Game Theory I - University of Chicagohome.uchicago.edu/bdm/pepp/gt1.pdf · 2016-10-20 · Best...
Transcript of Game Theory I - University of Chicagohome.uchicago.edu/bdm/pepp/gt1.pdf · 2016-10-20 · Best...
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Game Theory I
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A Strategic Situation
(due to Ben Polak)
Player 2
α β
Player 1α B-, B- A, C
β C, A A-, A-
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Selfish Students
Selfish 2
α β
Selfish 1α 1, 1 3, 0
β 0, 3 2, 2
I No matter what Selfish 2 does, Selfish 1 wants tochoose α (and vice versa)
I (α, α) is a sensible prediction for what will happen
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Selfish Students
Selfish 2
α β
Selfish 1α 1, 1 3, 0
β 0, 3 2, 2
I No matter what Selfish 2 does, Selfish 1 wants tochoose α (and vice versa)
I (α, α) is a sensible prediction for what will happen
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Selfish Students
Selfish 2
α β
Selfish 1α 1, 1 3, 0
β 0, 3 2, 2
I No matter what Selfish 2 does, Selfish 1 wants tochoose α (and vice versa)
I (α, α) is a sensible prediction for what will happen
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Nice Students
Nice 2
α β
Nice 1α 2, 2 1, 0
β 0, 1 3, 3
I Each nice student wants to match the behavior of theother nice student
I (α, α) or (β, β) seem sensible.
I We need to know what people think about each other’sbehavior to have a prediction
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Nice Students
Nice 2
α β
Nice 1α 2, 2 1, 0
β 0, 1 3, 3
I Each nice student wants to match the behavior of theother nice student
I (α, α) or (β, β) seem sensible.
I We need to know what people think about each other’sbehavior to have a prediction
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Nice Students
Nice 2
α β
Nice 1α 2, 2 1, 0
β 0, 1 3, 3
I Each nice student wants to match the behavior of theother nice student
I (α, α) or (β, β) seem sensible.
I We need to know what people think about each other’sbehavior to have a prediction
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Nice Students
Nice 2
α β
Nice 1α 2, 2 1, 0
β 0, 1 3, 3
I Each nice student wants to match the behavior of theother nice student
I (α, α) or (β, β) seem sensible.
I We need to know what people think about each other’sbehavior to have a prediction
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1, 2 3, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3
I Nice wants to match what Selfish does
I No matter what Nice does, Selfish wants to player α
I If Nice can think one step about Selfish, she shouldrealize she should play α
I (α, α) seems the sensible prediction
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1, 2 3, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3
I Nice wants to match what Selfish does
I No matter what Nice does, Selfish wants to player α
I If Nice can think one step about Selfish, she shouldrealize she should play α
I (α, α) seems the sensible prediction
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1, 2 3, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3
I Nice wants to match what Selfish does
I No matter what Nice does, Selfish wants to player α
I If Nice can think one step about Selfish, she shouldrealize she should play α
I (α, α) seems the sensible prediction
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1, 2 3, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3
I Nice wants to match what Selfish does
I No matter what Nice does, Selfish wants to player α
I If Nice can think one step about Selfish, she shouldrealize she should play α
I (α, α) seems the sensible prediction
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1, 2 3, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3
I Nice wants to match what Selfish does
I No matter what Nice does, Selfish wants to player α
I If Nice can think one step about Selfish, she shouldrealize she should play α
I (α, α) seems the sensible prediction5 / 38
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Outline
Strategic Form Games
Solving a Game: Nash Equilibrium
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Components of a Game
Players: Who is involved?
Strategies: What can they do?
Payoffs: What do they want?
