Heidegger, Plato and the Problem of Truth · PDF file3 Hajdeger (2007), 254‐255. 10 question...
Transcript of Heidegger, Plato and the Problem of Truth · PDF file3 Hajdeger (2007), 254‐255. 10 question...
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UDC:1305
Heidegger,PlatoandtheProblemofTruth()
GoranRui
UniversityofNiTheFacultyofPhilosophy,Ni
ABSTRACTThe subtitle of this papers topic suggests the conceptual frame of Heideggers
interpretationofPlatosontology.Using the allegoryof the caveasanexample the term (truth) isaccounted for ina strongassociationwith the term (formationandeducation).ThefirstpartoftheBookXofPlatosTheRepublicisusedbyHeideggerfortheexplicationoftheterm(imitation)and(production).
Keywords:truth,imitation,production,idea,wisdom,unconcealment.
Heidegger does not accept the traditional assumption used in Ancient Greekinterpretationof truthaccording towhich truth isacorrespondence (adequacy)betweenapropositionandanobject sincehe considers that in thisway thephenomenonof truth isreduced to the exactness and correctness. The concept of truth is considered to betraditionallyformulatedasveritasestadequatioreietintellectus(thetruthisaconsonancebetweenanobjectand intellect)andwas firstestablished(inasomewhataltered form)byAristotle1tobesubsequentlyacceptedbyKantasanagreementbetweencognitionanditsobject2.Heideggerhimselfalsosummarizeshisunderstandingofthetraditionalconceptoftruthinthreestatements:1.Theplaceoftruthisaproposition(alogicalstatement);2.Theessenceoftruthliesintheconsonancebetweenapropositionanditsobject;3.Aristotle,thefatherof logic,ascribed the truth to thepropositionas itsplaceoforigin.Hewasalso thefirstphilosophertodefinetruthintermsofcorrespondence.3.However,forHeideggertheexplanation of truth in terms of correspondence isnotpossible as it remindshim of anequationinthetheoryofnumbers,e.g.number6correspondsto3+3anditisofarelationalcharacter.AccordingtoHeidegger,thetruthdoesnothavethestructureofcorrespondencebetween cognition (the subject) and thatwhich is cognized (the object).What creates thegroundforthephenomenonoftruth istheessentialDaseinmodeofthehumanbeing,andthatisbeingintheworld.ThemainquestionofBeingandTime,thequestionconcerningthesenseofBeingrequiresasemanticclarificationoftheconceptoftruth.Therecurrenceofthe 1Aristotel,Metafizika1011b.2Kant(1976),B82.3Hajdeger(2007),254255.
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question brings us back to the tradition of Ancient Greek ontology in which a prephilosophical and prephenomenological (self)understanding of the term truth occurred.Listing the basic characteristics of the traditional concept of truth,whatwe are actuallydoing(alongsideHeidegger)isquestioningwhetherthepropositionistheoriginalplaceoftruth.Theanswertothisquestionisledbyasuppositionthatitisnotpossibletoexaminethephenomenonoftruthinisolation,i.e.withoutitbeingincludedintotheanalysisofthesetofnecessarytermssuchas,being,phenomenonaswellasthebasicconceptsoftheexistentialanalyticssuchasDasein,expositionandrepresentation(showingandpresentation).
It is beyond doubt that the ancient ontological tradition can be exceptionally usefulwhileconsideringthesequestions.However,itshouldnotbetakenasahistoricalcollectionofthememoriesofPreSocraticfragmentsandthewritingsofPlatoandAristotle,butasagenuinedirective to thought in its attempt to understand one of elementarywords, i. e.truth.Oneofthepossibilitiesofdeterminingtheconceptoftruthisaway()ofthe(understoodasalogicalstatement).Heideggerrejectsthispossibility.Thestatementisnottheplaceoftruthifbythewordplaceapositionisthoughttowhichtruthbelongsinafundamentalwayandthusmakingitpossible.Thequestionthatislegitimatelyimposedisthe following: if the judgment,propositionora logicalstatement isnot theplaceof truth,where is truth in thatcase? It ismore thanobvious thatHeidegger isdissatisfiedwith theinterpretation (and translation) of in terms of speech, story, law, reason etc. Heindicates to the fact,whichwillprobablybeacceptedbyanyclassicalphilologist, that thenounisderivedfromtheverbwhichisphoneticallyclosetotheGermanverblegen(toplacesomethinginthefrontandunderneath),lessen(collect,gather,recollect)andLatinlegerebeingcompatiblewiththeGermanlessen.
Themiddlevoice,,4meanstoplaceoneselfunderneathintogatheringofrest;meansarestarea;isaplacewheresomethingcanbestoredorleanedagainst.5
Althoughhedoesnotdenythattheprimary(dominant)meaningofistosayorspeak,Heideggerreenactssomewhatforgottensemanticmeaningssuchasgatheringandcollectingwhich are included into a certain laying determined as thatwhichout ofitselftogetherliesbeforeus6.Heideggermakes the lastmove towards the termthatwhich lies(which is laid)beforeus isplaced inunconcealment().Therefore,HeideggertranslatesAncientGreektermasaGermanwordUnverborgenheit,notasWahrheit, which means he translates as unconcealment and not as truthrespectively.On top of that,Heidegger considers the termWahrheit a nonGermanwordwith a false etymology, i.e. aderivation fromLatin verum: Verum, ver originallymeansclosing, covering. TheRomanword verum belongs to the semantic field of theAncientGreek that which is unconcealed. Therefore, verum, meaning that which isconcealed, is the exact opposite to 7. The explanation for the radical reinterpretation of theAncientGreekin terms ofLatin veritas is foundbyPerovi,followingHeidegger, in the fact that the Latin termswere founded: in the imperialenvironment,within aposition of superiorityusing treachery anddeception tobring the
4Themiddlevoiceoftheverbisrelatedtothemeaningoftheverb,toliedown.5Hajdeger(1999),168.6Hajdeger(1999),170.7Perovi(2006),54.
