EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO, Adm. Case No. 6589Complainant, Present: PUNO,J., Chairman, - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR.,Respondent. Promulgated: December 19, 2005x-------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NTINGA,J.: In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02 October 1997,[1]Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyers oath and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or willingly performed, promoted, or sued any groundless, false or unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii) delayed the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and employing illegal means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly showed disrespect to the Regional Trial Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) for employing unlawful and illegal means to attain his ends. According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama, Antique.[2]The case was decided in favor of the complainant and her co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property. However, respondents, with his co-defendants subsequently entered the disputed property and harvested the palay planted therein.[3] Plaintiffs were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in contempt of court because of their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of the court.[4] On 25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his co-defendants guilty of indirect contempt of court, with the penalty of one month imprisonment and fine.[5] Subsequently, on 26 July 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that instead of imprisonment, defendants were ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.[6] In hisAnswer to Complaintdated02 March 1998, respondent denied complainants allegations and claimed that said complaint was a form of harassment.[7]Hearings were thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of the complainant. Finally, on 09 December 1998, a hearing for the reception of complainants evidence was conducted.[8]While notices were subsequently sent to respondent setting the case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to respondents failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence.[9] In theReport and Recommendation(Report) dated 17 March 2004, the investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, found that complainant failed to prove that respondents actions, with respect to his unsuccessful defense of the case were not within the bounds of the law. Moreover, that respondent lost his case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or unlawful suit or giving aid, or consenting to the same,[10]he added. Thus, according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondents liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.[11] Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to respondents contumacious acts as final and conclusive, it was found that respondent committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Furthermore, theReportnoted respondents attempts to thwart the instant disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative to the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of the complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the Commission of his change of address.[12] Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be reasonable under the circumstances, the Commission recommended instead the penalty of suspension for one month.[13] As explained in the Report: A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the basis of the act for which the court found to be contumacious is a claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional attachment to the property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents subsequent acts, however, including those which were found to be contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case, merit disciplinary sanctions, for which is recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) month.[14] On 30 July 2004, the IBP passed a resolution adopting theReport and Recommendation, to wit:RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376 CBD Case No. 510 Epifania Q. Bantolo vs. Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent has been found by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution and for attempting to mislead the Commission into believing that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the trial court which pertains to a second contempt charge, Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month. The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken. Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well.[15] Such is the situation in the instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers commission of the contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and eventually punished by the lower courts.A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts[16]and to show respect to its processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him.[17]Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to the disbarment proceedings had necessarily caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP.Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.[18] In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a months suspension from the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct and will give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.

GORETTI ONG,complainant, vs.ATTY. JOEL M. GRIJALDO,respondent.D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded.To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession.[1]In this administrative case for disbarment, respondent Atty. Joel M. Grijaldo failed to perform his sworn duty to preserve the dignity of the legal profession.Complainant Goretti Ong is a widow residing in Talayan Village, Quezon City. Sometime in the early part of 1996, she engaged the services of respondent, a practicing lawyer in Bacolod City, as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 52843 before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch5,against Lemuel Sembrano and Arlene Villamil for violation ofBatas Pambansa Bilang22.[2]During one of the hearings of the case, the accused offered to amicably settle their civil obligation to complainant by paying the amount of P180,000.00. Complainant accepted the offer on the condition that payment shall be made in cash.At the hearing held on July 17, 1996, respondent advised complainant to wait outside the courtroom. When he came out, he handed to complainant cash in the amount of P100,000.00 and Metrobank Check No. 0701263862 for P80,000.00, postdated August 16, 1996, drawn by Atty. Roger Reyes, counsel for the accused. Complainant objected to the check payment and refused to settle the case, but he assured her that the check was drawn by a reputable lawyer. Complainant was prevailed upon by respondent into signing an affidavit of desistance, but she instructed him not to file it in court until the check is cleared.Upon presentment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to a stop-payment order from the drawer. Complainant immediately informed respondent of the dishonor, and the latter told her that he will talk to Atty. Reyes about it. Later, when complainant met with respondent in Manila, he relayed to her Atty. Reyes offer to replace the check with cash. Several weeks passed without any payment of the proceeds of the check, despite complainants repeated telephone calls to respondent. Sometime in December 1996, she suggested that respondent move for a hearing of the case, but he told her that courts are not inclined to set hearings near the Christmas season.On December 17, 1996, complainant personally went to Bacolod City to inquire about her case. She was surprised to learn that the same was dismissed as early as September 26, 1996.