linked in assignment

Nathan Adams – Climate Change Policy Term Paper – Student No. 1003599144

The Selection of Policy Instruments in Canadian Climate Change Policy: A Comparative Analysis of Different Provincial Approaches to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Nathan Adams

Student Number: 1003599144

Introduction

Government climate change policy instruments adopted by Canadian

provinces vary significantly from one to another (Böhringer, Rivers, Rutherford

and Wigle, 2015; Purdon, Houle and Lachapelle, 2014). These differences

have mainly been ascribed to provincial party systems, economies, public

opinion, administration and the influence of industrial sectors (Houle 2013;

Houle and MacDonald, 2012). Moreover, Houle and MacDonald (2012) have

identified eighty different policy instruments employed at the sub-federal level

and classified them accordingly in several categories (with the observation

that the three main categories are the accepted categorization in the

literature, and not done, but rather followed, by Houle and Mcdonald):

1. Regulatory

a. Greenhouse gas emissions standards (absolute caps)

b. Energy efficiency norms for buildings (private or public-owned)

c. Greenhouse gas emissions standards for fuels

d. Renewable energy regulatory targets

2. Market-based

a. Cap-and-trade systems

b. Carbon taxation

3. Voluntarism

a. Voluntary emissions reduction agreements


Whilst historically most provinces have adopted regulatory instruments to

reduce greenhouse gas emissions, considerably fewer have adopted

advanced market-based instruments. The multileveled governance system in

Canada has posed several challenges for the politics of climate change due to

the unequal distribution of power acting as a barrier to implementing coherent

policy at a federal level within each governmental tier (Lachapelle, Borick and

Rabe, 2012). However, the rate at which market-based instruments are being

incorporated in provincial climate change policy has made recent progress.

To-date, Manitoba, Québec, Ontario and British Columbia have committed to

the cap-and-trade Western Climate Initiative (Houle and MacDonald, 2012),

whilst Alberta intends to introduce a carbon tax in 2017 (Alberta Government,

2016).

It is hypothesized that Canadian provinces originally implemented different

policy instruments depending on the way that policymakers framed the issue

of climate change in sub-federal climate change plans (Houle and

MacDonald, 2012). Although this hypothesis was initially developed by Rabe

(2004) in the American context, Houle and MacDonald (2012) ascertain that it

is broadly consistent in the context of Canadian provinces too. This

hypothesis proposes that Canadian provinces can be distinguished from one

another based on the climate change policy instruments commissioned (Table

1):

Scenario 1: Climate Change as an Environmental Threat When policy-makers consider climate change as a serious environmental

threat, coercive policy instruments will be used (such as regulatory norms and

standards).

Scenario 2: Climate Change as an Economic Opportunity When policy-makers consider climate change as offering economic

development opportunities for their province, market-based instruments will

be used (such as carbon markets and financial disincentives which include

carbon taxes).


Scenario 3: Climate Change Mitigation as an Economic Threat When policy-makers consider efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions as

a threat to the economic growth of their province, they will use non-coercive

policy instruments (such as voluntarism) or no policy instruments at all.

Province Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3

Prince Edward Island

✔

Nova Scotia ✔

New Brunswick ✔

Newfoundland and Labrador

✔

British Columbia

✔

Manitoba ✔

Quebec ✔

Ontario ✔

Saskatchewan ✔ ✔

Alberta ✔

Table 1. Provinces as categorized by Houle and MacDonald (2012)


Prior to the proposed federal carbon tax to be introduced in 2017 (CBC News,

2016), different provincial governments adopted different approaches to

implementing market-based instruments to reduce greenhouse gas

emissions. Despite the fact that provincial climate change action plans can be

achieved most effectively and efficiently by implementing market-based

instruments (Houle, 2013), only Scenario 2 provincial governments have

seized the opportunity to employ them.

Thesis Statement

Although Canadian climate change policy is commonly debated at public and

academic levels, there is a lack of extensive study in provinces’ policy

instrument choices to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Houle and

MacDonald, 2012). This assignment primarily aims to discuss the reasons

why different provinces have adopted market-based instruments (cap-and-

trade or carbon taxation) to lower greenhouse gas emissions, whilst others

have not. Additionally, the differences in selected sub-national climate

change policy instruments will be rationalized by examining the aforesaid

hypothesis applied by Houle and Macdonald (2012) in order to review the

obstacles to carbon pricing in Canadian provinces.

