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The Clash of Civilizations?Author(s): Samuel P. HuntingtonSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 22-49Published by: Council on Foreign Relations

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The Clash of Civilizations?

Samuel P.Huntington

THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals havenot hesitated to

proliferatevisions of what itwill be?the end of his

tory, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the

decline of the nation state from theconflicting pulls

of tribalism and

globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the

emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect

ofwhat global politics is likely to be in the coming years.It ismy hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this

new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic.

The great divisions among humankind and the dominatingsource of

conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the mostpowerful

actors inworld affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politicswill

occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash

of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between

civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest

phase

in the evo

lution of conflict in the modern world. For acentury and a half after

the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of

Westphalia,the conflicts of theWestern world were

largely among

Samuel P. Huntington is the Eaton Professor of the Science of

Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute forStrategic

Studies at Harvard University. This article is the productof the Olin

Institute's project on "The Changing Security Environment and

American National Interests."

[22]







The Clash ofCivilizations?

princes?emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs

attemptingto

expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mer

cantilist economicstrength and,

mostimportant,

theterritory they

ruled. In the process they created nation states, andbeginning with

the French Revolution theprincipal lines of conflict were between

nations rather than princes.In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars

ofkings

were over; the wars ofpeoples

hadbegun." This nineteenth

century pattern lasted until the end ofWorld War I.Then, as a result

of the Russian Revolution and the reactionagainst it, the conflict of

nationsyielded

to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism,

fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal

democracy. Duringthe Cold War, this latter conflict

became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, nei

ther of which was a nation state in the classical Europeansense and

each ofwhich defined its identity in terms of its ideology.These conflicts between princes, nation states and

ideologieswere

primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars,"asWilliam Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the ColdWar

as itwas of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth,

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.With the end of theColdWar,international politics

moves out of itsWestern phase, and its center

piece becomes the interaction between theWest and non-Western

civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In thepolitics

of

civilizations, thepeoples and governments of non-Western civiliza

tions nolonger remain the objects of history

astargets ofWestern

colonialism butjoin

theWest asmoversand shapers

ofhistory.

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS

During the cold war the world was divided into the First,

Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are nolonger relevant. It

is far moremeaningful

now to group countries not in terms of their

politicalor economic systems

or in terms of their level of economic

development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.

What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is

a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, reli

FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [23]







Samuel P.Huntington

gious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural

heterogeneity. The culture of avillage

in southern Italy may be dif

ferent from that of a

villagein northern

Italy,but both will share in a

common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German vil

lages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that

distinguishthem from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs,

Chinese andWesterners, however, are notpart of any broader cul

tural entity. Theyconstitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the

highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural

identity people have short ofthat which distinguishes humans from

other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, suchas

language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the sub

jective self-identification ofpeople. People

have levels ofidentity:

a

resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of inten

sityas a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a

European,a

Westerner. The civilization towhich he belongs is the broadest level

of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and

do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and

boundaries of civilizations change.Civilizations may involve a

large number ofpeople,

aswith China

("a civilizationpretending

to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a

very small number of people, such as theAnglophone

Caribbean. A

civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with

Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, oronly one, as is the

case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and

overlap,and

mayinclude subcivilizations. Western civilization has

twomajor variants, European and North American, and Islam has its

Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless

meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom

sharp, theyare real. Civilizations are

dynamic; they rise and fall; they

divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations

disappearand are buried in the sands of time.

Westerners tend to think of nation states as theprincipal

actors in

global affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries.

The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civi

[^4] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume^No^








lizations. InA Study ofHistory, Arnold Toynbee identified 21major

civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.

WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH

Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the

future, and the world will be shapedin

largemeasure

by the interac

tions among seven oreight major civilizations. These include

Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox,

Latin American andpossibly African civilization. The most

impor

tant conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines sep

arating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

First, differences among civilizations are notonly real; they

are

basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, Ian

guage, culture, tradition and, mostimportant,

religion. The people of different civilizations

have different views on the relations between

God and man, the individual and the group, the

citizen and the state, parents and children, hus

band and wife, aswell asdiffering

views of the

relative importance of rights andresponsibili

ties, liberty and authority, equality and hierar

chy. These differences are theproduct

of centuries.They

will not

soondisappear. They

are far more fundamental than differences

among political ideologiesand

political regimes.Differences do not

necessarilymean conflict, and conflict does not

necessarilymean vio

lence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations

have generated the mostprolonged and the most violent conflicts.

Second, the world is becominga smaller place. The interactions

betweenpeoples

of different civilizations areincreasing; these

increasinginteractions

intensify civilization consciousness and

awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities

within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates

hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increasedreceptiv

ityto

immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans


The conflicts of the

futurewill occur along

the cultural fault lines

separating civilizations.







Samuel P.Huntington

react farmorenegatively

toJapanese investment than to

larger invest

ments from Canada and European countries. Similarly,as Donald

Horowitz haspointed out,

"An Ibomay

be ... an Owerri Ibo or an

Onitsha Ibo inwhat was the Eastern region of Nigeria. InLagos, he

issimply

an Ibo. In London, he is aNigerian. In New York, he is an

African." The interactions among peoplesof different civilizations

enhance the civilization-consciousness ofpeople that, in turn, invig

orates differences and animositiesstretching

orthought

to stretch

back deep into history.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and socialchange

throughout the world are separating people from longstanding localidentities.

