Generic 1NC from NFL naitonals 2014

8/11/2019 Generic 1NC from NFL naitonals 2014

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First OffA. Interpretation:

In the US context, economic engagement must include conditional carrots and

sticks.

Helweg, Professor of Public Policy @ SMU, 2000(Diana, Economic Strategy andNational Security, p. 145)

Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright has argued that a U.S. policy of economic engagement

with a country does not mean endorsement of its regime. In fact, the U.S. version of

engagement is different from countries, such as France and Japan, which often practice a

policy of unlimited economic engagement based on the rationale that unfettered trade and

investment best promotes democratic valuesfor the targeted nation, and financial success for

themselves. By contrast, U.S.-"style" engagement must be coupled witha range of policy tools

that includes the targeted use of economic restrictions. In other words, it is a variation of the

traditional carrot and stick approach rather than one or the other.

B. VIOLATION: The affirmative engages [Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela] without

attempting to directly manipulate the country with an incentive.

C. STANDARDS:

A. Predictable Limits: The methods of economic engagement are

functionally limitless. Key to fairness

B. Neg Ground and Research: Only our interp gives meaning to

engagement and cultivates educational debateproviding both sides

with the best ground.

D.Topicality is a VOTING ISSUE for fairness and education.


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Third Off

Russian resurgence into Latin America is growing

Wells 4-26-13(Miriam, Wells is a journalist who has previously worked for BBC Radio News and for Human Rights Watch. She has worked for InSight Crime since2012, specializes in Latin American Reporting, Should Russian Anti-Drug Aid to LatAm Worry the US? 2013 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/should-russian-drug-

aid-latam-worry-us)

Russian involvement in Latin America has been growing for several years, particularly in left-leaning countries, a

harkback to the Soviet era which has led some to suggest the alliances are more about geopolitics than

fighting drug trafficking. However, anti-drugs cooperation also has major economic benefits to

Russia, particularly in terms of arms sales, which have soared in the last 10 years. In 2009 Russia took the United

States' place as the main supplier of arms to Latin America for the first time, with sales totalling $5.4 billion. Russian

arms sales to Latin America grew 900 percent between 2004 and 2009, according to Russian newspaper Pravda.

"We are getting back forgotten, old Soviet markets,like Peru, for example," Russia's director of Military SalesServices, Alexander Fomin, said last month. Ties between Latin America and Russia began to deepen in earnest in

2008 whenthen-Russian President Dmitry Medvedevcarried out a Latin American tourin his first year in office, visiting Peru,

Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. One Russian diplomat claimed that cooperation "could be broader than in the Soviet era," andhinted at broader strategic motives by stating that "Latin America has already ceased to be

the United States' backyard." Since then, Moscow has signed far-reaching defense, energy and trade

agreementswith countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Brazil, and Russia-Brazil bilateral trade is predicted to increase to $10

billion annually in the next three years.

Russia conducts its foreign policy in terms of zero sum influence with the US

these conflicts spill over and destroy relations

Blank 2011(Steven, Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College Russias Second Wind in LatinAmerica, Perspectives on the Americas A Series of Opinion Pieces by Leading Commentators on the Region August 18https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-

policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf)

Indeed, Russian policy is not driven by Latin Americas views, but by classical desires for profit and

influence, mainly atthe expense of the United States,and a visceral anti-Americanism. Analystslike

Fedor Lukyanov, Vladimir Shlapentokh and Leonid Radzhikhovky all attest to the virtually obsessive anti-Americanism that

drives much of Russian foreign policy.3 Indeed, powerful peoplelike Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Premier Vladimir

Putinsright-hand man, apparently want to conduct a Latin American policy of anti-Americanism and

destabilization regardless of the consequences. Sechin reportedly promoted economic deals

and arms sales to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, and the formation among these three of an

alliance as Moscow considers the formation of such a union a worthy response to U.S.

activity in the former Soviet Union and the placement of missile defenses in Poland and the

Czech Republic.4 Not surprisingly Sechin advised Putin that Moscow should upgrade its relations with

these countries in particular, and with Latin Americain general.5 As Deputy Prime Minister, Sechin appears to have encouraged Venezuelan president Hugo Chvezto develop a nuclear program and Sechin negotiated the transfer of nuclear technology and weapons to Venezuela. In July 2009 he arranged a deal with Cuba that allowed

Russia to conduct deep-water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.6 Whereas in the previous thrust into Latin America, Moscow

focused primarily, though not exclusively, on reliable friends like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, to whom it

either sold a lot of arms or gave considerable economic and energy assistance, today Moscow fully appreciates Brazils dominant position in Latin America,has

cemented bilateral and multilateral ties with it through the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) organization, anddevotes its primary attention on Brazil, while not neglecting other targets of opportunity. Putin has called Brazil a strategic partner for Russia and cited bilateral cooperation in

the energy sector, as well as in nuclear energy, space, metals, biotechnologies and telecommunications.7 Beyond that, Russia has long sought entre into Brazils arms market

and it continues to do so vigorously. Whereas earlier Moscow wanted to show Washington that Moscow could

play in Latin America too, now Moscowsbroader primary objective is support for Russias

goal of a multipolar world that constrains U.S. power and forces Washington to heed
https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdfhttps://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdfhttps://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdfhttps://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf


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Moscows voice before acting. Thus Russias new activity builds upon previous policy statements by leading officials. Foreign Minister SergeiLavrov said that Latin America and Russia are natural partners, not because of Latin Americas

economic growth, but because of the congruence between Latin governments foreign policies

and Russias support of a multipolar world.8 Similarly Putinalso statedthat Latin America is becoming a

noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar world that is formingwe will pay more and

more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy.9

Destruction of Russian relations causes nuclear terrorism, and destroys

hegemony.

