Kumarila's Notion of Pauruseyavacana

8/13/2019 Kumarila's Notion of Pauruseyavacana

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, 2007, 3955 1970-9501 (online), 1970-951 (print) 978-88-8453-600-6 (print), 2007 Firenze University Press

KUMRILAS NOION

OF PAURUEYAVACANA*

n the Mms tradition, man-made statements, in contrast to

perception or Vedic injunctions, are not ultimately counted as pri-mary sources o inormation. Kumrila inherits abaras idea thatman-made speech can convey only a speakers cognition (vaktjna)and not the actual object in question. Tus the essential part oDharmakrtis view on speech as being vaktrabhipryascakais already ound in the barabhya. It is more appropriate tosay that Dharmakrtis idea o vaktrabhipryascaka was pre-figured by Kumrila or some other Mmsakas than to say thatDharmakrti invented it building on Digngas apoha theory.

I , man-made or mundane statements(paurueya/laukika-vacana) are not ultimately counted as primary sourcesof information. In contrast to Vedic injunctions (codan/vidhi/stra), whichare ultimately the single source of knowledge of dharma (and adharma),man-made speech, including even Manus teaching (mnavastra) or

Manus recollection (manusmti), acquires at best only the position of a

secondary source which is Veda-based. A man-made statement againhas a secondary position when opposed to direct perception (pratyaka). It

* I thank Vincent Eltschinger, Arlo Griffiths, Harunaga Isaacson, Helmut Krasser,Jonathan Silk, Ernst Steinkellner and Alex Watson for valuable suggestions andcomments.

1. Tis idea is clear in Jaiministra1.1.2 (codanlakao rtho dharma) and otherrelevant passages such as 1.3.1 (dharmasya abdamlatvd aabdam anapekya syt).

2. barabhyaad 1.1.2, F 18.1112: asati vymohe vedd api bhavati.


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can be valid only if it is based on perception (pratyakaprvaka) (or someother valid sources) and if it is also conveyed in a correct way, e.g., utteredby a honest speaker.

Mundane matters Religious matters

1 Primary source pratyaka(etc.) codan

2 Secondary source laukikavacana laukikavacana

Historically speaking, it is probably the Mms tradition that first clari-fied the distinction between Vedic injunctions and smtis. Tis is recordedinJaiministra1.3.12, Smtyadhikaraa. Tere the strakraappeals to

the distinction between perception and inference, i.e., the contrast whichis homologous with that between a Vedic injunction and a smtipassage. Asmtipassage can be regarded as anumnaor an inferential reason, inas-much as it allows us to infer its Vedic source.

aindriyaka dharma/adharma

1 pratyaka(etc.) codan

2 anumna smti

Considering the old Mms conception ofpramafound in the discus-sion of ealakaas or criteria of hierarchy between two ritual elements,the essential difference between perception and inference or a direct rev-elation (ruti) and an indirect, evidential verbal expression (liga) lies inthe distance (viprakara) from the goal aimed at or the meaning to be

3. barabhya ad 1.1.2, F 18.36: yat tu laukika vacanam, tac cet pratyayitt

purud indriyaviaya v, avitatham eva tat. athpratyayitd(-td] corr.; cf. lokavrtti-kattparyak71.17-18; -tt purud) anindriyaviaya v, tat puruabuddhiprabhavamapramam. aakya hi tat puruea jtum te vacant.For Kumrilas interpretation ofthese two conditions, i.e. having been uttered by apratyayitaspeaker and communicat-ing a perceptible object, see Kataoka 2001.