Research Questions 1. What are the obstacles to the employment of market-based

instruments at the sub-federal level?

2. What is the explanation for the different climate change policy

instruments chosen in different Canadian provinces and how effective

are they?


Obstacles to Market-based Instruments in Provinces Market-based instruments, such as cap-and-trade systems (Western Climate

Imitative) and carbon taxation (British Columbia carbon tax), are both effective

and efficient to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Höhne,

Warnecke, Day and Röser, 2013). They have also become increasingly

common in climate change policy since the Kyoto Protocol because they

provide economic incentive to industries and consumers to reduce their

greenhouse gas emissions (Houle, 2013).

Provincial governments face different obstacles to successfully incorporate

market-based instruments in their climate change policies (Böhringer et al.,

2015; Purdon, Houle and Lachapelle, 2014). These challenges are three-fold

(Table 2) (Houle, 2013):

i) Administrative Provincial governments have varying capacity to carry out tasks related to

climate change policy (Houle, 2013). These abilities include the preparation

of climate change strategies, legislation/regulation drafting and managing

emissions revenues (Houle, 2013). Additionally, political will and premier

commitment in climate change policy-making also directly influence the

adoption of market-based instruments (Houle and MacDonald, 2012).

Noteworthy examples include British Columbia Premier Gordon Campbell

(carbon tax introduction) (Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development, 2012) and Québec Premier Jean Charest (commitment to the

Western Climate Initiative) (Houle, 2015).

ii) Political Public opinion and the lack of inter-party consensus on the legitimacy of

market-based instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions prove to be

political barriers to carbon markets (Harrison, 2007; Houle, 2013; Lachapelle,

Borick and Rabe, 2012). As opposed to studies of Americans’ public opinion,

which show mixed support of market-based incentives (Harrison, 2007; Houle,


Lachapelle and Purdon, 2015), the majority of Canadians are in favor of them

(Houle, 2013) (Figures 1 and 6). In light of this, the lack of inter-party

consensus is a larger barrier to the incorporation of market-based climate

change policy in Canada than public opinion.

Figure 1. Change in Attitudes of Canadians towards a Carbon Tax, from 1991 to 2012

Source: Houle, 2013

However, on closer inspection, a divide in provincial public support of cap-

and-trade and carbon tax mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions

is observed (Table 2). Scenario 2 provinces (BC, QC, ON and MB) showed

considerably higher public support for market-based mechanisms in their

provincial climate change policies as opposed to Scenario 1

(atlantic/maritime) and 3 (AB and SK) provinces.

Table 2.

Comparison of public support of carbon taxation and cap-and-trade across Canadian

provinces

Source: Houle, 2015


Negating the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, there is broad

political party consensus of the legitimacy of the use of market-based

instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the Canadian Liberal

Party and New Democratic Party. As a result, provincial elections of

Canada’s four most populous provinces (BC, AB, ON and QC) between 2007

to 2013 led to a divide in whether or not cap-and-trade carbon taxation were

used as climate change policy instruments (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Governing political parties in selected provinces in post-2007 provincial elections

Source: Houle, 2013

Partially due to these election results, provinces governed by the Liberal Party

of Canada selected cap-and-trade (BC, ON and QC) and carbon taxation

(BC) as market-based instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions

whilst the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada had selected the use of

emissions intensity reduction (AB) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As a

result of the 2015 provincial election of Alberta, the New Democratic Party

won a majority government and announced the introduction of a new carbon

pricing system in 2017.


iii) Economic Economic obstacles primarily depend on the extent to which the oil and gas

sectors contribute to the economy of the province and the energy mix of the

electricity sector (MacDonald, 2009). Provinces that rely heavily on the

fossil fuel industry for economic development are specifically financially

disadvantaged with regards to adopting market-based instruments to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions (Houle, 2013; MacDonald, 2009). Due to this,

provinces that incorporate market-based instruments also tend to have more

diversified renewable energy mixes (Houle, 2013) (Figure 6)

British Columbia, Québec and Ontario have heterogeneous economies and

energy mixes (Figure 6) whilst those of New Labrador, Alberta and

Saskatchewan are driven by the fossil fuel intensive energy sector (Figure

3). This economic divide highlights the influence of the presence of fossil

fuel industries on the incorporation of market-based instruments in provincial

climate change policy. Due to this, the oil and gas sector have been more

willing to abide by the more lenient Alberta emissions intensity reduction

scheme rather than the hard emissions cap enforced by the Western

Climate Imitative cap-and-trade system (Houle, 2013).

