Global And Russian Energy Outlook

The Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of SciencesAnalytical Centre of the Government of the Russian Federation

GLOBAL AND RUSSIAN ENERGY OUTLOOK UP TO 2040

THE OUTLOOK WAS PREPARED BY:

The Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ERI RAS) and the Analytical Centre of the Government of the Russian Federation (AC)

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Long-term trends of the world energy 9'HPRJUDSK\ 11Economic Growth 143ULPDU\(QHUJ\&RQVXPSWLRQ 18'HYHORSPHQWRI(OHFWULFLW\*HQHUDWLRQ21International Trade 232 Emissions 24

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OUTLINE


ERI RAS AC of the Government of the Russian Federation

2

Key Findings



3

KEY FINDINGS

7KHSURWUDFWHGQDWXUHRI WKH FXUUHQWJOREDOQDQFLDO FULVLVKDV OHG WRreduced forecasts of economic and energy consumption growthDFFRPSDQLHGE\ DQ REYLRXV DFFHOHUDWHG LQFUHDVH LQ WKH VKDUH WDNHQ E\ GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV,QWKHORQJWHUPIRVVLOIXHOVZLOOUHPDLQGRPLQDQWDJDLQVWWKHEDFNJURXQG

of a slower growth in the share of non-hydrocarbon energy resources WKDQZDVHVWLPDWHG LQWKHSUHYLRXV2XWORRN7KH VKDOHEUHDNWKURXJKKDVSRVWSRQHG IRU WZRRU WKUHHGHFDGHV WKH WKUHDWRI UXQQLQJRXWRIHFRQRPLFDOO\YLDEOHRLODQGJDVUHVHUYHVZKLFKKDGVHHPHGVRFORVHMXVW YH WR VHYHQ \HDUV DJR DQG KDV VHFXUHG WKH SUHGRPLQDQWO\K\GURFDUERQ FKDUDFWHU RI WKH ZRUOGV HQHUJ\ VHFWRU 7KH VKDUH RI RLODQG JDV LQZRUOG SULPDU\ HQHUJ\ FRQVXPSWLRQZLOO UHPDLQ SUDFWLFDOO\XQFKDQJHGSHUFHQWLQDQGSHUFHQWE\7KHVWXG\RIRLODQGJDVSULFHG\QDPLFV LQGLIIHUHQWVFHQDULRVdid not

show fundamental cause for alarmist forecasts predicting either too high, or extremely low, prices within the period under review. ,QDOOFDVHVUDQJLQJIURPIXWXUHVXFFHVVWRSRVVLEOHIDLOXUHRIVKDOHWHFKQRORJLHVRLOSULFHVLQZLOOQRWPRYHRXWRIWKHUDQJHEEO*DVSULFHVZLOOEHFORVHO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKRLOSULFHVEXWDOVRVWURQJO\GLIIHUHQWLDWHGE\UHJLRQZKLFKGRHVQRWH[FOXGHODUJHVKRUWWHUPXFWXDWLRQVLQSULFHVXQGHUWKHLQXHQFHRISROLWLFDODQGVSHFXODWLYHIDFWRUV'HVSLWHWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIRLODQGJDVPDUNHWVDVLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHLQRLODQGOLTXHHGQDWXUDOJDV/1*H[SDQGVthe trend towards regionalization of prices,UHVXOWLQJLQFRQVLGHUDEOHGLIIHUHQFHVLQSULFHOHYHOVZLOOJDLQPRPHQWXP1DWXUDOJDVZLOODFFRXQWIRUWKHPRVWVXEVWDQWLDO LQFUHDVH LQDEVROXWHYROXPHVRIFRQVXPSWLRQDQGWKHVKDUHWDNHQE\JDVLQSULPDU\HQHUJ\FRQVXPSWLRQZLOOLQFUHDVHPRUHWKDQWKDWRIDQ\RWKHUIXHOThe next 30 years could, quite reasonably, be considered as the era of gas. But Russia runs the risk of missing the resulting opportunities.

7KHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHH[SHFWHGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIZRUOGHQHUJ\DQGHVSHFLDOO\ K\GURFDUERQPDUNHWVZLOO QRW VLJQLFDQWO\ FKDQJH WKH IXHOPDUNHWVWKHPVHOYHVEXWthe positions of the leading market participants will clearly be rebalanced, ZKLOH VRPH JOREDO SOD\HUV ZLOO EH DEOH WRJDLQLQXHQFH7KHUHVXOWVRIRXUUHVHDUFKFOHDUO\VKRZWKDWRussia will be more susceptible to adverse changes in market conditions during the IRUHFDVWSHULRG,QWKH%DVHOLQH6FHQDULR5XVVLDQRLODQGJDVH[SRUWVWRIRUHLJQPDUNHWVDSSHDUWREHVLJQLFDQWO\ORZHUWKDQWKHRIFLDOQDWLRQDOSURMHFWLRQV+LJKFRVWVDQGWKHFXUUHQWWD[DWLRQV\VWHPERWKOLPLWWKHFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVRI 5XVVLDQ HQHUJ\ UHVRXUFHV LQ JOREDOPDUNHWV 7KH 5XVVLDQ IXHO DQGHQHUJ\FRPSOH[FRXOGIDFHVHYHUHUHVWULFWLRQVRQH[WHUQDOGHPDQGIRUHQHUJ\UHVRXUFHVDWSULFHVDFFHSWDEOHWR5XVVLDUHVXOWLQJLQDGGLWLRQDOULVNV IRU 5XVVLDV HQHUJ\ VHFWRU DQG HFRQRP\ This research provides preliminary estimates of the consequences of this impact on the countrys economic growth (one percentage point slowdown per year) and possible measures to compensate for it.



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Introduction



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2) Versions RI WKH %DVHOLQH 6FHQDULR ZKRVH GLIIHUHQFHV UHODWH WR WKHVXFFHVVRIUHTXLUHGWHFKQRORJLFDOEUHDNWKURXJKVLQWKHSURGXFWLRQDQGFRQVXPSWLRQRIK\GURFDUERQVDQGWKHLUVXEVWLWXWHV

3) Forecasts for the development of Russias energy sector under certain K\SRWKHWLFDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVRIZRUOGIXHOPDUNHWVDQGWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHLULPSDFWRQWKHQDWLRQDOHFRQRP\

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INTRODUCTION



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1. BASELINE SCENARIO ENERGY CONSUMPTIONLong-term trends of the world energy

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Figure 1.1. Stages of world energy development

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Transition to the next stage (characterized by successive doubling of prices and more moderate growth of energy consumption) of world energy development is in progress.



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The Methodology of Forecasting Energy Demand,QIRUHFDVWLQJHQHUJ\FRQVXPSWLRQWUHQGVLQSRSXODWLRQJURZWKHFRQRP\DQGWKHHQHUJ\VHFWRUZHUHFRQVLGHUHGIRUJURXSVRIFRXQWULHVDQGIRUWKHZRUOGDVDZKROHIRUWKHODVW\HDUV7KH81PHGLXPVFHQDULRVHUYHGDVWKHEDVLVIRUSRSXODWLRQ2IRU2XWORRNVHH)LJXUHFigure1.2. Scheme of convergence of demographic and economic projections of energy consumption

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Our approach combines the demographic and economic projections of energy consumption.



11

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collected since 19553 WKHSHULRGEHLQJ WZLFH DV ORQJDV WKDW RI RXU IRUHFDVW KDVKLJKOLJKWHG WKH IROORZLQJSUREOHPVWorld population dynamicsDUHZHOOGHVFULEHGE\DOLQHDUGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKH81PHGLXPFDVHVFHQDULRZKLFKZHDFFHSWHGDVWKHEDVHOLQHIRUWKHFDOFXODWLRQRIHQHUJ\FRQVXPSWLRQVWDUWVGLYHUJLQJIURPLWRQO\DIWHUWKHWLPHVWDPS7KHG\QDPLFVRISHUFDSLWDHQHUJ\FRQVXPSWLRQDUHEHVWGHVFULEHGE\H[SRQHQWLDOQRWVRZHOOE\OLQHDUGHSHQGHQFHEXWGLYHUJHQFHEHWZHHQWKHWZRRQO\UHDFKHVSHUFHQWE\ZKLFKPDGHLWLPSRVVLEOHto rely only on the demographic projectionRIHQHUJ\FRQVXPSWLRQ&RQYHUVHO\ retrospective GDP LVZHOOFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\H[SRQHQWLDOGHSHQGHQFHDQGRQO\ VDWLVIDFWRULO\ VRE\DOLQHDURQHEXWWKHVHWUHQGVJLYHPRUHWKDQDWZRIROGGLYHUJHQFHRI*'3LQGLFDWRUVE\7KHeconomic forecast RIHQHUJ\FRQVXPSWLRQFDQQRWEHVXSSRUWHGE\HYHQDQH[FHOOHQWSUHGLFWDELOLW\RIGDP energy intensity LWKDVEHHQFRQVLVWHQWO\GHFUHDVLQJE\SHUFHQWSHU\HDUIRUPRUHWKDQKDOIDFHQWXU\DOUHDG\

