6/15/2014 Land Reform - Badly Need

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/land.reform.myanmar.htm 1/7

လယယာေျမဥပေဒႏငစကမႈဇလပငနးမားျဖင ဝသမခရနးမားပေပာကေရး

ျမနမာျပညမာ လယယာပငဆငမႈ ျပသနာ၊ အရႈပအရငးမားစြာ ျဖစေနျပး၊ လႊတေတာ က ေျဖရငးဖ႕ ေကာ မတဖြ႕၊

၂၀၁၂ ခႏစ လယယာေျမ ဥပေဒေရးဆြ အတညျပျပးခပါျပ။ ဒါေပမ အေကာငထညေဖၚဖ႕ နညးဥပေဒ မထတႏငပ

၈လေတာ ေနလ႕ လႊတေတာ ဥကဌက တြနးအားေပးျခငး ခရပါတယ။ ဟတနးကေတာ အေရးၾကးလြနးလ႕

လႊတေတာ မာ အထးၾကးစားခပါတယ။ အခေတာ လႊတေတာ လၾကးမားက လယယာေျမပငရငၾကးမားျဖစေနေတာ

ေဘးခဏခတထာပါတယ။ ဒါ အလြနအေရးၾကးေၾကာငးက လႊတေတာ အမတမားန႕ ႏငငေရးပါတမား၊

လမႈအဖြ႕အစညးမား အျမဆပကငထားရမာပါ။ အခေဆာငးပါးကေတာ လယယာေျမဥပေဒ Land Reform

ေအာငျမငစြာ အေကာငထညေဖၚခတ ႏငငမား ၾကးပြားတးတကချပး၊ မေအာငျမငတ ဖလစပငႏငငရ

စးပြားကဆငးပအေၾကာငး ျဖစပါတယ။ ျမနမာျပညက အမေဖာ ၊ အလပသမား ေရာငးစားေနျခငးက ရပတေစမ

နညးလမးအစ လယေျမယာဥပေဒ ျဖစပါတယ။ ဒါက ျမနမာအစးရေခါငးေဆာငအားလးသပါတယ။

အစးရသစလကထက ေျမယာေစးၾကးလာျခငးဟာ တႏငငလးျပည ဝသမခရနမား

ေပၚေပါကလာျခငးေၾကာငျဖစပါတယ။

တငဝမ၊ ေတာငကးရးယား န႕ ဖလစပင (၃)ႏငငစလး အေမရကနအကညမားစြာရပါတယ။ အေမရကနဦးေဆာငျပး

စးပြားစနစက ထးေထာငခပါတယ။ လယယာေျမဥပေဒ ေအာငျမငစြာကငသးႏငလ႕ တငဝမ၊ ေတာငကးရးယား

တ႕မာ ဝသမခရနစနစ အနညးဆးျဖစသြားေစပါတယ။ ဖလစပငမာ လယယာေျမဥပေဒက ျပဌာနးခေပမ

အေကာငထညမေဖၚႏငပ ကဆးခပါတယ။ ဒါေၾကာင ဖလစပငဟာ လာဘစားမႈန႕စးပြားေရး အႏမဆးက

ကေရာကသြားရပါတယ။ ဖလစပင ေတာရြာမားမာေတာ ျမနမာျပညလ ဆငးရပါတယ။ ဒါေပမ ျမနမာေလာကေတာ

မမြေတရာပါဘး။ ဒအေၾကာငး ဖလစပင ဖဦးထပန႕ေရႊျမနမာ ေဆာငးပါး ေရးချပးပါျပခငဗား။

ဆနဒယာဂတကသလ "ေဒါကတာယဂနဆနး၊ ပအပခဒ၊ ဟားဗတတကသလ"1 ေရးတစာတမးမားက

ေလလာမပါတယ။ သက ကးရးယားလမး၊ ေတာငကးရးယားမာ အေမရကားမာအလပေနတ

6/15/2014 Land Reform - Badly Need

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/land.reform.myanmar.htm 2/7

တကသလဆရာျဖစပါတယ။ ေတာငကးရးယားႏငငမာ ခရနအရငးရငအေၾကာငး၊ အေမရကနႏငငကေန စာတမးမား၊

စာအပ မားစြာထတေဝ၊ ပခ၊ သငၾကားေပးေနသ ျဖစပါတယ။ သျပစတ စာတနးတစခမာ "ခရနအရငးရင တငဝမး၊

ေတာငကးရးယား၊ ဖလစပင" ႏငင၃ခက ႏႈငးယဥထားပါတယ။ ဘာေၾကာင တငဝမး၊ ကးရးယားေတြက

ကမၻာ ထပတနးစးပြားႏငငျဖစျပး လာဘစားမႈမား အနညးဆးေရာကသြားခန ဖလစပငက

လာဘစားမႈအမားဆးႏငငအဆငက မတကပ၊ စးပြားေရးတးတကႏႈနးေႏးေကြးေနရျခငးက ရငးလငးေဖၚျပပါတယ။

၁၉၅၀က ဂပနျပးရင ဖလစပငက အာရတကမာ ဒတယစးပြားအငအားၾကး ႏငငျဖစခပါတယ။ အခေတာ ဗယကနမ၊

အငဒနးရား အဆငမာေရာကေနပါတယ။ စးပြားမတးတကပ၊ ျပညတြငး ဝသမခရနစနစၾကး ဘယလ

အျမစတြယသြားရသလ .. ဆတာက အခကလကမားစြာန႕ သးသပျပထားပါတယ။ ေဒးဗစခနး (ကးရးယားလမး

ပါေမာကၡ) ေရးတ " ခရနကကပတယလစဇင "2 စာအပမာလညး ျမနမာျပညအတြကသခၤနးစာယစရာ

အမားၾကးရပါတယ။

ေဒါကတာယ ရ စာတနး ၂၀၀၇ မာထတျပနပါတယ။ ကးကားခကမားစြားန႕ ႏငငေရးလပစားမႈ၊ အဆငျမငလာဘစားမႈ

မားမာ အဓကေရးထားပါတယ။ သာမနဝနထမးမား လာဘစားမႈက မေရးပါဘး။ ခရနးအရငးရငစနစ ကဆးဖ႕

ဘကစကေန ေလလာဆနးစစထားပါတယ။ ေနာကဆး အဓကအခကက လမား "ဝငေငြညမေအာင"4

လပေပးႏငျခငးလ႕ ေရးထားပါတယ။

ဘယလ "ဝငေငြညမေအာင" လပခသလ ဆေတာ လယယာေျမဥပေဒႏငစကမႈဇလပငနးမားက

ေအာငျမငစြာအေကာငထညေဖၚျခငးျဖစပါတယ။

ေဒါကတာယ အခကအလကမားအရ တငဝမ၊ ေတာငကးရးယား လယယာေျမဥပေဒ အေကာငးထညေဖၚႏငျခငးဟာ

- ေျမာကကးရးယားျခမးေျခာကမႈ၊ တရပကြနျမနစက စးရမမႈမား

- လႊတေတာ မ ေျမပငရင၊ ခရနမား အငအားနညးပါးျခငး တ႕ေၾကာငျဖစပါတယ။

လယေျမမားျပနေပးျခငး

ေတာငကးရးယားမာ ဂပနလကေအာက လြတလာခန ၁၉၄၅ မာ တစႏငငလး ထြနယကႏငတေျမအားလးရ ၅၈% က

လဦးေရး ၂.၇% လတညးစက ပငဆငခပါတယ။ ေျမာယာဥပေဒက လကေတြအေကာငထညေဖၚခနမာ

လႊတေတာ တြငး ေျမပငရငမား တားဆးမႈက ေကာ လႊားႏငခပါတယ။ တကယ ေတာငသလယသမားမားက

ေျမေတြျပနေပးပါတယ။

ေတာငကးရးယားမာ လယေျမေစးႏႈနးကေတာ " တစႏစလးစကပးတသးႏတနဖး"5 ရ ၁.၅ဆ ေတာငသမားက

ေပးရပါတယ ၊ ၅ႏစ အရစက ေပးသြငးေစပါတယ။ ေတာငသတစေယာကက ေျမ ၃ဟကတာ ထကပမပငရဘး

ဥပေဒသတမတပါတယ။ ၁၉၅၆ ခႏစက ထြနယကႏငတေျမ ၁၈%က လ ၆%ကပ ပငတအေျခအေန

ေရာကသြားပါတယ။ လယအငားထြနယကမႈေတြလညး ၄၉% ကေန ၇% ထ ကဆငးသြားပါတယ။

တငဝမမာ ၁၉၄၈-၁၉၅၃ လယေျမဥပေဒ ကငသးျပး လယေျမမား ေတာငသလယသမားမားက ျပနေပးပါတယ။

လယေျမေစးႏႈနးကေတာ တစႏစလးစကပးတသးႏတနဖးရ ၂.၅ဆ ေတာငသမားက ေပးရပါတယ ၊

ေတာငသေတြ လယပငျဖစလာေတာ လယသမားမား ဝငေငြပေကာငးလာပါတယ။ ဒေတာ ေတာငသလယသမား

6/15/2014 Land Reform - Badly Need

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/land.reform.myanmar.htm 3/7

မသားစမား ပညာသငႏငလာပါတယ။ ပညာတတမားျဖစလာျပး၊ စကမႈလယယာ၊ စားေသာကကနလပငနးမား

ထြနးကားလာပါတယ။ ကနထတလပငနးမား တးတကလာပါတယ။ ပညာတတမား ျဖစလာျခငးဟာ လမား

ဝငေငြမတမႈျဖစလာေစပါတယ။ လလတတနးစားအေရအတြက မားျပားလာေစပါတယ။

သေတသနျပခကမားအရ လယေျမဥပေဒျပဌာနးကငသးျခငးရ ၊ အဓကရညရြယခကကေတာ

လေတြဝငေငြညမေအာင လပႏငျခငးျဖစပါတယ။ ဥပမာ.. ထငးႏငင၊ လယသမားမားရ ဆနကအစးရေငြ

ေဒၚလာ၂ဘလေလာက ဆးရႈးသြားတာ၊ အျပစမေျပာရၾကပါဘး။ လယသမားမားဟာ ထငးႏငငမာ

အဆငးရဆးလတနးစားျဖစပါတယ။ ဒေတာ သတ႕က အစးရကေပးကမးတသေဘာပါပ။ ဒလလပေပးႏငလ႕

ထငးႏငင ကမၻာ အဆငထ တကလမးလာခပါတယ။ ျမနမာ ေခါငးေဆာငအမားစ (စစဗလေဟာငးမား)ဟာ

လယသမားမဘမးရးေတြ အမားၾကး ရပါတယ။ လယသမားဘဝျမငတငေရး အေျခခဟာ လယလပသ

လယေျမပငဆငေရးပါပ။

ဖလစပငမာေတာ ဒတယကမၻာစစျပးခနမာ ဖလစပငစးပြားေရးက အာရမာ ဂပနျပးရင ဒတယျဖစေနပါတယ။

အပခပသ အေမရကနမားက ၁၉၄၈ခေနာကပငးမာ၊ တြနးအားေပးလာပါတယ။ ေျမယာဥပေဒက

အေကာငထညေဖၚဖ႕ပါပ။ ဖလစပင လႊတေတာ ထမာ ေျမပငရငေတြက အမားစျဖစေနပါတယ။

ဥပေဒအေကာငထညေဖၚလ႕ မရႏငေတာ ပါဘး။ ေနာကဆး သမၼတမားက႕စ လကထကမာ အဆးဝါးဆး

ခရနအရငးရငစနစန႕လာဘစားမႈမားစြာေၾကာင သမၼတမားကစက ၁၉၈၇မာ လထအားန႕ျဖတခခပါတယ။ သမၼတ

အာကြႏ တကလာျပး လယေျမဥပေဒက ၾကးစားအေကာငထညေဖၚခေပမ ၃၀%ပ ျပးခပါတယ။ ေနာကပငး

ဖလစပငသမၼတမားမာ ေျမပငရငေတြန႕၊ ခရနေတြပ လႊတေတာ ထမာ အမားစျဖစေနလ႕ ဖလစပငမာ

လယေျမဥပေဒ ယခအခနထ မလပႏငပါဘး။

ရလဒကေတာ ဖလစပင န႕ တငဝမး၊ ေတာငကးရးယားတ႕ အေျခအေန မးန႕ေျမ ကြာျခားသြားပါေတာ တယ။

ဖလစပငမာ ဝသမခရနစနစ ရငသနဆျဖစပါတယ။

ျမနမာျပညမ အစပးခါစ ဝသမခရနစနစ

ေလာေလာဆယ ျမနမာျပညလႊတေတာ မာ " လယေျမသမးခရမႈ၊ လယေျမျပျပငေရး "3 ေတြ အျပငးအထန

ေဆြေႏြးေနပါတယ။ စစအစးရလကထကကတညးက အခ႕ ေပါကေရာကသမားက စစဗလေဟာငး၊

သားသမးနာမညန႕ သမးခထားရတာေတြက ဗလခပမႈးၾကးသနးေရႊ ဆအထ တငၾ။ ကတယလ႕ဆပါတယ။ ဒါလညး

မေျပလညေသးလ႕ အခတငရငးေနရတနးပါပ။ မတငရလ႕ ျငမခေနရသမားစြာ မၾကာခငေပၚလာရင ခကရေခမယ။

ေလာေလာဆယ၊ ဥပေဒမစးမးမႈ၊ လာဘစားမႈ အၾကးအငယ၊ ရငးႏးျမတႏမႈ၊ အခြနေကာကျခငး၊ ဘတဂတခြေဝျခငး

စတကစၥမားဟာ အနာဂါတျမနမာျပညအတြက အေရးၾကးပါတယ။ ပ၍ပ၍ အေရးၾကးတာကေတာ လယေျမဥပေဒ

အေကာငထညေဖၚဖ႕ျဖစပါတယ။ လယေျမဥပေဒက အစးရက ေစတနာန႕

တကယအေကာငထညေဖၚေပးျပးတေနာက ေတာငသလယသမားမား လယေျမပငလာမယျဖစပါတယ။

ျမနမာျပညမာ ေတာငသလယသမားမား လယေျမပငဆငမႈ နညးသြားပါျပး၊ လယဧက ၁၀၀၊ ၂၀၀ စသျဖင

လတစဦးကပ ပငေနၾကပါျပး။ သရငးဌားပစ ေတာငသမား လပကငေနရပါတယ။ စကပးလ႕

ရတသးႏေရာငးခေငြလညး လယသမားမား ေငြရႊငလာေအာင လပေပးရပါတယ။ ျမနမာျပညဟာ ေရေျမ၊

6/15/2014 Land Reform - Badly Need

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/land.reform.myanmar.htm 4/7

အေနထားသပေကာငးေတာ စကပး၊ ေမြးျမ တအားျဖစထြနးပါတယ။ ေတာငသလယသမားမား ကယပငလယယာ

ျဖစလာရင ေနာကပင ၂သးစက၊ ၃သးစကျပး ေခတမလာမယ။ ေတာငကးရးယား၊ တငဝမ ႏငငမားလ႕

ေတာငသလယသမားမား ဝငေငြေကာငးလာျပး၊ သားသမးမားက ေကာငးထားနငလာပါမယ။ ဒေတာ တျပညလး

ဝငေငြမတမႈ ျဖစလာျပး၊ ဝသမခရနစနစလညး အလလေပာကသြားမယ။ လာဘစားမႈမားလညး အလလ

နညးသြားပါလမမယ။

ဒါေၾကာင လယေျမဥပေဒက လႊတေတာ ဥကဌၾကးေျပာတအတငး လယယာေျမ စစမးစစေဆးေရးေကာ မရငက

အျမနဆး နညးဥပေဒထတျပနျပး၊ ဥပေဒက လႊတေတာ ကယစားလယမား ေဆြးေႏြးအတညျပရပါတယ။

ဒါဟာ အလြနအေရးၾကးတ ကစၥျဖစေၾကာငး၊ အနာဂါတျမနမာႏငငၾကး ဖလစပင အေသးစားႏငငဘဝ ေရာကမသြားဖ႕

လယယာေျမနညးဥပေဒ ေရးဆြသမား အထးဂရျပၾကမာျဖစပါတယ။ အခေရးဆြတ လယယာေျမဥပေဒဆတာ

ေတာငသလယသမားတငး လယပငရမယဆတာလား၊ အသမးခလယေျမကစၥတစခထလားေတာ မသပါ။

ေဆြးေႏြးၾကမ တပမေတာ သာ ၂၅% ကယစားလယမားန႕ ၾကခငေရးပါတ၊ အငအယဒပါတ၊ တ.စ.ည ပါတ၊

အငဒအကဖပါတ၊ တငရငးသားလမးစပါတမား လႊတေတာ ကယစားလယမား ခငဗား။

ေျမယာဥပေဒ (Land Reform)

အေရးၾကးဆးကေတာ ေတာငကးရးယား၊ တငဝမ၊ ထငးႏငငမားလ႕ ေတာငသလယသမားမား လယေျမပငဆငဖ႕

ဘယလလပေပးမလ ဆတ ဥပေဒျပဌာနး အေကာငထညေဖၚဖ႕ အလြနအေရးၾကးပါတယ။ ကြ နေတာ တ႕ ျမနမာႏငင

လႊတေတာ မာ အမားစေသာ ကယစားလယမားဟာ လယယာေျမမပငၾကပါဘး။ ဒေတာ မခြဆးျဖတရင ဒဥပေဒ

အတညျပျပး၊ လကေတြ႕ တကယလပတ ေတာငသလယသမားမား လယေျမပငဆငလာမယျဖစပါတယ။

သမၼတဦးသနးစနရ စးပြားေရးအၾကေပးအားလး ေျမယာဥပေဒ အေကာငထညဖလမာပါ။ လကတဆပစာ

ဝသမခရနအပစက လႊတေတာ ထမာ ကန႕လန႕ျဖစေနပါတယ။ လႊတေတာ လမားစက နားေလညေအာငလပေပးမ

ျပညတြငးပညာရငမား ဝငးဝနးလပေဆာငရပါမယ။ ျပညပကလညး ႏငငတကာအဖြ႕မားက ဖအားေပးဖ႕လပါတယ။

အငအားၾကးႏငငကေတာ အေမရကနျဖစပါတယ။ အေမရကနအားျဖင ဂပန၊ တငဝမ၊ ေတာငကးရးယား၊ စငကာပတ႕

ကမၻာထတတနးႏငငျဖစလာတာပါ။ တရပျပညၾကးလ အေမရကနအကညန႕ အႏစ၂၀အတြငး တးတကသြားတာ

မကျမငအေျခအေနျဖစပါတယ။ တကယလယယာလပကငသပ လယေျမပငဆငသငပါတယ။

စကမႈဇလပဖ႕၊ စကရလပဖ႕ သမးထားတယဆရငလ မလပျဖစေသးရင ဥပေဒအရ ျပနေပးရမာပါ။

လးဝျပနမေပးႏငရငလ စကမႈဇဆရင စကမႈဇေစးန႕ ညမ တ ေရာေၾကးေငြေပးရမာျဖစပါတယ။

အလြနရႈပေထြးပါတယ။ တစႏငငလးက ေျမေတြက ႏငငေတာ ကား၊ ရထားလမးေဆာကဖ႕၊ စကမႈဇလပဖ႕

ဘာညာန႕ သမးထားျပး၊ ၃ႏစေလာကထ ဘာမမလပေသးလ႕ ေၾကးတငေျမစာရငးက သြားစစမးေတာ ၊ အဒေျမေတြ

စစဗလေဟာငးမားရ သားသမး၊ ေဆြမးမား နာမညေပါကေနတာမး တစတငးျပညလး အနးအနးထေနပါတယ။

ဒလယေျမက ဘယလလပျပး ေမာငရငက ပငဆငေနရတာလ ေျဖရငးရပါမယ။ ျမနမာျပညအႏအျပားမာ

လယတစဧက ကပ၅သနး၊ ၁၀သနး ေစးႏႈနးပ ရပါေသးတယ။ လယတစဧက သးႏစကရင စကမႈဇ၊ ကားလမးေဘး

ေျမမားပ ေစးၾကးေပါကေနတာပါ။ ျခၾကညရင အာဏာရင၊ စစဗလေဟာငး၊ ခရနမားက ေျမအမားစက

6/15/2014 Land Reform - Badly Need

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/land.reform.myanmar.htm 5/7