Figure 3. Energy contribution to provincial GDP, average from 2007-2012 (as % of total

GDP)

Source: Houle, 2013


These three factors collectively sway the way in which the issue of climate

change has been addressed by policymakers in provincial climate change

plans. Due to the relationship between policy administration, politics,

economics and market-based climate change policy development, only

Scenario 2 provinces (BC, MB, ON and QC) have been successful in

entering the carbon market to reduce greenhouse gas emissions

considerably. More specifically, the relationship between economics and the

successful employment of market-based instruments in climate change

policy is depicted in Figures 3 and 4, where provinces with fossil fuel sectors

contributing substantially to provincial GDP have not successfully used the

carbon market to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to date.

Figure 4. Oil and gas extraction sector contribution to provincial GDP, average from 2007-

2012 (as % of total GDP)

Source: Houle, 2013

The economies of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Québec are not as

dependent on the fossil fuel industry for economic growth (Figure 4). Thus,

these provinces were in an advantageous position to develop cap-and-trade

systems in connection with the Western Climate Imitative to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions.


The Selection of Policy Instruments in Canadian Climate Change Policy Scenarios 1-3 have been identified as the three main framings of the climate

change issue:

Scenario 1: Environmental Threat Houle and MacDonald (2012) have contended that provincial policymakers

who have framed climate change as an environmental issue typically resort to

regulation instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As a

consequence, Scenario 1 provinces will resort to the use of coercive

instruments more recurrently than market-based ones.

The climate action plans of the maritime provinces (NL, PEI, NS, NB) are

outlined as the most concerned about the impacts of climate change (Table 1)

due to the frequent references to increasing temperatures, sea levels and

frequency of storms (Houle and MacDonald, 2012). This, in addition to the

fact that the majority of their populations live close to the Canadian coastline

with infrastructure located in areas susceptible to substantial damage.

Furthermore, as opposed to the frame of Scenario 3 provinces, the maritime

provincial climate change action plans contend that the impacts of climate

change have already negatively impacted economic prosperity and that

significant economic losses are yet to come (Houle and MacDonald, 2012)

(Table 3).


Province Climate Change Action Plan

Year

Climate Change Impacts

Mentioned in Climate Change

Action Plan

Nova Scotia 2009 Extreme storms, rising

temperature, vulnerable

coastline population and sea

level rise.

Prince Edward Island 2008 Environmental Natural Health,

citizens’ health/safety, economic

prosperity and quality of life

New Brunswick 2014-2020 Significant economic losses due

to extreme weather events and

impacts on water supply/quality

Newfoundland and Labrador 2011 Rising sea levels, invasive

species, extreme weather

events, ecosystem health and

impacts on fishing industry.

Table 3. Summary of how provincial policymakers’ frame the threats of Climate Change in

Scenario 1 (maritime) provinces.

Scenario 1 provinces are also disadvantaged and less likely to incorporate

market-based instruments in their climate change policy due to their weak

level of economic development in comparison to other provinces (Houle and

MacDonald, 2012). It is also noteworthy that although the climate action plan

of Newfoundland and Labrador focuses primarily on the threats of climate

change, it as well mentions the economic threat of greenhouse gas mitigation

efforts due to the energy contribution of 31.58% towards its provincial GDP

(Figure 3). Additionally, even though Newfoundland and Labrador generates

large amounts of hydroelectricity (Figure 5.), the province depends on the oil

and gas industry to provide economic development opportunities (Houle and

MacDonald, 2012)


Scenario 2: Economic Opportunity Houle and MacDonald (2012) contend that Scenario 2 provinces (BC, ON, QC

and MB) have climate change action plans in which policymakers did not view

climate change as a major environmental threat, but rather as an opportunity

for economic gain by ratifying policies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Because of this, the use of coercive (regulatory) instruments in climate

change policy is used less than in Scenario 1 provinces whilst the enactment

of advanced market-based (cap-and-trade and carbon taxation) instruments is

more widespread. In this case, the economic opportunity is attained through

the financial incentive to participate in national and international carbon

markets.

