ENHANCING COOPERATION THROUGH SYSTEMS THINKING: A CASE...

ENHANCING COOPERATION THROUGH SYSTEMS THINKING: A CASE STUDY OF ECUADOR’S NORTHERN BORDER

CAPSTONE THESIS

FALL 2013

BY XIMENA MICHELLE LEPPERT

CAPSTONE THESIS-‐ FALL 2013-‐ XIMENA MICHELLE LEPPERT

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………….3 CHAPTER ONE-NATURE OF THE CONFLICT 1.1.Background…………………………………………………………………………………....4 1.2. Issues and Goals………………………………………………………………………………9 1.3. Conflict Map………………………………………………………………………………...10 1.4. Actors………………………………………………………………………………………..10 1.5. Structures……………………………………………………………………………………13 1.6. Dynamics……………………………………………………………………………………15 1.7. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………………18 1.8. Existing Frameworks………………………………………………………………………..23 1.9. Re-framing the research question, leading to data collection, analysis, and interpretation…24 CHAPTER TWO- DATA 2.1. Methodology………………………………………………………………………………...26 2.2. Data Collection……………………………………………………………………………...26 2.3. Data Analysis………………………………………………………………………………..34 2.4. Data Interpretation…………………………………………………………………………..39 2.5. Bridge to Intervention Strategies……………………………………………………………48 CHAPTER THREE- RESOLUTION STRATEGIES 3.1. Relevant needs from conflict analysis………………………………………………………49 3.2. Overview of intervention strategies…………………………………………………………50 3.3. Needs………………………………………………………………………………………..52 3.4. Potential consequences from intervention strategy…………………………………………59 3.5. Capacity Building…………………………………………………………………………...59 CHAPTER FOUR- NETWORKING AND SUSTAINABILITY 4.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….60 4.2. The Network………………………………………………………………………………...62 4.3. The intervention and challenges for sustainability………………………………………….64 4.4. Strategies for sustainability………………………………………………………………….66 CHAPTER 5- CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………..70 APPENDIX……………………………………………………………………………………....72 REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………………..74


3

ABSTRACT

Research topic- Existing cooperative efforts and communication patterns among non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) that share an area of focus and work in highly violent

environments.

Research question- How has cooperation among NGOs working with youth groups in Ecuador’s

northern border contributed to the de-escalation of violence in the area?

Participants- Three NGOs working in Ecuador’s northern border.

Methods- The following research will use a Multiple Case Study methodology. The data will be

collected through semi-structured interviews and the review of public documentation. The

information collected from the interviews will be recorded, transcribed as well as coded.

Data analysis and Interpretation- The data will be analyzed and interpreted through four

theories: Social Interdependence Theory, Cooperation and Competition Theory, Dynamical

Systems Theory, and Coordinated Management of Meaning; as well as three frameworks: Dual

Concerns Model, LUUUUTT Model, and Communications Model.

Conclusions- The purpose of conducting this research was to learn about the levels of

cooperation among NGOs in conflict areas and whether cooperation helped decrease levels of

violence. Also, to identify positive practices being implemented as well as to develop sustainable

recommendations.

Keywords- Cooperation, competition, communication, networking, relationships, security,

community, trust, and sustainability.


4

CHAPTER ONE- NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

1.1. Background From the beginning of the 1900’s, Colombia has experienced a constant increase of social

inequality and political polarization that has subsequently led to the creation of several grassroots

guerrilla movements. According to Maria Clemencia Ramírez, author of the book Between the

Guerrillas and the State: The Cocalero Movement, Citizenship, and Identity in the Colombian

Amazon, the development and escalation of Colombia’s present intractable conflict took place in

three main periods. The first period came about early 1900’s to late 1930’s where many farmers

from the Andean region, migrated to the southern border of Colombia with the desire of owning

their own land and having a better future (Ramírez, 2011). At the time, the southern border of

Colombia constituted a vast area of Amazon forest that was yet to be developed. Many people

moved toward this area when the existence of a significant rubber reserve was discovered

(Ramírez, 2011). The majority of new settlers did not have legal ownership over the land they

were exploiting; nevertheless they established permanent residence in the area. Consequently,

the lack of legality coupled with the limited physical access to the region made the newcomers

ultimately feel abandoned by the government (Ramírez, 2011). As a result, the settlers took lead

over the “management” of these territories. In addition, Ramírez believes that the “constructed

horror of the jungle, of savagery and cannibalism, and its related imagery led the colonizers

during the rubber boom of the early twentieth century to ascribe these characteristics to

Putumayo [one of Colombia’s southern provinces] and to create a space of death, terror, and

cruelty” (Ramírez, 2011, pp.25). The communities ended up perceiving themselves as an

independent territory, becoming adamant toward the central government’s effectiveness and

mostly resented it (Ramírez, 2011). Although there wasn’t an evident up-rise during this first


5

period, the feeling of resentment and depravation born during this period ultimately contributed

to the creation of guerrilla movements in the late 1950’s.

The second period took place between 1930 and 1958. This term was characterized by

violent confrontations steered by the competition for power among the liberal and conservative

political parties in Bogotá. During most of the 1930’s the country was ran by the liberal party

with the support and protection of the police (Román, 2005). José Gallardo Román, in his book

El Plan Colombia y sus efectos sobre el Ecuador recounts how the police department was

formed by each presidency rather than being an independent institution. For this reason, the

police had a strong political alliance with whoever was in power. As a consequence, a citizen

with a public political affiliation whose party was not leading the state constantly lived in fear,

given that the police did not represent a neutral entity looking out for the wellbeing of the

civilian population. It was only in 1940, when the police became an independent non-affiliated

institution (Román, 2005). In 1946, the liberal rule came to an end with the victory of the

conservative candidate Mariano Ospina Pérez. A year after his victory, the liberal party began to

encourage civilians to protest against the government, as they believed that Ospina’s head offices

could be held accountable for some financial inconsistencies’ (Román, 2005). According to

Román’s recount of history, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán one of Ospina’s liberal opponents during

presidential elections began lobbying against him through weekly speeches in popular public

spaces. After several months of rallying, Gaitán was killed on April 9th, 1948. Given that he was

a prominent figure for the working class who easily identified with his discourse, his death called

for their revolt (Román, 2005). Many believed the opposition was involved in the conspiracy of

his assassination. The police provided civilians with weapons while the military protected the

government (Román, 2005). Finally, in 1949 after much turmoil Laureano Gómez from the


6

conservative party was elected president (Román, 2005). Although confrontations decreased,

both parties created their own-armed groups in case of future riots. Ramírez narrates that “during

the 1940s the persecuted Liberal families began to form armed self-defense groups called

cuadrillas. In 1949, in Tolima, the Communist Party also armed campesinos [farmers] self-

defense groups to resist Conservative persecution. These became mobile guerrilla units known as

marching columns (columnas de marcha)” (Ramírez, 2011, pp.38). On the other hand, the

conservative armed-groups were called the “pájaros” which translated to English would mean

“birds” (Román, 2005, pp.64).

After four years of conservative rule, the only solution to the continuous deaths from both

parties’ followers was a military dictatorship. In 1953, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla became

Colombia’s president. Considering he had no political affiliation, he was able to establish

neutral grounds amongst both parties’. People were so confident of the peace his election

brought, that armed groups began to give up their arms and hand them to the government

(Román, 2005). Rojas Pinilla was able to uphold three steady years of governance. In 1957, he

was taken of power because his behavior showed some lenience towards populist groups

(Román, 2005). The rest of his presidential term was lead by a military insurrectionary force.

The end to the second period of Colombia’s conflicted history came about with the creation of

the Frente Nacional (Román, 2005). The Frente Nacional was an agreement between the liberal

and conservative parties to take turns in ruling the country. This meant that every four years they

would switch presidents accordingly (Román, 2005). This agreement was effective until 1974.

The third period took place at the beginning of the 1970’s and has lasted to present days.

Towards the end of the Frente Nacional agreement, although no major violent interactions had

taken place, two guerrilla movements had been established: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de


7

Colombia (FARC), and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (Román, 2005). The first group

served the purpose of making the voices of farmers’ in the southern border of Colombia heard by

the central government and congress (Ramírez, 2005). The second group, advocated for the

interests of communist followers. Eventually, FARC had members in congress as well as in

multiple government entities around the country. According to Ramírez, FARC’s legitimacy

grew due their constant presence in rural areas. As narrated on the first paragraph of this section,

some settlers or farmers in the southern border of Colombia had felt abandoned by the

government; therefore when FARC arrived and fulfilled duties similar to those a government

should, they gained credibility.

Just like the rubber boom in early 1900’s, in 1978 the product that took over farmer’s land in the

southern border was Coca (Ramírez, 2011). The production of Coca in this area was lead by the

Medellín drug cartel (Ramírez, 2011). Farmers once they got involved were abused and only

paid in drugs. The goal of paying them with drugs according to Ramírez was to create

dependency. They were forced to develop an addiction and when they had, in order to earn more

they were obligated to continue working for the cartel. It is said that FARC, used its power in the

region to impose a tax on the drug-lords and demand for farmers not to be paid with drugs; in

return FARC offered armed protection to the cartel (Ramírez, 2011). From the research done it is

unclear were the taxes collected by FARC were invested on. Nevertheless civilians trusted

FARC since it was protecting them from the fear and violent treatment imposed by the cartel. In

1987 the drug cartel developed its own paramilitary group known as “Los Combos” (Ramírez,

2011, pp.45). This action defied the agreement the cartel had with FARC and as a consequence a

war erupted amongst the two parties. As a sequel to this rebellious act by the drug cartel, FARC

began a series of kidnappings of family members of the Medellín cartel. In addition, civilians in


8

the area began to live in fear, they either became victims of the open fire between the two parties

or they were thought to be FARC allies and therefore were abused.

In 2000, the Colombian government in alliance with the United States government launched

Plan Colombia. The objective of this plan had several components: generate new employment

opportunities in order for farmer’s to stop growing Coca, inform civilians on human right

violation laws, start negotiation processes with rebel groups, as well as combat drug trafficking

(Román, 2005, pp.122-124). For its implementation, the Colombian government trained a

specific group of military forces to be placed in the area and started fumigating visible Coca

crops from the air. Joanne Sum-Ping in her article A New Approach to Extraterritorial

Application of Environmental Statutes?: Uncovering the Effects of Plan Colombia, points out

that although fumigations may have decreased the production of Coca in Colombia, many

producers have chosen to start new Coca fields in Peru and Bolivia (Sum-Ping, 2006). In

addition, Sum-Ping brings attention to the fact that as long as farmers are not offered a decent

substitute to growing Coca the drug conflict in Colombia will have difficulties finding a long-

term solution (Sum-Ping, 2006). Another outcome from this intervention has been the

tremendous displacement of civilians within the Colombia territory and across its borders. Tanya

Korvkin in her article The Colombian War and ‘Invisible’ Refugees in Ecuador states that,

“between 1999 and 2006, approximately two million people-facing recurrent massacres, forced recruitment by the irregular armed forces, and aerial fumigation by the Colombian military- were displaced within the Colombian borders. Additionally, an unknown number of civilians fled to neighboring countries. Accordito UNHCR, the number of Colombian applications for asylum in Ecuador increased from less than 500 in 2000 to nearly 30,000 four years later” (Korovkin, 2008, pp.324).

Since the implementation of Plan Colombia, UNHCR has been working on the border Ecuador

shares with Colombia with the purpose of protecting the rights of people who have fled their

homes and crossed to Ecuador. Multiple peace building NGOs have established offices in the


9

area with the objective of creating development projects that bring stability to both refugees and

their hosting communities. The objective of this multiple case study is to research how has

cooperation among NGOs working with youth groups in Ecuador’s northern border with

Colombia contributed to the de-escalation of violence in the area. There will be three NGOs

participating of the research.

1.2. Issues and goals

Issues Goals Lack of law enforcement and funding from Colombia’s central government for the southern region between 1900 to 1990’s

Identify and understand how people living in the area perceived the role of the central government to be and what they felt they should have received from it. Also, understand how the lack of law enforcement let to unrest and other factors.

Establishment of the Medellín Cartel in the area

Understand the structure, impact, and role of the institution. Identify strategies to develop new viable and long-term income alternatives for farmers not to depend on Coca production.

Confrontations between FARC and drug cartel in the 1980’s

Learn more about the present interests both actors have for staying in the area and identify ways in which their power over the territory could be decreased.

Implementation of Plan Colombia Learn more about the effects the plan has had on the ground and identify points of improvement in order to decrease the negative impact its execution has had on civilians.


