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Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region

Chris Wilson

Land Management and Conflict Minimisation Sub-Project 1.1

The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat LMCM project is supported by AusAID and UNDP


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2 Land and Conflict in the Pacific Region

Disclaimer

This paper was commissioned as an independent consultancy report by the Pacific Islands

Forum Secretariat. The views and opinions presented in this report are those of the

author(s). The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat bears no responsibility for the accuracy

of the facts represented in this report.


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Preface

The Land Management and Conflict Minimisation Project (LMCM) is an initiative of the

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) that was endorsed by the Forum RegionalSecurity Committee and the Forum Officials Committee in 2006. The project focuses on

the interlinkages between land management and conflict minimisation, and approaches

land issues in the Pacific from a holistic point of view, combining both economic

development and conflict prevention perspectives. The recognition of the centrality of

customary land tenure in the lives of the people of the Pacific is the key underlying

principle upon which the LMCM project is founded.

The first phase of the LMCM project has comprised a review of national, regional and

international literature. This review has resulted in ten sub-project reports. In 2008, these

reports were drawn together into a synthesis report Improving Accessto Customary Land

and MaintainingSocial Harmony in the Pacific, including 12 Guiding Principles and a

suggested Implementation Framework to provide guidance to Pacific Islands Forum

countries in land management whilst ensuring the minimising of land-related conflict.

The 2008 Pacific Islands Forum Annual Leaders meeting endorsed the importance of

addressing these issues, and endorsed the Principles and Framework where appropriate.

Whilst stressing the fact that land management is a national issue, Leaders instructed the

Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat to

develop a regional initiative under the Pacific Plan to support members to progress land

management and conflict minimisation efforts.


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Summary Terms of Reference of Sub Project 1.1: Review of

Conflict in the Pacific and the Role of Land in Conflict and

Conflict Escalation

Objective of the consultancy

To undertake a detailed desk review and analysis on recent conflicts in the Pacific and the

role of land in the conflicts and conflict escalation including lessons learned.

Specific tasks

The consultant is expected to critically review published and unpublished literature from

the Pacific and other regions on recent conflicts in the Pacific and the role of land in the

conflicts. The review will include but not be limited to the following topics:

the role of land in recent conflict and conflict escalation;

the role of the different stakeholders, including the State, in contributing to

conflict and conflict escalation;

economic, social, environmental and political costs of land related conflict and

unresolved conflict (local and national); and

lessons learned on the role of land in recent conflict and conflict escalation.


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Contents

E X E C U T I V E SU M M A R Y .............................................................................................. 7

1. CR ISIS IN T H E PA CI FI C 19872007...................................................................... 9

1.1 Secessionist insurgency, ethno-political violence and coups ....................................... 9

1.2 The social, economic and political costs..................................................................... 10

2. I N T R O D U C T I O N ....................................................................................................... 12

2.1 Land and conflict: the theoretical literature ................................................................ 13

2.2 Land and land issues in the Pacific ............................................................................. 14

3. CASE STUDI ES: LAND I N CONFL I CT A ND CONF L I C T ESCA LA T I ON ..... 18

3.1 Bougainville ................................................................................................................ 19

3.2 Solomon Islands .......................................................................................................... 23

3.3 Fiji ........................................................................................................................... 28

4. LESSONS LE ARNED AND REC OM MEND ATI ONS .......................................... 35

1. Conflict between landowners and Government and companies ................................... 36

2. Compensation for the alienation and use of land .......................................................... 37

3. Intra-generational and inter-generational conflict over land ........................................ 38

4. Land and employment................................................................................................... 40

5. Environmental degradation ........................................................................................... 41


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Executive Summary

In the past two decades, the South Pacific has experienced increasing political instability,

inter-communal violence and armed intervention. The democratic will of people

has been overturned three times since 1987, most recently in December 2006. Unrest in

-most region of Bougainville stemmed from grievances

linked to exploitation of a large copper mine, including perception of inadequate benefits

and compensation to local communities. Protest attacks on the mine by local activists

resulted in brutal retaliation by the PNG security forces, and from 1988 to 1998 a small

guerrilla organisation waged secessionist war against the Papua New Guinean security

forces. From 1998 until 2003, the Solomon Islands capital Honiara and the island of

Guadalcanal were periodically paralysed by violence between indigenous Guadalcanalese

and migrants from the nearby island of Malaita. This inter-ethnic conflict was in large

part the result of differences over land ownership between the two groups, grievances

which were exacerbated by political intervention, ultimately leading to a spiral of attacks

and counter attacks.

These conflicts have exerted substantial social, economic and political costs on the states

and communities involved. Several thousand civilians and security personnel have died,

and tens of thousands have been displaced. Violence and instability has deterred tourism

and foreign investment and caused already fragile economies to contract. Each crisis

damages the State and increases the

potential for subsequent instability.

The turmoil in various locations across the Pacific has been caused by a range of

intersecting and mutually reinforcing political, social and economic issues and disputes.

This report attempts to demonstrate how land-related issues have interacted with the

surrounding context to cause rising tension and violence. Particular focus is placed on

three cases:

In Bougainville, discontent over inadequate compensation, environmental

degradation, and a loss of land and way of life emerged following large-scale


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resource extraction and compounded grievances from years of marginalisation of

the Bougainville people.

In Solomon Islands, tensions over the loss of customary land to migration and

resource projects were exacerbated by political competition.

In Fiji, tensions over the use of customary land were exploited in the context of

political coups, and a civilian-led putsch, from 1987 to 2006.

This study reveals a number of lessons for stakeholders in the region regarding the main

causes of land-related conflict. reluctance to recognise the

permanent alienation of customary land; a perceived lack of adequate compensation paid

to landowners; a lack of jobs for traditional owners in resource projects on leased or sold

customary land; disputes between landowners over the distribution of revenue gained

from land; disputes between different generations of owners over the transfer of land; the

emergence of much greater environmental degradation than was formerly suggested; a

lack of information and decision-making power on the part of owners regarding the

management of their land; and the political exploitation of land-related grievances. Future

land-related conflict can potentially be avoided by means such as providing for a more

timely Government response to rising tension, and an institutional environment that

reduces the scope for disputes, as well as an early warning system for early intervention

to prevent disputes escalating into conflicts; appropriate mediation and resolutionmechanisms at different levels to prevent large-scale conflicts re-emerging; developing

more appropriate systems of compensation and leasing; and better informing people of

their land rights.


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1. Crisis in the Pacific 1987 2007

1.1 Secessionist insurgency, ethno-political violence and coups

The following discussion focuses on three conflicts which have most greatly affected the

Pacific region and which best demonstrate the role of land in conflict Bougainville,

Solomon Islands and Fiji.

In May 1987, Fi j i image was damaged when Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni

Rabuka led military personnel in a coup against the popularly elected Government

of Prime Minister Dr Timoci Bavadra. Subsequent opposition to the coup led to Rabuka

staging a second coup to end any further political accommodation. The installedGovernment passed a new constitution into law in 1990, based on a foundation of

positive discrimination towards the indigenous Fijian community.

In late 1988, a dispute in the Papua New Guinean region of Bougainville between the

operators of the Panguna copper and gold mine, Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), and

local landowners, led to attacks on mine staff and property. Following brutal reprisals by

the Papua New Guinean security forces, the dispute escalated into a regional ethno-

political and secessionist conflict. Several years of guerrilla-style insurgency followedbefore the Tarawa cease fire agreement in April 1998.