Cap-and-trade (and carbon taxation to a lesser extent) is the most consistent

market-based instrument used in climate change policy to reduce greenhouse

gas emissions in Canada. The climate action plans of Scenario 2 provinces

identify the potential of becoming leaders in new technologies and industries

in attempt to produce low-carbon economies (Houle and MacDonald, 2012).

Because of this, rather than centering climate change action plans on the

environmental threats of climate change, Scenario 2 policymakers identify the

economic opportunities to attract new investments (Table 4).



Year

Climate Change Economic

Opportunities Mentioned in

Climate Change Action Plan

British Columbia 2008 Investment in clean

energy/energy-efficient

technology, new jobs and

increased national/international

competitiveness

Ontario 2016-2020 Global green economy forecast

to be six times greater than

1990s technology boom,

investment in clean technology

Québec 2013-2020 Increased economic

competitiveness through cap-

and-trade via the WCI

Manitoba 2015 Business opportunities and cost

saving through working towards

green economy development

Table 4. Summary of how provincial policymakers’ frame the economic opportunities of

Climate Change in Scenario 2 provinces.

Since Scenario 2 provinces also have more diversified economies and energy

mixes than Scenario 3 provinces (AB and SK) (Figure 6), they did not have

the same difficulty to incorporate market-based instruments in climate change

policy. Because of this, Scenario 2 provinces either already form part of the

cap-and-trade Western Climate Initiative (QC) or have pledged to (BC, ON,

MB) (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Map of WCI, 2013 Source: Purdon, Houle and Lachapelle, 2014


Figure 6. Energy Capacity Mix by Province and Territory, 2014 and 2040

Source: Government of Canada National Energy Board, 2016

Moreover, public support of the WCI cap-and-trade system within Scenario 2

provinces has been identified to be significantly high (Lachapelle, Borick and

Rabe, 2012) (Figure 7). Only five of the original eleven partners have

remained members of the WCI. The importance of public acceptance of

global warming and support of the cap-and-trade system is stressed in Figure

7. Figure 7 depicts that the six original signatories that withdrew from the WCI

both lacked the public acceptance of global warming and the public support of

the cap-and-trade mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.


Figure 7. Public Opinion on Climate Change and Policy in 2013

Source: Lachapelle et al., 2014 as cited in Houle and MacDonald, 2012

Scenario 3: Economic Threat Houle and MacDonald (2012) contend that Scenario 3 provinces (AB and SK)

have climate change action plans in which policymakers viewed the mitigation

of climate change through greenhouse gas emissions reduction as an

economic threat. Alberta and Saskatchewan are examples where immediate

reduction in greenhouse gas emissions could have considerable negative

impacts on their economies. The oil and gas industries contribute to 24.26%

and 16.13% of the share in provincial GDP respectively (Figure 4), and form

the bulk of their provincial energy mixes (Figure 5). The dependence of

Scenario 3 provinces’ economic growth (Figure 4) and electricity generation

(Figure 3) dependence on fossil fuels has rendered the incorporation of strong

regulation, cap-and-trade or carbon taxation to lag behind (MacDonald, 2009).

This is reflected in the climate change action plans of both Alberta and

Saskatchewan (Table 5).



Year

Climate Change Mitigation

Economic Threats Mentioned

in Climate Change Action Plan

Alberta 2008 Cannot maintain both

environmental progress and

economic prosperity

simultaneously, policies must be

compatible with largest trading

partner (USA) and no reduction

targets but intensity emission

reduction targets

Saskatchewan 2007 Provincial economic growth is

dependent on rising greenhouse

gas emissions and reducing

them will be challenging

Table 5. Summary of how provincial policymakers’ frame the mitigation of climate change as

an economic threat in Scenario 3 provinces.

Both Scenario 3 provinces’ climate change action plans affirm the

dependence on fossil fuel energy to promote economic growth. Additionally,

both Scenario 3 provinces do not have significant public support of market-

based climate change policy as compared to Scenario 1 and 2 provinces

(Table 2).

The Saskatchewan Party does not have inter-party consensus on the

legitimacy of market-based instruments in climate change policy, which is

reflected in its climate change action plan. The climate action plan specifies

that the production of fossil fuel energy contributes significantly to its

economic growth and that reducing greenhouse gas emissions will be

challenging (Houle and MacDonald, 2012).