10

1.3. Conflict Map

1.4. Actors

Primary Actors

A primary actor is someone who is “directly involved and experience direct impact of the

conflict” (Fisher-Yoshida, 2013, pp.14). The conflict map in section 1.3 was able to identify ten

primary actors based on the history provided by the conflict’s background information. Each of

the primary actors became engaged in the conflict during the span of three different time periods

in Colombia’s history. Being aware of these stages of Colombia’s history helps understand the

conflict’s escalation to present days. The first period, represented on the map by the light green

vertical rectangle, took place between the 1900’s and 1930’s. During this time, farmers from the

Andean region migrated to the southern border of Colombia in search of better opportunities

(Ramírez, 2011). They are considered primary actors because although they settled on the region

Refugeess influx on Ecuador's border with Colombia

Refugees

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)

Civilians

Medellin CartelFarmers/ Settlers

Ecuador's central government

United States central government

Military

Cuadrillas (liberal party guerrila)

Columnas de Marcha (communist guerrila)

Pajaros (Conservative party guerrilla)

Jorge Eliecer Gaitan

UNHCR

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Drug Industry DemandIncome PyramidWeak law enforcement

Refugee LawsEcuadorian vs. Colombia

Political parties-Liberals vs.Conservatives(Competition, rivalry, and corruption)

Human Rights organizations Media

United Nations

Ecuadorian Military

Plan Colombia

Colombia's central government

Frente Nacional

Primary Actors

Secondary Actors

Economic Structures

Political Structures

Social Structures

Security Structures

Reinforcing feedback loops Inhibiting feedback loops

Communities Culture

EducationEconomic SecurityPsychological and emotional security

Police


11

for the rubber boom, their following generations either became involved in the production of

Coca or they became victims of the Medellin Cartel and the Plan Colombia (Ramírez, 2011;

Sum-Ping, 2006). Similarly, the Colombian central government’s involvement in the conflict

emerged during the first period and remained present until today. During the first period, the

inactions of the central government in the region contributed directly to the escalation of the

farmers’ resentment and feelings of rebellion (Ramírez, 2011). On the second period, the central

government was present due to its evident political instability caused by rivalry among the liberal

and conservative parties’, which consequently contributed to the development of guerrilla

movements (Ramírez, 2011). Finally, the central government has remained a primary actor on

the third period of conflict escalation given that it is the actor who approved and supervised the

implementation of Plan Colombia (Román, 2005).

The second period in history that contributed to the escalation of the conflict being

analyzed, took place between 1930 and 1958. This period is represented by the green rectangle

situated in the middle of the conflict map. During this time four additional primary actors

emerged as a result of the political turmoil between liberals and conservatives: Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Medellín Cartel, the police, and civilians. During this

period, the Medellin Cartel had moved its Coca production to the southern border of Colombia,

which consequently had a negative impact on civilians as they were abused while working at the

Cartel’s plantations. As a result, the FARC offered armed protection for the Cartel in exchange

of a tax charge and a better treatment of the Cartel’s employees (Ramírez, 2011). The police on

the other hand was politically led rather than being an independent institution (Román, 2005). As

a result it was biased when choosing whom to protect.


12

The third stage of the conflict’s intensification is represented by the dark green rectangle

on the right side of the conflict map. During this period, six additional primary actors were

immediately engrossed in the conflict: the US central government, the Colombian military,

Colombian refugees, Ecuador’s central government, UNHCR, and multiple non-governmental

organizations. The United States in an attempt to reduce the influx of drugs coming into the

country, found the Plan Colombia to be a great strategy to counteract the war on drugs (Sum-

Ping, 2006). The Colombian military, was a key actor for the law enforcement factor proposed in

the Plan Colombia. As a result, confrontation erupted between FARC, the Medellin Cartel, and

the military among others. Settlers were forced to flee the area in order to escape violence, many

becoming refugees in Ecuadorian territory. The Ecuadorian government reached out to the

United Nations refugee agency for aid (Korovkin, 2008). Once UNHCR became involved other

NGOs opened offices on the border as well.

Secondary Actors

Secondary actors are “indirectly involved and experience indirect impact” (Fisher-

Yoshida, 2013, pp.14). On the conflict map, there are five secondary actors that have been

recognized. All of them pertain to the second period of conflict escalation referred to in the

background section. Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was a political figure that represented the liberal party.

His death triggered an open fire confrontation between conservatives and liberals known as “the

Bogotazo”(Román, 2005, pp.57). This event gave birth to the first guerrilla movements: the

“Cuadrillas”, “Columnas de Marcha”, and the “Pájaros” (Ramírez, 2011, pp.38; Román, 2005,

pp.64). These groups throughout the 1950’s became more organized, gained credibility in rural

areas and eventually formed guerrilla movements that continue to be active: Ejército de


13

Liberacion Nacional (ELN) and FARC. These five actors are not directly involved in the conflict

being analyzed, however, their actions contributed to its present complexity.

1.5. Structures

Structures are “institutions and systems in place […][that] have an influence on the

creation, perpetuation, escalation and resolution of the conflict” (Fisher-Yoshida, 2013, pp.15).

There are four types of structures: Economic, Political, Social, and Security. On the conflict map

they are represented by a hexagon. The light blue hexagons represent the economic structures,

the purple hexagons represent the political structures, the green hexagons represents the social

structures, and the light pink hexagons represent the security structures. The following chart

describes the structures that have been identified on the conflict map and what their influence is

in regards to the influx of refugee’s on Ecuador’s northern border.


14

Structures Institutions or Systems

Influence

Income Pyramid

The income and class disparity from the early 1900’s contributed to the creation of the conflict as farmer’s felt the need to migrate from the highlands to the southern border with the purpose of finding better opportunities. Once settled, they continued to feel abandoned by the central government and as a consequence steered a rebellious interaction as their modus operandi. (Ramírez, 2011).

Economic

Drug Industry

The success of the drug industry has helped perpetuate the conflict as the cartel and informal farmers will continue to do whatever they can to keep up the production. This in return, will cause civilians to continue migrating their homes in search of safety. (Sum-Ping, 2006).

Political Parties

Colombia’s government from the 1930’s on has been a victim of the destructive competition among the liberal and conservative parties’. The government’s political instability has helped escalate the conflict by creating their own guerrilla movements during the 1940’s in order to be able to compete amongst each other physically rather than through elections (Ramírez, 2011; Román, 2005).

Weak law enforcement

The sporadic presence of police or military in the southern border of Colombia may have allowed guerrilla movements and the drug cartel to claim ownership of the area.

Frente Nacional

The Frente Nacional agreement may have allowed the conflict to de-escalate for a long period of time allowing Colombia to improve its government capabilities (Román, 2005).

Political

Refugee Laws

There is still further research to fulfill, however, maybe there are discrepancies between Ecuador and Colombia’s refugee laws, or the unorganized influx of Colombian citizens to Ecuador can be a source for conflict creation.

Human Rights organizations

These organizations usually pressure governments and international agencies to take action, this in return can potentially help de-escalate conflict as it pushes for the involvement of the United Nations.

United Nations

UNHCR has been involved in protecting the rights of humans who become refugees, offering them opportunities to re-insert themselves in society. Their efforts may have contained the conflict, however, there is still work to do among refugees and the host communities.

Media This institution can either help the conflict to escalate or de-escalate it really depends on the source’s intention and purpose.

Social

Communities Communities are being broken within Colombia due to the migration of people to safer areas while communities in Ecuador


15

are becoming host communities to refugees. Both groups are experiencing change. The host communities’ have perceived this change as negative since it has broken the traditional dynamics of the original group and it has created tension between old and new settlers.

Culture The fluidity on the border between Colombia and Ecuador can be perceived as an enhancement of the cultures communities in the area, or as a threat to communities who are very protective of their values and traditions.

Education The fluidity of people and influx of refugees to Ecuador has had an impact on the education structure given that the demand for education may exceed the capacity of school availability or new comers, given their situation, have lost tremendous amounts of school time.

Plan Colombia

Although its initial objective it is believed to have included a holistic approach to the conflict, the conflict map shows its implementation has helped it escalate (Román, 2005).

Ecuadorian Military

Depending on the levels of communication among the Ecuadorian military and the Colombia military, this structure can either help de-escalate or escalate the conflict.

Economic The farmers in the southern border had no long-term economic security which led them to work for the drug cartel or become coca farmers themselves (Ramírez, 2011).

Security

Psychological and Emotional

Feeling neglected on the early years of settling in the southern border and having been abused by the drug industry civilians in the area have low to no psychological and emotional security.

1.6. Dynamics

Dynamics refer to the “relationships amongst actors and between the actors and

structures” (Fisher-Yoshida, 2013, pp.16). The conflict map in section 1.3 was elaborated

following the mapping proposed by the Attractors Landscape Model (ALM), developed by Peter

T. Coleman. Coleman suggests intractable conflicts should be portrayed as landscapes, were the

deep and shallow valleys represent negative interactions between the parties involved and the

shallow and wide valleys represent positive interactions (Coleman, 2011). A conflict, usually

nests in the deep and narrow valleys and is fed by negative interactions that make it hard for the

conflict to shift toward a shallow and wide valley (Coleman, 2001). On a conflict map, these


16

negative interactions or relationships are depicted as “reinforcing feedback loops” while positive

relationships or influences are represented through “inhibiting feedback loops” (Coleman, 2011,

pp.125). On the conflict map in section 1.3, reinforcing feedback loops are represented through a

continuous arrow while inhibiting feedback loops are represented through a doted arrow.

As shown by the map, the conflict at hand is flooded by reinforcing feedback loops which help

us understand visually the complexity of the conflict. The counteractive relationship among the

political parties structures and the Colombian government fueled the establishment and

strengthened the following secondary actors: Cuadrillas, Columnas de Marcha, and the Pájaros.

These three secondary actors were the first resemblance to a guerrilla movement in Colombia.

Their founding served as a trickling effect for the creation of more institutionalized guerrilla

movements such as the FARC and ELN. Their relationships are also portrayed on the map with

reinforcing feedback loops.

In addition, the weak law enforcement structure allowed for the Colombian government and its

political parties to develop competitive and corrupt relationships rather than encouraging a

peaceful coexistence. The weak law enforcement structure also benefited the Medellín Cartel.

Given that there was little governmental or military presence in the southern territory of

Colombia, it was easy to take over the area elections (Ramírez, 2011). As previously described,

the political parties structure and the weak law enforcement structure are the most influential in

the gradual intensification of the conflict. Therefore, both structures are represented by larger

hexagons on the conflict map. The only inhibiting feedback loop connected to either structure

come from the Frente Nacional structure, a system developed in the 1950’s by both parties in an

attempt to respect each other (Román, 2005).


17

Also from an economical perspective, the evident income disparity amongst citizens broke any

possibility of building a positive government-civilian relationship. Consequently, their

association is also represented on the map by a reinforcing feedback loop. Moreover, the drug

industry took advantage of the poor class vulnerability by making Coca production look

advantageous to farmers. To top that of, the once seemingly positive economic relationship

between the FARC and the Cartel did not endure and violence in the area broke out (Ramírez,

2011). As a result, the Colombian government institutionalized the Plan Colombia represented

on the map as a security structure. Although this plan had a holistic approach to solve the conflict

in Colombia’s southern border, it had a negative impact on innocent people who became

refugees (Román, 2005). Therefore their relationship is also represented by a reinforcing

feedback loop. Meanwhile, in regards to decreasing the FARC and the Medellín Cartel’s

negative impact many claim the plan has been successful and therefore their relationships are

represented by an inhibiting feedback loop. The initial political instability and afterwards the

violent environment fostered by the drug industry not only impacted negatively the economic

security of civilians but most importantly their psychological and emotional security, as show in

the map by the security structures.

As for the social structures, the Unites Nations through UNHCR and the Human Rights

organizations have strong relationship with refugees as they have brought light to the issue as

well as tangible aid. As a consequence, they are both linked with an inhibiting feedback loop. In

regards to the relationship amongst NGOs and UNHCR it has been depicted by both a

reinforcing feedback loop and an inhibiting feedback loop because it is unknown whether they

have cooperated or competed with one another. Therefore, they can either contribute to the de-

escalation of the conflict or otherwise. As for the media structure, this has had a positive impact


18

in regards to making the issue known internationally, hence the inhibiting feedback loop on the

map. Nevertheless, the media also tackled the Plan Colombia from a very disapproving

perspective, reason why their relationship is depicted by a reinforcing feedback loop.

Meanwhile, the communities’ social structure has been impacted negatively by the influx of

refugees on Ecuador’s northern border. The host communities have perceived their arrival as a

threat, reason why their relationship has been represented by a reinforcing feedback loop.

Similarly, their arrival has impacted both groups’ cultures. They both fear they will loose their

values and traditions if they incorporate the others in their daily life. Therefore the relationship

amongst the communities’ structure and the cultures structure is depicted by a both-way

reinforcing feedback loop. Finally, the influx of refugees has also negatively impacted the

education structure. The reinforcing feedback loop connecting both represents the over flooding

demand for schools in the area and lack of assistance for children and adolescents who have lost

significant amounts of schooling.

The relationships discussed among the structures and actors are a depiction of the conflict

presently. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge these relationships are fluid and therefore

are constantly changing.

