikebeing
deprivedof
mobility.A
nanthropom
orphicbeing
who,w
ithoutdisability,
chosenever
tom
ovefrom
birthto
deathw
ouldbe
hardto
viewas
human.
Experiences
ofpainand
pleasureare
comm
onto
allhuman
life(though,
onceagain,
boththeir
expressionand,
tosom
eextent,
theexperience
itselfm
aybe
culturallyshaped).
Moreover,
theaversion
topain
asa
3.1.3.C
apacityforPleasure
andP
ain
1U
•UL
LJW
thJLT
hIIL
t:btM
1N
LS
AT
hL
vIAR
I’HA
C.
NU
SSBA
UTV
I•511
fundamentalevilis
aprimitive
and,itappears,unlearnedpartofbeing
ahum
ananim
al.Asociety
whose
mem
bersaltogetherlacked
thataversionw
ouldsurely
bejudged
tobe
beyondthe
boundsofhum
anness.
3.1.4.C
ognitiveC
apability:P
erceiving,Imagining,T
hinking
Allhum
anbeings
havesense-perception,the
abilityto
imagine,and
theability
tothink,m
akingdistinctions
and“reaching
outforunderstand
ing
.”4
3A
ndthese
abilitiesare
regardedas
ofcentralimportance.Itis
anopen
questionw
hatsortsofaccidents
orim
pediments
toindividuals
inthese
areasw
illbesufficientfor
usto
judgethat
thelife
inquestion
isnot
reallyhum
anany
longer.But
itis
safeto
saythat
ifwe
imagine
agroup
ofbeingsw
hosem
embers
totallylack
sense-perception,ortotally
lackim
agination,ortotally
lackreasoning
andthinking,w
eare
notin
anyofthese
easesim
agininga
groupofhum
anbeings,no
matterw
hatthey
looklike.
3.1.5.Early
Infan
tDevelopm
ent
All
human
beingsbegin
ashungry
babies,aw
areof
theirow
nhelp
lessness,experiencingtheir
alternatingcloseness
toand
distancefrom
that,andthose,on
whom
theydepend.This
comm
onstructure
toearly
lif&
4—w
hic
his
clearlyshaped
inm
anydifferentw
aysby
differentsocialarrangem
ents—gives
riseto
agreatdealofoverlapping
experiencethat
iscentral
inthe
formation
ofdesires,andofcom
plexem
otionssuch
asgrief,love,
andanger.T
his,in
turn,is
am
ajorsource
ofour
abilityto
recognizeourselves
inthe
emotional
experiencesof
thosew
hoselives
arevery
differentin
otherrespects
fromour
own.Ifw
eencountered
agroup
ofapparenthumans
andthen
discoveredthatthey
neverhadbeen
babiesand
hadnever,in
consequence,hadthose
experiencesofextrem
edependency;
need,and
affection,we
would,I
think,have
toconclude
thattheirform
oflifew
assufficiently
differentfromour
own
thatthey
couldnotbe
consideredpart
ofthesam
ekind.
3.1.6.PracticalR
eason
Allhum
anbeings
participate(or
tryto)
inthe
planningand
managing
oftheirow
nlives,asking
andansw
eringquestions
aboutwhat
isgood
andhow
oneshould
live.Moreover,they
wish
toenacttheir
thoughtin
theirlives—
tobe
ableto
chooseand
evaluate,andto
functionaccord
ingly.Thisgeneral
capabilityhas
many
concreteform
s,and
isrelated
incom
plexw
aysto
theother
capabilities,emotional,im
aginative,andintellectual.B
uta
beingw
hoaltogether
lacksthis
would
notbe
likelyto
beregarded
asfilly
human,in
anysociety;
3.1.7.Affiliation
with
OtherH
u,nanB
eings
All
human
beingsrecognize
andfeel
some
senseof
affiliationand
concernfor
otherhum
anbeings.M
oreover,we
valuethe
formof
lifethat
isconstituted
bythese
recognitionsand
affiliations.We
livew
ithand
inrelation
toothers,and
regarda
lifenot
livedin
affiliationw
ithothers
tobe
alife
notworth
theliving.(H
ereI
would
reallyw
ish,with
Aristotle,to
spellthingsoutfhrther.W
edefine
ourselvesin
terms
ofatleasttw
otypes
ofaffiliation:intimate
family
andlorpersonal
relations,and
socialor
civicrelations.)
3.1.8. Relatedness
toO
therSpecies
andto
Nature
Hum
anbeings
recognizethat
theyare
notthe
onlyliving
thingsin
theirw
orld:that
theyare
animals
livingalongside
otheranim
als,andalso
alongsideplants,in
auniverse
that,asa
complex
interlockingorder,
bothsupports
andlim
itsthem
.We
aredependent
uponthat
orderin
countlessw
ays;and
we
alsosense
that we
owe
thatorder
some
respectand
concern,howeverm
uchw
em
aydifferabout exactly
whatw
eow
e,tow
hom,and
onw
hatbasis.Again,a
creaturew
hotreated
animals
exactlylike
stonesand
couldnotbe
broughtto
seeany
differencew
ouldp
rob
ablybe
regardedas
toostrange
tobe
human.
Sotoo
would
acreature
who
didnot
inany
way
respondto
thenaturalw
orld.
Hum
anlife
wherever
itislived,m
akesroom
forrecreationand
laughter.The
forms
playtakes
areenorm
ouslyvaried—andyetw
erecognize
otherhum
ans,across
culturalbarriers,
asthe
animals
who
laugh.L
aughterand
playare
frequentlyam
ongthe
deepestand
alsothe
firstmodes
ofourm
utualrecognition. Inabilityto
playorlaugh
istaken,correctly,as
asign
ofdeepdisturbance
ina
child;Witproves
permanentw
ew
illdoubtw
hetherthe
childis
capableof
leadinga
fullyhum
anlife.
An
entire
3.1.9.Hum
orandP
lay
512’G
LOB
AL
JUSTIC
E: SEMIN
AL
ESSAY
S
societythat
lackedthis
abilityw
ouldseem
tous
bothterribly
strangeand
terriblyfrightening.
3.1.10.S
eparateness
How
everm
uchw
elive
with
andfor
others, we
are,eachof us,“one
innum
ber,”45
proceedingon
aseparate
paththrough
thew
orldfrom
birthto
death.E
achperson
feelsonly
hisor
herow
npain
andnot
anyoneelse’s.E
achperson
diesw
ithoutentailinglogical])’
thedeath
of anyoneelse.‘W
henone
personw
alksacross
theroom
,noother
personfollow
sautom
atically’vVhen
we
count thenum
berofhum
anbeings
ina
room,
we
haveno
difficultyfiguring
outwhere
onebegins
andthe
otherends.
‘Theseobvious
factsneed
stating, sincethey
might have
beenothenvise.
We
shouldbear
themin
mind
when
we
heartalk
aboutthe
absenceof
individualismin
certainsocieties.
Even
them
ostintense
forms
ofhum
aninteraction,
forexam
plesexual
experience,are
experiencesof
responsiveness,not
offrision.
Iffusion
ism
adethe
goal,the
resultis
boundto
bedisappointm
ent.
3.1.11.S
trongS
eparateness
Because
ofseparateness,
eachhum
anlife
has,so
tospeak,
itsow
npeculiar
contextand
surroundings—objects,places, a
history,particular
friendships, locations, sexualties—
thatare
notexactly
thesam
eas
thoseofanyone
else, andin
terms
ofwhich
theperson
tosom
eextent
identifiesherself. T
houghsocieties
varya
greatdeal
inthe
degreeand
typeofstrong
separatenessthat
theyperm
itand
foster,thereis
nolife
yet known
that reallydoes
(asPlato
wished)
failtouse
thew
ords“m
ine”and
“notm
ine”in
some
personaland
nonsharedw
ay. What
Iuse,live
in,respondto, Iuse, live
in,respondto
fromm
yow
nseparate
existence.A
ndon
thew
hole, human
beingsrecognize
oneanother
asbeings
who
wish
tohave
atleast some
separatenessof context,a
littlespace
tom
ovearound
in, some
specialitem
sto
useor
love.‘Ibis
isa
working
list.Itis
putout
togenerate
debate.Ithas
doneso
andw
illcontinue
todo
so, andit w
illberevised
accordingly.A
sI
havesaid, the
listis
composed
oftwo
differentsorts
of items;
limits
andcapabilities.
As
faras
capabilitiesgo,
tocall
themparts
ofhum
annessis
tom
akea
verybasic
sortof
evaluation.It
isto
saythat
alife
without
thisitem
would
betoo
lacking, tooim
poverished,tobe
human
atall.
Obviously,
then,it
couldnot
bea
goodhum
anlife.
So
thislist of capabilities
isa
ground-flooror
minim
alconception
ofthe
good. (Inthe
sensethat
itdoes
not hillydeterm
inethe
choiceofa
way
oflife,but
simply
regulatesthe
parameters
ofwhat
canbe
chosen,it
plays, however,
therole
traditionallyplayed
inliberal
politicaltheory
bya
conceptionofthe
righ
t.)46
With
thelim
its,things
arem
orecom
plicated.In
selectingthe
limits
forattention, w
ehave, once
again,m
adea
basicsort
ofevalua
tion,saying
thatthese
thingsare
soim
portantthat
lifew
ouldnot
behum
anw
ithoutthem
.B
utw
hatw
ehave
saidis
thathum
anlife, in
itsgeneral
form, consists
ofthe
awareness
ofthese
limits
plusa
struggleagainst
them.
Hum
ansdo
notw
ishto
behungry,
tofeel
pain,to
die.(Separateness
ishighly
complex,
botha
limit
anda
capability. Much
thesam
eis
trueof
many
ofthe
limits
implied
bythe
shapeand
thecapacities
of thebody.)
On
theother
hand, we
cannotassum
ethat
thecorrect
evaluativeconclusion
todraw
isthat
we
shouldtry
ashard
aspossible
toget
ridofthe
limit
altogether. Itis
characteristicof hum
an
lifeto
preferrecurrent hunger
pluseating
toa
lifew
ithneither
hunger
noreating
toprefer
sexualdesire
andits
satisfactionto
alife
with
neitherdesire
norsatisfaction.
Even
where
deathis
concerned,the
desirefor
imm
ortality, which
many
human
beingscertainly
have, isa
peculiardesire:
Forit
isnot
clearthat
thew
ishto
loseone’s
finitudecom
pletelyis
adesire
thatone
cancoherently
entertainfor
oneself orfor
someone
oneloves.It
seems
tobe
aw
ishfor
atransition
toa
way
of lifeso
wholly
different, with
suchdifferent values
andends, that
it
seems
thatthe
identityofthe
individual will
notbe
preserved. Sothe
evaluativeconclusion,in
mapping
outaground-floor
conceptionofthe
good(saving
what
functioningis
necessaryfor
alife
tobe
human)
will
haveto
beexpressed
with
much
caution, clearly,interm
sof w
hat would
bea
humanly
goodw
ayof countering
thelim
itation.
4.T
HE
TW
OT
HR
ES
HO
LD
S
Things
nowgetvery
complicated. For w
ew
anttodescribe
two
distinctthresholds:
athreshold
ofcapability
tofunction
beneathw
hicha
life
will
beso
impoverished
thatit
will
notbe
human
atall;
anda
some
what higher
threshold, beneathw
hichthose
characteristicfunctions
are
availablein
sucha
reducedw
aythat,
thoughw
em
ayjudge
theform
oflifea
human
one,we
will
notthink
ita
goodhum
anlife. T
helatter
MA
RTH
AC
,NU
SSBA
UM
’SlS
thresholdis
theone
thatw
illeventually
concernus
when
we
turnto
publicpolicy:
forwe
don’t wantsocieties
tom
aketheir
citizenscapable
ofthebare
minim
um.M
yview
holds,with
Aristotle,thata
goodpoliti
calarrangem
entis
one“in
accordancew
ithw
hichanyone
whatsoever
might
dow
elland
livea
flourishinglife.”47
‘Theseare
clearly,inm
anyareas,tw
odistinct
thresholds,requiringdistinct
levelsof
resourceand
opportunity.O
nem
aybe
alivew
ithoutbeing
wellnourished.A
sM
arxobserved,one
may
beable
touse
one’ssenses
without
beingable
touse
themin
afully
human
wa
And
yetthere
isneed
forcautionhere.Forin
many
casesthe
move
fromhum
anlife
togood
human
lifeis
suppliedby
thecitizen’s
own
powers
ofchoiceand
self—definition,in
sucha
way
thatonce
societyplaces
themabove
thefirstthreshold,m
ovingabove
thesecond
ism
oreorless
upto
them.
Thisis
especiallylikely
tobe
so,Ithink,in
areassuch
asafluliation
andpracticalreasoning,w
herein
many
casesonce
socialinstitutionsperm
itachild
tocross
thefirstthreshold
itsow
nchoices
will be
centralinraising
itabove
thesecond.(‘This
isnot
always
so,however:
forcertain
socialconditions,for
example
certainm
indlessform
soflabor
or,we
may
add,traditionalhierarchicalgender
relations,may
impede
theflourishing
ofaffiliation
andpracticalreason,w
hilenot
stamping
itoutentirely.)
On
theother
hand,it
isclear
thatw
herebodily
healthand
nutrition,for
example,are
concerned,thereis
aconsiderable
differencebetw
eenthe
two
thresholds,and
adifference
thatis
standardlym
adeby
resourcesover
which
individualsdo
nothave
fullcontrol.It
would
thenbe
theconcern
ofquality-of-life
assessment
toask
whether
allcitizens
arecapable,
notjustof
thebare
minim
um,but
ofgood/jfr
inthese
areas.C
learlythere
isa
continuumhere.N
orw
illit
inpractice
beat
alleasy
tosay
where
theupper
threshold,especially,shouldbe
located.I
shallnot
saym
uchabout
thefirst
threshold,butshall
illustrateit
bya
fewexam
ples.What
isan
existencethat
isso
impoverished
thatit
cannotproperlybe
calleda
human
life?H
erew
eshould
count,Ibelieve,
many
forms
ofexistencethat
takeplace
attheend
ofahum
anllfe—
allthose
inw
hichthe
beingthatsurvives
hasirretrievably
lostsensationand
consciousness(in
whatis
calleda “perm
anentvegetativecondition”);and
also,Iwould
hold,some
thatfallshortofthis,butin
which
thecapacity
torecognize
lovedones,to
thinkand
toreason,has
irreversiblydecayed
beyonda
certainpoint.I w
ouldinclude
theextrem
eabsence
ofabilityto
engagein
practicalreasoning
thatis
oftenthe
outcome
ofthenotorious
frontallobotomy.Iw
ouldalso
includean
absenceofm
obilityso
severethat
itmakes
speech,asw
ellasm
ovementfrom
placeto
place,impossible.
Itfollow
sfrom
thisthat
certainseverely
damaged
infantsare
nothum
anever, even
if bornfrom
two
human
parents:again,those
with
globalandtotal sensory
incapacityand/or no
consciousnessor thought;
also,Ithink, those
with
noability
atalltorecognize
orrelate
toothers.
(Thisof course
tellsus
nothingaboutw
hat we
owe
themm
orallyit just
separatesthat
questionfrom
moral
questionsabout hum
anbein
gs.)
48
Again, w
enotice
theevaluative
characterof these
thresholdjudg—
ments.T
hefactthata
personw
hohas
lost herarm
scannotplay
apiano
doesnot
make
usjudge
thatshe
nolonger
livesa
human
life;had
shelost
thecapacity
tothink
andrem
ember,or
toform
affectionaterela
tionships,it w
ouldhave
beena
differentm
atter.IV
Ianysuch
disastersare
notto
beblam
edon
socialarrangem
ents,and
inthose
casesthe
first thresholdhas
nopolitical im
plications. But
many
are, where
badnutrition
andhealth
careenter in.T
herole
ofsocietyis
even
more
evidentif we
thinkofa
more
controversialgroup
offirst—
thresholdcases, in
which
thenonhum
anoutcom
ew
asenvironm
entallycaused: the
rarecases
ofchildrenw
hohave
grown
upoutside
ahum
ancom
munity, or
ina
severelydysfunctional
home,
andutterly
lacklan
guageand
reason,orlack
social abilitiesin
anextrem
eand
irreversiblewayc
We
canfocus
thepolitical question
more
productively, however, if
we
nowturn
fromthe
questionof
mere
human
lifeto
thequestion
ofgood
life,thelevelw
ew
ouldreally
liketo
seea
human
beingattain.
Here,
asthe
nextlevel
ofthe
conceptionof
thehum
anbeing,
Ishallnow
specif5i certainbasic
functional capabilitiesat w
hichsocieties
shouldaim
fortheir
citizens, andw
hichquality
oflife
measurem
entsshould
measure. In
otherw
ords, thisw
illbe
anaccount
ofthesecond
threshold—although
insom
eareas
itm
aycoincide,
forthe
reasonsI
havegiven,w
iththe
firstO
nceone
iscapable
ofhum
anfunctioning
inthis
areaone
isalso
capable, with
some
furthereffort
andcare,
ofgood
functioning. I introducethis
listasa
listof capabilitiesto
function,rather
thanof actual flinctionings, since
Ishall argue
that capability,notactual
functioning,should
bethe
goalof public
policc
4.1
.L
EV
EL
2O
FT
HE
C0
NC
EF
rION
OF
TH
EH
urw
iNB
EIN
G:
BA
SIC
Huw
’F
UN
CT
ION
AL
CA
PA
BIL
ITIE
S
1.B
eingable
tolive
tothe
endofa
human
lifeof norm
allen
gth
,49
notdying
prematurely, or
beforeone’s
lifeis
soreduced
asto
benot w
orthliving.