မပငေသးပါဘး။ လယေျမယာပငဆငမႈက ပြငလငးျမငသာစြာ ထတျပနရပါမယ။

ျပညသလထကလညး လယေျမပငဆငမႈက ငါနမဆငလ႕ မေနသငပါ။ လတငး ေျမတကြကပငဆငေအာင

ျမနမာျပညမာ ေျမယာေတြ တပတေခါငးၾကးပါပ။ အားလးန႕ဆငတ ကစၥၾကးျဖစပါတယ။ ျမနမာျပညမာ

ဝသမခရနစနစၾကး ပေပာကသြားဖ႕ရာ အေရးယ၊ ေထာငခ၊ ျပစဒဏေပးရင ရမလား ထငၾကပါတယ။ မရပါဘး။

ျပညသတေယာကစက အခ လယေျမ နညးဥပေဒက ေအာငျမငစြာကငသးဖ႕ ကညမာ ၊ ဝသမခရနစနစလညး

ေပာကသြားျပး၊ လာဘစားမႈမားလညး ေလာ နညးသြားမာ ေသခာပါတယ။

ေတာငကးရးယားမာ လယေျမဥပေဒ အေကာငထညေဖၚႏငလ႕ တငးျပညၾကးပြားတးတကရပါတယ။ ဒါေပမ

ေတာငတနးန႕သစေတာေနရာေတြက ဥပေဒထ မထညလကမလ႕ အဒေနရာေတြပါ အမျခေျမေစးႏႈနး

မတရားေစးတကသြားခဖးပါတယ။ လကရျမနမာႏငငမာျဖစသလပါ။ အဒ ေတာငကးရးယား၊ တငဝမ ႏငငမားက

နမနာယျပး ဖ႕ပါပ။ အ... ဖလစပငႏငငကပ နမနာယမယဆရငေတာ ခကေချပေပါ ေနာ ...။

လႊတေတာ အမားစဟာ ခရန၊ လယေျမပငရငၾကးေတြ မဟတဘးဆတာ ေသခာပါတယ။ လနညးစကပ

စစဗလေဟာငး၊ ဝသမခရနေတြ ျဖစပါတယ။ ဒေတာ လႊတေတာ က လမားစဟာ လေတာ လေကာငးမားျဖစျပး၊

ျငမမေနသငေတာ ပါဘး။ ၾကခငေရးပါတဝငျဖစျပး၊ ပါတလၾကးမားက စစဗလေဟာငး၊ ခရနမားျဖစေနလ

သတ႕အလမလကပ ျပညသ႕အလက လကရပါမယ။

ဥပမာအခ႕

၂၀၁၂ ခႏစ လယယာေျမ ဥပေဒ အခနး ၁၁ ပဒမ ၃၂ တြင ႏငငေတာ အကးျဖစထြနးေစမည စမကနး မားအတြက

လယယာေျမက သမးယရာတြင လအပေသာ ပမာဏကသာ သမးယရမည ျဖစၿပး စမကနး အား သတမတ

ကာလအတြငး အျမနဆး ၿပးစးေစရန အေကာငအထည ေဖာ ရမည ျဖစရာ စမကနး မား ေဆာင႐ြကျခငး

မျပေတာ ပါက မလ လယယာေျမ လပပငခြင ရရထားေသာ လပဂၢလ၊ အဖြ႔အစညး ထ ျပနလည ေပးအပရမညဟ

ေဖာ ျပထားေၾကာငး ပသမၿမ႕နယ တရား လႊတေတာ ေရ႕ေနႀကး ဦးေကာ ဇငက သးသပ ေျပာဆသည။

ပသမမနစက႐အတြက သမးဆညးခေသာ လယဧက တစေထာငေကာ မာ အသးမျပပ စကရမႈးမားက

သးစားခေပးခသည။ မနစကရမာလညး ဂပနႏငင၊ တ႐တႏငင စသည ႏငငမားက ေျပာငးလ၍ အကးတ လပကင

ခၾကေသာ လညး ႏစစဥ အ႐ႈးေပၚခကာ ယမနႏစက ေငြကပ သနးေပါငးမားစြာ အလြသးစား ျပလပမႈျဖင မနစက႐မး

တစဦးအား ပသမခ႐င တရား႐းမ ေထာငဒဏ အႏစ ၄၀ ခမတခေၾကာငး ပသမခ႐င တရား႐းမ သရရသည။

ျမနမာႏငငမာ အမယာေျမေစးႏႈနးေတြ ေစးႀကးေနတာက ထနးညေဆာငရြကေပးဖ႔ ရ မရ

ျပညသ႔လႊတေတာ ကယစားလယ ဦးၿဖးမငးသနး ဇြန၁၀၊ ၂၀၁၄ ျပညသ႔လႊတေတာ မာ ေမးခြနးေမးျမနးရာမာ

ျပညနယ န႔ တငးေဒသႀကးအလက အမယာေျမ ပငဆငမႈအခြန ေကာကခနငဖ႔ လအပရင

ဥပေဒျပဌာနးသြားနငေအာင ႀကးစားသြားမာ ျဖစေၾကာငး သမၼတရး၀နႀကး ဦးစးေမာငက ျပနလညေျဖၾကားခပါတယ။

ယဇနကမၸဏက ကခငျပညနယ၊ ဟးေကာငးခငဝမးေဒသ၊ မးညႇငးခ႐င၊ ဖားကန႔ၿမ႕နယ၊ ဝါရာဇြပ ေကး႐ြာအပစ

အတြငးမ လယေျမဧက သးသနးေကာ က စကပးေရးႏင ေမြးျမေရးလပငနးမား လပေဆာငဖ႕ ဆျပး ၂၀၀၆ ခႏစခန႔

သမးယခပါတယ။ လယေျမ တစဧက ေလာ ေၾကးေငြ ရစေသာငးကပ ေပးခတယဆပါတယ။ ညႏႈငးမရလ႕ ၂၀၁၄

6/15/2014 Land Reform - Badly Need

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/land.reform.myanmar.htm 6/7

ကခငျပညနယမ ရနကန၊ ဗဟနးက ယဇနကမၸဏဌာနခပအထ ၂ၾကမလာေရာကျပး၊ ထပမ ဆႏၵျပၾကပါတယ။

ဖားကန႔ၿမ႕နယ၊ ျပညနယလႊတေတာ ကယစားလယ ဦးအငဖေရာငးဂမက အဆပါ ျပနာမားအတြက ကခငျပညနယ

လႊတေတာ ႏင ကခငျပညနယ အစးရအဖြ႔တ႔မ ပါဝငေျဖရငးရန အေရးႀကး အဆအျဖစ တငသြငးခၿပး၊ လႊတေတာ က

အတညျပခသညအတြက ကြငးဆငး စစမးေရးအဖြ႔က ၂၀၁၄ ဧၿပလ ၁၀ ရကေန႔တြင ဖြ႕စညးခသည။

နဂးခပ

အနာဂါတျမနမာႏငငအတြက

၁။ လယယာေျမ - ေတာငသလယသမား၊ လယလပသတငးလယပငေစတ ေျမယာဥပေဒ အေကာငထညေဖၚရပါမယ။

၂။ စကမႈဇ - အေသးစား/အလတစား SME လပငနးမားက အစးရက အားေပးရပါမယ။ (ဒအေၾကာငး

အမားၾကးေရးခၾကပါျပ)။

ဒါေၾကာင လယယာေျမနညးဥပေဒ အလြနအေရးၾကးပါတယ။ အျမနဆး အေကာငထညေပၚရပါမယ။ ျမနမာႏငင-

ကမၻာ အဆငေမ ာ လငေနသ ျပညတြငး၊ျပညပျမနမာလမးအားလး လယယာေျမဥပေဒအတြက

ဝငးဝနးလပေဆာငဖ႕လပါတယ။ အဓကပဂၢလမားက ျပညသ႕လႊြတေတာ န႕တပမေတာ ေခါငးေဆာငမား ျဖစပါတယ။

အကးေကးဇးမားကေတာ ..

- ေတာငသလယသမားတငး လယပငၾကမယျဖစပါတယ။

- ဝသမခရနစနစ ခပျငမးဖ႕အေျခချဖစပါတယ။

- လာဘစားမႈမးစ ေလာ နညး၊ ပေပာကေစမာ ျဖစပါတယ။

- စကမႈဇနယမားက ျမ႕နယတငးမာ အေသးစား၊ အလတစား စးပြားလပငနးမား လပႏငလာျပးရင..

- တငးရငးသား လကနကကငအေရးလ ေျပလညလာျပး..

- သာယာဝေျပာေသာ ႏငင၊ အနညးဆး ထငးႏငငအဆငက ေရာကလာမယ ေမ ာ လငပါတယ။

လယေျမျပျပငေျပာငးလမႈ ေအာငျမငစြာလပႏငပါေစ...။ ဇာနၾကး။

Reference

1. Dr. You, Jong-Sung Ph.D Harvard University

http://irps.ucsd.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/jongsung-you.htm

http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/003/5292.pdf

2. Crony Capitalism, Taiwan, South Korea and Philippine

3. Illegal Land Transfer, Land Reform

6/15/2014 Land Reform - Badly Need

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/land.reform.myanmar.htm 7/7

4. Income Equality

5. Cost of 1 Acre paddy field in Myanmar to reference

2012 Sample cost to produce rice by University of California

End...

**********************************************************************************

Myanmar Land Reform (Page 1)

Attachments

1. Philippine and Myanmar (Burmese) Page.9

2. Land Reform Paper by (Page14)Dr. You, Jong-Sung Ph.D Harvard University

3. Cost of one Acre paddy field (Page 59)Myanmar to reference2012 Sample cost to produce riceby University of California

4. ေျမလြတေျမရငးဥပေဒ ၂၀၁၂ (Page 79)

5. ေျမယာဥပေဒ ၂၀၁၂ (Page 91)

6/15/2014 ဖလစ� င - ဖဦးထ� ပ�မ◌◌း

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/Paootoke.htm 1/6

ဖလစပင၊ ဖဦးထပလမးႏငေရႊျမနမာ

ႏငငျခားအလပသြားလပဖးသမား ဖလစပငလမးမတေဆြေတြ႕ရမညျဖစသည။ စငကာပရ ျမနမာမားက ဖဦးထပ

ဟ နာမညေပးထားၾကသည။ ဦးထပပ ေၾကာင ဖဦးထပေခၚျခငးမဟတပါ။ ျမနမာမားက မေလးရားလမးက "မ"၊

အငဒနးရားလမးက "အ"၊ ကးရးယားလမးက "ကၾကး"၊ ဂပနလမးက "ဂငယ"၊ ဖလငပငလမးက "ဖ" - ဖဦးထတ ဟ

ေခၚျခငးျဖစသည။ ပညာမတတေသာ ဖလစပငအမးသမးမားစြာ အမေဖၚအျဖစ ကမၻာအႏ႕အလပလပေနခန

စကၤာပေရာကျမနမာအလပသမားမားႏင ပပနး၊ ခစသျဖစျပး အမေထာငက၊ သားသမးမားျဖင ဖလစပငႏငငသ႕

လကေနထငသ ျမနမာျပညဖြားေယာကၤ ားမားစြာ ရေနေလျပျဖစသည။ အခ႕ ဖလစပငအမးသမးမားသည

ျမနမာႏငငသ႕ ေယာကၤ ားႏငအတ လကလာေနထငၾကသည။ ကမၻာေပၚတြင တရပကလားျပးလ င

ဖလစပငလမးသည အမားဆးႏငငတကာတြငအလပလပၾကသည။ ယခအခါ ျမနမာျပညတြငးရ

စကရအလပရမားတြင ဖလစပငအလပသမားမားစြာေရာကလာျပျဖစသည။ လႈငသာယာစကမႈဇတြင

အမငားေနထငသ၊ ဖလစပငအလပသမားမားစြာ စေန၊တနဂၤေႏြတြင အျပငထြကလညပတေနသညက ျမငရသည။

မၾကာမ ျမနမာတစႏငငလးတြင ဖလစပငအလပသမားမားစြာ ေရာကရေတာ မညျဖစသည။

ႏငငတကာတြင အလပလပေနသ ဖလစပငလမး စစေပါငး ၁၀.၄ သနးမ ၁၃.၅သနးအထ ရျပး၊ ႏငငလဦးေရ

သနး၉၀ေကာ ၏ ၇% ရေသာ လပသားထၾကးျဖစသည။ သတ႕ျပနပ႕ေသာ ေငြေၾကး ကနေဒၚလာ ၂၁ ဘလ

(၂၀၁၁) ရသျဖင တမးသားလးထတကနတနဘး GDP ၏ ၁၃.၅% အထပငရေလသည။ ႏငငအတြက

အၾကးမားဆးဝနေငြရာေပးေနေသာ ဖလစပငအလပသမားမားက OFW Overseas Filipino Workers

ဟေခၚၾကသည။ ဝကတြင ဖတၾကညပါက ဖလစပငလမးအမားဆးအလပလပေသာ ႏငငမားမာ

- အေမရကနႏငင ၃၄၉၄၂၈၁ (၃.၄၉သနး)

- ေဆာ ဒအာေရဗ ၁၂၆၇၆၅၈ (၁.၂၆ သနး)