In July 1998, seemingly ethnically motivated attacks began on the island of Guadalcanal

in Solomon Islands. Militant Guadalcanalese, calling themselves the Guadalcanal

Revolutionary Army (GRA) and later the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) attacked

Malaitans living and working on the island. The militia drove Malaitan communities off

the Guadalcanal Plains. The capital, Honiara, fell into a form of siege situation. In June

1999, the Government was forced to declare a state of emergency on Guadalcanal. Inearly 2000, Malaitans in Honiara formed the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), which began

attacking non-Malaitans in and around Honiara. On 5 June 2000, members of the MEF

s prime minister.


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In October 2000, members of the MEF and IFM signed the Townsville Peace Agreement

armed regional assistance mission (RAMSI) into the country.

In Fi j i, on 19 May 2000, armed civilians stormed the Fiji parliament and the democratic

will of the Fijian people was once more overturned. The group, led by George Speight,

held the Mahendra Chaudhry-led Government hostage for 56 days. Following the putsch,

thugs looted shops, attacked Indian places of worship and drove Indo-Fijians from their

homes in some areas. Following the resignation of the president, the Fiji military first

negotiated the release of the hostages, then forcibly quashed the rebel group. The ousted

Government was not reinstated and a new Government under Laisenia Qarase was

installed. In November, a mutiny within the military by soldiers seeking to install a more

ethno-nationalist Government, and involving some members of the Speight coup, was

suppressed after a bloody gun battle in the army barracks.

1.2 The social, economic and political costs

These conflicts have damaged the social fabric of each country. The long process of

nation-building has been set back as inter-communal distrust and tension have

undermined feelings of national unity. Each has left a legacy of political instability, as

of that year. As small economies, the Pacific Island Countries are also particularly

vulnerable to serious economic impact from such crises. Each affected country has lost

revenue from international investment and tourism and large proportions of domestic

budgets have gone towards combating rebellion and policing inter-communal warfare.

This series of crises in the Pacific has changed the international image of the region from

one of tourist idyll to one of instability and military intervention. Each crisis has had an

impact on the surrounding region and has in some cases played a role in causinginstability in neighbouring countries.

By 1996, the violence in Bougainville had claimed the lives of around 500 members of

the Papua New Guinea security forces, possibly 1,000 guerrillas and perhaps several


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thousand Bougainvillean civilians. The crisis had displaced approximately 60,000 people

from their homes and brought the economic life of Bougainville to a halt. Between 8,000

and 10,000 jobs were lost in the mining sector and a similar number in the cocoa and

copra sectors (See Regan 2000 for an overview of the costs of the conflict). Papua New

Guinea also lost substantial revenue with the cessation of mining. The violence led to

infrastructure.

The violence on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands has had a severe human cost for the

island nation. By May 2000, approximately 55 people had died. The fighting brought

reports of serious human rights abuses including rape. Attacks and intimidation forced

approximately 20,000 to flee the island as internally displaced people and caused

numerous others to leave their homes and move elsewhere in Guadalcanal. Women in

particular faced health risks as many were forced to deliver babies in camps, removed

from adequate health care. The conflict exacerbated an already difficult economic climate

in Solomon Islands. When Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd closed in mid 1999 because

of the violence in Guadalcanal, 1,800 people lost their jobs. A further 2,200 became

unemployed when Gold Ridge Mining Ltd and Solomon Taiyo Ltd closed in mid 2000

(Dinnen 2002:292). .

The series of coups in Fi j i has damaged the Fiji economy, deterred foreign investment,

undermined the tourism industry and caused the exodus of numerous skilled workers. In

and 1.7% respectively (ADB 2007). The departure of tens of thousands of Indo- and

indigenous Fijians over the past two decades, taking with them business and other talents,

has also damaged the economic life of the nation. The decline in tourism, the largest

effect on other industries. The

garment industry has been gravely damaged both by declining tourism and the departure

of Indo-Fijian workers over the past two decades. Since the 2006 coup, Fiji potentially

faces the damaging loss of international aid, including the subsidisation of the national

sugar industry by the European Union.


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2. Introduction

This report is a desk review of literature on recent conflicts in the Pacific region and an

attempt to draw out the role of land in these conflicts. It is intended as a precursor study

for subsequent sub- Land Management

and Conflict Minimisation Project, which will provide a greater depth of analysis and

will present new information based upon fieldwork and primary sources. This report is

intended as an overview for key stakeholders in the Pacific Island nations on the role of

land in regional conflicts.

The report focuses on three cases that have had the most impact on the region and which

best demonstrate the role of land in conflict in the Pacific: Bougainville, Solomon Islands

and Fiji. These case studies will highlight how land-related issues have contributed to

conflict in the context of resource extraction, migration and national politics. In the

sing the use of force in the resolution of

social, political or economic disputes.

It is clear that all of the conflicts discussed in this report, as is the case with conflict

elsewhere in the Asia Pacific region and globally, have involved a range of mutually

reinforcing social, political and economic factors. Without denying the importance of

other factors, this report attempts to demonstrate how land issues have interacted with

other social, political and economic contexts to cause conflict in the South Pacific and

may continue to do so in the future.

The report will begin with a brief discussion of the theoretical literature on the

connections between land and conflict. The next section will discuss some of the land-

related issues that form the background to conflict in the Pacific, including customary

tenure and land shortages. The report will then introduce three case studies those of

Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Fiji which demonstrate how these issues have led to

conflict in the context of resource extraction, migration and national politics. The final

section considers lessons learned.


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2.1 Land and conflict: the theoretical literature

Observers have long recognised that land and resources are often at the heart of

international and intra-State conflicts. Seemingly intractable violence in Israel and the

Palestinian Territories and in Ethiopia and Eritrea stemmed from disputed territory. Land

and resources have also featured prominently in internal conflicts in Southeast Asia. For

example, a conflict in the Indonesian province of North Maluku, during which several

thousand people died, began with a dispute over a small tract of rural land.1

Most detailed studies of these and other conflicts involving land suggest that they are

caused by the interaction of emotional ties towards territory and competition for the

economic benefit derived from it. Other theorists assert that a key to understanding the

incidence of internal conflict is ascertaining how relevant stakeholders view territory.2

For ethnic groups, territory is central to their identity, a major element of both their past

and future as a distinct group.3 Loss of control over a long-held tract of territory can

economic well-

Because of this highly emotive connection to land, conflict may sometimes erupt

regardless of the quality or economic viability of the land in question.

Studies suggest

resource extraction and civil war. Some conclude that the presence of mines, oil fields,

logging operations and other lucrative resource projects provide the necessary funding for

rebellion, as well as the motivation to begin conflict so as to undertake looting and other

exploitation of the resource part of an argument now commonly known as the Greed

thesis.4 Other commentators suggest that conflict often occurs in the context of natural

resource exploitation because of the environmental degradation, land expropriation,

migration and unequal job allocation invariably associated with it.5 The economic

conflict linked to natural resources is almost always intertwined with other political and

competition

between stakeholders over natural resources occurs most frequently in situations of

scarcity, uneven allocation of resources, and a lack of governmental transparency.6 The


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potential for conflict is high when resource exploitation is carried out in areas where local

communities have strong local identities and have faced a history of political and

economic marginalisation by the State.7 Susan Olzak asserts that when migration or

other factors bring ethnic groups into closer proximity in an environment of declining

resources, all interaction and disagreements between such groups are increasingly viewed

in terms of ethnic difference and competition for resources becomes more volatile.8

Conflict over natural resources is invariably caused by a combination of grievances,

strong attachment to territory and a quest for greater economic and political benefit by

certain stakeholders. The exploitation of natural resources by major corporations, and the

environmental degradation and inequality that sometimes accompanies it, produces real

grievances among local populations. Yet these grievances also often disguise, or are used

by, more personal economic and political interests. As will be seen, many of the concepts

discussed above provide insights into conflict in the Pacific.