Theyalso weaken the nation state as a source of identity.

Inmuch of theworld religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in

the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such

movements are found inWesternChristianity, Judaism, Buddhism

and Hinduism, aswell as in Islam. In most countries and most reli

gions thepeople

active in fundamentalist movements are young, col

lege-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business

persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has

remarked, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twen

tieth century." The revival ofreligion,

"la revanche de Dieu," asGilles

Kepel labeled it, providesa basis for identity and commitment that

transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by

the dual role of theWest. On the one hand, theWest is at apeak of

power.At the same

time, however,and

perhapsas a

result,a return

to the rootsphenomenon is occurring among non-Western civiliza

tions. Increasinglyone hears references to trends toward a

turning

inward and "Asianization" inJapan,

the end of the Nehrulegacy

and

the "Hinduization" of India, the failure ofWestern ideas of socialism

and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of theMiddle East, and

now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris

Yeltsin scountry. A West at the

peakof its power confronts non

Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to

shapethe world in non-Western ways.

In the past, the elites of non-Western societies wereusually the

[26] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volumey2No.3








peoplewho were most involved with theWest, had been educated at

Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western atti

tudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Westerncountries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture.

Now, however, these relationshipsare

being reversed. A de

Westernization and indigenizationof elites is occurring

inmany non

Western countries at the same time thatWestern, usually American,

cultures, stylesand habits become more

popular among the mass of

thepeople.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and

hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and eco

nomic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become

democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians

cannot become Estonians and Az?ris cannot become Armenians. In

class and ideological conflicts, the key questionwas "Which side are

you on?" andpeople

could and did choose sides andchange

sides. In

conflicts between civilizations, the questionis "What are

you?" That

is a

given

that cannot be

changed.

And as we know, from Bosnia to

the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to thatquestion

can

mean a bullet in the head. Even more thanethnicity, religion dis

criminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be

half-French and half-Arab and simultaneouslyeven a citizen of two

countries. It ismore difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally,economic

regionalism isincreasing. The proportions of

total trade that wereintraregional

rose between 1980 and 1989 from

51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in EastAsia, and 32 percent

to 36 percent inNorth America. The importanceof

regional economic blocs islikely

to continue to increase in the

future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalismwill rein

force civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic

regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civi

lization. TheEuropean Community

rests on the shared foundation

of European culture andWestern Christianity. The success of the

North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now

underway ofMexican, Canadian and American cultures.Japan,

in

contrast, faces difficulties increating

acomparable

economicentity

FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [27]







Samuel PHuntington

in East Asia because Japanis a

society and civilization uniqueto itself.

However strong the trade and investment linksJapan may develop

with other East Asiancountries,

its cultural differences with those

countries inhibit andperhaps preclude

itspromoting regional

eco

nomicintegration like that in

Europe and North America.

Common culture, in contrast, isclearly facilitating the

rapid

expansion of the economic relations between thePeople

sRepublic of

China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese

communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cul

tural commonalitiesincreasingly

overcomeideological differences,

and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural

commonalityis a

prerequisite for economicintegration, the

principalEast Asian economic bloc of the future is

likelyto be centered on

China. This bloc is, in fact, already cominginto existence. As

MurrayWeidenbaum has observed,

Despitethe current

Japanesedominance of the

region,the Chinese-based

economy of Asia israpidly emerging

as a newepicenter

forindustry,

com

merce and finance. This strategicarea contains substantial amounts of tech

nology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial,

marketingand services acumen

(Hong Kong),a fine communications net

work (Singapore),a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very

largeendowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China).... From

Guangzhouto

Singapore, from KualaLumpur

toManila, this influential net

work?often based on extensions of the traditional clans?has been described

as the backbone of the East Asianeconomy.1

Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic

Cooperation Organization,which

brings togetherten non-Arab

Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan andAfghan

istan. One impetusto the revival and

expansionof this organization,

founded originally in the 1960s byTurkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the

realization bythe leaders of several of these countries that they had

no chance of admission to theEuropean Community. Similarly,

Caricom, the Central American Common Market andMercosur rest

1MurrayWeidenbaum, Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower?, St. Louis:

Washington University Center for the Study of American Business, Contemporary

Issues, Series 57, February 1993, pp. 2-3.

[28]FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72N0.3








on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader

Caribbean-Central American economicentity bridging the

Anglo

Latin divide, however, haveto

date failed.As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they

arelikely

to see an "us" versus "them" relationexisting between them

selves andpeople

of different ethnicityor

religion. The end of ideo

logically defined states in EasternEurope

and the former Soviet

Unionpermits

traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come

to the fore. Differences in culture andreligion

create differences over

policy issues, rangingfrom human

rightsto

immigrationto trade and

commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise

toconflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most

important, the efforts of theWest to promote its values of democra

cy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military pre

dominance and to advance its economic interests engender

countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to

mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, gov

ernments and groups will increasingly attempt tomobilize supportby

appealingto common

religionand civilization identity.

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro

level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations

struggle, often violently,over the control of territory and each other.

At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for rel

ativemilitary and economic power, struggle

over the control of inter

national institutions and third parties, and competitively promote

their particular political and religious values.

THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS

The fault lines between civilizations arereplacing

thepolitical

and ideological boundaries of theColdWar as the flash points for cri

sis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain

divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended

with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological division of

Europe hasdisappeared, the cultural division of

Europebetween

WesternChristianity,

on the one hand, and OrthodoxChristianity








Western

Christianitycirca icoo

Orthodox

Christianityand Islam

MILES c^SP^

Source:W. Wallace, THE TRANSFORMATION F

WESTERNEirROPE.ondon: Pinter, 1990.

Map by lb Ohlsson for FOREIGN FFAIRS.

Samuel P.Huntington

and Islam, on the other, hasreemerged.

The most significant dividing line in

Europe,as

William Wallace has suggested,may well be the eastern

boundary of

WesternChristianity

in the year 1500. This

line runsalong what are now the boundaries

between Finland and Russia and between

the Baltic states and Russia, cutsthrough

Belarus and Ukraine separating the more

Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox

eastern Ukraine, swings westward separat

ing Transylvania from the rest of Romania,

and then goes through Yugoslavia almost

exactly along the line nowseparating

Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of

Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of

course, coincides with the historic bound

ary between theHapsburg and Ottoman

empires. The peoplesto the north and west

of this line are Protestant or Catholic; theyshared the common

experiences of Euro

pean history?feudalism, the Renaissance,

the Reformation, theEnlightenment, the

French Revolution, the Industrial Revo

lution; theyare

generally economically bet

ter off than thepeoples

to theeast;

andthey

may now look forward toincreasing

involvement in a commonEuropean

econ

omy and to the consolidation of democrat

icpolitical systems. The peoples

to the east

and south of this line are Orthodox or

Muslim; they historically belonged to the

Ottoman or Tsarist empires and wereonly

lightly touched by the shaping events in therest of

Europe; theyare

generallyless

advanced economically; theyseem much

[30] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 72N0.3








less likelyto

developstable democratic political systems. The Velvet

Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideologyas the

mostsignificant dividing line

inEurope. As the

events inYugoslavia

show, it is notonly

a line of difference; it is also at times a line of

bloody conflict.

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civi

lizations has been goingon for 1,300 years. After the

foundingof

Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at

Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the

Crusaders attempted with temporarysuccess to

bring Christianity

and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the sev

enteenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended

their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured

Constantinople,and twice laid siege

toVienna. In the nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries asOttoman power declined Britain, France,

and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and

theMiddle East.

After World War II, theWest, in turn, beganto retreat; the colo

nial empires disappeared;first Arab nationalism and then Islamic

fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily

dependenton the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich

Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to,

weapons-rich.Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (cre

ated by theWest). France foughta

bloody and ruthless war inAlgeria

for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egyptin

1956; American forceswent

into Lebanon in 1958; subsequentlyAmerican forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged

in various militaryencounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists,

supported byat least three Middle Eastern governments, employed

the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations

and seized Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the

West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent amassive armyto the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression

by another. In its aftermath nato planning is increasingly directed to

potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."

This centuries-old military interaction between the West and








Samuel P.Huntington

Islam isunlikely

to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf

War left some Arabs feeling proudthat Saddam Hussein had

attacked Israel and stoodup

to theWest. It also leftmany feeling

humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the

Persian Gulf, the West'soverwhelming military dominance, and

their apparent inabilityto

shapetheir own

destiny. Many Arab coun

tries, in addition to the oil exporters,are

reaching levels of economic

and socialdevelopment

where autocratic forms of government

become inappropriate and efforts to introducedemocracy become

stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already

occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been

Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short,Western democra

cy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be apassing

phenomenon, but itsurely complicates relations between Islamic

countries and theWest.

Those relations are alsocomplicated by demography. The spec

tacularpopulation growth

in Arab countries, particularlyin North

Africa, has led to increased migrationtoWestern Europe. The move

ment within Western Europe toward minimizing internal bound

aries hassharpened political

sensitivities with respectto this

development.In

Italy, France and Germany, racism isincreasingly

open, andpolitical reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish

migrants have become more intense and morewidespread since 1990.

On both sides the interaction between Islam and theWest is seen

as a clash of civilizations. The West s "next confrontation," observes

M.J.Akbar,

an Indian Muslimauthor,

"isdefinitely going

to come

from theMuslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from

theMaghreb

to Pakistan that the strugglefor a new world order will

begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion:

We arefacing

amood and amovement fartranscending

the level of issues and

policiesand the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of

civilizations?theperhaps

irrational butsurely

historic reaction of an ancient

rivalagainst

ourJudeo-Christian heritage,

our secular present, and the world

wideexpansion

of both.2

2Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 266,

September 1990, p. 60; Time, June 15,1992, pp. 24-28.

[32]FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volumey2No.3








Historically,the other great antagonistic

interaction of Arab

Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now

increasingly Christian black peoplesto

the south. In the past, this

antagonismwas

epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and

black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the

Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between

Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions

between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa,

and thepolitical conflicts, recurring

riots and communal violence

between Muslims and Christians inNigeria. The modernization of

Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to enhance the prob

ability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the inten

sification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul IPs speech in

Khartoum inFebruary 1993 attacking the actions of the Sudans

Islamist government against the Christian minority there.