1.7. Literature Review

This multiple case study’s purpose is to learn if cooperation amongst non-governmental

organizations working with youth-refugees in the border between Ecuador and Colombia, have

contributed to the de-escalation of violence in the area. Taking into consideration the conflict’s

background, its complex dynamics, and the multiplicity of perspectives, it is necessary to analyze

the acquired information through multiple academic theoretical lenses. Bearing in mind that the

study’s focus is on the relationship between NGOs present in the conflicted area, it is necessary


19

to have a clear grasp of the levels of interdependence amongst each other. By studying the NGOs

levels of interdependence, the research will be able to learn how and why the NGOs are choosing

to compete or cooperate amongst each other and the outcome of their style of interaction on the

ground. With the objective of having a comprehensive understanding of the NGOs interaction,

the study will also focus on their interagency communication styles to learn about the practices

that encourage a healthy interaction and the practices that fuel a competitive relationship. Having

vast knowledge of their relationship and communication styles will allow other NGOs to

replicate possible good practices as well as recommend possible improvements. Finally, by

implementing an escalation and de-escalation lenses to the conflict, the study will be able to

learn how the relationships among NGOs contribute toward the conflict’s improvement or

otherwise.

Interdependence

For the interpretation of interdependence this study will analyze the data collected

through the lenses of Social Interdependence Theory, initially elaborated by Morton Deutsch and

further developed by David W. Johnson. This theory proposes two types of interdependence:

positive and negative. According to Deutsch,

“Positive interdependence exists when there is a positive correlation among individuals’ goal attainments; individuals perceive that they can attain their goals if, and only if, the other individuals with whom they are cooperatively linked attain their goals. Negative interdependence exists when there is a negative correlation among individuals’ goal achievement; individuals perceive that they can obtain their goals if and only if the other individuals with whom they are competitively linked fail to obtain their goals” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.288-289).

Individuals who depend on others to achieve their goals will opt for “effective” actions among

each other while those who know they can obtain the goal on their own will prefer “bungling”

actions (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.289). Generally, Deutsch believes that effective actions


20

are portrayed through “positive cathexis”, “substitutability”, and “inducibility” (Johnson and

Johnson, 2005, pp.289). On the other hand, bungling actions are depicted by “negative cathexis”,

“nonsubstitutability”, and “resitance” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.289). This eventually will

lead toward cooperative or competitive interactions amongst the parties involved. However, the

theory does not specify whether there is a range between positive interdependence and negative

interdependence where individuals can be in constant fluctuation.

In practice, Social Interdependence Theory has been used to improve the dynamics in the

education system, within and amongst organizations. Research focused on the business realm,

according to Johnson, has promoted the theory to further study about “the clarification of the

relationship between cooperation and power, the clarification of the relationship between

cooperation and conflict, the acknowledgement of the existence of multiple goals, the

consideration of the impact of cultural values on cooperation within organizations, and the use of

group-based reward system” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.333-334). The data collected from

the three NGOs interviewed by this study will also be analyzed through the above classifications.

In addition, when analyzing data through theory it is important to take into account the theory’s

limitations. The most relevant weaknesses to remember when implementing this Social

Interdependence Theory are the following: there are no correlation studies in regards to whether

a type of interdependence will stimulate specific actions and therefore outcomes; there is a lack

of research in regards to the outcomes the “psychological processes” proposed by Deutsch have

when coupled with multiple variables; more focus has been granted to effective actions rather

than bungling, and finally it is necessary to break down the assumption that individuals have

only one goal (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.340-341). Having a clear understanding of the


21

theory’s limitations will help shed light on what the theory is capable of doing and where it

should be supported by additional methodologies.

Cooperation and Competition

Similarly, the Theory of Cooperation and Competition branches out from the Social

Interdependence Theory, also developed by Morton Deutsch and further enriched by David W.

Johnson. This theory considers that positive interdependence leads to cooperative relationships

while negative interdependence is inclined to creating competitive interactions (Deutsch, M.,

2006). Its research sheds more detail in regards to the characteristics necessary for both

approaches to develop. For example, in order to lay the foundations for cooperation the

following characteristic should be present: a clear communication, an openness to helping your

teammates, having equal responsibilities among group members, a sense of feeling heard and

respected, active listening, being open to sharing knowledge, and sharing a mutual goal

(Deutsch, M., 2006). If none of the above characteristics are in place, individuals most

commonly would resort to a competitive strategy. As a result, individuals easily fall into difficult

situations.

Interagency Communication Styles

The theme of interagency communication will be analyzed through the Coordinated

Management of Meaning (CMM) Theory initially developed by Barnett Pearce and Vernon

Cronen. CMM purpose is grounded on making sense of peoples’ interactions, it “explicates the

fact that, as social beings, we are always in relationship with others, either in the actual moment

or in the way that our ‘internal voices’ are shaped by the social world. Our relationships are

complex, and all interaction is a striving for coordination with others” (Creede, Fisher-Yoshida,

and Gallegos, 2012, pp.25). The theory follows three principles: coherence, coordination, and


22

mystery. Coherence refers to the need for individuals to understand other people through their

own worldviews. To do so you need to be able to coordinate your ideas and thoughts. The

principle of coordination helps you order your viewpoints, own them as well as understand there

are other perspectives that should be taken into consideration (Creede, Fisher-Yoshida, and

Gallegos, 2012). There is no necessity of categorizing whether one perspective is better than the

other rather CMM encourages you to embrace the differences. The principle of mystery, suggests

for individuals to be happy with uncertainty and develop flexibility when incompatibilities are

found among individuals (Creede, Fisher-Yoshida, and Gallegos, 2012). CMM is a state of mind

that is developed through practice and can be applied with any human interactions. In practice,

CMM has been incorporated in organizational development trainings, in spiritual exercises,

among others (Creede, Fisher-Yoshida, and Gallegos, 2012). A good example of CMM in

practice is the one shared by Barnett Pearce and Kimberly A. Pearce on their article Extending

the Theory of the Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) Through a Community Dialogue

Process. They implemented CMM on a community based dialogue project whose aim was to

reshape communication styles, and understand more so than reach concrete solutions to the

ethnic tensions present in a highly diverse community. More so than limitations, it is important

to keep in mind that CMM will help gather a comprehensive view of the relationship patterns

amongst the NGOs being interviewed rather than reach cause and effect conclusions.

Conflict escalation and de-escalation

Lastly, the fluctuation between escalation and de-escalation of the conflict at hand will be

analyzed through the Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). This theory believes conflict should not

be analyzed as linear but rather as fluid and multi-leveled. The theory suggests conflict should be

depicted within a mountainous landscape where conflict lies on the deep and narrow valleys


23

(Coleman, 2011). In addition, it suggest conflict is fueled or deflected by “attractors”, “a subset

of potential states or patterns of change to which a system’s behavior converges over time”

(Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, and Wrzosinska, forthcoming, pp.264-265). The stronger an

attractor is the more difficult it becomes for the conflict to shift toward a positive environment

represented by shallow and wide valleys (Coleman, 2011). DST believes the conflicts

complexity should be well understood before trying to simplify an issue (Coleman, 2011).

Having an easy grasp of the conflicts complexity, would allow researchers to recognize actions

that may deflect the attractors intensity. Therefore, this theory will be used not only to develop

the conflict map on section 1.3. but also to identify positive practices used amongst the NGOs

being interview that are contributing to the de-escalation of conflict.

1.8. Existing frameworks

The following frameworks will support this multiple case study: Communications Model

(Fisher-Yoshida, 2012), Dual Concerns Model (Pruitt and Kim, 2004), and the LUUUUTT

Model (Creede, Fisher-Yoshida, Gallegos, 2012). The Communications Model, states that for

individuals to have a successful communication with others they should know themselves, be

aware of others, the context of their relationship, and the culture surrounding them (Fisher-

Yoshida, 2013-06-26). Applying this framework to this study will helps the study to learn how

each NGO sees themselves, the others around them, the context in which they are in, the culture

of their organization and the culture of the community they are living in. This exercise will allow

the research to learn about the levels of awareness each party has when communicating with one

another.

The Dual Concern Model, proposes that an individual or group will cooperate or compete

depending on how high or low is their concern of fulfilling their own outcome versus their need


24

of fulfilling their own interests (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). The model states the following: if a party

has a high concern for other and low concern for self it would prefer to “yield” from its

preferences; if a party has low concern for other and low concern for self it would “avoid” the

conflict completely; if party has low concern for other and high concern for self it would choose

a “contending” approach to solving the conflict; finally if the party has high concern for other

and self it would address the conflict from a “problem solving approach” (Pruitt and Kim, 2004,

pp.40-41). Aside from the theories chosen for the data analysis section of this study, the dual

concern model framework will allow us to pinpoint themes or repetitive language choices that

may be representative of one or several of the four preferences proposed by the model for each

of the NGOs interview.

CMM theory In order to enhance understanding developed four models for analyzing

information: Daisy Model, Hierarchy Model, LUUUUTT Model, and the Serpentine Model. The

LUUUUTT Model stands for “stories Lived”, “stories Untold”, “stories Unheard”, “stories

Unknown”, “stories Untellable”, “stories Told”, and “story Telling” (Creede, Fisher-Yoshida,

Gallegos, 2012, pp.34). It is a tool that will help unveil and understand the multiplicity of stories

and the different perspectives the parties involved in a story may have. This model will help

understand the views each of the parties participating in this research have in regards to the story

of their relationships.

1.9. Re-framing the research question, leading to data collection, analysis and interpretation The conflict in the northern border Ecuador shares with Colombia is not only very

complex but it has also been present and active for a long period of time. Its length, has allowed

for negative patterns to strengthen and as a consequence the violence has been continuously

escalating. As a result many civilians have crossed the border to Ecuador seeking refuge,


25

however this has produced other tensions with the host communities. Non-governmental

organizations have been present in the area for several years with the purpose of building a safe

environment for both actors. The following chapter will collect and analyze data with the

purpose of learning how cooperation among NGOs working with youth groups in Ecuador’s

northern border with Colombia has contributed to the de-escalation of violence in the area.


26

CHAPTER TWO- DATA

2.1. Methodology The following research will use a multiple case study methodology. According to John W.

Creswell in his book Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, a “case study research is a

qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system

(a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in depth data collection

involving multiple sources of information […], and reports a case description and case themes”

(Creswell, 2013, pp.97). Therefore, through the study of three different cases, this research will

learn how cooperation among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working with youth

groups in the northern border Ecuador shares with Colombia has helped decrease violence in the

area. The cases chosen for this study are the intervention projects of three NGOs that have been

working for at least a year either in Ecuador’s northern border provinces.

2.2. Data Collection The data will be collected through semi-structured interviews, as well as through the review of

public documentation such as: NGOs project proposals, NGOs partial reports, NGOs final

reports, NGOs monitoring and evaluation templates, NGOs websites, and multiple newsfeed.

The information collected from the interviews will be recorded, transcribed as well as coded with

the purpose of finding themes within each case and amongst them.

The semi-structured interview used for the study was made up of six main questions and

several possible follow up questions as shown in Table 2.2.1. The interview was performed to

the three NGOs participating of the study. Some interviews were held via skype and others

through mail correspondence. In addition, in order to respect the privacy of each entity all of the

participants signed a consent regarding their confidentiality. Therefore, their identity will remain


27

anonymous and will be addressed as NGO-1, NGO-2, and NGO-3. The following paragraphs

will be dedicated to recount the results of the interviews as well as the revised public

documentation.

Table 1.2.1. Interview Questions Main Questions Additional Questions How long have you been working in Ecuador’s Northern border?

Have you established any joint efforts or alliances with other NGOs working with youth groups in the area?

If so, can you give any examples? How does working in alliance benefit the projects execution?

Is there any particular experience that you would like to share, where working with other NGOs in the area has helped you achieve the project’s goal in a satisfactory manner?

Which Conflict Resolution methods have you applied in the planning and implementation stages of the project?

Can you give me some examples? What strategies have you commonly found successful?

Have you had any experiences where your actions have influenced the escalation of conflict in the area?

If so, what did you do to redirect the process?

How do you ensure the processes sustainability? Do you have a post-monitoring plan? Do you dedicate a certain time frame for peace-building efforts before closing the process?

NGO-1

NGO-1 mission is to promote dialogue and capacity building, as well as coordinate

processes for the sustainable development of Latin America (NGO-1, 2013). All of NGO-1 work

is developed under the umbrella of eight main areas of focus one of them being peace-building in

the northern border (NGO-1, 2013). The information gathered from NGO-1 for this study

pertains only to this area of focus.

NGO-1 began its work in Ecuador’s northern border on 2007 after the elaboration of a peace and

conflict needs assessment of the area. This assessment was developed in coordination with three

additional non-governmental entities (NGO-1.1, 2013). The results of this assessment suggested


28

that any intervention in the area should focus on development projects with women and

adolescents, considering they are the population most vulnerable to the conflict previously

described on chapter one (NGO-1.1, 2013). From then on, NGO-1 has executed several

interventions through multiple partnerships. Together with another entity NGO-1 signed an

agreement to develop an intervention sensitive to conflict for a peace and development project

being held at the border (NGO-1.1, 2013). Similarly, NGO-1 with the help of international

funding executed a three-year intervention that proposed the consolidation of multi-sector spaces

with the objective of creating public policies at the municipal level (NGO-1.1, 2013). These

previous interventions led to the creation of a peace-building project targeted to the younger

population living at the border. The youth program was launched in 2011 also with international

funding and in partnership with another non-governmental institution (NGO-1.1, 2013).