[3]Apparently, respondent submitted her Affidavit of Desistance[4]and, on the basis thereof, the public prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the case which was granted by the court. When complainant confronted respondent, he admitted to her that he had already received the amount of P80,000.00 from Atty. Reyes but he used the same to pay for his financial obligations.Thus, on April 2, 1997, complainant filed an Administrative Complaint against respondent for disbarment.[5]Complainant further alleged in her complaint that respondent represented her in another case, entitledPeople of the Philippines versus Norma Mondia,also for violation of B.P. 22, where she was the offended party. Respondent approached the accused, Norma Mondia, and offered to delay the hearing of the case in consideration of the amount of P10,000.00. However, Mondia did not have that amount of money. Attached to the complaint is the affidavit of Norma Mondia attesting to this fact.[6]Furthermore, Henry Tiu, a former client of respondent, executed an affidavit, which is attached to the complaint, alleging that he gave respondent the amount of P3,000.00 for the purpose of posting his bail bond, but respondent did not post his bail which resulted in Tius arrest.[7]Likewise, a certain Luz Dimailig, whose affidavit is also attached to the complaint, averred that respondent represented her as counsel for plaintiff in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 52;that the case was dismissed by the trial court; that the appeal filed by respondent to the Court of Appeals was dismissed due to his failure to file the appellants brief; and that the petition for review before the Supreme Court was denied for lack of proof of service on the Court of Appeals, late filing and late payment of docket fees. Moreover, Dimailig alleged that she gave respondent the amount of P10,000.00 for settling the said civil case, but she later learned that he did not remit the money to the defendants or their counsel.[8]On June25,1997, respondent was required to file his comment within ten days from notice.[9]Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time, alleging that he has not received a copy of the complaint.[10]On February 5,1998,[11]complainant furnished respondent a copy of the complaint. However, despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, respondent still failed to file his comment.On October 19, 1998, respondent was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment.[12]Respondent filed a Compliance, stating that the copy of the complaint he received from complainant was not legible. Complainant again furnished respondent with a clearer and more legible copy of the complaint including its annexes; but respondent still did not file his comment.Consequently, on June 14, 2000, another show cause order was issued against respondent.[13]Respondent replied by stating that the quality of the copy furnished him by complainant was worse than the first one he received.Dissatisfied with respondents explanation, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00, which he complied with on November 27, 2000.[14]However, he again failed to file his comment and, instead, moved for additional time to file said comment.On August 13, 2001, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[15]The records of the IBP show that respondent has not filed his comment to the complaint. On January 18, 2002, the Investigating Commissioner, Manuel A. Tiuseco, submitted his report recommending the disbarment of respondent.[16]However, in its Resolution No. XV-2002-553 dated October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty of disbarment and recommended instead respondents indefinite suspension from the practice of law for grossly immoral conduct and deceit.[17]After a careful review of the records of this case, we find the recommendation of Commissioner Manuel A. Tiuseco well-taken.It is clear that respondent gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client, the complainant. Were it not for complainants vigilance in inquiring into the status of her case, she would not have known that the same had already been dismissed on September 26, 1996. Respondent deliberately withheld this fact from her, notwithstanding that she talked to him sometime in December 1996.Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state:Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.Rule 18.04.A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.Respondent breached his duty to his client when he failed to inform complainant of the status of the criminal case. His negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and diligence required of every lawyer.[18]His infraction is rendered all the more deplorable by the fact that complainant is a resident of Quezon City and the case was filed in Bacolod City. It was precisely for this reason that complainant engaged the services of respondent, a Bacolod-based lawyer, so that her interests in the case may be amply protected in her absence. Respondents failure to look after his clients welfare in the case was a gross betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust and confident which was reposed in him. In a similar case, we held:It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment subject however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his clients request for information. Respondents failure to communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case.[19]Worse, when respondent used the money which he received from Atty. Reyes to pay for his own obligations, he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that [a] lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Furthermore:Rule 16.01.A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.Rule 16.02.A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.Rule 16.03.A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful lees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.Respondents misappropriation of the money entrusted to him and his refusal to account for it to his client despite repeated demands were competent proof of his unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him. His acts showed a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. He held the money in trust for his client as settlement of the case he was handling. Upon receipt thereof, he was under obligation to immediately turn it over, in the absence of a showing that he had a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should have been scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted.[20]A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his client that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his clients consent. Respondent, by converting the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent, was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct.Not only did he degrade himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession.[21]Aside from violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondents failure to promptly turn over the money to his client and his conversion of the same for his personal use rendered him liable for contempt under Rule 138, Section 25of the Rules of Court, to wit:Unlawful retention of clients funds; contempt.---When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.Furthermore, respondent violated his oath of office and duties as counsel when he approached his clients opponent and offered to delay the case in exchange for money. His offer to delay the case would have frustrated the interests of his client which he had sworn to protect. As a lawyer, respondent should avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent the speedy, efficient and impartial adjudication of cases.[22]Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[23]Respondents act of propositioning his clients .opponent and offering to delay the case against her was intended to benefit the latter. Hence, such act amounted to double-dealing and conflict of interest, and was unethical practice of law. Attorneys, like Caesars wife, must not only keep inviolate their clients confidence, but must also avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[24]Finally, respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the directives of this Court to file his comment constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility.A resolution of this Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.[25]Respondents obstinate refusal to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of our lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is especially so, as in the instant case, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.[26]All told, respondents transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not only to complainant, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.[27]He has proved himself unworthy of membership in the legal profession and must, therefore, be disbarred.WHEREFORE,for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and grossly unethical behavior, respondent ATTY. JOEL GRIJALDO is DISBARRED from the practice law.His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.He is further directed to PAY complainant Goretti Ong the amount of P80,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision.This Decision shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the land for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-27396 September 30, 1974JESUS V. OCCEA and SAMUEL C. OCCEA,petitioners,vs.HON. PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, respondent. I.V. BINAMIRA, Co-Executor, Estate of W.C. Ogan, Sp. Proc. No. 423, CFI of Bohol,Intervenor.Jesus V. Occea and Samuel C. Occea in their own behalf.Hon. Paulino S. Marquez for and in his own behalf.I.V. Binamira for and in his own behalf as intervenor.ANTONIO,J.:pIn this petition forcertiorariwithmandamus, petitioners seek (1) to nullify the order of respondent Judge Paulino S. Marquez of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, in Sp. Proc. No. 423 entitled "In the Matter of the Testate Estate of William C. Ogan," in relation to petitioners' claim for partial payment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, dated November 2, 1966, fixing at P20,000.00 petitioners' attorney's fees, "which would cover the period March 1963 to December 1965," and directing its immediate payment minus the amount of P4,000.00 previously received by petitioners, and his second order, dated January 12, 1967, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and modifying the November 2, 1966 order by deleting therefrom the above-quoted phrase; (2) to direct the said court to approve the release to them as attorney's fees the amount of P30,000.00 minus the amount of P4,000.00 already advanced to them by the executrix; and (3) to allow petitioners to submit evidence to establish the total attorney's fees to which they are entitled, in case no agreement thereon is reached between them and the instituted heirs.The gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan subject matter of the probate proceeding in Sp. Proc. No. 423 is more than P2 million. Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occea and Atty. Samuel C. Occea, are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occea, and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963, defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the estate. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased father's estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter into compromise with the claimants, as a result of which the total amount of P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants, including co-executor Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. A partial distribution of thecorpusand income of the estate was made to the heirs in the total amount of P450,000.00. On November 18, 1966, the estate and inheritance taxes were completely settled by the executrix and the requisite tax clearance and discharge from liability was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees, dated November 18, 1965, asking the court to approve payment to them of P30,000.00, as part payment of their fees for their services as counsel for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize the executrix to withdraw the amount from the deposits of the estate and pay petitioners. Three of the heirs, Lily Ogan Peralta, William Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan, moved to defer consideration of the motion until after the total amounts for the executrix's fees and the attorney's fees of her counsel shall have been agreed upon by all the heirs. In July, 1966, five of the seven instituted heirs, namely, Lily Ogan Peralta, Necitas Ogan Occena, Federico M. Ogan, Liboria Ogan Garcia and Nancy Ogan Gibson, filed with the court a Manifestation stating that they had no objection to the release of P30,000.00 to petitioners as partial payment of attorney's fees and recommending approval of petitioners' motion.Their first motion dated November 18, 1965 being still unresolved, petitioners filed a second Motion for Payment of Partial Attorneys' Fees, dated July 5, 1966, praying for the release to them of the amount of P30,000.00 previously prayed for by them. Action on the matter was, however, deferred in an order dated August 6, 1966, upon the request of the Quijano and Arroyo Law Offices in behalf of heirs William Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan for deferment until after all the instituted heirs shall have agreed in writing on the total attorney's fees. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration under date of September 12, 1966, asking the court to reconsider its deferment order and praying that payment to them of P30,000.00 be approved on the understanding that whatever amounts were paid to them would be chargeable against the fees which they and the instituted heirs might agree to be petitioners' total fees.On November 2, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order fixing the total fees of petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at P20,000.00. Petitioners moved to reconsider that order. On January 12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by fixing petitioners' fees for the entire testate proceedings at P20,000.00.Petitioners contend that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in fixing the entire attorney's fees to which they are entitled as counsel for the executrix, and in fixing the said fees in the amount of P20,000.00. The reasons given by petitioners in support of their contention are: (1) the motion submitted by petitioners for the court's resolution was only for partied payment of their attorney's fees, without prejudice to any agreement that might later be reached between them and the instituted heirs on the question of total attorney's fees, yet respondent Judge resolved the question of total attorney's fees; (2) considering that the only question raised by petitioners for the court's determination was that of partial attorney's fees, they never expected the court to make a ruling on the question of total attorney's fees; consequently, petitioners did not have the opportunity to prove to total fees to which they were entitled, and, hence, they were denied due process of law; (3) of the seven heirs to the estate, five had agreed to petitioners' motion for partial payment to them of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, while the remaining two did not oppose the motion; (4) in his order, respondent Judge stated that he based the amount of P20,000.00 on the records of the case, but the amount of attorney's fees to which a lawyer is entitled cannot be determined on the sole basis of the records for there are other circumstances that should be taken into consideration; and (5) contrary to respondent Judge's opinion, the mere fact that one of the attorneys for the executrix is the husband of said executrix, is not a ground for denying the said attorneys the right to the fees to which they are otherwise entitled.Only Judge Paulino S. Marquez is named respondent in the present petition, for, according to petitioners, "no proper party is interested in sustaining the questioned proceedings in the Lower Court."In his Answer to the petition, respondent Judge alleged that (a) petitioners' proper remedy is appeal and not a special civil action, considering that there is already a final order on the motion for payment of fees; (b) petitioner Atty. Samuel Occea is the husband of executrix Necitas Ogan Occea, hence, Samuel Occea's pecuniary interest now goes against the pecuniary interest of the four heirs he is representing in the special proceeding; (c) one reason why respondent Judge ordered the deletion of the phrase containing the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 from his November 2, 1966 order is that there are miscellaneous payments appearing in the compromise agreement and in the executrix's accounting which cover expenses incurred by petitioners for the estate; (d) co-executor I. V. Binamira should be included as party respondent to comply with Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (e) it is the duty of respondent Judge not to be very liberal to the attorney representing the executrix, who is at the same time the wife of said counsel and is herself an heir to a sizable portion of the estate, for respondent Judge's duty is to see to it that the estate is administered "frugally," "as economically as possible," and to avoid "that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division," in order that there may be a worthy residue for the heirs. As special defenses, respondent Judge alleged that the seven instituted heirs are indispensable parties in this case; thatmandamuscannot control the actuations of the trial court because they involved matters of discretion; and that no abuse of discretion can be imputed to respondent Judge for trying his best to administer the estate frugally.On the arguments that he had opposed in the lower court petitioners' motion for payment of partial attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, and that since petitioners Samuel C. Occea and Jesus V. Occea are the husband and father-in-law, respectively, of executrix Necitas Ogan Occea, the latter cannot be expected to oppose petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving the co-executor as the lone party to represent and defend the interests of the estate, Atty. I. V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan estate, filed with this Court on July, 1967, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was granted in a resolution of August 9, 1967. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution of August 9, 1967 and an Opposition to "Motion for Leave to Intervene," contending that Atty. Binamira ceased to be a co-executor upon his resignation effective October 29, 1965. On August 15, 1967, Atty. Binamira filed Intervenor's Opposition to Petition (answer in intervention) traversing the material averments of the petition.On August 25, 1967, intervenor filed a Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Exicutrix's Motion for Reconsideration. On September 18, 1967, intervenor filed Intervenor's Comments on Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 9, 1961. On September 21, 1967, petitioners filed against intervenor a Petition for Contempt asking this Court to hold intervenor in contempt of court. We required intervenor to comment thereon. On October 9, 1967, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition for Contempt. Invervenor filed on October 20, 1967, Intervenor's Comments and Counter Petition, asking this Court to dismiss petitioners' motion for indirect contempt and instead to hold petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for gross breach of legal ethics. We deferred action on the contempt motion until the case is considered on the merits. On January 15, 1968. Intervenor I. V. Binamira filed an Answer to Supplemental Petition. This was followed on February 12, 1968, by another Petition for Contempt, this time against one Generoso L. Pacquiao for allegedly executing a perjured affidavit dated December 20, 1967, to aid intervenor I. V. Binamira to escape liability for his deliberate falsehoods, which affidavit intervenor attached to his Answer to Supplemental Petition. On the same date, February 12, 1968, petitioners filed against intervenor a Second Supplemental Petition for Contempt. On February 19, 1968, petitioners filed Petitioners' Manifestation Re Documentary Evidence Supporting Charges.We shall now consider the merits of the basic petition and the petitions for contempt.IThe rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be followed by counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the administrator to make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an action against him in his personal capacity, and not as administrator,1or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the court, after notice to all the heirs and interested parties, to direct the payment of his fees as expenses of administration.2Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other persons interested in the estate will have the right to inquire into the value, of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment. In the case at bar, petitioner filed his petition directly with the probate court.There is