4. See Einoo 1998 and Pollock 2005 for general descriptions of theSmtyadhikaraa.

5. Jaiministra1.3.2: api v kartsmnyt pramam anumna syt|6. Jaiministra 3.3.14: rutiligavkyaprakaraasthnasamkhyn samavye

pradaurbalyam, arthaviprakart|


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conveyed (artha): perception or a direct revelation conveys the informationdirectly, whereas inference or an evidential verbal expression can do it indi-rectly, i.e. only by presupposing its source. In this respect, this distinctionbetween perception and inference or a revelation and an evidential verbal

expression can be regarded as a specific instance of Mmss general di-chotomy between direct and indirect.

aindriyaka dharma/adharma artha

1 skt pratyaka(etc.) codan mla

2 dvrea anumna smti laukikavacana

When Mmsakas investigate the nature of man-made speech, they as-

sume this direct/indirect dichotomy and its parallelism with the dis-tinction between perception and inference. For example, it is most naturalfor abara and Kumrila to conceptualize inference as being preced-ed by perception (pratyakaprvaka) as well as to describe man-madespeech as having a perceptible object (indriyaviaya), being based onthe sense faculty (aindriyakatva) or more generally being based on asource (mlasadbhva). Tus, describing the intention of an opponent,Kumrila states:

For speech always should convey a meaning which is [already] knownthrough another means of valid cognition. And it [i.e., speech] cannot bea means of valid cognition in itself, just as recollection [cannot, because itrelies on a preceding cognition].

According to our normal experience, speech conveys to a hearer an objectthat a speaker has experienced through a means of valid cognition such asperception. Like recollection (smti), speech in itself is not a reliable, inde-pendent source. Just as a recollection is valid only when it is based on anoriginal experience, man-made speech is valid only when it is based onperception or the like.

7. Te Mms view of this dichotomy is best represented in the ktyadhikaraa(1.3.3035): a word directly expresses a universal (smnya/kti/jti) and not a particular(viea/vyakti); the latter can be expressed indirectly only through the former.

8. lokavrttikacodan, v. 22:pramntarada hi abdo rtha prpayet sad|smtivac casvaya tasya prmya nopapadyate||


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Here one can clearly see that Kumrila uses the direct/indirect dichot-omy, as indicated by the words svayamandpramntarada, and theparallelism to recollection as indicated by smtivat.

In the following I would like to elucidate Kumrilas concept of man-

made speech, for Kumrilas description, especially that in the codanstrasection of the lokavrttika, is not clear enough for us to determine his own

view. Rather, his view seems to sway between the two opposing views as towhether man-made speech is a means of valid cognition (prama) or not.

-

In spite of Kumrilas apologetic interpretation as found in lokavrttikaabda,vv. 114, it seems almost certain that the old tradition represented by

the Vttikra as referred to in the barabhyadoes not count man-madespeech as an independent source or prama. Te Vttikra, aer infer-ence, mentions only stra, i.e., Vedic teaching, and not verbal testimonyin general (abda):

As for a [Vedic] teaching, it is knowledge of an object which is not in con-tact [with the sense faculties], through cognition of speech.

Kumrila accepts that this strais nothing but Vedic teaching (codan/upadea), and therefore does not include man-made speech. Tus, there is

no definition of verbal testimony in general in the barabhya.Te lower status of man-made speech is reconfirmed by abaras discus-

sion in barabhyaad 1.1.2. In contrast to the Veda, which is the directsource of dharma, abara grants a man-made statement (paurueyavacanam) only a secondary position. He clearly states that a man-madestatement can be valid only when it is uttered by a trustworthy personwho has correct knowledge (pratyayita< pratyayo sya sajta), orseen from another standpoint, only when his speech has perceptible

9. barabhyaad 1.1.35 (Vttikra), F 32.3: stra abdavijnd asannike rthevijnam.

10. lokavrttikaabda, v. 12cd: codan copadea ca stram evety udhtam||11. lokavrttikakik 112.2324: pratyayo sya sajta ity etasminn arthe hi

trakdismter itajanta pratyayitaabdam abhiyukt smaranti. (Adhyy5.2.36: tadasya sajta trakdibhya itac.)

12. For the interpretation of vwhich connects the two conditions (pratyayittpurud indriyaviayav), see Kataoka 2001. likantha in the Pariia (9.78) inter-prets it as a sign of rephrasing the same thing and not as a sign of rigid option ( vikalpa).