In regards to building alliances and working with other institutions, one of NGO-1 priorities

when planning an intervention is coordination. They believe that only through coordination

amongst diverse entities within the project’s location, sustainability can be guaranteed (NGO-

1.2, 2013). Therefore, previous to intervening directly with the participants of any given project,

NGO-1 seeks to inform and be in agreement first with governmental agencies present in the area

and then with other NGOs interested in collaborating. For this reason, one experience that NGO-

1 found helpful to start its project in the border was the development of an “inter-institutional

table” which congregated state as well as non-governmental institutions with the objective of

sharing their intervention plans either to join efforts or to avoid duplicating them (NGO-1.2,

2013). The table meets every three months and its management rotates yearly amongst the

voluntary members (NGO-1.2, 2013).


29

For this project, one of the conflict resolution methods that were applied at the beginning of its

implementation was “Do no Harm” (NGO-1.2, 2013). It is not applied regularly throughout the

process, however NGO-1 finds it should be applied before, during, and at the end of each

intervention. Nevertheless, all the material used to work with the participants was developed

through a “Do no Harm” lenses (NGO-1.2, 2013). In addition, to avoid fueling new conflicts for

being newcomers in the area, NGO-1 partnered with a local NGO to implement all the project

components (NGO-1.2, 2013). In addition, they found helpful being very transparent with people

in regards to the projects purpose, funding, and limitations.

Finally, to ensure the sustainability of their intervention, NGO-1 created a training program for

the participants so they could be the ones in charge of replicating the material learnt with other

youth in their communities, rather than this being NGO-1 responsibility (NGO-1.2, 2013). In

addition, “youth offices” were organized and established in order to makes youth pleas visible to

entities in charge of policy making (NGO-1.2, 2013). Parallel to instituting a culture of peace

through cultural efforts, the participants were trained in developing their own businesses and

were given approval to micro-credit loans. The reasoning behind this component was that by

having a steady source of income, the participants became less vulnerable to the risks provided

by the conflict around them and simultaneously they could contribute to establishing a safe space

for other future young participants (NGO-1.2, 2013). The monitoring process post- intervention

takes place in an informal manner through the inter-institutional table.

NGO-2

NGO-2 dedicates its work to securing a safe insertion of refugees into Ecuadorian

communities close to the border with Colombia. Part of its mission seeks to support the creation

of public policies that insure the wellbeing of refugees as well as implement development


30

projects in the area (NGO-2, 2013). In addition, all of NGO-2 interventions strive to be aligned

with the Ecuadorian “Plan of Good Living” in order to guarantee long-term change (NGO-2,

2013).

NGO-2 began working in the Ecuadorian border on 2000. Presently, it has offices in multiple

provinces where the majority of refugees conglomerate (NGO-2, 2013). In regards to NGO-2

view on working in alliances, the interviewee said they do work in “collaboration with diverse

organizations from civil society, NGOs, international agencies and with out a doubt state

institutions” (NGO-2.1, 2013). Although NGO-2 has multiple cooperation agreements, just like

NGO-1 their priority is to collaborate with government entities more so than other non-

governmental organizations. An example of a successful collaborative interaction for NGO-2 has

been with a state agency for the development of public policies that include the wellbeing of

refugees. In addition, they received aid from another state agency “through technical support for

the development of the Canton Development Plan [which] allowed [NGO-2] to identify

communities and neighborhoods with large numbers of refugees and include them on public

policies planned by the local institution” (NGO-2.1, 2013). For NGO-2, the elaboration of public

policy that takes into account the safety of refugees is what guarantees a long-term commitment

for the improvement of refugees’ livelihoods.

As for the application of any particular conflict resolution method during the planning and

implementation stages of any of their projects, NGO-2 works through inter-agency dialogue

tables in order to avoid the duplication of efforts as well as to find possibilities of collaboration

or exchange of resources (NGO-2.1, 2013). In addition given that NGO-2 finds that any

intervention does cause some sort of impact, “when developing activities in case-sensitive areas

or areas impacted by conflict its necessary to analyze the impact of your presence” (NGO-2.1, 2,


31

2013). Therefore, NGO-2 finds it important to recognize and keep in mind throughout the

process that any intervention as it raises awareness about the refugees’ circumstances it also

makes them more visible targets in the conflict (NGO-2.1, 2013). To avoid this, NGO-2 aside

from performing impact assessments has also established specific security protocols for the area.

With reference to insuring sustainability before ending an intervention, NGO-2 believes that

sustainability is conditioned by: funding, the NGOs technical capacity, and the NGOs human

capacity (NGO-2.1, 2013). In addition they believe that a constant presence of the NGO in the

area would be a form of securing the upkeep of the “spaces of protection” that have been

provided (NGO-2.1, 2013). Nevertheless, this is conditioned by the funding they obtain.

Therefore, for NGO-2 sustainability does not mean to insure that a long-term result that lasts

without the presence of the NGO in the territory. On the contrary, the process may only be

sustained if the NGO is kept visible in the area.

NGO-3

NGO-3 mission is to promote social and economic development as well as elaborate

studies and monitoring evaluations for other entities (NGO-3, 2013). To do so, NGO-3 focuses

its work on four areas: health, child labor, local production, and education (NGO-3, 2013). The

following interview mostly focuses on the education work NGO-3 has been involved in the

northern border for the past three years. What NGO-3 seeks to do is help adolescents with

notable delay in their studies or who have dropped out of schools to register in school. They

provide guidance outside of school for tough subjects as well as psychological support.

To begin their intervention in the northern border, NGO-3 mostly sought out to build alliances

with state agencies more so than other non-governmental organizations. In the case of this

particular intervention, “it was at the request of a state agency” that they began their work in the


32

area (NGO-3.1, 2013). For NGO-3 working in coordination with the government it’s not only

important but also necessary (NGO-3.1, 2013). When dealing with education programs, you need

to be in sink with the government’s requirements to receive their approval. Therefore, having the

endorsement of a state agency in the project was basic for a smooth and appropriate

implementation. In regards to building alliances with other non-governmental organizations,

NGO-3 finds it difficult considering there are more “restrictions, [and] less resources from

international cooperation […], it is very difficult to think about building cooperation networks

with other NGOs” (NGO-3.1, 2013). Considering there is less funding, NGOs often find

themselves competing with one another. Nevertheless, NGO-3 has participated in some joint

efforts with other NGOs. They haven’t been substantial alliances rather mostly an exchange of

information or non-monetary resources with other NGOs who are also working with youth in the

area (NGO 3.1, 2013). In addition, the interviewee believes that given the specificity of NGO-3

the possibility of generating any cooperative efforts is very low.

When asked about Conflict Resolution methods, NGO-3 said that they do not apply any CR

methods “systematically” (NGO-3.1, 2013). Nonetheless, they are aware of the vulnerable and

violent conflict in the area. For that reason, they tend to involve “the people, the institutions, and

the local actors with who they will be working from day one. Therefore, we start working the

possible conflicts before they develop, although some are unavoidable” (NGO-3.1, 2013). The

reason why they include all the foreseeable involved actors in the project’s planning is because

then all the choices are made multilaterally rather than the NGO imposing. As a result, when

disagreements arise they remind all the actors that everyone had a say in the projects design from

its start and therefore everyone is responsible for the choices that were made together (NGO-3.1,

2013). Another strategy NGO-3 uses to avoid conflict is transparency. The interviewee believes


33

that many times, “the conflicts that NGOs in this kind of job have are because their budgets are a

mystery […], therefore for us the budget is a tool for work and not a mystery […]. This way the

budget stops being a mystery and a source of conflict and it becomes a tool for good

management” (NGO-3.1, 2013).

Given that the northern border of Ecuador has been exposed to violence for multiple decades, its

population has trouble-trusting people. Therefore, when an NGO settles in the area they usually

assume the NGO is coming to profit in their name. Hence, if you show them how much money

has been allocated to the project from the beginning and how will the payments be made you

have a better possibility of building a long lasting relationship. Nevertheless, NGO-3 finds that

as much as you prepare and try to foresee conflict, given the vulnerability of the area there are

conflicts you won’t be able to avoid and therefore have to be very quick and inventive to resolve

them before they continue escalating (NGO-3.1, 2013). To do so, NGO-3 encourages its team to

first understand and respect the local context and culture, and secondly practice empathy as well

as solidarity. Finally, for NGO-3 it is important to remember that there are multiple conflicts

happening however, they only have the ability to focus on education. Therefore, it is an

important process for their team to understand this in order not to become frustrated.

At last, NGO-3 does not have any sustainability mechanisms in place. The reason is that

specifically the project they were interviewed for only responds to short term and very concrete

results. It responds to funders who allocate resources to fulfilling no more than one-year

processes. Therefore, even though they would like to follow up with the participants after the

process is done they do not have the budget to do so or to develop a post-intervention monitoring

tool.


34

2.3.Data Analysis

The data collected for each NGO was coded and subsequently themes were identified

within and across each NGO. Themes “are broad units of information that consist of several

codes aggregated to form a common idea” (Creswell, 2007, pp.186). The following paragraphs

will provide an in depth description for each of the themes found as well as distinguish those that

are common to the three NGOs being studied. In addition, direct quotes translated from Spanish

will be included with the purpose of supporting the themes identified.

NGO-1

Four themes were identified from NGO-1 interview results: culture of peace,

coordination, methods, and sustainability.

Culture of peace

NGO-1 before beginning its intervention in the northern border completed a needs assessment

that showed an urgency of development projects as well as peace-making efforts in the area. The

study also suggested that any given intervention should focus on women and adolescents since

they were currently the most vulnerable population to the conflict. As stated by the interviewee,

“we prioritized the work with adolescents and women because we consider it a group that is

vulnerable in the border zone. Why is it vulnerable, do to the lack of opportunities they had, the

lack of access to participatory and decision-making spaces, and also due to the violence which

affected mostly women but also adolescents through forceful recruitment” (NGO-1, 2013). As a

result, NGO-1 planned an intervention that would empower adolescents and women without

making them a direct target of the present conflict. Instead of training them in mediation

processes as to intervene in the conflict, NGO-1 developed and intervention that used art as a

means to “increase the capacities of adolescents in order to become better actors, [specifically]


35

peace actors” (NGO-1, 2013). Through dance and theater, women and adolescents were

advocating for their rights without the need of being violent themselves. They were also

provided tools and skills necessary to develop their own micro-enterprises in order to protect

their livelihood so they could sustainably advocate for the livelihood of other adolescents and

women.

Coordination

NGO-1 throughout the interview mentioned several times the importance of coordination, mostly

with state agencies more so than other non-governmental organizations. NGO-1 sought

coordination through the creation of an inter-institutional table, “whose objective was to gather

state and non-state agencies so they could share what they do, so they could present their

planning programs, and to coordinate among institutions in order not to do the same thing or to

duplicate efforts” (NGO-1, 2013). Everyone is interested in participating on the table as it helps

build networks and inform about other’s projects. However, no specific initiatives have yet been

developed and implemented from this space.

Sustainability

The first means NGO-1 applied to insure sustainability was coordination with local state

agencies, “none of the activities were done without coordinating with someone else, its key for

us to create networks and strengthen them” (NGO-1, 2013). According to the interviewee it is

essential to have this in mind from the beginning because “it is very important to know to whom

you will hand [everything that has been developed] when you leave the area, and that is the

reason why it is so important to have clear links with state agencies” (NGO-1, 2013). The second

course of action by which NGO-1 guarantees the intervention’s sustainability is through capacity

building. Aside from providing a safe space for the youth to meet and organize, NGO-1 first


36

trained the youth on “non-violent communication skills, active listening, negotiation” among

other skills as well as partnered with a cooperative business specialized on creating savings and

providing credit (NGO-1, 2013). This helped the participants improve their livelihoods while

also building a culture of peace within their communities.

Methods

As for the conflict resolution skills used to create a safe space for interaction, before their

intervention NGO-1 performed a “Do No Harm” assessment. In addition, they developed a

capacity building manual for their participants that provided useful communication skills before

executing the youth forums. These forums had the objective of bringing adolescents together to

speak about the violence present in their communities with the objective of building a proposal

that would bring their issues to the forefront of governmental agencies agendas.

NGO-2

Three themes were identified from NGO-2 data collection: public policy, collaboration,

and security.

Public Policy

From the information gathered for NGO-2, the majority of their time and effort is dedicated to

building and implementing public policies that benefit refugees’ within Ecuadorian borders. It is

apparent that for NGO-2 the only way to sustain refugees’ rights and safety is through the

creation of policies that are advocated by government agencies rather than civil society. Having

this mechanism in place will help increase the probability of public policy enforcement.

Collaboration

NGO-2 strongly believes in collaboration. In the interview it mentioned having worked with civil

society organizations, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and state


37

agencies (NGO-2.2, 2013). Nevertheless, from the interview’s narrative it is evident NGO-2

holds a stronger and steadier relationship with state agencies. In alliance with governmental

institutions aside from the examples already stated in the previous section they were able to

“develop a program of territorial planning where communities that existed unofficially were

registered. This way, the Municipality was able to start to develop project that provided basic

needs to this population” (NGO-2.2, 2013). All the examples of cooperation NGO-2 mentioned

are linked to a state agency.