I516
•U
LU
$A
LJL
Jb1
iCi:
MItM
.Jb
bM
b
______A
YU
UL
fldt..
4LJOO
DEtLJLV
1•
3L1
2.B
eingable
tohave
goodhealth;to
beadequately
nour
ished
;5
0to
haveadequate
shelter;
51
havingopportuni
tiesfor
sexualsatisfaction,
andfor
choicein
matters
ofreproduction;5
2being
ableto
move
fromplace
toplace.
3.B
eingable
toavoid
unnecessaryand
nonben
eficial
pain,so
faras
possible,and
tohave
pleasurableexperiences.
4.B
eingable
touse
thesenses;being
ableto
imagine,to
think,andto
reason—and
todo
thesethings
ina
way
informed
andcultivated
byan
adequateeducation,
including,but
byno
means
limited
to,literacy
andbasic
mathem
aticaland
scientifictrain
ing
.53
Being
ableto
useim
aginationand
thoughtin
connectionw
ithexperiencing
andproducing
spirituallyenriching
materials
andevents
ofone’s
own
choice;religious,
literary,musical,and
soforth.Ibelieve
thattheprotec
tionof
thiscapability
requiresnot
onlythe
provisionof
education,butalso
legalguarantees
offreedom
ofexpression
with
respectto
bothpolitical
andartistic
speech,andoffreedom
ofreligiousexercise.
5.B
eingable
tohave
attachments
tothings
andpersons
outsideourselves;
tolove
thosew
holove
andcare
forus,
togrieve
attheir
absence;in
general,to
love,to
grieve,toexperience
longingand
gratitu
de.
54
Support
ingthis
capabilitym
eanssupporting
forms
ofhuman
associationthat
canbe
shown
tobe
crucialin
theirdevelopm
ent.5
5
6.B
eingable
toform
aconception
ofthe
goodand
toengage
incritical
reflectionabout
theplanning
ofone’s
own
life.Thisincludes,today,being
ableto
seekem
ployment
outsidethe
home
andto
participatein
politicallife.
7.B
eingable
tolive
forand
toothers,to
recognizeand
showconcern
forother
human
beings,to
engagein
variousform
sofsocialinteraction;to
beable
toim
aginethe
situationof
anotherand
tohave
compassion
forthat
situation;to
havethe
capabilityfor
bothjustice
andfriendship.Protecting
thiscapability
means,once
again,protecting
institutionsthat
constitutesuch
forms
ofaffiliation,and
alsoprotecting
thefreedom
sof assem
blyand
politicalspeech.
8.B
eingable
tolive
with
concernfor
andin
relationto
animals,plants,and
thew
orldofnature.
9.B
eingable
tolaugh,
toplay,
toenjoy
recreationalactivities.
10.B
eingable
tolive
one’sow
nlife
andnobody
else’s.‘This
means
havingcertain
guaranteesof noninterfer
encew
ithcertain
choicesthat
areespecially
personaland
definitiveof
sellhood,such
aschoices
regardingm
arriage,childbearing,sexual
expression,speech,andem
ployment.
lOa.
Being
ableto
liveone’s
own
lifein
one’sow
nsurround
ingsand
context.Thism
eansguarantees
offreedomof
associationand
offreedom
fromunw
arrantedsearch
andseizure;
italsom
eansa
certainsortof guarantee
ofthe
integrityofpersonalproperty,though
thisguarantee
may
belim
itedin
variousw
aysby
thedem
andsofsocial
equality,andis
always
upfor
negotiationin
connectionw
iththe
interpretationof
theother
capabilities,since
personalproperty,
unlikepersonal
liberty,is
atool
ofhum
anfunctioning
ratherthan
anend
initself.
My
claimis
thata
lifethat
lacksany
oneof
thesecapabilities, no
matter
what
elseit
has,will
fallshort
of beinga
goodhum
anlife.
Soit
would
bereasonable
totake
thesethings
asa
focusfor
concern,inassessing
thequality
oflife
ina
countryand
askingabout
therole
ofpublic
policyin
meeting
human
needs.Thelist
iscertainly
general—and
thisis
deliberate,in
orderto
leaveroom
forplural
specificationand
alsofor
furthernegotiation.
But
Iclaim
thatit
does,rather
likea
setof
constitutionalguarantees,
offerreal
guidancein
theongoing
•L
’LU
flhL
.JIJDI&
L:
JVIIL
’ttL,tb
1X
b.
.
historicalprocess
offurtherrefinem
entandspecification,and
farm
oreaccurate
guidancethan
thatoffered
bythe
focuson
utility, oreven
onresources.
Afew
comm
entsare
inorder
abouttherelationship
ofthisversion
ofthe
listto
otherversions
Ihave
publishedpreviously.
First,taking
some
lessonsfrom
theH
uman
Developm
entR
eport,it
isconsiderably
more
specificabout m
atterssuch
aseducation
andw
ork,soas
togive
thedevelopm
enttheorist
something
concreteto
measure.
Second,it
isfar
more
explicitlyconcerned
with
guaranteesofpersonal liberty
of expression, reproductive
choice, andreligion.56
Thisw
asnot
onlycalled
forin
general, butcalledforth
bythe
attemptto
articulatethe
specificrequisites
ofequal female
capability
5Third,
inaccordance
with
itscom
mitm
enttothe
distinctionbetw
eenends
andm
eans, it understands“property
rights”as
instrumentalto
otherhum
ancapabi1ities,5
andtherefore
toa
certainextent, as
upfor
negotiationin
general socialplanning.
Thelist
is, emphatically,a
list of separatecom
ponents.We
cannotsatisfy
theneed
forone
ofthem
bygiving
alarger
amount
ofanother.
All
areofcentral
importance
andall
aredistinct
inquality.’This
limits
thetrade-offs
thatit
will
bereasonable
tom
ake,and
thuslim
itsthe
applicabilityof quantitative
cost-benefitanalysis.At the
same
time,the
items
onthe
listarerelated
toone
anotherin
many
complex
ways. For
example
ourcharacteristic
mode
ofnutrition,
unlikethat
ofsponges,
requiresm
ovingfrom
hereto
there.A
ndw
edo
whatever
we
doas
separatebeings,tracing
distinctpaths
throughspace
andtim
e.Notice
thatreproductive
choicesinvolve
bothsexual
capabilityand
issuesof
separateness,andbind
thetw
otogether
ina
deepand
complex
way.
Afurther
comm
entis
inorder, concerning
therelationship
of thisthreshold
list toan
accountof human
equalityA
comm
itmentto
brin
ging
allhum
anbeings
acrossa
certainthreshold
of capabilityto
chooserepresents
acertain
sortofcomm
itment
toequality:
forthe
viewtreats
all personsas
equal bearersof hum
anclaim
s, nom
atterwhere
theyare
startingfrom
interm
sof circum
stances,specialtalents,w
ealth,gender,or
race. On
theother
hand,Ihave
saidnothing
sofar
abouthow
oneshould
regardinequalities
thatpersistoncethe
thresholdlevelhas
beenattained
forall persons.T
osom
eextentI
feelthis
would
beprem
ature,since
thethreshold
levelhas
sorarely
beenattained
forthe
complete
capabilityset. O
nthe
otherhand, one
canim
aginea
situation—perhaps
itcould
bethat
ofthe
USA
orJapan,
givencertain
largechanges
inhealth
supporthere, oreducationaldistribution
there, thatwould
meet
thresholdconditions
andstillexhibit inequalities
of attainmentbetw
een
thegenders
orthe
races. We
havetw
ochoices
here: eitherto
arguethat
thissituation
actuallycontains
capabilityfailure
afterall;
orto
grantthat
thecapability
viewneeds
tobe
supplemented
byan
independenttheory
of equality. I amnotyet certain
whatIw
anttosay
aboutthis, butI am
inclinedto
thefirst alternative, since
I thinkthat gender
inequality
ofthe
sortone
seesin
aprosperous
nationdoes
nonetheLesspush
thesubordinated
racialor
gendergroup
beneathan
acceptablethreshold
ofautonomy, dignity
andem
otional wellbeing. Indeed, subordination
isitselfa
kindof capability
failure, afailure
toattain
complete
person-
hood.So
Iam
inclinedto
saythat,
properlyfleshed
out,the
secondthreshold
would
beincom
patiblew
ithsystem
aticsubordination
of onegroup
toanother.
5.T
HE
RO
LE
OF
TH
EC
ON
CE
PT
ION
IND
EV
EL
OP
ME
NT
PO
LIC
Y
My
claimis
thatw
eurgently
needa
conceptionof
thehum
anbeing
andhum
anfunctioning
inpublic
policy. Ifwe
tryto
dow
ithoutthis
sortof guidancew
henw
eask
howgoods,resources, and
opportunities
shouldbe
distributed,w
ereject
guidancethat
is,Ithink,
superiorto
thatoffered
byany
oftheother
guidescurrently
available.1
shallfocus
hereon
thearea
ofmost
concernto
ourproject:
the
assessment
ofthe
qualityof life
ina
developingcountry, w
ithspecial
attentionto
thelives
ofw
omen.
Forthe
time
being,I
shalltake
the
nation-stateas
my
basicunit,
andthe
questionI
shallask
is,“How
is
thenation
doing,with
respectto
thequality
of lifeof
itscitizens?”
Inother
words,
Ishall
beasking
thesort
ofquestion
askedby
theU
NH
uman
Developm
ent Report. I
shallnotpropose
ageneral
theoryabout
howthe
needsrevealed
bysuch
anassessm
ent shouldbe
met: w
hether
bycentralized
government
planning,for
example,
orthrough
asys
temof
incentives,and
whether
throughdirect
subsidiesor
through
theprovision
ofopportunities
forem
ployment.
Nor
shallI
askw
hat
responsibilitiesricher
nationshave
topoorer
nations,inensuring
that
theneeds
ofall human
beingsare
met
thew
orldover. T
hatis
anurgent
question,andit m
ustatalater
datebe
confronted. Fornow
, however, I
shall focuson
thecorrect understanding
of thegoal, w
hereeach
separate
nationis
concerned.T
hebasic
claimIw
ishto
make—
concurringw
ithA
martya
Sen—is
thatthe
centralgoal
ofpublic
planningshould
bethe
capabilitiesof
citizensto
performvarious
important
functions.The
questionsthat
shouldbe
askedw
henassessing
qualityof
lifein
acountry
are(and
ofcourse
thisis
acentral
partof
assessingthe
qualityof
itspolitical
arrangements)
“How
well have
thepeople
ofthecountry
beenenabled
toperform
thecentral
human
functions?”and,“H
avethey
beenput
ina
positionofm
erehum
ansubsistence
with
respecttothe
functions,orhave
theybeen
enabledto
livew
ell?”In
otherwords,w
eask
where
thepeople
are,with
respecttothe
secondlist.A
ndw
efocus
ongetting
asm
anypeople
aspossible
abovethe
secondthreshold, w
ithrespect
tothe
interlockingsetofcapabilities
enumerated
bythat
list.5
9N
aturally,the
determination
ofwhether
certainindividuals
andgroups
areacross
thethreshold
isonly
asprecise
am
atteras
thedeterm
inationof
thethreshold;
andI
haveleft
thingsdeliberately
somew
hatopen-ended
atthis
point,in
keepingw
iththe
proceduresof
theH
uman
Develop—
inent Report,believing
thatthe
bestway
tow
orktow
arda
more
precisedeterm
inationis
toallow
thecom
munity
ofnationsto
hamm
eritout
afteran
extendedcom
parativeinquiry,ofthe
sortthereportm
akespos
sible.Again,w
ew
illhave
toansw
ervarious
questionsabout
thecosts
we
arew
illingto
payto
getallcitizensabove
thethreshold,as
opposedto
leavinga
small
number
belowand
allowing
therest
aconsiderably
above-thresholdlife
quality.Here
my
claimis
thatcapabffity-equality
inthe
senseofm
ovingall
abovethe
threshold,shouldbe
takenas
thecentralgoal. A
swith
Raw
ls’sdifference
principle,sohere:Inequalities
indistribution
abovethe
thresholdshould
betolerated
onlyifthey
move
more
peopleacross
it;
6°once
allareacross,societies
areto
agreatextent
freeto
choosethe
othergoals
thatthey
wish
topursue.
The
basicintuition
fromw
hichthe
capabilityapproach
starts,inthe
political arena,isthat
human
capabilitiesexerta
moral
claimthat
theyshould
bedeveloped.H
uman
beingsare
creaturessuch
that,providedw
iththe
right educationalandm
aterialsupport,theycan
become
fullycapable
ofthe
major
human
functions,cancross
thefirst
andsecond
thresholds.’Thatis,they
arecreatures
with
certainlow
er—levelcapabili
ties(w
hichI
haveelsew
herecalled
“basiccapabilities”)61
toperform
thefunctions
inquestion.W
henthese
capabilitiesare
deprivedof the
nourishment
thatw
ouldtransform
theminto
thehigh-level
capabilities
thatfigure
onm
ylist,they
arefruitless,cut
off,insom
ew
aybut
ashadow
ofthem
selves.They
arelike
actorsw
honeverget
togo
onthe
stage,ora
musicalscore
thatisneverperform
ed.Theirvery
beingm
akesforw
ardreference
tofunctioning.T
husiffunctioning
neverarrives
on
thescene,
theyare
hardlyeven
what
theyare.T
hism
aysound
likea
metaphysicalidea,and
ina
senseit
is(in
thatit
isan
ideadiscussed
inA
ristotle’sM
etaphysics).B
utthat
doesnot
mean
thatit
isnot
abasic
andpervasive
empirical
idea,an
ideathat
underwrites
many
ofour
dailypractices
andjudgm
entsin
many
times
andplaces. I
claimthat
justas
we
holdthat
achild
who
diesbefore
gettingto
maturity
hasdied
especiallytragically—
forher
activitiesofgrow
thand
preparationfor
adult activitynow
havelosttheir
point—so
toow
ithcapability
andfunctioning
more
generally:W
ebelieve
thatcertain
basicand
centralhum
anendow
ments
havea
claimto
beassisted
indeveloping,and
exertthatclaim
onothers,and
especially,as Aristotle
saw,on
government.W
eshall
seethe
work
thisconsideration
cando
inargum
entsforw
omen’s
equality.Ithink
itis
theunderlying
basis,inthe
Western
philosophicaltradition, for
many
notionsof hum
anrights.I
suggest, then,thatinthinking
ofpolitical
planningw
ebegin
fromthis
notion,thinking
ofthe
basiccapabilities
ofhuman
beingsas
needsfor
functioning,which
giverise
tocorrelated
politicalduties.
There
is,then, anem
piricalbasisfor
thedeterm
inationthat
acer
tainbeing
isone
ofthe
onesto
which
ournorm
ativeconception
andits
associatedduties
applies. Itis
thegap
between
potentialhum
annessand
itsfullrealization
that exertsa
moralclaim
.Ifthew
orkerdescribedby
Marx
asnot
capableof
atruly
human
useof
hissen
ses6
2had
reallybeen
anonhum
ananim
al,thefactthat he
was
givena
formof life
suitedto
suchan
animal w
ouldnotbe
atragedy. Ifw
omen
were
reallyturtles,
thefact
thatbeing
aw
oman
isnot
yeta
way
ofbeinga
human
beingw
ouldnotbe,as
itis, anoutrage.T
hereis,of course,enorm
ouspotential
forabuse
indeterm
iningw
hohas
thesebasic
capabilities.The
historyof
IQtesting
isjust
onechapter
inan
inglorioussaga
ofprejudiced
capability-testingthat
goesback
atleast
tothe
Noble
Lie
ofPlato’s
Republic.T
hereforew
eshould,
Ithink,
proceedas
ifevery
offspringoftw
ohum
anparents
hasthe
basiccapabilities,unless
anduntil
longexperience
with
theindividual
hasconvinced
usthat
damage
tothat
individual’scondition
isso
greatthat
itcould
neverin
anyw
ayarrive
atthe
highercapability
level.T
hepolitical and
economic
applicationofthis
approachis
evidentin
avariety
ofareas.Am
artyaSen
hasdeveloped
anum
berofits
con
creteim
plicationsin
theareas
ofwelfare
anddevelopm
enteconomics,
andhas
focusedparticularly
onits
applicationto
theassessm
entof
wom
en’squality
oflife.