Concurrently, Alberta’s 2008 climate change action plan contended that

emission intensity targets were selected (rather than absolute emission

targets or cap-and-trade/carbon taxation) to reflect the reality of Alberta’s

energy-based economy. There was no inter-party political consensus in both

the Federal and Alberta Provincial Progressive Conservative Party regarding

the legitimacy of market-based instruments to reduce greenhouse gas

emissions. The combination of these factors severely disadvantaged the

province of Alberta to make progress on greenhouse gas emission reduction.

The election of the New Democratic Party as the provincial government for

Alberta in 2015 has shifted the means by which climate change policy will be

addressed. A carbon tax that will cover 78-90% of Alberta’s emissions will be

introduced in 2017 starting at $20 per tonne and will be increased by $10

yearly afterwards (Alberta Government, 2016). Despite potential short-term

economic repercussions, this shift emphasizes the importance of political will

to reach a low carbon economy and also the prerequisite of inter-party

consensus on the legitimacy of market-based instruments to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions.

Multi-Scenario Province: Saskatchewan

It is possible that several of the scenarios may be applicable simultaneously

within a given jurisdiction. However, it is rare that competing scenarios are of

equal importance in the final formulation of climate change policy.

Incidentally, Saskatchewan is an example of a jurisdiction that has been

identified by Houle and MacDonald (2012) to fit the criteria for both Scenario 2

and 3 (Table 1). Although Saskatchewan’s climate action plan mentions the

economic opportunity of developing industrial efficiency in response to climate

change, Scenario 3 is more dominant within the selected policy instruments,

primarily due to the dependence of its economy on the fossil fuel industry

(Figures 3 and 4).


Different Provincial Approaches Towards Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Accomplishments and Failures

The combined influence of provinces’ economy diversity, administrative

capacity, inter-party consensus and public opinion largely contributes the

effectiveness of climate change policies (Environment and Climate Change

Canada, 2016; Houle, 2013). A trend in greenhouse gas emissions between

1990 and 2014 can be observed in Figure 8. This trend can also be related to

provincial selections of climate change policy instruments.

Figure 8. Greenhouse gas emissions by province and territory, Canada, 1990-2014

Source: Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2016

On closer inspection of Figure 8, it is evident that the following trends in the

amount of greenhouse gases can be extrapolated (Table 6):


i) Firstly, Scenario 1 provinces collectively emitted 8.54% less greenhouse gases in 2014 than in 1990. However, this only

accounted for 6% of Canada’s total emissions in 2014 (excluding

territories).

ii) Secondly, Scenario 2 provinces collectively emitted 1.52% less greenhouse gases in 2014 than in 1990. This accounted for

46.17% of Canada’s total emissions in 2014 (excluding territories).

iii) Thirdly, Scenario 3 provinces collectively emitted 63.07% more greenhouse gases in 2014 than in 1990. This accounted for

47.82% of Canada’s total emissions in 2014 (excluding territories).

Scenario Type

Mt CO2e 1990

Mt CO2e 2005

Mt CO2e 2014

Emissions Trend since

1990

Scenario 1

Provinces

(PEI, NS, NB,

NF)

48 56.3 43.9 Decreasing

Scenario 2

Provinces

(ON, QC, BC,

MB)

342.5 386.2 337.3 Decreasing

Scenario 3

Provinces

(AB, SK)

220.3 302.6 349.3 Increasing

Table 6. Analyses of data from Figure 8

Data source: Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2016

(https://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/default.asp?lang=en&n=18F3BB9C-1)


Evidently, the credit-based emissions trading system adopted in Alberta in

2007 was not successful in reducing greenhouse gases in the long-term

(Figure 8). This is opposed to the revenue-neutral carbon tax introduced in

British Columbia in the same year, which required all the revenue to be

returned to its residents in the forms of reduced personal, small business and

corporate income taxes (Pedersen and Elgie, 2015). This approach ultimately

reduced the amount of British Columbia’s greenhouse gas emissions in the

long-term (British Columbia Ministry of the Environment, 2012; Pedersen and

Elgie, 2015) (Figures 8 and 9).