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enemies to the fall (fallit)andkeep them in the securevicinityofonesowngovernment.Forceassecurityandawarenessofonesowndomination thusbecomesacharacteristicofverum8
Insisting that theAncientGreekverbmeans laying as letting thatwhich liesbeforeusbepresent inunconcealment,Heidegger relates thenouns and.Originallylayinghasdeveloped,earlyandinawaythatdominatesthatwhichisunconcealed,intospeechandtalk.9Thespeechgainsitsessentialformduetodisclosureofbeing(presence)that(already)liesbeforeus.Thisdynamicsoftransitionfromtheconcealedbeing into theunconcealed iswhatHeideggerdenotesaspresenceor thebeingofBeing.WhatpresencingmeansforHeideggerislastinginunconcealment.10BesidethetemporaldimensionpresencingalsohasaspacialdimensioncontainedintheDa(hereandnow).Thedisclosure of the present in presencing is the process that is termed by thephilosopher from Freiburg and is considered a process of its own kind in liberating thepresencefromthedimensionofconcealment.asunhiddenessnecessitatesashiddeness.Thisalsoholdsfortherelationshipbetweenpresenceandabsence.Theabsentisactuallythebeingthatisnothere,itisthehiddenbeing.Itturnsoutthatunconcealmentisbasedonconcealmentindebtingitsbeingrevealedanddisclosedtoitsbeingshelteredandconcealed. In his interpretation of Heraclituss fragmentsHeidegger retains exactly thisrelation,connectionandcontextofpresenceandabsenceequatingthewithor with (), respectively. in the textMoira11 is the light thatenablesanypresence toappear.Although theessenceof ishidden, itenables thepresenceofthatwhichispresenttoemergeasand(appearanceandform).Theinsight underlying presencing is that Being is nothing but the presence of thatwhich ispresent.
Disclosurebelongs to the regionofunconcealment.Thatwhich stillhasnotemergedintothelight,whichstillhasnotbeenrevealed,i.e.concealmentisleftbehindindisclosure.However, covering and concealment are not any kind of deficiency of absence andpresence, but the determinant of theAncientGreek human existentialmode.Heideggerdoesnotclaimthatthereisanequalontologicalstatusofconcealmentandunconcealmentinthe process of disclosure.What he claims is quite the opposite: concealment has afulfilling advantage over all other modes according to which that which is presentpresences.12 Amore precise clarification of concealment is that it indicates shelter andhiddeness inrecoil.Itmeans toremainreservedlyhidden in faceof theapproachof thatwhichispresent.Itmeansshelteringthatwhichispresentintheinaccessiblevicinitywhichremains in its arrival in that arrivalwhich is an increasing selfcovering.13 In order toenhancehisargumentationor tocreateapossibilityofananalogicalargumentHeideggerreferstotherootlathintheverbwhichiscommonlytranslatedasforget.In a fundamental ontologists vocabulary this verb certainly does not refer to the act of
8Perovi(2006),52.9Hajdeger(1999),171.10Hajdeger(1999),177.11Hajdeger(1999),200.12Hajdeger(1999),212.13Hajdeger(1999),212.
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omittingofacertainfactfrommemory,buttothegeneralattitudeand(existential)conducttowards the presence and absence. Interpreting Heraclituss Fragment 16 in which theEphesianwondershowcanonehide from thatwhichneversets,Heidegger is trying toaccountforthequestionwhoorwhatitisIremainhiddenfrom.Heisprimarilyfocusedontheetymologyof thewordsettingdown.It isconnectedwithwhichmeanstowraporsink.meansentersomething.Thesunentersthesea,itsinksintoitSettingdown,inGreekfashion,ishappeningasanentranceintoconcealment.14Theinitialand finalpartofHeraclitussFragment16aremarkedwith two terms that forHeideggerhavethesamemeaning,i.e.and.Ifthesentenceismorecloselylookedat,theuseofthenegationcanbeobservedin(thatwhichneversets)meaningthatwhichneverenterstheregionofconcealment.TheexpressionisreadbyHeidegger as . Thewhole of this endeavor is aimed at affirming theexpression that which never sets in terms of that which is constantly begotten(), i.e. . Being begotten and generated uninterruptedly (continually,constantly) is what discloses presence. There is a difference between the negationunderstood as and the one understood as . directly denies that towhichnegationrefers,,ontheotherhand,describessomethingthathasemergedinthefieldofitsnegation:rejection,distancing,safeguarding.15Grammaticallyspeaking,thetermisseenbyHeideggerasaparticipleandinitsverbalformatthat,i.e.astoset.Thatwhichneversets isreformulated into toneversetwhich,nominallyspeaking,means toneve