2.2 Land and land issues in the Pacific

and its primary means to a secure future. Indeed, land is often seen as the basis of claims

to citizenship.9 Ownership of land is what gives people a voice in local and national

as the place where parents

and ancestors are buried. As discussed in the previous section, such ties form a strong

emotional bond between people and their land.

In this widely quoted statement from 1974, three Bougainvillean students expressed their

close connection with the land:

our life. Land is our physical life food and sustenance. Land is our

social life: it is marriage; it is status; it is security; it is politics; in fact, it is our

only world. When you take away our land, you cut away the very heart of our

existence. We have little or no experience of social survival detached from the

land. For us to be completely landless is a nightmare which no dollar in the pocket

or dollar in the bank will allay; we are a threatened people.


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Given the great emotional and economic importance afforded to land by many

communities in the Pacific, perhaps it is not surprising that a number of land-related

issues have caused tension between various stakeholders. These have included disputes

over compensation for alienation of customary land, compensation for leasing of

customary land and perceptions of land ownership. Other tensions are those between

owners, between different generations of owners, and those caused by opposing systems

of descent. In addition, land shortages and a lack of high-quality land have caused

competition between communities.

Customary tenu re: Some of the most contentious and complicated land-related disputes

in the region have arisen over the question of customary title. The vast majority of land in

the Pacific is held under group ownership or customary tenure. Customary tenure has the

economic security. Customary ownership provides a social safety net for owners because

they know they hav

10

Compensation for alienation of land: Tension has arisen at various times and locations

across the Pacific around the question of customary ownership, particularly in the context

of large-scale migration and resource extraction. The connection felt by Pacific Islanders

with their territory, and the central role this territory plays in their conception of who they

are, means that many never fully accept the permanent alienation of traditional land.11

This understanding of ownership has led traditional landowners to seek further

compensation from, or the return of land by, Government departments, mining

companies, agricultural plantations, tourist resorts and migrants. Demands for

compensation or land return have been made even when previous land sales have been

carried out through formal legal and customary channels and procedures. For example, in

Fiji, traditional owners have disputed, and in some cases reclaimed, tourist sites including

the Turtle Island Resort and Nadi Airport. Likewise in the Papua New Guinean province

of West New Britain, customary owners have demanded compensation for the oil palm

plantations established by the Government on their traditional land.12 As will be seen

later in this report, the violence in Guadalcanal in Solomon Islands stemmed in part from


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the people of Guadalcanal not recognising the permanent alienation of their land.13 Even

when paid to local communities, compensation payments hold the risk of causing conflict

as non-recipients dispute the claim of recipients.14

Compensation for leasing of customary land : Tension has also arisen in the context of

the leasing of customary land. Landowners in Papua New Guinea have initiated

compensation disputes with mining companies after signing leases when they have come

to believe they were deprived of information at the time of signing the contract. 15 In

particular, disputes have arisen when landowners feel they had inadequate information

regarding the size or quality of the mineral deposit, the expected prices to be obtained for

the minerals and the environmental damage associated with the mining. The most

prominent claims for further compensation in Papua New Guinea include the Panguna

mine in Bougainville (discussed in greater detail below), the Ok Tedi mine and disruption

to the Mt Kare gold mine in 19911992.16 Frequent claims for further compensation have

in turn created a situation of insecurity for mining companies sometimes leading to only

short-term investment and a lack of capital injected into bridges, waste disposal and other

infrastructure.17 This in turn undoubtedly creates the conditions for further conflict.

Diverging perceptions of land ownership: Different understandings of the nature of

land ownership on the part of customary owners on one hand and the State and

multinational corporations on the other have also caused tension, sometimes years after

the sale or lease of land. Local communities often think differently from State authorities

about who has rights to the resources found within their land. Many do not comprehend

or agree with State declarations that mineral ore mined from within their land is State

property and will be extracted for the benefit of the nation as a whole.18 The lack of State

services has also exacerbated perceptions that landowners are not receiving adequate

compensation.

Intra-generational conflict over land: Disputes have also arisen over decision making

with regard to land and the distribution of the economic benefits from its commercial use.

Landowning communities in the Pacific involve various competing sub-groups and

hierarchies.19 Many land disputes in the Pacific arise from intra-clan disagreement over


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the use and exploitation of land and the distribution of associated economic benefits.20

This factionalism within groups has led to conflict as companies, governments and

migrants have reached agreements over the use of land with one section of the

community, only to face opposition from another at a later date. In addition, some

individuals invariably are, or perceive themselves to be, excluded from decision-making

power. Many owners do not have complete trust in the trustees of their land nor in the

land management system which oversees the use of their land.21

Intergenerational tension and different systems of descent: In some parts of the

Pacific, tension has risen over time as new generations of traditional owners have come

to believe that, while the previous generation derived some profit from signing away the

rights to their traditional land, they themselves have not been adequately compensated.

Often, such grievances are not directed at the older members of the kin group who sold

the land rights, but at the migrants or companies using the land. Younger generations of

landowners have asserted that their parents were ill-informed about the true value of their

land when they sold it to resource companies and have demanded greater compensation.22

In West New Britain Province, for example, younger generations of traditional

landowners have recently reclaimed land sold to migrants by the previous generation.23

Differences in systems of descent within and between Pacific nations have also

contributed to tensions. In some cases, different systems exist in neighbouring districts,

with one society based on patrilineal and the other on matrilineal descent. Sale or lease of

land to migrants or companies by male members of a kin group in a matrilineal society

has led to later generations questioning the legitimacy of the transaction.

Land shortages and quality: Growing population density and associated land shortages

as well as a lack of land of suitable quality for agriculture have further exacerbated

tension over land ownership. In the post-World War II era, rising populations have led to

increasing land shortages in many areas of the Pacific. In some areas, such as Solomon

Islands, population growth has led to a decrease in the size of agricultural plots and, as a

consequence, cultivation cycles have become much shorter. This in turn has led to

smaller crop yields and a much greater value placed on land as well as increased

reluctance to allow land to be used for public or other projects.24


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Many Pacific Island states face a shortage of quality agricultural land. For example, only

16% of Fiji is considered to be arable land.25 In certain areas of the Pacific, such as Papua

New Guinea, high rates of migration by communities from areas of poor land quality into

areas of arable land have caused tension between migrant and local communities.26

Koczberski and Curry illustrate how rapid population growth in West New Britain

Province of Papua New Guinea has created tension. Large-scale in-migration, in part by

workers seeking employment in the palm oil industry, has led to competition for jobs and

land. Rising tension has resulted in calls by locals for all migrants to be returned to their

home areas and in some cases violent attacks have taken place between locals and

migrants.

3. Case Studies: Land in conflict and conflict escalation

-felt connections to the land has interacted with the

particular post-colonial trajectory of many Pacific Island states to fuel tensions. As seen

in the previous section, disagreements over land ownership have emerged over the rights

to resources and heightened competition for arable land. When migration has been

accompanied by rising crime and competition for employment, such grievances can

quickly escalate into antagonism directed at a particular group, and then to violence. As is

also the case in many places around the world, local politicians in the Pacific have

frequently exploited tensions over land for their own political gain.27

In short, conflict in the Pacific has been a complex phenomenon. In some cases land has

been the primary source of tension between different stakeholders, in others land issues

have been utilised by individuals and groups for their own ends. The following section

provides case studies of three of the major conflicts in the region in recent decades. The

discussion draws out the role of various stakeholders to each conflict, including local

communities, landowners, militant groups, migrant communities, provincial and national

governments, security forces, and national and international corporations.


