Eurozona 02.10.12 (Dokument v AJ)

5
 Market Economics 10 February 2012 Eurozone: Fiscal Update www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com Please refer to important information found at the end of th e report. The most recent fiscal news from the eurozone… Ahead of the Eurogroup meeting yesterday, the leaders of the three political parties in the Greek coalition government reached a final agreement on the additional austerity measures demanded by the Troika as a prerequisite to the second rescue package. There was, however, no agreement on a deal for Greece at the Eurogroup meeting. It seems to us that the eurozone officials are frustrated with the way Greece has approached the issue so far. The fact that there were many delays in the agreement of the new austerity measures due to political resistance makes eurozone officials worry about whether Greece is sincere in its promises. This was strictly put by the Eurogroup President Jean-Claude Juncker yesterday, when he said “in short: no disbursement without implementation”. There has been talk in recent days of a proposal for the interim government to serve a longer term, until 2013, rather than the country hold an election in April. However, there is no consensus on this proposal. One of the members of the coalition government, New Democracy party, continues to reiterate its demand for general elections as soon as possible. Therefore, before Greece has a new government, the Greek parliament’s approval of the new austerity measures before the deal is endorsed is crucial. Eurozone finance ministers made it clear that they would only move forward if at least: (i) the government sets out precisely how it will find EUR 325mn of savings this year so that pensions are not cut beyond the EUR 300 limit set by the New Democracy leader and supported by LAOS leader, (ii) the Greek MPs approve the loan agreement in a vote on Sunday and (iii) all the members of the coalition government give a clear commitment that they would stick to the agreement even after general elections. Against this backdrop, the new loan agreement is due to be submitted to the parliament today, with the vote to take place on Sunday. A decision is needed by 15 February, when the Eurogroup is expected to convene again on the issue. Given the majority of the coalition government in the parliament, we believe that the deal is likely to be passed. However, this is not without risks. The latest press reports suggest some coalition MPs already said they will vote against the agreement. The resolution of the situation depends on Greece, as most other aspects of the deal seem to have been finalised. Yesterday, the EU Economic Affairs Commissioner, Olli Rehn, said that “the draft agreement on private sector involvement to decrease the Greek debt burden is practically finalized…It will hel p substantially to reduce th e Greek debt burden toward s 120 percent of GDP by 2020” and added that 99% of work on the debt sustainability report is done. The involvement of the official sector in the Greek debt restructuring has yet to be clarified, however. At the ECB press conference yesterday, Mr Draghi refused to comment specifically on the ECB position on the treatment of Greek bonds purchased through the SMP. But, while he confirmed that the ECB does not intend to take losses – this would violate the EU Treaty – he seemed to leave the door open to other forms of participation (such as the speculated swap at below par of the Greek bonds with the EFSF). A decision on this issue will be taken in conjunction with other pending issues on the Greek deal. We believe that, in order to achieve 100% participation in the PSI, collective action clauses (CACs) will be inserted and activated. In this respect, the ECB exchanging its Greek bond holdings with the EFSF bonds beforehand looks like the most likely option at the moment. At the ECB press conference yesterday, most of the Q&A was dedicated to the new collateral

Transcript of Eurozona 02.10.12 (Dokument v AJ)

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Market Economics 10 February 2012

Eurozone: Fiscal Update

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com Please refer to important information found at the end of the report.

The most recent fiscal news from the eurozone…

Ahead of the Eurogroup meeting yesterday, the leaders of the three political parties in theGreek coalition government reached a final agreement on the additional austeritymeasures demanded by the Troika as a prerequisite to the second rescue package. Therewas, however, no agreement on a deal for Greece at the Eurogroup meeting.

It seems to us that the eurozone officials are frustrated with the way Greece has approachedthe issue so far. The fact that there were many delays in the agreement of the new austerity

measures due to political resistance makes eurozone officials worry about whether Greece issincere in its promises. This was strictly put by the Eurogroup President Jean-ClaudeJuncker yesterday, when he said “in short: no disbursement without implementation”.

There has been talk in recent days of a proposal for the interim government to serve a longerterm, until 2013, rather than the country hold an election in April. However, there is noconsensus on this proposal. One of the members of the coalition government, NewDemocracy party, continues to reiterate its demand for general elections as soon as possible.

Therefore, before Greece has a new government, the Greek parliament’s approval of the newausterity measures before the deal is endorsed is crucial. Eurozone finance ministers made itclear that they would only move forward if at least: (i) the government sets out precisely how itwill find EUR 325mn of savings this year so that pensions are not cut beyond the EUR 300

limit set by the New Democracy leader and supported by LAOS leader, (ii) the Greek MPsapprove the loan agreement in a vote on Sunday and (iii) all the members of the coalitiongovernment give a clear commitment that they would stick to the agreement even aftergeneral elections.