63
With
hisadvice,the
UN
Hum
anD
evelopment
b44•U
LO
AkJU
bjjL
jt:bM
LN
AL
tSS
AY
b-—
-
Reports
havebegun
togather
information
andto
ranknations
inaccor
dancew
iththe
typeofplural-valued
capability-focusedm
easuringthe
approachsuggests.In
aclosely
relatedstudy,lftelthar
Hossein
hasused
theapproach
togive
anaccountofpoverty
ascapability
failure.64In
de
pendently,avery
similar
approachhas
beendeveloped
byFinnish
andSw
edishsocial
scientists,aboveall
Erik
Allardtand
RobertE
rikso
n.
65
Wishing
todevelop
ways
ofgathering
information
abouthow
theirpeople
aredoing
thatw
ouldbe
more
sensitiveand
informationafly
complete
thanpolls
basedon
ideasof
utility,they
worked
outlists
ofthe
basichum
ancapabilities
forfunctioning
andthen
examined
theperform
anceof
variousgroups
inthe
population—above
allw
omen
andm
inorities—in
theseterm
s,thusanticipating
theprocedures
oftheH
uman
Developm
entReport,w
hichdevotes
agreat dealofattention
togender
differences,urban-ruraldifferences,and
soforth.
‘The“capabilities
approach”hasclear
advantagesover
othercurrent
approachesto
quality-of--lifeassessm
ent.A
ssessment
thatuses
GN
Pper
capitaas
itssole
measure
fallsto
concernitselfw
iththe
distributionofresource
andthus
cangive
highm
arksto
countriesw
ithenorm
ousinequalities.N
ordoesthis
approachexam
ineotherhum
angoods
thatarenot
reliablycorrelated
with
thepresence
ofresources:infant
mortalit)ç
forexam
ple,oraccess
toeducation,or
thequality
ofracialand
genderrelations,or
thepresence
orabsence
ofpoliticalfreedom
s.TheH
uman
Developm
entReportfor
1993inform
sus,for
example,
thatthe
United
Arab
Em
irateshas
realG
NP
percapita
of$16,753—
tenth-highestin
thew
orld,higher,
forexam
ple,than
Norw
ayor
Australia—
while
overall,inthe
aggregationof
allthe
indicatorsof life
qualityit
ranksonly
sixty-seventhin
thew
orld(outof 173
nationsm
easured).Itsadult
literacyrate
is55%
,far
lower
thanany
ofthe
60countries
generallyahead
ofit,and
alsothan
many
generallybelow
it.(B
othN
orway
andA
ustraliahave
adultliteracyof99%
.)Them
aternalmortality
rateof130
per100,000
livebirths
iscomparatively
high.Theproportion
ofwom
enprogressing
beyondsecondary
educationisvery
low, and
only6%
ofthelaborforce
is female
(asopposed,forexam
ple,to42%
inSeychelles,35%
inB
razil,43%
inC
hina,47%
inV
ietnam,
26%in
India,and
20%in
Nigeria).In
fact,inall the
world
onlyA
lgeria(496)
hasa
lowerpropor
tionof fem
alesin
thelabor
force,onlyIraq
(6%)
tiesit,and
onlyQ
atar(7%
),Saudi
Arabia
(7%),
Libya
(9%),Jordan
(10%),
Pakistan(11%
),B
angladesh(7%
),and
Afghanistan
(8%)
come
close.E
videncelinks
female
wage-earning
outsidethe
home
stronglyto
female
healthcare
andlife-expectancy.66
And
infact, w
efind
thatthe
ratiooffem
alesto
males
inthe
United
Arab
Em
iratesis
theam
azing48:100,low
est inall
thew
orld. Ifthis
isdiscounted
asem
ployment related, w
em
aypursue
theother
countriesin
ourlow
externalem
ployment
comparison
class.
Theratio
offemales
tom
alesin
nationsin
which
thereis
noreason
to
supposesexual
discrimination
innourishm
entand
healthcare
is,Sen
hasshow
n,about
106:100in
Europe
andN
orthA
merica—
or,if
we
focusonly
onthe
developingw
orld,taking
sub-SaharanA
fricaas
our
“norm,”
102:100.InO
jtariris
60:100, inSaudi A
rabia84, in
Libya
91,
inJordan
95,inPakistan
92, inB
angladesh94,in
Afghanistan
94.
These
aresom
eof
thenum
bersthat
we
startnoticing
ifwe
focus
oncapabilities
andfunctioning
ratherthan
simply
onG
NP. T
heyare
essentialto
theunderstanding
ofhow
wom
enare
doing.In
fact,they
arethe
numbers
fromw
hichSen’s
graphicstatistics
regarding“m
issing
wom
en”em
erge.(The
number
of“m
issingw
omen”
isthe
number
of
extraw
omen
who
would
bein
agiven
countryif
thatcountry
hadthe
same
sexratio
assub-Saharan
Africa.)
‘Theystrongly
supportM
artha
Chen’s
argument
thatthe
rightto
work
isa
right basicto
thelives
of
wom
ennot
onlyin
itself, butfor
itsim
pact onother
basiccapabilities
andfunctionings. Saleha
Begum
’sem
ployment led
tobetter
nutritional
andhealth
statusfor herselfand,indeed, her children
andfam
ily. Metha
Bai
may
soonbecom
eone
ofthe
statisticsfrom
which
thenum
berof
missing
wom
enis
made.
Would
otheravailable
approacheshave
donethe
jobas
well?
The
comm
onapproach
that measures
qualityoflife
interm
sof utility—
poll
ingpeople
concerningthe
satisfactionof their preferences—
would
have
missed
theobvious
factthat
desiresand
sukjectivepreferences
arenot
always
reliableindicators
ofw
hata
personreally
needs.Preferences,
asA
martya
Sen’sw
orkhas
repeatedlyshow
n,are
highlym
alleable.67
Therich
andpam
peredeasily
become
accustomed
totheir
luxury,and
vieww
ithpain
andfrustration
alife
inw
hichthey
aretreated
justlike
everyoneelse. IV
Ialesare
aspecial
caseof
this:W
edo
notneed
togo
abroadto
knowthat
males
frequentlyresent
asituation
inw
hichthey
areasked
toshare
childcare
anddom
esticresponsibilities
onan
equal
basis.68
Thepoor
anddeprived
frequentlyadjust their
expectationsand
aspirationsto
thelow
level of lifethey
haveknow
n. Thus
theym
aynot
demand
more
education, betterhealth
care. Like
thew
omen
described
inSen’s
accountof
healthsurveys
inIndia,
theym
aynot
evenknow
what
it isto
feel healthy.69
Like
therural B
angladeshi wom
enso
vividly
II‘-°“‘‘
MA
RT
HA
C.
NU
SS
BA
UM
•525
describedin
Martha
Chen’s
AQ
uietRevolution,70
theym
aynot
evenknow
what
itm
eansto
havethe
advantagesof
education.W
em
ayim
aginethat
many
wom
enin
thecountries
Ihave
men,tioned
would
notfight,as
SelehaB
egumdid,for
participationin
thew
orkforce;nor
would
theybe
aware
ofthehigh
correlationbetw
eenw
orkoutside
thehom
eand
otheradvantages.A
sSen
argues,theym
ayhave
fullyin
ternalized
theideas
behindthe
traditionalsystem
ofdiscrim
ination,andm
ayview
theirdeprivation
as“natural.”T
husif w
erely
onutility
asour
measure
oflife
quality,we
most
oftenw
illget
resultsthat
supportthe
statusquo
andoppose
radicalchan
ge.
7’If
thesecriticism
sapply
toapproaches
thatfocus
onutility
ingeneral,they
applyall the
more
pointedlyto
thesortoflocal-tradition
relativismespoused
bythe
Ivlarglins,in
which
them
easureofquality
oflifew
illbethe
satisfactionofa
certaingroup
ofpreferences,namely
thetraditionalones
ofagiven
culture.Indeed,it is
illuminating
toco
nsider
howclose,in
itsrenunciation
ofcritical normative
argument,the
Marglin
approachis
tothe
prevailingeconom
icapproaches
ofwhich
itpresentsitselfas
aradicalcritique.A
preference—based
approachthat
givespriority
tothe
preferencesof
traditionalculture
islikely
tobe
especiallysubversive
ofthequality
of lifeof w
omen
who
havebeen
onthe
whole
badlytreated
byprevailing
traditionalnorm
s.And
onecan
seethis
clearlyin
theM
arglins’own
examples. Form
enstruationtaboos
impose
severerestrictions
onw
omen’s
power
toform
aplan
oflifeand
toexecute
theplan
theyhave
chosen.They
arem
embers
ofthe
same
family
oftraditional
attitudesabout
wom
enand
thew
orkplacethat
made
itdifficult
forSaleha
Begum
tosupport
herselfandher
family,
thatm
akeit
impossible
forM
ethaB
aito
sustainthe
basicfunctions
oflife.A
ndthe
Japanesehusband
who
allegedlyrenounces
freedomof
choiceactually
enhancesit,
inthe
ways
thatm
atter,by
askingthe
wom
anto
lookafterthe
boringdetails
oflife.One
cansym
pathizew
ithm
anyof
theM
arglins’goals—
respectfor
diversity,desire
topreserve
aspectsof traditional
lifethat
appearto
berich
inspiritualand
artisticvalue—
without agreeing
thatextreme
relativismofthe
sorttheyendorse
isthe
bestway
topursue
theseconcerns.
As
forliberal
approachesthat
aimat
equalityin
thedistribution
ofcertainbasic
resources,thesehave
relatedproblem
s,sincethese,too,
refuseto
takea
standon
theends
tow
hichthe
resourcesare
mean
s.72
Wealth
andincom
eare
notgoodin
theirow
nright;
theyare
goodonly
insofarasthey
promote
human
functioning. Second,human
beingshave
widely
varyingneeds
forresources,and
anyadequate
definitionofw
hois“better
off’and“w
orseoff”
mustreflectthat
fact.7
3W
omen
who
havetraditionally
notbeen
educated,forexam
ple,may
well
requirem
oreof
therelevant
resourcesto
attainthe
same
capabilitylevel:thatis
why,in
thecase
discussedby
Martha
Chen,
theB
angladeshR
uralA
dvancem
entCom
mittee
createda
specialfemale
literacyprogram
,ratherthan
aprogram
thatdistributed
equalresources
toall.T
hird,by
definingbeing
“well-off”in
terms
ofpossessionsalone,the
liberalfailsto
godeep
enoughin
imagining
theim
pediments
tofunctioning
thatare
actuallypresent
inm
anylives—
intheir
conditionsof
laboror
exclusionfrom
labor,for
example,
intheir
frequentlyunequal
family
responsibilities,in
theobstacles
toself-realization
imposed
bytraditional
norms
andvalues.74
Thestories
ofSalehaB
egumand
Metha
Baiare
vividexam
plesofsuch
unequalobstacles.No
right-to-work
effort,andno
expenditureofresources
inthat
connection,were
necessaryin
orderto
make
men
capableofw
orkingin
thefields
inB
angladesh.No
male
ofMetha
Bai’scaste
would
haveto
overcome
threatsof
physicalviolence
inorder
togo
outofthe
houseto
work
forlife-sustaining
food.
6.A
NS
WE
RIN
GT
HE
OB
JEC
TIO
NS
:H
UM
AN
FU
NC
TIO
NIN
GA
ND
PL
UR
AL
ISM
Ihavecom
mended
thehum
an-functionview
bycontrastto
itsrivals
onthe
developmentscene.B
utIm
ustnowtry
toshow
howitcan
answer
theobjections
Idescribed
earlier.C
oncerningneglect
ofhistoricalandculturald
ren
ce,
Ican
beginby
insistingthat
thisnorm
ativeconception
ofhum
ancapability
andfunctioning
isgeneral,andin
asense
vague,forpreciselythis
reason.Thelistclaim
sto
haveidentified
ina
verygeneralw
aycom
ponentsthatare
fundamental
toany
human
life.But
itallow
sin
itsvery
designfor
thepossibility
ofm
ultiplespecifications
ofeach
ofthe
components.This
isso
inseveral
differentways.
First,the
constitutivecircum
stancesof
human
life,while
broadlyshared,
arethem
selvesrealized
indifferent
forms
indifferentsocieties.’The
fearofdeath,the
loveofpla)
relationships
offriendship,andaffiliation
with
others,eventhe
experienceofthe
bodilyappetites
neverturn
upin
simply
thevague
andgeneralform
inw
hichw
ehave
introducedthem
there,but always
insom
especific
andhistorically
richcultural
realization,w
hichcan
profoundlyshape
notonly
theconceptions
usedby
thecitizens
inthese
areas,butalso
their
IZ.SO
•L
LL
JWU
JJUL
J.L.1L
:L
iYiir4
flLt1
iX
MA
RT
HA
C.N
US
SB
A!JM
•527
experiencesthem
selves.N
onetheless,we
dohave
inthese
areasofour
comm
onhum
anitysufficientoverlap
tosustain
ageneral conversation,
focusingon
ourcom
mon
problems
andprospects.A
ndsom
etimes
thecom
mon
conversationw
illperm
itus
tocriticize
some
conceptionsof
thegrounding
experiencesthem
selves,as
atodds
with
otherthings
human
beingsw
antto
doand
tobe.
When
we
arechoosing
aconception
ofgood
functioningw
ithrespectto
thesecircum
stances,we
canexpectan
evengreater
degreeof
pluralityto
become
evident. Here
theapproach
wants
toretain
pluralityin
two
significantlydifferent
ways:
what
Im
aycall
thew
ayof plural
specj/ication,andw
hatI
may
callthe
way
oflocalspecj/ication.Plural
specificationm
eansw
hatits
name
implies.
Publicpolicy,
while
usinga
determinate
conceptionof
thegood
ata
highlevel
ofgenerality,leaves
agreat
dealoflatitude
forcitizens
tospecify
eachof
thecom
ponentsm
oreconcretely,and
with
much
variety,inaccordance
with
localtraditions,or
individualtastes. IV
Ianyconcrete
forms
oflife,in
many
differentplaces
andcircum
stances,display
functioningin
accordancew
ithall
them
ajorcapabilities.
As
forlocal specification:Good
publicreasoning,Ibelieve
andhave
argued,isalw
aysdone, w
henw
elldone,w
itha
richsensitivity
tothe
concretecontext,to
thecharacters
oftheagents
andtheirsocialsituation.
Thism
eansthat
inaddition
tothe
pluralismI
havejust
described,theA
ristotelianneeds
toconsider
adifferentsortofplural
specificationof
thegood.For
sometim
esw
hatisa
goodw
ayofprom
otingeducation
inone
partofthe
world
will be
completely
ineffectualin
another.Forms
ofaffiliationthat
flourishin
onecom
munity
may
proveim
possibleto
sustainin
another.In
suchcases,
theA
ristotelianm
ustaim
atsom
econcrete
specificationof
thegeneral
listthat
suits,and
developsout
of,the
localconditions. This
will
always
most
reasonablybe
donein
aparticipatory
dialogue75
with
thosew
hoare
most
deeplyim
mersed
inthose
conditions.For
thoughA
ristotelianismdoes
nothesitate
tocriticize
traditionw
heretradition
perpetratesinjustice
oroppression,
italso
doesnot
believein
sayinganything
atallw
ithoutrich
andfull
information,
gatherednot
som
uchfrom
detachedstudy
asfrom
thevoices
ofthose
who
livethe
ways
oflife
inquestion.
Martha
Chen’s
work,
bothhere
andin
herbook,
givesan
excellentexam
pleof
howsuch
sensitivityto
thelocal
may
becom
binedw
itha
convictionthat
thecentral
valueson
thelist
arew
orthpursuing
evenw
hentradition
hasnot
endorsedthem
.
Theliberalcharges
thecapability
approachw
ithneglectofautonom
y,arguing
thatany
suchdeterm
inateconception
removes
fromthe
citizens
thechance
tom
aketheirow
nchoices
aboutthegood
life.Thisis
acom
plicatedissue:
Threepoints
canbe
stressed.First,the
listisa
listofcapabilities,nota
listofactualfunctions,preciselybecause
theconcep
tionis
designedto
leaveroom
forchoice.G
overnmentis
notdirected
topush
citizensinto
actingin
certainvalued
ways;instead,
itisdirected
tom
akesure
thatall
human
beingshave
thenecessary
resourcesand
conditionsfor
actingin
thosew
ays.Itleaves
thechoice
upto
them.A
personw
ithplenty
offood
canalw
ayschoose
tofast.A
personw
hohas
beengiven
thecapability
forsexual
expressioncan
always
choosecelibacyT
heperson
who
hasaccess
tosubsidized
educationcan
always
decideto
dosom
ethingelse
instead.B
ym
akingopportunities
available, governm
entenhances,and
doesnot
remove,ch
oice.