6/15/2014 ဖလစ� င - ဖဦးထ� ပ�မ◌◌း

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/Paootoke.htm 2/6

- ယေအအး ၉၃၁၅၆၂

- ကေနဒါ ၈၅၂၄၀၁

- မေလးရား ၆၈၆၅၄၇

- ၾသစေၾတးလား ၃၉၁၇၀၅

- ဂပန ၂၄၃၁၃၆

- အဂၤလန ၂၁၈၇၇၇

- ကဝတ ၂၁၃၆၃၈

- ကာတာ ၂၀၀၀၁၆

- ေဟာငေကာင ၁၉၅၁၂၈

- စငကာပ ၁၈၄၄၉၈

- အတလ ၁၇၂၁၄၈ ....တ႕ျဖစသည။ ဖလစပငအလပသမားမားမာ ဥေရာပ၊ အာရပ၊

ေတာငအေမရက တးတကသညႏငငအားလးနးပါးႏင၊ စးပြားေကာငးသညေနရာမားတ႕တြင ေတြ႕ႏငပါသည။

ဖလစပငလမးမားစြာတ႕သည ျပညတြငးမပညာသငၾကား၊ အရြယေရာကလ င ျပညပထြကအလပလပသညမာ

ရးရာထးစပင ျဖစေနသည။ ျပညတြငးတြင အလပကငရားပါးသညအျပင လပအားခမာလညး

ႏငငျခားထကစာလ င အလြနနညးပါးသျဖင ျပညပထြကအလပလပၾကသည။ အလပအကငရာေဖြေရး

ေအဂငစမားမတဆင ျပညပအလပအကင အလြယတက၊ ရာေဖြႏငျပး၊ ေအးဂငခ ေပးစရာပငမလေပ။

ဖလစပငေအးဂငအားလးနးပါးသည အလပရငထမ ေအးဂငခေတာငးယၾကသည။ အရညခငးနညးပါးသမားသာ

ေအးဂငမားက အလပရာေဖြခ ေတာငးၾကသည။ အမားအားျဖင အလပသမားက ေပးစရာမလေခ။

အစးရကယတငက အလပကငမားက ရာေဖြေပးျခငးမားရသည။ ႏစစဥႏစတငး လဦးေရတစသနးေကာ

ျပညပအလပကငသစမားျဖင ထြကခြာၾကသည။ အလပကငမားမာ ဆရာဝန၊ ဖစယေဆးဝနထမး၊ သနာျပ၊

စာရငးကင၊ ကြနျပတာပညာရင၊ အငဂငနယာ၊ ေျဖေဖာ ေရးေတးဂတ၊ တကကနရင၊ ေကာငးဆရာ၊ စစမႈထမး၊

သေဘၤာသား၊ သေဘၤာအရာရ၊ စားေသာကဆငအလပသမား စသညတ႕ျဖစျပး၊ အမေဖၚလပငနး၊

ကနးမာေရးအကလပငနးမားအတြက ဖလစပငအမးသမး အေျမာကအမား ျပညပထြကအလပလပကငၾကသည။

အလပလပရငး ထႏငငမား၏ အျမေနထငခြငမားရရကာ မသားစမားပါ ေခၚယ၊ ေကာငးထားၾကသည။

ထႏငငသားအျဖစ ခယရႏငပါက ႏငငသားခယလကၾကသည။ ထနညးျဖင အေမရကနႏငငသား၊

ဥေရာပႏငငသား ဖလစပငလမးမားစြာ ရေနျပျဖစသည။

ယခေဆာငပါးမာ ဖလစပငႏငငသားမား

- ဘာေၾကာင ျပညပထြကအလပလပရသနညး။

- ျပညပထြကအလပလပျခငး၏ အကးႏငအဆး

တ႕ကေလလာရနျဖစသည။

ဘာေၾကာင ျပညပထြကအလပလပရသနညး ေမးခြနး၏၊ အေျဖမာ ရငးေနပါသည။ လစာ၊

ဝငေငြပျပးရေသာေၾကာင ျဖစသည။ ျပညပအလပသြားလပျပး ေငြစျပနလာပါက ဖလစပငႏငငတြငး

6/15/2014 ဖလစ� င - ဖဦးထ� ပ�မ◌◌း

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/Paootoke.htm 3/6

ျပနလညရငးႏးလပကငရန အငမတနမလြယေသာေၾကာင၊ အလပသမားမားမာ ျပညပသြားလက၊

ေငြစျပနလာလက၊ ေငြကနသြားလ င ျပညပထြကအလပလပလက ..အသကၾကး၊ အနားယခနေရာကမ မမႏငငသ႕

အျပးအျငမးစားယ၊ ဦးေခါငးခေသဆးၾကေသာ အစဥအလာျဖစေနသညမာ ႏစေပါငးတစရာခန႕ရျပျဖစသည။

အကးေကးဇးမာ ျပညတြငးကနေနရစေသာ ဇနး၊ သားသမး၊ မဘမားက မနမနေထာကပေပးႏငသည။

ျပညတြငးတြင ေနစရတ၊ စားစရတ ေစးခသျဖင သာမနလတနးစားအဖ႕ စားဝတေနေရး အဆငေျပေပသည။

သ႕ေသာ လ ပစစပစၥည၊ ဇမခပစၥညး၊ ေမာေတာ ကား စသညတ႕မာ အငမတနေစးၾကးပါသည။

လကနထပစၥညးမားမာ ျပညပသြားအလပလပသမားသာ ဝယႏငသည။

ဖလစပငတြငခရနလတနးစားမာ အလြနခမးသာပါသည။ ဆးၾကးက ဆကေရးပါမည။

ကမၻာပထမဆးပတသ စပနႏငငသား မာဂယလနဆသ ၁၅၂၁တြင ဖလစပငကြ နစကေရာကရျပး

စပနကလနအျဖစ သမးယခသည။ မလက နတကးကြယသ၊ ဘာသာစ၊ လမးစမားစြာေနထငၾကသည။

စပနကလနလကထကတြင ႏစေပါငး၃၀၀ၾကာခသည။ ဖလစပငအားလး ခရစယန(ရမငကာသလစ)မား

ျဖစလာၾကသည။ စပနကလနစနစမ ၁၉ရာစတြင အေမရကနႏငငက သမးပကကာ အေမရကနကလနျဖစချပး

ဒတယကမၻာစစအတြငးက ဂပနသမးပကခခရသည။ ကမၻာစစအျပး အေမရကနက လြတလပေရးေပးခသည။

အစးရအဖြ႕၏ အကငပက၊ ျခစားမႈမားစြာခချပး၊ သမၼတဖာဒနနမားက႕စ အႏစ၂၀အပခပသညကာလမာ

အဆးဝါးဆးျဖစခသည။ ၁၉၈၆ ျပညသ႕ေတာ လနေရးျဖစျပးေနာက သမၼတအာကြႏ တကလာခသည။ ေနာက

သမၼတအဆငဆင ေျပာငးခေသာ လညး၊ သမၼတအာကြႏ မအပ အားလးနးပါး ျခစားမႈမားျဖင ရႈပေထြးေနသည။

လာဘစားမႈ၊ ႏငငေတာ ေငြမားအလြသးစားလပျပး ျဖတခခရသညသမၼတဖာဒနနမားကးစ၏ ဇနးသည

အမယဒါမားက႕စလ အထကလႊတေတာ အမတျပနျဖစေနသည။ ဖာဒနနမားက႕စ၏သားလညး

လႊတေတာ အမတျဖစေနသည။ ခရနမားစြာ ႏငင၏စးပြားေရးက ၾကးကင၊ လပစားေနေသာေၾကာင

တငးျပညတးတကမႈမရပ၊ ခရနသေဌးလတနးစားႏင ဆငးရသားတ႕ကြာျခားေနသည။ ျပညပအလပလပသမားမာ

လလတတနးစားျဖစေနသည။

ျပညပသ႕တတသပညာရငမားစြာ ထြကအလပလပေသာေၾကာင

- ပညာတတမား ႏငငခစျမတႏ းစတ (မးခစစတ) နညးသြားသည။

- ထပညာတတမားမာ မမေကာငးေကာငးေနရလ င ေတာ ျပျဖစလာျပး၊ ႏငငေရးစတဝငစားသ နညးပါးသြားသည။

- ခရနမားႏငအစးရဝနထမးမားပးေပါငးလပကငမႈေၾကာင တငးျပညလမတးတကပါ

- လခမးသာမားသာ ပျပးခမးသာေနျပး၊ ဆငးရခမးသာအလြနကြာျခားေနပါသည။

ဖလစပငႏငငသည ဒတယကမၻာစစမတငမက အေရ႕ေတာငအာရတြငအၾကြယဝဆးျဖစျပး၊ အာရတကတြင

ဂပနျပးလ င ဒတယအၾကြယဝဆးႏငငျဖစသည။ ဖလစပငႏငငသားမား ကမၻာအႏ႕မကႏာပြငခသည။

၁၉၆၀ေနာကပငး စးပြားေရးပကစးလာျပး၊ သမၼတဖာဒနနမားက႕ အႏစ၂၀ အာဏာရငစနစေအာကတြင

တငးျပညစးပြားပကခသည။ မားက႕ႏငအေပါငးအပါမား၏ ခရနစနစေၾကာင တငးျပညသယဇာတႏငဝငေငြမား

လတစစလကသ႕ေရာကသြားရသည။ ထခရနစနစႏငျခစားမႈမားက ေနာကသမၼတမားက

နညးပါးရနၾကးစားေသာ ၾကေသာ လညး၊ ယခ အခနထ ခရနစနစသည အားေကာငးလ ကရသည။ တငးျပညတြငး

ျခစားမႈမားစြာ ရေနေသာေၾကာင အေရ႕ေတာငအာရ၊ ဒမကေရစႏငငမားတြင အဆငးရဆးႏငငျဖစေနပါသည။

6/15/2014 ဖလစ� င - ဖဦးထ� ပ�မ◌◌း

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/Paootoke.htm 4/6

ပညာတတမားႏငအစးရဝနထမးမားမာ လလတတနးစားျဖစျပး အဆငေျပၾကသည။ ခရနလတနးစားမာ

အလြနခမးသာျပး လကနကကငအေစာငမားျဖငပင ငားရမးေနထငႏငသည။

ဖလစပငႏငငသည ေငြတတႏငသမားမာ ေဘာဒဂါတလျခေရးခန႕ထားႏငျပး၊

လငစငေသနပမားကငေဆာငခြငရသည။ မမေနအမတခါးဝ၊ လာရပေနသအား မမေသနပျဖငပစခတ

ကာကြယႏငေသာ ဥပေဒရသည။ ဖလစပငတြင ကာစႏ မား၊ ေတးဂတေပာ ပြမား၊

မးယစမာဖးယားဂဏမားစြာရသည။ ျပညပအထ ကာစႏ ၊ မာဖယာဂဏမား ရၾကသည။

ဖလစပငႏငင ၉၅%သည ခရစယန(ကာသလစ)မားျဖစျပး၊ ၅%သည မဆလငမားျဖစသည။

ဘာသာေရးအဆးမေအာကတြင ေနထငၾကေသာ လမးမားျဖစေသာေၾကာင ဆငးရေသာ လညး၊

ေရာငရတငးတမသည လမးျဖစသည။ ေပာ ရြငစြာေနတတေသာ လညး အဂၤလပစာလတငးနးပါးဖတႏငေသာ

အေျခခပညာတတသမားသည။ ထ႕ေၾကာင လင၊မးယစေဆးေၾကာငျဖစေသာ ကးစကေရာဂါ HIV ႏႈနး၊

ကမၻာတြငအနညးဆး ျဖစသည။ (ဖလစပင<0.01%, ျမနမာလမး 0.6%၊ ထငးလမး 1.2% WHO. UNICEF

data) ရၾကသည။

ျမနမာတစဦးအတြကသးသပခက

လကရအေျခအေနတြင ျပညပသြားေရာကလပကငသ ျမနမာမား ၁၀% နးပါးရေနမညျဖစသည။ အမားဆး ထငး

(၄သနး)၊ မေလးရား (၅သနး)၊ စငကာပ (၂သနး)၊ အေမရကန(၃သနး)၊ အေရ႕အလယပငး (၁သနးခန႕)ႏင တရပ၊

ဂပန၊ ကးရးယား၊ ဥေရာပႏငငမားတြငလညး ရေနပါသည။ ၂၀၁၁ ျမနမာျပညအစးရသစတကလာျပး

တငးျပညျပျပငေျပာငးလေရးလပသညေနာကပငး ျပညပထြကလပကငသ ပမားျပားလာသကသ႕ျဖစေနသည။

ႏငငကးလကမတအလြယတက ရရေသာေၾကာင၊ လစာေငြပရေသာ ျပညပသ႕ ေအးဂငဖး

ကပသနးေပါငးမားစြာေပးျပး တသသ ထြကေနဆပငျဖစသည။ ပညာမရသ၊ ထငးအလပသြားလပလ င ကပ၄သနး၊

အေရ႕အလယပငး ကပ၁၀သနး၊ စငကာပ ကပသနး၂၀ စသျဖင ပြစားခမားေပးျပး

ျပညပအလပထြကလပေနဆျဖစသည။ ဖလစပငလမးမားကသ႕ ပြစားခမေပးရေသာ ပြစားမားမေတြ႕ဖးေသးပါ။

ဝမးနညးစရာျဖစသည။ ျမနမာအခငးခငး ေခါငးပျဖတ၊ ရတစား၊ ျဖတစားလပေနသညမာ ေနာကဆး လကနကး၊

အမးသမးမားကေရာငးစားခသညအဆငပင ေရာကေနသညမာ ေၾကာကစရာေကာငးပါသည။

ဖလစပငႏငငမာ အတယစရာမားစြာရပါသည။ လကရအေနေျခအေနတြင ဖလစပငလမးသည ျမနမာထက အစစ၊

အရာရာ သာလြနေနေၾကာငး ျငငးမရပါ။ သ႕ေသာ ျမနမာႏငငသည ဖလစပငႏငငအေသးစား

ပစျဖစေနသညက ဝမးနညးစ ြာေတြ႕ရသည။

ကြ ႏ ပတ႕ အနာဂါတျမနမာျပညက ထငးႏငင၊ ဗယကနမႏငငကသ႕ တးတကေစလပါသည။

ေတာငကးရးယားစတငက ႏစျခကေသာ လညး အဆငတနး၊ ေဝးကြားလပါသည။ ဖလစပငႏငငကသ႕

မမႏငငသားအလပသမားမား၊ ျပညပသြားေရာကလပကငမႈက မႏစသကပါ။ လြနခေသာ အႏစ၂၀ခန႕က ထငး၊

ဗယကနမ မားသည စငကာပႏငအျခားႏငငမားသ႕ လာေရာကလပကငၾကသည။ ယခအခါ ထငး၊

ဗယကနမအလပသမားမား စငကာပတြငလာမလပေတာ ပါ။ သတ႕ျပညတြငး တစလေဒၚလာ ၃၀၀မ ၅၀၀အထ

6/15/2014 ဖလစ� င - ဖဦးထ� ပ�မ◌◌း

http://mingalaronline.biz/stories/Paootoke.htm 5/6

အလြယတက အလပကငေပါေနျပး၊ ထဝငေငြျဖင စားဝတေနေရး အဆငေျပေနသျဖင

ျပညပထြကလပစရာမလေတာ ။ ျပညပထြကလပသမားမာ အတစပက Expat ဟေခၚသည လစာေကာငးေသာ

တတသပညာရငမားသာ ျဖစသည။

ျမနမာျပညတြင အစစ၊ ေစးၾကးသြားျပး အမျခေျမေစးသာမက၊ အျခားေစးႏႈနးမားလညး

အေရ႕ေတာငအာရႏငငမားထက ၂ဆခန႕ ေစးတကသြားျခငးမာ ဝသမခရနစနစေၾကာငျဖစသည။

ဥပေဒစးမးမႈမရျခငး၊ လာဘစားေသာ အစးရအရာရၾကးမားက အဖမးဆးမရပ လႊတထား၊ ေစာငၾကညေနျခငးမာ

ဆငးရခမးသာ ကြာဟမႈၾကးမားသထက၊ ၾကးမားလာေစမညျဖစသည။

ထကသ႕ ဥပေဒမ၊ ဥပေဒၾကးစးမႈမရပ၊ ႏငငဖြ႕စညးပအေျခခဥပေဒကအစ

ဝသမခရနမားႏငအာဏာရငေဟာငးၾကးမားအား ကာကြယထားပါက၊ ဖလစပငတြင အာဏာရငမားက႕စ

အမးအႏြယမား ယေန႕တငေအာင ေနရာယထားသကသ႕ ျဖစသြားမည။ ျမနမာျပညတြင ဘနးဘရင၊

ဝသမခရနမား ရေနဆျဖစသည။ ထသမား မရငးႏငပါက ထငးႏငင၊ ကးရးယားႏငငမားကသ႕

ကမၻာ စပြားေရးထပတနးႏငငမား မဟတပ၊ အလပသမားမားေရာငးစားေနေသာ ဖလစပငႏငငကသ႕ ျဖစသြာမည။

ထအခါ ကြ ႏ ပတ႕ ျမနမာလငယမား၏ အနာဂါတမေကာငးေတာ ပါ။

ျမနမာ ဝသမခရနမားေၾကာင ဖလစပငကသ႕ ျဖစသြားမသြားေစလပါ။ ဖြ ျဖးဆႏငငတငး ခရနရပါသည။

ကးရးယားႏငဖလစပင ၂ႏငငတ႕၏ ခရနအရငးရငစနစ အျပငရငသနရငး ကးရးယားႏငငမ

ကမၻာ အဆငတကသြားျပး၊ ဖလစပငႏငငသည မတးတကပတေနရျခငးက ျမနမာအာဏာပငမား

သခၤနးစာယရပါမည။ ျမနမာအၾကးတနးအရာရၾကးမား ေတာငကးရးယားသ႕ ေစလႊတေလလာၾကသညဟ

ဆသည။ ျပညသလထမလညး ေလလာ၊လကေတြ႕ကငသးရနလေပမည။ ျမနမာျပညစးပြားေရးစနစသည

ဖလစပငနညးလမးသ႕ ဦးတညေနျခငးကလ အခနမေျပာငးပစရနလေနသည။

အစးရလၾကးမငးမားက

၁။ ျပညသလထအားျဖင အစးရလၾကးမငးမားက ပညာေပးရန

၂။ ျပညသလထအားျဖင အစးရလၾကးမငးမားက ပညာေပး၊ကညရန

၃။ ျပညသလထအားျဖင အစးရလၾကးမငးမားက ပညာေပး၊ ကည၊ ဝသမခရနဖယရားေရး

ေစာေစာစးစးလပေဆာငရန ..ျဖစပါသည။ ဌာနဆငရာမား၏ ႏငငပငေျမမားက ငားရမး၊လႊေျပာငးျခငးမားက

ေကာ မတဖြ႕ျပး တားဆးဖ႕ လပါသည။

ဆးပငငယစဥ လက၂ေခာငးျဖငပင ဝသမခရနးၾကးက အသာယာ၊ ႏႈတပစ၊ ေျဖရငးလ႕ရပါသည။

ဆးပငၾကးလာပါက မနညး၊ အားထတ ႏႈတပစရပါမည။ ဆးပင ပငစည၊လတစေယာကဖကခန႕ၾကးလာခနတြင

ယခဖလစပငခရနမားက ဖယထတဖ႕မလြယသလ ႏႈတပစဖ႕ အလြနခကသြားမညျဖစပါသည။ ဇာနၾကး

Embedded Autonomy or Crony Capitalism?

Explaining Corruption in South Korea, Relative to Taiwan and the Philippines,

Focusing on the Role of Land Reform and Industrial Policy

You, Jong-Sung Ph. D. candidate in Public Policy

Doctoral Fellow, Inequality and Social Policy Program Harvard University

jsyou@fas.harvard.edu

Abstract

By comparing Korea’s relative level of corruption with that of Taiwan and the Philippines and examining how a political economy of corruption has developed over time within Korea, this paper provides a test of existing theories on causes of corruption. I find that inequality of income and wealth best explains the relative level of corruption among these countries and across time within Korea, consistent with You and Khagram (2005). Although developmental state and crony capitalism literature emphasize the “autonomous and uncorrupt bureaucracy” and “rampant cronyism and corruption” in Korea, respectively, I find that Korea has been neither as corrupt as the Philippines nor as clean as Taiwan. Successful land reform in Korea and Taiwan brought about low levels of inequality and corruption, while failure of land reform in the Philippines led to a high level of inequality and corruption. However, wealth concentration due to chaebol industrialization increased corruption over time in Korea, in comparison with Taiwan.

Key words: corruption, crony capitalism, developmental state, income inequality, land

reform, chaebol, South Korea

Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1-4, 2005.

1

Introduction

South Korea (Korea hereafter, except occasionally), together with Taiwan, has been

praised by many scholars as a model developmental state with a competent and uncorrupt

bureaucracy (Johnson 1987; Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; Wade 1990). Since the financial

crisis of 1997, however, Korea has often been labeled as an example of crony capitalism,

together with other Asian countries like the Philippines (Kang 2002). Hence, an important

question to be resolved is whether Korea has been as corrupt as the Philippines or relatively

clean like Taiwan.

Indeed, Taiwan and the Philippines are ideal comparison cases. Korea shares a lot of

similarities with Taiwan and the Philippines. The initial economic conditions in the 1950s

and 1960s were not much different among these countries. The three countries all

experienced colonial rule before World War II, and were all heavily supported by the US

during the cold war era. They all have been experiencing democratization processes over

the last two decades. Despite the similar initial conditions, however, the levels of corruption

and economic development today are quite different. Taiwan has an obviously lower level

of corruption than the Philippines. Not only do all the available quantitative measures of

(perceived) corruption indicate that this is the case, but this has not been contradicted by any

qualitative studies, to my knowledge. Then, where is Korea’s relative level of corruption

located, and why is that so?

The second sets of questions are about the trend. Many scholars regarded Park

Chung-Hee’s regime (1961-79) as a prototype of a developmental state, while they judged

Syngman Rhee’s regime (1948-60) as predatory (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995). However,

others argued that both regimes were similarly corrupt (Wedeman 1997; Kang 2002). Thus,

the controversy about the transition from a predatory state to a developmental state is another

interesting question. Understudied, yet no less important, questions are how

industrialization and economic development since the 1960s and political democratization

since 1987 have affected the level of corruption in Korea.

By corruption, I mean “abuse of power for private gain.” There are many kinds of

corruption, but this paper will focus on political corruption and high-level bureaucratic

corruption. Although petty corruption may be more important for the everyday lives of most

2

people, there is evidence that the degree of petty corruption is closely correlated with the

degree of political and high-level bureaucratic corruption.1 Also, I use the term capture,

which indicates that corruption has reached the point in which the state has lost autonomy and

serves for the special interests of the privileged.

This comparative historical case study has two purposes. First, I intend to contribute to a

better understanding of corruption and development in Korea with a comparative perspective

through an extensive and systematic examination of both quantitative and qualitative

evidence. Second, I aim to provide a test of existing theories on causes of corruption. It’s

impossible to conduct a perfect test through this small-N study. However, this study will

make a meaningful contribution by not only looking at correlations among the three countries

but examining causal mechanisms through process tracing. In particular, I will test and

examine whether You and Khagram’s (2005) argument and finding about the causal effect of

income inequality on corruption has explanatory power in this comparative historical analysis

and, if so, what are the causal mechanisms.

Most empirical studies on the causes of corruption, including You and Khagram (2005),

were cross-national statistical analyses. Although large-N quantitative studies have an

advantage in identifying correlations between an explanatory variable(s) and the dependent

variable controlling for plausible covariates, and thus may be less vulnerable to omitted

variables bias than small-N case studies, they are often vulnerable to endogeneity bias and

weak at identifying causal mechanisms. Comparative historical case studies can be useful for

establishing causal direction and illuminating causal mechanisms by examining the historical

sequence and intervening causal process between an independent variable(s) and the outcome

of the dependent variable (Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997).

This study makes use of all the available quantitative and qualitative data from the

relevant literature. Although most data are secondary, careful examination of extensive data

from secondary sources may be better than the use of limited, and perhaps biased, primary

data.

I find that Korea has been more corrupt than Taiwan but much less corrupt than the

Philippines. I also find that income and wealth inequality is closely correlated with the 1 See Table 1 and the discussion on pages 10-11 for the evidence.

3

relative levels of corruption among the three countries. In order to establish causal direction

and identify causal mechanisms, I conduct careful process tracing focusing on the role of land

reform and industrial policy.

The organization of this paper is as follows. I first briefly review developmental state

literature and crony capitalism literature on Korea’s corruption and development. In the next

sections, I assess various pieces of available evidence on Korea’s level of corruption relative

to Taiwan and the Philippines and its trend since the 1950s. Then, I examine several

potential explanations for Korea’s relative level of corruption. In the following sections, I

look at how land reform and chaebol industrialization were carried out in Korea and how they

affected inequality and corruption, in comparison with Taiwan and the Philippines. I also

examine what role democratization has played in Korea. The final section summarizes my

findings and concludes with research and policy implications.

Embedded autonomy or crony capitalism?

Korea’s economy was regarded as a spectacular success story among developing countries,

together with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (World Bank 1993). Although Korea

was severely hit by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and recorded negative growth in

1998, it recovered rapidly and is growing again. Many scholars tried to explain Korea’s and

these four tigers’ success, and the most influential explanation was centered on the role of the

state (Amsden 1989: Evans 1995; Wade 1990). They argued that Korea’s “developmental

state” distinguished it from many other developing countries that were characterized as

“predatory states”. The developmental states of these four East Asian countries were

coherent and autonomous so that they were able to effectively carry out their economic

policies without degenerating into capture and corruption. The core of the developmental

state was “Weberian bureaucracy” with meritocratic recruitment and promotion, career

service, and reasonable pay and prestige. Later some South Asian countries such as

Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia came to be included in the list of developmental states,

although their growth records were not as fantastic as those of the four East Asian tigers.

However, the Asian financial crisis radically changed the perceptions of these countries,

and in particular, of Korea. Many, including the IMF, blamed the crony capitalism of Korea

4

and other affected countries as primarily responsible for the crisis. Thus, overnight, Korea’s

image was radically changed from a model developmental state with good governance to a

country with rampant corruption and cronyism. Then, what is the truth? Did the

proponents of the developmental state theory fail to see the cronyism and corruption in Korea?

Or did the crony capitalism argument exaggerate corruption and cronyism in Korea?

Whereas proponents of the developmental state theory had to explain why state intervention

did not produce much corruption in Korea, those who argued for crony capitalism had to

explain how Korea was able to achieve rapid economic development in spite of corruption

and cronyism.

The government intervention in the economy meant extensive interaction between public

officials and businessmen. The interaction could be collaboration, or collusion and

corruption, or both. The developmental state argument saw the close relationship between

government and business as benign collaboration, but the crony capitalism argument

interpreted it as collusion and corruption. Evans (1995) argued that collaboration between

the government and business was critically important for development, because information

exchange was necessary for effective policy formation and implementation and building up

trust helped reduce transaction costs. He further argued that an insulated, meritocratic

bureaucracy kept collaboration from degenerating into collusion and corruption. For him,

the autonomy of the state requires insulation of the bureaucracy from powerful societal

interests, but insulation does not mean isolation. Bureaucrats need to have close ties to

business yet still have to formulate and implement policies autonomously. Thus, “embedded

autonomy” was the key to the effectiveness of the developmental state of Korea.

Most scholars who studied the developmental state of Korea regarded Park Chung-Hee’s

regime (1961-1979) as a prototype of the developmental state. However, Syngman Rhee’s

regime (1948-1960) was generally regarded as predatory. Amsden (1989: 42) characterized

the 1950s with corruption, paralysis, underachievement, and bitter disappointment. Evans

(1995:51-52) pointed that, under Syngman Rhee, the civil service exam was largely bypassed

and that his dependence on private-sector donations to finance his political dominance made

him dependent on clientelistic ties and caused rampant rent-seeking activities. Some

5

scholars also noted that Korea’s developmental state has been challenged and has been

weakening since the 1980s (Moon 1994; Evans 1995).

Other scholars saw rampant corruption in Korea throughout its history after independence,

including the period of Park Chung-Hee’s presidency, and attempted to reconcile the high

growth and high corruption. Wedeman (1997) argued that Korea has had widespread,

high-level corruption ever since 1945 but that the type of corruption in Korea was functional

for economic development. He distinguished three different types of corruption such as

looting, rent-scraping, and dividend- collecting. Korea’s corruption represented an ideal

type of dividend-collection, while the Philippines and Zaire are examples of rent-scraping and

looting, respectively. Looting means uninhibited plundering or systematic theft of public

funds and property and extraction of bribes by public officials. Rent-scraping means

conscious manipulation of macroeconomic parameters to produce rents and the scraping off

of these rents by public officials. Dividend-collecting means transfers of a percentage of the

profits earned by privately owned enterprises to government officials. Among the three

types of corruption, looting is the most harmful to the economy but dividend-collecting may

be functional for economic development. The Korean governments, he argued, sold

economic opportunities and collected some portion of the profits, and their corrupt income

stayed in Korea, not going to Swiss bank accounts.

Kang (2002) also saw cronyism and corruption throughout the history of South Korea.

He compared crony capitalism in Korea and the Philippines, and argued that Korea neither

had a more autonomous or coherent state nor was subject to any less corruption than the

Philippines but that corruption had different effects on development in the two countries. He

developed a matrix of four types of corruption (Figure 1). The state could be coherent or

fractured, and the business sector could be concentrated or dispersed. According to him,

Korea moved from being characterized as a “predatory state” under Syngman Rhee to

“mutual hostages” under Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Whan to “rent seeking” after the

1987 democratization, whereas the Philippines moved from “rent seeking” (pre-Marcos) to

“predatory” (Marcos) to “laissez faire” (post-Marcos).

6

Figure 1. Kang’s (2002) Four Types of Corruption

State Coherent Fractured

Small-N (concentrated)

I. Mutual hostages type: PD collusion amount: medium

II. Rent seeking type: bottom-up amount: large

Business

Large-N (dispersed)

III. Predatory state type: top-down amount: large

IV. Laissez-faire type: residual amount: small

Mutual hostages, Kang (2002) argues, explains why money politics did not hinder

economic growth in Korea. He asserts that if there is a situation of mutual hostages among a

small and stable number of government and business actors, cronyism can reduce transaction

costs and minimize deadweight losses. He further argues that the Philippines was less

affected by the crisis of 1997 because some of the collusive government-business ties had

been broken by the downfall of Marcos, while democratization in Korea increased

rent-seeking activities and hence made it more vulnerable to the crisis.

Korea’s level of corruption, relative to Taiwan and the Philippines

In this paper, I focus on identifying and explaining the relative level of corruption in

Korea rather than regime types of corruption. Although different regime types of corruption

and their impact on development is an important area of study, it is beyond the scope of this

paper.

It is very hard to compare the levels of corruption across countries. Corruption, by its

nature, is conducted secretly, and the probability of exposure will be different in different

countries. Hence, most empirical studies of corruption relied on measures of the

“perceived” level of corruption such as Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption

Perceptions Index (CPI) and Kaufmann et al.’s (2003) Control of Corruption Indicator (CCI).

TI has been publishing the CPI annually since 1995, and the CCI has been biannually released

since 1996.

Both the CPI and the CCI are aggregate indices based on a variety of surveys of mostly

international business people and ratings of country experts, although there are some

7

methodological differences in aggregating various underlying survey data as well as some

differences in the selection of sources. Because perceptions are subjective and inaccurate,

these indices must have substantial measurement error. However, they are highly correlated

with each other and also are highly correlated with domestic public perceptions of

corruption.2

Figure 2 shows the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of the CCI 2002

for several Asian countries. A higher CCI value represents a higher level of control of

corruption, or a lower level of corruption. Because the CCI is a standardized score with a

mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, it is easy to interpret the CCI value in comparison to

the world average. Figure 2.

In 2002, Korea’s CCI value was 0.33, so its level of corruption was about a third standard

deviation below the world mean among the 195 countries that were covered in the CCI 2002.