no question that the probate court acts as a trustee of the estate, and as such trustee it should jealously guard the estate under administration and see to it that it is wisely and economically administered and not dissipated.3This rule, however, does not authorize the court, in the discharge of its function as trustee of the estate, to act in a whimsical and capricious manner or to fix the amount of fees which a lawyer is entitled to without according to the latter opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his services. Opportunity of a party to be heard is admittedly the essence of procedural due process.What petitioners filed with the lower court was a motion forpartialpayment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 as lawyers for the executrix for the period February, 1963, up to the date of filing of the motion on or about November 18, 1965. Five of the seven heirs had manifested conformity to petitioners' motion, while the remaining two merely requested deferment of the resolution of the motion "until the total amount for Executrix's fees and attorney's fees of her counsel is agreed upon by all the heirs." The court, however, in spite of such conformity, and without affording petitioners the opportunity to establish how much attorney's fees they are entitled to for their entire legal services to the executrix, issued an order fixing at P20,000.00 theentireattorney's fees of petitioners.In his Order of January 12, 1967, respondent Judge explained:The records of this case are before the Court and the work rendered by Atty. Samuel Occea, within each given period, is easily visible from them; his work as revealed by those records is the factual basis for this Court's orders as to attorney's fees.Whatever attorney's fees may have been approved by the Court on October 28, 1965 were as a result of compromise and were with the written consent of all the heirs and of all the signatories of the compromise agreement of October 27, 1965. That is not so with respect to Atty. Occea's thirty-thousand peso claim for fees; and so, this Court, after a view of the record, had to fix it at P20,000.00. The record can reflect what an attorney of record has done.In fixing petitioners' attorney's fees solely on the basis of the records of the case, without allowing petitioners to adduce evidence to prove what is the proper amount of attorney's fees to which they are entitled for their entire legal services to the estate, respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion correctable bycertiorari. Evidently, such fees could not be adequately fixed on the basis of the record alone considering that there are other factors necessary in assessing the fee of a lawyer, such as: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the attorney; and (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.4It should be noted that some of the reasons submitted by petitioners in support of their fees do not appear in the records of the case. For instance, they claim that in connection with their legal services to the executrix and to the estate, petitioner Samuel C. Occea had been travelling from Davao to Tagbilaran from 1965 to March, 1967, and from Davao to Cebu and Manila from 1963 to March, 1967, and that in fact he and his family had to stay for almost a year in Dumaguete City. These claims apparently bear strongly on the labor, time and trouble involved in petitioners' legal undertaking, and, consequently, should have been subject to a formal judicial inquiry. Considering, furthermore, that two of the heirs have not given their conformity to petitioners' motion, the need for a hearing becomes doubly necessary. This is also the reason why at this stage it would be premature to grant petitioners' prayer for the release to them of the amount of P30,000.00 as partial payment of their fees.IIAs stated above, petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against intervenor I. V. Binamira charging the latter of having made false averments in this Court.We have carefully considered these charges and the answers of intervenor, and, on the basis of the evidence, We conclude that intervenor I. V. Binamira has deliberately made false allegations before this Court which tend to impede or obstruct the administration of justice, to wit:1. To bolster his claim that the executrix, without approval of the court, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc., intervenor submitted as Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition a so-called "Real Estate Mortgage" which he made to appear was signed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna and the executrix. The certification of the Deputy Clerk of Court (Annex A-Contempt) shows that what intervenor claims to be a duly executed mortgage is in reality only a proposed mortgage not even signed by the parties.2. Intervenor, in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition, also stated that in December, 1965, the executrix, without the court's approval or of the co-executor's consent, but with petitioners' consent, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc. out of the estate's funds. The record shows that only P50,000.00 was loaned to the company to protect the investment of the estate therein, and that the same was granted pursuant to a joint motion signed among others, by intervenor, and approved by the court.3. To discredit petitioner Samuel C. Occea and his wife, the executrix, intervenor stated in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that less than a month after the loan of P100,000.00 had been granted to the transportation company, petitioner Samuel C. Occea was elected president by directors of his own choosing in the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc., insinuating that in effect the executrix loaned to her husband the said sum of money. The certification of the corporate secretary of the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc. (Annex D-Contempt) states that petitioner Samuel C. Occea was not the president of the company at the time, nor did he act as president or treasurer thereof, and that the president was Atty. Vicente de la Serna. This last fact is also shown in intervenor's own Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition.4. In intervenor's Opposition to this petition forcertiorari, he stated that contrary to the executrix's statement in the 1965 income tax return of the estate that an estate "income of P90,770.05 was distributed among the heirs in 1965, there was in fact no such distribution of income. The executrix's project of partition (Annex E-Contempt) shows that there was a distribution of the 1965 income of the estate.5. To discredit petitioner and the executrix, intervenor alleged in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that petitioners caused to be filed with the court the executrix's verified inventory which failed to include as assets of the estate certain loans granted to petitioner Samuel C. Occea in the sum of P4,000.00 and to the executrix various sums totalling P6,000.00. The letters written by the late W. C. Ogan to his daughter, the executrix (Annexes F, G. and H-Contempt), show that the said sums totalling P10,000.00 were in reality partly given to her as a gift and partly for the payment of certain furniture and equipment.6. Intervenor, in Order to further discredit