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3.1 Bougainville

-most province, comprising two islands

closer to the Solomon Islands capital Honiara than to Port Moresby. Bougainville is

28

Separatist violence began in the region in 1988 against a background of large-scale

mining. A large copper deposit was identified in the Panguna area of Bougainville in

1961 and mining began under Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) in 1972. Secessionist

sentiment, based on the distinctiveness of Bougainvillean identity and years of political

and economic marginalisation, had been expressed in Bougainville long before the

Panguna mine became a central grievance. However, the mine introduced a range of

issues, many associated with land, that exacerbated this sentiment. The Bougainville case

carries a number of lessons for stakeholders involved in the extraction of resources in the

Pacific region.

The mine had a major ecological and social impact on Bougainville. The mine and

associated roads and dumps stretched across 13,047 hectares of Bougainville, about 1.5%

of the total region.29 Many local landowners opposed the establishment of the mine but

operations began nonetheless.30 Some villagers living in the immediate mining zone were

200 households

were relocated. Although they were provided with new housing, the relocated families

were disturbed by the lights and constant noise associated with the 24-hour operation of

the mine.31 In addition, this new housing deteriorated over time, and little assistance with

maintenance was provided to the community.

BCL also paid compensation to local landowners for land used by the mine.32 However,

at least half of those who did receive compensation only received one-off payments and

many payments were small, particularly for those who had not lived immediately

adjacent to the mine site.33 While landowners were also paid a small amount

(approximately 0.2% in total) of the revenue generated by the mine, most came to see this

as inadequate. Later generations of landowners became aggrieved that they had received

little or no compensation while they suffered the same losses as the older generation. 34


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Many one-off payments had long been spent and the housing and infrastructure provided

for relocation had deteriorated. This growing grievance within the subsequent generation

of landowners was an important proximate cause of the secessionist violence in the late

1980s.35

In addition, the revenue sharing agreements established by the Australian Government (as

the administrator of Papua New Guinea) made no arrangement for payment to

Bougainville as a producing region. Profits from the mine went almost exclusively to the

Papua New Guinea Government in Port Moresby and BCL itself. In establishing this

system of revenue allocation, the national Government was attempting to distribute the

profits of the mine as widely as possible and ensure equitable funding for all provinces.

However, following years of previous marginalisation of Bougainville, this system

angered many in the immediate region of the mine. In 1974 the independent Papua New

Guinean Government agreed to pay Bougainville a share of revenue from the mine. But

most of this 5.63% share was allocated to the provincial Government, with only a small

proportion reaching landowners. This agreement did little to allay local grievances in the

long term.36 Bougainvi

common identity with the Papua New Guinea nation.37 Many landowners further refused

to accept that they did not have ownership over copper deposits in their land and opposed

its wholesale extraction, which they felt would leave nothing for later generations.38

At the time when many landowners leased their land to BCL they appear to have believed

that, at the end of the mining period, they would once again be able to use it. However,

over time it became clear that their land was being rendered unusable by dramatic

environmental degradation. A perception developed among many in the area that even

land somewhat removed from the mine had suffered a decline in productivity due to the

chemicals used in the mining operation.39 Tailings from the mine also altered the flow of

the Jaba River, causing flooding and a decline in fish stocks,40 and waste from the mine

caused fish and shellfish to die in coastal areas near the outflow. Loss of land and

environmental destruction became increasingly salient issues as the mine site, waste

dumps and other associated infrastructure expanded.41


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The mine and associated economic activity attracted large numbers of migrants from

other parts of Papua New Guinea into Bougainville. The employment opportunities in the

region unsurprisingly attracted large numbers of workers who exercised their right to

settle and work anywhere in the country. Some Bougainvilleans claimed that BCL

discriminated against them and gave the majority of jobs to non-Bougainvilleans.42

When migrant workers settled near the mine they were often joined by family and kin

members.43 Many also came to work in the cocoa plantations owned by Bougainvilleans.

Migrants came to dominate the informal sector in the area and many also established

gardens on customary land. Local Bougainvilleans also appear to have seen many

migrants as the source of rising crime in the area. Further, when a migrant contested and

won a seat in the provincial election, many Bougainvilleans began to perceive migrants

as assuming dominance in the region. Many began to fear that dominance by migrants

would eventually lead to the permanent alienation of Bougainvillean customary land.44

The mine, along with increased private ownership of land, also undermined

strongly egalitarian and functioned

through a system of reciprocal gift-giving and equality.45 Increasing inequality associated

with profits from and jobs at the mine disrupted this harmony. While many of those who

opposed the mine hoped for a greater share of mining revenue for Bougainville, some in

the secessionist struggle were not fighting for economic profit but for a return to an

egalitarian society based on subsistence agriculture and free from the social disruption

associated with the mine.46

As a means of articulating these grievances, landowners from the mining area formed the

Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) in 1979. Members established roadblocks

compensation agreement, but this largely benefited the members of the PLA instead of

society more broadly.47 In August 1987 a new landowners organisation was formed, the

New Panguna Landowners Association (New PLA). The founding members of this

organisation represented a younger generation of landowners who no longer had faith in

the ability of the older generation to obtain adequate redress for the social and

environmental impact of the mine and the seeming monopolisation of compensation


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money by the members of the PLA.48 The New PLA included several men, such as

Francis Ona, who had worked at the mine. BCL refused to recognise or negotiate with the

New PLA and maintained its connections with the older generation of landowners.49

In 1988, the New PLA demanded that BCL improve environmental protection and health

care for local communities and carry out a new land survey. Not long after, the group also

demanded that BCL pay it 50% of all profits from the mine, along with K10 billion in

compensation for environmental damage.50 A consultancy report commissioned by the

company concluded that the mine could not be held responsible for the loss of fish stocks

or declining agricultural productivity. In response, the New PLA carried out attacks

against the mine and succeeded in cutting off its power source. Reprisals against local

communities by the Papua New Guinea police only served to unify a greater proportion

of the Bougainville population behind the New PLA.

Throughout 1989 the New PLA, now renamed the Bougainville Revolutionary Army

(BRA), fought a guerrilla campaign against Papua New Guinean security forces. While

the national Government attempted a negotiated ceasefire, the brutality of the Papua New

Guinean forces in Bougainville made these attempts irrelevant on the ground and the

conflict escalated.51 Increasing insecurity also forced BCL to halt operations at the mine

and the Papua New Guinea security forces withdrew from Bougainville in March 1990.

The BRA established the Bougainville Interim Government, but factionalism within

Bougainvillean society led to internal fighting and the eventual return of Papua New

Guinean security forces.

By 1996, the violence in Bougainville had claimed the lives of around 500 members of

the Papua New Guinea security forces, possibly 1,000 guerrillas and perhaps several

thousand Bougainvillean civilians. The Bougainvillean population faced devastating

trauma and destruction. The crisis displaced approximately 60,000 people from their

homes and the local health and education sectors collapsed as the Government cut the

region off from national services. The conflict brought the economic life of the region to

a halt, in particular from the loss of revenue associated with the cessation of mining. In

addition, Anthony Regan estimates that between 8,000 and 10,000 jobs were lost in the


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mining sector and a similar number from agriculture. The violence led to the destruction

economic cost to the Papua New Guinea State was also severe: it has been estimated that

the closure of the mine cost the country A$1,000 per minute. The conflict caused a steep

decline in exports of copra and other commodities and in foreign investment in other

development projects.