Korea’s CCI 2002 value was much lower than that of Singapore or Hong Kong, but much

higher than that of Indonesia. The Philippines’s CCI 2002 value was -0.52, so its level of

corruption was about a half standard deviation above the world average. Taiwan’s CCI 2002

2 The perceptions of the domestic public concerning the extent of corruption (World Values Survey, 1995–97) have a correlation coefficient of 0.85 with the CCI and 0.86 with the CPI (You and Khagram 2005).

8

value was 0.81, so corruption in Taiwan was about four fifths of a standard deviation below

the world mean. When we compare CCI 2002 values of Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines,

Korea’s level of corruption was much lower than that of the Philippines, but higher than that

of Taiwan, and both differences were statistically significant.

Table 1 presents the available measures of corruption for Korea, Taiwan, and the

Philippines for the early 1980s to the present. CPI 80-85 and CPI 88-92 are TI’s historical

data, and CPI 95-04 and CCI 96-02 are averaged values for the period. BI 80-83 denotes

Business International’s data, which range from 1 to 10, and a higher value represents a lower

level of corruption. While all these data are measures of the perceived level of freedom from

corruption, Bribery 04 from TI’s Global Corruption Barometer Survey (2004) is a measure of

the experience of corruption. The Barometer survey was conducted in 64 countries in 2004.

The survey asked the respondents, “In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your

household paid a bribe in any form?” The respondents answered either “Yes” or “No”. Six

percent of Korean respondents said “Yes”3, whereas 1 percent of Taiwanese and 21 percent

of Filipinos gave the same answer. The world average was 10 percent.

Table 1. Indicators of (Freedom from) Corruption for the Three Countries

BI 80-83 CPI 80-85 CPI 88-92 CPI 95-04 CCI 96-02 Bribery 04Korea 5.75 3.9 3.5 4.3 0.37 6Taiwan 6.75 6.0 5.1 5.4 0.78 1Philippines 4.50 1.0 2.0 2.9 -0.43 21

Sources: BI’s ratings from Mauro (1995); CPI and Bribery from Transparency International; CCI from D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2003).

Note: Bribery 04 denotes the percentage of respondents who bribed during the last year.

The experience of bribery (Bribery 04) from the Barometer survey is a good objective

measure of corruption comparable across countries. One caveat is that this measure is likely

to capture petty corruption very well but may be a poor measure of grand corruption.

However, there are reasons to believe that the levels of petty corruption and the levels of

grand corruption are closely correlated, because corrupt practices are likely to spread both

top-down and bottom-up. Moreover, the public experience of bribery (Bribery 04) is highly

3 According to a different social survey conducted in Korea in 2003, 5.4 percent (sometimes 5.0 percent, and frequently 0.4 percent) of Koreans had some experience of bribing (Park 2003). It is strikingly close to the 6 percent response from the Global Barometer Survey.

9

correlated with the CPI and the CCI.4 Because the CPI and the CCI are more likely to reflect

corruption at the upper level of bureaucracy and political corruption rather than petty

corruption, the assumption of a close correlation between petty corruption and high-level

corruption seems to hold in reality.

All the data presented above consistently show that Korea has been more corrupt than

Taiwan but less corrupt than the Philippines at least since the early 1980s.5 Unfortunately,

there are no available quantitative measures of corruption across these countries for an earlier

period. However, Table 1 suggests that the same relative rankings are very likely to apply

for the 1970s and probably for even earlier periods as well, unless there are important reasons

for radical changes in the levels of corruption during the earlier period.

Anecdotal evidence also suggests that political corruption in Korea was higher than that in

Taiwan but lower than that in the Phlippines. In Korea, two former presidents, Chun

Doo-Whan and Roh Tae-Woo, were sentenced guilty of corruption. Chun and Roh were

accused of raising slush funds of $890 million and $654 million and of receiving $273 million

and $396 million in bribery, respectively. The Philippines’s Ferdinand Marcos was known

to have raised $3 billion, and was found to have used several million dollars to buy foreign

real estate, primarily in New York, and to have deposited around $550 million and $250

million in Swiss banks and Hong Kong banks, respectively (Wedeman 1997). Considering

that the Philippine GDP was much smaller than that of Korea in the 1980s, Marcos’

corruption was much more severe that that of the two Korean presidents. Although Taiwan

has had many scandals of political corruption, too, there was no such big corruption scandal

comparable to Marcos’s or Chun’s and Roh’s.

In summary, the evidence indicates that the developmental state literature generally

overlooks the problem of corruption in Korea, while the crony capitalism literature tends to

overestimate the degree of corruption in Korea.

Korea’s level of corruption, from the 1950s to the present

4 Bribery 04’s correlation with the CPI 02 and CCI 02 are -0.72 and -0.73, respectively. 5 The values of the historical data such as CPI 80-85 and CPI 88-92 are not strictly comparable to the values of CPI for later years, because there are differences in the underlying survey data and their methods. So, looking at the relative rankings of the three countries will be safer.

10

Now, what can we say about the trend of corruption in Korea across time? Was the level

of corruption higher in the 1950s, under Syngman Rhee, than in the 1960s and 1970s, under

Park Chung-Hee? Did corruption increase or decrease with the rapid industrialization and

economic growth in the 1970s and the 1980s? Has the level of corruption increased or

decreased since the democratization of 1987?

There are no quantitative data available for the period before 1980, to my knowledge.

Previous literature, especially developmental state literature, often assumed, without

presenting adequate evidence, that Rhee’s regime was highly corrupt but Park’s regime was

not. This judgment seems to be based on such reasoning as that Park’s regime must have

been less corrupt than Rhee’s because Korea’s economy developed very fast under Park

unlike under Rhee. However, several scholars including Lie (1998), Wedeman (1999), and

Kang (2002) judged that Park’s regime was not considerably less corrupt than Rhee’s based

on various pieces of anecdotal evidence. Some Korean scholars also argued that the Rhee

and Park regimes cannot be differentiated in terms of the degree of rent seeking and

corruption (Kim and Im 2001), and that Park’s centrally managed economy produced a large

scope for rent seeking and corruption (Lee 1995). In the mid-1970s, a Korean social

scientist noted, “The rapid expansion of the scope of governmental authority (under Park)

tended to induce corruption at a far greater scale and in an even more pervasive manner than

before (under Rhee)” (Hahn 1975, recited from Lie 1998:96). Many journalistic reports on

corruption during the Park administration argued, with some quantitative and qualitative

evidence, that the level of corruption then was no smaller, and possibly larger, than under

Rhee (Lee and Kim 1964; Park 1967).

It is true that one of Park’s rationales for the military coup in 1961 was to eliminate

corruption, as Chun Doo-Whan’s military coup of 1980 also used the same catch phrase.

Immediately after the coup of May 16, 1961, the military arrested chaebol owners on charges

of illicit wealth accumulation, but the investigation ended with a negotiation on the political

and economic terms between the military and business owners. The junta not only reduced

the fines, but also provided financial subsidies for those industrialists who pledged to

undertake specific industrial projects and to provide political funds (Kim and Im 2001).

11

Because of international and domestic pressures, Park had to end military rule in two

years and run for presidential election in 1963. He created the Democratic Republican Party

(DRP), and needed funds for the big party and for the expensive campaigning. It was widely

known that the inaugural fund for the party was prepared by illegal manipulation of the stock

market (Oh and Sim 1995:248). He even received secret donations from Japanese and

American firms. It is estimated that Park spent about 60 billion won (approximately $200

million) for the election, while the total amount of official contributions from businesses was

just 30 million won (approximately $100,000) (Woo 1991:107; Oh and Sim 1995:275-76).

Thus, the bulk of political funds were collected in illegal ways.

An important conduit of political funds during Park’s regime came from the allocation of

foreign loans with low interest rates, for which the recipients were happy to pay a commission

of 10-15 percent. Other sources of political contributions included quid pro quos for

granting low-interest loans and for procurement of government projects (Woo 1991:108; Kim

and Park 1968).

Then, is it possible to assess the degree of corruption under Park in comparison with that

under Rhee, Chun, and Roh? One way of doing that is looking at the amount of illicitly

raised political funds during their presidencies. It is quite certain that the total amount of

illicitly collected political funds has increased over time from Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) to

Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979) to Chun Doo-Whan (1981-87) to Roh Tae-Woo (1988-92), if

not to Kim Young-Sam (1993-97). Individual contributions also increased over time. Five

chaebol were found to have made more than 60 million won (about 1.5 billion won in 1990

constant prices) of informal political contributions to Rhee’s Liberal Party (Kim 1964). Top

businessmen’s annual contributions to Park are known to have reached 500-600 million won

(about 1.3-1.5 billion won in 1990 constant prices), starting from 100-200 million won (about

0.8-1.5 billion won in 1990 constant prices) before Yushin (in 1972)6 and 200-300 million

won (about 1-1.5 billion won in 1990 constant prices) in the early Yushin period (Oh and Sim

1995:253). Samsung, Hyundai, Tonga, and Daewoo were found to have made illegal

political donations of between 15 and 22 billion won to President Chun, and Samsung,

6 Yushin refers to the pro-government coup by which Park eliminated direct presidential elections and term limits and thereby made his power permanent.

12

Hyundai, Daewoo and LG contributed illegally between 21 and 25 billion won to President

Roh Tae-Woo. Also, Samsung was found to have donated illegally at least 10 billion won

and 34 billion won (8 and 22 billion won in 1990 constant prices) to Lee Hoi-Chang in the

1997 and 2002 presidential elections, respectively, who lost to Kim Dae-Jung and Roh

Moo-Hyun, respectively (PSPD 2005).7 Chung Ju-Young, the founder of the Hyundai Group,

once declared that he donated to Roh Tae-Woo 2-3 billion won twice each year, and even 10

billion won in 1992, the last year of Roh’s office. Finally, Chung Tae-Soo, the founder of

the Hanbo Group, which went bankrupt in 1997 and was convicted of corruption, was found

to have donated 60 billion won to Kim Young-Sam before the presidential election of 1992

(Oh and Sim 1995: 274). Thus, top-level businessmen’s informal political donations seemed

to have steadily increased over time from the 1950s until the early 1990s. Considering all

these available pieces of evidence, it is hard to tell that Park’s regime was essentially less

corrupt than Rhee’s.

So far, we primarily looked at political corruption. Yoon (1994) looked at bureaucratic

corruption in the third Republic (Park’s regime before the Yushin: 1963-72), fourth Republic

(Park’s regime after the Yushin: Oct. 1972-1979), fifth Republic (Chun’s regime: 1982-87),

and the sixth Republic (Roh’s regime: 1988-1992). He searched corruption-related articles

from the three major newspapers (Dongailbo, Chosunilbo, and Choongangilbo) during the

two years, except the last year, in the later period of each Republic. Political corruption was

excluded from his analysis, because media reports of political corruption depend very much

on the degree of freedom of press rather than the actual incidence of corruption.

Table 2 shows the number of media-reported bureaucratic corruption incidents for each

Republic by the amount of bribes paid in 1985 constant prices, based on Yoon (1994). The

number of reported corruption incidents is not significantly different among the Republics.

Considering that freedom of the press was most severely suppressed in the fourth Republic

(Park’s regime after the Yushin), it is surprising that the number of corruption incidents of

over 10 million won during the 4th Republic is no less than that during the 5th Republic.

Yoon’s (1994) research did not include the 1st Republic (Rhee’s regime: 1948-1960) and the 7 Samsung gave Roh Moo-Hyun 300 million won (200 million won in 1990 constant prices) in 2002 (PSPD 2005). Samsung is known to have given some money to Kim Dae-Jung, but the amount is still unknown (Hangyoreh Sinmun 07-25-2005).

13

short-lived 2nd Republic (Chang Myun administration: 1960-61). Although we cannot tell

whether bureaucratic corruption was lower under Park than under Rhee, it was not

particularly lower than under Chun or Roh.

Table 2. Number of Bureaucratic Corruption Incidents Reported in the Media, by the Amount of Bribe in 1985 Constant Prices

3rd Rep.

Park (61-72) 4th Rep.

Park (72-79) 5th Rep.

Chun (80-87) 6th Rep.

Roh (88-92) 1-10 million won 31 30 56 16 > 10 million won 10 22 21 34

Total 41 52 77 50 Source: Yoon (1994) Note: The period covered for each Republic is as follows. Dec.1969 through Nov. 1971 (3rd Rep.),

Aug. 1977 through Jul. 1979 (4th Rep.), Dec. 1984 through Nov. 1986 (5th Rep.), and Feb. 1990 through Jan. 1992 (6th Rep.).

Considering all the evidence presented so far, it is very likely that Park’s regime was not

substantially different from Rhee’s, Chun’s or Roh’s in terms of degree of overall corruption,

except for Chun’s and Roh’s personal accumulation of wealth during their presidencies.

Table 3 summarizes the comparable information across presidencies, and it is hard to identify

any qualitatively important differences in the level of political and bureaucratic corruption

among various regimes. Thus, my conclusion is that the level of corruption in Korea has

been higher than that in Taiwan and lower than that in the Philippines ever since 1950s. The

primary difference between Rhee and Park was more about competence rather than about

corruption. The overall level of corruption seems to have slightly increased until the early

1990s, and it has been slightly decreasing since the late 1990s.

Table 3. Various Information about Corruption across Presidencies

President Period CPI* # of reported bureaucratic corruption**

Top-level political donation*** (1990 constant billion won)

Rhee Syngman 1948-1960 1.5-3.5 (five chaebol) Park Chung-Hee 1961-1972 41 5-10 (estimated) Park Chung-Hee 1972-1979 52 7-10 (estimated) Chun Doo-Whan 1980-1987 3.9 77 16-24 (four chaebol) Roh Tae-Woo 1988-1992 3.5 50 21-25 (four chaebol) Kim Young-Sam 1993-1997 4.3 56 (Hanbo) Kim Dae-Jung 1998-2002 4.2 8 to Lee (Samsung) Roh Moo-Hyun 2003-2004 4.4 22 to Lee (Samsung)

14

Sources: * TI, ** Yoon (1994), *** Kim (1964), Oh and Sim (1995), and PSPD (2005). For Park’s periods of before and after the Yushin, the presented values are estimated from the typical top-level annual political donation. All other values are based on the prosecution’s findings.

Explanations for South Korea’s relative level of corruption

Why, then, has Korea been more corrupt than Taiwan but less corrupt than the

Philippines, even though the three countries shared similar initial conditions in many aspects?

In order to explain Korea’s relative level of corruption in comparison with Taiwan and the

Philippines, I will first consider the explanatory ability of several factors such as government

intervention, economic development, income inequality, democracy, Protestantism,

Confucianism, and ethnic homogeneity that have been proposed by the literature to have

positive or negative causal effects on corruption.

The degree of government intervention in the economy, or the size of government is often

regarded as a cause of corruption, because government intervention can create rents and

encourage rent-seeking activities. However, recent empirical findings show that larger

government size is associated with lower levels of corruption (La Porta et al, 1999; Friedman

et al, 2000). In our case, the degree of government intervention does not seem to explain the

relative levels of corruption in the three countries. Governments in Korea and Taiwan

intervened in the economy very heavily, but the levels of corruption were lower in these

countries than in the Philippines where government intervention was not as extensive as in

Korea or Taiwan. It may be more useful to look at what kinds of government intervention

increase corruption under what conditions than just the overall extent of government

intervention. I will attempt to do so in the following sections.

The level of economic development (per capita income), perhaps through the spread of

education, creation of a middle class, and so forth, has been found to have the most significant

and important explanatory power for corruption by many empirical studies (Paldam 2002;

Treisman 2000). In contrast, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) argue that causation runs in the

opposite direction: from lower corruption to economic development. You and Khagram

(2005) also show that previous studies overestimate the effect of economic development on

corruption and that its effect may not be significant. The case of the three countries seems to

support the argument of Kaufmann and Kraay (2002).

15

Economic development cannot explain the relative levels of corruption in the three

countries, considering that the initially no less developed Philippines has become much more

corrupt than Korea and Taiwan. Table 4 indicates that the Philippines had a slightly higher

per capita income in the 1950s and not much lower per capita income until 1980 than Korea

and Taiwan. It is more likely that different levels of corruption seem to explain the

variations in economic growth in these countries. However, we may need to consider more

complex relationships between corruption and economic development beyond simple

causation in either direction. In particular, some government policies may affect both

corruption and economic growth at the same time. I will examine this possibility in later

sections.

Table 4. Real GDP per capita in 1996 constant $

year 1953 1968 1980 1996S. Korea 1328 2289 4790 14320Philippines 1571 2343 3289 3122Taiwan 1118 2399 5869 15589

Source: Heston et al. (2002)

Although democracy theoretically is supposed to provide checks against corruption,

cross-national empirical studies have found differing results. Treisman (2000) concludes

that democracies are significantly less corrupt only after 40 years. Montinola and Jackman

(2002) demonstrate that partial democratization may increase corruption, but that once past a

threshold, democracy inhibits corruption.

In terms of democracy, Korea and the Philippines have many similarities. Both

countries initially had democratic period until 1972 (pre-Yushin period except for 1961-63 in

Korea, and pre-Marshall Law period in the Philippines), and had a dramatic and rapid

democratic transition from 1986 (the Philippines) or 1987 (Korea). Taiwan had an

authoritarian regime until the late 1980s and since then gradually has democratized. Thus,

among the three countries, Taiwan has been the least democratic until recently, but also the

least corrupt. In all three countries, the perceived level of corruption has slightly decreased

since democratization in the late 1980s, as Table 1 shows. The values of the CPI 95-04 are

16

slightly higher than those of the CPI 88-92 for all three countries. However, it is hard to tell

if the improvement is significant. Overall, democratization does not seem to have a

dramatic effect on controlling corruption so far in these countries.

Another, quite opposite, argument to consider is the positive role of authoritarian regimes

in controlling corruption. Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore claims that authoritarian rule there

has been necessary to contain corruption as well as to help develop the economy. Taiwan’s

Chiang Ching-Kuo and Korea’s Park Chung-Hee were also cited as such examples. Indeed,

Taiwan’s story seems to fit to this theory. However, this argument is easily refuted. At

least, democratization did not increase corruption in both Korea and Taiwan, and in the

Philippines most scholars agree, and the evidence presented in this paper partly supports, that

the Marcos regime was more corrupt than both the pre-Marcos and post-Marcos era.

The role of democratization and democracy in controlling corruption must be very

complex. Democratization has both positive and negative impacts on controlling corruption.

Competitive elections and the growth of civil society can be a check on corrupt politicians,

but the need to finance expensive election campaigns creates new incentives for corruption

(Rose-Ackerman 1999). Moreover, the exposure of corruption and media reports are likely

to increase with improvement in the freedom of the press, which may cause perceptions of

corruption to rise even though actual corruption has not risen. I will look at these issues in

more detail in a later section.

Ethno-linguistic fractionalization has been found to be positively correlated with

corruption, although its significance disappears after per capita income and latitude controls

are added (Mauro 1995; La Porta et al. 1999). As Table 5 shows, Korea has an extremely

high level of homogeneity both ethnically and linguistically, but corruption is higher in Korea

than in ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous Taiwan. Although the extremely high

linguistic fractionalization may partly explain the high level of corruption in the Philippines,

the ethno-linguistic story does not fit very well for our case of the three countries overall.

Protestantism has been found by many cross-country empirical studies to be associated

significantly with less corruption (La Porta et al. 1999; Paldam 2001; Sandholtz and Koetzle

2000; Treisman 2000). Egalitarian or individualistic religions such as Protestantism may

encourage challenges to abuses by officeholders. Table 5 shows that, in terms of

17

Protestantism, Korea has some advantage, not disadvantage, over Taiwan, but Protestantism

does not seem to have much contributed to lowering corruption in Korea. There may be a

threshold for the Protestantism effect, and Korea’s Protestant population may not have

reached the threshold.

Table 5. Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization; Percentage Population by Religion in 1980

Ethnic frac. Linguistic frac. Protestant Catholic Muslim Buddhist S. Korea 0.002 0.002 12.2 3.9 0 20* Taiwan 0.27 0.5 3 1.5 0.5 93** Philippines 0.24 0.84 3.8 84.1 4.3 3***

Source: Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization is from Alesina et al. (2003). Percentage population by religion (for year 1980), except for the Buddhist population, is from La Porta et al. (1999). For the Buddhist population, * for year 1985, from Ministry of Economic Planning, Korea's Social Indicators 1987 **mixture of Buddhist, Confucian, and Taoist 93%, from CIA Factbook, 2004 *** Buddhist and other, from CIA Factbook, 2004.

“Confucian familism” has often been accused of fostering patrimony, nepotism, social

distrust, and bribes or gift exchanges (Fukuyama 1995; Kim 1999), and crony capitalism

literature has often relied on these arguments (Kim and Im 2001). However, it is

questionable whether nepotism and gift exchange is unique for Confucian cultures. Tu (2001)

argues that Confucian literati tried to curb a king’s despotism and bureaucratic corruption and

that Confucian familism is not the same as cronyism. A study of Korean social networks

(Yee 2000) demonstrates that, contrary to Fukuyama’s view that Koreans under the

Confucian influence are more kin-oriented, they effectually rely less on their kin than

Americans do.

Confucian tradition is very strong in Korea and Taiwan, while it is absent in the

Philippines. However, Korea and Taiwan are much less corrupt than the Philippines. Thus,

the Confucian familism argument seems to lack solid evidence. Actually, the meritocratic

bureaucracies in Korea and Taiwan have their historical roots in Confucian tradition (Evans

1995; Schneider and Maxfield 1997). Note that the developmental state literature

emphasizes the positive role of meritocratic bureaucracy in ensuring the autonomy of the state

and preventing it from degenerating into collusion and corruption.

18

Lastly, You and Khagram (2005) argue that income inequality increases the level of

corruption. The wealthy have greater ability to engage in corruption, and their incentives for

buying political influence increases as redistributive pressures grow with inequality. Since

higher levels of inequality, in particular more skewed income distributions, mean lower ratios

of median income to mean income, redistributive pressures should increase as inequality

rises, as the median voter theorem predicts (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Contrary to the

prediction of the median voter theorem, however, we do not observe higher redistribution in

countries with higher inequality (Iversen and Soskice 2002), probably because policy

outcomes favor the rich rather than the median voter. Through a comparative analysis of

129 countries using instrumental variables regressions, they demonstrate that the explanatory

power of inequality is at least as important as conventionally accepted causes of corruption

such as economic development.