Security

When asked about sustainability, NGO-2 mostly addressed the safety of their participants more

so than explaining how their intervention efforts will be sustained once they deploy from the

area. Given that NGO-2 has the objective to mitigate present violence toward refugees its focus

centers on creating projects that tackle short-term issues while advocating for public policies that

sustain the short-term actions through long-term commitments made by state agencies. NGO-2

makes a clear statement that the security of refugees is extremely important therefore if their

presence helps them stay safe they will make every effort to do so (NGO-2.2, 2013).

Nonetheless, if their presence makes refugees more vulnerable “ with the objective of mitigating

the effect of this action it is precise that the agencies question the necessity of guarding the rights

of the communities were they work, through a strict respect of security protocols (mostly based

on risk prevention)” (NGO-2.2, 2013). For this reason, bringing safety to refugees by

safeguarding their rights is a core goal for NGO-2.

NGO-3

Three themes were identified from the information gathered for NGO-3: cooperation,

complexity, and transparency.


38

Cooperation

For NGO-3 coordination among institutions is very important. Nevertheless, its focus is

generating stronger relationships with state agencies more so than other NGOs. For NGO-3 it is

very important to develop long-term processes with the government considering their project has

a focus on education (NGO-3.1, 2013). If they are not aligned with the ministry of education

current policies, NGO-3 interventions will not be long lasting.

Complexity

The northern border Ecuador shares with Colombia is very permeable and therefore volatile. The

context in which NGO-3 works in is always fluctuating and as a consequence its team has to be

prepared for the unknown and be able to react appropriately in order to avoid any conflict (NGO-

3.1, 2013). Taking into consideration that there are high numbers of refugees in the area, much of

NGO-3 work relies on trying to build positive relationships between the newcomers and the local

communities.

Transparency

In order to avoid further conflict, NGO-3 has incorporated transparency as one of its conflict

resolution strategies. Sharing their budget details with the primary actors of their project not only

shows their willingness of being an open book but also it engages the participants. It allows them

to have a say in the funding allocation and help follow through with its proper use. When the

project is fulfilled, the appropriate use of the budget would have been the foundation to building

relationships based on trust.

Overall, amongst the three NGOs there is a basic and very important similarity. All three

emphasize on the importance of coordinating with state agencies previous to any of their

interventions. For all, this NGO-state relationship is what insures their processes sustainability.


39

Also, all of them have cooperated with other NGOs, nevertheless their interactions are not as

strong, as necessary, or long-term based.

2.4.Data Interpretation

Interdependence

Johnson and Johnson believe “positive interdependence exists when there is a positive

correlation among individuals’ goal attainments; individuals perceive that they can attain their

goals if, and only if, the other individual with whom they are cooperatively linked attain their

goals” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.288-289). To be able to determine in a qualitative manner

if the three NGOs interviewed have built a positive interdependence with other NGOs within

their area of expertise, the following paragraphs will identify examples of “positive cathexis”,

“substitutability”, and “inducibility” from the data collected (Johnson and Johnson, 2005,

pp.289). Similarly, in case there is no evidence of positive interdependence from the behavioral

patterns of the three NGOs, the data interpretation will shift to look for examples of negative

interdependence. According to Johnson and Johnson, “negative interdependence exists when

there is a negative correlation among individuals’ goal achievement; individuals perceive that

they can obtain goals if and only if the other individuals with whom they are competitively

linked fail to obtain their goals” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.288-289). In case there are

examples of “bungling” actions, examples of “negative cathexis”, “nonsubstitutability”, and

“resistance” will also be provided (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.289).

Johnson and Johnson in their article New Developments in Social Interdependence Theory,

determine substitutability as “the degree to which actions of one person substitute for the actions

of another person (Deutsch, 1949a)” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.290). NGO-1, NGO-2,

NGO-3 through their narrative show evidence of substitutability in their interventions. All three


40

NGOs emphasize on the importance of coordination amongst actors in order to avoid duplicating

efforts. An example provided by NGO-1 and NGO-2 was the creation of multi-agency dialogue

tables to organize their processes and if possible cooperate with one another. Nevertheless, all

three NGOs find it more important to collaborate and establish long-term projects with

government agencies instead of amongst each other. The examples provided in the data

collection section show that cooperation amongst NGOs consists mostly of specific exchange of

information more so than strong alliances. Therefore by engaging state agencies, NGOs are

substituting some of the state’s responsibilities more than other NGOs work. The reason why

NGOs are not interested in substitutability amongst each other is due to funding. NGO-3

mentioned that in the past couple of years funding for NGOs has become difficult to find and as

a consequence it fosters competition. Therefore, NGOs are not interested in substituting one

another’s responsibilities because in their eyes that may pose a threat. This does not mean that

there is presence of nonsubstitutability, NGOs do cooperate with each other but only on very

specific terms and do not seek to build strong alliances. As a consequence, nonsubstitutability

may be either non-existent or a latent conflict.

Cathexis on the other hand, “is an investment of psychological energy in objects outside of one-

self, such as friends, family, and work (Deutsch, 1949a). Cathexis may be positive or negative”

(Johson and Johnson, 2005, pp.290). An example of cathexis for NGO-1 and NGO-2 are the

multi-institution dialogue tables they referenced in their interviews. This a space were the NGOs

are dedicating extra time aside from their regular working schedules in the possibility of bringing

benefits for all. Nevertheless, this space can be an example of positive as well as negative

cathexis. It has the potential of being positive if the participants end up developing a long-term

goal were everyone contributes with their know how and simultaneously maximizes their NGOs


41

personal objectives. It can also be an example of negative cathexis considering that NGOs have a

preference of partnering with state agencies more so than NGOs. Therefore the efforts allocated

to the table can be seen by some as a waste of time. In addition, “there is recent evidence that

people’s goals are an important reference for their affect system, so that people react positively

when they make progress toward goals and negatively when they fail to reach their goals

(Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999)” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.291). Consequently,

NGO-1, NGO-2, and NGO-3 have all reacted positively to building stronger relationships with

state agencies more so than other non-governmental organizations due to the possibilities each

relationship brings. This is also due to new state requisites that call for NGOs to coordinate their

initiatives with state agencies.

Additionally, “inducibility is the openness to being influenced and influencing others (Deutsch,

1949a). Within a cooperative situation, collaborators easily induce each other to (a) engage in

actions that promote goal achievement or (b) not engage in actions that would interfere with goal

achievement” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, pp.291). The practice of inter-institutional tables is a

clear example of inducibility. All the NGOs participating from these tables are voluntarily

assisting with the purpose of helping one another regardless of the concrete benefits they might

receive from participating. This is possible because they all share the over-arching goal of

safeguarding the wellbeing of youth in the northern border.

The interpretation of Social Interdependence Theory for this case has shed the light on the fact

that positive interdependence exists, however it is stronger amongst NGOs and state agencies

instead of amongst NGOs. It also shows that although positive interdependence is taking place it

is weak as there are also indicators of negative interdependence.


42

Cooperation and Competition

As stated on the literature review section, the Theory of Cooperation and Competition

stems from Social Interdependence Theory. This theory holds that positive interdependence

leads to cooperative relationships while negative interdependence leads to competitive

relationships (Deutsch, M., 2006). The analysis of interdependence shows that all three NGOs

lean toward positive interdependence, however there are factors that make this disposition

fragile. For cooperation to unfold the following conditions should be in place: a clear

communication, an openness to helping others, having equal responsibilities among group

members, a sense of feeling heard and respected, active listening, being open to sharing

knowledge, and sharing mutual goals (Deutsch, M., 2006). From the conditions listed above all

three NGOs have the desire of having a transparent relationship with other actors whomever they

maybe; through the creation of multi-institution dialogue tables they show an openness to

collaborating with one another; participating voluntarily from this spaces or being open to

sharing resources is an example of willingness to share knowledge; and finally there is the

assumption from their mission statements that all of them want to improve the livelihoods of

communities living in the area. On the other hand, from the data collected it is unclear if the

NGOs interviewed by participating in these shared spaces feel equally responsible or have a

sense of feeling heard. In addition, by the information available it is undefined to what extent

each NGO is willing to share their knowledge considering they sometimes have to apply for

funding to the same source.

Finally, if the NGOs cooperative and competitive interactions were to be interpreted through the

lenses of a Dual Concerns Model framework, from the data collected it seems that all three

NGOs have a preference of a problem solving style more so than yielding, avoiding or


43

competitive styles. According to Pruitt and Kim, this behavior only happens if participants have

a high care for self as well as a high care for other (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). All three NGOs are

aware funding is limited for the non-profit sector nevertheless they have no desire of becoming

hostile to one another. They continue to collaborate with each other on aspects that do not

require money allocation. There preference of collaborating with state agencies is either due to:

their specific intervention objectives, with the purpose of sustaining the change they are trying to

achieve, or because it may be the central government pressing concern.

Interagency communication styles

The Coordinated Management of Meaning Theory developed by Barnett Pearce and

Vernon Cronen seeks to enhance peoples’ understanding of human interactions and their

multiplicity of perspectives (Creede, Fisher-Yoshida, and Gallegos, 2012). To do so, it

developed four models that help analyze and comprehend opposing views. For this specific

multiple case study only two models will be applied. This exercise will help us understand the

line of thought behind two different points of view on how cooperation develops among NGOs

in the northern border.


44

Daisy Model

LUUUUTT Model

Cooperation among NGOs

Coordination with other entities is a priority. Coordination with state agencies is a priority.

Inter-institutional dialogue tables are valuable. Inter-institutional dialogue tables only bring short term results.

It is important to avoid duplicity of efforts. We are aware that duplicity of efforts is important, however, our proposals are rigid and have little opportunity for change.

Cooperation is limited by funding. Cooperation is not limited by funding.

Cooperation among NGOs

Stories told: Cooperation among NGOs takes place and has positive long-term impact. Cooperation takes place and has positive concrete results.

Unknown stories: Cooperation is desired however NGOs specific goals are not aligned. Cooperation is not desired however NGOs specic goals are aligned.

Untold stories: There is a decrease of funding for non-profits therefore more competition which limits cooperation. There is a decrease of funding for non-profits however this does not hinder cooperation.

Stories lived: There is openness for cooperation among NGOs however cooperation with state agencies is preffered. Openness for cooperation among NGOs is limited and coperation with state agencies is put forward by central government.

Untellable stories: Cooperation is desired however the need for funding is greater.

Unheard stories: The context of the conflict in the area does not allow NGOs to organize openly. The context in the area does not call for collaboration.


45

The Daisy Model and the LUUUUT Model are able to portray two different narratives with

respect to cooperation among NGOs in Ecuador’s northern border. Both models allow us to

understand the reasoning behind why cooperation is more prominent with state agencies more so

than NGOs. Some of the main resonant observations made by the participants were the

achievement of long-term change and guaranteeing funding. However in the LUUUUT Model,

the unheard stories section as well as the unknown stories section demand more analysis about

the context within each organization and the immediate context in their respective interventions.

To have a greater understanding of the before mentioned, the Communications Model framework

will be applied. The Communications Model suggests that to better relate and comprehend others

it is important to be aware of their nature, be cognizant of their culture, and their surrounding

context (Fisher-Yoshida, 2013-06-26). For that reason the model will be applied to all three

participants.


46

From the application of the Communications Model it is evident that all three NGOs share some

commonalities in all categories. Although all three have the desire to cooperate, according to

their contexts they also have formal processes by which they have to abide. The difference

among their processes and regulations may hinder their desire to cooperate. In addition,

considering the context in which the interventions take place it could be possible that

strengthening their collaboration publicly may transform the organizations into targets at a meso-

level.

Conflict escalation and de-escalation Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) views conflict as fluid and multi-level. Rather than

trying to simplify conflict, DST embraces its complexity. The theory portrays conflict as a

Context of interventions - Lack of community structure -  Lack of trust and transparency -  Fear and unsafe enviroment -  The more visble you are the easier target you become


47

mountainous landscape where positive relationships are found in shallow and wide valley (since

they are vulnerable to change), while negative relationships or interactions fall into deep and

narrow valleys (considering they are difficult to shift) (Coleman, 2011). DST believes conflict is

strengthened by “attractors”, known to be as a sequence of actions or “potential states or patterns

of change” that trap a conflict in a deep and narrow valley (Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, and

Wrzosinska, forthcoming, pp.264-265). When mapping a conflict such as the one on section 1.3,

attractors are portrayed by “reinforcing feedback loops” while positive actions are depicted by

“inhibiting feedback loops” (Coleman, 2011, pp.125). The following map will reproduce the

cooperative dynamics mentioned in section 2.2 with the purpose of observing whether

cooperation among NGOs has contributed to the de-escalation of violence in the northern border.

From the data collected, although there is further strengthening to develop in regards to

cooperation among NGOs, their desire and willingness to cooperate should not be disregarded.