On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupt

ed between Orthodox andMuslimpeoples, including

the carnage of

Bosnia and

Sarajevo,

the

simmering

violence between Serb and

Albanian, the tenuous relations between Bulgarians and their

Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and Ingush, the

unremitting slaughterof each other by Armenians and Az?ris, the

tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and

the deployment of Russian troopsto

protect Russian interests in the

Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic

identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their

southern borders. This concern iswell captured by Archie Roosevelt:Much of Russian

historyconcerns the

strugglebetween the Slavs and the

Turkic peopleson their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the

Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs*millennium-long

confrontation with their easternneighbors lies the

keyto an

understandingnot

onlyof Russian

history,but Russian character. To understand Russian

realitiestoday

one has to have aconcept of the great Turkic ethnic group that

haspreoccupied

Russiansthrough

the centuries.3

The conflict of civilizations isdeeply

rooted elsewhere in Asia.

The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent

3Archie Roosevelt, For Lust ofKnowing, Boston: Little, Brown, 1988,pp. 332-333.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer1993 [33]







Samuel P.Huntington

manifests itself now notonly

in therivalry between Pakistan and

India but also inintensifying religious strife within India between

increasinglymilitant Hindu

groupsand Indias substantial Muslim

minority. The destruction of theAyodhya mosque inDecember 1992

broughtto the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular

democratic state or become aHindu one. In East Asia, China has

_outstanding

territorialdisputes

with most of its

neighbors.It has

pursueda ruthless policy

toward the Buddhist people ofTibet, and it is

pursuingan

increasinglyruthless

policytoward

itsTurkic-Muslim minority. With the ColdWar over, the

underlying differences between

China and th? United States have reasserted

themselves in areas such as humanrights,

trade

and weapons proliferation. These differences

areunlikely

to moderate. A "new cold war," Deng Xaioping report

edly asserted in 1991, is under way between China and America.

The samephrase

has beenapplied

to the increasingly difficult rela

tions between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference

exacerbates economic conflict. Peopleon each side allege racism on

the other, but at least on the American side the antipathiesare not

racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of

the two societies could hardly be more different. The economic issues

between the United States and Europeare no less serious than those

between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the same

politicalsalience and emotional

intensitybecause the differences

between American culture and Europeanculture are so much less

than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.

The interactions between civilizations vary greatlyin the extent to

which theyare

likelyto be characterized by

violence. Economic com

petition clearly predominatesbetween the American and

European

subcivilizations of theWest and between both of them and Japan. On

the Eurasian continent, however, theproliferation

of ethnic conflict,

epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing," has not been totallyrandom. It has been most

frequentand most violent between groups

belongingto different civilizations. In Eurasia the great historic fault

[34] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volumey2No.3

he crescent-shaped

Islamic bloc, from the

bulge of Africa to

central Asia, has

bloody borders.








lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This isparticularly

truealong

the boundaries of thecrescent-shaped Islamic bloc of

nations from thebulge

of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs

between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the

Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and

Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.

civilization rallying: the kin-country syndrome

Groups or statesbelonging

to one civilization that become in

volved inwar with people from a different civilization naturally try to

rally support from other members of their own civilization. As the

post-Cold War world evolves, civilizationcommonality, what H. D.

S.Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome,

isreplacing

political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as

theprincipal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can be seen

grad

ually emerging in thepost-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf,

the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between

civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilizational rally

ing, which seemed to become moreimportant

as the conflict contin

ued and which may providea foretaste of the future.

First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then

foughta coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While

onlya

few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many

Arab elites privately cheered him on, and he washighly popular

among largesections of the Arab

publics.Islamic

fundamentalistmovements

universally supported Iraq rather than the Western

backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.Forswearing Arab

nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal.He and his supporters attempted

to define the war as awar between

civilizations. "It is not the world against Iraq,"as Safar Al-Hawali,

dean of Islamic Studies at the Umm Al-Qura UniversityinMecca,

put it in awidely circulated tape. "It is theWest

against Islam."

Ignoring the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious

leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for aholy

waragainst the

West: "Thestruggle against American aggression, greed, plans and








Samuel P.Huntington

policies will be counted as ajihad, and anybody who is killed on that

pathis a

martyr." "This is awar," King Hussein of Jordan argued,

"againstall Arabs and allMuslims and not

against Iraqalone."

The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publicsbehind Saddam Hussein caused those Arab governments in the anti

Iraq coalition to moderate their activities and temper theirpublic

statements. Arab governments opposedor distanced themselves from

subsequent Western efforts toapply pressure on

Iraq, includingenforcement of a

no-flyzone in the summer of 1992 and the bomb

ing ofIraq

inJanuary 1993. The Western-Soviet-Turkish-Arab anti

Iraq coalition of 1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost onlytheWest and Kuwait against Iraq.

Muslims contrasted Western actionsagainst Iraq with theWest's

failure toprotect Bosnians against Serbs and to

impose sanctions on

Israel forviolating U.N. resolutions. The West, they alleged,

was

usinga double standard. A world of

clashing civilizations, however,

isinevitably

aworld of double standards: people applyone standard

to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.

Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in

the former Soviet Union. Armenian militarysuccesses in 1992 and

1993 stimulated Turkeyto become increasingly supportive of its reli

gious, ethnic and linguistic brethren inAzerbaijan. "We have a

Turkish nationfeeling the same sentiments as the Azerbaijanis," said

one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our newspapersare full of the photos of atrocities and are

askingus ifwe are still seri

ous aboutpursuing

our neutralpolicy. Maybe

we should show

Armenia that there's abig Turkey

in the region." President TurgutOzal

agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the

Armenians a little bit." Turkey, Ozal threatened again in 1993, would

"show itsfangs." Turkish Air Force

jetsflew reconnaissance

flights

alongthe Armenian border; Turkey suspended

foodshipments

and

airflights

to Armenia; and Turkeyand Iran announced they would

notaccept dismemberment of Azerbaijan.

In the last years of its exis

tence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan because its government was dominated by former communists. With the end of the

Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way toreligious

[36] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume7<2No.3








ones. Russian troops foughton the side of the Armenians, and

Azerbaijanaccused the "Russian government of turning 180

degrees"toward

supportfor Christian Armenia.

Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia,Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian

Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs.

Relatively little concern wasexpressed, however, over Croatian

attacks on Muslims andparticipation

in the dismemberment of

Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav breakup,

Germany, in an unusual display ofdiplomatic

initiative and muscle,

induced the other n members of the European Community to followits lead in

recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the popes

determination toprovide strong backing

to the two Catholic coun

tries, the Vatican extended recognitioneven before the

Communitydid. The United States followed the European lead.Thus the lead

ingactors inWestern civilization rallied behind their

coreligionists.

SubsequentlyCroatia was

reportedto be

receiving substantial quan

tities of arms from Central European and other Western countries.

Boris Yeltsin sgovernment,

on the other hand, attemptedto pursue

a

middle course that would besympathetic

to the Orthodox Serbs but

not alienate Russia from theWest. Russian conservative and nation

alist groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the government for not

beingmore

forthcomingin its support for the Serbs.

By early 1993 several hundred Russiansapparently

wereserving with

the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of Russian armsbeing sup

pliedto Serbia.

Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the

West for notcoming

to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders

urged Muslims from all countries toprovide help

to Bosnia; in viola

tion of the U.N. armsembargo, Iran

supplied weapons and men for

the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese groups sentguerrillas

to

train and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims

from over two dozen Islamic countries werereported

to befighting

in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other countries feltunder

increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own

societies toprovide

morevigorous support for the Bosnians. By the








Samuel PHuntington

end of 1992, SaudiArabia had reportedly supplied substantial fund

ing for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, whichsignificantly

increased their military capabilities vis-?-vis the Serbs.In the 1930s the

Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from

countries thatpolitically

were fascist, communist and democratic. In

the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict isprovoking intervention from coun

tries that areMuslim, Orthodox andWestern Christian. The parallel has not gone unnoticed. "The war in

Bosnia-Herzegovina has

become the emotional equivalent of thefight against fascism in the

Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those who died

there are regarded asmartyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."

Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groupswithin the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are

likelyto be

less intense and lesslikely

toexpand than conflicts between civiliza

tions. Commonmembership

in a civilization reduces theprobability

of violence in situations where itmight otherwise occur. In 1991 and

1992 many peoplewere alarmed by the

possibilityof violent conflict

between Russia and Ukraine over

territory, particularlyCrimea, the

Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization

is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between

Ukrainians and Russians should be low.They

are two Slavic, pri

marily Orthodox peoples who have had closerelationships with each

other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for

conflict, the leaders of the two countries wereeffectively negotiating

and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has

been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere inthe former Soviet Union and much tension and some

fightingbetween Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there

has beenvirtually

no violence between Russians and Ukrainians.

Civilization rallying todate has been limited, but ithas been grow

ing, and itclearly has the

potentialto

spread much further. As the

conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the

positions of nations and thecleavages between them

increasingly

were along civilizational lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders

and the media have found it apotent

means of arousingmass

support

and ofpressuring hesitant governments. In the coming years, the

[38] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volumey2No.3








local conflicts mostlikely

to escalate into majorwars will be those, as

in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civiliza

tions. Thenext

world war, if thereis

one, will beawar

betweenciv

ilizations.

THE WEST VERSUS THE REST

The west is now at anextraordinary peak of power in relation

to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent hasdisappeared

from

the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and

Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West

faces no economicchallenge.

It dominates internationalpolitical

and

security institutions and withJapan

international economic institu

tions. Global political and security issues areeffectively settled by

a

directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world econom

ic issuesby

a directorate of the United States, Germany andJapan,

all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other

to the exclusion of lesser and

largely

non-Western countries.

Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International

MonetaryFund that reflect the interests of theWest are

presentedto

the world asreflecting

the desires of the world community. The very

phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collec

tive noun(replacing "the FreeWorld") to give global legitimacy to

actionsreflecting

the interests of the United States and other Western

powers.4 Through the imf and other international economic institu

tions, theWest promotes its economic interests and imposeson

othernations the economic

policiesit thinks appropriate. In any poll of

non-Western peoples, the imfundoubtedly would win the support

of finance ministers and a few others, but getan

overwhelminglyunfavorable rating from just about everyone else, who would agree

4Almost invariablyWestern leaders claim theyare

actingon behalf of "theworld com

munity." One minor lapse occurred during the run-up to the Gulf War. In an interview

on "GoodMorning America," Dec. 21,1990, British Prime Minister JohnMajor referredto the actions "theWest" was

taking against Saddam Hussein. He quickly corrected him

self and subsequendy referred to "theworld community." He was, however, rightwhen

he erred.