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objects (indriyaviaya), i.e., when he conveys what he has directly per-ceived. abara presupposes the following process: first an object (viaya)is perceived through the sense faculty (indriya) by a speaker; thus heobtains a cognition (pratyaya), i.e., perceptual cognition (pratyaka); then

he utters a statement (vacana), which produces a cognition (jna) in ahearers mind.

pratyaka

|

viaya indriya pratyayita vacana jna

If a speaker tries to convey an imperceptible object, such as dharma,

he naturally fails, for his speech comes out of human knowledge (F18.5: puruabuddhiprabhava), and thus what he conveys is a mere fan-tasy. As abara explicitly states, it cannot be cognized by a human beingwithout a [Vedic] revelation (F 18.56: aakya hi tat puruea jtumte vacant). A man-made statement of dharma comes out of delusion(vymoha).

vymoha

|

purua upadea jna

At the best, as in the case of Manu, a human being can communicate dhar-ma only when his speech is based on the Veda.

dharma Veda Manu upadea jna

In the above view, abara accepts to some extent the validity of a man-made

statement: it is valid if it is based on a reliable source such as perception orthe Veda. Immediately aer this view, however, he introduces another view,which also elucidates the difference between Vedic injunctions and man-made statements. Surprisingly, he denies here the validity of man-madespeech in general with regard to external objects.

13. barabhyaad 1.1.2, F 18.11: upadeo hi vymohd api bhavati.14. See footnote 2.


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Furthermore, from a man-made statement arises a cognition this personunderstands thus and not [a cognition] this object is thus.

A man-made statement can convey what a speaker has in mind and not

what there is or the actual state of an external object. A human being cannotindependently convey true information about an objectper sevia speech.Because of this negative feature, a cognition based on a man-made statementsometimes is erroneous, as we oen experience. Tis negative (or skeptical)

view of man-made speech represents a developed form of the above view, inparticular, the view expressed with the wordspuruabuddhiprabhavaandvymoht.

pratyaya

| purua upadea jna

From the sequential order of these two different views in the barabhya,which are, as is oen the case, connected with the conjunction api ca(F 18.12),it seems that abara inherited the first view from the preceding tradition andthat he added as the second a fresh view either of his own or of someone else.Tis negative view of man-made speech may look rather surprising, because wehave oen learnt that the Mms system holds optimistic views on speech

and the world. Although it is true that abaras second view is motivated byhis intention to clarify the difference between man-made speech and Vedicrevelation, and therefore should not be emphasized too much, it is nonethelessa historical fact that his influential commentator Kumrila has expanded onabaras idea and further investigated the nature of man-made speech.

-

In lokavrttikacodan, in particular vv. 160168ab, Kumrila directlycomments on the barabhya passages mentioned above, and elabo-

15. barabhyaad 1.1.2, F 18.1213: api ca paurueyd vacantevam aya puruoveda iti bhavati pratyaya, na evam ayam artha iti.

16. barabhyaad 1.1.2, F 18.1314: viplavate khalv api kacit puruaktd vacantpratyaya.

17. An annotated translation of vv. 160170 is available in the appendix of aber 2002.


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rates abaras negative view of the cognitive process of man-made speech.aking into consideration other explanations in the codanstrasection,Kumrilas view can be summarized as follows. A trustworthy person (pta)does not have any of the three problems which can interfere in the process

of uttering a sentence: between the object in question (artha) and cognition(dh), between cognition (dh) and intention (vivak), and between inten-tion (vivak) and the utterance of a sentence (vkya). On the other hand, aspeaker who has not directly experienced the object in question (adra),a liar (asatyavdin/antavdin), or a confused man (bhrnta) does have aproblem in the process. A speaker may convey a piece of incorrect infor-mation; or even if he has experienced the object in question, he may tell alie; or even if he intends to speak honestly, he may fail to express himselfcorrectly.

artha dh vivak vkya

(adra) (asatyavdin) (bhrnta)

Whereas abara takes into consideration man-made statements which areeither true or false, without paying attention to the possibility of a dishonestor confused speaker, Kumrila carefully excludes dishonest and confusedutterances as being exceptional. Limiting in advance the matter of discourseto the general case of a trustworthy speaker in this way, Kumrila contrasts

man-made statements with Vedic ones: a man-made statement, though ut-tered by a trustworthy speaker, is valid with regard to the speakers cogni-tion alone. Tus Kumrila states:

Te cognition of a speaker is known from the sentence of a trustworthyperson; in other cases [there is] a failure.