76
Itw
illnot
always
beeasy
tosay
atwhatpointsom
eoneis
reallycapable
of making
achoice,especially
inareas
where
thereare
severetraditionalobstacles
tofunctioning.Som
etimes
ourbest
strategym
ayw
ellbe
tolook
atactual
functioningand
infer negativecapability
(tentatively)from
itsabsence.7
7B
utthe
conceptualdistinction
remains
veryim
portant.Second,this
respectforchoiceisbuiltdeeply
intothe
listitself,inthe
architectonicrole
it givesto
practicalreasoning.One
ofthem
ost centralcapabilities
promoted
bythe
conceptionw
illbe
thecapability
of choiceitself.78
We
shouldnote
thatthem
ajorliberalviewin
thisarea
(that ofjohnR
awls)
agreesw
ithour
approachin
justthis
area.ForR
awls
insiststhat
satisfactionsthatare
nottheoutgrow
thofone’svery
own
choiceshave
nom
oralworth;and
heconceives
ofthetw
om
oralpowers
(analogousto
ourpractical
reasoning), andofsociability
(correspondingto
ouraffiliation)
asbuiltintothe
definitionofthe
partiesin
theoriginalposition, and
thusas
necessaryconstraints
onany
outcome
theyw
illselect.7
9Finally,the
capabilityview
insiststhatchoice
isnotpure
spontaneity
flourishingindependent
ofm
aterialand
socialconditions.
Ifone
caresaboutautonom
)then
onem
ustcareaboutthe
restoftheform
oflife
thatsupports
it, andthe
materialconditions
thatenableone
tolive
thatform
of life.Thus
theapproach
claims
thatits
own
comprehensive
concernw
ithflourishing
acrossall
areasoflife
isa
betterw
ayofp
rom
otingchoice
thanis
theliberal’s
narrower
concernw
ithspontaneity
alone,which
sometim
estolerates
situationsin
which
individualsare
inother
ways
cutofffrom
thefully
human
useoftheir
faculties.I
turnnow
tothe
objectionabout
application;it
raisesespecially
delicatequestions
where
wom
enare
concerned.
I525’
GLO
BA
LJUSTIC
E: SEMIN
AL
ESSAYSM
AR
THA
C.NU
SSBAU
M•529
7.W
HO
GE
TS
INC
LU
DE
D?
WO
ME
NA
SH
UM
AN
BE
ING
S
Ina
noww
eU—
known
remark,
which
Icite
hereas
anepigraph,
thefem
inistlaw
yerC
atharineIvlacK
innonclaim
edthat
“beinga
wom
anis
notyet
aw
ayof
beinga
human
being.”8°
Thism
eans,I
think,that
most
traditionalw
aysof
categorizingand
valuingw
omen
havenot
accordedthem
fillm
embership
inthe
human
species, asthatspecies
isgenerally
defined. MacK
innonis
nodoubtthinking
inparticular
ofthefrequent
denialsto
wom
enof
therational
naturethat
istaken
tobe
acentral
part of what
itisto
behum
an.Itis
soberingto
remind
oneselfthat quite
afew
leadingphilosophers, including
Aristotle
andR
ousseau,the
“fathers”(certainly
notm
others)of
my
idea, diddeny
wom
enfull
mem
bershipin
human
functioningas
theyunderstood
thatnotion. If
thisis
so, onem
ightw
ellask,
ofwhat
useis
itreally
toidentil5’
aset
ofcentral
human
capabilities?For
thebasic
(lower—
level)capacity
todevelop
thesecan
always
bedenied
tow
omen, even
bythose
who
granttheir
centrality.Does
thisproblem
showthat
thehum
anfunction
ideais
eitherhopelessly
inleague
with
patriarchyor, atbest, im
potentas
atool for justice?
Ibelieve
thatit
doesnot.
Forif
we
examine
thehistory
ofthese
denialsw
esee,
Ibelieve,
thegreat
power
ofthe
conceptionof
thehum
anas
asource
ofm
oralclaim
s. Acknow
ledgingthe
otherperson
asa
mem
berof
thevery
same
kindw
ouldhave
generateda
senseof
affiliationand
aset
ofm
oraland
educationalduties. T
hatis
why,
tothose
benton
shoringup
theirow
npow
er,the
stratagemof
splittingthe
otheroff from
one’sow
nspecies
seems
sourgent
andso
seductive.B
uttodeny
humanness
tobeings
with
whom
onelives
inconversation
andinteraction
isa
fragilesort
of self—deceptive
stratagem,vulnerable
tosustained
andconsistent reflection, and
alsoto
experiencesthat
cutthrough
self-deceptiverationalization.8’
Any
moral
conceptioncan
bew
ithheld,out
ofam
bitionor
hatredor
shame.
But
theconception
ofthe
human
being,spelled
out,as
here,in
aroughly
determinate
way,
interm
sof circum
stancesof life
andfunctions
inthese
circumstances,
seems
much
harderto
withhold
thanother
conceptionsthat
havebeen
made
thebasis
forethics—
”rationalbeing,”
forexam
ple, or(as
Ihave
suggested)“person.”
To
illustratethis
point, Inow
turnto
theearliest argum
ent known
tom
ein
theW
esternphilosophical
traditionthat
usesa
conceptionof
thehum
anbeing
forfeminist ends. It
isnot the
first feminist argum
ent
inthe
Western
tradition: ForPlato’sR
epublicprecedes
(andinfluences)
itY2
But
Plato’sarg
um
entin
favorof equaleducationforw
omen
isheavily
qualifiedby
hiselitism
with
respectto
allfunctions
forall
human
beings;thus
it isable
togenerate
onlyelitistconclusions
form
alesand
females
alike.Platonic
justiceis
notthe
“humanistjustice”
ofSusan
Okin’s
powerfiil
phrase. Theargum
entI
havein
mind
is, instead,the
firstargum
entof
theR
oman
Stoicthinker
IvlusoniusR
ufusin
hisbrief
treatise“T
hatW
omen
Too
ShouldD
oPhilosophy,”
written
inthe
firstcen
tury
Ad).
83
Thisarg
um
entis
allthem
oreinteresting
inthat
it,in
effect,uses
Aristotelian
conceptsto
correctA
ristotle’sm
istakeabout
wom
en—show
ing,I
think,that
anA
ristotelianw
hois
bothinternally
consistentand
honestabout
theevidence
cannotavoid
theegalitarian
normative
conclusionthat w
omen, as
much
asm
en, shouldreceive
ahigher
education(for
thatis
ineffect w
hatis
meantby
doingphilosophy).84
‘Theargum
enthasa
tacitprem
ise.Itis
that—atleast w
ithrespect
tocertain
centralfunctions
ofthe
human
being—the
presencein
acreature
ofa
basic(untrained,
lower-level)
capabilityto
performthe
functionsin
question,given
suitablesupport
andeducation,
exertsa
claimon
societythat
thosecapabilities
shouldbe
developedto
thepoint
atwhich
theperson
isfully
capableof choosing
thefunctions
inquestion.T
hisprem
iseneeded
noargum
entinthe
philosophicalcultureofC
reco-Rom
anantiquity
sincethat m
oral claimis
more
orlesstaken
tobe
implicit
inthe
notionof
capabilityitself.
Ihave
triedto
giveit
intuitivesupport in
theargum
entof thispaper.
Theargum
entitselfnowfollow
sw
itha
trulyradicalsim
plicity.Itssecond
premise
consistsofan
appealtothe
experienceof the
imaginary
recalcitrantm
aleinterlocutor.W
omen,
heis
askedto
concedeon
thebasis
of experience,doin
facthavethe
basiccapabilities
toperform
aw
idevariety
ofthem
ostimportant
human
fiinctions.They
havethe
fivesenses. T
heyhave
thesam
enum
berof
bodilyparts,
implying
similar
functionalpossibilities
inthatsphere.T
heyhave
theability
toth
ink
andreason,justas
males
do. And, finally,they
haveresponsiveness
toethical
distinctions,making
(whether
well
orbadly)
distinctionsbetw
eenthe
goodand
thebad. Som
etim
eis
thenspent establishing
athird
premise:
that“higher
education”of
thesort
offeredby
theStoic
idealofliberal
education,isnecessary
forthefulldevelopm
entoftheperceptual, in
tellectual,and
moral
capabilities.Conclusion:
Wom
en, likem
en,should
havethis
education.
•U
LU
WtL
JLJb
IltZ:
t1V
U1N
Ltb
bX
bM
AR
TH
AC
.NU
SSBA
UT
vI•
531
Thepuzzle,forus,is
thesecond
premise.W
hydoes
theinterlocutor
acceptit?
‘Ne
seefrom
thesurrounding
materialthatthe
interlocutorisa
husbandw
hointeracts
with
hisw
ifein
anum
berofareas
oflifethatare
explicitlyenum
erated:planningand
managing
ahousehold
(where
sheis
theone
who
manages
most
ofthedaily
business);havingand
raisingchildren
(where
heobserves,orim
agines,herin
labor,enduringrisk
andpain
forthe
sakeofthe
family
and,later,caringfor
andeducating
thechild);
havingsexual
relationsw
ithhim
,andrefusing
tohave
sexw
ithothers;having
arealfriendship
with
him,based
oncom
mon
contemporary
ideasof”sharing
lifetogether”;8
5deciding
howto
treatthepeople
aroundher;being
fair,forexample,to
thehousehold
staffiand,finally,confrontingallthe
dangersand
them
oralambiguities
ofthepolitics
offirstcenturyA
.D.R
ome—
refusingto
capitulate,hesays,to
theunjust
demands
ofatyrant.In
allof
theseoperations
oflife,the
argument
seems
tobe,
hetacitly
acknowledges,in
factstronglyrelies
upon,hisw
ife’scapability
toengage
inpracticalreasoning
andethicaldistinction
making.Indeed,he
isdepicted
assom
eonew
how
ouldlike
thesethings
donew
ell—for
hew
antshis
wife
notto
reasonbadly
when
politicallife
getstough,or
totreatthe
servantsw
ithcruelty, or
tobotch
theeducation
ofthechildren.
Soin
hisdaily
lifehe
acknowledges
her humanity,her
possessionofthe
basic(low
er-level)capabilities
forfully
human
functioning. How
,then,M
usoniusreasonably
askshim
,canhe
consistentlydeny
herwhat w
ouldbe
necessaryin
orderto
developand
fhlflllthathumanity?
Ihis,Ibelieve,isan
impressively
radicalargument.A
nditled
to(or
reflected)a
socialsituation
thatm
arkeda
highpoint
forw
omen
inthe
Western
traditionforthousands
ofyearssince
andto
com
e.86
We
donot
needto
showthatthe
views
ofMusonius
onw
omen
were
perfectinall
respects;inm
anyw
aysthey
were
not.Buthis
argumentshow
s,Ibelieve,the
powerofa
universalconceptionofthe
human
beingin
claims
ofjustice
forwom
en.Fortheinterlocutor
mighthave
refusedto
acknowledge
thathisw
ifew
asa
“person”:Itwas
tosom
eextent
upto
himto
definethatratherrefined
andelusive
concept.He
couldnotfailto
acknowledge
thatshew
asa
human
being,with
thebasic
capabilityforthe
functionsin
question.Forhe
hadacknow
ledgedthatalready,in
hisdaily
life.
8. WO
ME
NA
ND
ME
N:T
WO
NO
RM
SO
RO
NE
?
But
shouldthere
bea
singlenorm
ofhuman
functioning?It
hasoften
beenargued,
inboth
non-Western
andW
esterntraditions,that
there
shouldbe
two
differentstandardsofhum
anfunctioning
andcapability
correspondingto
thedifferent“natures”ofthe
male
andthe
female.U
sually
theseoverlap
inthe
areasofbodily
health,mobility,and
perception,but
differsharply
inthe
areasofpractical
reasonand
affiliation.Most
comm
only,citizenship,publicactivity,and
fullpractical
autonomy
areassigned
tom
ales,carefor
home
andfam
ilyto
females.W
em
ustnow
confrontthe
claims
ofthisposition.
Thosew
horecognize
separatespheres
offunctioningform
alesand
females
havetaken
uptw
oim
portantly-differentpositions,w
hichw
eneed
tobe
careflilto
distinguish.Thefirst,w
hichI
shallcall
PositionA
,assignsto
bothm
alesand
females
thesam
egeneral
normative
listoffunctions,butsuggests
thatmales
andfem
alesshould
exercisethese
functionsin
differentspheresoflife.The
second,which
IshallcallP
osition
B,insiststhatthe
listoffunctions,evenata
highlevelofgenerality,
shouldbe
different.(ItisB
ratherthan
Athatis
usuallyassociated
with
theclaim
thatm
alesand
females
havedifferent“natures”.)
PositionA
iscom
patiblew
itha
seriousinterest
inequality
andin
genderjustice.For
what
itsays,after
all, isthat
males
andfem
aleshave
thesam
ebasic
needsfor
capabilitydevelopm
entand
shouldget
what
theyneed.It
isdeterm
inedto
ensurethatboth
getto
thehigher
(developed)levelofcapability
with
respecttoallthe
centralfunctions.Itsim
plyholds
thatthiscan
(andperhaps
should)be
donein
separatespheres.Itis
akind
ofgender-basedlocalspecification.A
is,afterall,theposition
ofMusonius,w
hoholds
thatthem
ajorfunctionsofaffiliation
andpracticalreason
may
beexercised
bythe
wom
anin
them
anagement
ofthehom
eand
bythe
man
inthe
publicsphere.8
7It
evidentlyseem
sto
himconvenient,given
wom
en’schildbearing
role,thatthe
customary
divisionsof
dutiesshould
notbe
overturned,andhe
believesthat
allthem
ajorcapabilities
canflourish
ineither
sphere.Isthis
anym
oreproblem
aticthan
tosay
thathuman
functioningin
Indiacan,and
evenshould,take
adifferent
concreteform
fromfunctioning
inE
ngland?The
difficultyis,how
ever,thatoncew
ehave
recognizedthe
extentto
which
genderdivisions
havebeen
sociallyconstructed
inm
orallyarbitrary
andinjurious
ways,
andonce
we
insist,instead,
onusing
comm
onhum
anityas
ourm
oraland
politicalbasis,itis
difficulttosee
what
goodargum
entsthere
arefor
PositionA
,which
justhappens
tom
aintainin
placedivisions
thathaveoften
provenoppressive
tow
omen.
What
couldsuch
arguments
be?I
havem
entionedbiologicaldifferences.B
uthowm
uchseparation
offunctionis
reallysuggested
byw
omen’s
childbearing,especiallytoday?
334•
tzI4JflhiJ.iJUO
ALL.tA
J4V
11IJtk
MA
RT
HA
C, N
US
SE
AU
M•
5331
Even
inthe
fourthcentury
n.c.,Platow
asable
tosee
thatthesituation
ofmales
andfem
alesis
notverydifferent from
thesituation
ofmale
andfem
alehunting
dogs:Thefem
aleneeds
aperiod
ofrestforchildbearingand
nursing,but
thisin
now
ayrequires,
oreven
suggests,a
lifelongdifferentiation
offunctions.
Advances
inthe
controlof
reproductionare
making
thisless
andless
plausible. And
itshould
beevident
toall
thatthedisability
imposed
bychildbearing
forthe
mem
berof thelabor
forceis
toa
largeexientconstructed, above
allbythe
absenceofsupport
forchild
care,bothfrom
thepublic
sphereand
fromem
ployers. Other
bodilydifferences
thathave
standardlybeen
mentioned—
forexam
ple,differences
inbodily
strengththathave
oftenbeen
heldto
imply
adif
ferentiationof functions—
areincreasingly
beingfound
tobe
basedon
badscientific
argum
ent,
88
andare
alsoless
andless
plausibleas
basesfor
functionaldifferentiation.M
ilitaryfunctions,for
example,depend
lessand
lessupon
bodilystrength
andm
oreand
more
oneducation.
Therecognition
of thisby
theU
SC
ongressin
itsrecentequalization
ofm
ilitaryroles
simply
grantsw
hatshould
longago
havebeen
obvious.O
nem
ightalsopointto
contingent socialfacts.Societiesare
alreadydivided
alonggender
lines.Soifw
eare
goingto
move
toa
situationin
which
wom
enw
illbe
capableof
exercisingall
them
ajorfunctions,
it
villbe
prudentto
developthe
resourcesof
thatgender-divided
structure,
seekinggreater
independenceand
flililllment
forw
omen
within
it,ratherthan
tryingto
breakitup.T
his, Ithink,isw
hatisreally
goingon
inM
usonius.A
sa
Greek-speaking
philosopherin
Nero’s
Rom
e,he
hasn’tthe
ghostofa
chanceofm
akinginstitutional
changesofthe
sortrecomm
endedin
Stoicview
softhe
idealcityin
which
males
andfem
alesw
ereto
befully
equalcitizensw
ithno
distinctionofspheres
andeven
nodistinction
ofclo
thin
g!
89
He
doeshave
ahope
ofconvincing
individual husbandsto
allowtheirw
ivesaccess
toeducation,so
hedoes
whathe
can.Much
thesam
eis
truein
Martha
Chen’sA
Quiet R
evolution.
Neither
Chen
norher
colleaguesproposed
tojettison
allgender
divisions;vithin
thevillage.Instead,they
found“fem
alejobs”
that were
somew
hatm
oredignified
andim
portantthan
theold
jobs, jobsthat
lookedcontinuous
with
traditionalfem
alew
orkbut
were
outsidethe
home
andbrought
inw
ages.Frequently
thisis
aprudent
strategyin
bringingabout
realsocial
change.As
Martha
Chen
shows,the
“revolution”in
wom
en’squality
oflife
neverw
ouldhave
takenplace
butfor
thecaution
ofthe
wom
en,w
hoat
eachstage
gavethe
men
ofthe
villagereason
tobelieve
that
thetransform
ationsw
erenot
overwhelm
inglythreatening
andw
eregood
forthe
well-being
ofthe
entiregroup.