Income inequality seems to provide a plausible explanation for the relative levels of

corruption among the three countries. As Table 6 indicates, Korea has had a much more

equal distribution of income than the Philippines ever since the 1950s. Although income

inequality in Korea was as low as in Taiwan until the 1960s, it has become somewhat higher

than in Taiwan since the 1970s. Thus, the different levels of income inequality may explain

the different levels of corruption in these countries.

Table 6. Inequality in Income and Land in Three Countries

Gini(57-69) Gini(70-89) Gini(90-97) Landgini(60-70)Korea 26.3 30.6 32.7 37.9Taiwan 28.3 26.3 27.7Philippines 43.8 42.2 42.9 52.2 Source: Gini data are from Dollar and Kraay (2002), adjusted for different definitions of gini

according to You and Khagram (2005); Landgini data are from Taylor and Jodice (1983).

Table 7 summarizes the discussion so far. As the table demonstrates, income inequality

has the strongest predicting ability for the levels of corruption. However, reverse causality

must be considered, too. The different levels of corruption could explain the different levels

of inequality. In order to sort out the causal direction and the mechanisms, we need to figure

19

out why three countries came to have different degrees of income inequality and how

inequality and corruption affected each other more concretely.

Table 7. Predicted Ability of Possible Causes of Corruption

Independent variables

Ranking of the independent variables

Predicted ranking of corruption

True or False

Government intervention

KOR=TWN > PHL KOR=TWN > PHL False

Econ development

KOR= TWN = PHL (until 1970s)

KOR= TWN = PHL False

Democracy KOR=PHL>=TWN KOR=PHL<=TWN False Ethno-linguistic diversity

PHL=TWN > KOR PHL=TWN > KOR False

Protestantism KOR> TWN = PHL KOR<= TWN = PHL False Confucianism KOR= TWN > PHL KOR= TWN > PHL False Inequality PHL > KOR > TWN PHL > KOR > TWN True

One plausible explanation for different levels of income inequality between Korea and

Taiwan on the one hand and the Philippines on the other hand is land reform. It is well

known that land reform was successful in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan after World War II, but

failed in the Philippines. It is evident that successes and failures in land reform affected

subsequent distribution of income.

Then, why did land reform succeed in Korea and Taiwan but fail in the Philippines even

though the United States was deeply involved in the land reform processes and exerted

considerable influence in all three countries? One possible explanation is that very high

levels of corruption in the Philippines inhibited land reform. Another possible explanation is

that different levels of corruption have little, if any, effect on the success or failure of land

reforms, but other factors determine the fate of land reforms.

Regarding land reform, another important question should be addressed. Land reform

involves massive intervention of governments in the redistribution of land. Then, it is very

possible that the process of land reform is corrupted and that land reform contributes to

increasing, rather than decreasing, corruption.

The higher levels of income inequality in Korea than in Taiwan since the 1970s may be

due to different strategies and processes of industrialization. One plausible hypothesis is

20

that Korea’s chaebol-centered economy produced higher inequality as well as more incentives

and opportunities for corruption than Taiwan’s small and medium-sized firms-centered

economy. Then, why did Korea and Taiwan choose different industrialization strategies?

One possible explanation is that different levels of corruption influenced government

decision-making differently. Hence, in order to find the right answers for these questions,

the next sections will be devoted to looking at the decision-making and implementation

processes of land reform and industrial policy in Korea, in comparison with Taiwan and the

Philippines.

Land reform

Many accounts of Korean development tend to ignore agrarian land reform and begin

their story from early 1960s (Lie 1998). Without land reform, however, the Korean state

might have been captured by the landlord class and the later economic miracle might not have

been achieved. In 1945, when Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule, the richest

2.7 percent of rural households owned two thirds of all the cultivated lands, while 58 percent

owned no land at all. By 1956, the top 6 percent owned only 18%. Tenancy dropped from

49 percent to 7 percent of all farming households, and the area of cultivated land under

tenancy fell from 65 percent to 18 percent (Ban, Moon, and Perkins 1980; Lie 1998; Putzel

1992).

Land reform in South Korea was carried out in two stages, by the American Military

Government (AMG) in 1948 and by the South Korean government from 1950 to 1952. In

March 1948, the AMG began to distribute 240,000 hectares of former Japanese lands to

former tenants, which accounted for 11.7 percent of total cultivated land. Before that, the

AMG implemented the reduction of rent to 1/3 in October 1945. After two separate

governments were set up in the southern and northern parts of Korea, the government of

South Korea began to implement agrarian land reform in 1950, just before the Korean War

broke out. Restricting the upper ceiling of landownership to three hectares, the government

redistributed 330,000 hectares of farmland by 1952. The landlords received 1.5 times the

annual value of all crops, and the former tenants were to pay the same amount in five years.

About 500,000 hectares were sold directly by landlords to their tenants. Thus, 52 percent of

21

total cultivated land transferred ownership, and the “principle of land to tillers” was realized

(Ban et al. 1980; Chun 2001; Kim 2001; Putzel 1992).

In Taiwan, land reform was also extensively carried out in three stages: first, in 1949,

rent reduction to 37.5 percent from the previous 50 per cent or over; second, in 1950, sale of

public lands to farmers; third, in 1953, land-to-the-tiller program (Lamba and Tomar 1986).

Absentee ownership was abolished, and a low ceiling was imposed on land that could be

retained by landlords. The compensation was based on the production value of the land, and

landlords received 2.5 times the annual value of all crops (Putzel 1992).

In the Philippines, however, land reform has been an abortive issue since before World

War II. All Filipino presidential candidates since the 1950s have run on platforms offering

vague promises of land reform, but reform has never been pursued with vigor (Kang 2002).

Magsaysay’s moderate proposal of land reform legislation was amended by Congress so that

most of the large estates could easily avoid expropriation. Marcos’s land reform was

minimal, and even Aquino’s reform was very limited (Doronila 1992; Putzel 1992).

Why, then, did Korea and Taiwan carry out extensive land reform, whereas the

Philippines did not? I offer three explanations. The threats from North Korea and

Communist China played a major role in promoting land reform in South Korea and Taiwan,

respectively. The role of the United States in land reform was positive and liberal in South

Korea and Taiwan, but largely conservative in the Philippines (Putzel 1992). In addition, the

political influence of the landed class was stronger in the Philippines, while the landlords in

Korea and Taiwan lost their influence after independence because of their collaboration with

the Japanese (Evans 1995:51-55).

An overview of the decision-making and implementation processes within the US State

Department and the American Military Government in Korea and within Rhee’s government

reveals that the communist threat and the political competition with North Korea to win the

support of peasants played a decisive role in pushing for a liberal reform program and that the

US exerted a positive and liberal influence. Before the US forces arrived in Korea,

“People’s Committees” led by communists and the left-of-center nationalists had been

established throughout the country. Although the Committees were outlawed by the AMG

in the South, they implemented an extensive land reform in the North as early as March 1946.

22

The North Korean reform was a major factor in winning support and legitimacy for the newly

emerging communist government. There was a debate between the liberals and

conservatives within the State Department about land reform in Japan and Korea, and the

liberal approach won the debate. In September 1946, the State Department announced that

one of the AMG’s major objectives was to implement land reform. However, the

implementation of redistribution of former Japanese-owned land by the AMG was delayed

until March 1948 because of initial reluctance of the Military Governor, General Lerch. The

price of the land was to be paid at 20 percent of the produce per year for 15 years (Chun

2001; Putzel 1992).

When the first election was held for the Republic of Korea in the South in 1948, all parties

pledged to implement land reform and the Constitution included a commitment to land

reform. Even the Korea Democratic Party that represented the interests of landlords did not

openly object to land reform, but tried to delay the enactment and implementation of the

reform and to increase the compensation for the landlords. Cho Bong-Am, Minister of

Agriculture, drafted a progressive land reform law with compensation of 150 percent of

annual produce. Although there was an attempt to increase the compensation to 300 percent,

the bill was passed with the clause of 150 percent compensation for the landlords and 125

percent payment for the former tenants after intense debate in April 1949. However,

President Rhee vetoed it on the ground that the government could not finance the 25 percent

gap between the compensation and payment. Finally, the Assembly passed the Land Reform

Act with 150 percent of compensation and payment on February 2, 1950, and President Rhee

signed it on March 10, 1950 (Kim 2001).

Unlike in the Philippines, the representatives of the landed class in the National Assembly

did not have strong power because of their former collaboration with the Japanese and even

the conservatives agreed that land reform would be necessary to cope with the communist

threat. An interesting phenomenon in Korea’s land reform was that many landlords sold

their land directly to their tenants before the land reform legislation was implemented. The

total area sold by landlords (500,000 hectares) exceeded the area of land redistributed by the

government (330,000 hectares), and the bulk of the sell-out occurred in 1948 and 1949 when

the prospect of land reform was clear (Hong 2001).

23

Taiwan’s case also demonstrates the important role of Communist China and the liberal

reformers of the US State Department. When Japanese colonial domination of Taiwan

(1895-1945) ended with the defeat of Japan in the World War II, Taiwan reverted to Chinese

rule in 1945. The Nationalist Chinese administration on Taiwan was initially repressive and

corrupt, and the February uprising in 1947 was violently suppressed by Nationalist Chinese

troops. When Chiang Kai-Shek was defeated by Mao Tse-Tung’s agrarian revolution on the

Chinese mainland, some 2 million predominantly military and bureaucratic refugees fled to

Taiwan. Even before Chiang Kai-Shek established his “provisional” capital in Taipei in

December 1949, the Nationalist authorities began implementing the rent reduction program.

It is notable that Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) and the United States jointly set up

the Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction in October 1948, in a belated effort to

introduce agrarian reform in mainland China (Lamba and Tomar 1986; Putzel 1992).

Chiang Kai-Shek’s corrupt and conservative KMT in mainland China transformed itself

into a more coherent and autonomous party-state in Taiwan and embraced land reform,

apparently having been given a bitter lesson from its failure (Evans 1995:54). The US also

advocated liberal agrarian reform to counter communism, and Ladejinsky, a liberal reformer

in the State Department, worked closely with KMT officials in Taiwan (Putzel 1992). In

addition, unlike in mainland China, the KMT received little resistance from the landed elites

in Taiwan.

In the Philippines, the politics of land reform were more complex. During the US

colonial period (1898-1941), the Americans were not interested in transforming the existing

Philippine power structures through land reform. The Americans, from William Taft (the

first civilian governor) to General Douglas MacArthur, felt most comfortable with those

landed, educated elites who spoke English (Kang 2002:27).

After the Philippines gained independence in 1946, the US still exerted enormous political

influence. As the State Department advised liberal land reform in Korea, Taiwan, and

Japan, it once did the same thing in the Philippines. In 1951, the US Mutual Security

Agency commissioned Robert Hardie to study the tenancy problem in the Philippines,

probably because of growing concern over the rise of an armed and communist-led peasant

movement. Hardie’s report released in December 1952 contained far reaching,

24

comprehensive land reform proposals such as distributing land to 70 percent of the tenants in

the country (Putzel 1992: 84-85).

However, the landlords and their representatives in Congress strongly resisted, and

President Quirino called the Hardie Report a “national insult.” In 1953, Hardie was replaced

by John Cooper. Cooper suggested only minor reforms were necessary in his report released

in 1954. The overall mood was changing in the US, and with the rise of McCarthyism,

Ladejinsky, architect of land reform in Japan and Taiwan, was accused of being a national

security risk (Putzel 1992:91, 96-99). Once the US pressure for liberal land reform

disappeared, the landed oligarchy was easily able to preserve their economic base through

their representatives in congress (Doronila 1992:102-104).

The Philippine case shows that, without external threat or pressures, the repeated attempts

for land reform were unsuccessful because the state was captured by the powerful landed

class. In addition, the failure of land reform helped the landed oligarchy to maintain and

expand their power continuously, and the economic policy machinery was routinely hijacked

by the powerful landed and business elites (MacIntyre 1994:9). By the early 1980s, a study

identified 81 families as exercising extensive control over the economy. They also

employed their wealth and power to gain access to state positions either through appointment

or election. Although popular demand for the redistribution of land was always a main

political issue, genuine reform never occurred. The landowning elite could employ a variety

of official and unofficial means to protect their interests. The militant landlords even

established private armies and allied with former Defense Minister Ponce Enrile, when land

reform became a more real issue after democratization. As a result, Aquino’s limited land

reform was only 30 percent completed by 1994, and did little to alter the distribution of land

in the Philippines (Moran 1999).

By contrast, land reform had a huge impact on Korean society and the economy. Large

landlords virtually disappeared. Agricultural productivity improved steadily (Ban, Moon,

and Perkins 1980: 291-93). Land redistribution plus the destruction of large private

properties during the war produced an unusually equal distribution of assets and income in

Korea (Mason et al. 1980; You 1998). Indeed, land reform opened space for state autonomy

from the dominant class (Suh 1998). As Rodrik (1995) noted, the initial advantage with

25

respect to income and wealth distribution in Korea and Taiwan is probably the single most

important reason why extensive government intervention could be carried out effectively,

without giving rise to rampant rent seeking.

Land reform also contributed to increasing enrollment in schools, by making it affordable

to more people. A characteristic of post-war public education in Korea was an unusually

large share of the financial burden imposed on private households relative to other countries

with comparable enrollment (Mason et al. 1980). The number of enrollments in primary

school doubled between 1945 and 1955, even though the Korean War (1950-53) destroyed

the whole country. The enrollment in secondary schools increased more than 8 times, and

that in colleges and universities increased ten times during the same period (Kwon 1984).

The spectacular increase in an educated labor force not only made high growth based on high

productivity possible, but also paved the road for the establishment of meritocratic

bureaucracy. Although the higher civil service exam (Haengsi) was instituted as early as

1949, only 4 percent of those filling higher entry-level positions came in via the exam under

Rhee Syngman’s government. The higher positions were filled primarily through special

appointments (Evans 1995:51-52). This reflected not only Rhee’s reliance on clientelistic

ties but also a shortage of a pool of enough highly educated people. However, Park

Chung-Hee was able to establish meritocratic bureaucracy with the aid of a supply of enough

university-educated people, although he still allocated a substantial part of the higher ranks to

the military who did not pass the highly competitive civil service exam.

However, land reform in Korea had its limitations, too. It was restricted to farmland,

while mountains and forests were excluded (Chung 1967). Later, Korea came to experience

serious problems of land speculation, extremely high prices of land, growing inequality in

land ownership, and excessive generation of capital gain from land ownership, which

contributed to increasing income inequality (Lee 1991; Lee 1995).

Another question regarding successful land reform in Korea and Taiwan is whether the

implementation processes were corrupt and if so, why.. In Korea, besides redistribution of

land, Rhee’s government carried out another distribution program of former Japanese

enterprises, which was known to be characterized by rampant corruption (Woo 1991). It is

also well known that privatization processes in Russia and other East European countries

26

created enormous rents and corruption. However, it is hard to find incidents of corruption

from the implementation of land reform.

The implementation of land distribution was very transparent and participatory, in Korea

as well as in Taiwan and earlier in Japan. In Japan, Ladejinsky and his liberal colleagues

emphasized tenants’ participation in the implementation process. Land Commissions were

established at national and local levels, and local committees were elected including five

tenants, three landowners, and two owner-cultivators (Putzel 1992: 73). Korea and Taiwan

followed the Japanese example. In Korea, local committees were comprised of one public

official, three landowners, and three tenants. A case study of local-level implementation

shows that the legal provisions were largely observed with minor exceptions and without

signs of corruption (Kwon 1984). Thus, the land reform case illustrates that government

intervention does not necessarily create corruption when it is carried out in a transparent and

participatory way.

Chaebol-centered industrialization

A myth exists about Park Chung-Hee’s economic development strategy. It is true that he

tried to justify his regime by rapid economic growth. It is also true that his administration

was more competent in setting economic policies and implementing them effectively than the

Rhee administration. However, it is a myth that the Park administration made the first

five-year economic plan based on export-led growth strategy, as Lie (1998:55-56)

demonstrated. Actually Park’s first five-year plan copied a lot from the short-lived Chang

Myun administration’s (1960-61) five-year plan. Nor was Park’s first five-year plan

particularly export-oriented. It emphasized the importance of import-substitution

industrialization to fulfill the goal of a “self-reliant economy.” Its initial projection of export

growth, mainly of agricultural produce and raw materials, was modest. Park’s emphasis on

exports came later.8

The most characteristic aspect of Park’s economic strategy was his emphasis on state

control of the economy and the promotion of large corporations and conglomerates, or 8 Rodrik (1995) raised doubt about export orientation as a key explanation for economic growth in Korea and Taiwan, noting that the initial size of exports was too small to have a significant effect on aggregate economic performance.

27

chaebols, apparently emulating Japanese zaibatsu. Although many chaebol began to form in

the 1950s, their rapid growth occurred under Park’s patronage. For him, modernization and

industrialization meant emulating Japan. Later his Yushin (1972) was very much modeled

on the Meiji Restoration (1860) of Japan, and he openly expressed his admiration for the

leaders of the Meiji Restoration (Moran 1999).

Park’s chaebol-centered industrialization strategy is contrasted with Taiwan’s

development strategy. Chiang Kai-Shek had little interest in helping Taiwanese indigenous

businesses grow too big, because his power base was from those people who came from

mainland China. The KMT leadership distanced itself from big businesses, and pursued

both growth and equity. The KMT also adopted monetary conservatism, which made

Taiwan’s state-business relationship less close, direct, and deep than Korea’s. In addition,

the KMT advocated state ownership of strategic sectors. Unlike Syngman Rhee who sold

off former Japanese firms at a bargain price, Chiang Kai-Shek transformed Taiwan’s enemy

properties into state enterprises. As a result of monetary conservatism and state ownership

of strategic sectors, small-and-medium-sized-enterprises (SMEs) grew and became the main

force of the economy. The number of manufacturing firms increased by 150 percent and the

average firm size grew by 29 percent between 1966 and 1976 in Taiwan, while in Korea the

number of firms increased by only 10 percent but firm size grew by 176 percent (Kim and Im

2001).

In order to both control and support the chaebol, Park used selective allocation of

low-interest rate foreign loans and domestic loans through state-controlled banks. Virtually all

foreign loans (both public loans and private long-term loans) with low interest rates required

government approval and guarantee. The government controlled all commercial banks and

adopted a low-interest rate policy, which created large rents and brought about a chronic

shortage in the supply of loans. As Table 8 shows, the nominal bank rate was typically less

than half of the curb-market rate and the real bank rate was often negative. Chaebol that

began to grow under the Rhee regime’s patronage through the allocation of aid dollars and

former Japanese enterprises were continuously supported by the Park regime only if they paid

back through economic performance such as exports and unofficial political contributions. As

a result, the chaebol expanded rapidly, while most SMEs had difficulty in getting loans and

28

had to rely much more on the curb market. Thus, the collusion between politics and

business (chungkyungyoochak) or the triple alliance of the government, the chaebol, and the

banks was gradually established (Lee 1995).

Cultivating good relationships with the President became a golden road for business

expansion, in particular, under Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Whan, and to a lesser degree,

under subsequent Presidents as well. Chung Ju-Young of Hyundai and Kim Woo-Jung of

Daewoo had close personal links with Park Chung-Hee and received extensive support

(Moran 1999). Chung Ju-Young’s close ties to Park led the media to dub Hyundai as the

“Yushin chaebol.” On the other hand, Samhak, a major distillery and one of the largest

conglomerates in the late 1960s, faced a misfortune because the owner backed Kim Dae-Jung

in the 1971 presidential election. After the election, Samhak was convicted of tax evasion and

forced into bankruptcy (Lie 1998:90-91).

Table 8. Real and Nominal Loan Rates, 1963-1976

Year Nominal Rate Curb Rate Inflation Real Rate1963 15.7 52.6 28.7 -13.01964 16.0 61.8 32.1 -16.11965 26.0 58.9 8.2 17.81966 26.0 58.7 14.3 11.71967 26.0 56.5 14.0 12.01968 25.8 56.0 11.8 14.01969 24.5 51.4 10.1 14.41970 24.0 49.8 13.2 10.81971 23.0 46.4 11.5 11.51972 17.7 39.0 14.5 3.21973 15.5 33.4 9.4 6.11974 15.5 40.6 26.7 -11.21975 15.5 41.3 24.1 -8.61976 17.5 n.a. 15.7 1.8

Source: Jones and Sakong (1980:105)

Another myth about Park Chung-Hee is that his administration was coherent and

autonomous, while Rhee’s was incoherent and captured by businesses. Clearly, Park’s

chaebol-centered industrialization strategy was not a result of the chaebol’s lobby but based

on his own desire to emulate Japan’s industrialization. The chaebol’s share of the national

29

economy was small when Park seized power, because of land reform and the destruction of

private properties during the war. The level of economic concentration was still relatively

low during the 1970s in comparison with other countries like Pakistan and India, although

business concentration was rapidly growing in Korea then (Jones and Sakong 1980:261-269).

However, as economic concentration by the chaebol grew, Park and subsequent regimes often

found themselves being effectively captured by them. Although Park chose his business

clients and the chaebol grew under his patronage, he had to accommodate the chaebol’s

demand for a bail-out when they were in crisis. When big businesses faced the threat of

financial insolvency in 1971,9 the Federation of Korean Industrialsits (FKI) requested

President Park to freeze the curb, transfer outstanding curb loans to official financial

intermediaries, reduce the corporate tax, and slash interest rates. Park issued an Emergency

Decree for Economic Stability and Growth, which transformed curb market loans into bank

loans to be repaid over five years at lower interest rates, with a grace period of three years

during which curb market loans were to be frozen. To bail out the overleveraged chaebol,

the Emergency Decree shifted the burden to small savers. Out of 209,896 persons who

registered as creditors, 70 percent were small lenders with assets in the market below 1

million won, or $2,890 (Woo 1991: 109-115; Kim and Im).