The Bougainville insurgency stemmed from a range of mutually reinforcing political and

economic grievances and interests, and identity factors.52 The prospect of greater revenue

clearly motivated some leaders and participants in the insurgency. Yet the conflict did not

stem from purely economic motives, as would be suggested by some of the theoretical

concepts discussed earlier in the report. In seeking the closure of the mine, many

Bougainvilleans were not seeking economic benefit. A number of land-related issues

caused grievances in the communities directly affected by the mine, including

environmental degradation and inadequate compensation for the loss of land and the

resources contained within. Grievances over the wealth extracted from local land, and a

number of issues associated with mine operations, such as migration into the area and

inequality in job allocation, exacerbated Bougainvill-standing sense of political

and economic marginalisation by the Papua New Guinea State.53 The national

Government and security forces, in seeking to prevent the cessation of production at the

mine, escalated the crisis through the excessive and indiscriminate use of force, which

widened support for the landowners among Bougainvillean society and eventually

threatened the State

3.2 Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands archipelago stretches across 1,400 km of the Southwest Pacific and

is home to more than 80 languages. A range of factors caused rising tension andinstability in Solomon Islands in the late 1990s, including economic decline and political

corruption. The following section will examine how questions of the ownership and use


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of land, brought to the fore in particular by long-term, large-scale migration, played a role

in the violence beginning in 1998.

Since the 1940s, Guadalcanal has been the destination for substantial numbers of

migrants from elsewhere in Solomon Islands. Most visibly, the new capital Honiara

became dominated by non-Guadalcanalese.54 When the capital was established on

Guadalcanal following World War II, many people from all over Solomon Islands were

drawn to the city in search of employment. A nu

established on the outskirts of the city. Migrants also settled in rural Guadalcanal,

attracted by employment opportunities in palm oil estates, rice projects, logging

operations and coconut plantations. The Gold Ridge mine located east of Honiara has

also attracted migrants since it opened in 1997.55

Many of these migrants came from the island of Malaita where a relatively dense

population and land shortages encouraged young men to take up the opportunities offered

on Guadalcanal. Over recent decades, Malaitan migration has become more permanent,

with more migrants remaining in Guadalcanal rather than returning to Malaita, as land

pressures of overpopulation and land shortages have increased on Malaita. Tension

between Guadalcanalese and Malaitans had begun to rise in the decade before the

conflict. As early as 1988, Guadalcanalese protested and called on the national

Government to repatriate all 56 Many Guadalcanalese

believed the migrants were obtaining employment and economic opportunities at the

expense of locals who were being marginalised. Most commentators point to a clash in

the cultures of the two communities and say stereotypes contributed to tensions. For

example, Guadalcanalese accused Malaitans of aggressiveness and blamed them for a

large number of murders on Guadalcanal.

Land issues were important in this rising tension. The large area obtained for use by oil

best agricultural land had been alienated from its customary owners over preceding

decades.57 Much rural land on Guadalcanal had not been registered and many boundaries


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were unclear.58 National financial arrangements have compounded tension: the vast

majority of profits from forestry, palm oil, mining and other projects have gone to the

national Government and private companies, and not to local communities nor even to

the provincial Government.59 As in the Bougainville case, the national Government

justifiably sought to benefit the nation as a whole from the profits of resources extracted

on Guadalcanal. A lack of revenue from, and employment in, local development projects

became a long-standing grievance among young men. Relationships between resource

companies and local villages also became strained. For example, the fact that the gold

mine had different lease arrangements with local communities to nearby oil palm

plantations also stirred resentment among those being paid less for the use of their land. 60

While many of the first Malaitan settlers obtained permission from the customary owners

to settle on land in Guadalcanal, over the following years many more members of the

initially agreed with the customary owners.61 In response to rising concern over the rise

of squatter settlements around the capital, the Government established Temporary

Occupation Licenses, to be managed by the Lands Division. However, mismanagement

allowed the camps to expand and people to overstay their licenses, ultimately

exacerbating social tension. Despite the legality of earlier sales or leases of land to

migrants or companies, many customary owners came to resent the occupation and

economic use of their traditional land by others.62 Many Malaitans on the other hand, felt

they had legitimate rights to reside on the land, having lived there for generations and

having acquired it formally through both customary and legal channels.63

Many younger-generation Guadalcanalese were angered at the sale of family-owned

lands to migrants by their parents and other members of the older generation. Many

younger Guadalcanalese repudiated the temporary and informal arrangements made

between the previous generation of their clan and migrant residents.64 It was many of

these younger landowners who formed the militias that were later to terrorise the

Malaitan settlers on Guadalcanal. In addition, despite Guadalcanal being a matrilineal

society, in some cases male members of the owning kin group sold family land to


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Malaitans without consulting other members of the hereditary line. This in some cases

left subsequent generations feeling aggrieved and questioning the legitimacy of the sale.65

The main turning point in this rising tension was the demand in mid-1998 by the Premier

of Guadalcanal Province, E. Alebua, that the national Government pay the province

compensation for the murders of 25 Guadalcanalese, allegedly by Malaitans, and return

all lands sold or leased to Malaitans to their traditional Guadalcanalese owners.66 Alebua

also demanded the national Government pay compensation for the loss of Guadalcanal

land used for the capital, Honiara. However, while he was Prime Minister, Alebua had

ignored similar claims, suggesting his demand for compensation in 1998 was at least

partly motivated by a quest for political and/or economic advantage. Indeed, as the

conflict progressed, demands for compensation became a prominent feature, opening up

widespread opportunities for the economic exploitation of the unrest.67

The repeated

payment of compensation also crippled the State financially and weakened its capacity to

respond to the conflict in other ways. When leaders of the Isatabu Freedom Movement

Guadalcanalese grievances

associated with the loss of, and lack of compensation for, their land.68 The focus on

Malaitans in these demands possibly motivated attacks by Guadalcanalese against

Malaitans.69

Some young Guadalcanalese men, motivated by the range of issues discussed above,

including members of the recently established Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA),

carried out attacks against Malaitans in rural areas. Migrant workers were expelled from

rice projects and plantations. As the violence increased, many groups also took advantage

of the rising instability to extort money and drive people from their property. In early

2000, Malaitans in Honiara formed the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), which began

attacking non-Malaitans in and around Honiara. On 5 June 2000, members of the MEF

nstalled Manasseh Sogavare as prime minister.

In October 2000, members of the MEF and IFM signed the Townsville Peace Agreement

armed Regional Assistance Mission ( known as RAMSI) into the country, which brought


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some stability to the nation. Since the RAMSI intervention, a number of customary

landowners have requested formal registration of land titles to eliminate the uncertainty

over ownership that caused tension in the 1990s.70

The violence on Guadalcanal had a severe human cost on the island nation. By May

2000, approximately 55 people had died. The fighting involved other serious human

rights abuses including rapes. By November 1999, attacks and intimidation had forced

35,309 people to flee their homes as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), many of whom

fled to Malaita.71 Some women were forced to deliver babies in IDP camps, removed

from adequate health care. IDPs faced not only the trauma of being driven from their

homes, but also loss of property, employment and livelihoods. The long-term cost of such

experiences can be severe. The Solomon Islands police force all but collapsed as a result

of the conflict.72

precedent for political change at the point of a gun, and increased doubts among some

Solomon Islanders over the legitimacy of the unitary State.73

The conflict exacerbated an already fragile Solomon Islands economy. When Solomon

Islands Plantations Ltd closed in mid 1999 because of the violence on Guadalcanal,

exports of palm oil and palm oil products fell from $SI 98 Million in 1998 to $SI 6.5

Million in 2000.74 In addition, 1800 people lost their jobs in the industry. A further 2,200

became unemployed when Gold Ridge Mining Ltd and Solomon Taiyo Ltd closed in mid

2000. The national economy contracted by 14% in 2000.75

As we have seen, tensions over the use and ownership of land featured heavily in causing

the violence on Guadalcanal. These land issues interacted with a range of other issues,

such as uneven economic development between islands and between urban and rural

areas. Tensions on Guadalcanal had multiple causes, including large-scale migration, the

alienation of customary land (by resource companies, the capital Honiara and agricultural

plantations), and conflict between generations of Guadalcanalese over the sale or lease of

kin land. Large-scale in-migration and competition for employment caused economic and

political issues to be viewed through the lens of ethnic tension.