Samuel P.Huntington

withGeorgy

Arbatovs characterization of imf officials as "neo

Bolsheviks who love expropriating otherpeople

smoney, imposing

undemocratic and alien rules of economic andpolitical

conduct and

stiflingeconomic freedom."

Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its deci

sions, tempered only by occasional abstentionby China, produced

U.N. legitimationof the West s use of force to drive

Iraqout of

Kuwait and its elimination of Iraqs

sophisticated weapons and capac

The

very phrase

"world

community" has

become aeuphemism to

give legitimacy to the

actions of theWest.

ityto

produce such weapons. It alsoproduced

the quite unprecedentedaction by the United

States, Britain and France in getting the

Security Council to demand thatLibya hand

over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and

then toimpose

sanctions when Libya refused.

After defeating the largestArab army, the

West did not hesitate to throw itsweight

around in the Arab world. The West in effect

isusing international institutions, military power and economic

resources to run the world inways that will maintain Western pre

dominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political

and economic values.

That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new

world, and there is asignificant element of truth in their view.

Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and insti

tutional powerare thus one source of conflict between theWest and

other civilizations. Differences inculture,

that is basic values and

beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S.Naipaul

has argued that

Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men."

At asuperficial

level much ofWestern culture has indeedpermeated

the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western con

cepts differ fundamentallyfrom those

prevalentin other civilizations.

Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human

rights, equality, liberty,the rule of law, democracy,

free markets, the

separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic,

Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures.

Western efforts topropagate such ideas produce instead a reaction

[40]FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volumej2No.3








against"human rights imperialism"

and a reaffirmation ofindigenous

values, as can be seen in the support forreligious fundamentalism by

theyounger generation

in non-Western cultures. Thevery

notion

that there could be a "universal civilization" is aWestern idea, direct

lyat odds with the particularism

of most Asian societies and their

emphasison what

distinguishesone

peoplefrom another. Indeed, the

author of a review of ioocomparative studies of values in different

societies concluded that "the values that are mostimportant

in the

West are least important worldwide."5 In thepolitical realm, of

course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the

United States and other Western powers to induce other peoples to

adoptWestern ideas concerning democracy and human

rights.

Modern democratic government originatedin theWest. When it has

developedin non-Western societies it has usually been the

productof

Western colonialism orimposition.

The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in

Kishore Mahbubani sphrase,

the conflict between "theWest and the

Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations toWestern

power and values.6 Those responses generally take one or a combina

tion of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like

Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursuea course of isolation, to

insulate their societies frompenetration

or"corruption" by

theWest,

and, in effect, to opt out ofparticipation

in theWestern-dominated

global community. The costs of this course, however, arehigh, and

few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equiv

alent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, isto

attempt tojoin theWest and accept its values and institutions. The

third alternative is to attempt to "balance" theWest by developingeconomic and military power and

cooperatingwith other non

Western societies against theWest, while preserving indigenous val

ues and institutions; in short, to modernize but not toWesternize.

5HanyC. Triandis, The New York Times, Dec. 25,1990, p. 41, and "Cross-Cultural

Studies of Individualism and Collectivism," Nebraska Symposium onMotivation, vol.

37>?989, PP- 41-133

6KishoreMahbubani, "TheWest and the Rest," TheNational Interest, Summer 1992,

PP- 3-*3








Samuel P.Huntington

THE TORN COUNTRIES

Inthe

future,as

people differentiate themselves by civilization,countries with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations,

such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,are candidates for dismem

berment. Some other countries have a fairdegree of cultural homo

geneity but are divided over whether theirsociety belongs

to one

civilization or another. These are torn countries. Their leaders typi

callywish to pursue

abandwagoning strategy and tomake their coun

tries members of theWest, but the history, culture and traditions of

their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypicaltorn country is

Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders ofTurkey

have followed in the Attat?rk tradition and defined Turkeyas amod

ern, secular,Western nation state.They allied Turkey with theWest

in nato and in the Gulf War; they applied formembership in the

European Community.At the same time, however, elements in

Turkish society havesupported

an Islamic revival and have argued

thatTurkey

is

basically

aMiddle Eastern Muslimsociety.

In addi

tion, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkeyas aWestern soci

ety, the elite of theWest refuses to accept Turkeyas such.

Turkeywill

not become amember of the European Community, and the real rea

son, as President Ozal said, "is that we are Muslim and theyare

Christian and theydont say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then

being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be

the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportu

nity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involvingseven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China.

Encouraged by theWest, Turkeyis

makingstrenuous efforts to carve

out this newidentity for itself.

During the past decade Mexico has assumed aposition somewhat

similar to that of Turkey. Just asTurkey abandoned its historic oppo

sition toEurope

andattempted

tojoin Europe,

Mexico hasstopped

defining itself by its opposition to the United States and is instead

attempting to imitate the United States and to join it in the NorthAmerican Free Trade Area. Mexican leaders are

engagedin the great

task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fiindamen

[42] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72N0.3








tal economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental politi

cal change.In 1991 a

top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de

Gortari describedat

lengthtome all the

changesthe Salinas

government was

making. When he finished, I remarked: "That's most

impressive. It seems to me that basically you want tochange Mexico

from a Latin American country into aNorth American country." He

looked at me with surpriseand exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely

what we aretrying

to do, but of course we could never say sopub

licly."As his remark indicates, inMexico as inTurkey, significant

ele

ments in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity. In

Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to Islam

(Ozal spilgrimage

toMecca); so alsoMexico's North American-ori

ented leaders have to make gesturesto those who hold Mexico to be

a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara

summit).