Cohen 2011 Ph.D., professor of Russian studies at New York University and Professor of Politics Emeritus at Princeton University (Stephen, Obama's Russia'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity? http://www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-opportunity?page=full)

An enduring existential reality has been lost in Washingtons postcold war illusionsand the fog of

subsequent US wars: the road to American national security still runs through Moscow. Despite the Soviet breakup twenty years

ago,only Russia still possesses devices of mass destruction capable of destroying the United States and

tempting international terrorists for years to come. Russiaalso remainsthe worlds largest territorial country, a crucial

Eurasian frontline in the conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations, with a vastly

disproportionate share of the planets essential resources including oil, natural gas, iron ore,nickel, gold, timber, fertile land and fresh water.In addition, Moscows military and diplomatic reach

can still thwart, or abet, vital US interests around the globe, from Afghanistan, Iran, China and

North Korea to Europe and Latin America. In short, without an expansive cooperative

relationship with Russia, there can be no real US national security. And yet, when President Obama took office in January 2009,relations between Washington and Moscow were so bad that some close observers, myself included, characterized them as a new cold war. Almost all cooperation, even decades-long agreements regulating

nuclear weapons, had been displaced by increasingly acrimonious conflicts. Indeed, the relationship had led to a military confrontation potentially as dangerous as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Georgian-

Russian War of August 2008 was also a proxy American- Russian war, the Georgian forces having been supplied and trained by Washington. Wha t happened to the strategic partnership and friendship between

post-Soviet Moscow and Washington promised by leaders on both sides after 1991? For more than a decade, the American political and media establishments have maintained that such a relationship was

achieved by President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s but destroyed by the antidemocratic and neo -imperialist agenda of Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Yeltsin in 2000. In

reality, the historic opportunity for a postcold war partnership was lost in Washington, not

Moscow, when the Clinton administration, in the early 1990s, adopted an approach based on

the false premise that Russia, having lost the cold war, could be treated as a defeated

nation.(The cold war actually ended through negotiations sometime between 1988 and 1990, well before the end of Soviet Russia in December 1991, as all the leading participants Soviet PresidentMikhail Gorbachev, President Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bushagreed.) The result was the Clinton administrations triumphalist, winner-take-all approach, including an intrusive crusade todictate Russias internal political and economic development; broken strategic promises, most importantly Bushs assurance toGorbachev in 1990 that NATO would not expand eastward beyond a reunited

Germany; and double-standard policies impinging on Russia (along with sermons) that presumed Moscow no longer had any legitimate security concerns abroad apart from those of the United States, even in its

own neighborhood. The backlash came with Putin, but it would have come with any Kremlin leader more self- confident, more sober and less reliant on Washington than was Yeltsin. Nor did Washingtons

triumphalism end with Clinton or Yeltsin. Following the events of September 11, 2001, to take the most ramifying

example, Putins Kremlin gave the George W. Bush administration more assistance in its anti-

Taliban war in Afghanistan, including in intelligence and combat, than did any NATO ally. In

return, Putin expected the long-denied US-Russian partnership. Instead, the Bush White

House soon expanded NATO all the way to Russias borders and withdrew unilaterally from

the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow regarded as the bedrock of its nuclear security. Those deceptions have not been forgotten in Moscow. Now

Russias political class, alarmed by the deterioration of the countrys essential infrastructures since 1991, is

locked in a struggle over the nations futureone with profound consequences for its foreign

policies. One side, associated withPutins handpicked successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, is calling for a

democratic transformation that would rely on modernizing alliances with the West.The

other side, which includes ultra-nationalistsand neo-Stalinists, insists that only Russias traditionalstate-

imposed methods, or modernization without Westernization, are possible. As evidence, they point to

NATOs encirclement of Russia and other US perfidies. The choice of modernizing

alternatives will be made in Moscow, not, as US policy-makers once thought, in Washington, but American policy will be a

crucial factor. In the centuries-long struggle between reform and reaction in Russia, anti-

authoritarian forces have had a political chance only when relations with the West were

improving. In this regard, Washington still plays the leading Western role, for better or worse.


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Fourth Off

Chinas expanding into Latin America---US influence is key to crowd them out

Dowd 12(Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, Crisis in theAmerica's, http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)

Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S.

policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the

expanding influence and reach of China. Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged

in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America. In Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of thecountrys oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions

into a new police academy.In Colombia, China is planning a massive dry canal to link the countrys Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either

terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the

Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China.In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin

drilling in Cubas swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil.

For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba.New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With

some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and

China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. Chinas state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-

transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazils main oil company when itsought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10 b illion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down

$3.1 billion for a slice of Brazils vast offshore oil fields.The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin

America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to

develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentinas petroleum company outright. The

New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant.There is good and bad to Beijings increased interest and

investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the

economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But Chinas riches come with strings. For instance, in exchange for

Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to Chinafrom 380,000 barrels perday to one million barrels per day. Its worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez

might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.or about 11

percent of net oil importsthe results would be devastating for the U.S.That brings us to the security dimension of

Chinas checkbook diplomacyin the Western Hemisphere.Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that

Beijing had approached every country in our area of responsibility and provided military

exchanges, aid or trainingto Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela.The JFQ study adds that China has an

important and growing presence in the regions military institutions. Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, sendofficers to professional military education courses in the PRC. In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell sophisticated

hardwaresuch as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft. The JFQ report concludes, ominously, thatChinese defense firms are likely to leverage their

experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary conseque nce being that those

purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products. Put it

all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of

Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at work here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is p robing Latin America

and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in Chinas neighborhood, China is developing trade and

military ties in Americas neighborhood.This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the regiona challenge that must beanswered.First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth that Chinas rulers do not share Americas valuesand needs to shape and conduct

its China policy in that context.Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai

slave-labor camps, many of them guilty of political dissent or rel igious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of

speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed,

Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a

decade, according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the

difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, There is no true internatio nal security without

respect for human rights.Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and

instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily. That means no more

allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish.Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and

foundered. The trade-expansion agreementswith Panama and Colombia were left in limbofor years, before President

Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journalreports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an

interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados)

remain empty.Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep

respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the U nited States in the midst of

massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good


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model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security

partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region.Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America. We should

remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and C hileborder the

Pacific.Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partnerson the Pacific Rim into

the alliance of alliancesthat is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.Finally, all of this needs to be part of a

revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this Monroe Doctrine

2.0 would make it clear to Beijing that the United Stateswelcomes Chinas efforts to conduct t rade in the Americas

but discourages any claims of controlimplied or explicitby China over territories, properties

or facilities in the Americas.In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorablyupon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or m ilitary assets in the Western Hemisphere.In short, what it was true in the 19th

and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

The plan limits Chinas influence in the region restarts U.S.Latin Ties

Pham 10[Dr. J. Peter Pham is senior vice president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy

and the incoming editor of American Foreign Policy Interests., Chinas Strategic Penetration of

Latin America: What It Means for U.S. Interests, 2010, American Foreign Policy Interests, 32:

363381]

All of this led to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clintontelling an audience of Foreign Service officers during a town hall meeting at the State

Department last year that she found the gains that China was making in Latin America quite disturbing .