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Yet it is important not to exclusively blame the conflict on migration and tensions over

land. Partly supporting the Greed thesis of Collier and others, it also seems likely that the

crisis in Solomon Islands was partly caused and aggravated by certain businessmen and

politicians who sought to use the tensions discussed above for personal gain.76 The

Government, particularly its plans to regulate the

forestry industry, threatened the interests of a broad range of the middle class.77 The

conflict and the eventual coup in 2000 halted this process. Many individuals also

benefited from the criminality and instability associated with the violence as well as from

the Government

3.3 Fiji

The democratic will of people has been overturned by four coups (and civilian led

putsches) since 1987. The causes of this political turmoil involve a complex range of

intertwined social, political and economic factors. The question of land has featured as

one among several contributing factors in this series of crises, as the rhetoric of coup

leaders has invariably centred on the need to protect indigenous Fijian control of land as

well as political authority against the increasing influence of Indo-Fijians. As Overton

78

As the following section will attempt to show, the question of land and itsconnection to national politics in Fiji is complex, and goes beyond simple ethnic tension

between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians.

All constitutions have been explicit in protecting indigenous Fijian ownership of

the vast majority of Fijian land. The constitutions have placed 83% of the land under

indigenous Fijian ownership. With the transfer of State owned land that was not claimed

or lay unused at the time of registration (Schedule A and B State lands) to indigenous

Fijian ownership in 2002, this figure is now closer to 90%. The remaining land is heldunder freehold or State ownership.

While indigenous Fijian clans cannot sell their land to non-clan members, they can lease

it. Most notably, many indigenous Fijians lease their land to Indo-Fijian farmers for the


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sugar cane plantations that provide a crucial element of the Fijian economy. Landowners

do not lease land to tenants directly but must do so through the Native Lands Trust Board

(NLTB), established in 1940.79 Rent is set at a certain percentage of the unimproved

value of the land and leasing periods set at 30 years. This leasing system has meant that

ordinary members of the owning clan receive a relatively small proportion of rental

payments. NLTB retains 20% of any payments (reduced from 25% in 1999) and the

various chiefs of the clan receive approximately 30%, leaving only 50% to be distributed

among the remaining members of the clan.80

The minimal return on leased lands received by most members of owning clans, and a

lack of information provided to local communities regarding the above system of

payments, has caused misperception between the two communities. The fact that chiefs

retain a large proportion of land revenue has precluded the dissemination of revenue to

ordinary members of the owning clan.81 This in turn has caused resentment among

indigenous Fijians, who blame their lack of compensation on an unfair leasing system

that unfairly favours the tenant. Many indigenous Fijians think that the leasing system

favours Indo-Fijian farmers who they believe grow rich by renting Fijian land while they

themselves receive little compensation.

In the past decade, land leases have been a major source of tension as the vast majority

have expired or are rapidly approaching the end of the lease period. Many indigenous

owners have not renewed the leases, and many more plan to follow suit in the future,

either to begin working the land themselves or to try to obtain higher rents privately.82

This has led to tension between owners and tenants. In one case, owners were arrested for

blockading a tramline used by the Fiji Sugar Corporation that ran through their land after

the lease had expired.83

This has created a great deal of insecurity in the Indo-Fijian community as many have

several generations. Conversely, while some Indo-Fijians may resent the indigenous


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agriculture. When Indo-Fijians have called for longer leasing periods, or Government

assistance in finding new land, this has increased tension between the two communities.84

Fijian ownership, the question of land therefore has served as a convenient tool for

mobilising and unifying indigenous Fijian political support against governments accused

of undermining indigenous Fijian interests. Indigenous Fijian concerns with losing their

land to Indo-Fijians, and through it political power in the country, were central to the

coups in 1987 and 2000, or at least the rhetoric surrounding them. The small rental

payments received by ordinary Fijians for the use of their land, and the perceived success

of Indo-Fijian tenants in the cane industry, made land a powerful mobilising tool.

During the 1987 election campaign, the ruling Alliance Party warned the nation that the

exclusively with Fijian mataqali(clans)85 In contrast, the Labour Coalition presented

its position as in the interests of ordinary Fijians and as a challenge to the interests of the

chiefly class. As Dr Timoci Bavadra stated publicly during campaigning: By restricting

the Fijian people to their communal way of lifestyle in the face of a rapidly developing

cash economy, the average Fijian has become more and more backward. This is

particularly invidious when the leaders themselves have amassed huge personal

wealth.86

The

concerns with a high Indo-Fijian representation in the Government but also threatened the

vested interests of a class and individuals that had long benefited from the post-colonial

system.

Within weeks, the new Government was challenged by a number of different groups,

including a new organisation called the Taukei (indigenous or owner) Movement.

Leaders of the movement claimed that Indo-Fijians dominated the Bavadra Government.

A broad range of other interest groups also opposed the Government. The earlier

campaigning of the ruling Alliance party, which claimed that the Coalition would

fostering opposition to the Bavadra Government, culminating in the eventual coup.87


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Those opposing the Bavadra Government approached Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni

Rabuka, who agreed to lead a military coup against the Government. A spate of violent

attacks and protests culminated in the overthrow of the Government and the eventual

reinstatement of the recently defeated Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister.

Growing opposition to the coup, and meetings between Bavadra and Mara, led to Rabuka

staging a second coup to end any further political accommodation. The Government

passed a new constitution into law, based on a foundation of positive discrimination

towards the indigenous Fijian community

Land was even more clearly a contributing factor in the 2000 civilian putsch led by

George Speight. Land became the rallying cry for indigenous Fijian opposition to the

Mahendra Chaudhry Government, which was elected to power in 1999.88 The

Government faced a difficult dilemma during its term the impending expiration of

numerous 30-year leases for land used by Indo-Fijian farmers. Soon after its election, the

Chaudhry Government set out to resolve the problem of the expiring leases, attempting to

protect tenants who were likely to be forced from the land, while also trying not to

alienate indigenous Fijians. The Government agreed to transfer all State Schedule A and

Schedule B land to the NLTB.89 The Government argued for a renewal of the

Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA), which provided 30-year leases to

tenants. This support for retaining the existing leasing arrangements was seen by some

indigenous Fijians as support for Indo-Fijian tenants at the expense of owners. The

Government also stated it would pay F$28,000 to those tenants forced to leave the land.90

To some Fijian owners however, this payment to Indo-Fijian tenants seemed an unfair

handout to those already enriched by t-fertile arable land.91

The Government also established a Land Use Commission designed to identify unused

arable land. Once again, however, this measure was seen and portrayed as an attempt to

undermine indigenous Fijian control of the land and assist Indo-Fijians. Another land

issue causing tension around this time was the announcement by the Government that the

Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) would manage the massive Fiji

mahogany industry. The Great Council of Chiefs, the premier indigenous Fijian

traditional authority, requested that further movement in the exploitation of mahogany be


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suspended until a commission could ascertain the benefits to landowners.92 The issue had

already emerged as a cause of tension when the Government had fired the manager of Fiji

Hardwoods, George Speight, over a conflict of interest.93

Land usage became a central element in rising opposition to the Chaudhry Government

within its first year in office. Soon after the election, the head of the NLTB issued a

State land to indigenous

Fijian ownership.94 The speaker of the Taukei Movement, which regrouped in March,

95

On 19 May 2000, armed men led by George Speight stormed the parliament and held the

Chaudhry-led Government hostage for 56 days. Groups of thugs looted shops, attacked

Indo-Fijian places of worship and drove Indo-Fijians from their homes in some rural

areas. Analysts assert that frequent public statements by the NLTB, nationalist politicians

and other leaders that Fijian ownership of land was under threat contributed to the public

sentiment that allowed the putsch.96 The supporters of George Speight who gathered

around the parliament buildings expressed their fear of indigenous Fijians losing their

land.