Historically Turkey has been the mostprofoundly

torn country.

For the United States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country.

Globally the mostimportant

torn country isRussia. The questionof

whether Russia is part of theWest or the leader of a distinct Slavic

Orthodox civilization has been arecurring

one in Russian history.

That issue was obscured by the communist victory in Russia, which

importedaWestern

ideology, adaptedit to Russian conditions and

then challenged theWest in the name of that ideology.The domi

nance of communism shut off the historic debate over

Westernization versus Russification. With communism discredited

Russiansonce

again face that question.President Yeltsin is

adopting Western principles and goals and

seekingto make Russia a "normal" country and a

part of theWest.

Yet both the Russian elite and the Russian public aredivided on this

issue.Among the more moderate dissenters, Sergei Stankevich

argues that Russia should rejectthe "Atlanticist" course, which would

lead it "to becomeEuropean,

to become apart of the world economy

inrapid

andorganized fashion, to become the

eighthmember of the

Seven, and to put particular emphasis on Germany and the United

States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." While

also rejectingan

exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless








Samuel PHuntington

argues that Russia should give priorityto the protection of Russians

in other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections,

andpromote

"anappreciable

redistribution of ourresources,

our

options,our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern

direction." People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinat

ing Russia's interests to those of theWest, for reducing Russian mil

itary strength, for failingto

support traditional friends such as Serbia,

and forpushing

economic andpolitical

reform inways injuriousto

the Russianpeople.

Indicative of this trend is the newpopularity

of

the ideas of Petr Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a

unique Eurasian civilization.7 More extreme dissidents voice muchmore

blatantly nationalist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and

urge Russia toredevelop

its military strength and to establish closer

ties with China and Muslim countries. The people of Russia are as

divided as the elite. An opinion survey inEuropean Russia in the

spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positiveatti

tudes toward theWest and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it

has been for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s istruly

a

torncountry.

To redefine its civilization identity,a torn country must meet three

requirements. First, itspolitical

and economic elite has to be gener

ally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to be willing

toacquiesce

in the redefinition. Third, the

dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to bewilling

to

embrace the convert. All three requirementsin

large part exist with

respecttoMexico. The first two in

large partexist with

respectto

Turkey.It is not clear that any of them exist with respect

to Russia's

joining the West. The conflict between liberaldemocracy

and

Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despitetheir

major differences, ostensiblyshared ultimate goals

of freedom, equal

ity and prosperity.A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia

could have quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on

an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually

7Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," TheNational Interest, Summer 1992,

pp. 47-51;Daniel Schneider, "A Russian Movement Rejects Western Tilt," Christian

Science Monitor, Feb. 5,1993, pp. 5-7.

[44]FOREIGN AFFAIRS -

Volume72N0.3








impossible for him to do that with a Russian traditionalist. If, as the

Russians stop behaving likeMarxists, they reject liberal democracyand

begin behavinglike Russians but not like

Westerners,the rela

tions between Russia and theWest could again become distant and

conflictual.8

THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION

The obstacles to non-Western countries joining theWest vary

considerably. Theyare least for Latin American and East

European

countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the formerSoviet Union.

Theyare still greater forMuslim, Confucian, Hindu

and Buddhist societies.Japan

has established aunique position for

itself as an associate member of theWest: it is in theWest in some

respects but clearlynot of theWest in

important dimensions. Those

countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or can

not, join theWest compete with theWest by developing their own

economic, military and political power. They do this by promotingtheir internal

developmentand by cooperating with other non

Western countries. The mostprominent form of this cooperation is

the Confucian-Islamic connection that hasemerged

tochallenge

Western interests, values and power.

Almost withoutexception, Western countries are

reducingtheir

military power; under Yeltsin'sleadership

so also is Russia. China,

North Korea and several Middle Eastern states, however, are

significantly expandingtheir

military capabilities. Theyare

doingthis by the import of arms from Western and non-Western sources

and by thedevelopment of indigenous

arms industries. One result is

the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called"Weapon

8Owen Harries has pointedout that Australia is trying (unwisely in his view) to

become a torn country in reverse.Although it has been a fullmember not

only of the

West but also of theABC A military and intelligencecore of theWest, its current lead

ers are in effect proposing that it defect from theWest, redefine itself as anAsian coun

try and cultivate close tieswith its neighbors. Australia's future, they argue, iswith the

dynamiceconomies of East Asia. But, as I have

suggested,close economic

cooperation

normally requiresa common cultural base. In addition, none of the three conditions nec

essary for a torn country to join another civilization is likely to exist inAustralia's case.








Samuel P.Huntington

States," and theWeapon States are not Western states. Another

result is the redefinition of arms control, which is aWestern concept

andaWestern goal. During

the Cold War theprimary purpose of

arms control was to establish a stablemilitary balance between the

United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the

post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms control is to pre

vent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts

to do

this through international agreements, economic pressure and con

trols on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.