Against this backdrop, the new loan agreement is due to be submitted to the parliamenttoday, with the vote to take place on Sunday. A decision is needed by 15 February, when theEurogroup is expected to convene again on the issue. Given the majority of the coalitiongovernment in the parliament, we believe that the deal is likely to be passed. However, this isnot without risks. The latest press reports suggest some coalition MPs already said they willvote against the agreement.

The resolution of the situation depends on Greece, as most other aspects of the deal seem tohave been finalised. Yesterday, the EU Economic Affairs Commissioner, Olli Rehn, said that“the draft agreement on private sector involvement to decrease the Greek debt burden ispractically finalized…It will help substantially to reduce the Greek debt burden towards 120percent of GDP by 2020” and added that 99% of work on the debt sustainability report isdone.

The involvement of the official sector in the Greek debt restructuring has yet to be clarified,however. At the ECB press conference yesterday, Mr Draghi refused to comment specificallyon the ECB position on the treatment of Greek bonds purchased through the SMP. But, whilehe confirmed that the ECB does not intend to take losses – this would violate the EU Treaty – he seemed to leave the door open to other forms of participation (such as the speculatedswap at below par of the Greek bonds with the EFSF). A decision on this issue will be takenin conjunction with other pending issues on the Greek deal.

We believe that, in order to achieve 100% participation in the PSI, collective action clauses(CACs) will be inserted and activated. In this respect, the ECB exchanging its Greek bondholdings with the EFSF bonds beforehand looks like the most likely option at the moment.

At the ECB press conference yesterday, most of the Q&A was dedicated to the new collateral

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IMPORTANT NOTICE. Please refer to important disclosures found at the end of this report.www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com 

rules, as the ECB approved the eligibility criteria for the acceptance of additional creditclaims as collateral in its refinancing operations. The new measures should lead to anincrease in available collateral of EUR 600-700bn (EUR 200-300bn once haircuts areapplied), according to Mr Draghi. Note that only seven central banks have submittedproposals so far (France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus, but more could

follow), confirming press speculation that some national central banks opted out. The decisionon additional collateral was “not unanimous” in Draghi’s words but “not particularlycontentious” either, suggesting that divisions within the board remain limited. This is importantin assessing the probability of further monetary easing.

  German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schauble, said during an informal talk with thePortuguese Finance Minister, Vitor Gaspar, that Germany would support a new or arenewed rescue programme for Portugal, once the Greek situation is resolved. Whileappreciating the support, the Portuguese Finance Minister later denied the need for a newprogramme and reiterated that the country will return to the markets in 2013.

Portugal is likely to experience a sharp decline in GDP over the next few years as a responseto fiscal tightening, well beyond the initial assumptions underlying the EU/IMF programme.

With elevated long-term bond yields, this implies the need for either additional public financingand/or restructuring of past debt. We think the former is the most likely option, but we cannotrule out the latter. Should there be a restructuring, we believe the contagion effect would besignificant, at least in the near term, despite the firewall set up by the EU authorities.

The Spanish cabinet will meet today to approve a reform of the labour market. The objectiveof this reform is to improve the competitiveness and flexibility of the Spanish workforce.According to the latest press reports, this reform could include a reduction in the redundancycompensation to 22 or 33 days per annum from the current 45 days, changes tothe collective bargaining system and a greater harmonisation of fixed and temporarycontracts.

Gizem KaraTel: 44 20 7595 8783Email: [email protected] 

Luigi SperanzaTel: 44 20 7595 8322Email: [email protected] 

Ricardo SantosTel: 44 20 7595 8369Email: [email protected] 

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Market Economics 10 February 2012

Fiscal Monitor www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com 

Ratings MonitorChart 1: Sovereign 5yr CDS & Credit Ratings

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

AA+ AA- A BBB+ BBB- BB B+

Rating (Avg. of Moody's, S&P, Fitch)

   5  y   r   S   o  v   e   r   e   i   g   n

   C   D   S    (

   b   p   )

Philippines

Romania

Colombia

Indonesia

TurkeyIceland

Bulgaria

Brazil

Kazakhstan

Hungary

Russia

Mexico

Thailand

Poland

Bahrain

Portugal

Ireland

Italy

Spain

S. Korea

Belgium

Slovenia

JapanAustralia

UK

US

France

Chile

China

Slovakia

Switz.Norway

Sweden

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

AA+ AA- A BBB+ BBB- BB B+

Rating (Avg. of Moody's, S&P, Fitch)

   5  y   r   S   o  v   e   r   e   i   g   n

   C   D   S    (

   b   p   )

Philippines

Romania

Colombia

Indonesia

TurkeyIceland

Bulgaria

Brazil

Kazakhstan

Hungary

Russia

Mexico

Thailand

Poland

Bahrain

Portugal

Ireland

Italy

Spain

S. Korea

Belgium

Slovenia

JapanAustralia

UK

US

France

Chile

China

Slovakia

Switz.Norway

Sweden

Source: Bloomberg, BNP Paribas, Note: the chart does not include Greece 

The chart above plots the relationship between sovereign ratingsand CDS spreads. Portugal, for example, is still trading at levelsconsistent with further downgrades.