Figure 9. British Columbia Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 1990-2012 Trends

Source: British Columbia Ministry of Environment, 2012

Note: Blue line denotes date of carbon tax commencement

Additionally, Québec has committed to reducing emissions 20% below 1990

levels by 2020 (Purdon, Houle and Lachapelle, 2014) and has also

successfully reduced its long-term greenhouse gas emissions due to joining

the WCI cap-and-trade system in 2012 (Figure 8). As opposed to the Alberta

credit-based system (which uses intensity targets and has no emissions cap)


the Québec system relies on the use of an absolute cap on emissions

(Purdon, Houle and Lachapelle, 2015).

Québec and British Columbia serve as examples of provinces that have

tapped into the carbon market by incorporating market-based mechanisms in

their climate change policy and have both decreased their greenhouse gas

emissions (Purdon, Houle and Lachapelle, 2014). This pattern shows that the

use of market-based instruments in climate change policy is effective in

reducing long-term greenhouse gas emissions. This efforts offer

encouragement to other provinces and states to reduce their greenhouse gas

emissions more cost-effectively too by incorporating carbon taxes in their

climate change policies or by committing to the WCI (Purdon, Houle and

Lachapelle, 2014).

Furthermore, the success of British Columbia’s taxation on carbon emissions

may serve as a model on which Alberta’s recently announced carbon tax for

2017 may be a potential success too. Lastly, the success of Québec’s

greenhouse gas reductions due to its WCI cap-and-trade system may also

serve as a template on which Ontario’s and Manitoba’s recent announcement

of joining may be a potential success too.

Conclusions:

There have been numerous barriers that have prevented effective climate

change action in Canada (Lachapelle, Borick and Rabe, 2012; MacDonald,

2009). The lack of burden sharing of abating greenhouse gas emissions in

Canada has contributed to its failure to limit emissions and reach international

climate change targets (Böhringer et al., 2015). However, there are signs of

change:


i) Public opinion on the support of market-based instruments in climate

change policy is increasing

ii) More provinces are incorporating carbon taxation and cap-and-trade

systems in their climate change policy

iii) Greenhouse gas emissions have been observed to decrease

significantly in British Columbia and Québec, serving as an

appealing factor for other provinces to act too

iv) For the first time, there is strong Canadian Federal leadership on

addressing the issue of climate change on a national scale through

the proposed nation-wide 2017 carbon tax

The first research question is addressed by the categorization of Canadian

provinces into different scenario types according to the way in which

policymakers framed the issues and opportunities offered by climate change.

Policymakers of different climate change action plans addressed potential

issues and opportunities based on provincial administrative capacity,

economic diversity, public opinion and inter-party consensus.

The second research question is addressed by comparing and contrasting the

greenhouse gas reduction effectiveness of different instruments employed in

distinctive provinces’ climate change policies.

To-date, the incorporation of market-based instruments in British Columbia

and Québec have proven effective at reducing long-term greenhouse gas

emissions, whilst the emission intensity credit-trading system employed in

Alberta has not been effective. Long-term data on Alberta’s greenhouse gas

emissions from 2017 onward will need to be analyzed to measure the

effectiveness of the carbon tax to be introduced in 2017. Furthermore, long-

term data on Ontario’s and Manitoba’s greenhouse gas emissions from 2017

onward will also require to be processed to measure the effectiveness of their

pledged participation in the WCI cap-and-trade system.


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The paper does show a lot of effort and background research. The main comments that can be made are that the paper seemed to over–rely on one source (Houle and MacDonald, 2012) and also that by borrowing the three scenario framework which is used in the “Introduction”, “Selection of policy instruments…” and “Different Provincial Approaches Towards” sections, it somewhat forces all arguments from the paper to go through that framework (although they did not necessarily had to, and sometimes did not seem fit to be placed in that framework), and the result is loss of clarity and organization in some parts and repetitive arguments in some parts. And, as mentioned once before in text, the presentation of arguments through scenario 1, 2, 3 seemed to have resulted in presenting mainly groups of provinces (which is fine and could have been done for a section or two of the paper to make that argument) but not a very clear picture of individual provinces. Also, please see the in-text comments, for more feedback and suggestions of future improvement. It seems that several of the visual representations (charts, tables, diagrams) seem to have just been pasted from other sources. Even if cited (which is correct) overreliance on external produced visual representations weakens good writing and the demonstration of own contribution. A simple way is to recreate the chart (column charts are very easy to create, the source of data would still be mentioned, but the result would be improved – figure 8 and table 6 are good examples of that can be done)

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