Although a hearer understands the object in question from a speakers state-ment, a hearers knowledge is valid only with regard to a speakers cogni-

tion, and not the actual object in question. Kumrila considers that a man-made statement has a limited power (akti) which enables it only to convey

18. lokavrttikacodan, v. 162ab: vaktdhr ptavkyena gamyate nyatra vipluti|19. lokavrttikacodan, v. 165: tenrthapratyayotpde rotur jte pi vkyata | jto

nnam aneneti vaktjne matir bhavet|| Terefore, though for a hearer a cognition ofan object arises from a sentence, there will [also] arise an idea about the cognition of thespeaker: Indeed [the object] has been known by him.


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a speakers cognition. Terefore it can convey the object in question onlyindirectly, through being based on some reliable source.

And at first utterances are indifferent [i.e. they do not cause a certain, valid,

cognition of an object itself], because they are separated [from the object]by the cognition [of the speaker]. But validity can be established becauseof the possibility that there is a cause of the speakers cognition.

One can again see the parallelism with recollection (smti) and inferencebehind Kumrilas explanation. A man-made statement can be valid onlywhen it is based on a proper cause (hetu) of information such as perceptualmeans or a Vedic injunction.

artha hetu vaktjna abda rotpratyaya

Te power of a man-made statement extends to a speakers cognition andnot further. A hearer needs an additional process of confirmation in orderto determine the object in question. Tus, concerning an external object,man-made speech is essentially not an independent source, free from anadditional condition. In other words, it has a person as the cause [of its

validity] (punimitta). Te Veda, on the other hand, is an independentsource in sharp contrast to man-made speech. It does not have a speakers

cognition as the prerequisite for validity and therefore it is never false.

20. lokavrttika codan, v. 167: tajjnntaritatvc ca abds tvad udsate |prmyasthpana tu syd vaktdhhetusabhavt||

21. lokavrttika codan, v. 168: arthe prva pratte pi nicayo hi tadraya |tenrthajnagamypi prmye saiva prvabhk|| For though an object is understoodbeforehand, a determination is dependent on it [i.e. the cause behind the speakers cogni-tion]. Terefore it is precisely that [cognition of the speaker (vaktdh)] that is a prerequisitefor the validity, although it is understood from the cognition of an object.

22. lokavrttikacodan, v. 169ab: ato tra punimittatvd upapann mrthat|Terefore in the case [of a man-made statement] it is possible that it is false, because it hasa person as the cause [of its validity].

23. lokavrttikacodan, vv. 169cd170: na tu syt tatsvabhvatva vede vakturabhvata || tadbuddhyantarayo* nstty artho rthai ca pratyate | ato na jnaprvatvamapekya nyathrthat|| (*-yo n-] C2GMB

1I

1K

1; -yor n-C1DPI

2; -yo nnB2) (Cf. also

Freschi and Graheli [2005:307, fn.67].) But it is impossible for the Veda to have thatintrinsic nature [of being false], because it has no speaker [i.e. author]. And becausethere is no intermediation by a [speakers] cognition, the meaning [of a Vedic sentence]is understood [directly] by means of the meanings [of the words]. Terefore [the Veda]


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Other evidence further confirms that Kumrila himself has as hisfinal view this negative view of the limited power of man-made speech.In commenting on another passage of the barabhya, Kumrila statesthat abara accepts onlyprovisionally(abhyupetya) the operation of a sen-

tence (vkyavypra) towards the object to be conveyed. In other words,according to Kumrilas interpretation, abara accepts as his final view thatman-made speech operates toward a speakers cognition and not toward anexternal object.