Park encouraged businesses to organize business associations, probably to make it easier

to control individual firms. Business associations were, on the one hand, valuable and

reliable sources of information for state officials and thus facilitated collaboration between

the state and the business (Evans 1995; Schneider and Maxfield 1997). They also served as

a conduit of raising official funds like the National Security Fund as well as unofficial

political funds. For example, the FKI [what is the FKI?] used to allocate to the chaebol

specific amounts of political donations and contributions to the National Security Fund (Oh

and Sim 1995). However, business associations as well as the chaebol became increasingly

powerful, as the example of the successful lobbying by the FKI for freezing the curb market

demonstrates.

9 Because of the IMF pressure after the first debt crisis of 1969, Park had to implement tough stabilization policies. As a result, the chaebol could not obtain bank loans as easily as before and had to rely on the high-interest curb market substantially.

30

Senior government officials often moved to corporate think tanks or to head up business

associations (Perkins 2000). Although Schneider and Maxfield (1997) interpreted that the

association leaders were extensions of the economic bureaucracy rather than representatives

of the private sector, this view of the developmental state overlooks the aspect of a growing

tendency of capture and corruption. Although Korea’s developmental state never

degenerated into a hopeless degree of capture and corruption as in the Philippines, the

growing power of the chaebol increasingly became a great concern for the public as well as

for subsequent administrations.

When Chun Doo-Whan came to power in 1980, he initially attempted to prosecute big

business on charges of illicit wealth accumulation, cut the collusion between government and

business, and introduce aggressive neo-liberal reforms. The FKI made an open statement

that it was not desirable to make big business a scapegoat in every regime change and that

preferential treatment of big business was not an act of corruption. At the same time, they

made it clear that they were willing to support and comply with the new government. Chun

accepted the pledges of loyalty in return for dropping the corruption charges as Park did in

1961.

However, in September 1980, Chun’s new government announced sweeping reforms to

reduce business concentration such as the forced sale of the chaebol’s “idle” real estate and

non-essential subsidiaries and tight credit control over big business. Twenty-six of the

largest chaebol were instructed to sell off 166 subsidiaries (from a total of 631) and to dispose

of 459 tracts of idle land. Also, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law was enacted

in April 1981. However, there was little progress in reducing economic concentration

during Chun’s presidency. The FKI openly opposed and lobbied against the monopoly

regulation law, tight credit controls, and industrial rationalization. Although the chaebol

were forced to sell off a total of 166 subsidiaries in 1981, within four years 120 new

subsidiaries were acquired. Similarly, the chaebol acquired new land holdings worth 20

times more than those they had sold off (Moon 1994).

Similar things were repeated under the Roh Tae-Woo and Kim Young-Sam

administrations. Like Chun, both Roh and Kim initially attempted to implement some

measures to reduce economic concentration, primarily to improve public support. However,

31

at the end of each president’s five-year term, the chaebol ended up increasing their size and

power. In particular, both Chun and Roh met frequently with heads of the chaebol

individually and received huge amount of unofficial political donations. When Roh had to

run for the direct presidential election, competeing with Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung,

Chun was known to have met with 30 heads of chaebol and collected 5 billion won from

each. Thus, he was easily able to raise funds, out of which he gave 100 billion won to Roh

(Oh and Sim 1995). Although Kim Young-Sam is not known to have directly received

political donations from the chaebol during his presidency, he is known to have received 60

billion won from Chung Tae-Soo, the head of the Hanbo group, when he was competing with

Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 presidential election (Woo 1991:60). Thus, reform of the

chaebol was not pursued with vigor and was effectively abandoned in exchange for illegal

political donations.

As Table 9 shows, economic concentration by the chaebol increased over time, and the

really vigorous measures for reform of the chaebol did not occur until Korea was hit by a

financial crisis and had to be bailed out by the IMF. Park’s chaebol-centered

industrialization strategy produced not only corruption and collusion between the government

and the chaebol but also increasingly created inefficiencies and widened inequality. It is

well known that the collapse of overleveraged chaebol like Hanbo in 1997 and the excessive

short-term debt of the chaebol from foreign banks was one main reason why Korea became a

victim of the Asian financial crisis, while Taiwan was little affected by the crisis. In fact,

the inefficiencies of the “chaebol economy” and the risks of overleveraged chaebol that

became evident to everyone after 1997 were manifest much earlier. As early as 1980,

Korean manufacturers had an average debt equity ratio of 488 percent, while this ratio

remained below 200 percent in Taiwan (Kim and Im 2001). Table 9. Trends in Chaebol Concentration, 1985-95 (Cumulative percent for manufacturing industry) (unit: %)

# of chaebol # of employees sales value added assets 1985 1990 1995 1985 1990 1995 1985 1990 1995 1985 1990 1995

4 6.5 6.9 8.1 21.9 23.4 27.3 11.7 17 27.2 23.6 26 2810 8.2 9 10.7 33.5 32.6 37.2 16.5 22.8 29.3 33.3 36.5 39.530 11.6 11.7 13.1 43.1 40.6 44.9 22.2 29 41 45.6 46.8 50.2

Source: Cho (1997)

32

The 1971 bail-out of big businesses, done at the expense of a large number of small

creditors, signaled that the state would not be able to let a big business fail if only it is big

enough for its failure to give the national economy an intolerable shock. Because the interest

rate of the state-controlled banks was always much lower than the market interest rate, the

chaebol had an incentive to over-invest, relying on over-borrowing. When the size of the

national economy was relatively small, the state could coordinate investments and prevent

redundant and excessive investments. As the national economy as well as the size of the

chaebol grew, the coordination became more and more difficult and inefficiencies grew.

The Chaebol’s investments were not limited to productive ones. One serious problem

was the land speculation of the chaebol. The overexpansion of large cities in the 1970s

brought about a land shortage, which forced up the price of land and housing (Suh 1998:26).

The chaebol purchased large areas of land not for productive but for speculative purposes

with the low-interest bank loans. Because the price of land increased much faster than

average prices of other goods, it was a very profitable investment for the chaebol. Five

percent of landowners owned 65 percent of private land in 1989, and their share increased to

83 percent in 2004 (Hangyoreh Sinmun 07-15-2005).

Chaebol-centered industrialization increased the inequality of income and wealth. The

Gini index rose during the 1970s, fell a little in the 1980s, but rose again in the 1990s. In

particular, income inequality has been continuously increasing after the financial crisis of

1997 (Lee Forthcoming; Yoo and Kim 2002). Lee (1991) shows that increasing inequality

in land ownership and capital gains from land ownership contribute significantly to income

inequality, although official income statistics fail to capture this. He estimates that unearned

income from transactions of land accounted for 10-20 percent of GDP in the late 1980s.

While the Gini index based on official income statistics was 33.6 in 1988, it was as high as

38.6 including capital gains from land, and 41.2 including capital gains from shares as well as

land, according to his estimates. Although land reform contributed to an unusually low

income inequality, it was restricted to farmland. Land speculation of the rich and the

chaebol increasingly concentrated land ownership and worsened income distribution.

33

In summary, chaebol industrialization increased income inequality and wealth

concentration over time, and the balance of power has shifted. Those in political power and

the chaebol exchanged favors (such as under-priced credit allocation and political funds).

Although the state had a dominant position in the early period, the chaebol’s ability to buy

political influence increased and the state was increasingly captured by the chaebol due to

corruption and the logic of “too big to fail.”

Democratization and the development of civil society

As I earlier indicated in Table 3, the trend of the CPI shows corruption became lower

under Kim Young-Sam (1993-97: CPI of 4.3), Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002: CPI of 4.2), and

Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-04: CPI of 4.4) than under Chun Doo-Whan (1981-87: CPI of 3.9)

and Roh Tae-Woo (1988-92: CPI of 3.5). If the CPI trend reflects reality, the positive effect

of democratization on controlling corruption was not realized immediately but several years

after democratization began in 1987.

Although Roh Tae-Woo (1988-92) was elected President in a democratic election, thanks

to a split of votes between two former democratization fighters, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim

Young-Sam, he was the second man in the 1980 military coup and Chun’s pick as his

successor. His anti-corruption campaign never gained public confidence, and he turned out

to be no less corrupt than Chun.

Kim Young-Sam (1993-97) was the first civilian President after Rhee, although his former

Party for Unification and Democracy merged with Roh Tae-woo’s Democratic Justice Party

and thus was supported by former military political power. Kim Young-Sam launched an

extensive anti-corruption drive, which was regarded as genuine by the general public. He

declared he would not receive any money as President unlike his predecessors, and introduced

reforms such as the disclosure of assets by high-level public officials, the real-name financial

transaction system, and amendments of the Election Malpractice Prevention Act and the

Political Fund Law. The 1995 local elections were generally assessed to be very clean with a

marked decline in practices of vote-buying, but the ruling party was decisively defeated (Oh

1999). In the 1996 national assembly elections, Kim Young-Sam seemed to be more

interested in the results of the election than in fair and clean processes.

34

Between the 1995 local elections and the 1996 national assembly elections, two former

Presidents, Chun Doo-Whan and Roh Tae-Woo, were arrested and indicted in charges of

corruption as well as mutiny and treason, and their trial began. Chun and Roh were

sentenced to death and 22 and a half years in prison, respectively, in August 1996 (Oh 1999).

They were later given presidential pardons with the agreement between Kim Young-Sam and

Kim Dae-Jung just after Kim Dae-Jung was elected President in the midst of the financial

crisis in December 1997.

Although Kim Young-Sam’s anti-corruption drive reached a peak with the indictment of

Chun and Roh, the 1996 national elections revealed his political will to root out corruption

had been compromised with the will to win. The Hanbo corruption scandal and its

bankruptcy in 1997 revealed not only the weakness of the chaebol-centered economy but also

corrupt relations between the chaebol and the political elite including Kim Young-Sam’s son.

Later, it was revealed that Kim Young-Sam himself had received 60 billion won in donations

from Chung Tae-Soo of Hanbo in 1992 and that around 100 billion won of illegal funds were

used in the 1996 National Assembly elections when he was President.

Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2002) was the first president in Korean history who was elected as

an opposition candidate. With the economic crisis, public sentiment was very critical about

the chaebol and the collusion between government and the chaebol, and public expectations

for anti-corruption reform was high. Unlike Kim Young-Sam’s, Kim Dae-Jung’s reforms

were more focused on enhancing transparency of the chaebol and public administration than

purging corrupt politicians. A comprehensive Anti-Corruption Law was enacted in July

2001. As with Kim Young-Sam, however, Kim Dae-Jung’s sons were found to be involved

in corruption scandals.

Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2007) obtained the party’s nomination through caucuses and

primaries with a relatively small campaign fund. He largely relied on small donations

through the internet and grassroots mobilization for his campaign fund for the presidential

election, and defeated the conservative candidate, Lee Hoi-Chang, who was later found to be

illegally funded by the chaebol. Roh Moo-Hyun was not perfectly free from illegal funds,

and his aids were prosecuted together with Lee Hoi-Chang’s campaign fundraisers.

Samsung Group was found to have made an illegal contribution of 34 billion won to Lee and

35

3 billion won to Roh in the 2002 presidential election (PSPD 2005). The National Assembly

elections in April 2004 were seen as relatively clean.

No less important, an anti-corruption campaign came from civil society. Civil society

organizations launched a “campaign for fair and clean elections” starting in 1991, and it is

believed that it contributed considerably to monitoring politicians and to increasing public

awareness. Civil society organizations upgraded their movement in 2000. They released a

list of corrupt politicians and launched negative campaigns to defeat them. Seventy percent

of those candidates on the black list of CSOs were defeated in the National Assembly

elections of April 2000 (You 2001).

The trend of the CPI seems to reflect reality to a certain degree. The CPI was highest in

1995 (4.3) and 1996 (5.0) after Kim Young-Sam’s extensive anti-corruption drive. The

relatively low scores of the CPI in 1997 (4.3), 1998 (4.2), and 1999 (3.8) seem to reflect

partly the corruption scandals such as Hanbo’s that occurred in 1997 and partly the

perceptions of crony capitalism by the international community after the financial crisis of

1997. Although the trial of Chun Doo-Whan and Roh Tae-Woo was an expression of

political will to cut corruption, it might have contributed to raising perceptions of corruption.

The gradually increasing CPI scores in 2000 (4.0), 2001 (4.2), 2002 (4.5), 2003 (4.3), and

2004 (4.5) may reflect various reform measures taken during this period and recovery from

the perception of “crony capitalism” as Korea has recovered from the economic crisis.

Corruption scandals during 2002 may have been reflected in the CPI 2003 rather than in the

CPI 2002.

There are some promising signs in recent years. Some surveys indicate that corruption has

been slightly declining recently. The annual surveys of the Korea Independent Commission

Against Corruption (KICAC) show that the percentage of clients that bribe public officials by

money or entertainment has been declining from 4.1 percent in 2002, to 3.5 percent in 2003,

to 1.5 percent in 2004. Public opinion surveys conducted in 1996 and 2003 show that the

Korean people are increasingly intolerant of corruption, as Table 10 indicates. TI’s Global

Barometer Survey also shows that Koreans are relatively optimistic about the prospect of

controlling corruption. Thirty-four percent of Koreans expected a decrease of corruption in

the next three years compared to an average of 17 percent of people in the world, while 27

36

percent of Koreans expected an increase of corruption compared to 45 percent of the world

average.

Table 10. Public Opinion about the Acceptability of Bribery To a traffic policeman To a teacher To a public official

<Survey year> 1996 2003 1996 2003 1996 2003 Strongly oppose 36.2 61.9 55.9 66.8 44.6 71.0 Somewhat oppose 23.8 17.3 19.7 14.8 27.3 15.4 Uncertain 26.1 17.6 15.4 14.8 20.5 9.9 Somewhat acceptable 11.9 3.0 7.9 3.1 6.1 3.3 Very acceptable 1.8 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.3

Sources: Lim (1996) and Park (2003). It seems that Korea is slowly but gradually reducing corruption, although it is too early to

tell with certainty. In the earlier period of democratization, the corrupting effect due to the

increasing demand for political funds seemed to be stronger than the anti-corruption effect

due to enhanced monitoring and accountability mechanisms. However, democratic reforms

and the growth of civil society seem to increasingly play a positive role in curbing corruption.

Many Koreans hope that the practice of huge amounts (billions of won) of illegal political

contributions by the chaebol will subside in the future, but it is yet to be seen whether new

practices of transparent financing of political funds will be firmly established.

Conclusion

Among the conventionally accepted causes of corruption, only income inequality is

significantly correlated with corruption among the three countries of Korea, Taiwan, and the

Philippines, consistent with the finding of the cross-national statistical study of You and

Khagram (2005). Further analysis reveals that land reform in Korea and Taiwan dissolved

the landed elite and produced an unusually equal initial distribution of income and wealth,

which helped prevent the state apparatus from being hopelessly captured by a powerful class.

Corruption was not a main factor that determined the success or failure of land reform, and

external factors played more important roles. Thus, land reform was exogenously given to

Korea and Taiwan, where landlords lost political power because of their collaboration with

the Japanese colonial rule, although capture and corruption played a role in the Philippine

37

case. Consequently, the level of corruption in Korea and Taiwan has been much lower than

that in the Philippines.

Although it is hard to compare the level of corruption before and after land reform in

Korea because the government immediately prior to the reform was the American Military

Government, some observers report corruption decreased substantially after the reform in

Taiwan (Putzel 1992). In contrast, in the Philippines, the failure of land reform maintained

the power of the landed oligarchy and led to high inequality in income and wealth. So, the

landed and business elites were able to capture the state, and continuous redistributive

pressures for land forced the politicians to repeatedly promise land reform and the landlords

to increasingly rely on corruption.

Although both Korea and Taiwan enjoyed exceptionally high equality initially largely due

to land reform, Korea’s chaebol-centered industrialization policies increased income

inequality and encouraged rent seeking and corruption at the same time. In contrast,

Taiwan’s monetary conservatism and small and medium-sized enterprise-centered

industrialization did not encourage rent seeking and moral hazard. Thus, Korea’s level of

corruption has become a little higher than that of Taiwan. Again, corruption did not much

affect the choice of different industrialization strategies, but different government policies had

a large impact on corruption, efficiency, and inequality.

This study suggests that economic growth is a consequence rather than a cause of

corruption. Inequality affected the level of corruption and capture, which in turn determined

economic growth. Thus, corruption is likely to be an important channel through which

inequality adversely affects economic growth (You and Khagram 2005). Although Alesina

and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that the adverse effect of

inequality on economic growth is attributable to high rates of taxation and redistribution, my

findings suggest an alternative explanation, with corruption as a causal pathway. The

Philippine case demonstrates that inequality does not necessarily cause redistribution.

Inequality created redistributive demand, but the wealthy employed corruption and capture to

avoid or minimize redistribution.

This paper also shows that government intervention does not necessarily increase

corruption. Some kinds of government intervention increase inequality and corruption at the

38

same time. The sale of Japanese vested properties and a low-interest rate credit allocation

are such examples. However, redistribution of farmland did not produce corruption

probably because it was implemented in a transparent and participatory way. The extensive

state ownership of big corporations in Taiwan did not create much corruption, while favoring

big conglomerates in Korea did create much corruption. Thus, the policy implication of this

study is that linking the extent of government intervention or the size of government to

corruption is too naïve and that the kind of intervention and the method of implementation

should be considered.

In summary, this comparative historical analysis not only supports You and Khagram’s

argument for the causal effect of inequality on corruption, but also shows how different levels

of income and wealth inequality due to exogenous shocks (land reform and industrial policy)

affect corruption. The causal mechanisms identified by this study are: (1) higher

inequality (due to failure of land reform) → stronger redistributive pressures → greater

incentives and resources for corruption, (2) lower inequality (due to land reform) → more

equal opportunity for education → meritocratic bureaucracy → lower corruption, and (3)

certain government interventions (under-priced credit rationing for the chaebol) → higher

inequality and corruption at the same time.

Regarding the democracy effect, the Korean case illustrates both a corrupting effect due to

political financing needs and an anti-corruption effect to due to enhanced monitoring and

accountability mechanisms. Increasing income inequality and economic concentration by

the chaebol are continuing concerns, while the positive effect of democratic reforms is a

promising sign for Korea.

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COOPERATIVE EXTENSION

2012

SAMPLE COSTS TO PRODUCE

RICE

SACRAMENTO VALLEY Rice Only Rotation, Medium Grain

Christopher A. Greer UC Cooperative Extension Farm Advisor, Sutter, Yuba, Placer & Sacramento Counties Randall G. Mutters UC Cooperative Extension Farm Advisor, Butte County Luis A. Espino UC Cooperative Extension Farm Advisor, Colusa, Glenn & Yolo Counties Paul Buttner Manager, Environmental Affairs, California Rice Commission Karen M. Klonsky UC Cooperative Extension Specialist, Department of Agricultural and Resource

Economics, UC Davis Richard L. De Moura UC Cooperative Extension Staff Research Associate, Department of Agricultural and

Resource Economics, UC Davis Kabir P. Tumber UC Cooperative Extension Staff Research Associate, Department of Agricultural and

Resource Economics, UC Davis

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COOPERATIVE EXTENSION

SAMPLE COSTS TO PRODUCE RICE Sacramento Valley - 2012

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 2 ASSUMPTIONS.................................................................................................................................................... 3 Cultural Practices and Material Inputs................................................................................................................. 3 Labor, Equipment and Interest............................................................................................................................. 6 Cash Overhead Costs ........................................................................................................................................... 7 Non-Cash Overhead Costs................................................................................................................................... 7 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................... 9 Table 1. COSTS PER ACRE TO PRODUCE RICE.......................................................................................... 10 Table 2. COSTS AND RETURNS PER ACRE TO PRODUCE RICE............................................................. 12 Table 3. MONTHLY CASH COSTS PER ACRE TO PRODUCE RICE ......................................................... 14 Table 4. RANGING ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................................... 16 Table 5. WHOLE FARM ANNUAL EQUIPMENT, INVESTMENT, AND OVERHEAD COSTS................ 17 Table 6. HOURLY EQUIPMENT COSTS ........................................................................................................ 18 Table 7. OPERATIONS WITH EQUIPMENT & MATERIALS...................................................................... 19

INTRODUCTION Sample costs to produce medium grain rice in the Sacramento Valley are presented in this study. This study is intended as a guide only, and can be used in making production decisions, determining potential returns, preparing budgets, and evaluating production loans. Practices described are based on production practices considered typical for the crop and area, but will not apply to every situation. Sample costs for labor, materials, equipment, and custom services are based on current figures. A blank column titled, “Your Costs”, is available in Table 1 and Table 2 to enter your own costs. The hypothetical farm operation, production practices, overhead, and calculations are described under the “Assumptions” section. For additional information or an explanation of the calculations used in the study call the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis at (530) 752-3589, or contact your local UC Cooperative Extension office. Sample Cost of Production Studies for current and archived commodities are available at http://coststudies.ucdavis.edu, or can be requested from the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, UC Davis, at (530) 752-6887, or obtained from selected county UC Cooperative Extension offices.

The University of California is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.

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ASSUMPTIONS The assumptions refer to Tables 1 through 7 and pertain to sample costs to produce medium grain rice in the Sacramento Valley. The cultural practices shown represent production operations and materials considered typical of a well-managed farm in the region. Costs, materials, and practices in this study will not apply to all situations. Timing and types of cultural practices will vary among growers within the region and from season to season due to variables such as weather, soil, insect, and disease pressure. The use of trade names and cultural practices in this report does not constitute an endorsement or recommendation by the University of California, nor is any criticism implied by omission of other similar products or cultural practices. Land. The hypothetical farm consists of 840 acres. The grower owns 201 acres and rents 639 acres. Medium grain rice (Calrose) is grown on 800 acres and 40 acres (10 owned and 30 rented) are used for roads, irrigation systems, equipment and shop area, and homestead. Typically, a grower with this amount of rice acreage will have several non-adjacent fields and the cultural practices will vary among fields. Additionally, extra costs may be incurred moving equipment between fields, but are not included in this study. No other crops are grown in rotation with rice. Both the grower-owned and rented land has a rice base and is eligible for farm program benefits. All operations are done on 100% of the acres unless noted otherwise. This study values land at $8,000 per acre. Approximately 24% of land is owned outright by the grower. The balance of land is rented at a price of $350 per acre. For more details about owned and rented land, please refer to the “Cash Overhead Costs” and “Non-Cash Overhead Costs” sections.