NGO-1

NGO-3

NGO-2

Multi-institutional dialogue table

Lack of "sense of community"

Lack of trust-worthyjudicial system

Drug industry

FARC

Lack of "sense of protection "

NGOs in generalRefugee influx on Ecuador's

northern border with Colombia

Government involvementin NGO work

Weak law enforcement

Cooperative efforts

Primary actors Social structures

Economic structures

Securitystructure

Politicalstructure

Reinforcing feedback loops

Inhiibiting feedback loops


48

So far, cooperation among NGOs has brought short-term however fruitful efforts. Therefore the

relationship amongst NGOs and their relationship with the cooperation efforts social structures

are depicted through inhibiting feedback loops. In addition, the relationship specifically among

NGO-1, NGO-2, and NGO-3 and the government political structure are also portrayed as

positive given that their joint efforts are sustaining long-term positive change. Furthermore, the

creation or use of inter- institutional tables by NGO-1 and NGO-2 has also helped built

cooperative networks amongst multiple agencies. Nevertheless, all of these cooperation efforts

are being threatened by social structures such as the lack of sense of community and the lack of a

trust-worthy judicial system; as well as security structures such as weak law enforcement. From

the map above it is evident that cooperation may contribute to the de-escalation of violence,

nonetheless there are multiple dynamics that need to be attended in order to optimize cooperation

in a sustainable manner.

2.5.Bridge to Intervention Strategies According to the data collected, analyzed, as well as interpreted the three unfulfilled

needs that surface from the participants are security, sense of community, and trust. Although

there is a desire for cooperation and sustainable interventions, the participants are dealing with a

lack of physical, psychological, emotional and economic security. In addition, the lack of

security inhibits people from trusting one another and being transparent. Lastly, the lack of a

sense of belonging hinders connectivity and as a consequence there are limited cooperative

efforts taking place. The following chapter will propose resolution strategies for the three needs

identified as well as offer a detailed description of how these strategies will be implemented.


49

CHAPTER 3- RESOLUTION STRATEGIES

3.1. Relevant needs from conflict analysis

Having collected and analyzed data on how cooperation among NGOs in the northern

border of Ecuador contributes to the de-escalation of violence in the area; evidence shows that

cooperation may contribute to the decrease of violence. However, present social as well as

security structures inhibit the strengthening of these collaboration efforts. On section 2.4.Data

Interpretation, the conflict map depicts clearly that the reinforcing factors that hinder cooperation

at a macro level are: the Plan Colombia, the drug industry, and the guerrillas. The factors that

interfere with cooperation at a meso and micro level are: a lack of sense of community, a lack of

sense of protection, a lack of trustworthy judicial system, a weak law enforcement, and funding.

In addition to the interpretation provided by the conflict map, the data gathered from the three

NGOs interviewed has allowed to identify three relevant needs that should be addressed in order

to improve the cooperation efforts put forward by the NGO sector: security, sense of community,

and trust.

Security

All three NGOs interviewed mentioned the importance of security either for their employees or

the processes direct participants. Considering the highly violent environment in which the NGOs

immerse themselves they are constantly facing physical, mental, and emotional insecurity. NGOs

as well as their target population can easily become victims of the violence happening amongst

the military, the drug cartel, and the guerrilla. People have become habituated to be aware of

their surroundings and feel unsafe in their own communities. In addition, the NGOs constantly

confront economic insecurity. Without recurring funding, their processes can fall and change


50

cannot be obtained. As a consequence, the lack of security hampers the NGOs efforts for

sustainable change.

Sense of Community

The lack of economic security has hindered the desire of building a sense of community between

NGOs working in the northern border. Although they share information between one another it is

rare for them to build long-term commitments. As a consequence, the NGOs in the area choose

to collaborate mostly with state agencies. The lack of a sense of community interferes with the

NGOs end results given that the capacity installed through their individual processes could be

optimized if embarked on as a community. The faint presence of a sense of community has

weakened the foundations of joint and cooperative work.

Trust

In order for security to be regained and for collaboration to be successful there is a need to build

a safe space based on trust where actors can be transparent and honest amongst each other about

their limitations, their divergence of goals, or their need of others’ know how.

All of the NGOs interviewed show openness toward cooperation and two have gone as far as

making the effort of enhancing cooperation through the establishment of a multi-institutional

dialogue table. Nevertheless, this dialogue table currently helps exchange information and

coordinate short-term efforts more so than long-term joint interventions. The following section

will propose resolution strategies that address in a sustainable manner the needs before

mentioned.

3.2. Overview of intervention strategy

The realm of conflict solving offers multiple resolution strategies when dealing with

contention. Some of these strategies are: conflict resolution, conflict transformation, peace-


51

making, peace-keeping, peace-building, among others (Regan, 2013, pp.16). Nevertheless, not

all strategies are always applicable since a conflict’s particular needs should be taken into

account in order to choose the most favorable intervention. Taking into consideration the

information gathered by this multiple case study and its data interpretation, a Systems Thinking

Approach would be the most suitable resolution strategy for the enhancement of cooperation

among NGOs in the northern border of Ecuador. Through the lenses of Systems Thinking, the

following paragraphs will delineate the specific intervention plan developed to address the need

for security, a sense of community, and trust.

According to Linda Booth Sweeney and Dennis Meadows in their book Systems Thinking

Playbook, “systems thinking is a broad term used to represent a set of methods and tools that

focus on systems –rather than parts- as the context for defining and solving complex problems,

and for fostering more effective learning and design. At its best, the practice of systems thinking

helps us to stop operating from crisis to crisis, and to think in a less fragmented, more integrated

way” (Sweeney and Meadows, 2010, pp.1). Accordingly, Systems Thinking allows us to

transcend from a linear perspective, and instead of seeing the identified needs as independent

parts to be solved separately from one another it depicts them as interwoven. Systems Thinking

recognizes the close-knit relationship amongst security, sense of community, and transparency,

and it values their connectivity. In addition, just as Sweeney and Meadows previous quote

stated, instead of depicting the identified needs as an imminent crisis to be solved in the short

term, it is more constructive instead to study the dynamics that promote the lack of security, the

lack of a sense of community, and the lack of trust amongst the NGO sector and look for a

sustainable and flexible solution.


52

Organizations have a personality of their own and therefore follow specific habits, formats, and

processes, which they feel more comfortable with. Nevertheless, these practices may become

obsolete if the organizations do not work dynamically with their surrounding environment.

Jamshid Gharajedaghi asserts that,

“to change[,] systems need to go through an active process of unlearning. Unlearning is an iterative and collective process of the second-order learning. A participative and iterative design process with the aim of replacing the distorted shared images is the most effective learning tool to produce a second order learning and a desired change in the behavioral pattern of a social system” (Gharajedaghi, 2007, pp.473).

In other words, to change the pattern of interactions that perpetuate the lack of the above-

mentioned needs, NGOs in the area have to collectively recognize the situation and together

come up with an image of where they want to head toward and achieve. As long as they do not

share the desire to change, the system will continue being the same. Through the application of

Systems Thinking, the purpose of this intervention plan is to assist NGOs in the northern border

in adopting a Systems Thinking lenses to develop a shared image of the future that addresses the

before mentioned needs by transforming in a sustainable manner the “distorted shared image”

that has preserved their absence. The following section will elaborate on the methods that will be

used to implement the intervention plan and address each need.

3.3. Needs

Security

According to the data collected, some of the efforts made to safeguard the NGOs security

have been made by NGO-1 and NGO-2. NGO-1 throughout their intervention implements a “Do

no Harm” assessment while NGO-2 has developed their own security protocols manual (NGO-

1.2, 2013; NGO-2.1, 2013). Within the realm of NGOs or civil society organizations several

actions have been taken to address this need. For example, the United States Department of

Homeland Security issued a statement on 2006 where they decided to contribute monetarily. The


53

appointed spokesperson stated the following, “we will free up these funds and award them to

appropriate parties based on risk, so that these organizations and their members can take

important precautionary and preventive measures that strengthen baseline security in their

communities” (Chertoff, 2006). Another example of a good practice that could be adopted as a

resolution for this conflict study is that of the National Association of Non-Governmental

Organizations (NANGO) from Zimbabwe. NANGO issued the Civil Society Security Scoping

Study in which they detail the causes for the lack of security and list several recommendations

for NGOs on how to improve their safety.

Following a Systems Thinking approach, to address the need of security for the NGO sector in

the northern border of Ecuador the recommendation is to transform the behavioral patterns

amongst NGOs in regards to security through the use of “culture as an operating system”

(Gharajedaghi, 2011, 64). In other words, by creating a joint image of what physical, emotional,

and economic security means to them the NGOs will build behavioral patterns that guide them

toward their desired culture of security. According to Susan Allen Nan, “inclusive networks

empower the least powerful to participate in the network. […] [while] Exclusive networks create

power relationships that reinforce the existing power structures” (Nan, 2009, 179). Through the

creation of an inclusive network based on the establishment of a culture of security the

participants will be able to replace their isolated and independent efforts and move toward a

more empowered interdependent system.

For this to be in place it is necessary for the NGOs to recognize the necessity and reasoning for

seeking change. Therefore, initially they would be addressed individually in order to introduce

them to the Systems Thinking Approach. Consequently, as a group the following workshops

would be advised: Ancient Wisdom Council and a Collaborative Loops. The Ancient Wisdom


54

Council’s objective is to “access the wisdom for addressing an issue or solving deep conflict,

allowing the community or group to put their agreement and energy behind new solutions”

(Windeagle and Kinney-Linton, R., 2007, pp.198). This process will help them recognize there

“distorted shared images” as Gharajeddaghi would call them, and build together an image of

their desired future (Gharajedaghi, 2007, pp.473). On the other hand, the Collaborative Loops

exercise “brings multiple teams together in a workshop to learn how to design and implement

their own change strategies” (Axelrod, D. and Axelrod E., 2007, pp.91). This activity will help

the NGOs work together in building a plan of how to reach their ideal culture of security.

Trust

One of the main efforts that have been made to address trust amongst NGOs is the

establishment of multi-dialogue tables (NGO-1.2, 2013; NGO-2.1, 2013). In the multi-dialogue

tables NGOs are able to share information and seeing how others have an interest either in

coming together to help or be helped. In addition, NGO-3 suggest to be transparent from the

beginning by sharing their budget and working together as to where and how the money will be

allocated (NGO-3.1, 2013). In their article Building trust in project-stakeholder relationships,

Karlsen, Graee and Massoud state “the following factors as being the most interesting and

important for building trust in a relation between a project and its stakeholders: reliable behavior,

good communication, sincerity, competence, integrity, reaching project milestones commitment,

benevolence, and goal congruence” (Karlsen, Graee, and Massoud, 2008, pp.12). Trust is very

hard to build and very easy to lose. Therefore, following the factors listed by Karlsen, Graee and

Massoud for building trust the recommendations for this particular intervention are:


55

• Throughout the process it is very important to fulfill all components proposed by the

intervention plan. As a sign of commitment, it is crucial to build a realistic time frame that

allows the intervention’s coordinator to fulfill the deadlines offered.

• It is also suggested that all stakeholders together come up with a definition of trust and choose

the best means to foster an inclusive and respectful communication amongst each other and

with their individual intervention participants.

For these actions to take place the following activities are suggested in addition to those

proposed for the enhancement of the NGOs security: Dynamic Facilitation and Jazz Lab. A

Dynamic Facilitation, “is a principled way to elicit a heartfelt, creative quality of thinking known

as ‘choice creating’ that generates increased trust, shared understanding, and the spirit of

community” (Rough and Martin, 2007, pp.224). Although the exercise of building a culture of

security will be a trust-building process in it of itself, the Dynamic Facilitation workshop will

allow the group to go beyond envisioning a culture of security to envisioning a multiplicity of

aspects that make up a proactive community. On the other hand, the Jazz Lab is a seminar that

uses music to teach its participants “to listen and communicate better”, “create effective teams

yet still retain autonomy”, “foster creativity and innovation”, “encourage diversity”, among

others (Tate, 2007, pp.593). The Jazz Lab will allow participants to engage in a more informal

manner and build personal relationships with those involved. These activities do not have to take

place simultaneously but according to what is needed after the “culture of security” process is

completed. Although such activities will contribute to the development of trust, “trust is

something that must be earned over time by listening, talking and making sure you ‘walk the

talk’, because stakeholders are becoming increasingly cynical” (Karlsen, , Graee, and Massoud,


56

2008, pp.10). Therefore, what needs to be in place for trust to be established is the effective

fulfillment of the first need listed.

Sense of Community

In regards to building a sense of community, NGO-1 as well as NGO-2 has made the

effort of participating in multi-institutional dialogue tables not only to build trust also to build a

network. These tables purpose is to exchange information in order to avoid duplicity of efforts

and encourage collaboration (NGO-1.2, 2013; NGO-2.1, 2013). In order to further strengthen

these efforts it is recommended to develop a System Thinking online platform. This platform

will help enhance a sense of community based on a culture of security and trust. The platform

will include the following components:

• A registry of all NGOs working in the northern border that includes their specialty, ongoing

projects, as well as contact information.

• An interactive map that depicts geographically where the NGOs are working within the

northern border and the entities, public and private, with which they are collaborating within

the area. All collaborative efforts will be represented through inhibiting feedback loops.

• A directory of all the entities that are funding the NGOs intervention as well as a newsfeed of

new funding opportunities. The purpose of this component is for the NGOs to be transparent

in order to optimize the application process. Instead of competing for this funding they will be

encouraged to work as a team and operate in an organized manner. All of them have a

different specialty, therefore if they work together the funding can be used by all instead of

them sub-contracting afterwards.