-

Kumrila clearly limits the power of man-made speech in contrast to theVeda, and accepts that it is not an independent source of information. Tis

is clear in the codanstrasection of the lokavrttika. In the abda(orstra) section, on the other hand, Kumrila seems to proceed in the otherdirection. He clearly accepts the validity of man-made speech. Interpretingthe definition of straor Vedic teaching found in the Vttikragrantha(Bh ad 1.1.3-5), Kumrila defends the validity of verbal testimony in general(abda). He states that it is pointless to mention it in the context of Vedicexegesis and that it is automatically understood if one defines the charac-teristic feature of Vedic teaching.

Here Kumrila clearly accepts that valid speech is not limited to the

Vedic alone. Man-made speech, too, can be valid, and therefore is countedas a means of valid cognition if it is uttered by a trustworthy speaker. Inthis way, Kumrila accepts the validity of man-made statements against theoriginal intention of the Vttikra and abara.

requires neither the cognition [of a speaker in order to be ascertained as authoritative]nor is it errant.

24. lokavrttikacodan, v. 176cd: abhyupetyrthaviaya vkyavypram ucyate||[abara] states [that it is different], aer having [provisionally] accepted an operation

of a sentence towards an [external] object[, which is in fact separated by a speakerscognition].

25. lokavrttikaabda, v. 10: yat tu gm nayetydivkyastha abdalakaam |tasya nehopayogo sti tasmc chstragata ktam|| On the other hand, the defining char-acter of speech [in general], which belongs to a sentence such as Bring a cow, is not usefulhere [in understanding the correct meaning of a Vedic teaching]. Terefore [only] the [defi-nition] of a Vedic teaching is made.

26. lokavrttikaabda, v. 11: viea ca na smnyam antaresti kacana | tasmttam apy udhtya smnya lakayet sukham|| And there is no particular that exists with-out a universal. Terefore one can easily define a universal also by citing a particular.


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,

vaidikavacana

laukikavacana ptaprata

anptaprata

One can probably see here the paradigm change of his time by whichKumrila, unlike Prabhkara, can no more hold the anachronistic viewof the old Mms system. In a sense, Kumrila reaches a compromisein the common, secular view as represented, e.g., in Nyyabhyaad 1.1.7.Tere Pakilasvmin states that the Naiyyika definition of verbal testimony(abda) is a definition common to [speech of] sages, ryas and barbar-ians (14.5: yryamlecchn samna lakaam). Even barbarians canbe trustworthy (pta) and their speech can be valid (perhaps even with

regard to dharma as is hinted by Pakilasvmins expression pta khalusktktadharm). Pakilasvmins criticism can be regarded as aiming ata conservative view of the Mms system.

-

Tus, with regard to the exact status of man-made speech, there is a ques-tion as to whether or not it is a means of valid cognition (prama). In histime, Kumrila had to accept its validity. But, at the same time, he had to

demarcate it to some extent in accordance with the Mms tradition. Hecould not give unlimited power to man-made speech, lest it may climb to ahigh position equal to the Veda.

Under these circumstances, abara gives a good hint to Kumrila asto how to solve the dilemma. It seems that abara himself does not paymuch attention to the exact status of man-made speech. He is probablysatisfied with its lower status in relation to the Veda. In the second view,he even reduces its power to the realm of a speakers cognition. For him,man-made speech is not an independent category of pramaor means

of valid cognition. Tus there is no problem at all for abara to depressits status.Kumrila inherits abaras idea that man-made speech can convey only

a speakers cognition (vaktjna), and not the actual object in question. Buthe does so on the premise that it also comprises a subcategory of means of

valid cognition. It is valid, but is so within its own domain, i.e., only withregard to a speakers cognition. Tus there is a demarcated territory or aclear division of domain in correspondence to each means of valid cogni-tion. In this respect, even the Buddhas statement can be regarded valid


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concerning its own domain, i.e., the Buddhas cognition, although it can-not be accepted as valid with regard to the external object (in particular,religious matters), it communicates. Similarly, even the Veda can be con-cluded to be invalid beyond its territory.

Even the Veda is false with regard to an object beyond its own function.