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Chicken
Player 2
Straight Swerve
Player 1Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1, 3 2, 2
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Choosing a Restaurant
Rebecca
P V
EthanP 4, 3 1, 1
V 0, 0 3, 4
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Working in a Team
2 players
Player i chooses effort si ≥ 0
Jointly produce a product. Each enjoys an amount
π(s1, s2) = s1 + s2 +s1 × s2
2
Cost of effort is s2i
ui(s1, s2) = π(s1, s2)− s2i
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Player 1’s payoffs as a function
of each player’s strategy
s1!
utility!u1(s1,6)
u1(s1,3)
u1(s1,0.5)
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Choosing a Number
N players
Each player “bids” a real number in [0, 10]
If the bids sum to 10 or less, each player’s payoff is her bid
Otherwise players’ payoffs are 0
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Outline
Strategic Form Games
Solving a Game: Nash Equilibrium
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Nash Equilibrium
A strategy profile where no individual has a unilateralincentive to change her behavior
Before we talk about why this is our central solutionconcept, let’s formalize it
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NotationPlayer i’s strategy
I si
Set of all possible strategies for Player i
I Si
Strategy profile (one strategy for each player)
I s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN)
Strategy profile for all players except i
I s−i = (s1, s2, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN)
Different notation for strategy profile
I s = (s−i, si)15 / 38
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Selfish Students
Player 2
α β
Player 1α 1, 1 3, 0
β 0, 3 2, 2
Si = {α, β}
4 strategy profiles: (α, α), (α, β), (β, α), (β, β)
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Chicken
Player 2
Straight Swerve
Player 1Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1, 3 2, 2
Si = {Straight, Swerve}
4 strategy profiles: (Straight, Straight), (Straight, Swerve),(Swerve, Straight), (Swerve, Swerve)
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Choosing a Restaurant
Rebecca
P V
EthanP 4, 3 1, 1
V 0, 0 3, 4
SE =? SR =?
Strategy profiles: ?
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Choosing a number with 3 players
Si = [0, 10]
I Player i can choose any real number between 0 and 10
s = (s1 = 1, s2 = 4, s3 = 7) = (1, 4, 7)
I An example of a strategy profile
s−2 = (1, 7)
I Same strategy profile, with player 2’s strategy omitted
s = (s−2, s2) = ((1, 7), 4)
I Reconstructing the strategy profile
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Notating Payoffs
Players’ payoffs are defined over strategy profiles
I A strategy profile implies an outcome of the game
Player i’s payoff from the strategy profile s is
ui(s)
Player i’s payoff if she chooses si and others play as in s−i
ui((si, s−i))
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Nash Equilibrium
Consider a game with N players. A strategy profiles∗ = (s∗1, s
∗2, . . . , s
∗N) is a Nash equilibrium of the game if,
for every player i
ui(s∗i , s−i
∗) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i
∗)
for all s′i ∈ Si
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Best Responses
A strategy, si, is a best response by Player i to a profileof strategies for all other players, s−i, if
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i)
for all s′i ∈ Si
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Best Response Correspondence
Player i’s best response correspondence, BRi, is amapping from strategies for all players other than i intosubsets of Si satisfying the following condition:
I For each s−i, the mapping yields a set of strategies forPlayer i, BRi(s−i), such that si is in BRi(s−i) if andonly if si is a best response to s−i
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An Equivalent Definition of NE
Consider a game with N players. A strategy profiles∗ = (s∗1, s
∗2, . . . , s
∗N) is a Nash equilibrium of the game if
s∗i is a best response to s−i∗ for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1, 2 3, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1X, 2 3, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1X, 2 3X, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1X, 2X 3X, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1X, 2X 3X, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3X
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Selfish vs. Nice