On
theother
hand,such
pragmatic
decisionsin
theface
ofrecalcitrant
realitiesdo
nottell
ushow
thingsought
tobe.T
ohold
thata
gender-dividedtw
o-spheresresultis
anacceptable
specificationofthe
normis
deeplyproblem
atic.For
veryoften
thetraditionally
female
normis
sociallydevalued,and
thetraditionally
male
functionspow
erfullyconnected
with
important
advantages.InM
usonius’sR
ome,a
husbandcan
beboth
acitizen
anda
householdm
anager;a
wife
doesnot
havethe
choiceto
bea
citizen.In
Metha
Bai’s
contemporary
India,the
confinement
ofw
omen
tothe
domestic
spherecuts
themoff
fromthe
choiceto
earna
living,a
powerful
determinant
ofoverall
capabilitystatus.
Inshort,
“separatebut equal”
assignments
usuallyserve
theends
ofadom
inantgroupand
perpetuatethe
oppressionof
thepow
erless.9°
This
pointneeds
particularattention
inthinking
aboutdivisions
oflabor
within
thefam
ily.It
seems
perfectlyreasonable
thatin
anyhousehold
thereshould
bea
divisionof
labor,even
along-standing
one,w
ithsom
em
embers
gaininggreater
skillsat
onetask,
some
atanother.It
would
alreadybe
greatprogress,vis—
à—vis
thecurrent
stateofthings
inall know
ncountries,if dom
esticduties
were
equallydivided
bytim
eand
effort.B
uteven
inthat
utopiansituation,
assignment
oftasks
alongtraditional gender-divided
linesm
aybe
suspect, onaccount
ofits
possibleassociation
with
lackof
respectand
seW—
respect. Ifall
andonly
girlsare
taughttocook, for
example,this
doesnot
seemto
bea
morally
neutralcase
offunctional
specialization(like
teachingone
childthe
piano,anotherthe
clarinet);for
itreinforcesstereotypes
thatare
associated, historically,with
thedenialto
wom
enof citizenship
andautonom
y.I
concludethat
thereare
nogood
arguments
forposition
A,and
thateven
theprudent
useof
Ain
promoting
gradualsocial
changeshould
beview
edw
ithcaution,and
with
aconstant
awareness
ofmore
genuinelyequal
norms.
Iturn
nowto
PositionB, w
hichhas
beeninfluentially
defendedby
many
philosophers,includingR
ousseauand
some
ofhiscontem
poraryfollow
ers.9
8T
hisposition
may
becriticized
ina
numberof differentw
ays.First,w
eshould
insistthat,insofaras
itrestson
theclaim
thatthereare
two
differentsets
ofbasic
capabilities,this
claimhas
notbeen
borneout
byany
responsiblescientific
evidence.As
Anne
Fausto-Sterling’sM
ythsof
Gender
repeatedlyshow
s,experim
entsthat
allegedlyshow
534G
LO
BA
LJU
ST
ICE
:SE
MIN
AL
ESSAY
SM
AR
TH
AC
.NU
SSBA
UM
535
stronggenderdivisions
inbasic
(untrained)abilities
arefullofscientific
flaws;
theseflaw
srem
oved,thecase
forsuch
differencesis
altogetherinconclusive.
Second,we
shouldnote
thatevenw
hatisclaim
edw
ithoutsubstantiation
inthis
bodyof
scientificm
aterialusually
doesnot
amount
toa
differencein
what
Ihave
beencalling
thecentral
basiccapabilities.
What
isalleged
isusually
adifferential
statisticaldistribution
ofsome
specificcapacity
fora
highlevel
ofexcellence,
notfor
crossingthe
threshold,andexcellence
insom
every
narrowly
definedfunction
(say,geom
etricalability),
ratherthan
inone
ofour
large-scalecapabilities
suchas
thecapability
toperform
practicalreasoning(w
hichm
ay,recall,be
donein
anum
berofdifferentways,in
accordancew
iththe
particulartastes
andabilities
ofthe
individual).So:
Even
iftheclaim
were
true,it
would
notbe
aclaim
aboutcapabilities
inour
capacioussense;
nor,since
itisa
statisticalclaim,w
ouldithave
anyim
plicationsfor
thew
aysin
which
individualsshould
betreated.
Sothe
politicalconsequences
ofsuchgender
differencesin
ourschem
eofthings,even
hadthey
beenestablished,w
ouldbe
nil.Finally,w
em
ustalsonote
thatitis
inprinciple
nexttoim
possible,rightnow
,todo
thesortofresearch
thatwould
berequired
ifsuchdif
ferencesw
ereeverto
beconvincingly
established.Forithasbeen
shown
thatright
now,
frombirth
on,babiesof
thetw
osexes
aredifferently
treatedby
parentsand
otheradults,in
accordancew
iththe
perceptionoftheir
externalgenitalia.They
arehandled
differently,spokento
differently,given
differenttoys.Their
emotions
arelabeled
differently—thus
acrying
infanttends
tobe
labeled“angry”
iftheobserver
believesitto
bea
boy,and“frightened”
iftheobserver
believesit
tobe
agirl.
92
Thism
eansthatin
thepresentgender-divided
stateofthings
we
cannotgetbeneath
culturereliably
enoughto
getthenecessary
evidenceaboutbasic
capabilities.Ithink
thissupports
theconclusion
Idefended
earlier:Thepotential
forerror
andabuse
incapability
testingis
sogreat
thatw
eshould
proceedas
ifeveryindividual
hasthe
basiccapabilities.
Butw
ecan
alsocriticize
PositionB
ina
differentway.For
Ibelievethat
itcan
alsobe
shown
thatthe
differentiatedconceptions
ofm
aleand
female
functioningcharacteristically
putforward
byB
areinternally
inadequate,andfail
togive
usviable
norms
ofhuman
flourishing.9
3W
hatdow
eusually
find,inthe
versionsofB
thatourphilosophicaltradition
bequeathsto
us?(R
ousseau’sview
isan
instructiveexam
ple.)W
ehave,
onthe
onehand,
males
who
are“autonom
ous,”capable
of
practicalreasoning,
independentand
self-sufficient,allegedly
goodat
politicaldeliberation.These
males
arebroughtup
nottodevelop
strongem
otionsoflove
andfeelings
ofdeepneed
thatare
associatedw
iththe
awareness
ofone’sow
nlack
ofself-sufficiency.Forthis
reasonthey
arenot
well
equippedto
carefor
theneeds
oftheir
family
mem
bers,or,
perhaps,evento
noticethose
needs.On
theotherhand,w
ehave
females
suchas
Rousseau’s
Sophie,broughtupto
lackautonom
yand
self-respect,illequipped
torely
onher
own
practicalreasoning,dependentonm
ales,focused
onpleasing
others,goodatcaring
forothers.Is
eitherofthese
viableas
acom
pletelife
fora
human
being?Itw
ouldseem
not.The
internaltensionsin
Rousseau’s
accountarea
goodplace
tobegin
seeingthis;they
havebeen
welldescribed
bySusan
0kmand
JaneR
olandM
artin.R
ousseau,inE
rnile,placestrem
endousem
phasison
compassion
asa
basicsocialm
otivation.He
understandscom
passionto
requirefellow
feeling,and
akeen
responsivenessto
thesufferings
ofothers.And
yet,inpreparing
Em
ileforautonom
ouscitizen
ship,inthe
endhe
shortchangesthese
emotionalfunctions,allocating
caringand
responsivenessto
thefem
alesphere
alone.Itappears
likelythat
Em
ilew
illbe
notonly
anincom
pleteperson
butalso
adefective
citizen,even
bythe
standardsof
citizenshiprecognized
byR
ousseauhim
self.W
ithSophie,things
againgo
badly.Taught
tocare
forothers,but
nottaught
thather
lifeis
herow
nto
plan,shelives
underthe
sway
ofexternal
influencesand
lacksself-governm
ent.A
sR
ousseauhim
selfshow
s,inhis
fascinatingnarrative
oftheend
ofherlife,she
comes
toa
badend
thoughherlack
ofjudgment. Ivloreover—
asM
usoniusalready
arguedto
hisR
oman
husband,defendingequalfunctioning—
sheproves
tobe
abad
partnerand
deficientin
love.Forlove,as
we
come
tosee,
requiresjudgm
ent andconstancy
ifitis
tobe
trulydeep
andtruly
per
ceptive.So
eachof
themfails
tolive
acom
pletehum
anlife;
andeach
fails,too, toexem
plif5rfullyand
well
thevery
functionsforw
hichthey
were
beingtrained,
sincethose
functionsrequire
supportfrom
otherfunctions
forw
hichthey
were
nottrained.The
textleadsits
thought
fulreaderto
theconclusion
thatthe
capabilitiesthathave
traditionallym
arkedthe
separatem
aleand
female
spheresare
notseparable
fromone
anotherw
ithouta
gravefunctional
loss.They
supportand
educateone
another.Sosociety
cannotstrive
forcom
pletenessby
simply
add
ingone
sphereto
theother.It
muststrive
todevelop
ineach
andevery
personthe
fullrange
ofhuman
capabilities.
•Z
JA3tU
.gJU3
n.4
;3iL
YU
PQ
U.
.aan
ta
MA
RT
HA
C,
NU
SS
BA
UM
•537
This
more
inclusivenotion
ofhum
anfunctioning
admits
tragicconffict.For
itinsistson
theseparate
valueand
theirreplaceable
imp
or
tanceof
arich
pluralityof
functions.A
ndthe
world
doesnot
always
guaranteethatindividuals
willnotbe
facedw
ithpainfulchoices
among
thesefunctions,in
which,in
ordertopursue
oneofthem
wellthey
must
neglectothers
(andthus,
inm
anycases,
subvertthe
oneas
well).B
utthis
shows
onceagain,lbelieve,the
tremendous
importance
ofkeepingsom
esuch
listofthecentralfunctions
beforeus
aswe
assessthe
qualityoflife
inthe
countriesofthe
world
andstrive
toraise
it.Form
anysuch
tragedies—like
many
casesof
simple
capabilityfailure—
resultfrom
unjustand
unreflectivesocial
arrangements.O
necan
imagine,and
tryto
construct,asociety
inw
hichthe
tragicchoices
thatfacedE
mile
andSophie
would
notbenecessar
inw
hichboth
males
andfem
alescould
learnboth
tolove
andto
reason.B
einga
wom
anis
indeednot
yeta
way
ofbeing
ahum
anbeing.
Wom
enin
much
ofthew
orldlack
supportforthe
mostcentralhum
anfunctions,and
thisdenialofsupportis
frequentlycaused
bytheirbeing
wom
en.Butw
omen,unlike
rocksand
plantsand
evendogs
andhorses,
arehum
anbeings,have
thepotentialto
become
capableofthese
human
functions,givensufficientnutrition,education,and
othersupport.T
hatisw
hytheirunequalfailure
incapability
isa
problemofjustice.Itis
upto
usto
solvethis
problem.I
claimthata
conceptionofhum
anfunctioning
givesus
valuableassistance
asw
eundertake
thista
sk.
94
NO
TE
S
[Note
addedby
authorin
2007:]T
hispaper
representsan
earlyand
ratherprim
itivestage
ofm
ythinking
abouthum
ancapabilities.
More
developedversions
arefound
inm
ybooks
Wom
enand
Hum
anD
evelopment:
YheC
apa
bilitiesA
pproach(C
ambridge
University
Press,2000),and
FrontiersofJustice:
Disability,
Nationality,
SpeciesM
embership
(Harvard
University
Press,2006).
Am
ongthe
important
developments
inthe
view,the
most
important
are:(1)
my
endorsementofaform
ofRaw
lsian“politicalliberalism
,”insuch
a way
thatthe
capabilitieslistis
introducednot
asa
comprehensive
viewofa
flourishing
life,butonly
asthe
sourcefor
politicalprinciplesthat
canpotentially
beendorsed
asthe
basisfor
adecent
comm
onlife
bypeople
who
sharedifferent
comprehensive
doctrinesofthe
good;(2)an
accountofpoliticaljustificationand
ofthe
relationshipbetw
eenm
yview
andview
sin
boththe
Utilitarian
andsocial-contracttraditions;
(3)an
accountoftherole
ofanotion
ofhuman
equalityin
thecapability
approach,inw
hichsom
ecapabilities
arethoughtto
bedistributed
adequatelyonly
iftheyare
distributedequally
(e.g.,freedomof
religion,therightto
vote,therightto
education),whereasothers
(e.g.,theright
tosuitable
housing)are
takento
bedistributed
adequatelyonce
anam
plesocial
minim
umis attained;
(4)am
ajorrevisionin
thenotion
of“basiccapabilities,”
with
theresult
thatbeing
bornof
two
human
parentsis
sufficientfor
beinga
beareroffully
equalhum
andignity, w
ithonly
afew
exceptions,suchas
theperson
ina
permanent
vegetativestate
andthe
anencephalicchild;
inother
words,so
longas
some
kindofintentionalfocusing
andstriving
ispresent,the
person, however
severelydisabled,has
entitlements
frillyequal
tothose
oftheso-called
“normal”
person;(5)
anaccount
ofpolitical
implem
entation,w
hichm
akesitclearthat
thecapabilities
list isa
basisforinternational discussion
andpersuasion
only, butthat
implem
entationis
thejob
ofgovernments
chosenby
andaccountable
tothe
people, exceptin
extreme
casesof genocide
andother
traditionallyrecognized
occasionsfor
humanitarian
intervention.1.The
argument
ofthis
paperis
closelyrelated
tothat
ofseveral
otherpapers
of mine,to
which
Ishallrefer frequently
inw
hatfollows: “N
ature,Func
tion,andC
apability,”O
xfordStudies
inA
ncient Philosophy,suppl.vol.1(1988):
145—84; “N
on-Relative
Virtues:
An
Aristotelian
Approach,”
Midw
estStudies
inPhilosophy
13(1988):
32—53,and,in
anexpanded
version,inlvi.N
ussbaumand
A.
Sen,eds.,
TheQ
ualityofL
Jè(O
xford:C
larendonPress,
1993),pp.
242—76; “A
ristotelianSocial
Dem
ocracj4”in
R.B
.Douglass,
G.M
ara,andH
.R
ichardson,eds.,
Liberalismand
theG
ood(N
ewY
ork:R
outledge,1990),
pp.203—
52;“Aristotle
onH
uman
Nature
andthe
Foundations
ofEthics,”
inW
orld,M
ind,and
Ethics:E
ssayson
thePhilosophy
ofBernard
Wiiia,ns,ed. R.H
arrisonandj.A
lthameds. (C
ambridge:
Cam
bridgeU
niversityPress,1995); “H
uman
Functioning
andSocial
Justice:In
Defense
ofA
ristotelianE
ssentialism,”
Political Theory20(1992):
202—46.
2. Bythis
Imean
that thedifference
inexternal genitalia
figuresin
sociallife
asit
isinterpreted
byhum
ancultures;
thusw
eare
neverdealing
simply
with
factsgiven
atbirth, but
always
with
what
hasbeen
made
ofthem(see
below, section
8for
discussionofthe
roleofculture
inbiological claim
sabout
male/fem
aledifferences).Thus,even
thecom
mon
distinctionbetw
een“gender,”
a culturalconcept,and“sex,”the
allegedlypure
biologicalconcept,isinadequateto
capturethe
depthofcultural interpretation
inpresenting
eventhe
biological“facts”
tohum
anbeings,from
thevery
startofa
child’slife.See
Anne
Fau
stoSterling,
Myths
ofG
ender(2nd
ed.,N
ewY
ork:Basic
Books,
1992).I
havediscussed
theseissues
furtherin
“Constructing
Love, D
esire,andC
are,”in
D.
Estlund
andlvi.N
ussbaum,eds.,Sex, Preference,and
Family:E
ssayson
Law
andN
ature(N
ewY
orlcO
xfordU
niversityPress,
1997),pp.
17—43,and
inm
ySex
andSocialJustice
(New
Yorlc
Oxford
University
Press,1999),
pp
.253
—275.
3.Fora
historicalargumentalong
theselines
fromthe
historyofW
estern
scientificthought,
seeT
homas
Laqueur,
Making
Sex(B
erkeleyand
Los
538•G
LQ
$A
LJL
JbiiC
:SF1Y
IINA
LS
SA
Th
MA
RT
HA
C.N
USSB
AU
M• 539
Angeles:
University
ofC
aliforniaPress,
1989).T
hepapers
inthis
volume
[Wom
en,C
ultureand
Developm
ent]by
Am
artyaSen
[“Gender
Inequalityand
Theories
ofJustice,”259—
73], Xiaorong
Li
[“Gender
Inequalityin
China
andC
ulturalR
elativism,”
407—25], and
Roop
Rekha
Verm
a[“F
emin
init
3sE
quality,and
Personhood,”433—
43]show
thatthe
useof ideas
ofnatureto
conveya
falsesense
ofappropriateness, “justil5’ing”
unjustpractices,is
byno
means
confinedto
theW
esterntradition.