She went on to add, I mean they are building very strong economic and political connections.... I dont

think thats in our interest.85 Howthen, in the face of Chinas growingcommercial and political

relationshipsacross the region, might American interests be secured and, indeed, advanced ? First, U.S.

policymakersneed toacknowledge that Americas Latin Americanand Caribbean neighbors

matter to the United States not only for its traditional security interest in limiting the influence of outside powers inthe Americas but also because globalization has accelerated the momentum for the increased integration of all of the nations i n the Western

Hemisphere and regional cooperation is required to meet a whole host of transnational challenges ranging from spurring economic growth to illegal

immigration to narcotics trafficking to environmental issues. Hence it is in the interests of the United States to renew

relationswith the countries to its south by developing and articulating acomprehensive strategy that clearly puts torest the legacy of benign neglectof the region. Second, rather than lament the passing of an era when the United States

unilaterally dictated the terms of engagement with its Latin American neighbors, the fact that the region is shaping its

future far more than it shaped its past86 ought to be welcomed. Engaging Latin American governments

and peoples on mutually agreeable terms isby far amore sustainable foundation for what ought to be the goals

of U.S. policy in the region:the stability, security, and, ultimately, prosperity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When thetrends to greater ownership by the countries of the region of their own individual destinies are added to the limitations tha t the current fiscal crisis and

the burdens of other challenges impose upon U.S. policy, it becomes apparent that A merican interests are best advanced by more modest expectations

and better targeting of available resources. In its engagements with its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors, the United S tates should privilege

building institutional capacity over the mere provision of aid. Third, despite Chinas efforts to secure access to Latin Americas natural resources and

markets, the region remains an important source of energy and other commodities for the United States as well as a major market for American goods

and services. About 25 percent of U.S. energy imports come from Central and South American countries and the region buys 20 p ercent of all of U.S.

exports, more than the European Union. Thanks to proximity as well as longstanding familiarity, U.S. businesses still have a

comparative advantage over overseas competitorsin the markets of the Western Hemisphere.87 Thus the

administration mustrecommit itself to building on those solid foundations to reinforce and expand Americaseconomic

ties with its neighbors to the south. In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama singled out Colombia and Panama

as key partners with which he promised to strengthen trade relations.88 Yet absent proactive White House leadership, the

free trade agreementswith those two countries have still not been ratified, while the North American Free TradeAgreement that came into force under President Bill Clinton was undermined by last years enactment of a measure canceling a pilot program that

allowed carefully screened Mexican trucks to carry cargo in the United States. Movement to repeal U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol and to se ttle a

dispute over cotton subsidies with the South American giantwould not only promote trade but would also clear the air between Washington and


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Brasilia, especially since the World Trade Organization has already ruled the subsidies illegal and, in a rare move, authorized the imposition of punitive

sanctions against American products.89

Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy and regime stability

preventing US influence key

Ellis 11[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense

Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter

2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf]

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets arebecoming increasingly valuable for Chinese

companiesbecause they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export baseat a time when economic

growth isslowing in traditional marketssuch as the United States and Europe. The region hasalso proven an

effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher valueadded productsin sectors seen asstrategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through

free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing

sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC hasoften had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically

well-connected established interestsin those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key

groups of businesspeople and governmentofficials in those nations have played a key role in the political

will to overcome the resistance . In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one ofthe few people in the country who could call President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese

company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has appliedmore explicit pressures

to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by theArgentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a

longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its

economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair

Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to

work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government pu blicly and bitterly broke

off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the

Chvez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency

to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned

Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in bus iness and other

operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime,

protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has

been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November

2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35

police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela,

became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to

rely increasingly on a combination of goodwilland fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence

with governments of the region , to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China

isintimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of

which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the

PRCleadership see the countrys sustained growth and development , and thus the stability of the

regime , threatened if an actor such as theUnited States is able to limit that cooperation or block

global institutions from supporting Chinese interests .In Latin America, Chinas attainment of

observer statusin the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts toobtain a seat at the table in key regional

institutions, and to keep them from being used against Chinese interests.In addition, the PRC has

leveraged hopes of access to Chinese marketsby Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade
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agreements, whosepractical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading

block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

Econ decline causes warROYAL 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense

[Jedediah Royal, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War andPeace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict.Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and

defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels.

Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on

leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of

a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next .

As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative

power(see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of

miscalculation(Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead

to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining

power(Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cyclesimpact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections

between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000)

theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic

conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so

long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline,

particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources , the likelihood for conflict

increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources . Crises couldpotentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by

interdependent states.4 Third, othershave considered the link between economic decline and external

armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess(2002) find a strong correlation between

internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write.

The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutuallyreinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour.

Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and

external conflicts self-reinforce each other(Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also

been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism(Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which

has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally

reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing

unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to

fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn(1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at

least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards

diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally

more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing

that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo anincrease in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic

integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science

scholarship links economic decline with external conflictal systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This impliedconnection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and

deserves more attention.

Goes globalKaminski 7


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(Antoni Z., ProfessorInstitute of Political Studies, World Order: The Mechanics of Threats (Central European Perspective), Polish

Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system,

although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow

the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public

administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts

fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the

crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to thespecial position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia

(disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). Apotential hotbed of conflict isalso Taiwan's

status. Economic recessionand the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to apolitical, or

even military crisis. The likelihood ofthe global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of

Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.