Demography

$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH ODWHVW 81 GHPRJUDSKLF IRUHFDVW E\ WKH ZRUOGSRSXODWLRQZLOO UHDFK EQ DQG WKHUHZLOO EH D VLJQLFDQW FKDQJH LQ LWVTXDOLWDWLYHSDWWHUQV7KHVRFDOOHGdemographic transition from high to low IHUWLOLW\DQGPRUWDOLW\UDWHVZKLFKLVDOPRVWFRPSOHWHLQGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVZLOOEHRYHU)LJXUH$VDUHVXOWSRSXODWLRQJURZWKZKLFKSHDNHGLQWKHVZLOOGHFUHDVHWZRIROGLQFRPSDULVRQZLWKWKHFXUUHQWUDWH7KLVODUJHO\H[SODLQVWKHH[SHFWHGVORZGRZQLQHQHUJ\FRQVXPSWLRQJURZWK

Figure 1.3. The worlds demographic transition

18

2118

1310

20

30

40

50

60people/1000 people

118 60

10

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

Range of birth rates by regionRange of deaths rates by regionAverage birth rate in the worldAverage death rate in the worldNatural growth

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By 2040, the demographic transition will be complete, resulting in the twofold decrease of natural population growth, largely explaining the forecast slowdown of energy consumption growth.



12

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Figure 1.4. Population by region, billions

0,61 0,64 0,28 0,29 3,83

4,59

0,460,57

2010 2040

0,61 0,64

2010 2040

0,28 0,29

2010 2040

0,34

oth. Developing Asia

IndiaEurope

CIS

3,83

4,59

2010 20402010 2040

1,87

2010 2040

0,220,34

2010 2040

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China

North AmericaEurope

Middl E t

CIS

1,02

1,87 2010 2040 China

Developed Asia

North America

Middle East

0,480,59

1,02

2010 2040

2010 2040Developed Asia

Asia0,48

0,59

2010 2040

2010 2040Africa

Asia

South and Central

2010 2040South and

Central America

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Figure 1.5. Population growth, GDP, and energy consumption by region

2,5bn people

140$ trillion

6 000mtoe

Africa

1,5

2,0

2,5bn people

80

100

120

140$ trillion

4 000

5 000

6 000mtoe

Africa

Middle East

South and Central America

CIS

0,5

1,0

1,5

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40

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80

100

1 000

2 000

3 000

4 000South and Central America

CIS

Developing Asia

Developed Asia

Europe

0,0

0,5

Population growth 201040

0

20

40

GDP growth 201040 -1 000

0

1 000

2 000

Energy consumption growth 201040

Developed Asia

Europe

North America

-0,5

0,0Population growth

201040

0GDP growth 2010

40 -1 000

0Energy consumption

growth 201040

North America

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By 2040, 73 per cent of the worlds population will live in the $VLD3DFLF5HJLRQDQG$IULFDIndia, by that time, will be the most populous country in the world.



13

Impact of Demographic Factors on GDP and Energy Consumption

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igure 1.6. Dynamics of working population by region, millions

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SHRSOHP

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non-OECD, excl. China

SHRSOHPUSA

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80%

100%

0%

20%

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OECD, excl. USA


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14

Economic Growth

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Economic growth in developed countries is based on the continuation of trends and parameters of post-industrial development, with a further shift to services.

The future of the Chinese economy its growth rate, social and political stability, and the levelling-out of its social structure beyond 2020 is the biggest uncertainty of long-term economic forecasting.