Tus, as a whole, Kumrila succeeds in presenting a new view on the valid-ity of man-made statements. Unlike his predecessors such as the Vttikraand abara, Kumrila accepts man-made statements as a subcategory ofmeans of valid cognition. But at the same time, he grants this type of meansof cognition a limited power which enables it to convey only a speakerscognition, either correct or incorrect, concerning the external object that

the speaker has intended to express.

pratyaya

|

artha mla/hetu pratyayita vacana jna

vymoha

|

apratyayita vacana jna

Amplifying this view, one must conclude that even Manus speech is validprimarily with regard to his cognition, and not to the meaning it is sup-posed to convey. Kumrila wil l probably agree. But in this case one canestablish its validity with regard to the object in question, because onecan prove that Manus teaching is based on the Veda alone. As was al-

27. lokavrttikacodan, v. 172: tem api hi yat krya prvatra pratipditam | tatra

samyaktvam arthe tu vypro naiva vidyate|| For even those [statements of the Buddha,etc.] are true with regard to their [own] result [i.e. a speakers cognition which is to be com-municated] which was mentioned above. But with regard to an [external] object, [they] haveno function [i.e. cannot communicate it to a hearer].

28. lokavrttikacodan, v. 173ab: svavyprtirikte rthe vedasypi mrthat|29. Tis is proved by Kumrila through arthpatti. antravrttika ad 1.3.2, A

163.2122: bhrnter anubhavd vpi puvkyd vipralambhant | dnuguyasdhyatvccodanaiva laghyas|| [As the source of Manus Smti,] only Vedic injunction, inasmuchas it can be established as conforming to evident facts, is less complicated [than any othercause:] [Manus] error, [his own] experience, someone elses utterance, or [Manus] deceit.


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,

ready mentioned, utterances are indifferent, because they are separated[from the object] by the cognition [of the speaker]. But validity can beestablished because of the possibility that there is a cause of the speakerscognition.

It does not seem that abara had intended in advance a change of theentire system when he presented the second view concerning the validityof human speech. Rather, it is more likely that he went this far in order toemphasize the difference between Vedic and man-made speech. Nonethe-less, the negative feature of this view is distinctive in the context of the

positive (or trusting) views on the validity of speech held by others duringthis period. Although further investigation is required and it is beyondthe scope of this short article, I would like to conclude by making a shortremark concerning Kumrilas possible position in history, in particular in

juxtaposition to Dharmakrti, perhaps the most famous scholar who holdsthat speech conveys only a speakers intention (vaktrabhipryascaka).

Even Dignga (ca. 480-540 AD), who dismisses the positive aspect ofword-meanings (padrtha) and thus establishes the apohatheory, presup-poses as a whole the positive Vaieika view on the universe of discourse, as

Katsura 1979 has convincingly shown. Unlike Dharmakrti, Dignga neversays that speech refers to the speakers intention. For him conceptualiza-tion (kalpan), in other words, connecting names, universals and the like(Pramasamuccaya 1.3d: nmajtydiyojan), is not limited to an indi-vidual person but is rather a social process shared by everyone. Tus it isnot surprising that Dignga accepts the Vaieika scheme of categories tosome extent.

abara (ca. 500550 AD) clearly encouraged Kumrila (ca. 600650AD) to take the negative view that man-made speech primarily conveys

a speakers cognition alone. In this light, we have to reconsider our nor-

30. See footnote 20.31. Pramavrttikasvavtti107.2021: nntaryakatbhvc chabdn vastubhi

saha | nrthasiddhis tatas, te hi vaktrabhipryascak|| Because utterances do not havean indispensable [causal] connection with entities, external objects are not established onthe grounds of them, for they indicate [only] the intention of the speaker [and not the actualstate of external objects].


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mal understanding that Mmsakas have a naive view of speech. If onethinks to contrast this position with that of Dharmakrti (ca. 600660AD), I would point out that, historically speaking, the essential part ofDharmakrtis view on speech as being vaktrabhipryascakais already

found, as explained above, in the barabhya, and not in Digngasworks.