4.SeeM
arthaChen’s
“AM
atterofSurvival: W
omen’s
Rightto
Em
ploym
entinIndia
andB
angladesh,”inW
omen,
Culture
andDevelopm
ent:AStudy
ofH
u,nanC
’apabilities,ed. Martha
C.
Nussbaum
andJonathan
Glover
(Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press,1995), 37-57.
5.J.S.M
ill,The
SubjectionofW
omen
(Indianapolis:B
obbsM
errill,1988);
Am
arrvaSen,“G
enderand
Cooperative
Conflicts,”
inI.T
inker,ed., PersistentInequalities
(New
York:O
xfordU
niversityPress,1990);“G
enderInequalityand
Theories
ofJustice”in
IVom
en, Culture
andD
evelopment,p
p.
259-7
3,
and“M
oreT
han100
Million
Wom
enA
reM
issing,”N
ewY
orkR
eviewofBooks;
Hum
anD
evelopmentR
eport,1993,
forthe
United
Nations
Developm
entP
rogramm
e(U
ND
P)
(New
York
andO
xford:O
xfordU
niversityPress,1993); Susan
Moller
Okin,Justire,
Gender,
andthe
Family
(New
York:
Basic
Books,
1989),see
my
reviewof
0km
,“Justice
forW
omen,”
New
York
Review
of Books
(October
1992);C
atharineM
acKinnon,
remark
citedby
Richard
Rorty
in“Fem
inismand
Pragm
atism,”M
ithiganQ
uarterlyR
eview30(1989):
263. MacK
innonhas
sinceacknow
ledgedthe
remark.
6.F
ora
compelling
argument
linkingfem
inismand
internationalism,
seeO
noraO
’Neill,
“Justice,G
ender,and
InternationalB
oundaries,”in
M.
Nussbaum
andA
.Sen,
eds.,The
Quality
ofLtfe, p
p.
3O3—23.
7. Kw
ame
Anthony
Appiah,In
My
Fatherc1-b
use:Africa
inthe
Philosophyof C
ulture(N
ewY
orkand
Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press,1992),pp.
136.8.
On
theother
hand,it
isclosely
relatedto
Kantian
approachesusing
theuniversal
notionof personhood.
See,forexam
ple, Onora
O’N
eill,“Justice,G
ender,andInternational
Boundaries,”w
ithm
ycom
mentary
(324—35).In
thepresent
volume
[iVom
en,C
ultureand
Developm
ent],see
thepapers
ofO
noraO
’Neill
[“Justice, Capabilities, and
Vulnerabilities,”
140—52],R
uthA
nnaP
ut
nam[“W
hyN
ota
Fem
inistT
heoryofJustice?”
298—331],
andR
oopR
ekhaV
erma
[“Femininit)s
Eq
uaIit
andP
ersonhood,”433—
43].B
elowI
shallbe
making
some
criticisms
ofthe
conceptof“person”
infem
inistargum
ent,and
relatedcriticism
sof
liberalK
antianapproaches
(onw
hichsee
alsoA
SD
andm
yreview
of0km
).B
utthese
differencesare
subtleand
takeplace
againsta
backgroundof
substantialagreem
ent.See
alsoD
avidC
rocker,“Functioning
andC
apabili.T
heF
oundationof Sen’s
andN
ussbaum’s
Developm
entE
thics,”PoliticalTheory
20(1992):584ff
9.By
relativism,I
mean
theview
thatthe
onlyavailable
criterionofad
judication
issom
elocalgroup
orindividual.T
husrelativism
,asI
understandit,
isa
genusofw
hichthe
brandofreliance
onindividuals’subjective
preferencesfrequently
endorsedin
neoclassicaleconom
icsis
onespecies.
(Econom
ists,of
course,are
relativistonly
aboutvalue,
notabout
what
theyconstrue
asthe
domain
ofscientific“fact.”) T
hisaffinity
willlaterbe
relevanttom
ycom
ments
onthe
Marglin
project.My
opponentsalso
frequentlyem
ploythe
term“post-
modernist”
tocharacterize
theirposition:T
hisis
avaguer
term,
associatedin
avery
generalw
ayw
iththe
repudiationof
bothm
etaphysicalrealism
(tobe
definedbelow
)and
universalism.
10.Much
ofthem
aterialdescribed
inthese
examples
isnow
publishedin
Dom
inatingK
nowledge:D
evelopment,
‘ulture,and
Resistance,ed.F.A
. Ivlarglinand
S.A.M
arglin(O
xford:C
larendonPress,
1990).The
issueof “em
beddedness”and
menstruation
tahoosis
discussedin
S.A.M
arglin,”LosingT
ouch:The
Cultural
Conditions
ofWorker
Accom
modation
andR
esistance,”pp. 217—82,
andrelated
issuesare
discussedinS
.A.M
arglin,“Tow
ardthe
Decolonization
ofthe
Mind,”
1—28.O
nSittala
Dcvi,see
F.A.M
arglin,“Smallpox
inTw
oSystem
sofK
nowledge,”
102—44;
andfor
relatedargum
entssee
Ashis
Nandy
andShiv
Visvanathan,“M
odernM
edicineand
ItsN
on-Modern
Critics,”
144—84.
11.ForSen’s
own
accountofthe
pluralityand
internaldiversity
of Indianvalues,one
thatstrongly
emphasizes
thepresence
ofa
rationalistand
criticalstrand
inIndian
traditions,seeM
.N
ussbaumand
A.
Sen,”lnternal
Criticism
andIndian
Relativist T
raditions,”in
M.
Krausz,ed.,R
elativism(N
otreD
ame,
IN:
Notre
Dam
eU
niversityPress,
1989)—a
paperoriginally
presentedat
thesam
eM
IlDE
Rconference
andrefused
publicationby
theM
arglinsin
itsproceedings;
and“India
andthe
West,”N
ewR
epublic(7
June1993).
12.S.A
.Marglin,
in“T
oward
theD
ecolonization,”22—
23,suggeststhat
binarythinking
ispeculiarly
Western.B
utsuchoppositions
arepervasive
inall
traditionsw
ithw
hichI
haveany
acquaintance:in
theU
panishads,forexam
ple(seethe
epigraphto
“Hum
anF
unctioning”),inC
onfucianthought
(see, again,the
epigraphto
“Hum
anFunctioning”),in
Ibothought
(see,form
anyexam
ples,C
hinuaA
chebe’sThings
FallApart
[London:
William
Heinem
ann,1958]).
Critics
ofsuch
oppositionshave
notexplained
howone
canspeak
coherentlyw
ithoutbouncing
offone
thingagainst
another.I
believethat
Aristotle
was
righttohold
thatto
sayanything
atallonem
ustruleoutsom
ething,atthevery
leastthecontradictory
of what
oneputs
forward.T
heargum
entsof N
ietzsche,w
hichare
frequentlyput
forward
asif
theyunderm
ineall
binaryoppositions,
actuallym
akefar
more
subtleand
concretepoints
aboutthe
originsof certain
oppositions,andthe
interestsserved
bythem
.13.
SeeE
.H
obsbawm
andI
Ranger,
eds.,The
Inventionof
Tradition
(Cam
bridge:Cam
bridgeU
niversityPress,1983).Inhis
New
Republic
piece, Senm
akesa
similar
argument
about contemporary
India:The
‘Western
constructionofIndia
asm
ysticaland“other”
servesthe
purposesofthe
fundamentalist
BJE
who
arebusy
refashioninghistory
toserve
theends
oftheirow
npolitical pow
er.A
neloquent
critiqueof the
whole
notionofthe
“other,”and
oftheassociated
“nativism,”
where
Africa
isconcerned,
canbe
foundin
Appiah
(aboven.
7),especially
inthe
essays“T
hePostcolonial
andthe
Postm
odern,”pp.
137—57
and“T
opologiesofN
ativism,”pp. 47—
72.14.T
heproceedings
ofthis
conferenceare
nowpublished
asN
ussbaumand
Sen,eds.,
TheQ
ualityofL
ffe(n.1
above).15.“C
apabilityand
Well-B
eing,”in
Nussbaum
andSen,pp. 30—
53.16.M
arglinhas
sincepublished
thispointin
“Tow
ardthe
Decolonization.”
His
referenceis
toT
akeoD
oi,The
Anatom
yofflependence
(ToI’o:
Kedansho,
1971).On
wom
enand
men
injapan,seeH
uman
Developm
ent Report,
1993,p.26: “Japan,despite
some
ofthe
world’s
highestlevels
ofhum
andevelopm
ent,still
hasm
arkedinequalities
inachievem
entbetw
eenm
enand
wom
en. The
1993hum
andevelopm
ent indexputsJapan
first.But w
henthe
HD
Iis
adjustedfor
genderdisparity, Japan
slipsto
number
17....W
omen’s
averageearnings
areonly
51percent
thoseof m
en,andw
omen
arelargely
excludedfrom
deci
sion-making
positions....T
heirrepresentation
iseven
lower
inthe
politicalsphere....In
legalrights
ingeneral,Japan’s
patrilinealsociety
isonly
graduallychanging
tooffer
wom
engreater
recognitionand
independence.Japannow
haspolitical
andnon-governm
entalorganizations
pressingfor
changeT
hequestion
offreedom
ofchoice
isthus
onthe
agendain
Japanin
alarge
way,
preciselyon
accountof
thesort
ofunequal
functioningvividly
illustratedin
Marglin’s
example, w
herem
enialfunctions
areperform
edby
wom
en, inorder
thatm
enm
aybe
freeto
performtheir
managerial
andpolitical
functions.17.
SeeS. A
. IVlarglin,“T
oward
theD
ecolonization.”18.See
S.A.
Marglin,
“Losing
Touch.”I
putthe
termin
quotesto
indi
catethat
Iam
alludingto
v1arglin’suse
ofthe
term,
notto
theconcept
asI
understandit.
19.SeeS.A
.Marglin, “T
oward
theD
ecolonization”and
“Losing
Touch.”
Similar
claims
arecom
mon
infem
inist argument. For
example, in
TheF
eminist
Theoryofthe
State(C
ambridge,iv[A
: Harvard
University
Press,1989), Catharine
IviacKinnon
arguesthat “objectivity”
astraditionally
conceivedin
theW
esternepistem
ologicaltradition
iscausally
linkedto
theobjectification
andabuse
ofw
omen.T
hisline
ofargum
entis
effectivelycriticized
inL
ouisevI.
Antony,
“Quine
asFem
inist:The
Radical
Import
of Naturalized
Epistem
ologu”inL
.M
.A
ntonyand
C.W
irt,eds.,A
Min
dofO
necO
wn:F
eminist E
ssayson
Reason
andO
bjectivity(B
oulder,C
C:
Westview
Press,1992),
pp.185—
225.See
alsothe
detailedexam
inationof
MacK
innon’sargum
entin
thesam
evolum
eby
SallyH
asLanger,
in“O
nB
eingO
bjectiveand
Being
Objectified,”
85—125.
MacK
innon’sfundam
entalcontributions
inthe
areasof
sexualharassm
entand
pornographydo
notdepend
onthis
analysis, andare
actuallyunderm
inedby
it.The
coreofher
thoughtactually
revealsa
strongcom
mitm
entto
atype
ofethicaluniversalism
,as
my
epigraphindicates.
See,in
theA
ntonyvolum
e,the
persuasiveanalysis
byL
izR
appaport,“G
eneralizingG
ender:R
easonand
Essence
inthe
Legal
Thought
ofC
atharineM
acKinnon,”
pp.127—
43.
Alcoff’s
contributionin
thepresent
volume
[“Dem
ocracyand
Rationality:
AD
ialoguew
ithH
ilaryPutnam
”in
IVom
en,C
ultureand
Develop‘nent, pp.225—
34]continues
thedebate
aboutfem
inismand
reason;and
seealso
L.
Alcoff
andE
.Potter,
eds.,F
eminist
Epistem
ologies(N
ewY
ork:R
outledge,1993).
Fora
healthyskepticism
aboutthe
roleof“anti—
essentialism”
within
feminism
,see
SeylaB
enhabib, “Feminism
andthe
Qiestion
ofP
ostmodernism
,”in
Situ
ating
theSe(f
Gender,
Com
munity,
andPostm
odernis,nin
Contem
poraryE
thics(N
ewY
ork:R
outledge,1992),pp.
203—42;
SabinaL
ovibond,“Feminism
andP
ostmodernism
,”N
ewL
eftR
eview178
(Novem
ber—D
ecember
1989):5—
28;V
allSvloghadam
,“Against
Eurocentrism
andN
ativism,”
Socialismand
Denzoc—racy
(fall/winter
1989):81—
104;M
oghadam,
Gender,D
evelopment,
andPolicy:
Thw
ardE
quityand
Em
powerm
ent,UN
U/W
IDE
RR
esearchfor
Action
series(N
ovember
1990).20.
For
anaccount
ofthis
sortof
normative
argument,
seeA
lasdairM
aclntyre,After
Virtue
(Note
Dam
e, IN:
Note
Dam
eU
niversityPress, 1989).
21
.J.Derrida,
Of G
ramm
atology,trans. U.
Spivak(B
altimore:Johns
Ho
pkins
University
Press,1976).T
heterm
ism
eantto
suggestthe
ideathat
realityis
simply
“there”and
thatknow
ledgeconsists
inbeing
“present”to
it, without
anyinterfering
barrieror
mediation.
22.R.R
orty,Philosophyan
dth
eMirro
rofN
ature
(Princeton,N
J:Princeton
University
Press,1979).
23.See,
forexam
ple,G
.E
.L
.O
wen,
‘Tithenai
taPhainom
ena”,inLogic,
Science,and
Dialectic
(London:
Duckw
orth,1986),
andM
.N
ussbaum,
TheF
ragilityo
fGoodness: L
uckan
dE
thicsin
Creek
Tragedy
andP
hilosop/iv(C
am-
bridge:C
ambridge
University
Press,1986).
Seealso
Hliary
Putnarn,A
ristotleafter
iVittgenstein,L
indlayL
ecture,University
ofK
ansas,1991.
24.See
theillum
inatingdiscussion
inB.
K.
Matilal,
Perception(O
xford:C
larendonPress,
1985). Itis
worth
notingthat
thisfundam
entalwork
isnot
citedanyw
herein
Marglin
andM
arglin,although
Matilal
was
presentat
theconference
anddelivered
apaper
criticalof
thefvlarglins’
characterizationof
Indiantraditions.
This
paperw
asdropped
fromthe
volume.
Ivlatilalalso
describedthe
implications
oftherealism
debateforIndian
ethicalthought:see
“Ethical
Relativism
andthe
Confrontation
ofCultures,”in
Krausz,ed.,R
elativis,,z
(Notre
Dam
e,IN:
Notre
Dam
eU
niversityPress,
1989),pp. 339—62.
25.There
isa
longerversion
ofm
ycriticism
ofcontem
poran’attacks
onuniversalism
in“H
uman
Functioning.”
Seealso
“Skepticismabout
PracticalR
easonin
Literature
andthe
Law
,”H
arvard
Law
Review
107(1994):
714—44.
Inboth
ofthesepapers
Istudy
thesurprising
convergencebetw
een“left”
and“right”
inthe
critiqueof
normative
argument,
the“postniodern”
positionsof
many
thinkerson
theleft
proving,often,
difficultto
distinguishfrom
claims
about thearbitrariness
ofevaluationin
neoclassicaleconomics. In
Barbara
Her
rnsteinSm
ith’sC
ontingenciesof
Value
(Durham
,N
C:
Duke
University
Press,l988),w
eeven
seea
fusionofthe
two
positions,apostm
odernismconcluding
iz’t
•j ua
i ss,t:t1vut4nL
.tir
IVIA
RTH
AC
. NU
SSBA
U?vl
•543
that,in
theabsence
oftranscendent
standards,w
eshould
understandvalue
judgments
asattem
ptsto
maxim
izeexpected
utility.26.A
nstotle,N
icomachean
Ethics V
III.I, I15
5a
21—22.1
discussthis
passagein
“Aristotle
onH
uman
Nature”
and“N
on-Relative
Virtues.”
27. K.A
.Appiah, l#
My
FatheriH
ouse,pp. vii—viii:“Ifm
ysisters
andI w
ere‘children
oftwo
worlds’,no
onebothered
totell
usthis; w
elived
inone
world,
intw
o‘extended’
families
dividedby
severalthousand
miles
andan
allegedlyinsuperable
culturaldistance
thatnever,
sofar
asI
canrecall,puzzled
orp
er
plexedus
much.”
Appiah’s
argument
doesnot
inany
senseneglect
distinctivefeatures
ofconcretehistories;indeed,one
of itspurposes
isto
demonstrate
howvaried, w
henconcretely
seen,historiesreally
are.But
hisargum
ent,like
mine,
seeksa
subtlebalance
between
perceptionof the
particularand
recognitionof
thecom
mon.In
hisessay”T
hePostcolonialand
thePostm
odern”(pp.
137—57),
Appiah
shows
thatit
isall
toooften
thefocus
on“otherness”
thatproduces
alack
ofconcrete
engagement
with
individuallives.