As the situation worsened in Suva, the military asked President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara

to resign so as to ensure security, negotiated the release of the hostages and then

eventually forcibly quashed the rebel group, taking George Speight and other leaders into

custody. A new interim Government was sworn in, comprising many of those who had

opposed the Chaudhry Government, including the leader of the Taukei Movement. The

new Government swore to protect indigenous Fijian interests, including land rights. In

November, a mutiny within the military by soldiers seeking to install a more ethno-

nationalist Government, involving some members of the Speight putsch, was suppressed

after a bloody gun battle in the army barracks.

The question of land in Fiji continued to play a destabilising role in national politics

when another military coup was launched in December 2006. One of the stated primary

causes behind the coup appears to have been military opposition to a set of bills being


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pushed through parliament by the Laisenia Qarase Government. While the most

publicised and probably the most important of these bills related to the pardoning of those

involved in the 2000 putsch, one of the bills, the Land Tribunal Bill, related to the

Government 500,000 to customary landowners to buy back

freehold land that they felt had been taken in return for inadequate compensation.97

The

military claimed these bills were an attempt to buy the support of ethno-nationalists.

The social, economic and political costs for Fiji of this series of coups and putsches have

been extensive. The series of coups in Fiji has damaged the Fiji economy, deterring

foreign investment, undermined the tourism industry and caused the exodus of numerous

skilled workers. In the years

contracted by 6.4% and 1.7% respectively.98 The departure of tens of thousands of Indo-

Fijians, as well as a number of indigenous Fijians, over the past two decades, taking with

them business and other talents, has also damaged the economic life of the nation. The

garment industry has been gravely damaged both by declining tourism and by the

departure of Indo-Fijian workers over the past two decades. Disruptions to sugar

production are particularly severe, since the industry accounts for 40% of the national

economy.99 While the most recent coup has not been accompanied by the same levels of

violence and looting as the 2000 putsch, the ramifications for Fiji in terms of lost aid and

tourism may be just as severe. Fiji potentially faces the damaging loss of international

aid, including the subsidisation of the national sugar industry by the European Union.

These crises have undermined a series of constitutions, the legitimacy of democracy in

Fiji and even cast doubt on the current boundaries of the nation State.100 This regular

political turmoil has left many Indo-Fijians unsure of their place and security in the

nation, having often been targeted for beatings and repressions. Indigenous Fijians have

also been victimised since the 2006 coup.101

The political crises in Fiji have therefore had a range of causes. The case belies a neat

correlation between inter-ethnic inequality and conflict suggested by some theories. The

turmoil in Fiji has arisen as much from inequality within indigenous Fijian society as

between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians.102 The 2000 putsch illustrates the problems


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with legitimacy likely to be faced by any Government led by an Indo-Fijian the

question of ethnicity and political control has proved a convenient tool for rallying

opposition to elected governments.103

The question of land ownership and use has clearly been an important issue causing

tension between indigenous Fijian landowners and Indo-Fijian farmers. Re-leasing and

rental arrangements require careful attention by national governments in the interests of

inter-ethnic harmony, political stability and economic development, and the potential

damage of manipulating local grievances to political ends should be recognised and

addressed. Sensitive as grievances over land are in themselves, they have only spilled

over as national concerns through the efforts of politicians and others seeking to unify the

constituencies for their own political gain. In each of the coups, poor and marginalised

indigenous Fijians responded to the ethno-nationalist claims of the coup leaders.

Indigenous Fijian control over land was always central to this rhetoric.


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4. Lessons Learned and Recommendations

The three conflicts discussed above differ in detail but reflect a number of common

threads. Each suggests that those theoretical contentions which explain resource-based

conflict in terms of simple economic competition or the emotional ties to land present too

narrow a focus. All three conflicts considered here have been the result of the interaction

of a range of political, economic and social tensions. In all cases too, the actions and

motivations of certain actors, some motivated by land issues, others by more personal

economic interests, exacerbated this tension and worsened and lengthened the conflicts.

The case studies above have attempted to illustrate the varying importance and role ofland in each conflict. The question of land has been a contentious issue in all three,

although how this has interacted with other factors to cause conflict has varied between

and within each case study.

As suggested by the overview of the theoretical literature on resource-based conflict

presented at the start of the report, land has become a volatile issue when communities

have believed the loss of their land represents both a threat to their economic well-being

and their identity. In certain locations, such as around the Panguna mine in Bougainvilleand on Guadalcanal, the alienation or destruction of land has been the primary source of

real grievance, particularly when accompanied by long-term uneven economic

development, perceptions of inadequate compensation, or large-scale migration. As

suggested by the theory of Susan Olzak discussed earlier in this report, in this way, ethnic

or clan differences became polarised around issues of socioeconomic justice, within

which land was a prominent feature.

This report has touched on some of the ways in which land has fed into rising tension andconflict in the Pacific. In some areas, such as on the Guadalcanal Plains, the legal transfer

of rights to land has been challenged by later generations of landowners or different sub-

groups of the owning community. In several areas, such as Bougainville, unsuccessful


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demands for further compensation by owning groups for the use of their land has led to

conflict. Similar dynamics can be seen in Fiji, where demands for increased rental

amounts by indigenous Fijian landowners have led to ethnic tension. The permanent

destruction of land and other natural resources was a source of grievance in Bougainville.

In all three cases, land issues have become volatile at times when used by powerful

individuals as a means of mobilising political support or seeking economic benefit. In

Fiji, where traditional ownership has been enshrined in law, politicians and those with an

interest in the status quo have raised the spectre of land alienation to mobilise opposition

to democratically elected governments. The agency of community leaders can be seen as

one cause of the escalation and prolongation of conflict in Bougainville and Solomon

Islands, as individuals made new claims of compensation and exploited the grievance and

attachment to land within communities, and the instability of conflict itself, for their own

agendas. These issues are discussed below, along with several ways in which

governments and other stakeholders can minimise their potential for causing conflict.

1. Conflict between landowners and Government and companies

The conflict surrounding the Panguna mine in Bougainville demonstrates the need for

national governments and resource companies to thoroughly take into account the

interests of local landowners when initiating such projects.104 Agreements with

landowners in the Panguna area in Boug

105 Future mining operations do not have to be carried out in

such a vacuum.

The Bougainville case also shows the dangers of strongly centralised financial

arrangements in resource extraction. When local communities face all the adverse

consequences of mining in terms of land loss, environmental degradation and the

destruction of a way of life, but do not accrue correspondingly greater benefits from

mining than citizens elsewhere in the country, the potential for conflict is high. The

success of economic (and political) decentralisation in ameliorating conflict in


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Bougainville, and in other places, such as in Aceh in Indonesia, provides valuable lessons

for devising appropriate institutions for diverse archipelagic nations.