32. Generally speaking, Buddhists assume that speech does not touch reality itself.No doubt Digngas apohatheory is in accordance with this general Buddhist view. Buthis criticism is mainly on the ontological level of word-meanings (padrtha). He replacedpositivejtis or smnyas with negative anypohas. But once this replacement has been

completed, Dignga is satisfied with the old Vaieika scheme. Cf. Pramasamuccayavtti ad k. 36d (quoted in Pramavrttikasvavtti62.2763.1): abdo rthntaranivttiviineva bhvn ha.

gotva agonivtti

| >>> |

gau govyakti gau govyakti

Vaieika Dignga

Te essential structure of abaras idea is different (see footnote 15). Te intermediation

by the speakers cognition is emphasized. Furthermore this idea mainly concerns vkyasand notpadas.

artha jna vkya

|

vakt

abaras simple idea is further developed by Kumrila by taking into considerationother possible intermediates (lokavrttikacodan, vv. 160168ab).

vijna vivak padrtharacan vkyrthapratyaya

| | | |

vakt rot

Te exact idea of vaktrabhipryascaka is not found in Dignga, although it is in thesame direction as his apohatheory in that both negate positive aspects of speech. TusDharmakrtis idea of vaktrabhipryascaka is more akin to abaras and Kumrilas thanto Digngas, though one can regard it as a kind of rigid extension of Digngas and thegeneral Buddhist perspective of speech.


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Jaiministra. See barabhya(A).

antravrttika. See barabhya(A).

Nyyabhya. Gautamyanyyadarana with Bhya o Vtsyyana. Ed. AnantalalTakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.

Pramavrttikasvavtti. Te Pramavrttikam o Dharmakrti:the First Chapterwith the Autocommentary. Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Oriental Research Institute Series,no. 116, 139. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.

Pramasamuccaya . Digngas Pramasamuccaya, Chapter . A hypotheticalreconstruction o the Sanskrit text with the help o the two ibetan transla-tions on the basis o the hitherto known Sanskrit ragments and the linguistic

materials gained rom Jinendrabuddhis k. Ed. Ernst Steinkellner. (http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf)

barabhya.A rmajjaiminiprata mmsdaranam. Ed. Subbstr. 6 bhgas.

Poona: nandramamudralaya, 192934.F See Frauwallner 1968.

lokavrttika.My text is based on my own unpublished edition prepared on thebasis of seven published editions and five manuscripts.P Te Pandit (New Series), Vol. , 1878 (July 1), pp. 76100.

C1 Mmslokavr tikam r matkumrilabhaapdaviracitamNikhilatan-trparatantrarmatprthasrathimirapratayNyyaratnkarkhyay Vykhyaynugatam.Ed. ailaga Rmastr.Caukhamb-Saskta-Granthaml, No. 3. K, 1898.

Mmms Slokavrtika with the Commentary Kasika o Sucaritamira.Ed. K. Smbaiva Sstr. Parts and . rivandrum: CBH Publications,1990 (Reprint. Originally published in 1926).

M lokavrttikavykhy tparyak o Uveka Bhaa . Ed.S.K. Rma ntha str. Revised by K. Kunjunni Raja a nd

R. Tangaswamy. Madras: University of Madras, 19712

(19401

).C2 Mmslokavr tikam r matkumrilabhaapdaviracitamrprtha-srathimirapratay Nyyaratnkarkhyay Vykhyaysamalaktam.Banaras: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office (Tename of the editor of this revised edition and the year of publicationare not given).

D lokavrttika o r Kumrila Bhaa. Ed. Swm Dvrikadsa str.Varanasi: ara Publications (or Ratna Publications, according to thecover), 1978.


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,

G rmajjaiminimuniprata Mmsdaranam, tatrarkumrilabhaa-viracitam Mmslokavrtikam, tac cabarabhyea, Nyyaratnkaravykhyay ippa [sic] casavalitam.Part 1. Ed. Musalagvakara Gajnana str. Vras:

Bhratya Vidy Prakana, 1979.B

1 A manuscript preserved in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, No. 520, Ms.

Wilson 325. Devangar. Paper. Complete. 30 cm 9.5 cm. 111 folios.See Catalogi Codicum Manuscriptorum. Bibliothecae Bodleianae. ParsOctava, Codices Sanskritiocos.T. Aufrecht. Oxonii.