Speaking
ofthe
sculpture“Y
orubaM
anw
ithB
icycle”that
appearson
thecover
ofthe
book,A
ppiahcom
ments;
“The
Man
with
aB
icycleis
producedby
someone
who
doesnot
carethat
thebicycle
isthe
white
man’s
invention—it
isnot
theteto
beO
therto
theY
orubaS
elfit
isthere
becausesom
eonecared
forits
solidity;it is
therebecause
itw
illtake
usfurther
thanour
feet will
takeus....”
(157).28.In
thiscategoryç
asclosely
relatedto
my
own
view, I
would
placethe
“internal—realist”
conceptionof
Hilary
Putnam
articulatedin
Reason,
Truth,
andH
istory(C
ambridge: C
ambridge
University
Press, 1981),ElheM
anyFacesof
Realism
(La
Salle:O
penC
ourtP
ublishing, 1987),andR
ealismw
itha
Hum
anFace
(Cam
bridge,IVIA
:Harvard
University
Press,1990);and
alsothe
views
ofC
harlesT
aylor,for example,in
Sourcesofthe
Se(fTheM
akingofM
odernIdentity
(Cam
btidge,IVIA
:Harvard
University
Press, 1989),and“E
xplanationand
Prac
ticalR
eason,”in
Nussbaum
andSen,
eds.,The
Quality
ofLjfe,pp. 208—
31.29.
Inthis
senseI
amthoroughly
inagreem
entw
ithSusan
Okin’s
replyto
thecharge
of“substitutionalism”
thathas
beenm
adeagainst
herbook, and
inagreem
entw
ithboth
0kmand
Ruth
Anna
Putnam
thatit
isa
mistake
toconceive
ofthe
moral
pointof
viewas
constitutedby
theactual
voicesof
alldisadvantaged
parties;see
Okin’s
“Inequalitiesbetw
eenthe
Sexesin
Different
Cultural
Contexts,”
pp.274—
97and
Putnam’s
“Why
Not
aF
eminist
Theory
of Justice?”pp.
298—331
inW
omen,
C’ulture
andD
evelopment.
Seem
yfurther
comm
entsbelow
,Section
5.30.C
anthe
Marglins
consistentlym
akethis
objectionw
hileholding
thatfreedom
ofchoiceis
justa
parochialW
esternvalue?
Itw
ouldappear
not;on
theother
hand,F.A. M
arglin(here
differing, Ibelieve,fromS.A
.Marglin)
alsoheld
inoral
remarks
deliveredat
the1986
conferencethat
logicalconsistency
issim
plya
parochialWestern
value.31.
The
politicsof
thehistory
of‘W
esternphilosophy
havebeen
inter
pretedthis
way, w
ithm
uchplausibility
thoughperhaps
insufficienthistorical
argumentation,by
Noam
Chom
skin
Cartesian
Lingiustics
(New
Yorlc
Harper
&R
ow, 1966). C
homsky
arguesthat
Cartesian
rationalism,w
ithits
insistenceon
innateessences,w
aspolitically
more
progressive, more
hostileto
slavefl’ andim
perialism,
thanem
piricism,
with
itsinsistence
that
peoplew
ereju
stw
hat
experiencehad
made
of them. M
yanalysis
of Stoicfem
inistargum
ent(below
Section7)
bearsthis
out.32.T
heuse
ofthisterm
doesnot im
plythat
thefunctions
allinvolvedoing
something
especially“active.”
(Seehere
Sen,“Capability
andW
ell-Being,”
inThe
Quality
of Life,pp.30—
53.)In
Aristotelian
terms, and
inm
ine,beinghealth)
reflecting, beingpleased, are
all “activities.”33.
For
furtherdiscussion
ofthis
point,and
examples,
see“A
ristotleon
Hum
anN
ature.”34.
Ibid.discusses
thetreatm
entof
thispoint
incontem
porarym
edi
calethics.
Could
onecease
tobe
one’sindividual
self without
ceasingto
be
human?
This
isruled
out,Ithink,
inA
ristotle’sconception, but
ispossible
in
some
otherm
etaphysicalconceptions.
But
thesort
ofcase
thatw
ouldm
ostforcefully
raisethis
possibilityis
northe
sortinvolving
illnessor
impairm
ent,but
insteadthe
sortinvolving
personalityor
mem
orychange;
andI
shallnot
attempt
todeal w
ithsuch
caseshere.
35. Appiah, In
My
FathercH
ouse,p. viii.36. In
“Aristotle
onH
uman
Nature,”
thereis
am
oreextended
accountof
thisprocedure
andhow
itjustifies.37.
This
ofcourse
isnot
incompatible
with
callingcertain
groupsnon
human
orsubhum
anfor
political purposes.But
suchdenials
areusually
either
transparent propagandaor
forms
ofself-deception,which
canbe
unmasked
by
criticalargum
ent.See
belowfor
acase
involvingw
omen;
andfor
anextensive
analysisof the
psychologyof such
self-deception, andits
unmasking, see
Raoul
Hilberg,
TheD
estructionofthe
European
Jews,
abridgededition
(New
York:
Holm
es&
Meier,
1985),pp. 274—93.
38.In
orderto
make
thisclear, I
speakof
itas
aconception
ofthe
good,
ata
verym
inimal
andgeneral
level.The
phraseI
haveelsew
hereused
is“the
thickvague
theoryofthe
good.”The
term“thick”
contraststhis
account, inits
comprehensiveness, w
ithR
awls’s
“thin”theory
of thegood, w
hichis
designedto
avoideven
partialcom
prehensiveness.39.
On
thissee
especially“N
on—R
elativeV
irtues.”40.1
havediscussed
my
own
views
aboutpractical
rationalityelsew
here,particularly
in“T
heD
iscernment
ofPerception,”
inL
ovecK
notsledge(N
ew
York:
Oxford
University
Press, 1990). Arelated
account, which
Iadm
ireand
toa
largeextent
agreew
ith,is
givenby
Henry
Richardson
inPracticalD
elib—eration
aboutF
inalE
nds(C
ambridge
University
Press,1994).
Richardson’s
accountis
closelyrelated,
asw
ell,to
thepragm
atistconception
supportedby
Hilary
Putnam
inhis
“Pragmatism
andM
oralO
bjectivity”in
Wom
en,C
ulture
andD
evelopment,pp.
199—224.
54
4G
LO
BA
LJU
ST
ICE
:S
EM
INA
LE
SSAY
SM
AR
TH
AC
. NU
SS
BA
IJM‘545
Should
theconception
ofreasonableness
bedefined
with
referenceto
democratic
procedures,as
SeylaB
enhabibhas
recomm
ended?I
seethe
attractions
ofthisproposal,butI
havenot
followed
it.First
of all,itseem
stom
ethat
democratic
proceduresas
theyactuafly
aredo
notalw
aysem
bodyreasonable
ness;so
todescribe
what
makes
adem
ocraticprocedure
reasonablew
evill
haveto
havea
notionof the
reasonablethat
isto
atleast
some
extentindependent
ofthenotion
of democracy.Second,to
builddem
ocracyinto
theground
levelof
theconception
ofthe
human
fromthe
startprevents
usfrom
raisinglater
onthe
questionof w
hatpolitical
arrangement
will
bestsecure
tocitizens
thelist
ofhum
ancapabilities,in
aw
idevariety
ofcircum
stances.It
may
turnout
thatthe
answer
will
always
be“dem
ocracy.”B
uteven
then,I
thinkit
will
rareLybe
just
democracy
(ancientA
thenianor
New
England
town-m
eetingstyle).
No
modern
democratic
stateis
apure
democracy,
andit
shouldat
thispoint
remain
anopen
questionas
tow
hatrole
shouldbe
playedby
relativelyundem
ocraticinstitutions
suchas
theU
SSuprem
eC
ourtin
promoting
thecapabilities
of citizens.41.F
orR
awis’s
useof
anotion
ofconsensus,
seeR
awis,“T
heIdea
ofan
Overlapping
Consensus,”
Oxford
JournalofL
egalStudies
7(1987),
andnow
PoliticalL
iberalism(N
ewY
ork:C
olumbia
University
Press,1993).
Raw
ls’snotion
ofconsensus
appearsam
biguousbetw
eenthe
two
notionsI
identi&here.
See,onthis,the
exchangebetw
eenJoshua
Cohen
andJean
Ham
ptonin
TheIdeaofD
emocracy
(New
York: O
xfordU
niversityPress,1992).C
ohenargues
thatR
awls
needs,and
canconsistently
defend,the
weaker
“overlap”reading
Ham
ptonargues
that,whatever
RawLs
intends,theplausibility
ofhisargum
entrests
onhis
optingfor
thenorm
ativereading.I
concurw
ithH
ampton.
42.To
citeonly
afew
recent examples
with
seriouspractical
consequences:in
theU
nitedStates
inthe
lS9Os,
theS
upreme
Court,
denyinga
Virginia
wom
an’sappeal
againsta
lawforbidding
wom
ento
practicelaw
,judgedthat
itwas
upto
thestate
Supreme
Court“to
determine
whether
thew
ord‘person”’
inthe
statuteon
which
thew
oman
basedher
appeal“is
confinedto
males.”
(InreL
ockwood,154
US
116, discussedin
0k
m,
Wom
en,p.
251
andn.10,and
seeSunstein’s
‘Gender,
Caste,
andL
aw”
inW
omen,
Culture
andDevelopm
ent,
pp.332—
59.)In
Massachusetts
in1932,
wom
enw
eredenied
eligibilityfor
juryservice,
althoughthe
lawstated
that“every
personqualified
tovote”
was
eligible.T
hestate
Supreme
Court
wrote:
“No
intentionto
includew
omen
canbe
deducedfrom
theom
issionof
thew
ord‘m
ale”(Com
monw
ealth‘a.
Welosky,276
Mass.
398,curt.denied,284U
S684
[1932]),discussedin
0k
m,
kT’,nen,p.
25I
andn.11.Such
readingsno
doubtreflect
faithfullyenough
theview
sthat
theF
oundershad
aboutthe
term“person”
when
theyused
itin
theC
onstitution:See
my
Jeffersonepigraph.A
lthoughthis
construalofthe
termdoes
notprevailtoday
inA
merican
itslegacy
isw
ithus
incountless
more
informal
ways.
43.Aristotle,M
etaphysics1.1.
44.1discuss
thisissue
inm
uchm
oredetail
inL
ecture3
ofmy
1993G
ifford
Lectures,U
niversityof
Edinburgh,in
chapter4
ofU
pheavalsof Thought:
TheIntelligence
ofEm
otions(N
ewY
ork:C
ambridge
University
Press,2001).
45. Aristotle, ubiquitously
inthe
accountsof substance.
46.O
nthese
issues,seefurther
in“A
ristotelianSocial
Dem
ocracy.”47. A
ristotle,PoliticsV
III:see
“Nature, F
unction,and
Capability”
48.Itm
aysupport
what Jam
esR
achelscalls
“moral
individualism”
(Crc
atedfromA
nimals
[Oxford
andN
ewY
orlcO
xfordU
niversityPress,
1990]),in
which
ourm
oralobligations
flowfrom
theendow
ments
ofthe
individualcreature
with
whom
we
aredealing, rather
thanfrom
itsspecies,and
ourgoal
shouldbe
toprom
ote—or
atleast
notto
impede—
theform
offlourishing
ofw
hichthe
beingis
basicallycapable.
On
thisview
suchan
infantshould
getthe
same
treatment
thatw
ew
ouldgive
toan
animal
ofsim
ilarendow
ment.
But w
em
ayalso
decideto
givethe
factthat
itisan
offspringof hum
anssom
em
oral weight;
nothingI
havesaid
hererules
thatout.
49.A
lthough“norm
aLlength”
isclearly
relativeto
currenthum
anp
os
sibilitiesand
may
need, forpractical
purposes,tobe
tosom
eextent
reLativized
tolocal
conditions,itseem
sim
portantto
thinkof it—
atleast
ata
giventim
ein
history—in
universaland
comparative
terms,
asthe
Hum
anD
evelopment
Report
does,to
giverise
tocom
plaintin
acountry
thathas
donew
ellw
ithsom
eindicators
oflifequality
butbadlyon
lifeexpectancy.A
ndalthough
some
degreeof
relativitym
aybe
putdow
nto
thedifferential
geneticpossibilities
ofdifferent
groups(the
“missing
wom
en”statistics,
forexam
ple,allow
thaton
theaverage
wom
enlive
somew
hatlonger
thanm
en),it
isalso
important
notto
concludeprem
aturelythat
inequalitiesbetw
eengroups—
forexam
ple,the
growing
inequalitiesin
lifeexpectancy
between
blacksand
whites
inthe
USA
—are
simply
geneticvariation,
notconnected
with
socialinjustice.
50.‘The
precisespecification
ofthese
healthrights
isnot
eas%but
thew
orkcurrently
beingdone
onthem
indrafting
newconstitutions
inS
outhA
fricaand
Eastern
Europe
givesreason
forhope
thatthe
combination
ofa
generalspecification
ofsuch
aright
with
atradition
ofjudicialinterpretation
will
yieldsom
ethingpracticable.
Itshould
benoticed
thatI
speakof
health,notjust
healthcare:
andhealth
itselfinteractsin
complex
ways
with
housing,w
itheducation, w
ithdignity.
Both
healthand
nutritionare
controversialasto
whether
therelevant
levelshould
bespecified
universally,or
relativelyto
thelocal com
munity
andits
traditions:for
example, is
lowheight
associatedw
ithnutritional
practicesto
be
thoughtof
as“stunting,”
oras
felicitousadaptation
tocircum
stancesof scarcity?
Foran
excellent summ
aryofthis
debate,seeS.R
.O
smani, ed.,N
utritionand
Poverty,W
IDE
Rseries
(Oxford:
Clarendon
Press,1990), especially
thefollow
ingpapers:
onthe
relativistside,T
.N
.Srinivasan,
“Undernutrition:C
oncepts, Measurem
ents,andPolicy
Implic
atio
ns,”
97
—120;
onthe
universalistside,C.G
opalan,”Undernutrition:M
easurement and
Imp
llcations,”
17—48; for
acom
pellingadjudication
of thedebate,com
ingout
onthe
546’G
LO
BA
LJU
ST
ICE
:S
EM
INA
LE
SSAY
SM
AR
TH
AC
. NU
SS
BA
UM
‘547
universalistside,
seeO
smani,
“On
Some
Controversies
inthe
Measurem
entof
Undernutrition,”
121—61.
51.There
isa
growing
literatureon
theim
portanceof
shelterfor
health:e.g.,that
theprovision
ofadequatehousing
isthe
singlelargest
determinant
ofhealth
statusfor
HIV
—infected
persons.Housing
rightsare
increasinglycom
ingto
beconstitutionalized,atleastin
anegative
form—
givingsquatters
groundsfor
appeal,for
example,against
alandlord
who
would
bulldozetheir
shanties.O
nthis
asa
constitutionalright,seeproposed
Articles
11,12,and17
oftheSouth
African
Constitution,
ina
draftput
forward
bythe
AN
Ccom
mittee,
adviserA
lbieSachs,w
herethis
isgiven
asan
example
ofajusticiable
housingright.
52.I
shallnot
elaboratehere
onw
hatI
thinkprom
otingthis
capabilityrequires,since
thereis
aW
IDE
Rprojectand
conferencedevoted
tothis
topic.53.
Agood
example
ofan
educationright
thatI
would
supportis
givenin
theA
NC
South
African
Constitution
draft,Article
11:“E
ducationshall
befree
andcom
pulsoryup
tothe
ageof
sixteen,andprovision
shallbe
made
forfacilitating
accessto
secondar
vocationaland
tertiaryeducation
onan
equalbasis
forall.E
ducationshallbe
directedtow
ardthe
development
ofthehum
anpersonality
anda
senseof personal
dignity,and
shallaim
atstren
gth
eningrespect
forhum
anrights
andfundam
entalfreedom
sand
promoting
understanding,toleranceand
friendshipam
ongstSouth
Africans
andbetw
eennations.”T
hepublic
(orotherw
iseneed-blind)
provisionof
highereducation
wil]
haveto
berelative
tolocalpossibilities,but
itisatleast
clearthat
theU
SAlags
farbehind
most
othercountries
ofcomparable
wealth
inthis
area.54.
On
theem
otionsas
basichum
ancapabilities,
see,in
additionto
my
“Em
otionsand
V/om
en’sC
apabilities,”in
iVom
en,C
ultureand
Developm
ent,pp.
360—95,
my
1993G
iffordL
ectures,U
pheavalsofT
hought:The
IntelligenceofE
motions
(Cam
bridge:C
ambridge
University
Press,2001),and
my
Hiding
fromH
umanity:D
isgust,Sham
e,andtheL
aw(P
rinceton:P
rincetonU
niversityP
ress,2004).My
omission
ofangerfrom
thislistofbasic
emotionalcapabilities
revealsan
ambivalence
aboutits
rolethat
Idiscuss
atlength,both
inG
iffordL
ectures3
and10, and
inThe
TherapyofD
esire:Theoryand
Practicein
Hellenistic
Ethics
(Princeton, N
J: Princeton
University
Press,1994),chs.7,11,and12.See
also“E
quityand
Mercy,”
Philosophyand
PublicA
ffairs(spring
1993).55.