The conflict between theWest and the Confucian-Islamic states

focuses largely, althoughnot

exclusively,on nuclear, chemical and

biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticatedmeans

for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other elec

troniccapabilities

forachieving

that goal. The West promotesnon

proliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and

inspectionsas means of realizing that norm. It

also threatens avariety of sanctions

againstthose who promote thespread

ofsophisticated

weapons and proposessome benefits for those

who do not. The attention of theWest focus

es, naturally,on nations that are

actuallyor

potentially hostile to theWest.

The non-Western nations, on the other

hand, assert their right to acquire and to deploy

whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. They alsohave absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the Indian

defense minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf

War: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear

weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are

viewed, probably erroneously,as the

potential equalizerof superior

Western conventional power. China, of course, alreadyhas nuclear

weapons; Pakistan and India have thecapability

todeploy them.

North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be attemptingto

acquire them. A top Iranian official has declared that allMuslim

states should acquire nuclear weapons, and in 1988 thepresident

of

[46]FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72No.3

A Confucian-Islamicconnection has

emerged to challenge

estern interests,

values and power.








Iran reportedly issued a directive calling fordevelopment

of "offen

sive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons."

Centrally importantto the

developmentof counter-West

militarycapabilities

is the sustained expansion of Chinas military power and

its means to createmilitary power. Buoyed by spectacular

economic

development, China israpidly increasing

its military spending and

vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed

forces. It ispurchasing weapons from the former Soviet states; it is

developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested aone-megaton

nuclear device. It isdeveloping power-projection capabilities, acquir

ing aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft car

rier. Itsmilitary buildup

and assertion of sovereigntyover the South

China Sea areprovoking

a multilateral regionalarms race in East

Asia. China is also amajor exporter of arms and weapons technolo

gy. It hasexported

materials toLibya and

Iraqthat could be used to

manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas. It has helped Algeriabuild a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production.China has sold to Iran nuclear

technologythat American officials

believe could only be used to create weapons andapparently has

shipped components of300-mile-range

missiles to Pakistan. North

Korea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while

and has sold advanced missiles and missile technologyto

Syria and

Iran. The flow of weapons and weapons technologyis

generally from

East Asia to theMiddle East. There is, however, some movement in

the reverse direction; China has received Stinger missiles from

Pakistan.

A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into

being, designedto

promote acquisition by its members of the

weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military

power of theWest. Itmay or may not last. At present, however, it is,

asDaveMcCurdy has said, "a renegades'

mutual support pact,run

bythe

proliferatorsand their backers." A new form of arms

competitionis thus

occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and theWest. In

an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form

of armscompetition,

one side isdeveloping

its arms and the other








Samuel PHuntington

side isattempting

not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms

build-upwhile at the same time

reducing its ownmilitary capabili

ties.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

This article does not argue that civilization identities will

replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each

civilization will become asingle coherent political entity, that groups

within a civilization will not conflict with and evenfight each other.

This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civ

ilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is

increasing; conflict between civilizations willsupplant ideological

and other forms of conflict as the dominant globalform of conflict;

international relations, historicallya game played

out within Western

civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become agame

inwhich non-Western civilizations are actors and notsimply objects;

successful political, security and economic international institutions

are morelikely

todevelop

within civilizations than across civiliza

tions; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more

frequent,more sustained and more violent than conflicts between

groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in

different civilizations are the mostlikely and most

dangeroussource

of escalation that could lead toglobal wars; the paramount axis of

world politicswill be the relations between "theWest and the Rest";

the elites in some torn non-Western countries willtry

to make their

countries part of theWest, but inmost cases face major obstacles to

accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate

future will be between theWest and several Islamic-Confucian states.

This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civi

lizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypothesesas towhat the future

maybe like. If these areplausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary

to consider theirimplications

forWestern policy.These implications

should be divided between short-term advantage and long-termaccommodation. In the short term it is

clearlyin the interest of the

West topromote greater cooperation and unity within its own civi

us] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume72No.3








lization, particularly between itsEuropean and North American

components; toincorporate into the West societies in Eastern

Europeand Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the

West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and

Japan;to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into

major inter-civilization wars; to limit theexpansion of the

military

strengthof Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction

ofWesternmilitary capabilities

and maintain military superiority in

East and Southwest Asia; toexploit differences and conflicts among

Confucian and Islamic states; tosupport in other civilizations groups

sympathetic toWestern values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and

values and topromote the involvement of non-Western states in

those institutions.

In thelonger

term other measures would be called for.Western

civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations

haveattempted

to become modern withoutbecoming Western. To

date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civi

lizations will continue toattempt

toacquire the wealth, technology,

skills, machines and weapons that arepart of

being modern. Theywill also attempt to reconcile this

modernitywith their traditional

culture and values. Their economic andmilitary strength relative to

theWest will increase. Hence theWest willincreasingly have to

accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power

approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ

significantly from those of theWest. This will require theWest tomaintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its

interests in relation to these civilizations. Itwill also, however, requiretheWest to

developamore

profound understanding of the basic reli

gious andphilosophical assumptions underlying

other civilizations

and the ways inwhichpeople in those civilizations see their interests.

It willrequire

an effort toidentify elements of

commonality between

Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be

no universal civilization, but instead aworld of different civilizations,

each ofwhich will have to learn to coexistwith the others. ?


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