petitioners and the executrix, stated in his Reply to Executrix's and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration that the executrix and petitioners refused to pay and deliver to him all that he was entitled to under the compromise agreement. The receipt dated October 29, 1965, signed by intervenor himself (Annex I-Contempt), shows that he acknowledged receipt from petitioner Samuel C. Occea, lawyer for the executrix, the sum of P141,000.00 "in full payment of all claims and fees against the Estate, pursuant to the Agreement dated October 27, 1965."7. In his Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor alleged that he signed Atty. Occea's prepared receipt without receiving payment, trusting that Atty. Occea would pay the amount in full, but later Atty. Occea withheld Chartered Bank Check No. 55384 for P8,000.00 drawn in favor of intervenor and P15,000.00 in cash. A receipt signed by intervenor I. V. Binamira (Annex K-Contempt) shows that he acknowledged receipt of the check in question in the amount of P8,000-00 "intended for Mrs. Lila Ogan Castillo ... ." Anent the sum of P15,000.00 in cash, Annex J-Contempt (Reply to the Opposition for Authority to Annotate Interest, etc. filed by intervenor with the probate court) shows that intervenor, as movant, himself had alleged that "no check was issued to movant, but withdrawn amount of P15,000.00 was included in purchasing Manager's check No. 55398 for the Clerk of Court (deposit) for P75,000.00," for the said amount was voluntarily extended by intervenor as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part of the total cash bond of P75,000.00 deposited with the Clerk of Court, as shown by a receipt signed by Atty. Samuel C. Occea (Annex K-11-Contempt) which forms part of the record in the court below.8. In his intervenor's Comments and Counter-Petition, intervenor denied the truth of petitioners' claim that intervenor had voluntarily and willingly extended the sum of P15,000.00 as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part of the P75,000.00-deposit. In the Opposition to Motion of Executrix for Reconsideration of Order of February 19, 1966, dated April 16, 1966 (Annex K-2-Contempt), intervenor had, however, admitted that "out of the goodness of his heart ... in the nature of help," he had "willingly extended as a favor and gesture of goodwill" the said sum of P15,000.00.9. To impugn the claim of petitioner Samuel C. Occea that he stayed in Dumaguete City for almost one year to attend to the affairs of the estate, intervenor, in his intervenor's Opposition to Petition, alleged that said petitioner's stay in Dumaguete City was not to attend to the affairs of the estate, but to enable him to teach in Silliman University. The certification of the Director of the personnel office of Silliman University, dated December 4, 1967 (Annex V-Contempt) is, however, to the effect that their "records do not show that Atty. Samuel C. Occea was teaching at Silliman University or employed in any other capacity in 1963, or at any time before or after 1963."The foregoing are only some of the twenty-one instances cited by petitioners which clearly show that intervenor had deliberately made false allegations in his pleadings.We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring by dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to do so might work to the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his oath.The charges contained in the counter-petition for indirect contempt of intervenor I. V. Binamira against petitioners have not been substantiated by evidence, and they must, therefore, be dismissed.We note that no further action was taken on the petition for contempt filed by petitioners against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who executed the affidavit attached to intervenor's Answer to Supplemental Petition, the contents of which petitioners claim to be deliberate falsehoods. The said respondent Pacquiao not having been afforded an opportunity to defend himself against the contempt charge, the charge must be dismissed.WHEREFORE, (1) the petition forcertiorariis granted, and the courta quois directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the total attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to, and (2) Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby declared guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against intervenor.

G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ,petitioners,vs.MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III).CRUZ,J.:It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926,sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957,thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, orafter fourteen years,a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972.1The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge.2These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and lawyers.The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners.3The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto.4For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights forthirty one yearsbefore it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived fornineteen more yearsafter the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited anothertwelve years,or until 195 7, to file their petition for review.5While arguing that they were not guilty oflachesbecause the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-opening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied this remedybefore the decree is issued?6Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been registered and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?Thinking to support their position, the petitioners citeRivera v. Moran7where it was held:... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a literal interpretation,it may first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the Legislatureand that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such petitioners must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction andthere can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud.We therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38,supra, may be filedat any time the rendition of the court's decisionand before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration. (Emphasissupplied).A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty onedaysbut for thirty oneyears.Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."8There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.9This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again.10Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition.11Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of the land in dispute.One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79, Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO EUGENIO,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NBELLOSILLO,J.:On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court oncertiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.1On 20 November 1992 movant filed aMotion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Recorddated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial judge.2But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution.3On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed aMotion to Lift(Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City.4However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion.5On 1 December 1994 movant again filed anEx-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarmentalleging among others that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart."6His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his disbarment.7On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court reiterating hisEx-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarmentof 1 December 1994. Thus I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was merely following my instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished for it.Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for relief . . . .Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its canons . . . .8On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession.9On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter.10On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment.11The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that [T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . .12WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.SO ORDERED.

RE:SUSPENSION OF ATTY.ADM. CASE No. 7006ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMERSENIOR STATE PROSECUTORPresent:PUNO,C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO,GARCIA,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA, andREYES,JJ.Promulgated:October 9, 2007X ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ XDECISIONAZCUNA,J.:This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144,entitledPeople v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofSurigaoCity, Branch 29.Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order datedMarch 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to theEvidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide andnot the charge ofmurder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount ofBail Bond.Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case,objected thereto mainly on the groundthatthe original charge ofmurder,punishable withreclusion perpetua,was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[1]In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2]Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of themotion to fix the amount of bail bond bycounsel for the accused.The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan.In an Order datedNovember 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolvedtheMotion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond atP40,000.Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order datedNovember 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit inan Order datedFebruary 10, 2003.In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders datedNovember 12, 2002andFebruary 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in theAugust 18, 2003issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, reads:SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge inSurigaoCityfor allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based inSurigaoCityfor ruling on a motionthat sought a bailbond forLuisPlazawho stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .Plaza reportedly posted aP40-thousand bail bond.Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense.But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak.But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinasB[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong.B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.x x xBagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges ofcertiorariagainst the judge.Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance. he said.[3]In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in thearticle,Judge Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide.Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason.Judge Buyser, in an Order datedAugust 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article.He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.[4]Mr. Francisco clarified that in thestatement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase for an unclear reason, was added by the newspapers Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.[5]Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss.For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[6]The Courts Order datedSeptember 30, 2003reads:ORDERMr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine ofP10,000.Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail.The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond ofP100,000.00.SO ORDERD.[7]Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law.He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial courts disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 11[8]and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.[9]In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. onOctober 1, 2003.He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program.In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, anda dictator who does not accord due process to the people.The hearing for the second contempt charge was set onDecember 4, 2003.OnNovember, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.In an Order datedNovember 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion.It stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondentsactions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.On the scheduled hearing ofDecember 4, 2003respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the court of his absence.The trial court issuedanOrder dated December 4, 2003 cancellingthe hearing to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for, and orderedhim to appearon January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003.However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.OnJanuary 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents Answer datedJanuary 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS.He, however, stated that right after the hearing ofSeptember 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court.He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latters instance.He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right offreedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.OnFebruary 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00).Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.[10]The trial court found respondents denials to be lame as the tape of his interview onOctober 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:TONY CONSING:Fiscal,nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay anggamayng panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni.O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt?Or have you not changed your mind yet?)BAGABUYO:Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred.Thats it.)x x xBAGABUYO:Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami.Kada adlao nagatoon ako.Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ongjurisprudenceug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso ngadisbarmentniining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . .Angkini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-abogado.Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat ngaOrder,Ton, angiyang pagkabakakon. . . .(Thats true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time.I study everyday.I read new jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment case againstthis Judge who does notknow his law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . .This judge who is ignorant of the lawshould not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred.Just take a look at his Order, Ton, andsee what a liar he is. . . .)x x xBAGABUYO:Yes,nag-ingon ang iyangOrder. . . .Ngano nga nakaingon ako ngabakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konongorder given in open court,ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyangordersa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad ngaP100,000.00ngabail bond. . . .(Yes, his Order said that . . . .Why did I say that he is a liar?It states that this Order was given in open court, andin Godsmercy,he did not statethe amount ofP100,000.00asbailbond. . . .)BAGABUYO:Kaydilimanlagimahibalosabalaod,akosiyang gui-ingnan,Your Honor, I have the right to appeal.Mibalik dayon, ug miingon siya,BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.(Because he does not know the law, I said, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal.Then he came back and said, BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.)x x xBAGABUYO:. . .P100,000.00angiyangguipapiyansa.Naunsa na?Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagkagross ignorance of the law. . . .(He imposed a bail ofP100,000.00.How come?This is where you will seehis gross ignorance of the law. . . . )x x xTONY CONSING:Sokaron, unsayplanonimo karon?(So what is your plan now?)BAGABUYO:Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . .(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)x x xBAGABUYO:Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . .Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siyain fact at that time I said he is not conversantof the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law.In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .)x x xBAGABUYO:Ah, misit downsabako,contemptra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka baMr. Tan?Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador,no way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not accord me due process of law . . . .(I sat down. . . . Thats it. But what was his purpose?He made me come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP.For Gods sake, Mr. Tan, whats wrong with you, Mr. Tan?Please read the law.What is your thinking?That when you are a judge, you are also a dictator?No way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not accord me due process of law. . . .)TONY CONSING:Somopasaka kangdisbarment,malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan kini,with all this problemsa Korte Suprema.(So you are filing a disbarment case?We hope that this be given action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.)BAGABUYO:Dili ako mabalaka niana kayusakatruckang akongjurisprudence,nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . .Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw na,madjong ang iyang guitunan?(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench.But what law has he been reading?I heard that he is a mahjongaficionado(mahjongero) and that is why he is studying mahjong.[11]The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should notpromote distrust in the administration of justice.The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondentfrom the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[12]for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 27[13]of the same Rule.Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,[14]Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15]Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondents suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.In its Report dated January 4, 2006,the Office of the Bar Confidant found thatthe article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondents criticism of the trial courts Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS,both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation ofoath of office by respondent.It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.The Office of theBar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial courts order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that therepetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant.It has been reiterated inGonzagav. Villanueva, Jr.[16]that:A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney.Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance asan attorney for a party to a case withoutauthority to do so.The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.[17]Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.[18]Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others.Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order datedNovember 12, 2002allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled,Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigaojudge for allowing murder suspect to bail out,which appeared in theAugust 18, 2003issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.Respondents statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan.Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, thatas a mahjongaficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studyingthe law, and that he was a liar.Respondent alsoviolated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers.Montecillo v. Gica[19]held:It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude.As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken.Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyers Oath, for which he isSUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with aSTERNWARNINGthat the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.No costs.SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 288-J June 19, 1974GAUDENCIO S. URBINA and VEDASTO B. GESMUNDOcomplainants,vs.JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN,respondent.R E S O L U T I O NTEEHANKEE,J.:pAfter the Court's resolution of February 6, 1974 dismissing the complaint "for failure to make out aprima faciecase without prejudice to respondent's filing a separate administrative complaint for unwarranted harassment against complainant Atty. Vedasto B. Gesmundo as sought in respondent's comment," there were belatedly reported to the Court (a) the verified Joint motion for suspension and/or to declare respondent and Atty. Marcial Esguerra in contempt of court" filed by complainant Gaudencio S. Urbina on December 27, 1973 for allegedly having made through said complainant's former counsel, Atty. Marcial Esguerra, grave threats against complainant's life if he (complainant) did not withdraw his complaints against respondent*and (b) the 1st Indorsement dated December 5, 1973 and received on January 9, 1974 of Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora of the Office of the President referring for comment complainant Gesmundo's letter of October 31, 1973 submitting his "objection to re-appointment" of respondent judge, both of which were referred to respondent for comment as per the Court's resolution