Nice
α β
Selfishα 1X, 2X 3X, 0
β 0, 1 2, 3X
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Chicken
Player 2
Straight Swerve
Player 1Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1, 3 2, 2
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Chicken
Player 2
Straight Swerve
Player 1Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1X, 3 2, 2
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Chicken
Player 2
Swerve
Player 1Straight 0, 0 3X, 1
Swerve 1X, 3 2, 2
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Chicken
Player 2
Straight Swerve
Player 1Straight 0, 0 3X, 1X
Swerve 1X, 3 2, 2
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Chicken
Player 2
Straight Swerve
Player 1Straight 0, 0 3X, 1X
Swerve 1X, 3X 2, 2
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Chicken
Player 2
Straight Swerve
Player 1Straight 0, 0 3X, 1X
Swerve 1X, 3X 2, 2
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You Solve Choosing a Restaurant
Rebecca
P V
EthanP 4, 3 1, 1
V 0, 0 3, 4
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Another Practice Game
Player 2
L R
Player 1U 10, 2 3, 4
D −1, 0 5, 7
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Working in a Team
u1(s1, s2) = π(s1, s2)− s21 = s1 + s2 +s1s2
2− s21
Find Player i’s best response by maximizing for each s2
∂u1(s1, s2)
∂s1= 1 +
s22− 2s1
First-order condition sets this equal to 0 to get BR1(s2)
1 +s22− 2 BR1(s2) = 0
BR1(s2) =1
2+s24
BR2(s1) =1
2+s14
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Working in a Team
u1(s1, s2) = π(s1, s2)− s21 = s1 + s2 +s1s2
2− s21
Find Player i’s best response by maximizing for each s2
∂u1(s1, s2)
∂s1= 1 +
s22− 2s1
First-order condition sets this equal to 0 to get BR1(s2)
1 +s22− 2 BR1(s2) = 0
BR1(s2) =1
2+s24
BR2(s1) =1
2+s14
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Working in a Team
u1(s1, s2) = π(s1, s2)− s21 = s1 + s2 +s1s2
2− s21
Find Player i’s best response by maximizing for each s2
∂u1(s1, s2)
∂s1= 1 +
s22− 2s1
First-order condition sets this equal to 0 to get BR1(s2)
1 +s22− 2 BR1(s2) = 0
BR1(s2) =1
2+s24
BR2(s1) =1
2+s14
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Player 1’s Best Response
BR1(0.5)! BR1(3)! BR1(6)!s1!
utility!u1(s1,6)
u1(s1,3)
u1(s1,0.5)
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Nash Equilibrium
0 1 s1
s2 1
0
BR1(s2) = 12 +
s24
BR2(s1) = 12 +
s14
23
23
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Solving for NE
Since best responses are unique, a NE is a profile, (s∗1, s∗2)
satisfying
s∗1 = BR1(s∗2) =
1
2+s∗24
s∗2 = BR2(s∗1) =
1
2+s∗14
Substituting
s∗1 =1
2+
12
+s∗14
4
s∗1 =2
3s∗2 =
2
3
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Practice Game with Continuous
Choices
2 players
Each player, i, chooses a real number si
There is a benefit of value 1 to be divided between theplayers
At a strategy profile (si, s−i), Player i wins a share
sisi + s−i
The cost of si is si
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Solving
Write down Player 1’s payoff from (s1, s2)
u1(s1, s2) =s1
s1 + s2× 1− s1
Calculate Player 1’s best response correspondence
∂u1(s1, s2)
∂s1=s1 + s2 − s1(s1 + s2)2
× 1− 1 =s2
(s1 + s2)2− 1
Set equal to zero to maximize
s2(BR1(s2) + s2)2
− 1 = 0⇒ BR1(s2) =√s2 − s2
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Solving
Write down Player 1’s payoff from (s1, s2)
u1(s1, s2) =s1
s1 + s2× 1− s1
Calculate Player 1’s best response correspondence
∂u1(s1, s2)
∂s1=s1 + s2 − s1(s1 + s2)2
× 1− 1 =s2
(s1 + s2)2− 1
Set equal to zero to maximize
s2(BR1(s2) + s2)2
− 1 = 0⇒ BR1(s2) =√s2 − s2
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Solving
Write down Player 1’s payoff from (s1, s2)
u1(s1, s2) =s1
s1 + s2× 1− s1
Calculate Player 1’s best response correspondence
∂u1(s1, s2)
∂s1=s1 + s2 − s1(s1 + s2)2
× 1− 1 =s2
(s1 + s2)2− 1
Set equal to zero to maximize
s2(BR1(s2) + s2)2
− 1 = 0⇒ BR1(s2) =√s2 − s2
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Solving
Write down Player 1’s payoff from (s1, s2)
u1(s1, s2) =s1
s1 + s2× 1− s1
Calculate Player 1’s best response correspondence
∂u1(s1, s2)
∂s1=s1 + s2 − s1(s1 + s2)2
× 1− 1 =s2
(s1 + s2)2− 1
Set equal to zero to maximize
s2(BR1(s2) + s2)2
− 1 = 0⇒ BR1(s2) =√s2 − s2
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Solving2
Player 2 is symmetric to Player 1, so write down bothplayers’ best response correspondences
BR1(s2) =√s2 − s2 BR2(s1) =
√s1 − s1
At a NE each player is playing a best response to the other.Write down two equations that characterize equilibrium.