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Fifth Off

We affirm the entirety of the 1AC, but reject their use of preemptiveargumentation

Preemption has become the doctrine of war. Any event can be simulated as a

threat to the existing order, justifying complete destruction of our knowledge

production in this academic spaceTheir politics uses unknown possibilities as

justifications for changes in the present- these threats are virtual and are unable to be

contested

Massumi 5(Brian, professor in the Communication Department at the Universit de Montral,

Fear (The Spectrum Said), Positions, 13.1, TBC 6/29/10 Project Muse p. 35-6, axheyd)

The necessity for a pragmatics of uncertainty to which the color system alerts us is related to

a change in the nature of the object of power. The formlessness and contentlessness of its

exercise in no way means that power no longer has an object. It means that the object of

power is correspondingly formless and contentless: post 9/11, governmentality has molded

itself to threat. A threat is unknowable. If it were known in its specifics, it wouldnt be a

threat. It would be a situationas when they say on television police shows, we have a

situationand a situation can be handled. A threat is only a threat if it retains an

indeterminacy. If it has a form, it is not a substantial form, but a time form: a futurity. The

threat as such is nothing yetjust a looming.It is a form of futurity yet has the capacity to

fill the present without presenting itself. Its future looming casts a present shadow, and that

shadow is fear. Threat is the future cause of a change in the present. A future cause is not

actually a cause; it is a virtual cause, or quasicause. Threat is a futurity with a virtual power to

affect the present quasicausally. When a governmental mechanism makes threat its business,

it is taking this virtuality as its object and adopting quasicausality as its mode of operation. That

quasicausal operation goes by the name of security. It expresses itself in signs of alert. Since its

object is virtual, the only actual leverage the security operation can have is on threats back-cast

presence, its pre-effect of fear. Threat, understood as a quasicause, would qualify

philosophically as a species of final cause.Oneof the reasons that its causality is quasi is that

there is a paradoxical reciprocity between it and its effect. There is a kind of simultaneity

between the quasicause and its effect, even though they belong to different times. Threat is

the cause of fear in the sense that it triggers and conditions fears occurrence, but without

the fear it effects, the threat would have no handle on actual existence, remaining purelyvirtual. The causality is bidirectional, operating immediately on both poles, in a kind of time-

slip through which a futurity is made directly present in an effective expression that brings it

into the present without it ceasing to be a futurity. Although they are in different tenses,

present and future, and in different ontological modes, actual and virtual, fear and threat are of

a piece: they are indissociable dimensions of the same event. The event, in its holding both

tenses together in its own immediacy, is transtemporal. Since its transtemporality holds a

passage between the virtual and the actual, it is a processareal transformation that is


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effected in an interval smaller than the smallest perceivable, in an instantaneous looping

between presence and futurity.Since it is in that smaller-than-smallest of intervals, it is

perhaps best characterized as infra-temporal rather than transtemporal.

Point 6 isnt just a preempt

We dont endorse gendered languageThese two lines were outlined as preemptive arguments to counter a G-lang K

or alt cause on case arguments

The opposite of the recognition of infinite alterity is a controlling attempt to

break down and understand everything. The notion of judging and demonizing

an individual leads to impersonal domination and tyranny

Wild, professor of philosophy, 80Professor of Philosophy at Yale University (John, Ph.D.from the University of Chicago, professor and chair of philosophy at Northwestern University,

2/29/80, Introduction to Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, book written by

Emmanuel Levinas, Springer, pp. 15-19, http://m.friendfeed-

media.com/48926eed43741a4e07a8241b7ee87bd55b666514)

Hegel and his followershave also seen the accidental biases and eccentricities that make the personal freedom of the

individual unreliable and open to criticism. They havetherefore attacked the personal existence, which Levinas calls

"the inner life," as capricious and subjective, and have defended those objective rational systems

and social organizations which subordinate, or even repress, the individual.Levinas grants that they

have dominated the course of human history.He points out, however, that while this view may have

weakened the influence of individual fantasies and delusions, it has led to forms of social

suppression and tyranny which are even worse. Must we always choose one or the other of

these evils? Anarchy on the one hand and tyranny on the other? In politics, in education, in every phase of

our cultural life, are we not constantly presented with alternatives of this kind?

One may say that a main argument ofthis book is the working out of a third way between the hornsof this recurrent dilemma. Totalitarian

thinking accepts vision rather than language as its model. It aims to gain an all-inclusive,

panoramic view of all things, including the other, in a neutral, impersonal light like the

Hegelian Geist (Spirit), or the Heideggerian Being. It sees the dangers of an uncontrolled,

individual freedom, and puts itself forth as the only rational answer to anarchy.To be free is the

same as to be rational, and to be rational is to give oneself over to the total system that is developing

in world history. Since the essential self is also rational, the development of this system will

coincide with the interests of the self. All otherness will be absorbed in this total system of

harmony and order .According to Levinas, however, there is another way, not yet fully

explored, which he is suggesting in this book.It cannot be identified with subjective anarchism since it takes

account of the other and his criticism.But it also differs from the holistic thinking of traditional philosophy in the

following ways. Instead of referring to the panoramic sense of vision as its model for

understanding, it refers to language where there is always room for the diversity of dialogue,

and for further growth through the dynamics of question and answer. This other-regarding way of thought rejects

the traditional assumption that reason has no plural , and asks why we should not recognize

what our lived experience shows us, that reason has many centers, and approaches the truth

in many different ways . Instead of building great systems in which the singular diversities of


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things and persons are passed over and diluted, this way of thinking prefers to start with the

careful analysis of the peculiar features of each being in its otherness , and only then to clarify

its relations with other things in the light of its peculiar and distinctive features.This other-

oriented mode of speaking and thinking will pay less attention to things as they appear to the

separated self, and more attention to the search for what they arein themselves, in their radical

otherness, even though this is less certain and always more difficult to find. This will mean less interest inconceptual constructions and a greater readiness to listen and learn from experience. It will

not think of knowing , in the sense of gathering, as the primary aim of [hu]man[ity] from

which action will follow as a matter of course, but rather of action and of the achievement of

justice and peace as prior to speaking and thinking .The basic difference is between a mode

of thought which tries to gather all things around the mind , or self, of the thinker, and an

externally oriented mode which attempts to pentrate into what is radically other than the

mind that is thinking it. This difference emerges with peculiar clarity in the case of my

meeting with the other person. I may either decide to remain within myself, assimilating the

other and trying to make use of him, or I may take the risk of going out of my way and tryingto speak and to give to him.This does not fulfill a need. I can satisfy my needs more adequately by keeping to myself and

the members of the in-group with which I am identified. And yet it is the expression of a desire, as Levinas calls

it, for that which transcends me and my self-centered categories. This desire is never

satisfied , but it seems insatiable, and feeds on itself. By communicating with the other, I

enter into a relation with him which does not necessarily lead to my dependence on him. Nor

does he become dependent on me. He can absolve himself from this relation with his integrity

intact. Hence Levinas calls it absolving, or absolute.And he finds many other relations of this kind, for example,that of truth. In so far as I am related to another entity and share in its being, it must be really changed. But as classical metaphysics

pointed out, in so far as I discover the truth about something, it is absolved from this relation and remains unchanged. The same is

true of the idea of absolute perfection which is clearly radically other than what I am. But I can strive for such an other

without changing it, or losing my own integrity, just as I can respond to another person and

engage in dialogue without jeopardizing his or my own being.Levinas suggests that this may be the reason

for Platos well-known statement at Republic 509 that the good lies beyond being, and relates it to his own view that the

conclusions of our basic philosophical questions are to be found beyond metaphysics in ethics.