15

Figure 1.8. Average GDP growth by region

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

0%

2%

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040

USA OECD, excl. USAChina non-OECD, excl. ChinaWorld

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Figure 1.9. Structure of world GDP by region

19%31%

14%

22%

40% USAOECD, excl. USA

China

2010

2040

36%14%

24%

China



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16

Table 1.1. Changing shares of the countries in the global GDP

5DWLQJE\*'3333IRU 5DWLQJE\*'3333IRU6KDUHLQJOREDO*'3

in 20106KDUHLQJOREDO*'3

in 2040EU-27 20% 1 China 24%

1 USA 19% 2 USA 14%2 China 14% EU-27 12%3 -DSDQ 6% 3 India 10%4 India 5% 4 %UD]LO 3%5 Germany 4% 5 Russia 3%6 Russia 3% 6 -DSDQ 3%7 UK 3% 7 Germany 2%8 %UD]LO 3% 8 UK 2%9 France 3% 9 0H[LFR 2%10 Italy 2% 10 France 2%


Figure 1.10. World and regional GDP (PPP) per capita

20 00030 00040 000

50 00060 000

70 00080 000

$2010/cap

010 000

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040


6RXUFHV(5,5$6$QDO\WLFDO&HQWUHRIWKH5)*RYHUQPHQW

Table 1.2. Comparison of the latest long-term forecasts for the average annual growth of world GDP (Constant US Dollars acc. to PPP index)

Forecast Source Period Average Annual Growth Rate of the World GDP,0)81 ,($:(21HZ3ROLFLHV ([[RQ0RELO '2( 2[IRUG(FRQRPLFV $&RSWLPLVWLF $&SHVVLPLVWLF Outlook-2013 $2010 201035 3.4%Outlook-2013 $2010 201040 3.4%

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17

Assumptions for the Baseline Scenario

The Baseline Scenario of world energy assumes WKDW WKHUHZLOOEHQRVLJQLFDQW WHFKQRORJLFDO UHYROXWLRQVRUbreakthroughs. ,WLVDVVXPHGWKDWWKHQDWXUDOFRXUVHRIVFLHQWLFDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOSURJUHVVZKLFKOLHVEHKLQGWKHHVWDEOLVKHGGRZQZDUGWUHQGLQ*'3HQHUJ\LQWHQVLW\ZLOOFRQWLQXHZLWKDWHQGHQF\IRUDOOFRXQWULHVDQGUHJLRQVWRFRQYHUJHWRZDUGVWKHHQGRIWKHIRUHFDVWSHULRG)LJXUHFigure 1.11. Dynamics of GDP energy intensity by region

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The Baseline Scenario assumes that there will be no radical change of the institutions in energy markets (changes LQWKHUXOHVRIWKHJDPHDSDUWIURPFHUWDLQHQKDQFHPHQWVDLPHGDWLPSURYLQJWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRIHQHUJ\PDUNHWVLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHPDLQSOD\HUV

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Figure 1.12. Primary energy production and consumption by key players in global energy markets in 2010

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The Baseline Scenario also assumes that the current energy policy priorities of these players, and the measures that have already been taken to implement them, are retained. /DUJHLPSRUWHUV PRVWRIWKH2(&'FRXQWULHV&KLQDDQGRWKHUGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVLQ$VLDDUHLQWHUHVWHGLQPRGHUDWHHQHUJ\SULFHVZKLFKDUHKHOSIXOIRUWKHLUHFRQRPLHV(QHUJ\H[SRUWHUVPDLQO\FRQVLVWLQJRIWKH23(&FRXQWULHVDQGWKH&,6VHHNWRPD[LPL]HWKHLUH[SRUWUHYHQXHV)LJXUH

0,6

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toe/$1000 of GDP (2010 prices)

USA

China

OECD, excl. USA


World

0,0

0,2

0,4

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

World

3 000

4 000

5 000

6 000

7 000

8 000

mtoe

Production

Consumption

0

1 000

2 000

Russia China USA OPEC OECD, excl. USA




18

Figure 1.13. Energy policy priorities of energy market players

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Primary Energy Consumption

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Figure 1.14. Primary energy consumption by region, Baseline Scenario