Chart 2: Greece – Credit Ratings

C

CCC-

CCC+

B

BB-

BB+

BBB

A-

A+

AA

AAA

Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Ju l-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Jan-12

Moody's

FitchS&P

C

CCC-

CCC+

B

BB-

BB+

BBB

A-

A+

AA

AAA

Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Ju l-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Jan-12

Moody's

FitchS&P

Source: Bloomberg, BNP Paribas 

Chart 4: Portugal – Credit Ratings

C

CCC-

CCC+

B

BB-

BB+

BBB

A-

A+

AA

AAA

Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Ju l-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Jan-12

Moody's

Fitch

S&P

C

CCC-

CCC+

B

BB-

BB+

BBB

A-

A+

AA

AAA

Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Ju l-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Jan-12

Moody's

Fitch

S&P

Source: Bloomberg, BNP Paribas 

Table 1: Eurozone Credit Ratings

Moody’s S&P Fitch

Rating Last Chg Rating Last Chg Rating Last Chg

AT Aaa - AA+ (-) 13/1/12 AAA -

BE Aa3 (-) 16/12/11 AAu (-) 25/11/11 AA (-) 27/01/12

FI Aaa - AAA (-) - AAA -

FR Aaa - AA+ (-) 13/1/12 AAA -

GE Aaa - AAAu - AAA -

GR Ca* 25/7/11 CC (-) 27/7/11 CCC 13/7/11

IR Ba1 (-) 12/7/11 BBB+ (-) 1/4/11 BBB+ (-) 14/4/11

IT A2 (-) 4/10/11 BBB+ (-) 13/1/12 A- (-) 27/01/12

ND Aaa - AAAu (-) - AAA -

PT Ba2 (-) 5/7/11 BB (-) 13/1/12 BB+ (-) 24/11/11

SP A1 (-) 18/10/11 A (-) 13/1/12 A (-) 27/01/12

Source: Bloomberg, BNP Paribas 

Note: u: unsolicited

(-): negative outlook

* : developing outlook

Chart 3: Ireland – Credit Ratings

C

CCC-

CCC+

B

BB-

BB+

BBB

A-

A+

AA

AAA

Ja n-09 Ju l-09 Jan -10 Ju l-10 Jan -11 Ju l-11 Jan -12

Moody's

FitchS&P

C

CCC-

CCC+

B

BB-

BB+

BBB

A-

A+

AA

AAA

Ja n-09 Ju l-09 Jan -10 Ju l-10 Jan -11 Ju l-11 Jan -12

Moody's

FitchS&P

Source: Bloomberg, BNP Paribas 

Chart 5: Spain – Credit Ratings

C

CCC-

CCC+

B

BB-

BB+

BBB

A-

A+

AA

AAA

Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Jan-12

Moody's Fitch

S&P

C

CCC-

CCC+

B

BB-

BB+

BBB

A-

A+

AA

AAA

Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Jan-12

Moody's Fitch

S&P

Source: Bloomberg, BNP Paribas 

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Market Economics 10 February 2012

Fiscal Monitor www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com 

Growth MonitorChart 1: Industrial Production (% y/y)

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro 

Among the so-called ‘peripherals’, industrial production continuesto contract in Greece. In Portugal and Spain, production has beenbroadly flat over the last year, but is now trending lower.

Chart 3: Manufacturing Sentiment

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro 

Manufacturing sentiment in the peripherals remains well below theeurozone average.

Chart 5: Consumer Sentiment

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro 

Consumer confidence for the eurozone overall is below its long-term average. Sentiment indices in the peripherals remain wellbelow their historical averages. In Portugal, sentiment is trendinglower, which is unsupportive of consumer spending.

Chart 2: Retail Sales (% y/y)

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro 

Consumer spending is weakening in Portugal and Spain.

Chart 4: Services Sentiment

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro 

Services sentiment is generally weaker.

Chart 6: Current Account (% GDP)

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro 

In Portugal and Greece, the current account deficit remains wide,reflecting persistent imbalances between domestic savings andinvestment. In contrast, Spain’s current account deficit narrowedfrom 10% of GDP in 2008 to 4.5% last year. In Ireland, the current

account has returned to a surplus.

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Market Economics 10 February 2012

Fiscal Monitor www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com 

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