My way of existing conveys my final answer.As Levinas points out, one answer is given by the totalizers who are

satisfied with themselves and with the systems they can organize around themselves as they

already are. A very different answer is given by those who are dissatisfied, and who strive for

what is other than themselves, the infinitizers , as we may call them. The former seek for

power and control ; the latter for a higher quality of life. The former strive for order and

system ; the latter for freedom and creative advance. This leads to the basic contrast which

is expressed in the title of the book, between totality on the one hand and infinity on theother .Many examples of the former can be found in the history of our Western thought. The latter is largely unknown and

untried.It is this outwardly directed but self-centered totalistic thinking that organizes

[humans] men and things into power systems, and gives us control over nature and other

people . Hence it has dominated the course of human history. From this point of view, only

the neutral and impersonal, Being , for example, is important. "What is it?" is the most basic

question that requires an answer in terms of a context, a system. The real is something that


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can be brought before the senses and the mind as an object. The acts of sensing, thinking,

existing, as they are lived through, are discounted as subjective . A priority is, therefore,

placed on objective thinking, and the objective. The group is more powerful, more inclusive,

and, therefore, more important than the individual . To be free is to sacrifice the arbitrary

inner self and to fit into a rationally grounded system.Inner feelings and thoughts cannot be observed. They

are private and unstable. So [humans] men are judged by what they do, their works that are visible

and remain. Since they endure, they can be judged by the group which also remains.They are

what they are judged to be by the ongoing course of history. Since this is the inclusive system, with nothing beyond, there is no

appeal from this judgment. It is final. As Hegel said, Die Weltgeschichte ist die Weltgericht. History itself is the final

judge of history.To the infinitizers on the other hand, this seems like a partial and biased

doctrine. Systematic thinking, no doubt, has its place. It is required for the establishment of those

power structures which satisfy necessary needs. But when absolutized in this way and applied

to free [humans] men, it constitutes violence , which is not merely found in temporary and

accidental displays of armed force , but in the permanent tyranny of power systems which

free [humans]men should resist. Slavery is the dominance of the neutral and impersonal over

the active and personal .In a living dialogue and even in a written monologue of many volumes it is more

important to find out who is speaking and why, than merely to know what is said. We do not

need to know the other person (or thing) as he [or she] is in himself, and we shall never know

him [or her] apart from acting with him. But unless we desire this, and go on trying, we shall

never escape from the subjectivism of our systems and the objects that they bring before us

to categorize and manipulate .We do not get rid of our thoughts and feelings by ignoring them or by any other means.

But we may seek to transcend them, first as individuals and only later, perhaps, as a group. The individual person

becomes free and responsible not by fitting into a system but rather by fighting against it and

by acting on his own.Those who are not limited to visible objects and who have some sense of

the inner life that is revealed in dialoguewill not judge a [hu]man exclusively by his [or her] works. They will

recognize the alien factors that always intervene between the [hu]man himself and the objects he [or she] produces. They willalso

be aware of the difference between those who judge and the other whom they are judging.

They will understand that thejudgment of historyis made by survivors on the works of the dead who are no

longer present to explain and defend them. They will see that this judgment is crude and subjective , varying with

the otherness of those who judge differently from place to place and from time to time. So

they will never accept it as final. They will seek rather to separate themselves from this course

of history to make judgments of their own with reference to a standard of perfection that is

radically other and transcendent. To this " idea of the infinite ," as Levinas calls it, an appeal

can be made.We are not bound to accept the status quo as right, and history itself is not the final judge of history.


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Sixth Off

Human solutions to environmental problems reinforce human chauvinism

nature/culture binaries must be questioned before environmental degradationcan be confronted.

Lintott 11 Sheila Lintott. Fall 2011. Preservation, Passivity, and Pessimism. Ethics & theEnvironment. 16:2. Pages 100-102.Perhaps I am being too literal; perhaps Jordan is merely suggesting that seeing nature as something we can affectpositively and

negativelyillustrates its dependence on us, which is conducive to our bonding with nature by cultivating a sense of responsibility

for our actions regarding it. Maybe seeing natures dependence on us can motivate us to act more responsibly in the way that

grasping his babys dependence and vulnerability can motivate a father to act responsibly toward the baby. Parents frequentlyare

touched by their childrens vulnerability in this way. However, nature simply is not vulnerablein this way. Nature

does not need us to survive; nature will continue long after us and would probably, in some sense,

be better off without us. Truth be told, we are the vulnerable, dependent ones in the human-

nature relationship. Restorationists sometimes seem reluctant to admit this. Some restorationists emphasize thecollaborative nature of their practice, seeing restoration ultimately as a way to (re-)enfranchise and (re)liberate nature. For example,

Trish Glazebrook describes the practice of restoration in the oil industry as follows: The actual practice of restoration in the

oil industry does not make natureat all, but rather involves providing the right conditions, and then allowing the

time for nature to heal itself. The process is more about patience than mastery and control(Glazebrook,30). One sometimes finds evidence of such an attitude in the best versions of restoration; however, one should look carefully at the

sentiments expressed in public and professional debates on the topic and at how the practice actually plays out to discern whether

restoration is always as humble, collaborative, and patient as Glazebrooks recount makes it seem. For example, take Turners

excitement and optimism about restoration as a normative paradigm; it is, literally, otherworldly: If we are alone [i.e. if we are the

only intelligent life in the universe], then we carry a gigantic responsibility. We are the custodians of life in the

universe, and the only plausible vector by which life may propagate itself to other worlds. Butone day the long discipline of restoration may bear a strange and unexpected fruit, and an alien sun may shine on miles of blowing

prairie. (Turner, 203) I am sincerely taken aback by such a suggestion and do not detect any humility or collaboration in it. Perhaps a