57

• A newsfeed alert about high violence activities happening in the area that allows the NGOs to

take preemptive cautionary measures (previously developed through the “culture of security

workshops”).

• Online seminars on different topics that allow NGOs to improve their work on the field such

as: conflict resolution skills, communication skills, and social media, among others.

• Shared monitoring and evaluation tools that allow the elaboration of a qualitative and

quantitative base line for future reference as well as to encourage peer recommendation if in

need of improvement.

The reasoning behind this suggested method is for NGOs to optimize resources. Having an

online platform will encourage NGOs who have limited budgets to get involved, as they would

not have to invest on traveling expenses. Also, it will not only build a sense of community but it

will also help NGOs work together for funding rather than competing for it. The platform will

help them build a collective work culture more so than an individualistic culture, considering that

by bringing everyone together the benefits are greater more so than when they work in isolation.

As a consequence, the platform will also help strengthen their culture of security. For this to be

successful NGOs must have gone through the “culture of security” intervention process since it

is a face-to-face intervention were participants are given the space to build transparent and

trustworthy relationships. In addition, a shared fund needs to be in place for the maintenance of

the platform.

Ecuadorian culture values relationships and therefore it is very careful in protecting one’s

image as well as avoiding the possibility of offending the image of others. As a consequence, it

is important when bringing all of the participants together to ensure the establishment of a safe

space that safeguards a positive interaction. For this reason, it is recommended for the processes


58

facilitator to establish together with the participants rules of engagement, such as: avoid blaming

or pointing fingers, phrase suggestions or points of improvement in a positive light, apply active-

listening when others are speaking, avoid interrupting others when speaking, when in

disagreement take time to understand the others perspective before asking questions, etc. It is

also necessary to consider a venue that is welcoming and accessible for all. The first interactions

are crucial to build trust amongst those present. If trust cannot be established the participants

won’t feel comfortable to speak transparently about their common needs.

Following a Systems Thinking Approach, it is suggested that the monitoring and

evaluation for the three needs should be done as a whole more so than individually considering

their interdependence. To monitor and evaluate the proposed intervention plan appropriately the

creation of a base line is suggested previous to starting any activity. The objective of creating a

base line is to have a reference point to compare and contrast changes after all the intervention

components are fulfilled. Some of the benchmarks that will be used to build this base line will

be:

• Within each participating NGO an individual survey will be completed for employees as well

as their stakeholders in regards to their present physical and emotional security as well as trust

levels in the NGO community.

• Each participating NGO through focal groups will complete a SWOT exercise.

• Each NGO will build a map of how they see themselves within their community and their

collaboration efforts with other entities.

• A summary of the amount of funding received from individual efforts.

From the gathered information, a monitoring and evaluation template will be created which

includes specific qualitative indicators that should be fulfilled as the suggested activities are


59

completed. It is advised that all stakeholders on a monthly basis monitor the intervention in order

to modify any of its components if necessary. The same benchmarks used to build the baseline

will be applied at the end of the implementation process to measure levels of change,

satisfaction, and fulfillment of the proposed intervention plan.

3.4. Potential consequences from interventions

If the process is well explained from the beginning and the NGOs have a willingness to

participate a potential positive consequence would be that at the end they count with a strong

coalition of organizations that generates greater impact in the area as it feels more secure

physically, emotionally, and economically. If the process were to fail, trust between NGOs

would be wounded and their willingness to participate in other capacity building proposals in the

future could be hampered.

3.5. Capacity building

As mentioned before, the participants will need an individual Systems Thinking

workshop previous to starting the group process with other NGOs. The following chapter will

provide an in depth description of the networks that need to be strengthen or built in order to

guarantee a sustainable upkeep of the intervention results.


60

CHAPTER FOUR- NETWORKING AND SUSTAINABILITY

4.1. Introduction

In order for the intervention plan proposed to have a long-term impact, it is necessary

first, to identify each of the participating NGOs networks and secondly if necessary, search for

means to strengthen them. A successful network according to Krebs and Holley in their article

Building Smart Communities Through Network Weaving should be composed of the following

features: “nodes link together because of common attributes, goals, or governance”, “diversity”,

“networks have several paths between any two nodes”, “some nodes are more prominent than

others”, and “most nodes in the network are connected by indirect link” (Krebs and Holley,

2002-2006, pp.4). The identified network for this multiple case study is composed of three main

hubs, and many structural holes that contribute to its lack of density. The network will be

described in detail on section 4.2.

From the data interpretation on chapter two, three needs were identified: security, sense of

community, and trust. To cater these needs, the proposed intervention plan is to develop a culture

of security amongst the NGOs through a Systems Thinking Approach. Instead of looking for

individual solutions for each need, the Systems Thinking Approach recognizes the connectivity

between each need and instead of seeking short term solutions suggests to study the patterns and

structures that perpetuate the lack of security, the lack of sense of community, and the lack of

trust (Sweeney and Meadows, 2010). Consequently, by establishing a common idea of a culture

of security the NGOs are able to move from an independent vision of security to envisioning and

sharing a common goal. Being able to envision their desired change makes it possible to identify

clear actions needed to reach their shared goal. The process of creating this shared image and

bringing it to life, if successful, will have as a result strong relationships based on trust.


61

Additionally once the culture of security is established, to enhance the NGOs sense of

community the creation of a virtual Systems Thinking platform is advised. This platform will

serve as an early warning cyber-community in addition to improving the NGOs fund-seeking

coordination efforts.

As for sustainability strategies incorporated into the intervention plan, all the workshops

suggested for the intervention allow the participants themselves to come up with ideas as well as

help them develop methods to implement their culture of security and the online platform. In

other words, the intervention plan coordinator is not responsible for developing the culture of

security or the online platform for the NGOs. On the contrary, the coordinator only facilitates

interactions and teaches the NGOs the appropriate tools so they can implement the initiatives

themselves. As a result, the NGOs will not be dependent of an outside source for change to take

place.


62

4.2. The Network

Network Map

The network map above was created with data collected from the three NGOs that participated

from this multiple case study. Therefore, only the links mentioned by the case study participants

are shown. All organizations represented on the map are actors specific to the NGOs

interventions in the northern border of Ecuador. NGO-1, NGO-2, and NGO-3 are depicted on the

map by light pink nodes. Light yellow nodes portray all other non-governmental organizations

they have partnered with. In addition, light blue nodes represent all state agencies with whom

they also cooperate. All nodes are connected via their primary stakeholder, refugees and local

communities, represented by the purple node.

NGO-2

NGO-1

NGO-3

Organization 1

Organization 2

Organization 3

Organization 9 Organization 8

Organization 7

Organization 6

Organization 5

Organization 4

Organization 11

Organization 10

Organization 12

Organization 13

Organization 14

Organization 15

Multi-institutiolanl dialogue tables

Organization 16Organization 17

Organization 19

Organization 18

Organization 20


Organization 23

Organization 22


Organization 29

Organization 30

Organization 27

Organization 26

Organization 31

Organization 32

Organization 33

Refugees and local communities

Non-governmental organizations State agencies


63

The network also helps recognize clearly and understand present relationships. For example,

NGO-1 for its intervention in the northern border specifically worked with two other direct

partners. In addition, NGO-1 and its partners participate of a multi-institutional dialogue table

made up of eighteen additional non-governmental organizations as well as public entities. This

multi-institutional table serves the purpose of sharing information with the objective of avoiding

duplicity of efforts and for organizing possible collaboration efforts amongst its members. On the

other hand, NGO-2 has sixteen partners two of which are governmental institutions. From these

sixteen partners NGO-2 only shares one partner with NGO- 1 and non-with NGO-3.

Furthermore, only one of NGO-2 sixteen partners participates from the multi-institutional

dialogue table. Nevertheless, both NGO-1 and NGO-2 are linked through the multi-institutional

dialogue table. Additionally, NGO-3 has two state agencies as partners one of which participates

in the multi-institutional dialogue table serving as a broker for NGO-3. Brokers “are nodes that

connect otherwise disconnected parts of a network” (Krebs and Holley, 2002-2006, pp.4).

Without Organization 19, NGO-3 would lack knowledge of the multi-institutional dialogue table

and as a result lack the possibility of expanding its scope.

From the map, it is evident the network is made up of three main hubs: the multi-institutional

table, NGO-2, as well as refugees and local communities. Hubs are “nodes with many

connections that quickly disperse information” (Krebs and Holley, 2002-2006, pp.4). The before

mentioned nodes are therefore considered hubs due to the high number of links they have to

other nodes. According to Kilduff and Tsai in their book Social Networks and Organizations,

density is “a measure of how many connections there are between actors compared to the

maximum possible number of connections that could exist between actors: the higher the

proportion, the more dense the network” (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003, pp.30). The maximum amount


64

of connections for this network is 528 and currently there are only 71 connections. Considering

the proportion is low between these two digits, it is possible to say the networks density is very

low. As a result, here is also a lack of clusters and weaving. Also, the presence of highly

crowded hubs causes many structural holes. Structural holes are, “gaps in the social world across

which there are no current connections, but that can be connected by savvy entrepreneurs who

thereby gain control over the flow of information (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003, pp.28). NGOs desire

to interact with one another and build connections that lead to long-term engagement. The

proposed intervention through a Systems Thinking Approach uses the elaboration of a culture of

security as a means to promote connectivity.

Presently, the network is very centralized as its main hub, refugees and local communities, is the

only main connector for all other nodes (Nan, 2009, pp.178). NGOs are linked through their

interventions main stakeholder. Therefore, the intervention plan is crucial for the networks

enhancement. The intervention itself encourages the implementation of actions that promote

connectivity. Accordingly, the network structure will inform sustainability if a shift from a

decentralized to a centralized network occurs. Sustainability will also be informed by the

increase of clusters and the number of links among them. The integration among clusters will

form a highly dense community and as a consequence a more inclusive network. Nan refers to

inclusive networks to “networks [that] lack boundaries. All are welcome to join the network by

participating” (Nan, 2009, pp.178). As a consequence, if challenges arise and links are broken

will not be left in isolation.

4.3. The Intervention and Challenges for Sustainability

The intervention plan developed, proposes to respond to the three identified needs

through a Systems Thinking Approach. A Systems Thinking Approach offers a set of skills and


65

methods that promote the study of a conflicts patterns and structure as a solving mechanism

contrary to solving a conflict isolated from the system in which it interacts (Sweeney and

Meadows, 2010). The intervention plan is made up of two main components. The first

component responds to the NGOs lack of physical, emotional, and economic security. All

participating NGOs, have taken measures to increase their security, however, there are recurring

events that prevent them from fulfilling this need. Gharajedaghi suggests that as long as groups

have misconstrued images of how to reach security the cycle of lacking the need will be ongoing

(Gharajedaghi, 2011). Therefore in order to change the patterns that perpetuate the participants’

lack of security Gharajedaghi suggests the creation of their desired image of security in order for

the participants to have a clear picture of what needs to change in order to reach that goal

(Gharajedaghi, 2011). If the first component is successfully completed, as a following step the

second component proposes to create an online Systems Thinking platform. Having developed

trust and a sense of community through the first process, the platform seeks to enhance these

new relationships and promote the NGOs integration by encouraging long-term connectivity.

This platform as detailed in section 3.3 offers tools and services that cater the newly developed

culture of security.

The proposed intervention plan will only be successful if the following challenges are

transcended:

• The non-governmental organization arena is regularly bombarded by workshops that promote

change and build enthusiasm in their participants, however, many times participants do not

end up implementing what they have learnt due to a number of limitations within their

organization. This has made people doubt and become skeptical of these processes. Therefore


66

the first challenge is to engage the participants and earn their trust. Without their full support

from the beginning the process is probably set up to fail.

• The first steps of the implementation are costly and demand a lot of time and commitment

from their participants. NGOs usually have very limited budgets and as a consequence their

employees workload is heavy. In addition, they work in an area where conflict is constant and

as a result there are many un-planed situations that come up and need to me handled

immediately.

• In regards to the projects sustainability. If the network continues to lack density and be highly

centralized the process will only be in the hand of few nodes. As a consequence if this nodes

dissolve the intervention will also stagnate. Nevertheless, as stated on section 4.3 the project

itself aims to increment the networks density through the creation of the culture of security

and the platform. The development of the culture of security will bring together a great

number of NGOs. It is in their hands to compose this project and its multiple elements.

Therefore, the execution of each element will be in the hands of multiple clusters developed

within the culture of security initiative. In addition, the use of an online platform will allow

the culture of security’s scope to grow, linking additional NGOs that might still be isolated

from the process.

4.4. Strategies for Sustainability

Sustainability strategies are specific measures taken to ensure the change being made by

the proposed intervention plan has a long-term life span. In addition, capacity needs to be

established locally with the purpose of leaving the acquired “know how” in the hands of many.

In other words, the project cannot sustain itself if the interveners’ do not share and install the

appropriate skills amongst multiple community members. For this reason, the intervention


67

proposed was carefully assembled to work as the processes facilitator rather than being the entity

responsible of delivering a finished product.