s∗1 =√s∗2 − s∗2 s∗2 =
√s∗1 − s∗1
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Solving2
Player 2 is symmetric to Player 1, so write down bothplayers’ best response correspondences
BR1(s2) =√s2 − s2 BR2(s1) =
√s1 − s1
At a NE each player is playing a best response to the other.Write down two equations that characterize equilibrium.
s∗1 =√s∗2 − s∗2 s∗2 =
√s∗1 − s∗1
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Solving2
Player 2 is symmetric to Player 1, so write down bothplayers’ best response correspondences
BR1(s2) =√s2 − s2 BR2(s1) =
√s1 − s1
At a NE each player is playing a best response to the other.Write down two equations that characterize equilibrium.
s∗1 =√s∗2 − s∗2 s∗2 =
√s∗1 − s∗1
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Solving2
Player 2 is symmetric to Player 1, so write down bothplayers’ best response correspondences
BR1(s2) =√s2 − s2 BR2(s1) =
√s1 − s1
At a NE each player is playing a best response to the other.Write down two equations that characterize equilibrium.
s∗1 =√s∗2 − s∗2 s∗2 =
√s∗1 − s∗1
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Solving3
s∗1 =√s∗2 − s∗2 s∗2 =
√s∗1 − s∗1
Use substitution to find Player 1’s equilibrium action
s∗1 =
√√s∗1 − s∗1 −
(√s∗1 − s∗1
)⇒ s∗1 =
1
4
Now substitute this in to find Player 2’s equilibrium action
s∗2 =
√1
4− 1
4=
1
2− 1
4=
1
4
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Solving3
s∗1 =√s∗2 − s∗2 s∗2 =
√s∗1 − s∗1
Use substitution to find Player 1’s equilibrium action
s∗1 =
√√s∗1 − s∗1 −
(√s∗1 − s∗1
)⇒ s∗1 =
1
4
Now substitute this in to find Player 2’s equilibrium action
s∗2 =
√1
4− 1
4=
1
2− 1
4=
1
4
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Solving3
s∗1 =√s∗2 − s∗2 s∗2 =
√s∗1 − s∗1
Use substitution to find Player 1’s equilibrium action
s∗1 =
√√s∗1 − s∗1 −
(√s∗1 − s∗1
)⇒ s∗1 =
1
4
Now substitute this in to find Player 2’s equilibrium action
s∗2 =
√1
4− 1
4=
1
2− 1
4=
1
4
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Why Nash Equilibrium?
No regrets
Social learning
Self-enforcing agreements
Analyst humility
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Take Aways
A Nash Equilibrium is a strategy profile where each playeris best responding to what all other players are doing
You find a NE by calculating each player’s best responsecorrespondence and seeing where they intersect
NE is our main solution concept for strategic situations
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