few readers are thinking that colonizing other worlds is ethically unproblematic, so long as no persons or sentient beings are

colonized in the process. However, there are two things to note about this. First, the attitude expressed here iscompatible with a willingness to accept degradation as given and to simply move on and away

from it via technological meansan attitude that sees human life as the most important life

on this planet(and perhaps on others). This is notan attitude that is conducive to healthy human-nature

relationships. And this leads to another issue, if we deal with past mistakes by leaving them and moving

on to new venues, whats to stop humanity from continuing on in this mannerworld-

hopping, as it were? Add to this the fact that many astronomers now believe that in all probability we are not alone, that is,

that we do not represent the only intelligent life in the universe. If so, then dreams of colonizing other planets need

to be checked by the possibility that other beings may already inhabit those worlds. I find myselfhere reminded of Val Plumwoods wise counsel against even contemplating colonizing distant planets before we can learn to live

well on this one. As she says, Perhaps the most important task for human beings is not to search the

stars to converse with cosmic beings but to learn to communicate with the other species that

share this planet with us (Plumwood 2002, 189). I find similar reasoning applicable to the debate over restoration and Isuggest that the most important task for human beings is not to seek greater mastery over nature to create nature anew (here or

elsewhere), but to learn to coexist peacefully with and to fully respect the nature that exists here and persists in each of us. I

partially agree with Jordan that the real challenge of environmentalism is not to preserve nature by protecting it from human

beings or rescuing it from their influence, but to provide the basis for a healthy relationship between nature and culture (Jordan

2000b, 208). My agreement is partial because, at this point in time, forging a healthy relationship between nature

and culture necessarily involves privileging the preservation and protection of nature from

human influence. Moreover, we also need to worry about the likely cultural uptake of the practice of restoration; that is, hownon-participants in the research and physical work of restoration, which will be the vast majority of people, are likely to interpret

and understand the process of restoration. Most likely participants will already be relatively virtuous concerning environmental


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matters. Those most in need of character remediation might be aware of the projects but are far less likely to freely participate in

them. From the point of view of a non-participating observer, Robert Elliots feared replacement thesis might come alivethat is,

restoration projects might just provide what seem to be valid grounds to excuse the initial

degradation and even justify future degradation(Elliot 2000). A non-participating observer who has heard talk of,for example, efforts to return wolves to Yellowstone Park might be impressed with the work and the sc ience involved, and might

then find in restoration a source of optimism regardless of how she or other humans continue to behave. Given how the

shock and awe of war seems to impress the public, it is reasonable to worry that many couldinterpret restoration as the human ability to pillage and then restore nature, giving us the

justification for consumerism in every corner of lifefrom big cars and big houses to big planes

flying us to remote locations for big vacations in restored nature that can be re-restored when

need be. Of course, this does not mean that restoration does justify degradation, but it might easily be interpreted that way. So,restoration needs to be secondary to preservation unless we want to be satisfied with restored and re-restored nature, which will

ultimately leave us with nothing tangible on which to base restorations.

They also commercialize algae for humans and provide water banks whose sole purpose is

human sustenance. In the underview of the 1AC he also said individuals buy in to the water

banks.

These flawed methods of knowledge are the root cause of all social andecological crises and alienation; returning to ecocentrism is key

Nayeri 13(Kamran Nayeri, Researcher UC Berkeley Political Economist University ofCalifornia Political Economist South Bay Mobilization Peninsula Peace and Justice Center,

http://philosophersforchange.org/2013/10/29/economics-socialism-ecology-a-critical-outline-

part-2/)

Of course, it is important to analyze historical changes in the forms of alienation from nature and

society and specific forms of exploitation and oppression as well as resistance to them as

modes of production change. In particular, it is important to understand and underscore how the capitalist mode ofproduction has transformed and deepened the anthropocentric culture through the dynamics of capital accumulation, as it has

turned almost everything into commodities through self-expansion of value. Intrinsic value of everything is turned into exchange

value. Also, it is important to understand how the historical form of capital accumulation,

centered on fossil fuel-driven industrialization, has created the conditions for irrepressibledamage to the fabric of life on Earth and perhaps possible demise of our species. But none of

these could have come to be without the rise of class society based on anthropocentrism that

defines civilization.If the above argument is true in its broad outline then it follows that no social transformation

is radical( getting to the root of the crisis ) unless it overcomes the 10,000 year old

anthropocentric culture. This challenges both the ecological and socialist movements that

aim to address the crisis of nature and crisis of society respectively. In other words, in todays globalizedcapitalist world to be a consistent naturalist requires challenging the capitalist system as the enforcer of the anthropocentric culture

and to be a consistent socialist one has to be a naturalist because the root cause of the crisis of the capitalist system, like all other

class societies before it is the anthropocentric culture. To resolve the planetary crisis and the social crisis, it is

necessary to revive the intrinsic value of everything , including each human being, by riddingour society and culture of values assigned to them by the marketand this cannot be done unless

we return to ecocentrism and transcend the capitalist system.
http://philosophersforchange.org/2013/10/29/economics-socialism-ecology-a-critical-outline-part-2/http://philosophersforchange.org/2013/10/29/economics-socialism-ecology-a-critical-outline-part-2/http://philosophersforchange.org/2013/10/29/economics-socialism-ecology-a-critical-outline-part-2/http://philosophersforchange.org/2013/10/29/economics-socialism-ecology-a-critical-outline-part-2/


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Thus the alternative: reject the aff and and endorse deep ecology. This breaks

out of the anthropocentric mindset and allows the environment to flourish

Katz 2k(Eric, assoc. professor of philosophy at New Jersey Institute of Technology. Againstthe inevitability of Anthropocentrism, in Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy

of Deep Ecology, edited by Eric Katz, Andrew Light and David Rothenberg, p. 21)

Deep ecology values the ecospherethe ecological systems and the natural entities that comprise the living and developing natural world. Deep ecology values the ecosphere in itself,

not merely for human purposes. Its chief practical concern is for the ecosphere to continue

to develop and flourish with a minimal amount of human interference, degradation, and

destruction. To accomplish this task, human social institutionseconomics, technology and

science, politics, education, philosophy, and religionmust be reoriented so that they can

exist in harmony with the developing processes and life-forms of the natural world.