Tom Devane in the Change Handbook offers a checklist to ensure sustainability before, during

and after an intervention. From this checklist, and taking into account the specific characteristics

of the intervention, some plausible sustainability strategies to apply in addition to those already

incorporated in the intervention are: (1)“evaluate systemic issues in the diagnosis and action

planning stages”, (2) “leadership systems with many leaders and role models”, (3) “establish

clear responsibilities”, (4) “track both newly articulated results and behaviors, as well as

appropriate follow-up” (Devane, 2008, pp.66-69). In regards to the first point listed, this case

study has evaluated the NGOs lack of cooperation as a whole nevertheless it is necessary to

become acquainted with the systems within each organization that are propelling this behavior.

There may be structures and patterns within organizations that need to shift before starting the

robust intervention process. The third point before mentioned should be applied during the

implementation phase. This means that, for the culture of security to succeed multiple clusters

need to be developed in order to guarantee a decentralized leadership where important

information and skills are handled by many. For this to take place assigned duties need to be

clear through the use of detailed monitoring evaluations. Lastly, the fifth point encourages

monitoring activities to be taken seriously and be adequately adjusted with the purpose of

building trust and a purposeful community.

The network map will be helpful in identifying organizations that are well connected, that can

serve as brokers to the interveners in order to perform the risk analysis. In addition, the

completion of a risk analysis will allow the identification of organizations that are strongly


68

motivated by the intervention proposal. These organizations can help promote and gather enough

attendants to carry out the interventions first component.

In order to recognize if the proper foundations for sustainability are being installed, Tom Devane

offers four means of identifying the change: “direction”, “energy”, “distributed leadership”, and

“appropriate mobilization of resources” (Devane, 2007, pp.60). Direction refers to having clear

goals and steps to reach that goal (Devane, 2007). , Therefore the participants no only will be

encouraged to come up with a shared image of a culture of security bit also need to be aware that

the establishment of such is in their own hands. Energy alludes to the motivation of the

participants (Devane, 2007). If the participants have no interest from the beginning, loose interest

during the process, or do not fulfill their responsibilities this is a red flag. It is crucial for the

interveners to establish the appropriate environment where every participant is heard and their

ideas are validated so they all feel identified with the created image of a “culture of security”.

Leadership makes reference to distributing responsibilities equally and horizontally (Devane,

2007). Therefore, it is indispensable to develop more clusters with equal duties in order to

decrease the density of the present hubs. Mobilization of resources suggests to be careful and

conscious not only monetarily but also of its human capital (Devane, 2007). In other words, it is

crucial to be transparent from the beginning about the budget and its limitations. In addition,

considering the budget and the human capital’s wellbeing organize the intervention to be a long-

term process rather than short-term, excessively exhaustive and intense. Finally, it is also

indispensable throughout the process to identify several leaders that in an ongoing manner can

work as network weavers. Network weavers are organizations or individuals that “actively create

new interactions between them” (Krebs and Holley, 2002-2006, pp.6). They will be the actors in


69

charge of promoting the culture of security, in addition to supervising the fulfillment of

responsibilities, and of keeping clusters motivated.


70

CHAPTER FIVE-CONCLUSION

The background information gathered to complete the conflict map on section 1.3 helped

understand the complexity of the conflict taking place on the Ecuador-Colombia border. It

recognizes that the escalation of violence in the area is not only due to the negative interactions

between few actors but of a multiplicity of structures as well. As shown on the map there are

social, economic, political, and security structures that have been present for over fifty years

which have contributed to the rise of reinforcing feedback loops among all the parties involved

and as a consequence converting the issue into an intractable conflict (Coleman, 2011, pp.125).

The complexity at hand has called upon NGOs to intervene with the intention of rebuilding a

sense of community in the area. The purpose of this multiple case study was to learn if

cooperation among NGOs working with youth in the northern border of Ecuador has contributed

to the de-escalation of violence in the area.

The data collected, analyzed and interpreted showed that cooperation was taking place in the

area. However, most long-term cooperative efforts were happening between NGOs and state

agencies. Nevertheless, the data identified a desire for coordination among NGOs as they created

a multi-institutional dialogue table (NGO-1.2, 2013; NGO-2.1, 2013). This dialogue table is

mostly used for the exchange of information in order to avoid the duplicity of efforts.

Nonetheless, there are few long-term collaborative processes among NGOs. The reason being is

that all three NGOs interviewed are hindered by the lack of trust, security, and sense of

community. Therefore, cooperation among NGOs can contribute to the de-escalation of violence

in the area however the network between NGOs in the area needs to be strengthened in order to

leverage a stronger impact as a group on the ground.


71

In order to enhance the NGOs cooperative efforts, the intervention plan developed proposes the

establishment of a culture of security and a Systems Thinking online platform. The first will help

NGOs build a common image of their desired future. Having a common goal, will allow them to

have a clear perspective of the actions needed in order to achieve their desired goal. While the

Systems Thinking platform, seeks to expand their scope and continuously offer tools that

reinforce their common goal. In addition, the platform will aid them in their strive for continues

innovation. The process will have helped them bridge trust with security and will result in a

strengthened sense of community. This intervention plan can only be successful if the network of

NGOs is able to become inclusive by implementing all the sustainability strategies previously

mentioned in chapter four.

A prominent limitation of this multiple-case study is that it is only reflective and applicable to

the specific network of NGOs studied. Therefore further research needs to be done on the ground

before its implementation in order to expand its impact and scope.


72

REFERENCES

Axelrod, D. and Axelrod, E. (2007). Collaborative Loops. In Holman, P., Devane, T., and

Cady, S., The Change Handbook. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 89-101.

Chertoff, M. (2006). Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertaff on

Homeland Security Grant Funding for High-Risk Non-Governmental Organizations. Lanham:

Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc.

Coleman, P. T. (2011). The Five Percent: Finding Solutions to (Seemingly) Impossible

Conflicts. New York: Perseus Books.

Coleman, P. T., Vallacher, R., Nowak, A., Bui-Wrzosinska, L., Bartoli, A. (forthcoming).

Navigating the landscape of conflict: Applications of dynamical systems theory to protracted

social conflict. In Ropers, N. (Ed.), Systemic Thinking and Conflict Transformation. Berlin:

Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. Retrieved from Columbia University courseworks

website.

https://courseworks.columbia.edu/portal/site/NECRK4200_001_2013_1/page/24a8930d-9c4c-

44fb-85bf-1436c395b641

Creede, C., Fisher-Yoshida, B. and Gallegos, P.V. (Eds). (2012). Introduction. The

reflective, facilitative, and interpretive practices of the coordinated management of meaning:

Making lives, making meaning. New York: Rowman & Litlefield. Retrieved from Columbia

University courseworks website.

https://courseworks.columbia.edu/portal/site/NECRK4205_001_2013_2/page/304c8632-ea70-

43a0-a00d-446c136cdcd2

Creswell, J.W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry & research design: Choosing among five

approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.


73

Devane, T. (2007). Sustainability of Results. In Holman, P., Devane, T., and Cady, S.,

The Change Handbook. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 59-69

Deutsch, M. (2006). Cooperation and Competition. In Deutsch, M., Coleman, P.T., and

Marcus, E.C. (Eds), The Handbook of Conflict Resolution. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Fisher-Yoshida, B. (2012) Transforming intercultural conflict through the context of

relationship. In Ting-Toomey, S. and Oetzel J. (Eds.), The Sage handbook of conflict

communication: Integrating theory, research, and practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Fisher-Yoshida, B. (2013). Conflict Assessment & Analysis K5100. Capstone Master

Thesis Project. (Power point slides). Retrieved from Columbia University courseworks website.

https://courseworks.columbia.edu/portal/site/NECRK5100_001_2013_3/page/c69fff02-ce84-

4464-8aa6-e6fa6a510f39

Fisher-Yoshida. (2013, 06, 26). Communication and CMM. Advanced Negotiation.

(Power Point Slides). Retrieved from Columbia University courseworks website.

https://courseworks.columbia.edu/portal/site/NECRK4205_001_2013_2/page/a7e64ebb-f78a-

4147-8960-c2da24c540f5

Gharajedaghi, J. (2011). Systems Thinking Managing Chaos and Complexity. Maryland:

Elsevier, Inc.

Gharajedaghi, J. (2007). Systems thinking: a case study for second-order-learning. The

Learning Organization. Volume 14(6) 473-479. Retrieved from Columbia University’s library

website.

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/215656017/fulltextPDF?accountid

=10226


74

Johnson, D. W., and Johnson, R. T. (2005). New developments in Social Interdependence

Theory. Genetic, Social, and Psychology Monographs. Volume 131(4). 285-358. Retrieved from

Columbia University courseworks website.

https://courseworks.columbia.edu/portal/site/NECRK4100_001_2012_3/page/5179b380-ac0e-

45d0-91ff-fc8a9aaaf236

Karlsen, J.T., Graee, K., and Massoud, M.J. (2008). Building trust in project-stakeholder

relationships. Baltic Journal of Management. Volume 3(1). 7-22. Retrieved from Columbia

University’s website. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/208664275

Kilduff, M., and Tsai, W. (2003). Social Networks and Organizations. London:SAGE

Publications.

Korovkin, T. (2008). The Colombian War and ‘Invisible’ Refugees in Ecuador. Peace

Review:A Journal of Social Justice. Volume 20(3). 321-329. Retrieved from Columbia

University’s library website.

http://www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/10402650802330154

Krebs, V. and Holley, J. (2002-2006). Building Smart Communities Through Network

Weaving. Retrieved from Columbia University courseworks website.


4464-8aa6-e6fa6a510f39

Kriesberg, L. (2007). The conflict resolution field: Origins, growth and differentiation. In

Zartman, W. (Ed.), Peacemaking in International Conflict. Washington, DC: United States

Institute of Peace. 25-60.Retrieved from Columbia University courseworks website.

https://courseworks.columbia.edu/portal/site/NECRK4100_001_2012_3/page/5179b380-ac0e-

45d0-91ff-fc8a9aaaf236


75

Lederach, J.P. (2006). Defining Conflict Transformation. Peacework. Volume 3(368). 26-

27. Retrieved from Columbia University’s library website.

http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/194457841/fulltext?accountid=10

226

Nan, S.A. (2009). Social capital in exclusive and inclusive networks. In Cox, M. (Ed.),

Social Capital and Peace-Building. New York: Routledge. 172-185.

National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations. (2009). Civil Society Security

Scoping Study. Harare: National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations.

NGO-1. (2013). NGO-1 Public documentation.

NGO-1.1. (2013). NGO-1 Intervention’s Systematization.

NGO-1.2. (2013 ). NGO-1 Interview.


NGO-2.1. (2013). NGO-2 Interview.


NGO-3.1. (2013). NGO-3 Interview.

Pearce, W.B., and Pearce, K.A. (2000). Extending the Theory of the Coordinated

Management of Meaning (CMM) through a Community Dialogue Process. Communication

Theory. Volume 10(4). 405-423. Retrieved from Columbia University’s library website.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/store/10.1111/j.1468-

2885.2000.tb00200.x/asset/j.14682885.2000.tb00200.x.pdf?v=1&t=hm59h0i7&s=36155a6c21bb

d62ba1186c52da5efed00f4fcbca

Pruitt, D. G. and Kim, S.H. (2004). Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and

Settlement, 3rd Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.


76

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., and Miall, H. (2011). Contemporary Conflict

Resolution. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ramírez, M.C. (2011). Between the Guerrillas and the State: The Cocalero Movement,

Citizienship, and Idetity in the Colombian Amazon. Durham: Duke University Press.

Román, J.G. (2005). El plan Colombia y sus efectos sobre el Ecuador. Quito:Eskeletra

Editorial.

Regan, B.M. (2013). Resolution Strategies. Capstone Master Thesis Project. (Power

point slides). Retrieved from Columbia University courseworks website.


4464-8aa6-e6fa6a510f39

Rough, J., and Martin, D. (2007). Dynamic Facilitation. In Holman, P., Devane, T., and

Cady, S., The Change Handbook. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 223-206.

Sweeney, L.B., and Meadows, D. (2010). Systems Thinking Playbook. Vermont: Chelsea

Green Publishing Company.

Sum-Ping, J. (2006) A New Approach to Extraterritorial Application of Environmental

Statutes: Uncovering the Effects of Plan Colombia. Columbia Journal of Environmental Law.

Volume 31(1). 139-170. Retrieved from Columbia University’s library website.

http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=13838

6&sr=TITLE(A%20new%20approach%20to%20extraterritorial%20application%20of%20enviro

nmental%20statutes?%20Uncovering%20the%20effects%20of%20Plan%20Colombia)%20and

%20date%20is%202006

Tate, B. (2007). Jazzlab. In Holman, P., Devane, T., and Cady, S., The Change

Handbook. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 593-597.


77

Windeagle and Kenney-Linton, R. (2007). Ancient Wisdom Council. In Holman, P.,

Devane, T., and Cady, S., The Change Handbook. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers,

Inc. 195-200.

ENHANCING COOPERATION THROUGH SYSTEMS THINKING: A CASE...

Documents

Transcript of ENHANCING COOPERATION THROUGH SYSTEMS THINKING: A CASE...