Many owners do not have complete trust in the trustees of their land, nor in the land

management system which oversees the use of their land.106 In several cases around the

region, the leasing of land has unnecessarily caused tension due to overly complicated

and inequitable leasing systems. This appears to be the case in Fiji. While the NLTB has

done much to guarantee the rights of tenants and owners alike, many owners feel

excluded from decision making with regard to their land. The NLTB has the power to,

and frequently does, make decisions regarding land without the consultation of

landowners.

2. Compensation for the alienation and use of land

The manner in which customary land is managed and utilised is a crucial issue in the

Pacific, not only as it relates to the potential for social conflict as discussed in this report,

but also to economic development. A review of the literature suggests there are several

issues with the potential to cause conflict over the management and use of customary

land: a fear of the alienation of customary land; a lack of information regarding the use of

land; a lack of input into decisions made regarding customary land; and an inequitable

distribution of economic benefits from the use of customary land.

As is clear from the review of the literature presented in this report, the alienation of

customary land has been the source of intense grievance in a number of areas across the

region. In some cases, the State has expropriated traditional land, and urban areas or

original agreements. Even after legitimate sales, customary owners have come to

subsequently challenge the permanent alienation of their land for a number of reasons.

These include perceptions that the clan as a whole has not been adequately compensated

and that the land was not appropriately valued at the time of sale.


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Tension has arisen in some cases due to the provision of inadequate information to

owners regarding the use of their land. In Bougainville for example, owners were

unaware of the revenue likely to be generated by their land and the extent of the

environmental degradation likely to be associated with the exploitation of it. Many

landowners also do not have access to adequate information regarding fair rent for the

property. In the case of mining, information must be provided regarding the likely size of

mineral deposits and expected prices to be gained for the ore, and concerning the likely

environment impact of the mine. Problems of mistrust between landowners and

companies can only be resolved by ensuring the former believe the latter are being honest

with them.107

3. Intra-generational and inter-generational conflict over land

Many land disputes in the Pacific arise from intra-clan disagreement over the use and

exploitation of land and the distribution of associated economic benefits. 108 The conflicts

addressed in this report, which are on the whole indicative of conflict in the region, have

arisen at least partly because local communities have perceived they have not been

adequately compensated for the use or loss of their land. In many cases, these grievances

have been legitimate, with only small, one-off, payments having been made to a handful

of individuals for the transfer of the land instead of benefit reaching the whole

community.

The case of Fiji demonstrates that problems of inadequate compensation sometimes result

from intra-community dynamics. The retention of a large proportion of land revenue by

chiefs has meant ordinary members of the owning clan receive little compensation. 109 As

discussed above, the leasing of land has in some areas unnecessarily caused tension due

to overly complicated and inequitable leasing systems. Many indigenous Fijians for

example, blame their lack of compensation on an unfair leasing system that they consider

unfairly favours the tenant, for example, by calculating rental amounts on the unimproved

value of their land. Land has therefore been a convenient tool for the mobilising of


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political support among the indigenous Fijian population. Further research is required

into how the unequal distribution of revenue within communities is linked with tension

betweenethnic communities.

A major source of grievance has been resentment among younger members of the owning

clan who feel they have been deprived of their birthright while receiving little

compensation. Compensation has often been exhausted within one generation, while

housing and other infrastructure provided to landowners has deteriorated significantly. In

other cases, later demands for compensation stem more from personal interest and rent

seeking behaviour. This tension has led to disputes within clans, in turn causing greater

militancy, as seen in the case of Bougainville. Invariably, however, grievances have been

directed at resource and plantation companies and, most dangerously, migrant

communities.

The examples discussed in this report suggest that to avoid conflict, the alienation or

commercial use of land must only be carried out in consultation with as many

representatives of the clan as possible and with ongoing compensation provided to the

owning kin groups. Safeguards must be established to prevent a small elite of the

landowning unit making important decisions regarding the land without the consultation

of the wider clan.110 Likewise, steps should be taken to disallow a small number of

individuals from monopolising the financial benefits accrued from the use of clan land.

To prevent disputes over what constitutes customary land, in areas where ownership has

not been documented a formal recording process should be carried out with the

agreement of local communities. Further research is required into the establishment of

effective, transparent and equitable land management systems. Possible means of

reforming customary land tenures in the Pacific are discussed in Fingleton (2006) and on

the land tenure question in Lal, Lim-Applegate and Reddy (2001).

To avoid grievances increasing in subsequent generations, agreements with local

communities should involve ongoing compensation provision must be made for new

injections of capital to later generations, and investments should be made in the name of

subsequent clan members. The provision of jobs, education scholarships and other


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assistance to local landowners might also help to ameliorate this tension. Where feasible,

leasing arrangements should be subject to periodic review by both tenants and owners so

as to avoid rising tension.111 Further investigation is needed into the legitimacy of

subsequent demands for compensation and the most effective means of balancing the

rights of owners with the efficient operation of business.

4. Land and employment

In all cases examined here, in particular Bougainville and Solomon Islands, landowners

have been aggrieved that they have been given fewer employment opportunities than

migrants in resource projects located on their traditional land. This factor has aggravated

tension over the loss of land as well as leaving many young male members of the local

communities under-employed and more vulnerable to provocation. One possible solution

to this problem is to establish and monitor job quotas for local communities in

plantations, resource projects and other industries. Funding for employment-focussed

skills training for local communities in such areas may partially resolve the problem of

imbalances in employment between local and migrant workers.

When considering the rights of traditional landowners however, policy makers must be

aware of the need to balance this requirement with the need to also find a just and

peaceful space for migrants. While indigenous landowners in many cases have legitimate

grievances and claims, many migrants were born in the area and are often the latest of

several generations to live in the area. As one migrant in West New Britain Province

remarked when asked about concerns of locals attempting to evict migrants from the area,

here.112 In

a study of West New Britain Province, Koczberski and Curry demonstrate that tensions

between local communities and migrants can facilitate the emergence of different and

opposed identities that can ultimately undermine the nation state.113


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5. Environmental degradation

In the context of resource extraction, the degradation of the environment in traditional

areas has been a major source of discontent among local populations. In Bougainville, the

destruction of large swathes of traditional land, declining productivity, reductions in fish

and bird life and an increase in disease among the local community played a major role in

causing conflict. As stated above, regional governments have learned a great deal from

the Bougainville case. Landowners must be made aware of the likely environmental

impact of mining and other resource projects. As Duncan and Duncan argue,

need for a fully public and widely-framed environmental impact statement for any

114 Stronger regulation and enforcement of environmental

protection by resource companies is also required to prevent a reoccurrence of the

destruction caused in that region and the concomitant tension.

6. Exploitation of land-related tensions

In some areas of the Pacific, politicians and businesspeople have exploited tensions over

land for political gain. In Solomon Islands, this largely took the form of claims for

compensation. In Fiji, powerful groups with political and economic interests in the

maintenance of the existing land management system have exploited fears of land loss to

mobilise opposition to political opponents. Other groups with agendas separate to the

maintenance of land management systems have allied themselves with these interests so

as to pursue their own goals

role in stimulating rising tension and attacks against migrant communities.

The capacity of politicians and other community leaders to exploit and cause inter-

communal tensions can be reduced by the widespread provision of information to the

public about their land rights and how leasing systems operate. In the case of Fiji, all

stakeholders, including indigenous Fijian landowners, should be reminded that customary

land is protected by the Fiji Constitution. Further questions remain concerning the


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relative importance of genuine land related grievances versus other contentious issues

such a

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