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On Case


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Fiat Double Bind Turn

Either the harms of the 1AC are true and they cannot effect change before

extinction happens, or their impacts are constructed for alarmism which makes

them symbolic terrorists

Vote negative on presumption: state change is impossible. Political

methodology focused on creating change at the state level is a lost cause. There

are an infinite number of barriers between our agency and the actions that take

place in congress. Rather than begin politics with the question of voting and

particular bills, we must begin with decentralized individual tactics.

Gilbert 2009(Jeremy, "Deleuzian Politics? A survey and Some Suggestions", New

Formations, EBSCO)

The key question which emerges here is one of the most vexed and contentious in the field of

studies of Deleuzian politics: namely, Deleuze and Guattaris attitude to democracy. While it isquite possible to read in their work an advocacy of that plural radical democracy which Laclau

and Mouffe have also famously advocated,80 it is equally possible to read in Deleuze an

aristocratic distaste for democracy which he shares with Nietzsche and much of the

philosophical tradition. This is the reading offered by Phillipe Mengue, and it is not difficult to

understand his argument. Democracy necessarily implies government by majorities, and as we

have seen, majority is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a wholly negative term. Deleuzes express

distaste for opinion, for discussion, his consistent emphasis on the value of the new, the

creative and the different, all seem to bespeak an avant-gardism which is ultimately inimical

to any politics of popular sovereignty. On the other hand, as Paul Patton has argued in

response to Mengue,81 most of Deleuzes anti-democratic statements can easily be read as

expressions of distaste with the inadequacy of actually-existing liberal democracy, informed bythe desire for a becoming-democratic which would exceed the self-evident limitations of

current arrangements. Taking this further, I would argue that if any mode of self-government

emerges as implicitly desirable from the perspective developedby Deleuze and Guattari, then

it would clearly be one which was both democratic and pluralistic without being subject to the

existing limitations of representative liberal democracy. Deleuzes earlier work may

occasionally be characterised by a Nietzschean aristocratic tone. However, where he expresses

anti-democratic sentiments in his work with Guattari, these only ever seem to spring from a

commitment to that Marxian tradition which understands liberal democratic forms to be deeply

imbricated with processes of capitalist exploitation.82 When weighing up the legacy of this

tradition today, it is worth reflecting that the degradation of actually existing democracy

under neoliberal conditions in recent decades, especially in the years since the fall of the Berlin

wall, has lent much weight to the hypothesis that a democratic politics which has no anti-

capitalist dimension can only ultimately fail, as the individualisation of the social sphere and

the corporate control of politics progressively undermine the effectiveness of public

institutions.83 From such a perspective, the problems with existing forms of representative

democracy are several. Firstly, in ceding legislative sovereignty to elected bodies for several

years at a time, they rely on the artificial stabilisation of majorities of opinion along party lines

which do not actually express the complexity of popular desires in any meaningful way. While it

is clearly true that democracy as such necessarily demands the temporary organisation of


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molarities for the purpose of taking collective decisions, the existing set of relationships

between individuals and parties does not enable these molarities to emerge with sufficient

intensity to effect major change: for example, despite the vehemence of anti-war opinion in

the UK in 2003, the government was effectively at liberty to pursue the invasion of Iraq, safe in

the knowledge that this intensity would disperse before the next general election. At the same

time, these relationships do not enable the emergence of sites of engagement and

deliberation which would enable new ideas and practices to emerge, simply delegating

political engagement to a class of professional politicians, journalists, and policy-specialists

whose job is not to innovate, invent and transform existing relations of power, but to

maintain them, and the arrangements which express them.Most crucially, they do not enable

the new forms of collective becoming which a more participatory, decentralised, molecular

democracy would facilitate, preventing any meaningful institutional expression of those new

forms of dynamic, mobile, cosmopolitan collectivity which globalisation makes possible.

Instead they seek to actualise that potential only in the politically ineffectual forms of a

universalised liberalism or banal forms of multiculturalism, two complementary grids which

are imposed upon global flows within the parameters of either the nation state or legalistic

supra-national institutions.84 The drive to find new forms of participative democracy which

characterises the leading-edge of contemporary socialist practice,85 and which has informednot only the politics of the social forum movement86 but more broadly the entire history of

radical democratic demands (including, for example, the Chartists demand for annual

parliaments, or the Bolshevik cry for all power to the soviets), surely expresses just this desire

for democratic forms not stymied by the apparatuses of majority and individualisation

Their Politics leads to passivityAntonio 95 (Nietzsches antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History; American

Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor, azp)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This

prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slavemorality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a

neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum;

there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to

the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations

makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central

focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral

standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets

of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens

the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to

correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche

1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest

time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena andviewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern

theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity,

Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations

overidentifywith their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They

look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?"They

are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being

anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social


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self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social

greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness,

spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes,

meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might

think, expect, say, or do(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17).

Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows,"

"abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in

the fashion of a stiff "puppet play."Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A

representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?"

Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article;social selves

"prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33,

259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts

foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or

participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to

be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94).

Superficiality rulesin the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One

thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest

news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather doanything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a

constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in

continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising,

and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous

circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre

people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-

mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect

ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new

simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst

inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing,

arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of themasses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one

covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father

confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and

overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant

(Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).


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Fem IR Turn

Security rhetoric promote an image of the state as necessary to maximize profit

creates a form of exclusion that makes their impacts inevitable

Tickner, feminist IR theorist and a distinguished scholar in residence at the School ofInternational Services, American University,01[J. Ann, Gendering World Politics, p. 48-52, MM]

Challenging the myth that wars are fought to protect women, children, and others

stereotypically viewed as vulnerable, feminists point to the high level of civilian casualties in

contemporary wars.Feminist scholarship has been particularly concerned with what goes on

during wars, especially the impact of war on women and civilians more generally. Whereas

conventional security studies has tended to look at causes and consequences of wars from a

top-down, or structural, perspective, feminists have generally taken a bottom-up approach,

analyzing the impact of war at the microlevel. By so doing, as well as adopting gender as a

category of analysis, feminists believe they can tell us something new about the causes of warthat is missing fromboth conventional and critical perspectives.By crossing what many

feminists believe to be mutually constitutive levels of analysis, we get a better understanding of

the interrelationship between all forms of violence and the extent to which unjust social

relations, including gender hierarchies, contribute to insecurity, broadly defined. Claiming that

the security-seeking behavior of states is described in gendered terms, feminists have pointed

to the masculinity of strategic discourse and how this may impact on understanding of and

prescriptions for security; it mayalso help to explain why womens voices have so often been

seen as inauthentic in matters of national security. Feminists have examined how states

legitimate their security-seeking behavior through appeals to types of hegemonic

masculinity. They are also investigating the extent to which state and national identities,which can lead to conflict, are based on gendered constructions.The valorization of war

through its identification with a heroic kind of masculinity depends on a feminized, devalued

notion of peace seen as unattainable and unrealistic.Since feminists believe that gender is a

variable social construction, they claim that there is nothing inevitable about these gendered

distinctions; thus, their analysesoften include the emancipatory goal of postulating a

different definition of security less dependent on binary and unequal gender hierarchies.