8 000

10 000

12 000

14 000

16 000

18 000

20 000mtoe

Africa

Middle East


CIS

0

2 000

4 000

6 000

8 000

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

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CIS exporters

Developing countries importers

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

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USA

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Domestic market with prices below world averge Environment

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19

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0

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1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

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Figure 1.16. The growth of primary energy consumption by region and type of fuel, Baseline Scenario

4 000

5 000

6 000

7 000

8 000

9 000mtoe USA

Bioenergy

Other renewables

Hydro

Nuclear

OECD, excl. USA China non-OECD, excl. China

0

1 000

2 000

3 000

4 000

1980 2010 2040 1980 2010 2040 1980 2010 2040 1980 2010 2040

Coal

Gas

Oil

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20

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Figure 1.17. World primary energy consumption by fuel type, Baseline Scenario

10 000

12 000

14 000

16 000

18 000

20 000mtoe

Bioenergy

Other renewables

Hydro

Nuclear

Coal

0

2 000

4 000

6 000

8 000

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

Coal

Gas

Oil

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Figure 1.18. Structure of world primary energy consumption by fuel type in 2010 and 2040, Baseline Scenario

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2040

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In the long term, the unequivocal dominance of fossil fuels will remain unchallenged; the share of oil and gas in global primary energy consumption will also be practically unaffected (53.6 per cent in 2010 and 51.4 per cent by 2040).



21

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2 000

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5 000

6 000mtoe

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Gas will have the highest demand of any type of fuel over the next 30 years.



22

Figure 1.20. Electricity generation by region, Baseline Scenario

20 000

25 000

30 000

35 000

40 000

45 000

50 000TWh

Africa

Middle East


CIS

Developing Asia

0

5 000

10 000

15 000

20 000

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

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North America

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Figure 1.21. World electricity generation by fuel type, Baseline Scenario

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27

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29

Figure 2.5. Dynamics of liquid fuels supply structure, Baseline Scenario

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80%

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2 000

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Long-Term Trends of Oil Pricing

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Figure 2.10. Correlation of balance and market oil prices

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Equilibrium Oil Price

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Figure 2.11. Oil supply (cost of production) curve

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Figure 2.12. Historical WTI and Brent price dynamics

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Oil Processing

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According to the Baseline Scenario, it is expected that the share of the world market, dominated by national companies will increase, while the positions of the majors will weaken, and small independent companies in the North American market will grow.



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Figure 2.17. Crude oil balance in the north-east Asian market

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40

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2551942 500

mtoe

199

1 000

1 500

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0

500

2010 2020 2040

OPEC production Spare crude oil production capacityOil exports Oil products exportsDomestic consumption

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$VLJQLFDQWGLIIHUHQFHLQprices which are suitable for OPEC members might signal potential instability and lack of coordination of the activities of the organizations members.

Over the forecast period, OPECs potential impact on the average annual oil price is estimated at $29/bbl (2010 prices), with SURYLVLRQIRUVLJQLFDQWFKDQJHVin volumes of spare capacity.



41

Can OPEC Affect Oil Prices?

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Figure 2.21. Changes in the balance price depending on OPEC policy, Baseline Scenario

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Figure 2.22. Gas consumption by region, Baseline Scenario

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43

Figure 2.23. The Balance of gas supply and demand in 2040, Baseline Scenario

bcm

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5 000

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Figure 2.25. World natural gas supply curve (cost of production) Baseline Scenario

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45

Figure 2.26. Gas production by region, Baseline Scenario

6 000bcm

3 000

4 000

5 000

Africa

Middle East


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Europe

North America

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1 000

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46

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Figure 2.28. Current world pricing of gas and its changes in 200510

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12

14 $2010/mmbtu

6

8

10

0

2

4

Europe (average weighted) China (average weighted)Japan (average weighted) USA (Henry Hub)

02000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

* Weighted average price between the prices of long-term contracts linked to alternative fuels, and spot prices.

6RXUFH(5,5$6

For the period to 2040, conditions will not be right for the formation of a single global JDVPDUNHWDQGDXQLHGJDVprice.



48

International Trade

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Figure 2.30. Inter-regional gas trade in 2040, Baseline Scenario, bcm

6RXUFH(5,5$6

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Positions of the Major Market Participants

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Global And Russian Energy Outlook

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