Inm
y1993
Gifford
Lectures,
Ispell
outw
hatI
thinkthis
entailsw
here“the
family”
isconcerned.O
nthe
whole,I
amin
agreementw
ithSusan
0kmthat
some
formofintim
atefam
ilylove
isofcrucial
importance
inchild
development,but
thatthis
neednot
bethe
traditionalW
esternnuclear
family.
Ialsoagree
with
0kmthat
theim
portanteducationalrole
ofthefam
ilym
akesitall
them
orecrucial
thatthe
family
shouldbe
aninstitution
characterizedby
justice,as
well
aslove.
SeeO
kin,Justice,G
ender,and
theFam
ily.56.“A
ristotelianSocialD
emocracy”said
thatalistofsuch
libertiesneeded
tobe
addedto
theA
ristotelianschem
e,but
itdid
notinclude
themin
theaccount
ofcapabilitiesitself
These
issuesare
furtherdeveloped
ina
WID
ER
projectand
conferenceon
reproductiverights
andw
omen’s
capabilities.57.
Forreproductive
choiceas
anequality
issue,see
Sunstein’s“G
ender,C
aste, andLaw
’”in
Wim
en,C
ultureandD
evelopment,pp. 332—
59, andalso
his“G
ender, Reproduction, and
Law
”presentedat the
conferenceon
reproductiverights
andw
omen’s
capabilitiesat W
IDE
Rin
1993.58.
On
thissee
also“A
ristotelianSocial
Dem
ocracy.”59.W
ithSen, I
holdthat
thecapability
setshould
betreated
asan
inter
lockingw
hole: form
ycom
ments
onhis
arguments,see
“Nature, F
unction, andC
apability.”Tensions
will
frequentlyarise
among
mem
bersof
thelist,
andI
shallcom
ment
onsom
eof
thosebelow
.B
utit
shouldbe
clearby
nowthat
thearchitectonic
roleof
practicalreasoning
imposes
strictlim
itson
thesort
ofcurb
onpersonal
autonomy
thatw
illbe
toleratedfor
thesake
ofincreasednutritional w
ell-being, etc.60.
Chris
Bobonich
“InternalR
ealism, H
uman
Nature,
andD
istributivejustice:
AR
esponseto
IvlarthaN
ussbaum,”
Modern
Philology(l\’Iay
1993),supplem
ent,74—
92, worries
thatthis
will
impose
enormous
sacrifices.B
utI
thinkthat
thisis
becausehe
hasnot
imagined
thingsin
detail,nor
thoughtabout
my
claimthat
oncepeople
havew
hatthey
basicallyneed,
theycan
getallsorts
of othergood
thingsthrough
theirow
nefforts. IfI
haveenough
foodto
bew
ellnourished,
more
foodw
illjustrot
onthe
shelfor
make
me
fat.If
my
basichealth
needsare
met, itseem
sright
thatI
shouldnotbe
ableto
claimexpensive
unnecessaryluxuries
(say,cosm
eticsurgery)
atthe
publicexpense
solong
aseven
oneperson
inm
ycountry
isw
ithoutsupport
forbasic
needs.A
ndso
forth.O
nem
usttake
seriouslythe
Aristotelian
idea, which
isbasic
toboth
Sen’sand
my
programs, that
resourcesare
justtools
forhinctioning
andhave
alim
itgiven
byw
hatis
neededfor
that6anctioning.
Above
thatlim
it,they
arejust
aheap
ofsm
Wofno
valuein
themselves.
61.See
“Nature, F
unction,and
Capability,”
with
referenceto
Aristotle.
62.M
arx,E
conomic
andPhilosophical
!vlanuscriptsof
1844,discussed
in“N
ature, Function,
Capability”
and“A
ristotleon
Hum
anN
ature.”63.
Seeespecially
Sen’s“G
enderInequality
andT
heoriesofJustice,”
inIV
omen,
Culture
andD
evelopment,
pp.259—
73;also
“More
Than
100M
illionW
omen
Are
Missing,”N
ewY
orkR
eviewofB
ooks37
(1990):61—
66.64.
Iftekha.rH
ossein,“Povertyas
Capability
Failure,”P
h.D.
dissertationin
Econom
ics,H
elsinkiU
niversity,1990.
65.See
Allardt, “H
aving,L
oving,B
eing:A
nA
lternativeto
theSw
edishM
odelof
Welfare
Research,”
andE
rikson,“D
escriptionsof
Inequality:T
heSw
edishA
pproachto
Welfare
Research,”
inN
ussbaumand
Sen,The
Quality
ofLift,
pp.88—
94and
67—84.
66.See
Sen, “More
Than
100M
illionW
omen.”
67.Sec
alsoJon
Elster,
SourG
rapes(C
ambridge:
Cam
bridgeU
niversityPress, 1983);
Cass
R. S
unstein,”Preferences
andPolitics,”
Philosophyand
Public
Affairs
20(1991):
3—34.
54
UL
O8A
LJU
ST
ICE
:SE
MIN
AL
ESSAY
SM
AR
TH
AC
. NU
SSBA
UM
• 549
68.PãiviSetala,ProfessorofW
omen’s
Studiesatthe
University
ofHelsinki,
informs
me
thatrecent
studiesshow
thateven
inFinland,only
40percent
ofthe
housework
isdone
bym
ales.This,in
thesecond
nationin
thew
orld(after
New
Zealand,
in1906)
togive
females
thevote,
anation
ascom
mitted
tosex
equalityas
anyin
thew
orld.\1Ve
canassum
ethat
thesituation
iscausally
relatedto
male
preferences.69.
On
thedisparity
between
externallyobserved
healthstatus
andself-
reportsof
satisfactionabout
health,see
Sen,C
omm
oditiesand
Capabilities
(Am
sterdam:
North-H
olland,1985).
70.IvIartha
Chen,
AQ
uietR
evolution:W
omen
inT
ransitionin
Rural
Bangladesh
(Cam
bridge, MA
:S
chenkman,
1983).Idescribe
thisaccount
ofarural
wom
en’sliteracy
project,andits
large-scaleim
pacton
wom
en’squality
oflife,in
“Non-R
elativeV
irtues,””Aristotelian
SocialDem
ocracy,”and“H
uman
Functioning
andSocial Justice.”
71.T
hisis
acriticism
ofeconom
icutilitarianism
,not
ofsophisticated
philosophicalform
sof
utilitarianismthat
buildin
means
tofilter
orcorrect
preferences.Nonetheless,the
human-functioning
approachw
ouldstillobject
tothe
roleplayed
bythe
comm
ensurabilityofvalues
inutilitarianism
,and
tothe
relatedsuggestion
thatfor
anytw
odistinct
endsw
ecan,w
ithoutloss
ofw
hatis
relevantfor
choice,im
aginetrade-offs
inpurely
quantitativeterm
s.F
urthermore,m
ostforms
ofutilitarianismare
comm
ittedto
aggregatingu
tilities
acrosslives,and
thusto
neglectingseparateness,w
hichI
havedefended
asfundam
ental.Ihave
addressedsom
eofthese
questionselsew
here,forexam
ple,in
“The
Discernm
entof Perception”
inLove’s
Know
ledge,andin
“The
Literary
Imagination
inPublic
Life,”
New
Literary
History
(fall1993).
Sen’sw
orkhas
addressedthem
ingreater
detail.I
thereforeleave
themto
oneside
forthe
purposesofthe
presentinquiry.
72.Foradetailed
considerationofthese
approaches,see“A
ristotelianSocial
Dem
ocracy,”“H
uman
Functioning,”w
ithreferences
torelated
arguments
ofSen.“A
ristotelianSocial
Dem
ocracy”contains
adetailed
accountof
therela
tionshipbetw
eenR
awls’s
resourcismand
my
project,w
hichis
aparticularly
subtleone.
Raw
isis
willing
totake
astand
oncertain
items:T
husliberty
andthe
socialconditionsof self-respectfigure
onhis
listof”primary
goods,”asw
ellas
wealth
andincom
e.O
nthe
otherhand,
hehas
repeatedlydenied
thathis
indexofprim
arygoods
could,orshould,be
replacedby
anindex
offunctio
nings
asin
theH
uman
Develop
inentReport.
73.This
isthe
centralpoint
repeatedlym
adeby
Senagainst
Raw
ls;for
anoverview
,see
“Capability
andW
ell-Being”
inThe
Quality
ofLfri,
with
references.74.In
Raw
ls’sliberalism
theproblem
iseven
more
acute,sincethe
partiesw
hoare
eitherwell
ornotw
elloffare
“headsof households,t’
usuallytaken
tobe
male,w
hoare
allegedto
deliberateon
behalfoftheinterests
oftheirfam
ilym
embers.B
utwom
encannot
infactrely
onthe
altruismofm
alesto
guarantee
theireconom
icsecurity,
oreven
survival.In
additionto
Sen’sw
orkon
thisissue, see
SusanM
ollerO
kin,Justice,G
ender,and
theFam
ily.inm
yreview
of0km
,I
offerthis
asa
reasonfor
OW
nto
bem
orecritical
ofresource-based
liberalismthan
sheis.
75.M
arthaC
henand
herfellow
development
workers,
inthe
projectdescribed
mA
Quiet R
evolution,were
indebtedin
theirpractice
toPaolo
Freire’snotion
of “participatorydialogue.”
76.Sen
hasstressed
thisthroughout
hisw
ritingon
thetopic.
For
anoverview
,see“C
apabilityand
Well-B
eing.”77.T
hisis
thestrategy
usedby
Erikson’s
Swedish
team,
when
studyinginequalities
inpolitical participation:see
“Descriptions
of Inequality.”The
pointw
asw
ellm
adeby
Bernard
William
sin
hisresponse
toSen’s
Tanner
Lectures
[theone
deliveredM
ay22,
1979is
reprintedherein
61—81]:
seeW
illiams,
“The
Standard
of Living:
Interestsand
Capabilities,”
in0.
Haw
thorn,ed.,The
Standard
ofLiving
(Cam
bridge:C
ambridge
University
Press,1987).T
ogive
justone
example
of theissue,w
ew
illneed
toask
tow
hatextent
laws
regulat
ingabortion,
sodomy
laws,
theabsence
ofcivil
rightslaw
s,etc.,
restrictthe
capabilityfor
sexual expressionofw
omen
andhom
osexualsin
agiven
society.T
hegay
Am
ericanm
ilitaryofficer
who
choosescelibacy
forfear
of losinghis
jobhas
not,in
therelevant
sense,beengiven
acapability
of choosing.78.
Secalso
Sen,C
omm
oditiesand
Capabilities.
79.The
relevanttextual
referencesare
gatheredand
discussedin
“Aristo
telianSocial
Dem
ocracy.”80.T
herem
arkw
ascited
byR
ichardR
ortyin
“Feminist and
Pragm
atism,”
Michigan
Quarterly
Review
30(1989):
231;it
hassince
beenconfirm
edand
repeatedby
IvlacKinnon
herself.81.
Seen.37
aboveon
Raoul
Hilberg’s
account,in
TheD
estructionofthe
European
Jews, of the
Nazi
deviceof categorizingJew
sas
animals
orinanim
ateobjects,and
thevulnerability
ofthat
stratagemto
“breakthroughs,”in
which
them
echanisms
ofdenial
were
caughtoffguard.
82.T
hem
ostcom
prehensiveand
incisiveaccount
ofPlato’s
arguments
aboutw
omen
isnow
inS
tephenH
alliwell,
Plato: Republic,
Book
V(W
arminster:A
risand
Phillips,1992), Introduction
andcom
mentary
tothe
relevantpassages.
Seealso
0km
,W
omen
inW
esternPolitical Thought.
83. For Musonius’s
collectedw
orks,seethe
editionby
0.
Hense
(Leipzig:
Teubner
Library,
1905).O
therw
orksw
ithradical
conclusionsfor
wom
en’sissues
include“Should
Boys
andG
irlsH
avethe
Same
Education?”
(answering
yesto
thatquestion);
“ShouldO
neR
aiseA
llthe
Children
Who
Are
Born?”
(arguingagainst
infanticide,aparticular
threatto
female
offspring);“O
nthe
Goal
ofMarriage”
(arguingagainst the
sexual doublestandard
andin
favorof
equalsexual
fidelityfor
bothsexes;
arguingas
well
againstthe
comm
onview
thatfem
aleslaves
were
availablefor
sexualuse).
84.Stoicsare
ofcoursehighly
critical ofmuch
that passesforhigher
educa
‘UL
UH
AL
JUS
TIC
E:
SE
MIN
AL
ESSA
YS
MA
RT
HA
C. N
USSB
AU
M551
tion,holdingthat
thetraditional
“liberalstudies”
arenot
“liberal”in
theright
way, that
is,donot
truly“free”
them
indto
takecharge
of itsow
nreasoning.
SeeSeneca, ]lvloralE
pistle,p.
88.85.
SeeM
usonius,“O
nthe
Coal
ofIvlarriage.”
Similar
conceptionsare
defendedby
Senecaand
Plutarch.
On
thisshift
inthinking
abourthe
marital
relationship,seethe
usefuldiscussion
inFoucault,
J-IistoryofSexuality, vol.111,
trans.R.H
urley(N
ewY
ork:P
antheon,1985).
86.O
nthe
way
inw
hichC
hristianitydisrupted
theem
ergingfem
inistconsensus,
seeC
.E
. lvi.de
Ste.C
roix,The
Class
Strugglein
theA
ncientG
reekW
orld(L
ondon:D
uckworth,
1987).87.See
thelastsection
of “ThatW
omen
Too,”w
herehe
answers
them
aleinterlocutor’s
imaginary
objectionrhat
educatedw
omen
will
spendtoo
much
time
sittingaround
andtalking,
andneglect
theirpractical
duties,by
tellinghim
thatthe
verysam
eissue
arisesfor
him:
He
toohas
practicalduties
thatm
ayseem
lessinteresting
thantalking
aboutideas,
andhe
tooshould
make
surethat
hedoesn’tneglect
them.It
is,Ithink,because
IVlusonius
hasa
prettylow
viewof
thew
orth0f
male
publiclife
thathe
caneasily
viewthat
sphereas
equivalentand
equalto
thefem
alesphere.
88.See
Anne
Fausto-S
terling,Myths
of Gender.
89.For
theevidence,
seeM
alcolmSchofield,
TheStoic
Ideaofthe
City
(Cam
bridge:C
ambridge
University
Press,1992).
90.Is
theN
igeriansiW
ationdepicted
inN
zegwu’s
paperan
exception?W
ecan
agreew
ithher
thatthe
traditionalsystem
inw
hichw
omen
con
trolledcertain
vitalagricultural
functions,and
men
others,w
assom
ewhat
better,in
capabilityterm
s,than
thesystem
ofconfinem
entto
thedom
esticsphere
imposed
byB
ritishcolonialism
,w
ithoutbeing
altogethersure
thatthe
traditionalsystem
was
morally
acceptable.This
would
dependon
acloser
scrutinyof
thew
holesystem
offlinctionings
andcapabilities,
asaffected
bygender
divisions.Iam
noexpert
inIbo
culture,clearly;butthe
traditionalIbo
families
depictedin
Chinua
Achebe’s
novels,forexam
ple,donot
seemto
me
tom
anifestfullgender
equalityin
capab
ilit3c
Okonkw
o(in
ThingsF
allApart)
candecide
tobeat
hisw
ife;she
cannotchoose
tobeat
himin
return,oreven
tostop
him,
inall
butthe
most
egregiousof
cases.O
konkwo
canchoose
totake
anotherw
ife;no
wife
ofhiscan
chooseanother
hushand.The
reasonw
hyO
konkwo
keepsw
ishingthat
Ezinm
ahad
beena
boyrather
thana
girlis
thathe
perceivesthat,being
agirl,she
isdebarred
fromm
anyfunctions
forw
hichshe
seems
well
suited.H
isfear
ofbeing
seenas
a“w
oman”
is,by
contrast,a
fearof capability
failure.91.O
nR
ousseau,see0km
,W
omen,and
JaneR
olandIviartin,R
eclaiming
aC
onversation(N
ewH
aven:Yale
University
Press,1985).On
some
relatedcontem
poraryargum
ents,forexam
plethose
of Allan
Bloom
,seeO
kin,Justke,ch.1.
92.On
allthis,see
Fausto-S
terling.93.
Here
Iam
inagreem
entw
iththe
generalline
ofargum
entin
0km,
Wom
en,and
Martin,
Reclaim
ing,and
with
therelated
arguments
inN
ancy
Chodorow
’sThe
Rep
roductionofiviothering, w
hichI
discussin
my
otherchapter
[“Em
otionsand
vvomen’s
Capabilities,”
in14’o,nen,
Culture
andD
evelopnent,
pp. 360—95].
94.I
amgrateful
toall
them
embers
ofour
meeting
forvaluable
com
ments,
andespecially
toA
martya
Senfor
valuablediscussions
andto
David
Crocker,Jonathan
Clover, C
assS
unstein, andSusan
Wolffor
helpful written
comm
ents. Iam
alsograteful
toC
hrisB
obonich, David
Estlund,
andH
enryR
ichardsonfor
comm
entson
relatedearlier
work.