Cultural Practices and Material Inputs

Land Preparation. Most of the primary tillage, which includes chiseling, plowing, discing, land leveling, laser leveling, and rolling is normally done from March through May. In this study, the permanent levees, which comprise 5% of the acres, are reworked and drains are maintained as necessary. The Endangered Species Act may affect the way the drains are maintained and additional costs may be incurred. All fields are chiseled two times to open the ground and dry the soil. This is followed by one discing to break up large clods with a stubble disc, and then disced twice more with a finish disc, which increases the soil’s drying surface. The field is then leveled and smoothed with a triplane. Laser leveling is done once every seventh year and in this study 1/7 of the cost is charged to the cultural operations. The ground is rolled with a corrugated roller prior to flooding and planting.

Fertilization. Aqua ammonia is applied preplant at 130 pounds of N per acre with an aqua fertilizer injector, 3 to 4 inches deep. At the same time, a starter fertilizer, 12-23-20 at 200 pounds per acre, is applied by air and incorporated using the aqua rig or roller. Zinc sulfate is applied by air to 50% of the acres at 30 pounds per acre. In July, 75% of the acres are top dressed with ammonium sulfate at 31.5 pounds of N or 150 pounds of material per acre. Adding soil amendments such as calcium and sulfur should only be done if a soil test indicates a need.

Planting. Water seeding, in contrast to drill-seeding or dry-seeding, is the primary seeding method in California. The soil is flooded, the seed is soaked and drained, and then the seed is broadcast by air on the fields at a rate of 180 lbs/acre. Most planting is done from April 20 to May 20, but sometimes continues into June.

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Irrigation. The grower purchases the majority of irrigation water from an irrigation district; however growers may also use well water. The grower pays the water costs on the rented and grower-owned land. The cost of water varies widely between irrigation districts in the Sacramento Valley. The seasonal cost of irrigation water for this study is $100.00 per surface acre. This does not include water needed for straw management.

Pest Management. The pesticides and rates mentioned in this cost study are listed in UC Integrated Pest Management Guidelines, Rice. For more information on other pesticides available, pest identification, monitoring, and management visit the UC IPM website at www.ipm.ucdavis.edu. For information and pesticide use permits, contact the local county Agricultural Commissioner's office.

Several sprays are applied for developing costs in this study. Weeds. Broadleaf and grass weeds are controlled with separate aerial and ground applications. An herbicide to control grass weeds is applied to virtually 100 percent of the conventional grown rice, at or shortly after, planting (e.g. Cerano, Clincher, Bolero, and Granite GR). This study assumes that Cerano is applied to 100% of the acres by air in May. An additional foliar active herbicide (e.g. Propanil, Grandstand, and Regiment) is applied in June to control broadleaf weeds, sedges and grasses that escape the first herbicide treatment. Tank mixes of two foliar active herbicides are often used. This study assumes that a Propanil (Super Wham) and Grandstand tank mix is applied by ground to 80% of the acres. Final weed control is a cleanup herbicide (e.g. Regiment) application in late June that is applied by air on 20% of the acres.

Insects. Rice water weevil control begins in May after planting, by treating 15% of the acres, which includes the field borders or edges, levees, and field area adjacent to these areas with Warrior insecticide. Armyworms are controlled with one insecticide application of Warrior in July on 5% of the acres. Arthropod Management (Algae and Shrimp). After planting in May, copper sulfate is applied to 20% of the acres to control algae and shrimp.

Diseases. Blast and aggregate sheath spot are controlled July through August with one application of Quadris on 45% of the acres.

Harvest. The rice crop is harvested at 20% kernel moisture (green rice) using one combine with a cutter-bar header. The grower also owns a pulled grain cart. The grain is dumped from the one combine into the grain cart, which is then taken to bulk grain trailers for transport to the dryer.

Transportation. The grower pays the transportation of green rice from the field to the dryer. Hauling grain from the dryer to storage may be considered a processing or marketing expense, but it is a cost and is reflected in the price returned to the grower. In this study, the cost of transporting the rice from the field to the dryer is included, but the hauling cost between the dryer and warehouse is not. The cost of transporting rice is based on a green weight of 95.34 hundredweight (cwt) per acre and a $0.45 per cwt field pickup and hauling charge. In this study, green weight is the calculated weight of the harvested rice at 20% moisture, including ‘invisible shrink’.

Drying and Storage. Drying charges increase with moisture content. Most dryers use a rate schedule that reflects the loss of moisture plus other ‘invisible’ losses in the system associated with immature kernels, dockage and dust. The non-moisture factor varies among dryers, but usually ranges from 2% to 6%. Together, these losses are called ‘shrink’. Rice is assumed to be dried to 13% moisture. The drying rate charge is based on a green weight of 95.34 cwt. The current cost of drying the rice in this study is $0.95 per cwt. Storage is

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charged at $0.78 per cwt on the dry weight and is similarly increased to estimate future power costs. Most of the drying cost is related to natural gas prices, and the storage cost to electricity prices.

Yields. The crop yield used in this study is 8,300 pounds (83 cwt) per acre at 13% moisture. Yields have varied over the years in California and are shown in Table A. Returns. A selling price of $17.00 per cwt of grain rice (with an assumed loan value of $6.50, or $10.50 above loan value) is used to estimate market income, based on 2012 grower input. A range of yields and prices are presented in Table 4 (page 16). This study also includes revenue received by rice growers from the Direct Payments (DP), but not Counter Cyclical Payments (CCP) or the Marketing Loan Program (MLP), which are all authorized by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 administered by the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA), Farm Service Agency (FSA). Limits apply to the DP, CCP, and MLP paid to each actively engaged individual associated with the farm. Here we assume that the farm is organized as a two-entity farm growing rice to the approved limits. Direct payments are tied to a history of rice base but not to current rice production. Individual farms’ direct payments depend on each farm’s acreage and yield base and other factors. For more information on this, other programs, or on meeting minimum requirements to comply with the programs please contact the USDA FSA or visit the website: http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/FarmPolicy/programProvisions.htm. Direct Payments. The total farm Direct Payment income is calculated by taking 85% of the payment yield multiplied by the payment rate and the individual farm’s base acreage. In this study the Direct Payment yield is assumed to be 68.20 cwt per acre and the 2012 Direct Payment rate is $2.35 per cwt. Per acre program support is calculated as 0.85 X $2.35/cwt = $1.998/cwt. Growers may elect to participate in the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) Program, but this study assumes that growers do not participate. More information on Direct Payments is available at the USDA website: http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/FarmPolicy/DirectPayments.htm. Farms are not required to grow rice to receive the Direct Payments, but almost all rice farms do collect this revenue and most Direct Payments go to farms that continue to grow rice. Counter Cyclical Payments. Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCP) are only made to growers when the market price or national average loan rate is less than the target price. This study assumes that the current market price is higher than the target price, so the CCP are not applicable in this study. For more details regarding counter cyclical payments, please visit: http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/FarmPolicy/CounterCyclicalPay.htm. Marketing Loan Gains and Loan Deficiency Payments. Rice farmers are eligible to receive a loan from the government by putting up their production as collateral. The loan rate for rice in 2012 is $6.50 per cwt. When market prices fall below the loan rate, farmers can repay the loans at a lower loan repayment rate resulting in a benefit to producers. The loan repayment rate for rice is the average world price for rice calculated weekly by the government. The difference between the loan rate and the average world price is called a Marketing Loan Gain. Alternatively, eligible farmers can choose to receive direct loan deficiency payments equivalent to the Marketing Loan Gain without having to take out the loan and then repay it. In this study we assume that the world price is above the loan rate and so marketing loan gains are not an additional source of revenue.

Table A. Average California Yield and Prices

Year Yield/Acre (Medium Grain)

Return/cwt (all types)

cwt $/cwt 2000 80.00 4.99 2001 83.00 5.28 2002 83.00 6.32 2003 78.40 10.40 2004 88.00 7.34 2005 75.50 10.10 2006 78.80 13.00 2007 85.00 16.20 2008 85.50 27.50 2009 87.40 19.60 2010 82.00 21.00 2011 85.00 16.00

Source: USDA NASS Historical Data

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Assessments. Under a state marketing order a mandatory assessment fee is collected and administered by the California Rice Research Board (CRRB). This assessment of $0.07 per dry cwt pays for rice research funded by the CRRB. In addition, the California Rice Commission (CRC) assesses each rice grower $0.04625 per dry cwt Rice millers and marketers also contribute an equal amount of $0.04625 per dry cwt This provides the CRC with a total budget based on $0.0925 per cwt for all California rice produced to work on a variety of issues facing the California rice industry. Straw Management. Postharvest operations for straw management are usually done using a single or a combination of commonly used methods, including: 1) burning (up to 25% of acres with disease), 2) chopping, discing, and flooding, 3) chopping and flooding, 4) chopping, flooding and rolling, 5) chopping and discing, and 6) baling. In this study a combination of methods 1, 4, and 5 are used postharvest. Rice straw burning is done on 10% of the acres in the fall and/or spring for straw management. Burning permits and fees vary for each air pollution control district. For this study, a $20 burn permit is charged to the farm and an additional $2.75 per acre is charged for each acre burned. Check with the air pollution office in your county for burning regulations and fees. The rice straw is chopped, flooded, and then rolled on 30% of the acres. The balance 60% of acreage is chopped and disced twice. The winter water costs for single and continuous flooding vary by district, and may be rain fed.

Labor, Equipment and Interest

Labor. A labor rate of $20.55 per hour for general and equipment labor includes payroll overhead of 37%. The basic hourly wage is $15.00 for general labor. The overhead includes the employers’ share of federal and California state payroll taxes, workers' compensation insurance for field crops, and a percentage for other possible benefits. Workers’ compensation costs will vary among growers, but for this study the cost is based upon the average industry final rate as of January 1, 2011 (personal email from California Department of Insurance, March 2011, unreferenced). Wages for management are not included as a cash cost. Any return above total costs is considered a return to management and risk. However, growers wanting to account for management may wish to add a fee. The manager makes all production decisions including cultural practices, action to be taken on pest management recommendations, and labor. Equipment Operating Costs. Repair costs are based on purchase price, annual hours of use, total hours of life, and repair coefficients formulated by American Society of Agricultural Engineers (ASAE). Fuel and lubrication costs are also determined by ASAE equations based on maximum Power Take Off (PTO) horsepower, and fuel type. Prices for on-farm delivery of red dye diesel and gasoline are $3.43 (excludes excise tax) and $3.82 per gallon, respectively. Fuel costs are derived from the Energy Information Administration, 2011 January to December monthly data. The cost includes a 2.5% local sales tax on diesel fuel and 7.5% sales tax on gasoline. Gasoline also includes federal and state excise tax, which are refundable for on-farm use when filing your income tax. Risk. The risks associated with crop production should not be underestimated. While this study makes every effort to model a production system based on typical, real world practices, it cannot fully represent financial, agronomic and market risks, which affect profitability and economic viability. Crop insurance is a risk management tool available to growers.

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Cash Overhead Costs

Cash overhead consists of various cash expenses paid out during the year that are assigned to the whole farm and not to a particular operation. Rent. Cash rents range from $300 to $400 per acre with surface water attached to the land, but water is not paid for by the landowner. The cost of water is borne by the grower renting the land. A rental price of $350 per acre is used in this study.

Rented Equipment. A 325 HP 4WD tractor is rented for one month (250 hours). The tractor is used for tillage operations over the 800 acres.

Property Taxes. Counties charge a base property tax rate of 1% on the assessed value of the property. In some counties special assessment districts exist and charge additional taxes on property including equipment, buildings, and improvements. For this study, county taxes are calculated as 1% of the average value of the property. Average value equals new cost plus salvage value divided by 2 on a per acre basis. Insurance. Insurance for farm investments varies depending on the assets included and the amount of coverage. Property insurance provides coverage for property loss and is charged at 0.803% of the average value of the assets over their useful life. Liability insurance covers accidents on the farm and costs $1,324 for the entire farm. Office Expense. Office and business expenses are estimated at $30 per acre. These expenses include office supplies, telephones, bookkeeping, accounting, legal fees, shop and office utilities. Regulatory Compliance and Administrative Costs. Compliance and administrative costs are estimated to be $5 per acre. This includes expenses such as managing paperwork for compliance, as well as miscellaneous administrative costs that accompany the compliance paperwork. Investment Repairs. Annual repairs on investments or capital recovery items that require maintenance are calculated as 2% of the purchase price. This includes repair on all investments (e.g. fuel tanks and pumps, backhoe, irrigation system, shop buildings, tools, etc.), except for land.

Non-Cash Overhead Costs

Non-cash overhead is calculated as the capital recovery cost for equipment and other farm investments. Land. Land values range from $6,000 to $8,000 per acre. This study uses a value of $8,000 per acre. However, the majority of rice growers do not own much of the ground that they farm. Environmentally important rice land is valued in excess of the amount that growers can profitably afford to pay because environmental associations or government agencies may be willing to pay more to acquire the land, however such land represents a small portion of total rice land. In this study, 24% of land is owned by the grower. Capital Recovery Costs. Capital recovery cost is the annual depreciation and interest costs for a capital investment. It is the amount of money required each year to recover the difference between the purchase price and salvage value (unrecovered capital). It is equivalent to the annual payment on a loan for the investment

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8

with the down payment equal to the discounted salvage value. This is a more complex method of calculating ownership costs than straight-line depreciation and opportunity costs, but more accurately represents the annual costs of ownership because it takes the time value of money into account (Boehlje and Eidman). The formula for the calculation of the annual capital recovery costs is [(Purchase Price – Salvage Value) x Capital Recovery Factor] + (Salvage Value x Interest Rate). Salvage Value. Salvage value is an estimate of the remaining value of an investment at the end of its useful life. For farm machinery (tractors and implements) the remaining value is a percentage of the new cost of the investment (Boehlje and Eidman). The percent remaining value is calculated from equations developed by the American Society of Agricultural Engineers (ASAE) based on equipment type and years of life. The life in years is estimated by dividing the wear out life, as given by ASAE by the annual hours of use in this operation. For other investments including irrigation systems, buildings, and miscellaneous equipment, the value at the end of its useful life is zero. The salvage value for land is the purchase price because land does not depreciate. Capital Recovery Factor. Capital recovery factor is the amortization factor or annual payment whose present value at compound interest is 1. The amortization factor is a table value that corresponds to the interest rate used and the life of the machine. Interest Rate. An interest rate of 4.75% is used to calculate capital recovery. The rate will vary depending upon loan amount and other lending agency conditions, but is the basic suggested rate by a farm lending agency as of January, 2011.

Irrigation System. The irrigation system in this study has the water delivered by a water district via canal and moved to the field by a portable PTO powered, low-lift pump. Many growers use well water to supplement surface water deliveries. In this study a 75 HP electric pump with a 500 foot deep well pumps water from an average depth of 120 feet. The water delivery system or returns system is not calculated as a cost in this study. Table Values. Due to rounding, the totals may be slightly different from the sum of the components.

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study Sacramento Valley UC Cooperative Extension

9

REFERENCES

American Society of Agricultural Engineers. 1992. American Society of Agricultural Engineers Standards

Yearbook. St. Joseph, MI. Boehlje, Michael D., and Vernon R. Eidman. 1984. Farm Management. John Wiley and Sons. New York, NY. Energy Information Administration. 2012. Weekly Retail on Diesel and Gasoline Prices. Internet accessed

January 2012. http://tonto.eix.doe.gov/oog/info/wohdp. University of California Statewide Integrated Pest Management Program. UC Pest Management Guidelines,

Rice. 2011 University of California, Davis, CA. Internet accessed January 2012. http://www.ipm.ucdavis.edu/PMG/selectnewpest.rice.html.

USDA-NASS. 2012. California Historic Commodity Data, California Medium Grain Rice. Washington, D.C.

http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/California/Historical_Data/index.asp. Internet accessed August 2012.

USDA-NASS Quickstats. 2012. California Historic Rice – Price Received. Washington, D.C.

http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/. Internet accessed August 2012. Mutters, Randall, Christopher Greer, Karen Klonsky, and Pete Livingston. 2007. Sample Costs to Produce Rice,

Sacramento Valley. University of California Cooperative Extension. Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics. Davis, CA.

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study Sacramento Valley UC Cooperative Extension

10

UC COOPERATIVE EXTENSION

Table 1. COSTS PER ACRE TO PRODUCE RICE SACRAMENTO VALLEY - 2012

Operation Cash and Labor Costs per Acre

Time Labor Fuel Lube & Material Custom/ Total Your Operation (Hrs./A) Cost Repairs Cost Rent Cost Cost Cultural:

Maintain drains 0.10 2 2 0 0 0 5 Maintain and rework levees 0.05 1 2 1 0 0 4 Chisel 2X 0.17 4 10 2 0 16 32 Stubble disc 0.15 4 7 2 0 0 12 Finish disc 2X 0.28 7 12 4 0 0 23 Triplane fields 2X 0.19 5 12 3 0 10 29 Laser level – 1X/7 years 0.00 0 0 0 0 16 16 Fertilize – Aqua @ 130 lbs N 0.00 0 0 0 75 25 100 Fertilize – 12-23-20 @ 200 lbs 0.07 2 3 1 27 15 47 Roll final seedbed 0.07 2 3 1 0 0 6 Fertilize – zinc, 50% of acreage 0.00 0 0 0 9 5 14 Irrigate 1.00 21 0 0 100 0 121 Weed control – grass spray 0.00 0 0 0 64 12 76 Soak (chlorine) and deliver seed 0.00 0 0 0 58 5 63 Plant @ 180 lbs/acre 0.00 0 0 0 0 15 15 Insect control rice weevil, 15% of acreage 0.00 0 0 0 2 2 3 Pest control shrimp/algae, 20% of acreage 0.00 0 0 0 7 2 8 Weed control – broadleaf spray, 80% of acreage 0.00 0 0 0 76 16 92 Weed control – cleanup spray, 20% of acreage 0.00 0 0 0 11 2 14 Fertilize – topdress 21-0-0, 75% of acreage 0.00 0 0 0 26 11 38 Insect control – armyworm, 5% of acreage 0.00 0 0 0 1 1 1 Disease control – fungicide, 45% of acreage 0.00 0 0 0 14 5 19 Pickup truck use 0.41 20 6 2 0 0 28

TOTAL CULTURAL COSTS/ACRE 2.50 67 57 15 469 157 766 Harvest: Combine rice – cutterbar header 0.39 10 25 14 0 0 49 Grain cart 0.21 5 14 3 0 0 22 Haul rice to dryer 0.00 0 0 0 0 43 43 Dry & store rice 0.00 0 0 0 0 155 155 Rice Research Board assessment 0.00 0 0 0 6 0 6 California Rice Commission assessment 0.00 0 0 0 4 0 4

TOTAL HARVEST COSTS 0.59 15 39 17 10 198 279 Postharvest: Burn permit & fees, 10% of acreage 0.50 10 0 0 0 0 11 Chop, flood & roll, 30% of acreage 0.07 4 4 1 8 0 16 Chop, 60% of acreage 0.16 4 3 1 0 0 8 Disc, 60% of acreage 0.09 2 4 1 0 0 7

TOTAL POSTHARVEST COSTS 0.83 20 10 3 8 0 42 Interest on operating capital at 5.75% 23 TOTAL OPERATING COSTS/ACRE 3.91 102 107 36 487 355 1,110

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study Sacramento Valley UC Cooperative Extension

11

UC COOPERATIVE EXTENSION

Table 1. Continued

SACRAMENTO VALLEY - 2012

Operation Cash and Labor Costs per Acre

Time Labor Fuel Lube & Material Custom/ Total Your

Operation (Hrs./A) Cost Repairs Cost Rent Cost Cost

CASH OVERHEAD:

Land rent1 280

Liability insurance 2

Office expense 30

Compliance & administration 5

Property taxes 23

Property insurance 2

Investment repairs 3

TOTAL CASH OVERHEAD COSTS/ACRE 345

TOTAL CASH COSTS/ACRE 1,454

NON-CASH OVERHEAD: Per producing Annual Cost

Acre Capital Recovery

Backhoe 18 2 2

Fuel tanks & pumps 13 1 1

Fuel wagons – 550 gallons (2) 4 1 1

Irrigation system 28 2 2

Land 2,010 95 95

Shop building 57 4 4

Shop tools 16 1 1

Tool carrier 18 1 1

Equipment 355 43 43

TOTAL NON-CASH OVERHEAD COSTS 2,519 152 152

TOTAL COSTS/ACRE 1,606

TOTAL COSTS/CWT 19.35

1Land Rent is $350/acre. This study allocates the total cost of rent ($223,650) over all rice producing acres (800) for a total of approximately $280 per producing acre.

