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1

Security and Stabilization: the Military

Contribution

UK revision of Joint COIN doctrine

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The National Security Strategy

taking on a wide range of challengingtaking on a wide range of challengingsecurity and stabilisation tasks insecurity and stabilisation tasks incomplex and demanding situationscomplex and demanding situations

strengthening the capacity within the

armed forces to work alongside

civilians for certain specific, short-

term reconstruction and development

tasks in hostile environments, and to

provide a stabilisation presence in the

immediate aftermath of a militaryoperation while sufficient security is

put in place to enable civilians to

deployNational Security Strategy March 2008

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3

What has Changed?What has Changed?JDP 3-40

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Whats Changed/Changing? Iraq and Afghanistan: learn and adapt from new insights

(CA, Money, Information, Intelligence, SSR). Op BANNER (38 years): review and integrate classic

insights.

Proliferation of fragile/failing/failed states.

Urbanisation (governance deficit and basic needs

challenge). States unable to monopolise violence (WMD).

Globalisation of insurgency/terrorism (home/away).

Multinational security/stabilisation operations (US led).

National sovereignty (interests/conditionality?)

Armed societies (multiple actors, power and authoritycentres).

Hybrid conflict: toxic mix of HIC and LIC.

Flawed paradigm: UK needs new capabilities (US ADdecrease, Psyops increased by 129%, OPTAG/NTC)

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Whats Changed/Changing? (Cont.)

Issue of HN Sovereignty post colonial world - weare not the responsible power!

In almost all instances UK will be partner (junior?)in a coalition.

The nature and spectrum of irregular actors mixedwith regional & global geopolitics has a moreprofound effect on our own nation than traditionalinsurgents.

Globalisation & Information age growth &importance of non-state influences challengesstate sovereignty.

Western Military forces are smaller. (less USA)

Changed legal frameworks.

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Key IdeasKey Ideas Breadth of Military Roles in Security & StabilizationBreadth of Military Roles in Security & Stabilization

LegitimacyLegitimacy -- National, Coalition & HNNational, Coalition & HN Dominant / Unifying Narrative (Strategic Communications)Dominant / Unifying Narrative (Strategic Communications)

InfluenceInfluence -- EngagementEngagement -- ReconciliationReconciliation

FiresFires

Information OperationsInformation Operations

Stabilisation & HN Capacity BuildingStabilisation & HN Capacity Building Partnering at all LevelsPartnering at all Levels

Money as a Weapon (Security Effect & Reconstruction)Money as a Weapon (Security Effect & Reconstruction)

Adapting Campaign Design & Campaign Planning ToolsAdapting Campaign Design & Campaign Planning Tools

Measured Response (Balancing Risk & Opportunity)Measured Response (Balancing Risk & Opportunity) Use and Conduct of Detention OperationsUse and Conduct of Detention Operations

Identifying TransitionsIdentifying Transitions

Learning, Adapting & AnticipatingLearning, Adapting & Anticipating

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The Military Contribution

Less than Nation Building.Less than Nation Building.

Stability the Decisive Condition, the platformStability the Decisive Condition, the platformwithout which the state cannot thrive and deliver.without which the state cannot thrive and deliver.

Security an elementSecurity an element at times the key elementat times the key element

of stability.of stability. COIN an elementCOIN an element at times the key elementat times the key element ofof

security.security.

Northern Ireland

Military Functions

Iraq

More than COIN.More than COIN.

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MT 4.5 MASDMT 4.5 MASDJDP 3-40

MASD operations are likely to follow an Intervention operation or a PEdeployment. The security situation may vary from non-benign to limited

permissiveness, while compliance is likely to be highly variable and the

likelihood of disruption high. UK forces will normally be acting as part of a

coalition with responsibility to support the recognised governing entity.

These operations will tend to be complex and dynamic requiring a broad

spectrum of military effects. The intensity will be variable across thetheatre in time and space, characterised by a campaign to counter

irregular activity conducted initially by coalition forces, but handing off to

the developed local security forces as soon as practicable. These

operations will require a high degree of force protection. The widest

range of coordinated stabilisation and reconstruction is to be expected,ranging from security assistance for civilian personnel through to, and

including, limited reconstruction activity delivered by UK forces and

extensive capacity building for local security forces. Engendering a

secure environment through localised consent will allow NGOs and OGDs

to take on the majority of this activity. These operations are likely to be

enduring in nature.

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BDD

OGDs/

IAs

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JDP 3-40 ScopeScope

Allies

LWC

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A description of security:Security describes the safety of a state or organisation and its protection

from internal and external threats. At the operational level it is the

provision and maintenance of the operating environment that affords the

necessary freedom of action, when and where required, to achieveobjectives. Armed forces, together with indigenous security forces,

provide the major contribution to security. The term encompasses:

Protection of the state: local populace, civilian agencies & key institutions

by preventing or containing (threats of) violence.

Delivering armed force or the threat of legal use of violence to compel

adversaries to submit to ones will.

The contribution to the immediate and sustained provision of human

security (as defined in BDD).

JDP 3-40 Why security & stabilization?Why security & stabilization?

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Chapter 1 - The operating context

Chapter 2 - Security & stabilization: principles and sectors

Chapter3 - Intelligence & understanding

Chapter 4 - Strategic communication & military influence

Chapter 5 - Campaign planning considerations

Chapter 6 - Execution & assessment

Chapter 7 - Engagement & reconciliation

Chapter 8 - Learn & adapt

Chapter 9 - Education & training

JDP 3-40 StructureStructure

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JDP 3-40 TimeframeTimeframe

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May 09Sep 08Mar 08 May 08 Jul 08 Nov 08 Mar 09Jan 09

Conception

Early discussions

Boot

Camp

Expert review

Revision

& single

authorship

IssueStudy Draft

Review

Issue

Ratification

Draft

Red

Teaming

Conference

WIDER ENGAGEMENT

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Academia - Oxford, KCL, Exeter, RMAS

OGDs - FCO, DFID, SU

Joint Organisations - PJHQ, Def Academy

Land Forces - LWC, ARRC

NGOs

Allies - JFCOM, PKSOI

Recently returned commanders

Past exponents - Frank Kitson

Media - Con Coughan (Daily Telegraph)

JDP 3-40 Examples ofWider EngagementExamples ofWider Engagement

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The requirement for coherence

The need for wide engagement

The desire not to be fixed by current operations The balance between seeking perfection, and

timeliness

JDP 3-40 Key IssuesKey Issues

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