Casualties of War: Challenging the Myth of Protection Despite a widespread myth that wars are

fought, mostly by men, to protect vulnerable peoplea category to which women and

children are generally assignedwomen and children constitute a significant proportion of

casualties in recent wars.According to the United Nations Human DevelopmentReport, there

has been a sharp increase in the proportion of civilian casualties of warfrom about 10percentat the beginning of the twentieth century to 90 percentat its close. Although the report

does not break down these casualties by sex, it claims that this increase makes women among

the worst sufferers, even though they constitute only 2 percent of the worlds regular army

personnel.46 The 1994 report of the Save the Children Fund reported that 1.5 million children

were killed in wars and 4 million seriously injured by bombs and land mines between 1984 and

1994.47 But there is another side to the changing pattern of war, and women should not be

seen only as victims; as civilian casualties increase, womens responsibilities rise.However, war


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makes it harder for women to fulfill their reproductive and care giving tasks. For example, as

mothers, family providers, and caregivers, women are particularly penalized by economic

sanctions associated with military conflict, such as the boycott put in place by the United

Nations against Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991. In working to overcome these difficulties,

women often acquire new roles and a greater degree of independenceindependence that,

frequently, they must relinquish when the conflict is terminated. Women and children

constitute about 75 percent of the number of persons of concern to the United Nations

Commission on Refugees (about 21.5 million at the beginning of 1999). This population has

increased dramatically since 1970 (when it was 3 million), mainly due to military conflict,

particularly ethnic conflicts.48 In these types of conflicts, men often disappear, victims of state

oppression or ethnic cleansing, or go into hiding, leaving women as the sole family providers.

Sometimes these women may find themselves on both sides of the conflict, due to marriage and

conflicting family ties. When women are forced into refugee camps, their vulnerability increases.

Distribution of resources in camps is conducted in consultation with male leaders, and women

are often left out of the distribution process. These gender-biased processes are based on

liberal assumptions that refugee men are both the sole wage earners in families and actors in

the public sphere.49 Feminists have also drawn attention to issues of wartime rape. In the

Rwandan civil war, for example, more than 250,000 women were raped; as a result they werestigmatized and cast out of their communities, their children being labeled devils children.

Not being classed as refugees, they have also been ignored by international efforts.50 In

northern Uganda, rebels abducted women to supply sexual services to fighters, resulting in a

spread of AIDS; frequently, after being raped, these women have no other source of

livelihood.51 As illustrated by the war in the former Yugoslavia, where it is estimated that

twenty thousand to thirty-five thousand women were raped in Bosnia and Herzgovina,52 rape is

not just an accident of war but often a systematic military strategy. In ethnic wars, rape is used

as a weapon to undermine the identity of entire communities. Cynthia Enloe has described

social structures in place around most U.S. Army overseas bases where women are often

kidnapped and sold into prostitution; the system of militarized sexual relations has required

explicit U.S. policymaking.53 More than one million women have served as sex providers forU.S. military personnel since the Korean War. These women, and others like them, are

stigmatized by their own societies.In her study of prostitution around U.S. military basesin

South Korea in the 1970s,Katharine Moon shows how these person-to-person relations were

actually matters of security concern at the international level. Cleanup of prostitution camps

by the South Korean government, through policing of the sexual health and work conduct of

prostitutes, was part of its attempt to prevent withdrawal of U.S. troops that had begun under

the Nixon Doctrine of 1969. Thus, prostitution as it involved the military became a matter of

top-level U.S.-Korean security politics. Crossing levels of analysis, Moon demonstrates how the

weakness of the Korean state in terms of its wish to influence the U.S. government resulted in a

domestic policy of authoritarian, sexist control. In other words, national security translated

into social insecurity for these women .54 By looking at the effects of war on women, we cangain a better understanding of the unequal gender relations that sustain military activities.

When we reveal social practices that support war and that are variable across societies, we find

that war is a cultural construction that depends on myths of protection; it is not inevitable, as

realists suggest. The evidence we now have about women in conflict situations severely strains

the protection myth; yet, such myths have been important in upholding the legitimacy of war

and the impossibility of peace. A deeper look into these gendered constructions can help us to

understand not only some of the causes of war but how certain ways of thinking about


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security have been legitimized at the expense of others, both in the discipline of IR and in

political practice.National Security: A Gendered Discourse: Donna Haraway claims that all

scientific theories are embedded in particular kinds of stories, or what she terms fictions of

science.55 IR feminists, like some other critical theorists, particularly those concerned with

genealogy, have examined the stories on which realismand neorealism base their

prescriptions for states national-security behavior, looking for evidence of gender bias.

Feminist reanalysis of the so-called creation myths of international relations, on which realist

assumptions about states behavior are built, reveals stories built on male representations of

how individuals function in society. The parable of mansamoral, self-interested behavior in

the state of nature, made necessary by the lack of restraint on the behavior of others, is taken

by realists to be a universal model for explaining states behavior in the international system.

But,as Rebecca Grant asserts, this is a male, rather than a universal, model : were life to go on

in the state of nature for more than one generation, other activities such as childbirth and child

rearing, typically associated with women, must also have taken place. Grant also claims that

Rousseaus stag hunt, which realists have used to explain the security dilemma, ignores the

deeper social relations in which the activities of the hunters are embedded. When women are

absent fromthese foundational myths, a source of gender bias is created that extends intointernational-relations theory.56 Feminists are also questioning the use ofmore scientifically

based rational-choice theory, based on the instrumentally rational behavior of individuals in the

marketplace that n

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