B2 A manuscript preserved in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, No. 521, Ms.

Wilson 277a. Devangar. Paper. Incomplete. 33 cm 9 cm. 38 folios.See the Catalog by T. Aufrecht.

I1 A manuscript preserved in the British Library, London, San Ms I.O.

3739 (=No. 7976). Devangar. Paper. Complete. 21.5 cm 17.5 cm. 89folios. See Catalogue o the Sanskrit and Prakrit Manuscripts in theLibrary o the India Office.A.B. Keith. London, 1935.

I2 A manuscript preserved in the British Library, London, San Ms I.O.

1449b (=No. 2149). Devangar. Paper. Complete. 24 cm 8 cm. 139folios. See the Catalog by A.B. Keith.

K1 A manuscript preserved in the Asiatic Society, Calcutta (Kolkata), G.

8854. Devangar. Paper. Complete. Dated savat 1642 (=1585 AD).28 cm 12.5 cm. 79 folios. SeeA Descriptive Catalogue o the Sanskrit

Manuscripts in the Collections o the Asiatic Society (GovernmentCollection). Haraprasada Shastri. Revised and Edited by NarendraChandra Vedantatirtha and Chintaharan Chakravarti. Vol. XI,Philosophy. Calcutta: Te Asiatic Society, 1957.

lokavrttikakik. See of the lokavrttika.

*

Einoo, Shingo. 1998. Baramon Densh ni Okeru SeitenVeda Kannen no Kakuch

to Kdka. Seiten to Ningen (okyo: Hshaku Hikaku Shky BunkaKenkysho), 169186.Frauwallner, Erich. 1962. Kumrilas Bhak. Wiener Zeitschrif r die Kunde

Sd- und Ostasiens6: 7890.. 1968.Materialien zur ltesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamms. Wien:

Hermann Bhlaus Nachf.Freschi, Elisa, and Alessandro Graheli. 2005. Bhamms and Nyya on Veda

and radition. In Boundaries, Dynamics and Construction o raditions inSouth Asia,ed. Federico Squarcini, 287323. Firenze: Firenze University Press.


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. 2003. Kumrilas Critique of Omniscience. Indo Shisshi Kenky, 15, 3569.

Katsura, Shry. 1979. Te apoha Teory of Dignga. Journal o Indian andBuddhist Studies28 (1): 1620.

Kellner, Birgit. 2003. Integrating Negative Knowledge into prama Teory:Te Development of the dynupalabdhiin Dharmakrtis Earlier Works.Journal o Indian Philosophy31: 121159.

Krasser, Helmut. 1999. Dharmakrtis and Kumrilas Refutations of the Existenceof God: A Consideration of Teir Chronological Order. In DharmakrtisTought and Its Impact on Indian and ibetan Philosophy, ed. Shoryu Katsura,215223. Wien: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaen.

Pollock, Sheldon. 2005. Te Revelation of radition: ruti, smti, and the SanskritDiscourse of Power. In Boundaries, Dynamics and Construction o raditionsin South Asia, ed. Federico Squarcini, 4161. Firenze: Firenze UniversityPress.

Steinkellner, Ernst. 1997. Kumrila, varasena, and Dharmakrti in Dialogue. ANew Interpretation of Pramavrttika 33. In Bauddhavidysudhkara:Studies in Honour o Heinz Bechert on the Occasion o His th Birthday, ed.Petra Kieffer-Plz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann, 625646. Swisttal-Odendorf:Indica et ibetica Verlag.

aber, John. 1992. Further Observations on Kumrilas Bhak. Journal oOriental Research62: 179189.

. 2002. Mohanty on abdaprama.Journal o Indian Philosophy30: 161190.

Kumarila's Notion of Pauruseyavacana

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