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study Sacramento Valley UC Cooperative Extension

12

UC COOPERATIVE EXTENSION Table 2. COSTS AND RETURNS PER ACRE TO PRODUCE RICE

SACRAMENTO VALLEY - 2012 Quantity/ Price or Value or Your Acre Unit Cost/Unit Cost/Acre Cost

GROSS RETURNS Rice 83.00 cwt 17.00 1,411 Direct Pay 68.20 cwt 1.998 136

TOTAL GROSS RETURNS 1,547 OPERATING COSTS Rent: 26 Tractor 325 HP 4WD 0.33 hour 80.00 26 Custom: 131 Laser leveling 0.13 acre 125.00 16 Fertilizer rig – Aqua Ammonium 1.00 acre 25.00 25 Air application – dry fertilizer 1.75 acre 15.00 26 Air application – zinc dry 0.50 acre 9.00 5 Air application – Cerano 1.00 acre 12.00 12 Soaking (chlorine) seed 1.80 cwt 2.25 4 Delivery – seed 1.80 cwt 0.70 1 Air application – seed 1.80 cwt 8.55 15 Air application – Warrior 0.15 acre 10.75 2 Air application – copper 0.20 acre 8.55 2 Ground application – Propanil/Grandstand 0.80 acre 20.00 16 Air application – Regiment 0.20 acre 10.75 2 Air application – Warrior 0.05 acre 10.75 1 Air application – Quadris 0.45 acre 10.75 5 Fertilizer: 137 Aqua Ammonia 130.00 lb N 0.58 75 12-23-20 200.00 lb 0.13 27 Zinc Sulfate 36% 15.00 lb 0.61 9 21-0-0 Ammonia Sulfate 112.50 lb 0.23 26 Herbicide: 125 Cerano 10.00 lb 4.90 49 Grandstand 4.80 fl oz 1.13 5 Super Wham 4.80 qt 12.38 59 Regiment 0.13 oz 87.03 11 Insecticide: 9 Warrior 0.77 fl oz 3.21 2 Copper Sulfate Fine 3.00 lb 2.26 7 Fungicide: 14 Quadris 5.40 fl oz 2.53 14 Adjuvant: 26 Adjuvant 3.50 fl oz 0.22 1 Crop oil 1.80 gal 13.85 25 Seed: 58 Seed 1.80 cwt 32.25 58 Irrigation: 108 Water – irrigation 1.00 acre 100.00 100 Water – straw management 0.30 acre 25.00 8

Note: Stated rates in the table represent total amount of product applied spread over total rice producing acres.

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study Sacramento Valley UC Cooperative Extension

13

UC COOPERATIVE EXTENSION

Table 2. Continued SACRAMENTO VALLEY - 2012

Quantity/ Price or Value or Your Acre Unit Cost/Unit Cost/Acre Cost Contract: 198 Hauling 95.34 cwt 0.45 43 Drying 95.34 cwt 0.95 91 Storage 83.00 cwt 0.78 65 Assessment: 10 California Rice Research Board 83.00 cwt 0.07 6 California Rice Commission 83.00 cwt 0.05 4 Burn Permit: 0 Burning fees 0.10 acre 2.75 0 Burn permit 0.10 acre 0.03 0 Labor: 102 Equipment operator labor 3.39 hour 20.55 70 Irrigation labor 1.60 hour 20.55 33 Machinery: 143 Fuel – gas 1.63 gal 3.82 6 Fuel – diesel 29.26 gal 3.43 100 Lube 16 Machinery repair 20 Interest on operating capital at 5.75% 23

TOTAL OPERATING COSTS/ACRE 1,111 NET RETURNS ABOVE OPERATING COSTS 437 CASH OVERHEAD COSTS Land rent 280 Liability insurance 2 Office expense 30 Compliance & administration 5 Property taxes 23 Property insurance 2 Investment repairs 3

TOTAL CASH OVERHEAD COSTS/ACRE 345 TOTAL CASH COSTS/ACRE 1,455 NON-CASH OVERHEAD COSTS (Capital Recovery) Backhoe 2 Fuel tanks & pumps 1 Fuel wagons – 550 gallons (2) 1 Irrigation system 2 Land 95 Shop building 4 Shop tools 1 Tool carrier 1 Equipment 43

TOTAL NON-CASH OVERHEAD COSTS 152 TOTAL COST/ACRE 1,607 TOTAL COST/ CWT 19.36 NET RETURNS ABOVE TOTAL COST -60

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study

Sacramento Valley

UC

Cooperative Extension

14

U

C C

OO

PERA

TIVE EX

TENSIO

N

Table 3. M

ON

TH

LY

CA

SH C

OST

S PER

AC

RE

TO

PRO

DU

CE

RIC

E

SAC

RA

MEN

TO V

ALLEY

- 2012

Beginning 02-12

FEB

MA

R

APR

M

AY

JU

N

JUL

AU

G

SEP O

CT

TOTA

L Ending 10-12

12 12

12 12

12 12

12 12

12

Cultural:

Maintain drains

5

5

Maintain and rew

ork levees

4

4 C

hisel 2X

32

32

Stubble disc

12

12 Finish disc 2X

23

23 Triplane fields 2X

29

29 Laser level – 1X

/7 Years

16

16

Fertilize – Aqua @

130 lbs N

100

100

Fertilize – 12-23-20 @ 200 lbs

47

47

Roll final seedbed

6

6

Fertilize – zinc, 50% of acreage

14

14

Irrigate

24 24

24 24

24

121 W

eed control – grass spray

76

76 Soak (chlorine) and deliver seed

63

63

Plant @ 180 lbs/acre

15

15

Insect control rice weevil, 15%

of acreage

3

3 Pest control shrim

p/algae, 20% of acreage

8

8

Weed control – broadleaf spray, 80%

of acreage

92

92 W

eed control – cleanup spray, 20% of acreage

14

14

Fertilize – topdress 21-0-0, 75% of acreage

38

38

Insect control – armyw

orm, 5%

of acreage

1

1 D

isease control – fungicide, 45% of acreage

19

19

Pickup truck use 3

3 3

3 3

3 3

3 3

28 TO

TAL C

ULTU

RA

L CO

STS 8

3 287

194 133

84 27

27 3

766

Harvest:

Com

bine rice – cutterbar header

49

49 G

rain cart

22

22 H

aul rice to dryer

43

43 D

ry & store rice

155 155

Rice R

esearch Board assessm

ent

6

6 C

alifornia Rice C

omm

ission assessment

4 4

TOTA

L HA

RV

EST CO

STS 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

114 165

279

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study

Sacramento Valley

UC

Cooperative Extension

15

U

C C

OO

PERA

TIVE EX

TENSIO

N

Table 3. C

ontinued SA

CR

AM

ENTO

VA

LLEY - 2012

B

eginning 02-12 FEB

M

AR

A

PR

MA

Y

JUN

JU

L A

UG

SEP

OC

T TO

TAL

Ending 10-12 12

12 12

12 12

12 12

12 12

Postharvest:

Burn perm

it & fees, 10%

of acreage

11

11 C

hop, flood & roll, 30%

of acreage

16

16 C

hop, 60% of acreage

8 8

Disc, 60%

of acreage

7

7 TO

TAL PO

STHA

RV

EST CO

STS 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 42

42 Interest on operating capital at 5.75%

0

0 1

2 3

3 4

4 5

23 TO

TAL O

PERA

TING

CO

STS/AC

RE

8 3

288 196

136 88

31 145

215 1,110

TOTA

L OPER

ATIN

G C

OSTS/C

WT

CA

SH O

VER

HEA

D:

Land rent

280 Liability insurance

2

Office expense

30

Com

pliance & adm

inistration

5 Property taxes

12

12

23

Property insurance 2

2 Investm

ent repairs 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 TO

TAL C

ASH

OV

ERH

EAD

CO

STS 14

0 0

0 0

12 0

0 0

345 TO

TAL C

ASH

CO

STS/AC

RE

22 3

288 196

136 100

31 146

215 1,454

TOTA

L CA

SH C

OSTS/C

WT

0.27 0.04

3.47 2.36

1.64 1.20

0.37 1.75

2.60 17.52

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study Sacramento Valley UC Cooperative Extension

16

UC COOPERATIVE EXTENSION Table 4. RANGING ANALYSIS SACRAMENTO VALLEY - 2012

COSTS PER ACRE AT VARYING YIELDS TO PRODUCE RICE

YIELD (cwt/acre) 59 67 75 83 91 99 107 OPERATING COSTS: Cultural 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 Harvest 188 211 233 279 279 301 324 Postharvest 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 Interest on operating capital at 5.75% 23 23 23 23 23 23 24 TOTAL OPERATING COSTS/ACRE 1,019 1,041 1,064 1,110 1,109 1,132 1,155 Total Operating Costs/cwt 17 16 14 13 12 11 11 CASH OVERHEAD COSTS/ACRE 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 TOTAL CASH COSTS/ACRE 1,363 1,386 1,409 1,454 1,454 1,477 1,499 Total Cash Costs/cwt 23 21 19 18 16 15 14 NON-CASH OVERHEAD COSTS/ACRE 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 TOTAL COSTS/ACRE 1,515 1,538 1,561 1,606 1,606 1,629 1,651 Total Costs/cwt 25.68 22.95 20.81 19.35 17.65 16.45 15.43

NET RETURNS PER ACRE ABOVE OPERATING COSTS

PRICE($/cwt) YIELD(cwt/acre)

Rice 59.0 67.0 75.0 83.0 91.0 99.0 107.0 Direct Pay 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0

11.00 1.998 -264 -189 -113 -60 38 114 189 13.00 1.998 -146 -55 37 106 220 312 403 15.00 1.998 -28 79 187 272 402 510 617 17.00 1.998 90 213 337 438 584 708 831 19.00 1.998 208 347 487 604 766 906 1,045 21.00 1.998 326 481 637 770 948 1,104 1,259 23.00 1.998 444 615 787 936 1,130 1,302 1,473

NET RETURNS PER ACRE ABOVE CASH COSTS

PRICE($/cwt) YIELD(cwt/acre)

Rice 59.0 67.0 75.0 83.0 91.0 99.0 107.0 Direct Pay 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0

11.00 1.998 -609 -533 -458 -405 -306 -231 -155 13.00 1.998 -491 -399 -308 -239 -124 -33 59 15.00 1.998 -373 -265 -158 -73 58 165 273 17.00 1.998 -255 -131 -8 93 240 363 487 19.00 1.998 -137 3 142 259 422 561 701 21.00 1.998 -19 137 292 425 604 759 915 23.00 1.998 99 271 442 591 786 957 1,129

NET RETURNS PER ACRE ABOVE TOTAL COSTS

PRICE($/cwt) YIELD(cwt/acre)

Rice 59.0 67.0 75.0 83.0 91.0 99.0 107.0 Direct Pay 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0

11.00 1.998 -761 -685 -610 -557 -458 -383 -307 13.00 1.998 -643 -551 -460 -391 -276 -185 -93 15.00 1.998 -525 -417 -310 -225 -94 13 121 17.00 1.998 -407 -283 -160 -59 88 211 335 19.00 1.998 -289 -149 -10 107 270 409 549 21.00 1.998 -171 -15 140 273 452 607 763 23.00 1.998 -53 119 290 439 634 805 977

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study Sacramento Valley UC Cooperative Extension

17

UC COOPERATIVE EXTENSION Table 5. WHOLE FARM ANNUAL EQUIPMENT, INVESTMENT, AND OVERHEAD COSTS

SACRAMENTO VALLEY - 2012

ANNUAL EQUIPMENT COSTS

Yrs. Salvage Capital Cash Overhead Yr. Description Price Life Value Recovery Insurance Taxes Total 12 200 HP 4WD tractor 170,712 10 50,426 17,784 888 1,106 19,778 12 225 HP 4WD tractor 185,891 10 54,909 19,366 967 1,204 21,536 12 95 HP 4WD utility tractor 47,735 16 8,550 3,958 226 281 4,465 12 Chisel – 21' 18,000 10 3,183 2,047 85 106 2,238 12 Combine – no header 370,000 7 100,690 50,904 1,890 2,353 55,147 12 Disc – offset 21' 42,500 10 7,516 4,833 201 250 5,284 12 Disc – stubble 14' 17,814 10 3,150 2,026 84 105 2,215 12 Disc ridger – 12' 12,000 10 2,122 1,365 57 71 1,492 12 Mower – flail 15' 18,000 20 938 1,385 76 95 1,556 12 Pickup – 1/2 ton 30,000 7 11,380 3,729 166 207 4,102 12 Pickup – 3/4 ton 45,000 7 17,070 5,594 249 310 6,154 12 Roller rice 22' 20,000 20 1,042 1,539 84 105 1,728 12 Triplane 16'X30' 20,914 10 3,698 2,378 99 123 2,600 12 V-ditcher 5,000 20 261 385 21 26 432 12 Triplane 24'X30' 35,000 10 6,189 3,980 165 206 4,351 12 Header – conv. 25' 60,000 7 16,328 8,255 306 382 8,943 12 Grain tub 35,000 10 6,189 3,980 165 206 4,351 TOTAL 1,133,566 293,642 133,506 5,730 7,136 146,372 40% of new cost* 453,426 117,457 53,402 2,292 2,854 58,549 *Used to reflect a mix of new and used equipment

ANNUAL INVESTMENT COSTS

Yrs. Salvage Capital Cash Overhead Description Price Life Value Recovery Insurance Taxes Repairs Total Backhoe 14,000 10 0 1,791 50 70 280 2,191 Fuel tanks & pumps 10,500 20 0 825 37 53 210 1,125 Fuel wagons – 550 gallons (2) 3,478 10 349 417 14 19 70 520 Irrigation system 22,500 20 0 1,767 80 113 450 2,410 Land 1,608,000 40 1,608,000 76,380 0 16,080 0 92,460 Shop building 45,338 20 0 3,561 162 227 906 4,856 Shop tools 13,087 20 1,309 987 51 72 262 1,373 Tool carrier 14,418 20 1,442 1,088 64 79 120 1,351 TOTAL INVESTMENT 1,731,321 1,611,100 86,817 458 16,712 2,298 106,285

ANNUAL BUSINESS OVERHEAD COSTS

Units/ Price/ Total

Description Farm Unit Unit Cost Land rent 639 acre 350.00 223,650 Liability insurance 840 acre 1.58 1,324 Office expense 800 acre 30.00 24,000 Compliance & administration 800 acre 5.00 4,000

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study Sacramento Valley UC Cooperative Extension

18

UC COOPERATIVE EXTENSION Table 6. HOURLY EQUIPMENT COSTS

SACRAMENTO VALLEY - 2012 COSTS PER HOUR Cash Overhead Operating Actual Capital Lube & Total Total Yr. Description Hours Used Recovery Insurance Taxes Repairs Fuel Oper. Costs/Hr. 12 200 HP 4WD tractor 201 4.45 0.22 0.28 12.28 61.71 73.99 78.94 12 225 HP 4WD tractor 809 5.06 0.25 0.31 9.41 39.81 49.23 54.85 12 95 HP 4WD utility tractor 233 2.11 0.12 0.15 3.68 15.16 18.84 21.22 12 Chisel – 21' 133 4.09 0.17 0.21 2.56 0.00 2.56 7.03 12 Combine – no header 340 47.57 1.77 2.20 27.64 59.72 87.36 138.89 12 Disc – offset 21' 224 7.73 0.32 0.40 3.74 0.00 3.74 12.19 12 Disc – stubble 14' 234 3.46 0.14 0.18 1.60 0.00 1.60 5.39 12 Disc ridger – 12' 40 2.73 0.11 0.14 1.32 0.00 1.32 4.30 12 Mower – flail 15' 132 4.20 0.23 0.29 3.59 0.00 3.59 8.31 12 Pickup – 1/2 ton 326 4.58 0.20 0.25 2.44 7.64 10.08 15.12 12 Pickup – 3/4 ton 326 6.87 0.31 0.38 3.09 7.64 10.73 18.29 12 Roller rice 22' 135 4.55 0.25 0.31 1.09 0.00 1.09 6.20 12 Triplane 16'X30' 100 3.17 0.13 0.16 2.14 0.00 2.14 5.61 12 V-ditcher 80 1.54 0.08 0.11 0.88 0.00 0.88 2.61 12 Triplane 24'X30' 53 5.31 0.22 0.27 3.59 0.00 3.59 9.39 12 Header – conv. 25' 309 10.70 0.40 0.49 6.12 0.00 6.12 17.71 12 Grain cart 181 5.31 0.22 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.80 12 Rented 325 HP 4WD tractor 183 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.70 64.70 74.40 74.40

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study

Sacramento Valley

UC

Cooperative Extension

19

UC

CO

OPER

ATIV

E EXTEN

SION

T

able 7. OPE

RA

TIO

NS W

ITH

EQ

UIPM

EN

T &

MA

TE

RIA

LS

SAC

RA

MEN

TO V

ALLEY

- 2012

O

peration

Rate/

O

peration M

onth Tractor

Implem

ent M

aterial acre

Unit

Maintain drains

Feb 95 H

P 4WD

Utility tractor

V-ditcher

M

aintain and rework levees

Apr

225 HP 4W

D tractor

Disc ridger – 12'

C

hisel 2X

Apr

Rented 325 H

P 4WD

tractor C

hisel – 21' Lube

0.15 acre

225 HP 4W

D tractor

Chisel – 21'

Stubble disc

Apr

225 HP 4W

D tractor

Disc – stubble 14'

Finish disc 2X

A

pr 225 H

P 4WD

tractor D

isc – offset 21'

Triplane fields A

pr 225 H

P 4WD

tractor Triplane 24'X

30'

A

pr R

ented 325 HP 4W

D tractor

Triplane 16'X30'

D

iesel 12.00

gal

Lube

0.17 acre

Laser level 1X/7 Y

ears A

pr

Laser leveling

0.13 acre

Fertilize – Aqua A

mm

onium

Apr

Aqua am

monia

130.00 lb N

Fertilizer rig – A

qua Am

monium

1.00

acre Fertilize – 12-23-20

Apr

225 HP 4W

D tractor

Roller rice 22'

12-23-20 200.00

lb

A

ir application – dry fertilizer 1.00

acre R

oll final seedbed A

pr 225 H

P 4WD

tractor R

oller rice 22'

Fertilize – zinc, 50% of acreage

Apr

Zinc Sulfate 36%

15.00 lb

Air application – zinc dry

0.50 acre

Irrigate M

ay

W

ater 0.20

acre

June

W

ater 0.20

acre

July

W

ater 0.20

acre

Aug

Water

0.20 acre

Sept

Water

0.20 acre

Weed control – grass spray

May

Cerano

10.00 lb

Air application – C

erano 1.00

acre

A

djuvant 3.50

fl oz

C

rop oil 1.00

gal Soak (chlorine) and deliver seed

May

Seed - rice 1.80

cwt

Soaking (chlorine) seed 1.80

cwt

Delivery – seed

1.80 cw

t

Plant seed M

ay

A

ir application – seed 1.80

cwt

2012 Rice Costs and Returns Study

Sacramento Valley

UC

Cooperative Extension

20

UC

CO

OPER

ATIV

E EXTEN

SION

Table 7. C

ontinued

SAC

RA

MEN

TO V

ALLEY

- 2012

O

peration

Rate/

Operation

Month

Tractor Im

plement

Material

acre U

nit

Insect control rice weevil, 15%

of acreage M

ay

W

arrior 0.58

fl oz

Air application – W

arrior 0.15

acre

Pest control shrimp/algae, 20%

of acreage M

ay

C

opper Sulfate fine 3.00

lb

Air application – copper

0.20 acre

Weed control – broadleaf spray, 80%

of acreage June

Grandstand

4.80 fl oz

Crop oil

0.80 gal

Super wham

4.80

qt

Ground application – Prop/G

rand 0.80

acre

Weed control – cleanup spray, 20%

of acreage June

Regim

ent 0.33

oz

Air application – R

egiment

0.50 acre

Fertilize – topdress 21-0-0, 75% of acreage

July

21-0-0 A

mm

onia Sulfate 112.50

lb

Air application – D

ry Fertilizer 0.75

acre

Insect control – armyw

orm, 5%

of acreage July

Warrior

0.38 fl oz

Air application – W

arrior 0.10

acre

Disease control – Q

uadris, 45% of acreage

July

Q

uadris 5.40

fl oz

Air application – Q

uadris 0.45

acre

Com

bine rice Sept

C

ombine – no header

H

eader – conv. 25'

Grain tub

Sept 200 H

P 4WD

tractor G

rain cart

Haul rice to dryer

Sept

H

auling 95.34

cwt

Dry &

store rice O

ct

D

rying charge 95.34

cwt

Storage charge 83.00

cwt

Rice R

esearch Board assessm

ent O

ct

C

alifornia Rice R

esearch Board

83.00 cw

t

California R

ice Com

mission assessm

ent O

ct

C

alifornia Rice C

omm

ission 83.00

cwt

Burn perm

it & fees, 10%

of acreage O

ct

B

urning fees 0.10

acre

Burn perm

it 0.10

acre

Chop, flood &

roll, 30% of acreage

Oct

225 HP 4W

D Tractor

Disc – Stubble 14'

200 HP 4W

D tractor

Roller rice 22'

Water – straw

managem

ent 0.30

acre

Chop, 60%

of acreage O

ct 95 H

P 4WD

Utility tractor

Mow

er – flail 15'

Disc, 60%

of acreage O

ct 225 H

P 4WD

Tractor D

isc – stubble 14'

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၂၇။ ၁၇ (ဃ)

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10

(၁ဝ)

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-

( )

။

( )

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ဝ

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၃ဝ။ -

( )

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( )

။

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။

(၁၁)

၃၂။

။

ဂ ။

11

၃၃။

။

၃၄။

ဝ

။

(၁၂)

၃၅။ ၁၉

။

၃၆။ ၁၉

၃၅

။

၃၇။ ၁၄

၁ဝ ။

။

(၁၃)

၃၈။ ဝ

။

၃၉။ ဝ ဝ

၂၁ ဝ ။

၄ဝ။

ဝ

။

12

၄၁။ ၃၇ ။

၄၂ ။ -

( ) ဝ

။

( )

။

၄၃။ -

( ) ၁၉၅၃

( ) ၁၉၆၃

(ဂ) ၁၉၆၃ ။

။

( )

Myanmar Land Reform (Page 1)

Attachments

1. Philippine and Myanmar (Burmese) Page.9

2. Land Reform Paper by (Page14)Dr. You, Jong-Sung Ph.D Harvard University

3. Cost of one Acre paddy field (Page 59)Myanmar to reference2012 Sample cost to produce riceby University of California

4. ေျမလြတေျမရငးဥပေဒ ၂၀၁၂ (Page 79)

5. ေျမယာဥပေဒ ၂၀၁၂ (Page 91)